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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Belief"
Williams, Peter. "Beliefs supporting belief". Philosophers' Magazine, nr 7 (1999): 56–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm1999768.
Pełny tekst źródłaLakemeyer, Gerhard. "On Perfect Introspection with Quantifying-In1". Fundamenta Informaticae 17, nr 1-2 (1.07.1992): 75–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/fi-1992-171-206.
Pełny tekst źródłaChappell, T. D. J. "Does Protagoras refute himself?" Classical Quarterly 45, nr 2 (grudzień 1995): 333–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800043433.
Pełny tekst źródłaCrane, Tim. "Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?" Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 65, nr 4 (1.11.2023): 414–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2023-0060.
Pełny tekst źródłaBach, Kent. "Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, nr 3 (wrzesień 1997): 215–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00036.
Pełny tekst źródłaYanke, Greg, Mohamed Y. Rady i Joseph L. Verheijde. "When Brain Death Belies Belief". Journal of Religion and Health 55, nr 6 (19.08.2016): 2199–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10943-016-0298-4.
Pełny tekst źródłaWolfe, Michael B., i Todd J. Williams. "Poor metacognitive awareness of belief change". Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, nr 9 (1.01.2018): 1898–910. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2017.1363792.
Pełny tekst źródłaAHMED, ARIF. "Belief and religious ‘belief’". Religious Studies 56, nr 1 (6.05.2019): 80–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412519000234.
Pełny tekst źródłaR, Velusamy. "Folklore Elements in Kalittokai". International Research Journal of Tamil 4, S-16 (12.12.2022): 28–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.34256/irjt224s164.
Pełny tekst źródłaGrigg, Richard. "The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God". Religious Studies 26, nr 3 (wrzesień 1990): 389–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020540.
Pełny tekst źródłaRozprawy doktorskie na temat "Belief"
Etlin, David Jeffrey. "Desire, belief, and conditional belief". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45898.
Pełny tekst źródłaIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 127-132).
This dissertation studies the logics of value and conditionals, and the question of whether they should be given cognitivist analyses. Emotivist theories treat value judgments as expressions of desire, rather than beliefs about goodness. Inference ticket theories of conditionals treat them as expressions of conditional beliefs, rather than propositions. The two issues intersect in decision theory, where judgments of expected goodness are expressible by means of decision-making conditionals. In the first chapter, I argue that decision theory cannot be given a Humean foundation by means of money pump arguments, which purport to show that the transitivity of preference and indifference is a requirement of instrumental reason. Instead, I argue that Humeans should treat the constraints of decision theory as constitutive of the nature of preferences. Additionally, I argue that transitivity of preference is a stricter requirement than transitivity of indifference. In the second chapter, I investigate whether David Lewis has shown that decision theory is incompatible with anti-Humean theories of desire. His triviality proof against "desire as belief' seems to show that desires can be at best conditional beliefs about goodness. I argue that within causal decision theory we can articulate the cognitivist position where desires align with beliefs about goodness, articulated by the decision making conditional. In the third chapter, I turn to conditionals in their own right, and especially iterated conditionals.
(cont.) I defend the position that indicative conditionals obey the import-export equivalence rather than modus ponens (except for simple conditionals), while counterfactual subjunctive conditionals do obey modus ponens. The logic of indicative conditionals is often thought to be determined by conditional beliefs via the Ramsey Test. I argue that iterated conditionals show that the conditional beliefs involved in indicative supposition diverge from the conditional beliefs involved in learning, and that half of the Ramsey Test is untenable for iterated conditionals.
by David Jeffrey Etlin.
Ph.D.
Hernando, Miguel (Miguel Angel Hernando Cupido) 1970. "Studies in belief and belief attribution". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8764.
Pełny tekst źródłaIncludes bibliographical references (p. 207-209).
My dissertation is about Frege's classic problem of the morning and the evening star. I distinguish two aspects of the problem. One aspect I call it psychological, and it consists in describing the content of the beliefs of people who are willing to assent to pairs like (1) 'Hesperus is nice' and (2) 'Phosphorus is not nice.' I assume an interpretivist account of belief content, according to which an agent has the beliefs that best explain her behavior, and I propose certain principles of interpretation to substantiate this view. I use this account to argue that the person who assents to (1) and (2) is not incoherent, but simply mistaken about the proposition expressed by those sentences. In my view, the subject who assents to (1) and (2) takes them to express propositions about different planets, but at least one of those planets cannot be a real planet. I propose that it is a fictional one, and appeal to Kendall Walton's account of prop-oriented make-believe to explain how to use propositions that are about fictional entities to describe the belief state of people who are confused about some identity. The other aspect of the problem I call it semantical, and it consists in explaining how pairs of attributions like 'Charles believes that Hesperus is nice' and 'Charles does not believe that Phosphorus is nice' can be true at the same time. I offer a semantics based on the idea that, when we describe the belief state of people who are confused about some identity, we have to put ourselves in their shoes. We put ourselves in someone else's shoes by modifying our belief state to resemble the belief state of the other person; when we change our beliefs in this way, we acquire the beliefs necessary to talk of a single object as if it were two different ones. I argue that this Simulation Semantics can offer a satisfactory treatment of certain examples of belief attribution that cannot be handled by contemporary theories (examples in which the subject of the attribution is both confused about an identity, and is not familiar with the words that we use to attribute a belief to her). I also argue that this semantics has interesting applications to other problems in the philosophy of language, like for example the problem of the informativeness of identity statements. 7102 M
by Miguel Hernando.
Ph.D.
McClung, Samuel Alan. "Peer evaluator beliefs analyzed within a teacher belief framework". Diss., The University of Arizona, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186587.
Pełny tekst źródłaRenner, William. "Acausal belief propogation for inference on belief networks". Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=79116.
Pełny tekst źródłaBorders, Andrew Johnson. "Balancing belief". [Huntington, WV : Marshall University Libraries], 2008. http://www.marshall.edu/etd/descript.asp?ref=869.
Pełny tekst źródłaNajle, Maxine Belén. "ANALYSIS OF AUTOMATIC JUDGMENTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF". UKnowledge, 2019. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/psychology_etds/161.
Pełny tekst źródłaSantos, Clara Maria Melo dos. "Good reasoning : to whom? when? how?; an investigation of belief effects on syllogistic and argumentative reasoning". Thesis, University of Sussex, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.296530.
Pełny tekst źródłaLi, Shiyan. "Geometry of belief". School of Computer Science and Software Engineering - Faculty of Informatics, 2007. http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/81.
Pełny tekst źródłaClarke, Roger. "Belief in context". Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/39817.
Pełny tekst źródłaDavis, Jack Frank. "Belief and imagination". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2018. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10049327/.
Pełny tekst źródłaKsiążki na temat "Belief"
Belief. London: BBC, 2005.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaBelief. Boston: Roberts, 1985.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaVattimo, Gianni. Belief. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1999.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaCollins, Francis S. Belief. New York: HarperCollins, 2010.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaJohnson, Stephanie. Belief. London: Vintage, 2001.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaJohnson, Stephanie. Belief. Auckland, N.Z: Vintage, 2000.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaBakewell, Joan. Belief. London: Duckworth Overlook, 2006.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaJaszczolt, Katarzyna. Expressions of belief and belief ascription. [Lodz: University of Lodz], 1995.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaLuetz, Johannes M., i Patrick D. Nunn, red. Beyond Belief. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67602-5.
Pełny tekst źródłaKellenberger, James. Religious Belief. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74170-9.
Pełny tekst źródłaCzęści książek na temat "Belief"
Alvarado, Sergio J. "Beliefs and Belief Relationships". W The Kluwer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science, 49–80. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1561-2_3.
Pełny tekst źródłaMatthews, Robert J. "Belief and Belief’s Penumbra". W New Essays on Belief, 100–123. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_6.
Pełny tekst źródłaBratta, Phil. "They Believe Their Belief". W Affect, Emotion, and Rhetorical Persuasion in Mass Communication, 93–105. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351242370-7.
Pełny tekst źródłaLuger, Tana M. "Health Beliefs/Health Belief Model". W Encyclopedia of Behavioral Medicine, 999–1000. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39903-0_1227.
Pełny tekst źródłaOrbell, Sheina, Havah Schneider, Sabrina Esbitt, Jeffrey S. Gonzalez, Jeffrey S. Gonzalez, Erica Shreck, Abigail Batchelder i in. "Health Beliefs/Health Belief Model". W Encyclopedia of Behavioral Medicine, 907–8. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1005-9_1227.
Pełny tekst źródłaWilks, Yorick, i Afzal Ballim. "Belief Systems: Ascribing Belief". W Künstliche Intelligenz, 386–403. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-83739-5_12.
Pełny tekst źródłaBrown, Duncan. "Writing Belief, Reading Belief". W Finding My Way, 89–108. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781032633831-5.
Pełny tekst źródłaFoley, Michael, i Gordon Geddes. "Belief". W Religious Studies: Christianity GCSE, 99–162. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13913-2_4.
Pełny tekst źródłaFriedman, Aleene M. "Belief". W Treating Chronic Pain, 141–54. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-5968-3_11.
Pełny tekst źródłaKim, Nancy. "Belief". W Judgment and Decision-Making, 235–50. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-26956-0_13.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenia konferencji na temat "Belief"
Liu, Daxin, i Gerhard Lakemeyer. "Reasoning about Beliefs and Meta-Beliefs by Regression in an Expressive Probabilistic Action Logic". W Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/269.
Pełny tekst źródłaHunter, Aaron, François Schwarzentruber i Eric Tsang. "Belief Manipulation Through Propositional Announcements". W Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/154.
Pełny tekst źródłaLorini, Emiliano, i Francois Schwarzentruber. "Multi-Agent Belief Base Revision". W Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/270.
Pełny tekst źródłaDelgrande, James P., Joshua Sack, Gerhard Lakemeyer i Maurice Pagnucco. "Epistemic Logic of Likelihood and Belief". W Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/360.
Pełny tekst źródłaBoukhris, Imen, Zied Elouedi i Salem Benferhat. "Analyzing belief function networks with conditional beliefs". W 2011 11th International Conference on Intelligent Systems Design and Applications (ISDA). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isda.2011.6121782.
Pełny tekst źródłaBuckingham, David, Daniel Kasenberg i Matthias Scheutz. "Simultaneous Representation of Knowledge and Belief for Epistemic Planning with Belief Revision". W 17th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2020}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2020/18.
Pełny tekst źródłaSouza, Marlo, i Renata Wassermann. "Belief Contraction in Non-classical logics as Hyperintensional Belief Change". W 18th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2021}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2021/56.
Pełny tekst źródłaBaker, Clayton. "Predictive Modelling of Human Reasoning Using AGM Belief Revision". W Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/811.
Pełny tekst źródłaGregoire, Eric. "Change Your Belief about Belief Change". W 2013 IEEE 25th International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ictai.2013.133.
Pełny tekst źródłaSingleton, Joseph, i Richard Booth. "Who’s the Expert? On Multi-source Belief Change". W 19th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2022}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2022/33.
Pełny tekst źródłaRaporty organizacyjne na temat "Belief"
Minker, Jack, i Donald Perlis. Distributed Belief Systems. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, sierpień 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada244286.
Pełny tekst źródłaSmith, Joseph D. Belief: Foundation of Military Strategy. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, kwiecień 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada263590.
Pełny tekst źródłaMeeuwis, Maarten, Jonathan Parker, Antoinette Schoar i Duncan Simester. Belief Disagreement and Portfolio Choice. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, wrzesień 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25108.
Pełny tekst źródłaEnke, Benjamin, Frederik Schwerter i Florian Zimmermann. Associative Memory and Belief Formation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, styczeń 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26664.
Pełny tekst źródłaBianchi, Francesco, Sydney Ludvigson i Sai Ma. Belief Distortions and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, czerwiec 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27406.
Pełny tekst źródłaWilliams, Mary P. Breast Health Belief Systems Study. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, sierpień 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada378006.
Pełny tekst źródłaAhn, Sungsoo, Michael Chertkov i Jinwoo Shin. Sythesis of MCMC and Belief Propagation. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), maj 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1254988.
Pełny tekst źródłaJenkins, Odest C. Coordinating Robotic Networks through Belief Propogation. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, wrzesień 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada577130.
Pełny tekst źródłaDempster, Arthur P. Theory and Applications of Belief Functions. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, listopad 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada217092.
Pełny tekst źródłaMinker, Jack, i Donald Perlis. Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Belief Systems, and Parallelism. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, lipiec 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada201458.
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