Gotowa bibliografia na temat „B-Gendarmerie”

This investigation aims to study implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in the interventions of gendarmeries under the aegis of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), because two decades after its creation, there is evidence that the WPS is falling behind on its initial promise. Using a mixed strategy with a case study design, data were collected in 14 countries using structured interviews with 24 organisations linked to security in the European Union, including 6 linked to the EGF. After densifying the evolution of conflict, the window of opportunity that led to creation of the EGF and the implications of EGF’s current organisation not having structures dedicated exclusively to gender, suggestions obtained from the primary information were dissected. Integration of ideas in the literature with the results of this study suggest that the main obstacles to innovation for implementation of the WGS result from: (a) existing limitations in the institutions that make up the EGF; (b) lack of a plan to implement the WGS agenda; (c) lack of resources (materials and/or structures dedicated to gender); and (d) failure to incorporate a gender perspective into all planning dimensions.

The article reexamines the question, previously raised in historical scholarship and journalism, of the possible role of Viacheslav Zaikin, a well-known historian and graduate of Kharkiv University, as a “provocateur” during World War I. In Ukrainian historiography, in contrast to Russian, the work of imperial law enforcement institutions with covert agents has been given little to no attention. The necessary sources are either lacking or unavailable. The purpose of this study was to try and compare the well-known accusations against Viacheslav Zaikin, made by his contemporaries, with gendarmerie documents, primarily agent reports, about the activities of Ukrainian youth organizations in which he may have been involved. This approach does not guarantee an accurate answer to the question. But at least it should enable one to take steps in that direction, namely: to determine whether or not Viacheslav Zaikin’s acting as a “provocateur” was possible at all (and thus to exclude the opposite); to ascertain the (im)possibility of his supplying intelligence to law enforcement by placing it into the context of the circumstances of his life and activities; to determine the correspondence of the contents of this intelligence to Viacheslav Zaikin’s status and connections in Ukrainian organizations, etc. The author’s research establishes that: a) the quality of information in the agent reports fits Viacheslav Zaikin’s capabilities and his place in the Ukrainian youth circles of Kharkiv; b) the fact that Viacheslav Zaikin himself does not figure in gendarmerie documents looks very suspicious; and c) no categorical conclusions can be made due to the insufficiency and inconsistency of the available evidence.