Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Debt (Public), United States: Tennessee”

We study the extent to which the perceived cost of losing the exorbitant privilege the United States holds in global safe asset markets sustains its public debt safety. Our findings indicate that losing this special status in the event of a default significantly augments the debt capacity for the United States. Debt levels would be up to 30 percent lower if the United States did not have this special status. Most of this extra debt capacity arises from the loss of convenience yields on Treasuries, which makes debt more expensive following its loss, providing strong incentives to repay debt.

The object of research is the policy of public debt management of the United States of America and Ukraine. The problem solved is the low level of efficiency of the policy of public external and internal debt management of Ukraine in the context of financing economic growth. The main scientific results: based on the analysis of the policy of public debt management of the United States of America, it has been proved, that the public debt and the US budget deficit should be perceived not as a problem or threat to macroeconomic stability, but as a tool to stimulate economic growth. It is substantiated, that in order to optimize the policy of internal and external public debt management of Ukraine it is expedient to introduce a debt rule, which is based on the program-targeted method of attracting public debt and provides for the use of public borrowing exclusively to finance economic development programs. In this case, Ukraine, following the example of the United States, will be able to achieve sustainable economic growth, because changing the priorities from debt financing of current state budget expenditures to financing capital expenditures will allow the Ukrainian government to develop economic infrastructure, create conditions for high value-added goods and to develop small and medium business, which will ultimately ensure macroeconomic stability and progressive economic development of the state. The scope of practical use of research results. The results of the study can be used by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and in particular by the Ministry of Finance during the formation of the Medium-Term public debt management strategy of Ukraine. Innovative technological product: The debt rule is based on the program-target method of attraction and use of the state internal and external debt that allows to use effectively the state borrowings for financing of economic growth. Scope of application of an innovative technological product: Policy of management of the state internal and external debt of Ukraine

Public debt is an important aspect of the world's financial system, and its state has an impact on countries' economy. The article examines the evolution of the Russian Federation's and the United States' public external debt management, as well as the current state of the Russian Federation's and the United States' external public debts, as well as a comparison of the Russian Federation's and the United States' public debts. Государственный долг является важным аспектом мировой финансовой системы, и его состояние оказывает влияние на экономику стран. В статье рассматривается эволюция управления государственным внешним долгом Российской Федерации и США, а также текущее состояние внешнего государственного долга Российской Федерации и США, и сравнение Государственных долгов.

The American economy suffers from a general budget deficit, mainly due to the high public expenditures, especially the military, as the United States of America occupies the first place in the world in the proportion of military spending, and the budget deficit is mainly financed through the sale of government securities, which led to an increase in the volume of public debt In the United States of America, which is a dangerous indicator, especially after interest payments on public debt exceeded the barrier of $ 500 billion for the year 2018, which pushes them to borrow again to finance these benefits, this cumulative and continuous increase in the size of public debt works to influence the economic variables Monetary and financial. The research aims to analyze the development of internal public debt in the United States of America and its most important causes, in addition to clarifying the mechanisms and methods used to alleviate the severity of the internal public debt without compromising the ability of the economy or the ability to repay previous debts to maintain investor confidence in the strength of the American economy. The research reached several results, the most prominent of which is that the large increase in the volume of the internal public debt and the consequent increase in the money supply did not negatively affect the monetary side of the economy as inflation rates did not reach high levels and international reserves increased, accompanied by a decrease in interest rates. While the research presented several recommendations, including the need to achieve financial discipline and market access to borrow at the lowest possible costs by issuing debt regularly, in addition to avoiding resorting to any special measures to increase the volume of public debt and adhere to the debt ceiling approved by the US Congress.

The government budget constraint ties the market value of government debt to the expected present discounted value of fiscal surpluses. We find evidence that U.S. Treasury investors fail to impose this no‐arbitrage restriction in the United States. Both cyclical and long‐run dynamics of tax revenues and government spending make the surplus claim risky. In a realistic asset pricing model, this risk in surpluses creates a large gap between the market value of debt and its fundamental value, the PDV of surpluses, suggesting that U.S. Treasuries may be overpriced.

The United State of America has been experiencing high debt to GDP ratio of more than 100% and these Public debts are detrimental. The main purpose of this study was to examine the shocks of the variables on others in the USA economy by using quarterly data. The variance decomposition and the Generalised Impulse Response Function techniques were employed to analyse the data. The result revealed that high variation of shocks in real federal debt is explained by their own innovations in the short run, by CPI followed by real federal debt its self. In the long run, this leads to CPI and real government spending. The GIRF reveals that in the short run, real federal debt responds negatively to shocks from CPI, real federal interest payment and real federal government tax receipts and positively to real federal debt and real government spending. In medium term, only real federal government tax receipts are negative while the others are positive. In the long run, the response are all positive to shock from the independent variables. The results lead to the recommendation that the US government should focus on real federal debt in the short run. In the medium term, US government should focus on increasing real government spending and reducing only real federal government tax receipts. In the long run the target should real be federal debt, CPI, real federal interest payment, real government spending and real federal government tax receipts.

The author examines the causes and sources of the depreciation of money in Russia compared with that in the United States. The subject is causal connections between the budget deficit, money supply, and the depreciation of money. The relevance of the research for Russia is determined by concerns about macroeconomic stability and high inflation. In the case of the United States, an increase in the money supply and an inflation spike occurred because of the debt financing of the federal budget deficit. The scientific novelty of the paper lies in considering the two main options for monetary policy to support the liquidity of public debt: hard and soft, and the analytical methods and results of the research. One of the important scientific results is that the burden of public debt should be measured not as the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product (GDP) but as the share of public debt in a bond market. The second scientific result is very important for the practice: during 2011–2022, in the eight biennial periods, the GDP deflator was approximately equal to the growth of the money supply M2 minus GDP growth. Thus, the depreciation of money was directly caused by monetary policy. In the other three biennial periods, a substantial difference was observed, probably because of external shocks. As the method of the study, the author estimated the effect of interest rates caused by crowding out corporate debt by public debt. It was substantiated that to obtain the effects of soft monetary policy and thus the increase of M2 to GDP deflator, it is essential to use biennial periods. Based on the results of the analysis, it was revealed that, particularly in 2021–2022, the growth of the GDP deflator amounted to 139.8% and was due to the growth of the money supply M2 by 140.5%. At the same time, the effect on GDP growth was insignificant, at 3.4%. The key conclusion is that for the implementation of macroeconomic stability policies, it is necessary to manage the expansion of the M2 money supply, the exchange rate, and to use the GDP deflator as an important indicator in addition to the inflation index — consumer price index. A good way to achieve this is to adopt a special law for controlling inflation, similar to the USA Inflation Reduction Act.

The main purpose of this study was to examine the various finance models that are presently being used to finance facilities and to provide information for the Texas legislature, the Texas Education Agency, and local school districts concerning facilities funding models that might be used in Texas. Based on the information gathered and analyzed, several conclusions are drawn and recommendations regarding state funding of capital projects in the State of Texas are made. The model recommended for Texas is one that provides for an equalized grant and includes formulas for the distribution of state money.

The purpose of this study was to determine the knowledge of United States Supreme Court decisions affecting education possessed by public school teachers, principals, superintendents, and board members; to determine if significant differences existed among these groups in their knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education; and to determine if significant differences existed within each group depending on years of experience in education and level of education. Five hundred randomly selected subjects from the public school systems in Tennessee were asked to indicate their knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education by completing the survey instrument, Supreme Court Decisions Impacting on Education. This instrument measured respondents' knowledge of Supreme Court decisions in five areas: (1) student rights; (2) employee rights; (3) church-state relationships; (4) race, language, and sex discrimination; and (5) school finance and organization. A total of 241 (48.2%) usable responses were returned. The data revealed that there was a general lack of knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education. Significant differences were found to exist among the four groups in all areas except that of race, language, and sex discrimination. Superintendents scored significantly higher than teachers and board members in knowledge of Supreme Court decisions in the area of student rights. Superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers in the area of employee rights. Superintendents scored significantly higher than all other groups in the area of church-state relationships. In the area of school finance and organization, superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers. On overall knowledge of Supreme Court decisions affecting education, superintendents and principals scored significantly higher than teachers and board members. Years of experience in education was not found to be a significant factor within any of the four groups. Level of education was found to be a significant factor among superintendents. Superintendents with either a doctoral degree or a Master's degree plus additional coursework scored significantly higher than those with a Master's degree or an Education Specialist degree. Level of education was not found to be a significant factor within any other group.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2010.
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The thesis deals with the issue of the increasing public debt of the United States. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the structure and hitory of US national debt and its impact on the selected investment instruments development. Theoretical introduction is followed by analysis of the causes of the so high public debt of the United States. The analysis is based on the structure and public debt history. The final part of the thesis deals with the question how the high national US public debt affects the behaviour of the foreign investors.

Using the techniques of oral history, residents of the Cypress Creeks area of southwestern middle Tennessee were questioned about their perceptions of the social change since 1940. In that year, the National Park Service hired men in the area to help snake out logs for the Natchez Trace Parkway's right-of-way. For most men in the area, the temporary positions on the Trace were the first "public" jobs they ever had. After these positions were no longer needed, outmigration brought residents north to factory-cities; thus, the building of the parkway remains a watershed in residents' memories as the benchmark when change began. In this study I examined oral material concerning pre- and post-change periods, to see how social change is articulated in people's talk about changes in social folk custom. Moreover, it was found that residents today regret the sense of loss associated with the "good old days" and that this abstract loss is most easily expressed by talking about the concrete changes in the area's customs.

In this thesis, I am examining how East Tennessee State Normal School in East Tennessee and Appalachian State Normal School in Western North Carolina interpreted progressive education differently in their states. This difference is that East Tennessee State began as a state funded school to educate future teachers therefore their school and their curriculum was more rounded and set to a structured schedule. Appalachian State Normal School was initially founded to educate the uneducated in the “lost provinces” therefore, curriculum was even more progressive than East Tennessee State’s – based strongly on the practices of farming, woodworking, and other practical skills. I will also be looking at what these different interpretations tell about the states, what it says about the Appalachia region, and how both schools applied these progressive ideas in their schools. Lastly, I will be answering how Progressive education, and normal schools affected the communities in East Tennessee and Western North Carolina.

Abstract Between 1945 and the 1970s, the advanced economies underwent a long period of debt consolidation, facilitated by economic growth, fiscal restraint, and financial repression. Rapid productivity gains in the United States and catch-up growth elsewhere resulted in “thirty glorious years” of growth. Capital controls, credit regulation, and accommodating central banks created a captive market for government debt. Since interest rates remained below growth rates, governments could reconcile social spending with budget balance. Overall, debt-to-GDP ratios fell by more than two-thirds from their postwar highs. The oil shocks of the 1970s then inaugurated a period of slower growth, larger budget deficits, and rising debts. Developing countries, in contrast, started out with lower debt ratios and borrowed more modestly, until the oil shocks reversed these trends. From this point, developing nations borrowed heavily abroad, from money-center banks that recycled petrodollars. This debt cycle ended in tears, with a Latin America debt crisis, painful deleveraging, and poor growth for a decade.

This chapter studies how Elizabeth Warren, Hillary Clinton, and Sheryl Sandberg fared as women public intellectuals in the context of contemporary political and corporate life. Elizabeth Warren used her economic stance as a major part of her focus on her Senate campaign and she has also been influential in her contribution to debates on affordable health-care and college debt. Warren's reputation has been built on her role as a ‘progressive fighter’ and comes from her track record of opposition to Donald Trump, which goes back to before his presidency. Meanwhile, Sheryl Sandberg is a bestselling author and her books and the controversy surrounding them have framed her contribution and legacy. Unlike other women public intellectuals with distinct academic careers and hugely successful publications, Sandberg does not write as an academic, but as a corporate thinker who is interested in the advancement of women in corporate life. Finally, Hillary Clinton is probably the most famous woman public intellectual on the planet. She has come closest to breaking the ‘glass ceiling’ in US politics and has provided signposts for women, both positive and negative, about what it means to be a woman at the highest levels of the public sphere.

Abstract Debt problems get all the attention, but not all borrowing ends in tears. There have also been instances when high debts were successfully reduced. This chapter describes three of the largest debt consolidations in history: Britain after the Napoleonic Wars, the United States after its Civil War, and France after the Franco-Prussian War. These nineteenth-century debt consolidations were achieved mainly by running substantial budget surpluses over extended periods. This was made possible by the politics of the era; in all three countries, creditors had disproportionate political sway. The resulting political configuration meant that inflation and debt repudiation were beyond the pale.

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the evolution of credit cards in the United States, tracing their historical development, causes, consequences, and impact on both individuals and the economy. It delves into the transformation of credit cards from specialized merchant cards to ubiquitous financial tools, driven by legal changes like the Marquette decision. Credit card debt has emerged as a significant financial challenge for many Americans due to economic factors, consumerism, high healthcare costs, and financial illiteracy. The consequences of this debt on individuals are extensive, affecting their financial well-being, credit scores, savings, and even their physical and mental health. On a larger scale, credit cards stimulate consumer spending, drive e-commerce growth, and generate revenue for financial institutions, but they can also contribute to economic instability if not managed responsibly. The paper emphasizes various strategies to prevent and manage credit card debt, including financial education, budgeting, responsible credit card uses, and professional counselling. Empirical studies support the relationship between credit card debt and factors such as financial literacy and consumer behavior. Regression analysis reveals that personal consumption and GDP positively impacts credit card debt indicating that responsible management is essential. The paper offers comprehensive recommendations for addressing credit card debt challenges and maximizing the benefits of credit card usage, encompassing financial education, policy reforms, and public awareness campaigns. These recommendations aim to transform credit cards into tools that empower individuals financially and contribute to economic stability, rather than sources of financial stress.

On January 19, 2023, the United States hit its debt ceiling, leading to a debt-ceiling crisis. US sovereign debt, for decades, was considered a risk-free investment, but the 2023 US debt ceiling crisis shocked the financial world. The COVID-19 pandemic has hung a heavy burden on public finances. Quarantined economic activity heavily affected state budget revenues all over the world. Before the Covid-19 crisis, there was the 2008 financial crisis with its famous outcomes, when economic stimulus was provided including state budget programs financed by sovereign debts. It was still pandemic circumstances when on 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in an escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War. In less than 20 years period the world has had three global-scale crises, but the deterioration social-economic picture is far less dramatic than it will be without state interventions. Nothing is free, it is an obvious and well-known economic axiom, so if the costs of these crises are not on the surface, it means that the problem is hidden somewhere and postponed in time. In a simplified picture we see that states' actions in the field of public finance aren’t rational. When revenues are decreasing, from a household point of view it is normal to turn on some austerity mode and live with less luxury, but different approaches are taken by the states when GDP growth and tax revenues are decreasing. The bright examples of these we saw during the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 crisis. From an economic point of view, loans couldn’t be a source of prosperity. Moreover, sovereign credit puts on long-run burden on the real economy. Money is considered a sign of wealth and prosperity, but actually, in the fractional reserve banking system, it is not the same. For the creation of debt money in the modern credit system, we don’t need savings, we can create it simply from “thin air”. So, an increased volume of money and debt in the economy doesn’t mean prosperity, it means more burden on future generations and the economy at all. The real economy has to pay these debts in the long run future and there it will negatively affect welfare and prosperity. More Fiat money doesn’t create prosperity, prosperity is a result of economic growth and savings. Printing money without proportional economic growth or creating debt money without adequate savings, only exacerbates allocation of resources and wealth. So, money multiplier is not about wealth creation it’s about wealth allocations. Empirical pieces of evidence from the current century showed us that, a crisis is a signal, it is a communication instrument that should be considered correctly and with some scrutiny examinations about its origins and foundations. Tactical solutions can't give strategic outcomes. When empirical evidence shows that instruments used by the state to extinguish crises create much more scaled ones, it’s time for rethinking and structural reforms.

To help meet the nation’s energy needs, recycling of partially used nuclear fuel is required to close the nuclear fuel cycle, but implementing this step will require considerable investment. This report evaluates financing scenarios for integrating recycling facilities into the nuclear fuel cycle. A range of options from fully government owned to fully private owned were evaluated using DPL (Decision Programming Language 6.0), which can systematically optimize outcomes based on user-defined criteria (e.g., lowest life-cycle cost, lowest unit cost). This evaluation concludes that the lowest unit costs and lifetime costs are found for a fully government-owned financing strategy, due to government forgiveness of debt as sunk costs. However, this does not mean that the facilities should necessarily be constructed and operated by the government. The costs for hybrid combinations of public and private (commercial) financed options can compete under some circumstances with the costs of the government option. This analysis shows that commercial operations have potential to be economical, but there is presently no incentive for private industry involvement. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) currently establishes government ownership of partially used commercial nuclear fuel. In addition, the recently announced Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) suggests fuels from several countries will be recycled in the United States as part of an international governmental agreement; this also assumes government ownership. Overwhelmingly, uncertainty in annual facility capacity led to the greatest variations in unit costs necessary for recovery of operating and capital expenditures; the ability to determine annual capacity will be a driving factor in setting unit costs. For private ventures, the costs of capital, especially equity interest rates, dominate the balance sheet; and the annual operating costs, forgiveness of debt, and overnight costs dominate the costs computed for the government case. The uncertainty in operations, leading to lower than optimal processing rates (or annual plant throughput), is the most detrimental issue to achieving low unit costs. Conversely, lowering debt interest rates and the required return on investments can reduce costs for private industry.

This article examines the impacts of four major economic and financial crises that significantly affected Turkey’s economic stability and growth: the 1994 crisis, the 1997-98 Asian crisis, the 2001 Turkish crisis, and the 2008 global crisis. The 1994 crisis was triggered by a sudden currency depreciation and resulted in a severe economic contraction. It revealed the vulnerabilities of the Turkish financial system and highlighted the need for structural reforms to improve fiscal discipline and monetary policy. The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis had a ripple effect on Turkey, leading to a sharp decline in exports, capital outflows, and a banking crisis. The Turkish Lira came under intense pressure, and the government had to implement stabilization measures with support from international institutions. The 2001 Turkish economic crisis stemmed from high public debt, banking sector weaknesses, and a loss of investor confidence, which led to a significant depreciation of the Turkish Lira, a banking sector restructuring, and the implementation of economic reforms. The 2008 global financial crisis, originated in the United States. The collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a sharp decline in global demand, leading to a decline in Turkey's exports. The government implemented stimulus measures to mitigate the impacts of the crisis and prevent a severe recession. Overall, these crises exposed vulnerabilities in Turkey's economy and highlighted the importance of implementing structural reforms, improving financial regulations, and maintaining macroeconomic stability. The Turkish economy has demonstrated resilience in recovering from these crises, but ongoing challenges remain in sustaining long-term economic growth and stability.

The Kyrgyz Republic economy openness is studied within the framework of the Eurasia. Insufficient level of the financial and economic standing of Kyrgyzstan is clarified. Reasons for Governmental regulating use in the area of monetary, tax and budget policy in USA have been set up. Conditions of the development of industrial countries economy are under consideration. The necessity of financialisation of all capital of country is defined. Kyrgyzstan public budget’s permanent deficiency formation reasons are studied. A necessity of integration economic relations development within the framework of Eurasia is offered. A necessity of sustainable economic relations establishment as well as finding solution for external debt between Kyrgyzstan and Russia have been justified. It is recommended to strengthen effective fight against a scale corruption, «shadow» economy and criminalization of economy and finances. The increase of efficiency and responsibility of top managers of the public administration level have been offered. The necessity of the independent mastering of own gold-mining fields is justified. The need to attract the foreign direct investments to the area of mining and processing industry have been offered. Within the framework of acceleration of economic integration. Needs for the development of exploring and processing of hydrocarbons as well as building of large economic entities especially the hydroelectric power stations, namely Kambar-Ata-1 Hydro-Power Plants have been suggested. By this it is also suggested to Russia to develop this as strategic partner of Kyrgyzstan. Creation of integral customs system and energy cooperation suggested. It should be supported by establishment of unique equivalent among Eurasia states. By this it is to be possible to find acceptable solutions in finance and economy and to form a united economic cooperation considering a sovereignty of each state. It is necessary to develop the identical financial reporting of point-of-sale and payment balances, balance of international investments, compliable national republics and on the whole on Eurasia. To walk away from the calculation and actual use of dollar of the USA in finance and economic operations. Based on econometric prognosis of gross internal product and the public budget of Kyrgyzstan is made calculating on the per to 2025 year.

Economic structures are a major cause of long-term growth or stagnation. Different economic structures have different ranges of structural learning, innovation, and different effects on income distribution, which are key determinants of economic performance. Through theory about economic structures it is explained why institutions work differently in space and time. This paper shows using a case study in the United States, that the source of recent financial crises rests on the structural characteristics of the economy. Constant deindustrialization is increasing inequality, and a debt-intensive credit boom has emerged to offset the deflationary effects of this structural change. The strong application of the austerity system in Europe and other parts of the world, even after the evidence points to less frugal policies, illustrates the theory of power it has over public policy. The economic structure should be put at the center of analysis, to better understand the economic changes, income disparities and differences in the dynamics of political economy through time and space. This paper provides a critical overview of the rapidly developing comparative studies of institutions and economic performance, with an emphasis on its analytical and political implications. The paper tries to identify some conceptual gaps in the literature on economic growth policy. Emphasis is placed on the contrasting experiences of East Asia and Latin America. This paper argues that the future investments in this field should be based on rigorous conceptual difference between the rules of the game and the game, and between the political and institutional, embedded in the concept of management. It also emphasizes the importance of a serious understanding of the endogenous and distributive nature of institutions and steps beyond the narrow approach of property law relations in management and development. By providing insights from the political channels through which institutions affect economic performance, this paper aims to contribute to the consolidation of theoretically based, empirically based and relevant to policy research on political and institutional foundations of growth and prosperity.

The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the extreme inequality in Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, and pushed millions into poverty. The economic crisis continues due to the obscene global vaccine inequality. As of end March 2022, a dismal 14% of SADC citizens had been fully vaccinated against COVID-19, compared with 65.5% in the United States and 73% in the European Union. In 2021, with infections rising in SADC, the critical health, social protection and economic programmes put in place by most governments in 2020 were rolled back and replaced with austerity, in the context of growing debt burdens and lack of external support for country budgets. Such austerity has been built into IMF programmes in the region. Recovering from the pandemic, however, offers SADC governments a once-in-a-generation opportunity to do what their citizens want: increase taxes on the wealthy and large corporations, boost public spending (especially on healthcare, education and social protection), and increase workers’ rights as well as tackling joblessness and precarious work. With external support, including through debt relief and aid, they could reduce inequality drastically and eliminate extreme poverty by 2030.

The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the extreme inequality in Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, and pushed millions into poverty. The economic crisis continues due to the obscene global vaccine inequality. As of end March 2022, a dismal 14% of SADC citizens had been fully vaccinated against COVID-19, compared with 65.5% in the United States and 73% in the European Union. In 2021, with infections rising in SADC, the critical health, social protection and economic programmes put in place by most governments in 2020 were rolled back and replaced with austerity, in the context of growing debt burdens and lack of external support for country budgets. Such austerity has been built into IMF programmes in the region. Recovering from the pandemic, however, offers SADC governments a once-in-a-generation opportunity to do what their citizens want: increase taxes on the wealthy and large corporations, boost public spending (especially on healthcare, education and social protection), and increase workers’ rights as well as tackling joblessness and precarious work. With external support, including through debt relief and aid, they could reduce inequality drastically and eliminate extreme poverty by 2030.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

From this edition, the Financial Stability Report will have fewer pages with some changes in its structure. The purpose of this change is to present the most relevant facts of the financial system and their implications on the financial stability. This allows displaying the analysis more concisely and clearly, as it will focus on describing the evolution of the variables that have the greatest impact on the performance of the financial system, for estimating then the effect of a possible materialization of these risks on the financial health of the institutions. The changing dynamics of the risks faced by the financial system implies that the content of the Report adopts this new structure; therefore, some analyses and series that were regularly included will not necessarily be in each issue. However, the statistical annex that accompanies the publication of the Report will continue to present the series that were traditionally included, regardless of whether or not they are part of the content of the Report. In this way we expect to contribute in a more comprehensive way to the study and analysis of the stability of the Colombian financial system. Executive Summary During the first half of 2015, the main advanced economies showed a slow recovery on their growth, while emerging economies continued with their slowdown trend. Domestic demand in the United States allowed for stabilization on its average growth for the first half of the year, while other developed economies such as the United Kingdom, the euro zone, and Japan showed a more gradual recovery. On the other hand, the Chinese economy exhibited the lowest growth rate in five years, which has resulted in lower global dynamism. This has led to a fall in prices of the main export goods of some Latin American economies, especially oil, whose price has also responded to a larger global supply. The decrease in the terms of trade of the Latin American economies has had an impact on national income, domestic demand, and growth. This scenario has been reflected in increases in sovereign risk spreads, devaluations of stock indices, and depreciation of the exchange rates of most countries in the region. For Colombia, the fall in oil prices has also led to a decline in the terms of trade, resulting in pressure on the dynamics of national income. Additionally, the lower demand for exports helped to widen the current account deficit. This affected the prospects and economic growth of the country during the first half of 2015. This economic context could have an impact on the payment capacity of debtors and on the valuation of investments, affecting the soundness of the financial system. However, the results of the analysis featured in this edition of the Report show that, facing an adverse scenario, the vulnerability of the financial system in terms of solvency and liquidity is low. The analysis of the current situation of credit institutions (CI) shows that growth of the gross loan portfolio remained relatively stable, as well as the loan portfolio quality indicators, except for microcredit, which showed a decrease in these indicators. Regarding liabilities, traditional sources of funding have lost market share versus non-traditional ones (bonds, money market operations and in the interbank market), but still represent more than 70%. Moreover, the solvency indicator remained relatively stable. As for non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), the slowdown observed during the first six months of 2015 in the real annual growth of the assets total, both in the proprietary and third party position, stands out. The analysis of the main debtors of the financial system shows that indebtedness of the private corporate sector has increased in the last year, mostly driven by an increase in the debt balance with domestic and foreign financial institutions. However, the increase in this latter source of funding has been influenced by the depreciation of the Colombian peso vis-à-vis the US dollar since mid-2014. The financial indicators reflected a favorable behavior with respect to the historical average, except for the profitability indicators; although they were below the average, they have shown improvement in the last year. By economic sector, it is noted that the firms focused on farming, mining and transportation activities recorded the highest levels of risk perception by credit institutions, and the largest increases in default levels with respect to those observed in December 2014. Meanwhile, households have shown an increase in the financial burden, mainly due to growth in the consumer loan portfolio, in which the modalities of credit card, payroll deductible loan, revolving and vehicle loan are those that have reported greater increases in risk indicators. On the side of investments that could be affected by the devaluation in the portfolio of credit institutions and non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), the largest share of public debt securities, variable-yield securities and domestic private debt securities is highlighted. The value of these portfolios fell between February and August 2015, driven by the devaluation in the market of these investments throughout the year. Furthermore, the analysis of the liquidity risk indicator (LRI) shows that all intermediaries showed adequate levels and exhibit a stable behavior. Likewise, the fragility analysis of the financial system associated with the increase in the use of non-traditional funding sources does not evidence a greater exposure to liquidity risk. Stress tests assess the impact of the possible joint materialization of credit and market risks, and reveal that neither the aggregate solvency indicator, nor the liquidity risk indicator (LRI) of the system would be below the established legal limits. The entities that result more individually affected have a low share in the total assets of the credit institutions; therefore, a risk to the financial system as a whole is not observed. José Darío Uribe Governor

Banco de la República's monitoring of the local financial market infrastructure is an additional contribution to the country's financial stability. One of the products of that monitoring has been the Payment Systems Report, which is now known as the Financial Infrastructure Report. The change in name, as of this edition, is intended to reflect in a broader way the issues that are addressed in the report. The 2022 edition includes several changes that are the result of a comparative study of financial infrastructure reports prepared by other central banks. These changes seek to make the report more fluid and easier to read, including main points and selected key figures for the different interest groups to which it is addressed. The report shows the financial infrastructure continued to render its services without interruption, with general evidence of good performance in 2021. Additionally, the resilience of the Central Counterparty Risk of Colombia (CRCC) and the Large-value Payments System (CUD) to extreme events was validated, based on stress tests conducted according to international standards (focused on liquidity and credit risk). As for retail payments, transactional information indicates the use of electronic instruments increased in terms of value during 2021 compared to 2020 (credit and debit cards, checks and electronic funds transfers). The use of debit and credit cards in payments rose to levels similar to those reached in the pre-pandemic year. Meanwhile, electronic funds transfers continued to grow. Although the results of the BR 2022 survey show cash continues to be the instrument most used by the public for regular payments (like the situation in other countries), the perception of its use decreased significantly to 75 % (87 % in 2019). Also, in commerce, cash was the preferred instrument for customers. However, in this measurement, several retail channels such as hairdressers, drugstores and restaurants joined the group that has traditionally received electronic payments for a value greater than 10% of their sales (hypermarkets and gas stations). Likewise, for nearly 50% of the population, cash payments are lower than before the pandemic. This is consistent with the transactional increase in electronic payment instruments that was observed in 2021. Banco de la República continues to monitor the technological developments that have expanded and modernized the supply in the international and local payments market, as these are issues of interest to the industry that provides clearing and settlement services. This report outlines the Pix case for instant payments in Brazil, the projects that are underway regarding the possible issue of digital currency by central banks (CBDC) for cross-border payments, as well as an approach to the Fintech ecosystem in Colombia, with an emphasis on companies that provide payment services. Leonardo Villar Governor Main points: 2022 The local financial infrastructure was safe and efficient throughout the year. The services of the financial infrastructure were proved on a continuous basis, showing good performance overall. Less momentum in the large-value payment system CUD activity declined versus the previous year because of fewer government deposits with BanRep. This was offset partially by growth in repos to increase money supply and in retail-value payments (electronic funds transfers, checks and cards). Increased momentum in financial market infrastructures. Larger amounts were cleared and settled through the Central Securities Depository (DCV) due to an increase in the market for sovereign debt. Operations managed by the Central Counterparty Risk of Colombia (CRCC) increased due to inclusion of the foreign exchange segment and the positive evolution in non-delivery forward peso/dollar contracts. Added confidence in the peso/dollar spot foreign exchange market due to CRCC interposition. Number and value of trades grew, mainly due to the adjustment of therisk management model for the FX segment and the increase in the limiton net selling positions in dollars. Stress testing with international standards to validate CRCC and CUD resilience Stress tests conducted independently by the SFC, BanRep and the CRCC, like those done in England and the United States, concluded that the CRCC's risk management model allows it to withstand extreme market events and simultaneous defaults by its main members. Based on the experience of other central banks, BanRep strengthened its intraday liquidity risk stress exercises in the CUD by incorporating temporary payment delays. It calculated that a two-hour delay by a key participant increases the system's liquidity needs by 0.5%. Electronic payments increased during 2021 According to transactional information, all electronic payment instruments increased in value versus 2020 (electronic funds transfers, checks and debit and credit cards). Electronic funds transfers continued to grow (80% from legal entities), with the participation of closed schemes driven particularly by the use of mobile wallets (35% of the number of intra-transfer transactions). The use of debit and credit cards for payments climbed to levels similar to those witnessed in the pre-pandemic year. Cash continues to be the instrument most used by the public for regular payments. The results of the BanRep survey in 2022 show that the perception of the use of cash declined significantly to 75% (87% in 2019), and about 50% of the population perceive their cash payments as being lower than those they made before the pandemic. Electronic funds transfers were second most used instrument, having increased to 15% (3% in 2019). Also, in commerce, cash was the preferred instrument of payment for its customers; however, several commerce channels received more than 10% of the value of their sales in electronic payments (hypermarkets 35%, gas stations 25%, hairdressers 15%, drugstores 14% and restaurants 12%). Continuous technological developments have broadened, and modernized services offered in the payments market. Pix (instant payments in Brazil). The high level of adoption of instant transfers in Brazil motivated a review of its strengths; namely, the possibility of different use cases between individuals, businesses, and government; high participation by financial and payment institutions; free of charge for individuals and the possibility of charging legal entities, and simple user experience. Digital currencies in central banking. Several groups of countries have joined forces to conduct pilot projects with wholesale CBDCs for cross-border payments. Flows generated by international trade, foreign investment and remittances between individuals can be processed more efficiently, transparently, and securely by reducing their cost and increasing their speed. Due to the constant progress being made on this issue, BanRep will continue to monitor all CBDC-related matters. The fintech ecosystem for payments in Colombia. A high percentage of existing FinTech companies in the country are dedicated to offering digital payment services: wallets, payment gateways, mobile devices (point-of-sale terminals) and acquisition. These have driven innovation in payment services.