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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Computationnal social choice"
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Procaccia, Ariel D. "Computational social choice". XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students 18, nr 2 (grudzień 2011): 31–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2043236.2043249.
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Kelly, Jerry S. "Social choice and computational complexity". Journal of Mathematical Economics 17, nr 1 (styczeń 1988): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(88)90022-5.
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Endriss, Ulle. "Computational Social Choice: Prospects and Challenges". Procedia Computer Science 7 (2011): 68–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2011.12.022.
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Mandali, Alekhya, Claire Gillan i Valerie Voon. "27 The coexistence of social withdrawal and impulsivity: a trans-diagnostic approach". Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry 91, nr 8 (20.07.2020): e19.1-e19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jnnp-2020-bnpa.44.
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IntroductionSocial anxiety disorder or phobia (SAD) is a debilitating condition, where an individual experiences overwhelming fear to situations involving social interactions. Prototypically, SAD presents as shy, submissive, inhibited, and risk- aversive behaviours. Contrastingly, an atypical sub-group show impulsive, aggressive, novelty-seeking behaviours along with severe substance abuse problems. In scenarios, where there is co-existence of polar opposite symptoms, trans-diagnostic approaches extrapolate the characteristics of a disorder as a continuum rather than a categorical one. Data-driven computational models such as drift diffusion model utilize behavioural measures and extract potential markers that reflect the activity of specific brain networks. Here, we aim to analyse and correlate the psychological traits with computational estimates of behaviour during risk-taking and value based decision making.MethodsWe used the data from 1400 participants who completed the 2 stage sequential learning task. We focused on the second stage of the task, where the reward probabilities of the choices are stochastic. The computational measures were estimated for two scenarios i.e. when the participants made 1) accurate choices and 2) risky choices (the choice with maximum variance in reward probability was labelled as risky). This computation was performed for all the trials across all the participants. We then used choice–(risky vs non-risky or correct vs incorrect) and response time as inputs to the hierarchical drift diffusion model to extract threshold (a), drift rate (v) and response bias (z) parameters. The computational parameters were then correlated with the 3 psychological factors that span the compulsive, anxiety- depression and the social withdrawal spectrum.ResultsThe computational parameters from both accuracy and risk taking scenarios of the sequential learning task were correlated with the 3 factors. While controlling for IQ and age, we found a generalized correlation which is significant between the threshold parameter(‘a’) and social withdrawal, with the former estimate being negatively correlated (Accuracy: |r| = -0.078, p=0.003; Risk: |r| = -0.075, p=0.005) with the latter. This relation was not observed with regard to anxiety-depression and compulsive traits.ConclusionsWe show that individuals with higher social withdrawal levels are impulsive as they accumulate less evidence while making a choice. This behaviour holds irrespective of the choice being chosen is an optimal or a risky one. Critically, we show how a trans-diagnostic approach of integrating computational model and psychological questionnaires can reveal the existence of psychological traits as a continuum.
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ENDRISS, ULLE. "The 1st international workshop on computational social choice". Knowledge Engineering Review 23, nr 2 (czerwiec 2008): 213–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269888908001343.
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AbsractComputational social choice is a new discipline currently emerging at the interface of social choice theory and computer science. It is concerned with the application of computational techniques to the study of social choice mechanisms, and with the integration of social choice paradigms into computing. The first international workshop specifically dedicated to this topic took place in December 2006 in Amsterdam, attracting a mix of computer scientists, people working in artificial intelligence and multiagent systems, economists, game and social choice theorists, logicians, mathematicians, philosophers, and psychologists as participants.
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Brandt, Felix, i William S. Zwicker. "Special Issue on Computational Foundations of Social Choice". Mathematical Social Sciences 64, nr 1 (lipiec 2012): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.003.
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Ismaili, Anisse, i Patrice Perny. "Computational social choice for coordination in agent networks". Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 77, nr 3-4 (13.06.2015): 335–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10472-015-9462-x.
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Elkind, Edith, i Jérôme Lang. "Guest editorial: special issue on computational social choice". Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 22, nr 1 (15.10.2010): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10458-010-9155-0.
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Kim, Jaejoong, i Bumseok Jeong. "Expecting social punishment facilitates control over a decision under uncertainty by recruiting medial prefrontal cortex". Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 15, nr 11 (1.11.2020): 1260–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsaa145.
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Abstract In many decision-making situations, sub-optimal choices are increased by uncertainty. However, when wrong choices could lead to social punishment, such as blame, people might try to improve their performance by minimizing sub-optimal choices, which could be achieved by increasing the subjective cost of errors, thereby globally reducing decision noise or reducing an uncertainty-induced component of decision noise. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, 46 participants performed a choice task in which the probability of a correct choice with a given cue and the conditional probability of blame feedback (by making an incorrect choice) changed continuously. By comparing computational models of behaviour, we found that participants optimized their performance by preferentially reducing a component of decision noise associated with uncertainty. Simultaneously, expecting blame significantly deteriorated participants’ mood. Model-based fMRI analyses and dynamic causal modelling indicate that the optimization mechanism based on the expectation of being blamed would be controlled by a neural circuit centred on the right medial prefrontal cortex. These results show novel behavioural and neural mechanisms regarding how humans optimize uncertain decisions under the expectation of being blamed.
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Bredereck, Robert, Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Jiong Guo, Rolf Niedermeier i Gerhard J. Woeginger. "Parameterized algorithmics for computational social choice: Nine research challenges". Tsinghua Science and Technology 19, nr 4 (sierpień 2014): 358–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tst.2014.6867518.
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Gross-Humbert, Nathanaël. "Étude des notions de diversité et d'envie dans le cadre de problèmes d'affectation avec groupes d'agents". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Sorbonne université, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024SORUS257.
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L'objectif de cette thèse est d'étudier les notions de diversité et d'équité dans le cadre de problèmes d'allocation de ressources où l'ensemble des agents est partitionné en un certain nombre de types.Ces problématiques ont de nombreuses applications, en premier lieu dans le problème qui a inspiré le modèle, l'immobilier de Singapour, mais également dans des problèmes plus divers telles que la répartition des élèves en écoles ou l'allocation des ressources médicales.Les travaux effectués se divisent en deux grands axes, le premier étudie les mécanismes d'allocations dans un contexte où les agents souhaitent se regrouper par types mais sont limités par des quotas de diversité, le deuxième étudie l'équité entre les types eux-mêmes.Dans le cadre du premier axe, nous considérons un modèle qui dispose, en plus d'une partition de l'ensemble des agents en un certain nombre de types, d'une partition de l'ensemble des ressources (ou objets) en un certains nombres de blocs, et de quotas de diversité entre ces types et ces blocs. Nous introduisons dans ce modèle une dynamique d'amélioration en autorisant les agents à effectuer des échanges de ressources bilatéraux. Cette dynamique introduit une notion de stabilité, où une allocation est stable si elle est invariante par cette dynamique.Nous étudions les propriétés de cette notion de stabilité, puis nous considérons deux mécanismes d'allocations. Le premier est le mécanisme de loterie, utilisé en situation réelle, qui consiste à ordonner les agents, puis leur laisser sélectionner leur objet favori chacun leur tour dans l'ordre. Le second, basé sur notre dynamique, consiste à partir d'une allocation quelconque et à appliquer des échanges améliorants jusqu'à atteindre une allocation stable. Nous présentons ensuite plusieurs séries d'expériences effectuées avec ces mécanismes et discutons de leurs résultats.Dans le cadre du deuxième axe, nous discutons de la notion d'équité, au travers de la notion d'envie. Nous posons 4 axiomes qui représentent des propriétés que l'on souhaite retrouver dans une notion d'envie, puis nous listons un certain nombre de définitions utilisées dans la littérature, et nous vérifions lesquelles vérifient quels axiomes.Cela fait, nous définissons nos propres notions d'envies, basées sur des comparaisons utilisant des sous-groupes, et nous les situons par rapport aux axiomes, puis nous discutons de leurs aspects computationnels. Nous explorons ensuite les différentes interprétations possibles du concept de monotonie.Nous introduisons une relaxation de nos notions d'envie, le degré d'envie, que nous montrons difficile à calculer. Nous présentons alors deux méthodes d'approximation. La première, plus efficace, repose sur une réduction à une variante du problème du sac à dos, la deuxième, théoriquement beaucoup plus longue, repose sur une succession d'échantillonnage par une chaîne de Markov.Si les résultats théoriques indiquent que cette deuxième méthode a une complexité beaucoup trop importante pour être utilisable en pratique, une série d'expérience suggère qu'elle serait en réalité bien plus rapideThe purpose of this thesis is to study the notions of fairness and diversity in resource allocation problems where the agent set is partitionned into types. These concepts have numberous applications, first among them being the Singapour housing allocation problem, which inspired our model. Other applications include allocating students to schools or medical resources to hospital.This work follow to main axis, the first one is about allocation mechanism within the context of a model with diversity constraints, while the second one is about equity between types of agents using the notion en envy.In the first part, we study a model for which, just as the agent set is partitionned into a set of types, the item set is partitionned into a set of blocks, and there are diversity quotas between these types and these blocks. We introduce a dynamic of individual improvement in which agents are allowed to improve their allocation by swapping their item with an other (willing) agent.This dynamic create a notion of stability, for which an allocation is stable if no pair of agent wish to swap their item. We then study the theoretical property of this notion of stability, before considering two different methods for generating allocation. The first one, the lotery mechanism, consists in ordering the set of agents, then allowing each one in turn to pick their favorite item. The second one relies on the dynamic we just introduced: we start from a random allocation, and we apply improving swap between agents until we reach a stable allocation. We then describe several series of experiments made using these mechanisms, and discuss their results.The second main contribution is about the notion of equity, which we consider through the lens of envy and envy-freeness. We define 4 axioms which stands for properties we consider to be critical to a relevant definition of envy. We then list the definitions of envy commonly used in the litterature, and we check whether or not they satisfy the axioms. We then define our own notions of envy, which relies on comparison using subgroups. We first study whether or not they satisfy the axioms, then their computationnal aspects. We then discuss the different possible interpretations of the concept of monotony.We then relax our notions of envy by defining the degree of envy,. However, we show that it is hard to compute, we thus bring forward two ways to approximate its computation. The first and most efficient one relies on a reduction to a variant of the knapsack problem, while the second one uses a succession of samples made using a Markov chain.While the theoretical complexity of this second method is very high, experimental results suggest convergence is in practice much faster
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Durand, Martin. "Axiomatic and computational aspects of discrete optimization problems in collective settings : from Multi-Agent Scheduling to Participatory Budgeting". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Sorbonne université, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023SORUS290.
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Cette thèse s'inscrit à la frontière entre deux domaines de recherche : le choix social computationnel et l'optimisation discrète, avec un accent sur l'ordonnancement. Le choix social computationnel est l'étude des processus de décision collective, de leurs propriétés mathématiques et computationnelles. Le but de ces processus est d'agréger un ensemble de préférences individuelles pour en déduire une solution "satisfaisante" pour la communauté. De nombreuses questions sont étudiées: qu'est-ce que "satisfaisante pour la communauté" signifie ? Est-ce la solution préférée par le plus grand nombre d'individus ? Est-ce une solution de compromis, appréciée par un grand nombre de participants et qui ne crée pas trop d'insatisfaction chez les autres ? Si oui, comment mesurer et exprimer ce compromis ? Comment le processus assure-t-il l'équité entre les votants et entre les candidats, dans le cas d'une élection par exemple ? Les participants ont-il intérêt à mentir ? Qu'en est-il des aspects computationnels ? Le processus peut-il être exécuté rapidement ? L'optimisation discrète est un domaine de recherche traitant de la résolution de problèmes complexes. Ces problèmes peuvent être extrêmement variés, de l'optimisation de tournées de véhicules pour le transport et la livraison de produits à la gestion de la production d'électricité dans une centrale. Le point commun de tous ces problèmes est d'avoir une structure composée (1) d'une fonction objectif, ou de plusieurs fonctions objectif, que l'on cherche à optimiser, cela peut être un coût à minimiser ou un indicateur de qualité à maximiser par exemple; (2) d'un ensemble de variables correspondant à des décisions, l'ensemble de ces décisions formant une solution au problème, ces décisions peuvent correspondre à l'utilisation ou non d'une source d'énergie, au passage ou non d'un camion à un entrepôt pour récupérer des biens par exemple; (3) un ensemble de contraintes sur les variables, il peut par exemple être impossible de faire tourner une machine pendant trop longtemps, car la machine a besoin de refroidir. A chaque solution correspond une valeur de la fonction objectif et notre but est de trouver la solution optimisant la fonction objectif. Parmi les problèmes d'optimisation discrète, les problèmes d'ordonnancement traitent de l'affectation de tâches à des machines. Les machines peuvent représenter des unités de calcul, des employés dans une entreprise, des salles de cours, dots Les tâches correspondent alors à des programmes informatiques, des travaux à effectuer (livraison, rédaction de rapport, dots) ou des enseignements. Une solution est alors une affectation de chaque tâche à une machine avec une fenêtre de temps correspondant à l'exécution de la tâche. Dans cette thèse on s'intéresse à des problèmes d'optimisation discrète, et notamment à des problèmes d'ordonnancement, dans lesquels plusieurs agents ont des préférences sur l'ensemble des solutions. Il s'agira alors de trouver des processus de décision qui tiennent compte de ces préférences pour trouver une solution satisfaisante. Il est également possible que ces préférences entrent en conflit avec un autre objectif, indépendant des votants, et qui concerne l'efficacité du système. Il faudra alors trouver un compromis entre satisfaction des agents et efficacité du systèmeThis thesis focuses on several collective decision making problems, from multi agent scheduling to participatory budgeting. There are several agents, that can represent companies, citizens of a city, members of a research lab dots, for which a common solution has to be found. Such a solution can be a schedule of tasks of interest for the agents, a ranking of items that the agents have to sort or a selection of projects approved by the agents. Each agent has different interest over the possible solutions. This can be because the solution impacts directly the agents or because the agents express preferences over the possible solutions. Any solution can be evaluated thanks to different tools. We will mostly focus on fairness and efficiency. Fairness and efficiency can be formulated in different ways, depending on the context, from objective functions to binary properties. In all cases, our goal will be to find a solution that corresponds as much as possible to the interests or preferences of the agents. A solution is collectively satisfying if it is "close" to the preferences of the agents, according to some definition of closeness, or if the overall benefit of the agents is high. The solution should also be fair in the sense that no agent should be treated better than any other. We study different problems, especially scheduling problems, in which we have to find fair solution or fair decision making processes while guaranteeing some notion of efficiency
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Wilczynski, Anaëlle. "Interaction entre agents modélisée par un réseau social dans des problématiques de choix social computationnel Strategic Voting in a Social Context: Considerate Equilibria Object Allocation via Swaps along a Social Network Local Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems Constrained Swap Dynamics over a Social Network in Distributed Resource Reallocation Poll-Confident Voters in Iterative Voting". Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PSLED073.
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Le choix social repose sur l’étude de la prise de décision collective, où un ensemble d’individus doit convenir d’une solution commune en fonction des préférences de ses membres. Le problème revient à déterminer comment agréger les préférences de différents agents en une décision acceptable pour le groupe. Typiquement, les agents interagissent dans des processus de décision collective, notamment en collaborant ou en échangeant des informations. Il est communément supposé que tout agent est capable d’interagir avec n’importe quel autre. Or, cette hypothèse paraît irréaliste pour de nombreuses situations. On propose de relâcher cette hypothèse en considérant que la possibilité d’interaction est déterminée par un réseau social, représenté par un graphe sur les agents. Dans un tel contexte, on étudie deux problèmes de choix social : le vote stratégique et l’allocation de ressources. L’analyse se concentre sur deux types d’interaction : la collaboration entre les agents, et la collecte d’information. On s’intéresse à l’impact du réseau social, modélisant une possibilité de collaboration entre les agents ou une relation de visibilité, sur la résolution et les solutions de problèmes de vote et d’allocation de ressources. Nos travaux s’inscrivent dans le cadre du choix social computationnel, en utilisant pour ces questions des outils provenant de la théorie des jeux algorithmique et de la théorie de la complexitéSocial choice is the study of collective decision making, where a set of agents must make a decision over a set of alternatives, according to their preferences. The question relies on how aggregating the preferences of the agents in order to end up with a decision that is commonly acceptable for the group. Typically, agents can interact by collaborating, or exchanging some information. It is usually assumed in computational social choice that every agent is able to interact with any other agent. However, this assumption looks unrealistic in many concrete situations. We propose to relax this assumption by considering that the possibility of interaction is given by a social network, represented by a graph over the agents.In this context, we study two particular problems of computational social choice: strategic voting and resource allocation of indivisible goods. The focus is on two types of interaction: collaboration and information gathering. We explore how the social network,modelingapossibilityofcollaboration or a visibility relation among the agents, can impact the resolution and the solution of voting and resource allocation problems. These questions are addressed via computational social choice by using tools from algorithmic game theory and computational complexity
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Ayadi, Manel. "Winner Determination under Common Voting Rules using Truncated Ballots". Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PSLED030.
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Les règles de vote classiques supposent que les bulletins de vote des électeurs sont des ordres de préférence complets sur les candidats. Cependant, lorsque le nombre de candidats est suffisamment élevé, il est trop coûteux de demander aux électeurs de classer tous les candidats. Il y a donc un compromis à faire entre l’efficacité d’une méthode d’agrégation des préférences et la charge de communication qu’elle fait peser sur les électeurs.Dans cette thèse, nous abordons ce problème en suggérant de demander aux électeurs de ne classer que leurs k candidats préférés (où k peut varier selon les électeurs et/ou au cours du processus). On dit que de tels votes sont k- tronqués. Nous étudions la quantité d’information nécessaire pour déterminer le résultat de l’élection (de manière exacte ou approchée) à partir de bulletins tronqués selon différentes règles de vote et nous proposons et analysons différentes méthodes permettant un compromis entre précision du résultat et quantité de communication requise ; certaines ne requièrent qu’une seule phase de communication, alors que d’autres sont dynamiquesClassical voting rules assume that voters’ ballots are complete preference orders over candidates. However, when the number of candidates is large enough, it is too costly to ask the voters to rank all candidates. There is therefore a trade-off between the efficiency of an aggregation method and the communication burden it places on voters.In this thesis, we address this problem by suggesting to ask voters to report only their k preferred candidates (where k may vary depending on the voters and/or during the process). The obtained ballots are then said to be k-truncated. We study the amount of information needed to determine the outcome of the election (exact or approximate) from truncated ballots with respect to different voting rules and we propose and analyze different methods allowing a compromise between the accuracy of the result and the amount of communication required; some require only one round of communication, while others are interactive
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Shams, Parham. "Procedures based on Exchanges and new Relaxations of Envy-Freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Sorbonne université, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023SORUS477.
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Cette thèse s'inscrit dans le contexte du Choix Social Computationnel. Il s'agit d'un domaine à l'intersection du Choix Social, de l'Informatique et de l'Intelligence Artificielle. Nous nous intéressons plus particulièrement au problème partage équitable de ressources indivisibles qui consiste à trouver une allocation équitable et efficace d'un ensemble d'objets à un ensemble d'agents. Tandis que la notion d'efficacité est communément traduite par l'exigence minimale de complétude (tous les objets doivent être alloués dans le but de ne gâcher aucun objet) ou la notion plus exigeante de Pareto-Optimalité (une allocation est dite Pareto-Optimale s'il n'existe pas une autre allocation telle que tous les agents sont au moins aussi contents et un agent est strictement plus content), plusieurs notions ont été proposées pour définir l'équité. Une des mesures d'équité la plus importante est l'absence d'envie. Une allocation est dite sans envie ou envy-free si aucun agent n'aurait envie de changer ses objets contre ceux d'un autre agent. Cependant, il n'existe pas forcément d'allocation envy-free quand on est dans le cadre de ressources indivisibles. Afin de surmonter cette limitation, des relaxations ont été récemment proposées dans la littérature.Dans cette thèse, nous étudions tout d'abord une famille de procédures décentralisées basée sur des échanges d'objets entre agents. Nous analysons en particulier comment ces procédures se comportent et les propriétés désirables qu'elles montrent. Plus précisément, on étudie les séquences de choix sincères et les cycles d'échanges de ressources. Dans un second temps, nous proposons de nouvelles relaxations de la notion d'absence d'envie (et d'autres mesures d'équité) et les étudions en profondeur. La première relaxation a pour but d'équilibrer l'envie entre les agents (quand elle ne peut être évitée) et se base sur l'Ordered Weighted Average (OWA), un agrégateur habituellement utilisé dans le domaine de l'optimisation multicritère pour traduire l'équité. La deuxième relaxation se concentre sur l'approbation sociale de l'envie et se rapproche plus de la théorie du vote étant donné que les agents votent sur l'envie des autres agents. Nous examinons les aspects computationnels liés à ces nouvelles relaxations, leurs liens avec des notions d'équité et d'efficacité existantes avant de les tester expérimentalementThe work of this thesis is in the scope of Computational Social Choice. It is a field at the intersection of Social Choice, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence. In particular, we study the problem of Fair Division of Indivisible Goods where the the objective is to find a fair and efficient allocation of a set of (valuable) objects among a set of agents. While efficiency is usually brought by the minimal requirement of completeness (all the objects have to be allocated in order not to waste anything), or the more demanding notion of Pareto-Optimality (an allocation is Pareto-Optimal if there is no allocation such that all the agents are not worse off and one agent is strictly better off), several notions have been proposed to define the fairness of an allocation.One of the most prominent fairness measures is called envy-freeness. An allocation is said to be envy-free if no agent would like to exchange her bundle of resources with another agent. However, envy-freeness is not guaranteed to exist when considering indivisible goods so various relaxations have been proposed recently in the literature to overcome this limitation.In this thesis, we first thoroughly study a family of decentralized allocation procedures related to exchanges of goods. We analyze how these procedures behave and the desirable properties they exhibit. More specifically, we study sequence of sincere choices and cycle exchanges of resources. We then propose new relaxations of the envy-freeness notion (and also of other fairness measures) and thoroughly study them. Our first relaxation aims at balancing the envy among the agents (when it cannot be avoided) and is based on the Order Weighted Average (OWA) aggregator usually used in multi-criteria optimisation to bring fairness. The second relaxation focuses on the social approval of the envy and is more related to voting theory, as it lets agents vote about the envy of the other agents. We investigate computational issues related to these new relaxations, their link with existing fairness and efficiency notions and we experimentally test them
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ABOUEIMEHRIZI, MOHAMMAD. "Election Control via Social Influence". Doctoral thesis, Gran Sasso Science Institute, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12571/21656.
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In the past, the power of news dissemination was under a few people's control, like newspapers' editors and TV channels. Thanks to social networks, this power is in the hand of everyone now. Social networks became very popular as soon as they were launched, and many societies extensively welcomed them. They have provided an engaging environment so that people can share their moments with their relatives, friends, colleagues, and even their unseen friends (so-called virtual friends) as their `followers.' In this virtual world, people can also share their opinions with their followers by broadcasting a message. Diffusing information and news among the followers will affect them and slightly change their opinions. When a follower is influenced, she may shares/retweets/forwards the message to her own followers and cause more propagation. There are many shreds of evidence that a message shared by few people (even in some cases one person) has been watched by millions of users and went viral. Hence, social media is an inseparable part of our life that can provide many opportunities, e.g., teaching, entertainment, news, and give us the power of sharing our experiences. Researchers have shown that many people prefer to get news from social networks rather than related websites as they are speedy tool to provide news from everywhere.
Therefore, social media is considered one of the most effective tools to manipulate the users' opinions, and it is an attractive means of election control for political campaigns/parties/candidates. As a real example, in the 2016 US presidential election, it has been shown that 92% of Americans saw and remembered pro-Trump fake news stories, 23% remembered pro-Clinton false news, and a very high portion of them believed the news. Moreover, the campaigns can use social influence in order to polarize the users such that a voter receives specific messages in support/oppose of a candidate/party and not all possible messages. These activities impair the integrity of the elections and our democracies because people should have access to all reliable news from different perspectives to make a fair judgment. In this thesis, we investigate the computational aspects of this problem and study different manipulators' strategies to understand how they work. Our goal is to prevent malicious activities as they have enough potential to cause drastic consequences for any society.
We study different aspects of controlling elections utilizing social influence. First, we consider a multi-winner election control where some parties are running for an election, and more than one candidate will be selected as winners. There is a social network of voters and an attacker trying to bribe some users/voters to start a diffusion process and spread a message among them; her goal is to change the voters' opinion regarding a target party. In the constructive model, the attacker tries to maximize the number of winners in the target party, while in the destructive case, she wants to minimize it. In this model, we present some hardness results, approximation guarantee, and polynomial-time algorithms regarding different structures (e.g., graphs, trees, and arborescent), objective functions, diffusion models (e.g., linear threshold and independent cascade models), and different configurations of influencing voters.
Second, we investigate a single-winner election control problem where the attacker does not know the exact voters' preference list; instead, she has/guesses a probability distribution over all candidates for each voter. In this case, we show that the problem is at least as hard to approximate as the Densest-k-subgraph problem, which is hard to approximate for some constant under the exponential time hypothesis. Then we consider a lightly relaxed version and present some hardness and constant factor approximation algorithms for some objective functions regarding both constructive and destructive models. We also examine some real-world social networks and experimentally show that our algorithm works well.
Finally, we present a Stackelberg game variation for competitive election control where there are two players called attacker and defender. They have a budget and the number of their seed nodes should not exceed their budget. The attacker plays first and selects a set of seed nodes to start a diffusion and change the voters' opinion. She knows that the defender is aware of everything and plays afterward. When the attacker's diffusion process is finished, the defender selects her seed nodes to cancel the attacker's influence over the infected voters. Indeed, the attacker tries to maximize the number of infected voters after both diffusion processes, while the defender attempts to minimize it. For simplicity, we first investigate the influence maximization model of this problem and then extend it to the election control through social influence for a single-winner election control problem regarding plurality scoring rule under the independent cascade model. We show that the attacker's problem is $Sigma_2^p$-hard when the defender is able to find an optimal strategy. We also show the same hardness result regarding any approximation algorithm. Moreover, we show that the defender's problem is NP-hard to approximate within any factor $alpha geq 1$. Since the problems are inapproximable, we consider a relaxed version in which the defender selects her seed nodes based on a probability distribution over the nodes, and the attacker is aware of the distribution. In the relaxed model, we give a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the attacker's problem. We also simulate our results and show that the attacker can activate many voters even when the defender can find the optimal solution. Moreover, we show that the greedy influence maximization algorithm works very well for the defender.
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Novaro, Arianna. "Collective decision-making with goals". Thesis, Toulouse 3, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019TOU30179.
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Des agents devant prendre une décision collective sont souvent motivés par des buts individuels. Dans ces situations, deux aspects clés doivent être abordés : sélectionner une alternative gagnante à partir des voix des agents et s'assurer que les agents ne manipulent pas le résultat. Cette thèse étudie l'agrégation et la dimension stratégique des décisions collectives lorsque les agents utilisent un langage représenté de manière compacte. Nous étudions des langages de type logique : de la logique propositionnelle aux CP-nets généralisés, en passant par la logique temporelle linéaire (LTL). Notre principale contribution est l'introduction d'un cadre de vote sur les buts, dans lequel les agents soumettent des buts individuels exprimés comme des formules de la logique propositionnelle. Les fonctions d'agrégation classiques issues du vote, de l'agrégation de jugements et de la fusion de croyances sont adaptées et étudiées de manière axiomatique et computationnelle. Les propriétés axiomatiques connues dans la littérature sur la théorie du choix social sont généralisées à ce nouveau type d'entrée, ainsi que les problèmes de complexité visant à déterminer le résultat du vote. Une autre contribution importante est l'étude de l'agrégation des CP-nets généralisés, c'est-à-dire des CP-nets où la précondition de l'énoncé de préférence est une formule propositionnelle. Nous utilisons différents agrégateurs pour obtenir un classement collectif des résultats possibles. Grâce à cette thèse, deux axes de recherche sont ainsi reliés : l'agrégation des CP-nets classiques et la généralisation des CP-nets à des préconditions incomplètes. Nous contribuons également à l'étude du comportement stratégique dans des contextes de prise de décision collective et de théorie des jeux. Le cadre du vote basé sur les buts est de nouveau étudié sous l'hypothèse que les agents peuvent décider de mentir sur leur but s'ils obtiennent ainsi un meilleur résultat. L'accent est mis sur trois règles de vote majoritaires qui se révèlent manipulables. Par conséquent, nous étudions des restrictions à la fois sur le langage des buts et sur les stratégies des agents en vue d'obtenir des résultats de votes non manipulables. Nous présentons par ailleurs une extension stratégique d'un modèle récent de diffusion d'opinion sur des réseaux d'influence. Dans les jeux d'influence définis ici, les agents ont comme but des formules en LTL et ils peuvent choisir d'utiliser leur pouvoir d'influence pour s'assurer que leur but est atteint. Des solutions classiques telles que la stratégie gagnante sont étudiées pour les jeux d'influence, en relation avec la structure du réseau et les buts des agents. Enfin, nous introduisons une nouvelle classe de concurrent game structures (CGS) dans laquelle les agents peuvent avoir un contrôle partagé sur un ensemble de variables propositionnelles. De telles structures sont utilisées pour interpréter des formules de logique temporelle en temps alternés (ATL), grâce auxquelles on peut exprimer l'existence d'une stratégie gagnante pour un agent dans un jeu itéré (comme les jeux d'influence mentionnés ci-dessus). Le résultat principal montre qu'un CGS avec contrôle partagé peut être représenté comme un CGS avec contrôle exclusif. En conclusion, cette thèse contribue au domaine de la prise de décision collective en introduisant un nouveau cadre de vote basé sur des buts propositionnels. Elle présente une étude de l'agrégation des CP-nets généralisés et une extension d'un cadre de diffusion d'opinion avec des agents rationnels qui utilisent leur pouvoir d'influence. Une réduction du contrôle partagé à un contrôle exclusif dans les CGS pour l'interprétation des logiques du raisonnement stratégique est également proposée. Par le biais de langages logiques divers, les agents peuvent ainsi exprimer buts et préférences sur la décision à prendre, et les propriétés souhaitées pour le processus de décision peuvent en être garantiesAgents having to take a collective decision are often motivated by individual goals. In such scenarios, two key aspects need to be addressed. The first is defining how to select a winning alternative from the expressions of the agents. The second is making sure that agents will not manipulate the outcome. Agents should also be able to state their goals in a way that is expressive, yet not too burdensome. This dissertation studies the aggregation and the strategic component of multi-agent collective decisions where the agents use a compactly represented language. The languages we study are all related to logic: from propositional logic, to generalized CP-nets and linear temporal logic (LTL). Our main contribution is the introduction of the framework of goal-based voting, where agents submit individual goals expressed as formulas of propositional logic. Classical aggregation functions from voting, judgment aggregation, and belief merging are adapted to this setting and studied axiomatically and computationally. Desirable axiomatic properties known in the literature of social choice theory are generalized to this new type of propositional input, as well as the standard complexity problems aimed at determining the result. Another important contribution is the study of the aggregation of generalized CP-nets coming from multiple agents, i.e., CP-nets where the precondition of the preference statement is a propositional formula. We use different aggregators to obtain a collective ordering of the possible outcomes. Thanks to this thesis, two lines of research are thus bridged: the one on the aggregation of complete CP-nets, and the one on the generalization of CP-nets to incomplete preconditions. We also contribute to the study of strategic behavior in both collective decision-making and game-theoretic settings. The framework of goal-based voting is studied again under the assumption that agents can now decide to submit an untruthful goal if by doing so they can get a better outcome. The focus is on three majoritarian voting rules which are found to be manipulable. Therefore, we study restrictions on both the language of the goals and on the strategies allowed to the agents to discover islands of strategy-proofness. We also present a game-theoretic extension of a recent model of opinion diffusion over networks of influence. In the influence games defined here, agents hold goals expressed as formulas of LTL and they can choose whether to use their influence power to make sure that their goal is satisfied. Classical solution concepts such as weak dominance and winning strategy are studied for influence games, in relation to the structure of the network and the goals of the agents. Finally, we introduce a novel class of concurrent game structures (CGS) in which agents can have shared control over a set of propositional variables. Such structures are used for the interpretation of formulas of alternating-time temporal logic, thanks to which we can express the existence of a winning strategy for an agent in a repeated game (as, for instance, the influence games mentioned above). The main result shows by means of a clever construction that a CGS with shared control can be represented as a CGS with exclusive control. In conclusion, this thesis provides a valuable contribution to the field of collective decision-making by introducing a novel framework of voting based on individual propositional goals, it studies for the first time the aggregation of generalized CP-nets, it extends a framework of opinion diffusion by modelling rational agents who use their influence power as they see fit, and it provides a reduction of shared to exclusive control in CGS for the interpretation of logics of strategic reasoning. By using different logical languages, agents can thus express their goals and preferences over the decision to be taken, and desirable properties of the decision process can be ensured
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Barrot, Nathanaël. "Sur les aspects computationnels du vote par approbation". Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PSLED006/document.
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L'objet de cette thèse est l'étude des aspects algorithmiques du vote par approbation. Il s'agit principalement d'une étude théorique des enjeux computationnels soulevés par le vote par approbation dans des contextes de décisions variés. Cependant, j'étudie aussi des questions plus proches de la théorie classique du choix social et je conduis de brèves études expérimentales.Dans un premier temps, l'étude se porte sur une famille générale de règles de vote pour les élections de comités et les référendums multiples à l'aide du vote par approbation. Dans un second temps, je porte mon attention sur un contexte plus général, le vote par approbation sur domaines combinatoires en se basant sur des préférences conditionnelles. Finalement, je me place dans le cadre du vote avec préférences incomplètes pour étudier les problèmes de vainqueurs possibles et nécessaires dans le vote par approbationThe subject of this thesis is the study of computational aspects of approval voting. Most of the works are theoretical results about computational issues raised by approval voting, in many different settings. However, I also study some questions that are more related to classical choice theory, and some problems are investigated through experimental analysis.Firstly, I study a general family of rules for approval voting in the context of committee elections and multiple referenda. Secondly, I focus on a more general setting, approval voting in combinatorial domains, based on conditional preferences. Finally, I consider approval voting in the context of incomplete preferences, to study the possible and necessary winner problems
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Baumeister, Dorothea [Verfasser], Jörg [Akademischer Betreuer] Rothe, Egon [Akademischer Betreuer] Wanke i Ulle [Akademischer Betreuer] Endriss. "Computational Complexity in Three Areas of Computational Social Choice: Possible Winners, Unidirectional Covering Sets, and Judgment Aggregation / Dorothea Baumeister. Gutachter: Egon Wanke ; Ulle Endriss. Betreuer: Jörg Rothe". Düsseldorf : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1027368913/34.
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Loreggia, Andrea. "Iterative Voting, Control and Sentiment Analysis". Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3424803.
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In multi-agent systems agents often need to take a collective decision based on the preferences of individuals. A voting rule is used to decide which decision to take, mapping the agents' preferences over the possible candidate decisions into a winning decision for the collection of agents. In these kind of scenarios acting strategically can be seen in two opposite way. On one hand it may be desirable that agents do not have any incentive to act strategically. That is, to misreport their preferences in order to influence the result of the voting rule in their favor or acting on the structure of the election to change the outcome. On the other hand manipulation can be used to improve the quality of the outcome by enlarging the consensus of the winner. These two different scenarios are studied in this thesis. The first one by modeling and describing a natural form of control named ``replacement control'' and characterizing for several voting rules its computational complexity. The second scenario is studied in the form of iterative voting frameworks where individuals are allowed to change their preferences to change the outcome of the election. Computational social choice techniques can be used in very different scenarios. This work reports a first attempt to introduce the use of voting procedures in the field of sentiment analysis. In this area computer scientists extract the opinion of the community about a specific item. This opinion is extracted aggregating the opinion expressed by each individual which leaves a text in a blog or social network about the given item. We studied and proposed a new aggregation method which can improve performances of sentiment analysis, this new technique is a new variance of a well-known voting rule called Borda.Nei sistemi multi agente spesso nasce la necessità di prendere decisioni collettive basate sulle preferenze dei singoli individui. A tal fine può essere utilizzata una regola di voto che, aggregando le preferenze dei singoli agenti, trovi una soluzione che rappresenti la collettività. In questi scenari la possibilità di agire in modo strategico può essere vista da due diversi e opposti punti di vista. Da una parte può essere desiderabile che gli agenti non abbiano alcun incentivo ad agire strategicamente, ovvero che gli agenti non abbiano incentivi a riportare in modo scorretto le proprie preferenze per influenzare il risultato dell'elezione a proprio favore, oppure che non agiscano sulla struttura del sistema elettorale stesso per cambiarne il risultato finale. D'altra parte l'azione strategica può essere utilizzata per migliorare la qualità del risultato o per incrementare il consenso del vincitore. Questi due diversi scenari sono studiati ed analizzati nella tesi. Il primo modellando e descrivendo una forma naturale di controllo chiamato "replacement control" descrivendo la complessità computazione di tale azione strategica per diverse regole di voto. Il secondo scenario è studiato nella forma dei sistemi di voto iterativi nei quali i singoli individui hanno la possibilità di cambiare le proprie preferenze al fine di influenzare il risultato dell'elezione. Le tecniche di Computational Social Choice inoltre possono essere usate in diverse situazioni. Il lavoro di tesi riporta un primo tentativo di introdurre l'uso di sistemi elettorali nel campo dell'analisi del sentimento. In questo contesto i ricercatori estraggono le opinioni della comunità riguardanti un particolare elemento di interesse. L'opinione collettiva è estratta aggregando le opinioni espresse dai singoli individui che discutono o parlano dell'elemento di interesse attraverso testi pubblicati in blog o social network. Il lavoro di tesi studia una nuova procedura di aggregazione proponendo una nuova variante di una regola di voto ben conosciuta qual è Borda. Tale nuova procedura di aggregazione migliora le performance dell'analisi del sentimento classica.
Książki na temat "Computationnal social choice"
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Moulin, Herve. Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Redaktorzy Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerome Lang i Ariel D. Procaccia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984.
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Rothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner i Irene Rothe. Einführung in Computational Social Choice. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3.
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Handbook of computational social choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
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Trends in Computational Social Choice. Lulu Press, Inc., 2017.
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Conitzer, Vincent, Jérôme Lang, Felix Brandt, Ulle Endriss i Ariel D. Procaccia. Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
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Conitzer, Vincent, Jérôme Lang, Felix Brandt, Ulle Endriss i Ariel D. Procaccia. Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
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Fu, Wai-Tat, Mingkun Gao i Hyo Jin Do. Computational Methods for Socio-Computer Interaction. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198799603.003.0016.
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From the Arab Spring to presidential elections, various forms of online social media, forums, and networking platforms have been playing increasing significant roles in our societies. These emerging socio-computer interactions demand new methods of understanding how various design features of online tools may moderate the percolation of information and gradually shape social opinions, influence social choices, and moderate collective action. This chapter starts with a review of the literature on the different ways technologies impact social phenomena, with a special focus on theories that characterize how social processes are moderated by various design features of user interfaces. It then reviews different theory-based computational methods derived from these theories to study socio-computer interaction at various levels. Specific examples of computational techniques are reviewed to illustrate how they can be useful for influencing social processes for various purposes. The chapter ends with how future technologies should be designed to improve socio-computer interaction.
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Rothe, Jörg, i Irene Rothe. Economics and Computation: An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, and Fair Division. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2016.
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Rothe, Jörg, i Irene Rothe. Economics and Computation: An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, and Fair Division. Springer, 2015.
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Rothe, Jörg, i Irene Rothe. Economics and Computation: An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, and Fair Division. Springer London, Limited, 2015.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaCzęści książek na temat "Computationnal social choice"
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Faliszewski, Piotr, i Rolf Niedermeier. "Parameterization in Computational Social Choice". W Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 1516–20. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_785.
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Faliszewski, Piotr, i Rolf Niedermeier. "Parameterization in Computational Social Choice". W Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 1–5. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_785-1.
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Rothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner i Irene Rothe. "Einleitung". W Einführung in Computational Social Choice, 1–22. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3_1.
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Rothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner i Irene Rothe. "Nichtkooperative Spiele: Gegeneinander spielen". W Einführung in Computational Social Choice, 25–91. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3_2.
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Rothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner i Irene Rothe. "Kooperative Spiele: Miteinander spielen". W Einführung in Computational Social Choice, 93–118. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3_3.
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Rothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner i Irene Rothe. "Präferenzaggregation: Gemeinsame Entscheidungsfindung durch Wählen". W Einführung in Computational Social Choice, 121–214. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3_4.
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Rothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner i Irene Rothe. "Judgment Aggregation: Gemeinsame Urteilsfindung". W Einführung in Computational Social Choice, 215–30. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3_5.
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Rothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner i Irene Rothe. "Cake-cutting: Aufteilung teilbarer Ressourcen". W Einführung in Computational Social Choice, 233–321. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3_6.
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Rothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner i Irene Rothe. "Multiagent Resource Allocation: Aufteilung unteilbarer Ressourcen". W Einführung in Computational Social Choice, 323–40. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3_7.
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Chevaleyre, Yann, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang i Nicolas Maudet. "A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice". W Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 51–69. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69507-3_4.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenia konferencji na temat "Computationnal social choice"
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Kimelfeld, Benny, Phokion G. Kolaitis i Julia Stoyanovich. "Computational Social Choice Meets Databases". W Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/44.
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We develop a novel framework that aims to create bridges between the computational social choice and the database management communities. This framework enriches the tasks currently supported in computational social choice with relational database context, thus making it possible to formulate sophisticated queries about voting rules, candidates, voters, issues, and positions. At the conceptual level, we give rigorous semantics to queries in this framework by introducing the notions of necessary answers and possible answers to queries. At the technical level, we embark on an investigation of the computational complexity of the necessary answers. In particular, we establish a number of results about the complexity of the necessary answers of conjunctive queries involving the plurality rule that contrast sharply with earlier results about the complexity of the necessary winners under the plurality rule.
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Brill, Markus. "From Computational Social Choice to Digital Democracy". W Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/698.
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Digital Democracy (aka e-democracy or interactive democracy) aims to enhance democratic decision-making processes by utilizing digital technology. A common goal of these approaches is to make collective decision-making more engaging, inclusive, and responsive to participants' opinions. For example, online decision-making platforms often provide much more flexibility and interaction possibilities than traditional democratic systems. It is without doubt that the successful design of digital democracy systems presents a multidisciplinary research challenge. I argue that tools and techniques from computational social choice should be employed to aid the design of online decision-making platforms and other digital democracy systems.
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Suksompong, Warut. "Tournaments in Computational Social Choice: Recent Developments". W Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/626.
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Tournaments are commonly used to select winning alternatives in scenarios involving pairwise comparisons such as sports competitions and political elections. This survey discusses recent developments in two major lines of work—tournament solutions and single-elimination tournaments—with a focus on how computational social choice has brought new frameworks and perspectives into these decades-old studies.
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Jamil, Hasan. "A Free-Choice Social Learning Network for Computational Thinking". W 2018 IEEE 18th International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies (ICALT). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icalt.2018.00023.
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Schierreich, Šimon. "Multivariate Analysis and Structural Restrictions in Computational Social Choice". W Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-24}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/966.
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In my research, I focus on computationally hard problems in the area of computational social choice. I am interested in the study of input restrictions that guarantee the existence of efficient and scalable algorithms that can be of practical interest.
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Boehmer, Niclas, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Simon Rey, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanisław Szufa i Tomasz Wąs. "Guide to Numerical Experiments on Elections in Computational Social Choice". W Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-24}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/881.
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We analyze how numerical experiments regarding elections were conducted within computational social choice literature (focusing on papers published in the IJCAI, AAAI, and AAMAS conferences). We analyze the sizes of the studied elections and the methods of generating preference data, thereby making previously hidden standards and practices explicit. In particular, we survey a number of statistical cultures for generating elections and their commonly used parameters.
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Tao, Liangde, Lin Chen, Lei Xu i Weidong Shi. "Local Differential Privacy Meets Computational Social Choice - Resilience under Voter Deletion". W Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/547.
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The resilience of a voting system has been a central topic in computational social choice. Many voting rules, like plurality, are shown to be vulnerable as the attacker can target specific voters to manipulate the result. What if a local differential privacy (LDP) mechanism is adopted such that the true preference of a voter is never revealed in pre-election polls? In this case, the attacker can only infer stochastic information about a voter's true preference, and this may cause the manipulation of the electoral result significantly harder. The goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative study on the effect of adopting LDP mechanisms on a voting system. We introduce the metric PoLDP (power of LDP) that quantitatively measures the difference between the attacker's manipulation cost under LDP mechanisms and that without LDP mechanisms. The larger PoLDP is, the more robustness LDP mechanisms can add to a voting system. We give a full characterization of PoLDP for the voting system with plurality rule and provide general guidance towards the application of LDP mechanisms.
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Wang, Aihe, Yunfeng Luo i Yan Li. "A research of institution design based on social choice". W 2011 Fourth International Workshop on Advanced Computational Intelligence (IWACI). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iwaci.2011.6160096.
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Alouf-Heffetz, Shiri. "Using Liquid Democracy For Attention-Aware Social Choice". W Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/809.
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My PhD research deals with the use of Liquid Democracy (LD) for social choice scenarios, while considering the scarcity of attention as a driving factor. My aim is to better understand LD: theoretically as well as practically; in particular, by establishing containment in certain computational classes for corresponding combinatorial problems, suggesting methods to improve the use of LD, and understand its adaptation to specific scenarios. Concretely, I consider the use of LD as a solution for the problem of low voter attention in light of the high cognitive effort needed by voters to actively participate in voting processes.
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Rofin, Mark, Vladislav Mikhailov, Mikhail Florinsky, Andrey Kravchenko, Tatiana Shavrina, Elena Tutubalina, Daniel Karabekyan i Ekaterina Artemova. "Vote’n’Rank: Revision of Benchmarking with Social Choice Theory". W Proceedings of the 17th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics. Stroudsburg, PA, USA: Association for Computational Linguistics, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.eacl-main.48.
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