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Schwitzgebel, Eric. "Knowing Your Own Beliefs". Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 35 (2009): 41–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2009.10717643.
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How do you know your own beliefs? And how well do you know them? The two questions are related. I'll recommend a pluralist answer to the first question. The answer to the second question, I'll suggest, varies depending on features of the case.Self-scanning. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2003) say this: You have in your mind a functionally defined “belief box.” To believe some propositionP is just to have a representation with the content “P” in the belief box. You also have a monitoring mechanism that can scan the contents of the belief box. Normally, you come to know what you believe by deploying that scanner, creating a new belief in the belief box, a belief with the content “I believe thatP.” Self-scanning accounts admit of many possible variations and complications (e.g., Armstrong 1968, 1981, 1999; Lycan 1996; Goldman 2006), but the basic idea is that people have one or more interior monitors or scanners that detect the presence of beliefs and produce, as output, beliefs about those beliefs (or judgments about those beliefs, or representations of those beliefs).
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Battigalli, Pierpaolo, i Giacomo Bonanno. "The Logic of Belief Persistence". Economics and Philosophy 13, nr 1 (kwiecień 1997): 39–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100004296.
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The principle of belief persistence, or conservativity principle, states that ‘When changing beliefs in response to new evidence, you should continue to believe as many of the old beliefs as possible’ (Harman, 1986, p. 46). In particular, this means that if an individual gets new information, she has to accommodate it in her new belief set (the set of propositions she believes), and, if the new information is not inconsistent with the old belief set, then (1) the individual has to maintain all the beliefs she previously had and (2) the change should be minimal in the sense that every proposition in the new belief set must be deducible from the union of the old belief set and the new information (see, e.g., Gärdenfors, 1988; Stalnaker, 1984). We focus on this minimal notion of belief persistence and characterize it both semantically and syntactically.
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Chappell, T. D. J. "Does Protagoras refute himself?" Classical Quarterly 45, nr 2 (grudzień 1995): 333–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800043433.
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Protagoras believes that all beliefs are true. Since Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true is itself a belief, it follows (somewhat trivially, perhaps?) from Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true that Protagoras' belief is true. But what about the belief that Protagoras' belief is false? Doesn't it follow, by parallel reasoning and not at all trivially, that if all beliefs are true and there is a belief that Protagoras' belief is false, then Protagoras' belief is false?
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Williams, Peter. "Beliefs supporting belief". Philosophers' Magazine, nr 7 (1999): 56–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1999768.
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PLANTINGA, ALVIN. "Swinburne and Plantinga on internal rationality". Religious Studies 37, nr 3 (wrzesień 2001): 357–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412501225712.
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I took it that the definitions Swinburne quotes imply that all of a person's basic beliefs are (privately) rational; Swinburne demurs. It still seems to me that these definitions have this consequence. Let me briefly explain why. According to Swinburne, a person's evidence consists of his basic beliefs, weighted by his confidence in them. So presumably we are to think of S's evidence as the set of the beliefs he takes in the basic way, together with a sort of index indicating, for each of those beliefs, his degree of confidence in that belief. Now it is clear, first, that different basic beliefs can be held with different degrees of confidence. I believe 2+1 = 3 more firmly than there are presently some large trees in my backyard, and I believe that second proposition more firmly than I played bridge last night. Nevertheless, I believe all three propositions; I don't just believe them probably. So, the set of my basic beliefs contains propositions, all of which I believe. Further, a belief of mine is ‘rendered (evidentially) probable by [my] evidence’, I take it, just if it is probable with respect to the set of my basic beliefs. But of course probability of 1 with respect to that set; the degree of confidence with which I hold those beliefs does not seem to be relevant. Hence my conclusion that on these definitions all of my basic beliefs are rational.Swinburne points out that some of my basic beliefs may be improbable with respect to the rest of my basic beliefs; these beliefs, then, might be thought irrational, at least if they are not held as firmly as those with respect to which they are improbable. But this seems to me an uninteresting sense of ‘irrational’. Many of my basic beliefs are improbable with respect to my other basic beliefs; they are none the worse for that. I now remember, as it seems to me, that in the second bridge hand last night I was dealt three aces, three jacks, and three deuces. This is unlikely on the rest of my basic beliefs. It is, nonetheless, not irrational in any useful sense; memory is an important and independent source of rational belief, a source such that its deliverances do not necessarily depend, for warrant or rationality, on their probability with respect to other basic beliefs. I believe the same goes for some of my Christian beliefs. They may be improbable with respect to other beliefs, basic or otherwise, that I hold; but that need be nothing whatever against them.
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Alston, William P. "Does God have Beliefs?" Religious Studies 22, nr 3-4 (wrzesień 1986): 287–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500018333.
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Beliefs are freely attributed to God nowadays in Anglo–American philosophical theology. This practice undoubtedly reflects the twentieth–century popularity of the view that knowledge consists of true justified belief (perhaps with some needed fourth component). (After all no one supposes that God has beliefs in addition to, or instead of knowledge.) The connection is frequently made explicit. If knowledge is true justified belief then whatever God knows He believes. It would seem that much recent talk of divine beliefs stems from Nelson Pike's widely discussed article, ‘Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action’. In this essay Pike develops a version of the classic argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will in terms of divine forebelief. He introduces this shift by premising that ‘A knows X’ entails ‘A believes X’. As a result of all this, philosophers have increasingly been using the concept of belief in defining ‘omniscience’.
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Vidal, Javier. "El autoconocimiento de las creencias: una objeción al método de la transparencia". Humanities Journal of Valparaiso, nr 14 (29.12.2019): 429. http://dx.doi.org/10.22370/rhv2019iss14pp429-448.
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According to the method of transparency, genuine self-knowledge is the outcome of an inference from world to mind. A. Byrne (2018) has developed a theory in which the method of transparency consists in following an epistemic rule in order to form self-verifying second-order beliefs. In this paper, I argue that Byrne’s theory does not establish sufficient conditions for having self-knowledge of first-order beliefs. Examining a case of self-deception, I strive to show that following such a rule might not result in self-knowledge when one is involved in rational deliberation. In the case under consideration, one precisely comes to believe that one believes that p without coming to believe that p. The justification for one’s not forming the belief that p with its distinctive causal pattern in mental life and behaviour, is that one already had the unconscious belief that not-p, a belief that is not sensitive to the principles governing theoretical and practical reasoning.
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Samraj, Tennyson. "Epistemic Awareness of Doxastic Distinctions: Delineating Types of Beliefs in Belief-Formation". ATHENS JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 1, nr 1 (20.01.2022): 37–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajphil.1-1-3.
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Doxastic distinctions help us define the basis and biases in belief–formation. Empirical and extra-empirical justification play an important role in determining doxastic distinctions. When we distinguish the different types of beliefs, we understand (1) that there are basically three kinds of beliefs, namely, verifiable, falsifiable, and unfalsifiable beliefs. Empirical justification provides the basis for establishing the veracity of verifiable and falsifiable beliefs. Extra-empirical justification provides the basis for establishing the veracity of unfalsifiable or irrefutable beliefs. (2) Verifiable or falsifiable beliefs that are reductive require the mandatory acceptance of their truth. However, unfalsifiable beliefs which are non-reductive require the volitional acceptance of their truth. Because there is both empirical and extra-empirical justification in belief-formation, we can accept beliefs with or without, against, or regardless of empirical evidence. Unfalsifiable beliefs do not mean that these beliefs are unjustifiable; it simply means that these beliefs are not empirically justifiable. Understanding the basis and biases of belief-formation is to be aware of how we come to know what we believe. As empirical basis allows us to hold beliefs based on either the principle of confirmation or falsification. Extra-empirical basis, namely phenomenological conjectures, allows us to hold beliefs founded on existential assertions. The intent of this paper is to present doxastic distinctions to help us understand the basis and biases associated with belief-formation. As long as epistemic claims are accepted, and their content is considered believable, the means used to arrive at those beliefs must also be respected. Every doxastic distinction not only provides the basis for belief-formation but also defines the role and limits of both empirical and extra-empirical justification in belief-formation. When we recognize the different types and different ways of justifying beliefs: we understand (1) why we can accept beliefs with or without evidence; against or regardless of empirical justification, and (2) know when to define beliefs as Plato argued as justified true belief and when to define beliefs as justified belief-decisions. Keywords: beliefs, justified true belief; justified belief-decisions, empirical and extra-empirical
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Prims, J. P. "Call it a conspiracy: How conspiracy belief predicts recognition of conspiracy theories". PLOS ONE 19, nr 4 (18.04.2024): e0301601. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0301601.
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While conspiracy theories are treated as irrational fringe beliefs in popular culture, conspiracy belief is quite common. Given the disconnect between stereotypes about conspiracy belief and its prevalence, I tested whether people have difficulty recognizing the conspiracy theories that they believe as conspiracy theories. Across two studies I demonstrate that people have considerable difficulty identifying conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories, particularly when they do not take much time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. This is consistent with the notion that people experience “conspiracy blindness.” People have trouble recognizing the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories because they do not take the time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. In Study 2, I demonstrate that people can overcome their conspiracy blindness and recognize the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories when they are given a definition for “conspiracy theory” and asked to consider their answer. This suggests that people are typically ignorant of their own conspiracy beliefs, but capable of recognizing them when given the tools and motivation to do so. However, recognizing their beliefs as conspiracy theories does not reduce their adherence to those beliefs.
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Donahue, Sean. "Knowledge exclusion and the rationality of belief". Analysis 79, nr 3 (6.12.2018): 402–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/any078.
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Abstract Two epistemic principles are Knowledge Exclusion and Belief Exclusion. Knowledge Exclusion says that it is necessarily the case that if an agent knows that p, then she does not believe that ∼p, and Belief Exclusion says that it is necessarily the case that if an agent believes that q, then she does not believe that ∼q. Many epistemologists find it reasonable to reject the latter principle and accept the former. I argue that this is in fact not reasonable by proposing a case in which an agent can use that she has contradictory beliefs towards a proposition as decisive evidence for that proposition. A natural response is that this case conflicts with common assumptions about the relation between knowledge, contradictory beliefs and rationality. I reply by drawing ideas from Lasonen-Aarnio’s (2010) remarks on unreasonable knowledge to explain why these common assumptions do not threaten my argument.
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Sullivan, Jessica, Sophie Cramer-Benjamin, Joseph Alvarez i David Barner. "Everything is Infinite: Children’s Beliefs About Endless Space, Time, and Number". Open Mind 7 (2023): 715–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/opmi_a_00104.
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Abstract How do children form beliefs about the infinity of space, time, and number? We asked whether children held similar beliefs about infinity across domains, and whether beliefs in infinity for domains like space and time might be scaffolded upon numerical knowledge (e.g., knowledge successors within the count list). To test these questions, 112 U.S. children (aged 4;0–7;11) completed an interview regarding their beliefs about infinite space, time, and number. We also measured their knowledge of counting, and other factors that might impact performance on linguistic assessments of infinity belief (e.g., working memory, ability to respond to hypothetical questions). We found that beliefs about infinity were very high across all three domains, suggesting that infinity beliefs may arise early in development for space, time, and number. Second, we found that—across all three domains—children were more likely to believe that it is always possible to add a unit than to believe that the domain is endless. Finally, we found that understanding the rules underlying counting predicted children’s belief that it is always possible to add 1 to any number, but did not predict any of the other elements of infinity belief.
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Joven Romero, Marco Antonio. "Belief and pluralistic ignorance". Filosofia Unisinos 21, nr 3 (25.11.2020): 260–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.03.
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Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.
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Boden, Matthew Tyler, Howard Berenbaum i James J. Gross. "Why Do People Believe What They Do? A Functionalist Perspective". Review of General Psychology 20, nr 4 (grudzień 2016): 399–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000085.
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Why do people believe what they do? Scholars and laypeople alike tend to answer this question by focusing on the representational functions of beliefs (i.e., representing the world accurately). However, a growing body of theory and research indicates that beliefs also can serve important hedonic functions (i.e., decreasing/increasing negative or positive emotional states). In this article, we describe: (a) the features of belief; (b) the functions served by beliefs, with a focus on the hedonic function; (c) an integrative framework highlighting the hedonic function and contrasting it with the representational function; and (d) the implications of our framework, and related future research directions for individual differences in belief, belief change, and the ways in which beliefs contribute to adaptive versus maladaptive psychological functioning.
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Dafoe, Allan, Remco Zwetsloot i Matthew Cebul. "Reputations for Resolve and Higher-Order Beliefs in Crisis Bargaining". Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, nr 7-8 (11.03.2021): 1378–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002721995549.
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Reputations for resolve are said to be one of the few things worth fighting for, yet they remain inadequately understood. Discussions of reputation focus almost exclusively on first-order belief change— A stands firm, B updates its beliefs about A’s resolve. Such first-order reputational effects are important, but they are not the whole story. Higher-order beliefs—what A believes about B’s beliefs, and so on—matter a great deal as well. When A comes to believe that B is more resolved, this may decrease A’s resolve, and this in turn may increase B’s resolve, and so on. In other words, resolve is interdependent. We offer a framework for estimating higher-order effects, and find evidence of such reasoning in a survey experiment on quasi-elites. Our findings indicate both that states and leaders can develop potent reputations for resolve, and that higher-order beliefs are often responsible for a large proportion of these effects (40 percent to 70 percent in our experimental setting). We conclude by complementing the survey with qualitative evidence and laying the groundwork for future research.
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Foss, Jeffrey E. "How many beliefs can dance in the head of the self-deceived?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20, nr 1 (marzec 1997): 111–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x97320032.
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Mele desires to believe that the self-deceived have consistent beliefs. Beliefs are not observable, but are instead ascribed within an explanatory framework. Because explanatory cogency is the only criterion for belief attribution, Mele should carefully attend to the logic of belief-desire explanation. He does not, and the consistency of his own account as well as that of the self-deceived, are the victims.
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Park, Seungbae. "Against motivational efficacy of beliefs". Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication 23, nr 1 (15.07.2015): 86–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/cpc.2015.215.
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Danielle Bromwich (2010) argues that a belief is motivationally efficacious in that, other things being equal, it disposes an agent to answer a question in accordance with that belief. I reply that what we are disposed to do is largely determined by our genes, whereas what we believe is largely determined by stimuli from the environment. We have a standing and default disposition to answer questions honestly, ceteris paribus, even before we are exposed to environmental stimuli. Since this standing and default disposition is innate, and our beliefs have their source in environmental stimuli, our beliefs cannot be the source of the disposition. Moreover, a recent finding in neuroscience suggests that motivation is extrinsic to belief.
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Greenberg, Alexander. "Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence". Criminal Law and Philosophy 14, nr 1 (16.09.2019): 91–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-019-09507-7.
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Abstract We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising other believers as ‘gullible’ or ‘biased’, and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief by thinking about it in parallel with another kind of responsibility: legal responsibility for criminal negligence. Specifically, I argue that that a popular account of responsibility for belief, which grounds it in belief’s reasons-responsiveness, faces a problem analogous to one faced by H.L.A. Hart’s influential capacity-based account of culpability. This points towards a more promising account of responsibility of belief, though, if we draw on accounts of negligence that improve on Hart’s. Broadly speaking, the account of negligence that improves on Hart’s account grounds culpability in a (lack of) concern for others’ interests, whereas my account of epistemic responsibility grounds responsibility for belief in a (lack of) concern for the truth.
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Lurz, Robert W., Carla Krachun, Mary C. Mareno i William D. Hopkins. "Do Chimpanzees Predict Others’ Behavior by Simulating Their Beliefs?" Animal Behavior and Cognition 9, nr 2 (1.05.2022): 153–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.26451/abc.09.02.01.2022.
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Recent studies have shown that great apes predict that other agents will search for objects of interest where the agents believe the objects are hidden. Little is understood about the cognitive process that apes undergo to make such predictions. According to prevailing models, great apes make such predictions by metarepresenting others’ beliefs or perceptual states. We investigated the simpler simulation model. In this model, apes predict where other agents will search for objects of interest by simulating believing what another agent believes about the location of the object. The simulation model predicts that simulating what another believes should manifest in altercentric biasing effects, such as behaving as if one shares another’s belief in cases where the other’s belief is false. We tested this by giving chimpanzees a novel search paradigm embedded in a change-of-location false-belief test and measured where they searched for a grape that they witnessed moved from its original location to a new location. In true-belief trials, chimpanzees were presented with an agent who knew (as they did) that the grape was hidden in the new location; in false-belief trials, the agent falsely believed the grape was still hidden in the original location while the chimpanzee knew it was hidden in the new location. As predicted by the simulation model, chimpanzees searched for the grape closer to its original location than to its new location in significantly more false-belief trials than true-belief trials. Results suggest that chimpanzees show a signature altercentric biasing effect of simulating believing what others believe and may use simulation, rather than metarepresentation, to predict where others will search for objects of interest.
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Goldberg, Zachary J., i Sean Richey. "Anti-Vaccination Beliefs and Unrelated Conspiracy Theories". World Affairs 183, nr 2 (29.05.2020): 105–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0043820020920554.
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Much recent literature has examined the correlates of anti-vaccination beliefs, without specifying the mechanism that creates adherence to these debunked ideas. We posit that anti-vaccination beliefs are an outcome of a general psychological propensity to believe in conspiracies based on new research on the interconnectedness of conspiracy beliefs. These ideas are tested with a confirmatory factor analysis and a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model of a nationally representative U.S. sample from the 2016 American National Election Studies. The confirmatory factor analysis shows that anti-vaccination beliefs highly correlate with belief in the unrelated conspiracies that Obama is a Muslim and 9/11 trutherism. Our SUR models also show that all three of these very different beliefs have similar predictors. All three have a negative correlation with political trust, political knowledge, education, and a positive correlation with authoritarianism. Thus, anti-vaccination beliefs are shown to be part of a psychological propensity to believe in conspiracies.
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George Phillips, Winfred. "Blanshard's Ethics of Belief and Metaphysical Postulates". Religious Studies 27, nr 2 (czerwiec 1991): 139–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020801.
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In Brand Blanshard's major defence of reason in religion, Reason and Belief, he criticizes both Roman Catholics and Protestants for advocating contradictory theological doctrines and for believing beyond what the evidence supports. Claiming belief to be an ethical matter, with one morally responsible for one's religious beliefs, he holds that one is morally obligated in such metaphysical matters to believe only what the evidence warrants. Blanshard finds that religious beliefs typically fail to meet the standard of this ethics of belief, and thus his ethics appears inhospitable to religious belief.
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Branković, Marija. "Who believes in ESP: Cognitive and motivational determinants of the belief in extra-sensory perception". Europe’s Journal of Psychology 15, nr 1 (28.02.2019): 120–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i1.1689.
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Many people believe in extra-sensory perception, e.g. the ability to communicate with thoughts, to sense future events or locate radiation with the help of a V-shaped piece of wood. Addressing a gap in research specifically focused on ESP beliefs, we investigated cognitive styles and basic motivations related to these beliefs in two survey studies. The findings suggest that a propensity to use intuition is the best predictor of ESP beliefs in terms of cognitive style. ESP belief is positively related to fear of death, and this relation is partly mediated by fatalism, i.e. the belief that chance controls one’s life. ESP beliefs do not seem to be perceived as irreconcilable with a rational view of reality however, they do not necessarily provide psychological protection from existential concerns. The implications of the findings in terms of costs and benefits of these beliefs and the possibility to change them are discussed.
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Bach, Kent. "Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, nr 3 (wrzesień 1997): 215–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00036.
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Brons, Lajos Ludovic. "Patterns, noise, and Beliefs". Principia: an international journal of epistemology 23, nr 1 (26.08.2019): 19–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n1p19.
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In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of what someone believes, and the same belief can be described by different sentences or propositions (which is illustrated by Dennett’s analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege’s puzzle), but in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful (or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other kinds of “deviant” implications.
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Pouivet, Roger. "Against Theological Fictionalism". European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3, nr 2 (23.09.2011): 427–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.404.
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According to theological fictionalism, God has the same status as a fictional character in a novel or a movie. Such a claim has been defended by Robin le Poidevin on the basis of Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe. But it is not only a philosophical esoteric account of religious beliefs, it is now an exoteric view, sometimes accepted by “believers” themselves, and so could even be considered a postmodern heresy. But theological fictionalism does not work: faith is real assent and not make-believe; belief is different from acceptance; belief and faith are dispositional, but make-believe seems to presuppose an account of beliefs as occurrent states; we cannot anymore imagine at will than we can believe at will.
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FRITH, C. D. "Schizophrenia and theory of mind". Psychological Medicine 34, nr 3 (kwiecień 2004): 385–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0033291703001326.
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We suspect that people have an everyday theory of mind because they explain and frequently talk about the behaviour of others and themselves in terms of beliefs and desires. Having a theory of mind means that we believe that other people have minds like ours and that we understand the behaviour of these others in terms of the contents of their minds: their knowledge, beliefs and desires. But how can we demonstrate experimentally that people are using their theory of mind to predict the behaviour of others. This problem is particularly acute in the case of animals or young human children when they do not have language. Dennett (1978) discussing Premack & Woodruff's (1978) seminal paper ‘Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?’, suggested that the use of false beliefs to explain behaviour would provide convincing evidence. When their belief is true (i.e. corresponds to the actual state of the world) we can explain peoples' behaviour on the basis of the state of the world without needing to know about their beliefs. This ambiguity does not arise when the belief is false. The first experiment to use this approach was published by Wimmer & Perner (1983). They showed that at around 4 years of age a child knows that Maxi will look for his chocolates where Maxi believes them to be, even though the child knows that this belief is false because he has seen Maxi's mother moving the chocolates. In the English-speaking world the task involving Maxi and the chocolates has become the Sally-Anne task (see this issue, Lee et al. 2004).
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Zhang, Junfa, i Yin Zhang. "Research on the Effects of Ideals and Beliefs Education for College Students". Scientific and Social Research 3, nr 2 (13.07.2021): 7–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.36922/ssr.v3i2.1092.
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The question of college students nowadays having firm ideals and believes is not only related to their achievements, but also related to the reformation and development of the country. In addition, by conducting scientific and effective education of ideals and beliefs for college students, it can be used to promote development in the direction of demand for talents in the new era with ideals, beliefs and responsibility. The authors propose several ways to effectively carry out the education of college students’ ideals and beliefs, based on the significance of ideals and beliefs and the introduction of the relationship between the ideal and belief education of college students, as well as the “youth dream” and the “Chinese dream” in order to explore effective ways to strengthen the ideal and belief education for college students in the new era. This article may be a reference for higher education institutions.
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Elzawawi, Fatma. "EXAMINING THE BELIEF CHANGE OF LIBYAN TEACHERS OF ENGLISH WHO UNDERTAKE POSTGRADUATE STUDIES ABROAD". (Faculty of Arts Journal) مجلة كلية الآداب - جامعة مصراتة, nr 09 (1.06.2017): 33–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.36602/faj.2017.n09.12.
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Recent research has made a significant contribution to the exploration of teachers' beliefs and the relationship between teachers' beliefs and practices. This paper reports on a study in which I investigated the beliefs about English Language Teaching of ten experienced Libyan teachers of English who were engaged in MA and PhD studies abroad. Diaries and interviews were used in the data collection. Two aspects of their beliefs were examined: whether, and how, their beliefs changed as a result of studying abroad, and the sources of these beliefs. In this study, it was found that while some of the teachers' previously held beliefs changed and others remained the same, in every case awareness of alternative beliefs had been raised. In addition, the results also showed that the beliefs held by this group of Libyan teachers were derived from a variety of sources, and had been influenced by more than one source, with consequent effects on their teaching perceptions and practices. Key words: Teacher Believes, Belief Change, Professional Development, Libya.
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Wolfe, Michael B., i Todd J. Williams. "Poor metacognitive awareness of belief change". Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, nr 9 (1.01.2018): 1898–910. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2017.1363792.
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When people change beliefs as a result of reading a text, are they aware of these changes? This question was examined for beliefs about spanking as an effective means of discipline. In two experiments, subjects reported beliefs about spanking effectiveness during a prescreening session. In a subsequent experimental session, subjects read a one-sided text that advocated a belief consistent or inconsistent position on the topic. After reading, subjects reported their current beliefs and attempted to recollect their initial beliefs. Subjects reading a belief inconsistent text were more likely to change their beliefs than those who read a belief consistent text. Recollections of initial beliefs tended to be biased in the direction of subjects’ current beliefs. In addition, the relationship between the belief consistency of the text read and accuracy of belief recollections was mediated by belief change. This belief memory bias was independent of on-line text processing and comprehension measures, and indicates poor metacognitive awareness of belief change.
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A. McLaughlin, Laura, i James McLaughlin. "Framing the Innovation Mindset". Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology 18 (2021): 083–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.28945/4793.
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Aim/Purpose: To build the skills of innovation, we must first establish a framework for the belief system that surrounds effective innovation practice. In building any belief system, sometimes outdated beliefs need to be replaced with better, more carefully researched ideas. One such belief, discovered in our research and elsewhere, is that creativity is innate and that great ideas arise through chance or happenstance. Background: One belief regarding innovation and creativity, discovered in our research and elsewhere, is the belief that creativity is innate. History has repeatedly shown this to be untrue, yet people still believe it. We have found within our research another belief is that innovation happens through random, unstructured processes -- that great ideas arise through chance or happenstance. However, participants also believed that innovation is a skill. If someone believes innovation is a skill but also believes innovation is innate, random, and unstructured, this disconnect presents obstacles for the training and development of innovation skills. Methodology: This research is based on a combination of background research and direct survey of innovators, educators, scientists, and engineers, in addition to the general public. The survey is used to illuminate the nature of significant beliefs related to creativity and innovation practice Contribution: We examine the myths and truths behind creativity as well as the false beliefs behind innovation as we present a closed model for innovation and the key framing elements needed to build a successful, trainable, developable system that is the innovation mindset. And like any skill, creativity and innovation can be taught and learned using tools and processes that can be followed, tracked, and documented. If innovation is a skill, creativity should not re-quire magic or the production of ideas out of thin air. Findings This paper identifies the historic nature of creativity as well as the general strategies used by innovators in implementing innovation practices and pro-poses a framework that supports the effective development of the innovation mindset. Recommendations for Practitioners: Apply the framework and encourage ideation and innovation participants to appreciate that they can learn to be creative and innovative. Start as early as possible in the education process, as all of these skills can be instructed at early ages. Recommendations for Researchers: Continue to gather survey data to support a refined understanding of the motivations behind the disconnect between innovation as a methodical skill and the beliefs in the use of random ideation techniques. Impact on Society: Transforming the understanding of creativity and innovation from one of mythical belief to one of methodical skill application will dramatically alter the lifelong impact of knowledge gained in support of global economic and environmental challenges. Future Research: A continuation of the recommended research paths and collaboration with other creativity researchers leading to improved methods for dissuading mythical beliefs toward formalized, systematic ideation and innovation practices.
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Kornilaki, Ekaterina N., i Plousia Misailidi. "Οι πεποιθήσεις των παιδιών για τη μετά θάνατον ζωή: Επισκόπηση της σύγχρονης έρευνας". Preschool and Primary Education 7, nr 1 (16.04.2019): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/ppej.18604.
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This paper reviews recent studies investigating children's afterlife beliefs. In doing so, the paper concentrates on the following questions: (a) At what age do children begin to believe in the afterlife and what is the developmental course of their beliefs? (b) Is children's belief in the afterlife grounded on a common-sense dualism; is this belief related to constraints of the human cognitive system; or is it the consequence of religious indoctrination and other socio-cultural influences? Finally, the paper attempts a critical discussion of the research findings, and discusses the prospects for future research.
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Kim, Jong Won. "Reid on Particularism, Habit, and Personal Identity". Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13, nr 3 (wrzesień 2015): 203–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2015.0104.
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Are the first principles in the philosophy of Thomas Reid derived inductively from particular experience, or are they self-evident? Is Reid an epistemic particularist, or a methodist? Some scholars interpret him as an epistemic particularistic, while others hold that he is a methodist like other philosophers of his time. This debate was central to an exchange between Roderick Chisholm and Keith Lehrer. Taking the general belief in personal identity as an example, this paper aims to show which interpretation is more consistent with Reid's whole philosophical system. Although Reid believes that the general belief is self-evident without reasoning, it is not self-evident in the way that beliefs in particular cases are. Reid's overall philosophical method makes the self-evidence of particular beliefs more basic, the self-evidence of general beliefs being transferred from particular beliefs by means of habit. I conclude that the particularistic interpretation is more consistent with his whole philosophical system than the methodist interpretation.
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Metz, Mike. "Accommodating linguistic prejudice? Examining English teachers’ language ideologies". English Teaching: Practice & Critique 18, nr 1 (8.04.2019): 18–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/etpc-09-2018-0081.
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PurposeThe purpose of this study is to support the integration of scientifically grounded linguistic knowledge into language teaching in English Language Arts (ELA) classrooms through building an understanding of what teachers currently know and believe about language.Design/methodology/approachIn total, 310 high school English teachers in the USA responded to a survey about their language beliefs. Statistical analysis of responses identified four distinct constructs within their belief systems. Sub-scales were created for each construct, and hierarchical regressions helped identify key characteristics that predicted beliefs along a continuum from traditional/hegemonic to linguistically informed/counter-hegemonic.FindingsKey findings include the identification of four belief constructs: beliefs about how language reveals speaker characteristics, beliefs about how society perceives language use, beliefs about how language should be treated in schools and beliefs about the English teacher’s role in addressing language use. In general, teachers expressed counter-hegemonic beliefs for their own role and their view of speaker characteristics. They expressed hegemonic beliefs for societal perceptions and the dominant school language narrative. Taking a linguistics class was associated with counter-hegemonic beliefs, and teaching longer was associated with more hegemonic beliefs.Practical implicationsThe findings of this study suggest that the longer teachers teach within a system that promotes hegemonic language practices, the more they will align their own beliefs with those practices, despite having learned linguistic facts that contradict pervasive societal beliefs about language. The Dominant School Language Narrative currently accommodates, rather that disrupting, linguistic prejudice.Originality/valueA current understanding of teachers’ language ideologies is a key step in designing teacher professional development to help align teaching practices with established linguistic knowledge and to break down a socially constructed linguistic hierarchy based on subjective, and frequently prejudicial, beliefs.
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Joven-Romero, Marco Antonio. "On the Nature of Belief in Pluralistic Ignorance". Contemporary Pragmatism 15, nr 1 (22.02.2018): 23–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01501003.
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I apply recent research on the links between belief, truth and pragmatism based on Williams (1970) statement that “beliefs aim at truth,” to the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, in which agents act contrary to their private beliefs because they believe that other agents believe the contrary. I consider three positions; an epistemic position, a pragmatic position, and a third position coordinating the first two. I apply them to pluralistic ignorance while considering the recent study of Bjerring, Hansend and Pedersen (2014). I conclude that a purely epistemic approach is better for understanding pluralistic ignorance.
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Steinmann, Annebirth, Alea Ruf, Kira F. Ahrens, Andreas Reif i Silke Matura. "Bacon, Brownie, or Broccoli? Beliefs about Stress-Relieving Foods and Their Relationship to Orthorexia Nervosa". Nutrients 14, nr 18 (6.09.2022): 3673. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/nu14183673.
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Background: Nutritional beliefs play an important role when it comes to food choice. However, little attention has been paid to which foods individuals believe to be comforting when experiencing stress. With increasing health awareness in the general public, this study aims to examine whether the nutritional belief exists that only healthy foods relieve stress. If so, we are interested in its relationship to Orthorexia Nervosa (ON) tendencies. Methods: 175 participants (mean age 28.5 ± 7.8 years, 124 females) completed questionnaires to assess beliefs about stress-relieving foods and ON tendencies. Principal component analysis was used to reduce foods to food groups. Subsequently, a latent profile analysis was performed to identify groups with distinct nutritional beliefs. Results: Among eight distinct groups, one group (8% of the sample) reported the belief that exclusively healthy foods relieve stress. Multinominal logistic regressions showed that higher ON tendencies were associated with that group. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that individuals with stronger ON tendencies believe that, in particular, healthy foods relieve stress. This indicates that nutritional beliefs in ON concern not only the somatic consequences of certain foods, but also psychological consequences, which might also drive orthorexic behaviour. This offers a new target for the diagnosis and treatment of ON.
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Liu, Liying. "The theoretical study of voluntary beliefs". Advances in Education, Humanities and Social Science Research 7, nr 1 (22.09.2023): 418. http://dx.doi.org/10.56028/aehssr.7.1.418.2023.
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Beliefs reinforce people's perception of right and wrong to provide behavioral guidance. But is our faith voluntary? Therefore, it is necessary to understand whether these beliefs can be determined by our conscious choices. To shed light on this debate, this paper will explain why people's beliefs are involuntary mainly by examining the relevant literature in biological, social, and cultural psychology and exploring the importance of science and education in helping individuals develop new beliefs in line with modern ethics. By exploring and understanding the underlying mechanisms that influence our belief system, people's beliefs can become more rational and more in line with the modern world. This requires the guidance of the government to make people return to rationality. Therefore, I believe that the government should call for social projects that follow modern ethical guidelines. These programs can give people awareness of protecting the environment and raising equality. By doing so, humans can be more adapted to embrace the beliefs of diversity, inclusion and equity.
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Rogers, Todd, Don A. Moore i Michael I. Norton. "The Belief in a Favorable Future". Psychological Science 28, nr 9 (3.08.2017): 1290–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797617706706.
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People believe that future others’ preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own. People holding a particular view (e.g., support of President Trump) are more likely to believe that future others will share their view than to believe that future others will have an opposing view (e.g., opposition to President Trump). Six studies demonstrated this belief in a favorable future (BFF) for political views, scientific beliefs, and entertainment and product preferences. BFF is greater in magnitude than the tendency to believe that current others share one’s views (false-consensus effect), arises across cultures, is distinct from general optimism, is strongest when people perceive their views as being objective rather than subjective, and can affect (but is distinct from) beliefs about favorable future policy changes. A lab experiment involving monetary bets on the future popularity of politicians and a field experiment involving political donations ( N = 660,542) demonstrated that BFF can influence people’s behavior today.
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Buckwalter, Wesley, i John Turri. "INABILITY AND OBLIGATION IN INTELLECTUAL EVALUATION". Episteme 17, nr 4 (21.12.2018): 475–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.49.
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ABSTRACTIf moral responsibilities prescribe how agents ought to behave, are there also intellectual responsibilities prescribing what agents ought to believe? Many theorists have argued that there cannot be intellectual responsibilities because they would require the ability to control whether one believes, whereas it is impossible to control whether one believes. This argument appeals to an “ought implies can” principle for intellectual responsibilities. The present paper tests for the presence of intellectual responsibilities in social cognition. Four experiments show that intellectual responsibilities are attributed to believe things and that these responsibilities can exceed what agents are able to believe. Furthermore, the results show that agents are sometimes considered responsible for failing to form true beliefs on the basis of good evidence, and that this effect does not depend on the seriousness of the consequences for failing to form a belief. These findings clarify when and how responsibilities for belief are attributed, falsify a conceptual entailment between ability and responsibility in the intellectual domain, and emphasize the importance of objective truth in intellectual evaluations.
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Sturgeon, Scott. "Conditional Belief and the Ramsey Test". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51 (marzec 2002): 215–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008146.
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Consider the frameS believes that—.Fill it with a conditional, sayIf you eat an Apple, you'll drink a Coke.what makes the result true? More generally, what facts are marked by instances ofS believes (A→C)?In a sense the answer is obious: beliefs are so marked. Yet that bromide leads directly to competing schools of thought. And the reason is simple.Common-sense thinks of belief two ways. Sometimes it sees it as a three-part affair. When so viewed either you believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment. This take on belief is coarse-grained. It says belief has three flavours: acceptance, rejection, neither. But it's not the only way common-sense thinks of belief. Sometimes it's more subtle: ‘How strong is your faith?’ can be apposite between believers. That signals an important fact. Ordinary practice also treats belief as a fine-grained affair. It speaks of levels of confidence. It admits degrees of belief. It contains a fine-grained take as well. There are two ways belief is seen in everyday life. One is coarse-grained. The other is fine-grained.
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Eman Mohammed. "Exploring the Main Similarities Between the Concept of Divinity and Eastern Beliefs among Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism". Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization 12, nr 2 (11.10.2022): 74–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.32350/jitc.122.06.
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This study will seek to attempt to discuss the concept of divinity in eastern beliefs, especially (Taoism, Hinduism, etc.), and then identify the similarities between the latter beliefs in relation to this concept. The goal of this paper is to find out the reasons why Eastern beliefs strayed from the worship of God and how they developed their concept of divinity. This research is very important because it provides information on the prevailing beliefs in India and China, which believe in the plurality of deities, the worship of ancestors from fathers and grandfathers, the sanctification of the forces of nature, and the practice of spiritual worship to reach the stage of union from God as they believe. This study focuses on answering the questions: Is the concept of divinity unified in eastern beliefs? The study used both the inductive and the deductive method by relying on the mother of books of eastern beliefs like the book of Tao. The most important findings of the study are that the philosophical and moral eastern religions prevailing in India and China are not based on belief in the monotheism of divinity. The study also showed that Eastern beliefs meet in a plurality the gods, and gradually and passed through stages in the search for the god that meets their needs, they worshiped the forces of nature, totem, man, and others, and practiced magic, sorcery, astrology, and other manifestations of polytheism.
Key words: Buddhism, Confucius, Divinity, Eastern beliefs, Hindus
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Mercer, Jonathan. "Emotional Beliefs". International Organization 64, nr 1 (styczeń 2010): 1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309990221.
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AbstractA belief in alien abduction is an emotional belief, but so is a belief that Iran intends to build nuclear weapons, that one's country is good, that a sales tax is unjust, or that French decision makers are irresolute. Revolutionary research in the brain sciences has overturned conventional views of the relationship between emotion, rationality, and beliefs. Because rationality depends on emotion, and because cognition and emotion are nearly indistinguishable in the brain, one can view emotion as constituting and strengthening beliefs such as trust, nationalism, justice or credibility. For example, a belief that another's commitment is credible depends on one's selection (and interpretation) of evidence and one's assessment of risk, both of which rely on emotion. Observing that emotion and cognition co-produce beliefs has policy implications: how one fights terrorism changes if one views credibility as an emotional belief.
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Ashbaugh, Andrea R., Laurie A. Gelfand i Adam S. Radomsky. "Interpersonal Aspects of Responsibility and Obsessive Compulsive Symptoms". Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 34, nr 2 (18.01.2006): 151–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352465805002699.
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Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is associated with an inflated sense of responsibility to prevent harm. Increasingly, it has been recognized that inflated responsibility is a complex phenomenon. The purpose of this study was to examine how interpersonal aspects of responsibility are related to symptoms of OCD. Three new valid and reliable scales assessing beliefs about other people's responsibility, comparative beliefs about responsibility, beliefs about the allocation of responsibility, and beliefs about how others allocate responsibility were used to evaluate interpersonal influences on responsibility. Whereas personal beliefs about responsibility were related to all OCD symptom types, it appears that beliefs about other people's responsibility were related to only a subgroup of symptom types. Furthermore, the belief that one is more responsible than others predicts OC symptoms beyond commonly assessed personal beliefs about responsibility. Finally, individuals with OC symptoms tend to allocate more responsibility to themselves than others, compared to individuals without OC symptoms, despite the fact that individuals with OC symptoms believe that others tend to allocate responsibility equitably. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive models of OCD.
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Boylu, Emrah, Mete Yusuf Ustabulut i Ezgi İnal. "Grammar-learning Beliefs of Students Who Learn Turkish as a Foreign Language". International Journal of Psychology and Educational Studies 9, nr 1 (30.01.2022): 32–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.52380/ijpes.2022.9.1.442.
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The aim of the study is to determine the beliefs of those who learn Turkish as a foreign language about learning grammar and to determine whether their beliefs are in line with their perceptions of grammar. In this study, which was created using the mixed method, the data about the beliefs of the learners in accordance with the survey method was collected, which is one of the basic quantitative research methods. In addition, the data for the determination of learners’ perceptions were collected in accordance with one of the qualitative research methods—the phenomenology method. The study group of this research consists of B1, B2, and C1 level students who learn Turkish at Aydın TÖMER (Turkish Teaching Application and Research Center), İstanbul Aydın University. Based on the findings obtained in the research, 45% of the learners believe that they can learn Turkish without knowing the grammar while 37% believe that they cannot. When the beliefs about grammar-learning method are examined, it is seen that 27% of the learners have the belief that it is important to learn grammar directly, and 63% believe that it is more important to understand the rules based on examples. In the context of all of this data, it was concluded that there is a parallelism between the grammar-learning beliefs of those who learn Turkish as a foreign language and their grammar perceptions. In other words, those who think that they cannot learn Turkish without knowing grammar also perceive grammar as difficult, a necessity, and produce metaphors for it. In addition, it was understood that those who believe that they can learn Turkish without knowing grammar perceive grammar as a tool and produce metaphors and provide reasons.method, the data about the beliefs of the learners in accordance with the survey method was collected, which is one of the basic quantitative research methods. In addition, the data for the determination of learners’ perceptions were collected in accordance with one of the qualitative research methods—the phenomenology method. The study group of this research consists of B1, B2, and C1 level students who learn Turkish at Aydın TÖMER (Turkish Teaching Application and Research Center), İstanbul Aydın University. Based on the findings obtained in the research, 45% of the learners believe that they can learn Turkish without knowing the grammar while 37% believe that they cannot. When the beliefs about grammar-learning method are examined, it is seen that 27% of the learners have the belief that it is important to learn grammar directly, and 63% believe that it is more important to understand the rules based on examples. In the context of all of this data, it was concluded that there is a parallelism between the grammar-learning beliefs of those who learn Turkish as a foreign language and their grammar perceptions. In other words, those who think that they cannot learn Turkish without knowing grammar also perceive grammar as difficult, a necessity, and produce metaphors for it. In addition, it was understood that those who believe that they can learn Turkish without knowing grammar perceive grammar as a tool and produce metaphors and provide reasons.The aim of the study is to determine the beliefs of those who learn Turkish as a foreign language about learning grammar and to determine whether their beliefs are in line with their perceptions of grammar. In this study, which was created using the mixed method, the data about the beliefs of the learners in accordance with the survey method was collected, which is one of the basic quantitative research methods. In addition, the data for the determination of learners’ perceptions were collected in accordance with one of the qualitative research methods—the phenomenology method. The study group of this research consists of B1, B2, and C1 level students who learn Turkish at Aydın TÖMER (Turkish Teaching Application and Research Center), İstanbul Aydın University. Based on the findings obtained in the research, 45% of the learners believe that they can learn Turkish without knowing the grammar while 37% believe that they cannot. When the beliefs about grammar-learning method are examined, it is seen that 27% of the learners have the belief that it is important to learn grammar directly, and 63% believe that it is more important to understand the rules based on examples. In the context of all of this data, it was concluded that there is a parallelism between the grammar-learning beliefs of those who learn Turkish as a foreign language and their grammar perceptions. In other words, those who think that they cannot learn Turkish without knowing grammar also perceive grammar as difficult, a necessity, and produce metaphors for it. In addition, it was understood that those who believe that they can learn Turkish without knowing grammar perceive grammar as a tool and produce metaphors and provide reasons.The aim of the study is to determine the beliefs of those who learn Turkish as a foreign language about learning grammar and to determine whether their beliefs are in line with their perceptions of grammar.
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Williams, Emyr, Leslie Francis i Christopher A. Lewis. "Introducing the Modified Paranormal Belief Scale: Distinguishing between Classic Paranormal Beliefs, Religious Paranormal Beliefs and Conventional Religiosity among Undergraduates in Northern Ireland and Wales". Archive for the Psychology of Religion 31, nr 3 (wrzesień 2009): 345–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/008467209x12499946199605.
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Previous empirical studies concerned with the association between paranormal beliefs and conventional religiosity have produced conflicting evidence. Drawing on Rice's (2003) distinction between classic paranormal beliefs and religious paranormal beliefs, the present study proposed a modified form of the Tobacyk Revised Paranormal Belief Scale to produce separate scores for these two forms of paranormal belief, styled ‘religious paranormal beliefs’ and ‘classic paranormal beliefs’. Data provided by a sample of 143 undergraduate students in Northern Ireland and Wales, who completed the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity alongside the Tobacyk Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, demonstrated that conventional religiosity is positively correlated with religious paranormal beliefs, but independent of classic paranormal beliefs. These findings provide a clear framework within which previous conflicting evidence can be interpreted. It is recommended that future research should distinguish clearly between these two forms of paranormal beliefs and that the Tobacyk Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale should be routinely modified to detach the four religious paranormal belief items from the total scale score.
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LEKEAS, PARASKEVAS V. "COALITIONAL BELIEFS IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY TU GAMES". International Game Theory Review 15, nr 01 (marzec 2013): 1350004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913500047.
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In cooperative games, due to computational complexity issues, deviant agents are not able to base their behavior on the outsiders' status but have to follow certain beliefs as to how it is in their strategic interest to act. This behavior constitutes the main interest of this paper. To this end, we quantify and characterize the set of coalitional beliefs that support cooperation of such agents. Assuming that they are engaged in a differentiated Cournot competition, for every belief of the deviants we define a TU-game, the solution to which characterizes the set of coalitional beliefs that support core nonemptiness. For this we fix the number of coalitions that deviants S will face to, say, j in number and introduce the notion of j-belief of S as the least number of coalitions into which the outsiders N\S will reorganize. We then define for every j-belief a TU-game and the j-belief core of it. We prove that the worth of S is minimized when the n – s agents split approximately equally among the j coalitions, while the worth of S is maximized when j – 1 agents have one member and one coalition has n – s – (j – 1) members. Given the above, we prove that when goods are substitutes, the j-belief core is nonempty, provided that S believe the N\S will form a sufficiently large number of coalitions, while when goods are complements, the j-belief core is nonempty irrespective of the beliefs of the agents in S. Finally, in the case of homogeneous goods we prove that the j-belief core is nonempty and depends only on the number of the outsider coalitions and not on their size.
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Misbahuddin M, Iqbal. "ISLAM JAWA SEBAGAI SUMBER IDE PENCIPTAAN KARYA GRAFIS". Kusa Lawa 1, nr 1 (25.05.2021): 48–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.21776/ub.kusalawa.2021.001.01.07.
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Islam Java As a Source of Ideas of Graphic Creation. Java as one of the largest landmasses in Indonesia has many unsolved mysteries until now because it is considered as mystical and forbidden to touch for the inexperienced. For a long time, Java made a history that many people can still feel, from the history of power, mysticism, culture to religious affairs. In the beginning, Java itself already had a belief in the strongest entity called God and already had its own thoughts on how God exists and is felt. Some people recognize that belief as animism and dynamism, which believes that certain spirits or objects have a power that is considered their God, others consider Java to have a more complex religion or belief which is often called Kejawen, Kapitaian, Sundanese Wiwitan, and so on. If drawn straight with the beliefs recognized today it is believed by some to have the same as the teachings of Islam. Why can it be called similar to Islamic teachings, because there are some beliefs that believe that there is only one God who must be worshiped for them in a predetermined manner. From this restlessness, the writer wants to dissect these problems into graphic art works. Keywords: Java; teachings; practitioners; culture
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Benbaji, Yitzhak. "A New Puzzle about Believed Fallibility". Dialogue 45, nr 4 (2006): 679–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300001232.
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ABSTRACTI shall consider the phenomenon of believing ourselves to have at least one false belief: a phenomenon I call believed fallibility. I shall first present a paradoxical argument which appears to show that believed fallibility is incoherent; second, note that this argument assumes that we are committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs; third, sketch a more intuitive notion of commitment in which we are not committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs and argue that the original paradoxical argument is now defused; fourth, construct a new paradoxical argument showing that if we believe that we have at least one false belief we are committed to a contradiction, employing the preferable notion of commitment; and, fifth, suggest that perhaps we might avoid the new paradox by denying that closing our beliefs under conjunction is required by rationality.
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Pasquale, Michael. "Folk beliefs about second language learning and teaching". AILA Review 24 (21.12.2011): 88–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/aila.24.07pas.
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What do students and teachers believe about the second language learning process? What if these beliefs are in conflict with each other or with prevailing applied linguistic theories? These are the types of questions that are investigated within folk linguistic research. Some researchers have taken a quantitative approach that relied on questionnaires (e.g., Horwitz 1985), while others have delved into the cognitive foundations of beliefs (e.g., Woods 2003). Lastly, some have used discoursal approaches which use discourse analytic (e.g., Pasquale & Preston, forthcoming) and culturally contextualized approaches (e.g., Barcelos 1995) suggesting that folk belief is a dynamic process. Therefore, a discoursal approach may provide insights into respondents’ reasoning rather than what might be considered more static domains of belief.
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Butar-butar, Grecetinovitria Merliana. "KEHIDUPAN SETELAH KEMATIAN DALAM PERJANJIAN LAMA DAN KEYAKINAN BATAK TOBA". Jurnal Teologi Cultivation 3, nr 1 (14.07.2019): 10–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.46965/jtc.v3i1.248.
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AbstractThe entry of Christianity into the Batak land made a shift in the belief value of the Batak Toba people. This paper discusses beliefs about human spirit life after death in the Old Testament and in the beliefs of pre-Christian Batak people.The Israelites believed in a life form after death, death is not annihilation, but the transition to another type of existence in sheol. BatakToba people believe that there is life after death even more have power. In addition to the mention of begu, sumangot and sahala, in the Toba Batak community, people who have died arealso called tondi.Keywords: Life, After Death, Old Testament, Toba Batak Beliefs
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Müller, Basil. "Normativity as a Kind of Conformity: Towards a naturalistic account of epistemic normativity". KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 34, nr 1 (1.01.2020): 49–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340104.
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Abstract There seem to be things we ought not to believe and others we are permitted to believe. Belief is treated as a normative phenomenon both in everyday and academic discourse. At the same time, normativity can be seen as a threat to a naturalistic understanding of the world. Whilst naturalistic claims are of descriptive nature, norms are prescriptive. It is usually held that they cannot be reduced to statements of fact. This problem is also pertinent to the normativity of belief. How is such a phenomenon to be understood within a naturalist framework? Sullivan-Bissett provides a naturalistic account of epistemic normativity in which she explains epistemic normativity in terms of biological functions of belief-producing mechanisms. Importantly, her account is error-theoretic: She argues that we mistake doxastic strategies, which are at best normative in a hypothetical sense, to be categorical epistemic norms. In continuation of Sullivan-Bissett's account, I draw attention to one of the belief-producing mechanisms which is responsible for bringing about these mistaken beliefs. I claim that normative conformity { a social-learning mechanisms { brings about our beliefs in the existence and categorical validity of epistemic norms. Keeping with the evolutionary perspective employed by Sullivan- Bissett, I answer questions about the function and phylogeny of our mistaken beliefs in epistemic normativity by means of normative conformity and in line with Sullivan-Bissett's account.
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Grigg, Richard. "The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God". Religious Studies 26, nr 3 (wrzesień 1990): 389–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020540.
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The antifoundationalist defence of belief in God set forth by Alvin Plantinga has been widely discussed in recent years. Classical foundationalism assumes that there are two kinds of beliefs that we are justified in holding: beliefs supported by evidence, and basic beliefs. Our basic beliefs are those bedrock beliefs that need no evidence to support them and upon which our other beliefs must rest. For the foundationalist, the only beliefs that can be properly basic are either self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Belief in God is none of these. Thus, says the foundationalist, belief in God is justified only if there is sufficient evidence to back it up.