Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Crticism, interpretation”

In Dobbs Case, the U.S. Supreme Court(hereinafter “the Court”) ruled that abortion was not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. The Dobbs Case contains debates on fundamental and important issues raised in constitutional interpretation. Interpreting the “liberty” of Due Prcess Clause, the Court emphasized the text and history at the time of enactment of the 14th Amendment. That approach is similar to so-called originalist interpretation. On the other hand, the dissenting opinion argues that the Constitution has steadily developed through important constitutional principles, American history and tradition, and the gradual evolution of the Court’s precedents. Several crticisms of originalism are equivalent to the Court’s opinion. The Court overruled Roe and Casey on the ground that the Roe was egregiously wrong from the start, while the dissenting opinion stated that the Court violates the principle of stare decisis and the rule of law for overruling Roe even though there has been no legal or factual change except for the change in the composition of the Court. Though the fact that Roe has been consistently challenged over the past 50 years shows that Roe is not so-called super precedent, it also shows that Roe has been repeatedly confirmed as a good precedent. Overruling Roe means abolishing a fundamental right that has been recognized so far, not recognizing a new fundamental right or expanding the scope of a existing fundamental right. In this regards, the Court should have provided a stronger justification for overruling Roe. The Court held that it had no authority to determine the issue of abortion because the Constitution is neutral on abortion, and that the resolution of this issue should be left to the people and their elected representatives. The Court is relying on merely a majority-ruled democracy, and it is inconsistent with another important concept of democracy, constitutional democracy that requires constitutional protection of the minority from the tyranny of the majority.

The field of linguistics focuses on the spoken incarnation of language and considers written phenomena as an imperfect approximation of the former. The author argues that present understanding of punctuation as a subsystem of human language is inadequate, and that even when studies examine punctuation from a linguistic standpoint, they emphasize modern written language and American English in particular. It is, however, quite possible to describe the behavior of punctuations with the same methodology that was until recently reserved for spoken language. Just as language develops over time and changes from place to place, so too does punctuation. This paper argues for the compatibility between recent developments in computational linguistics' approaches to punctuation and textual criticsm that attends to punctuation in poetry. A full understanding of its conventions is crticial for a proper interpretation of meaning. Furthermore, the author shows that the relevance of these studies to literary analysis remains unexplored. Nevertheless, with the developing techniques made possible through computational linguistics, the potential for in-depth study is expanding.