Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Chinese Communist Party (CCP)”
Utwórz poprawne odniesienie w stylach APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard i wielu innych
Sprawdź 50 najlepszych rozpraw doktorskich naukowych na temat „Chinese Communist Party (CCP)”.
Przycisk „Dodaj do bibliografii” jest dostępny obok każdej pracy w bibliografii. Użyj go – a my automatycznie utworzymy odniesienie bibliograficzne do wybranej pracy w stylu cytowania, którego potrzebujesz: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver itp.
Możesz również pobrać pełny tekst publikacji naukowej w formacie „.pdf” i przeczytać adnotację do pracy online, jeśli odpowiednie parametry są dostępne w metadanych.
Przeglądaj rozprawy doktorskie z różnych dziedzin i twórz odpowiednie bibliografie.
Zhou, Shanding. "Changes of the Chinese Communist Party’s Ideology and Reform Since 1978". Thesis, Griffith University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/366150.
Pełny tekst źródłaThesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Business School
Griffith Business School
Full Text
Hearn, Kay, i n/a. "Sniffer Packets & Firewalls". University of Canberra. n/a, 2008. http://erl.canberra.edu.au./public/adt-AUC20081217.153550.
Pełny tekst źródłaSmith, Douglas. "Public Spaces, Parks and Democratic Transition: A Case Study of Republican China". Thesis, Griffith University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/366151.
Pełny tekst źródłaThesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Business School
Griffith Business School
Full Text
Dumm, Elena. "Show No Weakness: An Ideological Analysis of China Daily News Coverage of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests". Wittenberg University Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wuhonors1617884910805174.
Pełny tekst źródłaChi, Chia-Lin. "Lee Teng-Hui’s political cross-straits policy and mainland china’s reaction". Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/28534.
Pełny tekst źródłaThesis (DPhil (International Relations))--University of Pretoria, 2004.
Political Sciences
unrestricted
Zhang, Yang. "Taming factions in the Chinese Communist party". Diss., University of Iowa, 2016. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/2170.
Pełny tekst źródłaSanson, Esther Mary. "The Chinese Communist Party and China's Rural Problems". Thesis, University of Canterbury. Languages and Cultures, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/1903.
Pełny tekst źródłaMerrill, Ian Scott. "Exercising Control: Chinese Communist Party Policy Toward Religion". Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/321896.
Pełny tekst źródłaChun, Philip. "The Paths to Power in the Chinese Communist Party". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/867.
Pełny tekst źródłaZhang, Chi. "How does the Chinese Communist Party legitimise its approach to terrorism?" Thesis, University of Leeds, 2018. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/22740/.
Pełny tekst źródłaYoung, Susan Amanda. "The price of modernisation : Chinese Communist Party policy towards intellectuals since 1978 /". Title page, contents and introduction only, 1985. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09AR/09ary76.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaZeng, Jinghan. "The Chinese Communist Party's capacity to rule : legitimacy, ideology, and party cohesion". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2014. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/64241/.
Pełny tekst źródłaDing, Yuanyuan. "The Party, the Oil Companies, and Energy Security: Who Determines Chinese Policy?" unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-04212008-131346/.
Pełny tekst źródłaTitle from file title page. John Duffield, committee chair; Daniel Franklin, Michael Herb, committee members. Electronic text (48 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed August 25, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-48).
Zwisler, Evan. "Tibetan Buddhism and the Chinese Communist Party: Moving Forward in the 21st Century". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/454.
Pełny tekst źródłaBrasnett, Jonathan. "Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese Communist Party authority : the fundamental problem of Dalai Lama leadership". Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/57774.
Pełny tekst źródłaArts, Faculty of
Asian Research, Institute of
Graduate
Feeney, Caitlin. "China's Censored Leap Forward: The Communist Party's Battle with Internet Censorship in the Digital Age". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/408.
Pełny tekst źródłaLiu, Jianyi. "The origins of the Chinese Communist Party and the role played by Soviet Russia and the Comintern". Thesis, University of York, 2000. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/9813/.
Pełny tekst źródłaArantes, Virginie. "From the Avoidable to the Desirable: the Chinese Communist Party "Green" Authoritarian Strategy. Shanghai as Case Study". Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/304319.
Pełny tekst źródłaDoctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
Wu, Yang. "Changing faces in the Chinese Communist revolution : party members and organization building in two Jiaodong counties, 1928-1948". Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/45675.
Pełny tekst źródłaClegg, Jennifer R. "Peasant organisation in the Chinese Revolution : a study of agrarian relations and the methods of the Chinese Communist Party in organising rural struggles". Thesis, University of Manchester, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.734451.
Pełny tekst źródłaGruin, Julian Y. "Communists constructing capitalism : socio-economic uncertainty, Communist party rule, and China's financial development, 1990-2008". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a70d4158-ac36-477c-accb-37f940071a0d.
Pełny tekst źródłaBlizzard, William D. Jr. "The Building of the Shenyang Jianzhu University 1998-2007: A Case Study of the Role of Professor Fuchang Zhang and His Communist Party Network". [Yellow Springs, Ohio] : Antioch University, 2008. http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi?acc_num=antioch1240840793.
Pełny tekst źródłaTitle from PDF t.p. (September 26, 2009). Advisor: Al Guskin. "A dissertation submitted to the Ph. D. in Leadership and Change program of Antioch University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2008"--The title page. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-81).
Bell, James. "Economic Statecraft and Ethnicity in China". Wright State University / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1527196412862614.
Pełny tekst źródłaDouglas, Dan. "Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping: A Trait Analysis". Wright State University / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1500049187715943.
Pełny tekst źródłaGuo, Zhenglin. "Cun min zi zhi yu dang de ling dao : Zhongguo nong cun dang zheng guan xi de lei xing yan jiu = Village self-government and leadership of Chinese Communist Party : study on the types of the relation between the party and village government /". click here to view the abstract and table of contents, 1999. http://net3.hkbu.edu.hk/~libres/cgi-bin/thesisab.pl?pdf=b1564621xa.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaWang, Lili. "Becoming Urban in the Chinese Way: The Politics of Planning and Urban Change in Nanjing, China". The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1480505387185065.
Pełny tekst źródła郭正林. "村民自治與黨的領導 : 中國農村黨政關係的類型硏究 = Village self-government and leadership of Chinese Communist Party : study on the types of the relation between the party and village government". HKBU Institutional Repository, 1999. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/194.
Pełny tekst źródłaKnight, John Marcus. "Our Nation’s Future? Chinese Imaginations of the Soviet Union, 1917-1956". The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu149406768131314.
Pełny tekst źródłaWolfe, Christian J. "Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness". Wright State University / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1629981480039829.
Pełny tekst źródłaWan, Yao-Jun, i 萬耀鈞. "Article:An Analysis of the Information Warfare engaged by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - A Case Study on the Cyber Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)". Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/k7yu9h.
Pełny tekst źródła淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所碩士在職專班
106
The 21st century signifies the era where information technologies are used in non-force wars and the research on the theory of information warfare also reaches the peak in this period. From the experience of success in the Gulf War based on high technologies, the CCP realized that the war has been irreversibly affected by high technologies and information. According to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, China will transform itself from an "Cyber power"into an"Cyber superpower," which demonstrates that the rapid military transformation initiated by the Chinese Communist Party will bring about rapid development of modern high technologies with the information technology as the core. According to the Defense White Paper of "China''s Military Strategy," in order to carry out the military strategic plans, strengthen its military forces under the new situation, and serve the core needs for national security, China should focus on building an information-based military network to win the information war and enhance the system combat capability of the network information system. The network information system shall integrate all kinds of combat forces, units and elements into the overall combat capability and gradually build an integrated, autonomous and synergetic system for joint operations. monographs and internet resources to study on "Cyber force" and the "Strategic Support Forces," analyze their development situations, and provide suggestions for Taiwan′s newly established Command of the Information, Communication Electronic Warfare Force in terms of the research highlights. Keywords: Cyber Force, Strategic Support Forces, Command of the Information, Communication Electronic Warfare Force
Chan, Hsiu-Hui, i 詹綉慧. "A Research on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Criticized the Film ’’Wu Xun Zhuan’’". Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/peqbvf.
Pełny tekst źródła國立中央大學
歷史研究所
104
May 20, 1951, Mao Zedong published the article ’’ We should pay attention to the discussion of the film Wu Xun Zhuan’’ (應當重視電影《武訓傳》的討論)in People's Daily , opened to criticize the film. The film had been acclaimed literary and art circles, also gained praise for Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, but criticized by Mao. The CCP organized a series of critical articles to criticize Wu Xun and the film Wu Xun Zhuan related people and things. After three months of criticism , it was finished at the end of August. Mao Zedong in the article criticized Wu Xun ‘begging up schools’ not to touch the foundation of feudalism, but to promote its feudalism. The film praised of Wu Xun ‘serving the people’ and in contrasted to the peasant revolution failed. Mao thought it was the reactionary bourgeois ideology. Mao therefore expanded to clarify the CCP and literary and art circles within the reactionary ideas. During the ‘Cultural Revolution’, the film's director Sun Yu and actor Zhao Dan have suffered persecution, Laogai, imprisoned in Niupeng and writed self-examination. Until 1985, Hu Qiaomu was in vindication of Wu Xun and the film Wu Xun Zhuan. Hu said Mao was very one-sided, extreme and rough. Wu Xun Zhuan as the first film since the founding of the PRC was criticized , it was also the first banned film. Until 2012, it lifted, the film was special. So, why did Mao criticize it and how did Mao criticize it ? After being criticized open arts rectification campaign and movie unified. These will be discussed in this dissertation.
Shan, Wei-Shuenn, i 許惟順. "Military Strategy of the CCP(Chinese Communist Party)Navy in the South China Sea". Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/65032005091694148132.
Pełny tekst źródła淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
100
The South China Sea is known to hold abundant crude petroleum resources. This has led to many sovereign and political controversies in the region, and prompted countries bordering the South China Sea to emphasize their ability to project regional power while at the same time allying with the US through joint maneuvers as well as economic co-operation to ensure their interests. In recent years the PRC has achieved considerable technological advancement on the strength of their booming economic growth in the past decades, and this has brought their weapons development to another level. As a result, their role in the South China Sea has changed to a certain extent. With Chinese nationalism on the rise, consolidating national interests has become their first priority, and their sea power strategy has changed. The PRC’s real intention now is to use the South China Sea as an opportunity to aggressively expand its sea power by developing new lines of surface and subsurface naval vessels as well as aircraft carriers. There is no doubt that the PRC intends to build up a formidable military power that will enable it to hold opposing forces at bay and enjoy absolute superiority in the region. This research relies primarily upon the “documentary analysis method,” referencing professional publications to discuss the direction and purpose of PRC military strategy, how the CCP Navy is developing and changing, and changes in the country''s South China Sea military strategy as well as the impact thereof. This research will also include an “Expert In-depth Interview” to further reinforce the points made through documentary analysis. In addition, with the help of “Scenario Analysis” we can trace evidence of a correlation between changes in the CCP naval development strategy and its South China Sea military strategy. This study will go on to examine linkages between the PRC’s naval strategy and its disputes with South China Sea nations, an on that basis will explore the future direction of the PRC’s military strategy vis-à-vis the South China Sea. Through this research, we have come to a realization that sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea are handled in one of two ways. One approach relies on diplomacy, while the other relies on military force, and the impact of the approach employed determines whether problems will be mitigated or exacerbated. A military approach is more likely to intensify problems, while a diplomatic approach is more likely to mitigate them.The interplay between escalation and defusing of tensions has given rise to a model for movement toward conflict. This model enables us to understand the reasons for conflict, the processes thereof, and whether the situation will move in the direction of war or peace. This model can facilitate the development of a more reasonable basis for deciding whether to use military or diplomatic means to handle regional conflicts and controversies. In the expert’s interview, we learn that future PRC policies on South China Sea are likely to stress several points: aircraft carriers as the starting point for strengthening command and control capabilities; a dual focus on development of both surface and subsurface vessels; preventing seizure of islands by other nations, and strengthening the nation''s capacity to project military power; and use of non-bellicose military action to bolster the nation''s strategic undertakings. The CCP (PLA) navy regards enhancement of its sea power as the foundation for achievement of the following goals: upgrading of its military capabilities; improvement of its ability to hold opposing forces at bay; consolidation of its national sovereignty; maintenance of the PRC''s access to petroleum; and assurance that petroleum shipping lanes are kept open. South China Sea controversies are now becoming a global issue. It would thus be beneficial for our country to issue a public statement on the South China Sea issue. We have several preliminary suggestions for current South China Sea policy: 1. The government should move toward establishing a national-level strategic plan for the South China Sea. 2. We should develop basic infrastructures in the Pratas Islands and on Taiping Island. 3. We should boost our ability to defend these two islands. It is hoped that the above will serve as useful reference for the ROC authorities, and that they will promote our country’s development in the South China Sea.
Lee, Shu-fen, i 李淑芬. "A Study on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Governing Xinjiang and the Early Development of the Production and Construction Corps (1949-1966)". Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41737371199327027199.
Pełny tekst źródła國立中央大學
歷史研究所碩士在職專班
100
After the emancipation of Xinjiang, the People’s Liberation Army in Xinjiang immediately incorporated the troops led by Tao Shi-Yue and the National Army in Ili,Tuscaloosa and Koy-Assa. In order to effectively suppress the anti-communist forces and meet the large demands of army provisions in Xinjiang, CCP set up the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps by following the ancient method of stationing troops and reclaiming and safeguarding the border regions. Established in 1954, the corps experienced two important stages from 1949 to 1966: Lasting from October 1949 to the end of 1957, the first stage is the fundamental and also the hardest period for agricultural reclamation in Xinjiang. Before the establishment of the corps, troops entered and were stationed in every region in Xinjiang to suppress the anti-communist forces and stabilize CCP political power. In order to encourage self-sufficiency, they set up army reclamation farms there. After the establishment of the corps, they shifted their priority from armed struggle to economic development like planning and construction of state-run livestock farms and overall efforts geared toward economic development. The second stage from 1958 to May 1966 is the height of the development period of the corps. During this period, the corps rapidly developed into an agricultural reclamation system of strong economic strength. Meanwhile, in order to deal with the Itard Incident caused by the worsening relations between China and the Soviet Union, the corps received instructions to establish farms along the Sino-Soviet border and took the task of stationing troops and reclaiming and safeguarding the border regions. The development of the corps is not only related to Xinjiang’s stabilization and development but also the Sino-Soviet border safety.
Cheng, yi-shin, i 陳義興. "Chinese Communist Party Unions". Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30485633339292721788.
Pełny tekst źródła國立中山大學
大陸研究所
93
Abstract As Marx said, workers can fight owing to their impoverishment. So before the Chinese Communist Party taking the sovereignty, the unions and working class played the part as the vanguard. During the primary phase in building the sovereignty, the Chinese Communist Party still gave certain weight to the union. Trade Unions Act, Land Reform Law, and Marital Law called three principal law in primary phase were all adopted. But as the public ownership of socialism was set up, the unions were marginalized because the formation of “unit” system. Besides, under the extreme thoughts of “Left”, legal nihilism interfered in the development of national legal system. When “Revolutionary Labor Convention” replaced the local and basic unions during the Cultural Revolution, the unions had functioned nothing to zero. After the 11th The Third Plenary Session of the Communism Central Executive Committee, the political and economical reformation led to relation’s transformation between the party and labor. It then prompted the collapse of social control by nation. Furthermore, to expand the non-state-run industry needs to organize union. In addition, workers’ demonstration in Poland in July 1980 and the appeals for democratization in Tian''anmen Square in 1989 both influenced the labor movement quite much at that time. But the unions in China were not fully recovered and developed until the economic globalization, especially being a member of WTO. That forced the Chinese Communist Party to adjust the labor right policy. And by reforming the unions, the Chinese Communist Party attained to the independence, democracy and publicity of the unions. But in order to attract foreign investment and develop the economics, Chinese Communist Party did not apply enough measures to the non-state-run industries. The rate of organization in non-state-run industries can not be compared with state-run ones. After reformation and openness, the change in labor relation made protecting labor’s legal rights the most principal obligation and function out of unions’ four functions. And all they mainly through the followings to attain this. 1. participating the legislation and policy making; 2.involving in the negotiation between the labor, capital and official; 3.signing the collective contract under equal negotiations; 4.settling the labor dispute etc. At higher level, the unions may participate the politics.At lower level, labor convention inside the industry is also a basic form to organize the labor participate the democracy. By which the labor will practice the autonomy . The workers’ rights in China will not be worse than the ones in capitalist countries if the unions there can really exercise the rights endowed with law. But in reality, the exercise of the unions must be based on the operative principles .That is, “the unions’ activities should concentrate on the economic buildup and insist the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party”. Therefore, under such considerations labor’s rights may be sacrificed. And as the Chinese scholar Feng said, the unions or labor convention in China are more functional than beneficial ones.
Kositz, Bryce William. "Chinese Communist Party Historiography of the 1911 Revolution, 1935-1976". Phd thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/144233.
Pełny tekst źródłaTien, Fei-Sheng, i 田飛生. "Elite Recruitment in the Chinese Communist Party : A Case Study of the Sixteenth Party Congress". Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/80948604135560898749.
Pełny tekst źródła淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
92
According to the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) charter, the national party congress serves three major tasks: firstly, to establish ideological, political, and organizational guidelines for the party through the ratification of Central Committee’s work report; secondly, to revise the party’s organizational charters according to the new guidelines; thirdly, to establish a new central leadership. The major objective of this study is to investigate into the process of elite recruitment in the central committee during the sixteenth party congress. In order to further our understanding of CCP elites’ advancement to their current positions, the following questions will be examined: Are there any special institutional and political features in the recruitment process of the sixteenth party congress compared to previous ones? What are the development and impact of the “four standards of cadre promotion” on CCP’s political recruitment process? What are the political implications of the leadership lineup of the sixteenth party congress? What are the possible interaction between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao during the power transition period? In this thesis, “elites” are defined as talents who earned their qualifications through a selection process; “recruitment” is defined as the selection of talents to fill up official positions. While political elites contend for official posts via regular and open elections in democracies, the recruitment of political elites in authoritarian regimes, such as China, have been done in less institutionalized manners. The first and second generation Chinese leaders (contemporaries of Mao Zedong and Den Xiaoping) earned their qualifications with their credentials as revolutionary war heroes and with their own charisma. Yet the demand for more definite and transparent rules of recruitment to build up the legitimacy of new leadership has become stronger for the third and fourth generation leaders (contemporaries of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) who do not enjoy the same political authority as their predecessors did. According to the observation of some China specialists, this demand for procedural transparency has been the driving force behind the expansion of “intra-party democracy” in the CCP in recent years. This study analyzes the leadership lineup of the sixteenth Central Committee with special attention to the members and standing members of the political bureau, the central secretariat, and the central military commission. The major findings of this study are as follows. Firstly, while the national party congress holds the final say in the recruitment of national leaders, it is only the vertical dimension of political recruitment in China. An investigation into the changeover of provincial level party secretaries (usually immediately before the party congress) and of the National People’s Consultation Conference (held right after the congress) will reveal the horizontal dimension of political recruitment process. Secondly, the new leadership lineup ratified by the sixteenth party congress has manifested an incremental overall handover of power from the third to the fourth generation leaders. Nevertheless, the process of political succession at the top is still contingent on the wills of a few central leaders in the political bureau. Thirdly, the fact that Hu Jintao, the new general secretary of the CCP, has not assumed the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission indicates the existence of factional power struggle within the central leadership. Fourthly, although the political succession process in the sixteenth party congress was done in an opaque and uncertain manner as usual, the historical trends of peaceful generational transfer of power and continual institutionalization of power transfers move further. Lastly, the fourth generation leaders as a whole are technocrats who are younger, better educated, and have more professional experience than previous generations.
Yu, Chung-Kwang, i 游重光. "On the Chinese Communist Party''s "Anti-Peaceful Evolution" (1989-1994)". Thesis, 1999. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56949176838437610346.
Pełny tekst źródła淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所
87
The goal of this research is to investigate and present an analytical description of Chinese Communist Party''s subjective understanding of the West''s "peaceful evolution" in the post-cold war period (especially in the wake of the June 6, 1989 Tiananmen incident) and the aspect of the struggles caused by the influence of the objective international environment, and introduce the inherent conventional factors and internal pressure factors that compel the communist authorities to oppose peaceful evolution. The reference literature includes Chinese and foreign periodicals, primarily monographs, and a conventional analysis of this literature is performed. This paper contains four chapters plus an introduction and a conclusion. The first chapter compares Chinese Communist Party''s subjective understanding of "peaceful evolution" with the objective international environment. The second chapter analyzes the factors that compel CCP to oppose peaceful evolution, namely its own historical background, the ideological crisis, the administrative crisis, and the pressure of corruption. The third chapter investigates of the direction of economic reform, spiritual culture, and nationalistic education policies realization under the new interpretation of the theory of diplomacy and socialism. The fourth chapter assesses the effects of peaceful evolution, explains the role played by nationalism vis-a-vis peaceful evolution, and notes restrictions limiting the utilization of the literature. On the whole, the Chinese Communist Party authorities have attemptted to merge socialism and nationalism, and take this as the principal content of their opposition to peaceful-evolution. The CCP will strengthen and consolidate national power in diplomatic affairs and economic development. The increasing reliance on nationalism as a means of opposing peaceful evolution will discolse the irrelvance of socialism in the face of peaceful evolution''s counterattack. The CCP''s understanding is that reliance only on new interpretations and new developments of theory and the system is insufficient for a strong sense of psychological security.
Liu, Tung-Shu, i 劉東旭. "The Chinese Communist Party central Asia strategy moves towards the research". Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/42596340415464462398.
Pełny tekst źródła淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
96
Central Asia contains plentiful sources of energy and is the only place where the energy has not been developed yet in the whole word. The reason causes major powers prolonging their influence to control Central Asia countries. After 911, the USA makes excuses of anti-terrorism to send troops into Afghanistan which challenging the deployment of China’s strategy towards Central Asia. Under the circumstance, China has adopted some methods to deal with the threaten of USA, they are as follows : 1、China develops cooperative relation with the USA by using the issue of combating terrorism. It is helpful that the direct conflict of both countries in Central Asia’s interest could be avoided. 2、China uses the method of multilateral diplomacy which includes cooperation and exchange in culture, technical and educational field to enhance relationship with Russia and Central Asia countries. 3、China signed an agreement with Kazakhstan to build an oil pipe which is going to connect with Central Asia’s oil transportation network. And this will bring China to be an irreplaceable strategic position in “Pan-Asia global energy bridge”. Not only China has adopted diversiform ways to maintain and strive for the benefit in Central Asia, but also the major power such as USA and Russia does too. The future tendency of Central Asia still needs longtime observation.
Wang, Wen-Tser, i 王文澤. "The Study of the Chinese Communist Party Cultivated in Political Elites". Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/40597161756819319952.
Pełny tekst źródła淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
98
The objective existence does not transfer with subjective will. According to Marxist philosophy, nothing transfers with human’s subjective will no matter on science, social studies, history, or human thoughts. In the understanding rule, the assurance rule, and in terms of the rule, can develop the human subjective will of creativeness correctly. But the affairs internal contradiction unceasingly with the movement and the solution process is “development”. The old contradiction was solved, with the result that the new one would be come up. The affairs develop with spiral type forward according to this rule, repeatedly, “contradictory” namely for development power. Thus, by observing the political elites cultivated model in the central of Chinese Communist Party could discover the model of the central, has swayed in the contradiction between “the ideology orientation” and “the technical specialized orientation” all along since establishing the government. The Chinese Communist Party recover the postwar economy in new democracy time, with the aim of being socialism fast, has begun using a lot of technical specialized bureaucrat; this time “the technical specialized orientation” has exceeded “the ideology orientation” slightly. In Three Red Flag times, it had intense struggle between “the ideology” and “the expert”, and had the victory mutually. But in the Cultural Revolution time, “the ideology” had substituted “the expert” completely, also had caused Mainland China turbulent politics and depressed economy. After reform and open policy, the central of Chinese Communist Party had cultivated political elites from technical specialized bureaucracy in order to reconstruct rational bureaucracy of Mainland China; “the expert” had got ahead “the ideology” for the time being. But, it is noteworthy that the central of Chinese Communist Party cultivates political elites in present age, “the ideology” is not opposite of “the expert” or exclusion completely but infiltration and dialectic relations mutually. Mainland China emphasizes economic development currently, and therefore needs the massive technical experts. However, the political objective only draws back the inferior position, not be substituted completely. In the cultivated process, it is still important estimate standard regarding the purity of “party character”,” party morality”, and the loyalty of “insisted that Chinese Communist Party leads”, “insisted Chinese characteristic socialism”. 表單編號:ATRX-Q03-001-FM031-01
Huang, Ching-hsien, i 黃清賢. "Dialectics of Globalization and Localization on the Chinese Communist Party''s Ideology". Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ck4md4.
Pełny tekst źródła國立中山大學
大陸研究所
95
The foundation of the Chinese Communist Party was originated from the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the May Forth movement in 1919. Of the two events, the former inherited the ideological characteristics of “globalization” on Marxism, while the latter embodied the ideological features of “localization” on nationalism. Up to now, the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party has still been involving the dialectics of “globalization” and “localization”. This doctoral dissertation first elaborates on the research motivation, purpose, method, documents, framework and so forth. It then continues to expound on the definitions of ideology, dialectics, globalization and localization. The third chapter discusses Marxism and Leninism which are the origins of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology. Chapter four analyzes how Mao Zedong conducted the dialectics of ideology and helped the Chinese Communist Party to seize power. Chapter five explores why Mao Zedong led the dialectics of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology to advance the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The sixth chapter studies how Deng Xiaoping guided the dialectics of ideology and promoted the Chinese Communist Party to transform a political movement into an economic reform. Chapter seven investigates why and how Jiang Zemin, and later, Hu Jintao carry on the dialectics of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology and construct the important thought of Three Represents, harmonious society of socialism, etc. Chapter eight concludes the achievements and discoveries of this research. Be it Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, or, as a matter of fact, regardless of whoever was or is in charge, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party invariably conducts the dialectics of ideology on the “globalization” of Marxism-Leninism and the “localization” of the Chinese Communist Party in power. Based on the successful experience of “localization” of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communist Party expects to achieve the goal of “globalization” of the Marxism-Leninism.
Hsiao, Chin-yen, i 蕭錦炎. "The Impact of Village Election on the Rule of Chinese Communist Party". Thesis, 1999. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/63246966997379735620.
Pełny tekst źródłaKim, Tae-hee, i 金泰姬. "The Chinese Communist Party and Local People's Congress Since the 1980's". Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/58943754125876240523.
Pełny tekst źródłaShen, Lin Mei, i 沈伶鎂. "Liberation and discipline: the Chinese communist party and gender discourse. (1921-1949)". Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78545344950812060530.
Pełny tekst źródłaKuo, Yi-Chi, i 郭怡岐. "A study of the Eleventh Party Congress of Chinese Communist Party and the following development of it". Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/50502101501097352535.
Pełny tekst źródła國立中央大學
歷史研究所碩士在職專班
98
In the late years of Mao Zedong, whose successor was the focus of events, though Deng Xiaoping had performed well in the reform activity taken place in 1975, his opinions regarding the Cultural Revolution were quite different from those of Mao; therefore, Deng was forced to undertake his personal 3rd stepping down from the power, due to the “April Fifth Movement”. Finally, Hua Guofeng became the successor of Mao, he overthrew “the Gang of Four ”, and terminated the Cultural Revolution spanning a period of ten years. As people across the nation hoped that Hua Guofeng could correct the mistaken “Leftist” implemented for past years; in contrast, he still continued to execute the false strategies of Mao arising in his late years. In the Eleventh Party Congress of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hua announced to continue the “class struggle”, presenting “two whatevers”, which contributed to the failure of the correction. Ultimately, Deng Xiaoping resumed his job because of the negotiation and supports of senior governors, he frustrated the prestige of Hua by means of commending opposite ideology, demonstrating his philosophy in relation to politics and economics to obtain supports; hence, the Thrid Plenum of Eleventh Party Congress ensured Deng the position of top leader in the CCP. The Thrid Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress disapproved the policies determined in the Eleventh Party Congress, presented to transfer the overall works of the party to the modernization construction, reforming the party, organization, redressing those mishandled cases of jurisdiction, promoting the reforms regarding industry and agriculture, thereby lifting the economic development of China. Hua Guofeng fell out of the power after the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress of CCP, due to his faults in economic policies and “two whatevers”. After assumption of the top leader, Deng Xiaoping set the “open-door and reform” economic policy, from then on, China formally escaped from the era of Mao during which frequent class struggle were taking place.
Hsieh, Chu-chih, i 謝曲治. "The Research of Chinese Political Situation During the 9th Chinese Communist Party Congress (The 9th Congress)". Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/28mj3m.
Pełny tekst źródła國立中央大學
歷史研究所碩士在職專班
96
The Research of Chinese Political Situation During the 9th Chinese Communist Party Congress (The 9th Congress) Abstract The 9th Chinese Communist Party Congress was held in 1969. This Congress was deeply influenced by The China’s Cultural Revolution while it was taking place (1966-1976).The 9th Congress continued the sprit of proletarian revolution. Due to the particular timing, the 9th Congress was different from the previous one. Mao hosted the 9th Congress to celebrate the victory of China’s Cultural Revolution and the primary purpose was to win over more and more united Chinese people. At that time, Lin Biao and Jiang Qing were both open strife and veiled struggle. The Chinese political situation was sly and shrewd. Mao wanted the Congress of victors, but it was difficult. There are four topics in this research. First, why did Mao bring down Peng Dir White after Lushan meeting (1959)? Liu Shaoqi was Mao’s preferable successor during the 7th Congress. Why did Liu Shaoqi be refuted afterwards ? Second, why did Mao adopt Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan’s political report? How did this report affect the 9th Congress and China’s political situation in the future? Third, the armed force threat from Soviet caused the evacuation of China government cadre members in 1969. Was Liu Shaoqi involved in this event? Lin Biao issued First Order and urged that China should keep the position of chairman. Is it against Mao’s idea? Forth, Mao got lots of assistance from Lin Biao in the issues of Three Red Flags, Personality Cult and the starting of Culture Revolution. Mao made an exception to let Lin Biao to be his successor and wrote it in the party constitution. But Mao broke up with Lin Biao when Lin Biao started the conflict with Zhang Chunqiao in Lushan Meeting(1970). Why did Mao break up with Lin Biao to protect Zhang Chunqiao? The issues mentioned above will be researched in this thesis.
Cheng-Li-Lin i 林政澧. "Xi Jinping of 「China Dream」and Chinese Communist party of Country Publicity Strategy". Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82772568918465151125.
Pełny tekst źródła淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士班
103
Propaganda of the right to speak, is an important tool under the Communist Party and government institutions, leaders consolidate leadership, advocacy thought "China Dream" theory of fifth-generation leader Xi Jinping put forward, the most important reason of course is to be able to construct a part of his ideology, in order to establish a position of authority within the party theory to construct the foundation for their ideology. So, if we can successfully construct "China Dream" in theory, will help to establish the rule of authority Xi Jinping, allowing access to the CCP''s propaganda and ideological identity and trust of the people.
Wang, Linlin. "Another way out : the wartime communist movement in Jiangsu, 1937-1945". Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5635.
Pełny tekst źródłatext
HAN韓家德, CHIA-TE, i 韓家德. "A Study of Chinese Communist Party Military Relations - Case Study of the seventeenth largest". Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73352461301445666460.
Pełny tekst źródła淡江大學
中國大陸研究所碩士在職專班
99
Communist China is the communist country has been party-military relations, but also military and political experts at home and abroad are interested in research issues. Especially after the congress by Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin and the ruling party, government, and military leaders of the three powers one of the literati, Communist Party of Communist China military relations have become important political and military focus of the CPC. Traditional Communist party-military relations has repeatedly adhered to the "party leader" to a military mission 1990s transition period, domestic and international situation changes, and enhance the modernization and professionalization of the armed forces, whether military role and the party will give the military a total of relations challenges? Hu Jintao, the Chinese Communists took over the military power is becoming another military strongman? Communist Party Congress, the Communist Party head of the military division, will give party-military relations is the new Communist party-military relations? These issues gradually scholars to study Chinese military and political concerns. Therefore, this paper aims to review Hu Jintao at the congress of the Communist Party after the military relations, and the future after the age of eighteen major trend of party-military relations; and the Communist Party Congress, for example, to examine the fourth generation of the fifth generation of the CPC and the future party-military relations. This paper studies the relationship between the military of the Chinese Communist Party - Communist Party Congress as an example. Discussed include: Communist party-military relations and interactions for the congress of the Communist Party after the years after the previous military relations and the differences in the system, but also to the Communist leaders in defense policy, military defense policy changes or the differences , Communist Party Congress, the complement system in the political elite, how to adjust the screening operation and planning, scheduling and political succession, and the stable development of the party to make a military relationship; of the emphasis on "the party''s absolute leadership over the military," the political thinking on the future of the party the impact and influence of the military relations and military relations between the party congress after the assessment, and to explore whether the Hu Jintao regime has a substantial effect. Looking ahead, the military relations between the Communist Party of the situation at home and abroad, and military modernization and professionalization of the urgent need, coupled with the "Military Law", "nationalization of the military" has become a party-military relations with new challenges. Communist Party Congress to modify the content of the constitution, law officers and echelon fixed succession succession, and the class level, position limits on retirement decisions, whether the Chinese Communist Party stay in power, monopoly power, control the armed forces, it is worth inquiry. In addition to the military of the relationship between the CPC should continue to be of the observations, the later development of national security policy, we must pay more attention to the future development trend of its armed forces and strengthen the cognitive and as we should to protect our national security.
Lutze, Thomas D. "The Battle for the Middle Forces United States relations with the Chinese Communist Party /". 1989. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/20863745.html.
Pełny tekst źródłaTypescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 143-148).
張妍庭. "Research on the system of recruitment of leading cadres by the Chinese communist party". Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/00797296677549283408.
Pełny tekst źródła