Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Armed Forces – Operations other than war”

<div><p class="Els-history-head">Joint Defense Regional Command I (Kogabwilhan I) is the Operation Main Command (Kotamaops) of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI or Tentara Nasional Indonesia) which is directly under the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. Kogabwilhan I’s task is to act as an initial follower and restorer in the event of a conflict in its territory, both for War Military Operations (WMO) and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as well as a deterrent in the event of a threat. The current phenomenon is that the organizational readiness of units in the Natuna area is not yet ideal, the readiness of human resources, especially the Indonesian National Armed Forces units in the Natuna area, is still limited, and the support for facilities and infrastructure of the Indonesian National Armed Forces units in the Natuna area is not adequate, and the implementation of operational activities in the Indonesian National Armed Forces units in the Natuna area. Natuna is not optimal. The purpose of this study is to provide government input on the implementation of Joint Defense Regional Command I (Kogabwilhan I) policies in supporting the national defense. This study uses a qualitative method which is an understanding of social phenomena from several participant perspectives. The results achieved are by the theory of Policy Implementation related to Resources, Communication, Disposition, and Bureaucratic Structure, a strategy is needed to revamp the bureaucratic structure and recalculate budget resources. </p></div>

There is no further regulation regarding the role played by Special Operations Command Of The Indonesian National Armed Forces in eradicating the Crime of Terrorism through Military Operations Other Than War as stated in the TNI Law Article 7 paragraph (2) letter (b) number 3 through the main tasks of the TNI through OMSP to overcome acts of terrorism, so that there is a legal ambiguity in it and raises a question about the role and authority of the Special Operations Command Of The Indonesian National Armed Forces in the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, as well as to what extent the Special Operations Command Of The Indonesian National Armed Forces can be deployed in the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. Using normative legal research with statute approach and conceptual approach. This study explains that the role and authority of the Special Operations Command Of The Indonesian National Armed Forces in the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism is as an auxiliary task. In the context of terrorism crimes, the Special Operations Command Of The Indonesian National Armed Forces is involved in the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism which is carried out as an auxiliary task and there are limitations in the involvement of the Special Operations Command Of The Indonesian National Armed Forces in the Eradication of Terrorism Crimes such as the situation and conditions, place, time, and the level of threat that the Special Operations Command Of The Indonesian National Armed Forces can take action to the field in combating terrorism operations

The collaborative efforts involving the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), Indonesian National Police (POLRI), government, and the local community in managing floods in Pekanbaru, Indonesia have been ongoing for an extensive period. These efforts require sustained attention, particularly during the prevailing rainy conditions. The military campaign approach comprises a series of joint operations executed to achieve strategic and operational objectives within specific spatial and temporal constraints. This military campaign involves Military Operations for War (MOW) and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The objective of this study was to describe and analyze the synergy among the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), Indonesian National Police (POLRI), the government, and the local community in addressing floods in Pekanbaru through a military campaign strategy. This strategy involved TNI units with distinct branches and functions. The approach undertaken by the TNI (specifically those from KODIM 031 Pekanbaru) in flood disaster relief operations included collaboration with the Regional Disaster Management Agency of Pekanbaru to mobilize all available TNI and POLRI forces within the vicinity of Pekanbaru. This collaborative effort involved various stakeholders, such as TNI, POLRI, the government, NGOs, youth organizations (Karang Taruna), and other relevant entities. These activities took place in the East Labuh Baru, Payung Sekaki District, particularly along Arjuna Street. This effort is expected to establish an effective synergy among these groups, foster closer ties with the community, and manage floods by addressing issues related to drainage systems, canals, and overgrown vegetation.

Purpose of the study: The position of Indonesia at the point of three plates of the earth and its location in the tropics makes it vulnerable to disasters. To face the possible disaster, Indonesia Armed Force following its mandate based on Law No. 34 of 2007, synergize with the National Board of Disaster Management to design disaster management cooperation through joint exercise training routinely until 2015. Methodology: The research used a qualitative method, with primary data in the form of interview and observation, and secondary data were obtained from related documents, such as meeting notes and data on the deployment of troops to the disaster area. Main Findings: The results show that the synergy between two institutions through the cooperation of personnel training, considering the strengths of each institution that can be mutually reinforcing in disaster management is very important to be continued. Applications of this study: This study which about military operations other than war (MOOTW) can be useful in every country because of this research look at the synergy between the military and other institutions in disaster management, Social Science, Security Studies and Social Science. Novelty/Originality of this study: Research on military operations other than war generally looks more at how the military serves as peacekeepers in conflict-prone areas. Very little research has examined the synergy of the military and other institutions in tackling natural disasters.

Operational deception (Maskirovka) as a Russian capability to surprise the enemy The aim of the article was to present the characteristics of operational deception used by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and to broaden the understanding of the evolution of operations using Maskirovka. Particular attention was paid to examples of its use in contemporary wars and armed conflicts - primarily in the conflict in Ukraine and in the Five-Day War in Georgia. The analysis led to an identification of trends regarding the use of deception in contemporary and future conflicts and activities other than war. It shows that the maskirovka will be increasingly used to achieve strategic goals and shape international opinion. One of the most important areas of its application will be cyberspace, enabling more effective disinformation and propaganda activities, including information warfare. Considering the dynamic development of technology and capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the field of operational masking, it is justified to conduct further research in the Maskirovka area. Keywords: deception, operational deception, disinformation, concealment, simulation, imitation, Maskirovka, The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, War in Georgia, Conflict in Ukraine. Celem artykułu było przedstawienie charakterystyki maskowania operacyjnego stosowanego przez Siły Zbrojne Federacji Rosyjskiej oraz poszerzenie wiedzy na temat ewoluowania działań, w których stosuje się maskirowkę. Szczególną uwagę poświęcono przykładom jej wykorzystania we współczesnych wojnach i konfliktach zbrojnych – przede wszystkim w konflikcie na Ukrainie oraz w wojnie pięciodniowej w Gruzji. Na podstawie przeprowadzonej analizy wskazano tendencje dotyczące posługiwania się maskirowką we współczesnych i przyszłych konfliktach oraz działaniach innych niż wojenne. Wynika z niej, że maskirowka będzie coraz częściej wykorzystywana do osiągania celów strategicznych oraz kształtowania opinii międzynarodowej. Jednym z najważniejszych obszarów jej stosowania stanie się cyberprzestrzeń, umożliwiająca skuteczniejsze prowadzenie działań dezinformacyjnych i propagandowych, w tym wojny informacyjnej. Ze względu na dynamiczny rozwój technologii, jak również potencjał Sił Zbrojnych Federacji Rosyjskiej do działań z zakresu maskowania operacyjnego należy kontynuować badania dotyczące maskirowki.

In the late 80s and early 90s of the twentieth century, Armenia openly made territorial claims to the historical lands of Azerbaijan and launched a military aggression against our country. At that time, taking advantage of the chaos in Azerbaijan, Armenia occupied 20% of our lands, and as a result of the policy of ethnic cleansing pursued by Armenia, more than 1 million Azerbaijanis were expelled from their native lands. The process of negotiations on the elimination of the consequences of military aggression against Azerbaijan and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884, which lasted about 30 years, did not yield results due to the destructive position of Armenia. On September 27, 2020, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia again grossly violated the norms of international law. There were dead and wounded among civilians and servicemen. It has launched counter-offensive operations by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan to prevent and neutralize real and potential military threats to the national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Thus, part of the Republic of Azerbaijan was liberated by military means, and the other part of the lands occupied by the Armenians was liberated peacefully on the basis of the commitment of the defeated Armenia, the Declaration of November 10, assessed for the Republic of Armenia as an “act of capitulation”.

The purpose of this study is to find out about the setting of the authority of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) overcoming the armed separatist movement, armed insurgency, and acts of terrorism in Law NRI Number. This research is normative legal research using the statutory approach, historical approach, comparative approach, philosophical approach. The analysis technique is done by qualitative juridical analysis. The results showed that the legis ratio of regulating the authority of the Indonesian National Army in overcoming armed separatist movements, armed insurgency, and acts of terrorism in RI law number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army was departed from the desire to abandon the dual function model of ABRI, namely as a security and security forces and as a social-political force. As a social and political force, ABRI at that time had a role as a stabilizer, a dynamist, as a pioneer, and as an implementer of Pancasila democracy. With the enactment of RI law number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Army, changing the Indonesian National Army as a means of defense of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, which is tasked with implementing a state defense policy to uphold national sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity, and protect national security, carry out military operations for war and military operations other than war, and actively participate in the task of maintaining regional and international peace

This article reflects a journalist’s personal experience of reporting on the UK military, analysing the relationship between senior military figures and the Ministry of Defence (their political masters) and the media. Topics covered include manipulation of the media and the popularity of the armed forces, as well as unpopular, ill-planned, military operations, notably Iraq and Afghanistan. The author also examines other operations, notably the wars in the Falklands and Kosovo, the 1991 Gulf War and the Scott Arms-to-Iraq Inquiry. The article goes on to explore leaks by frustrated military; tensions between military commanders and ministers; the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review; military chiefs not speaking truth to power; ministers jealous of the military’s close relations with journalists; and the Defence Advisory Notice Committee. The author reveals how official secrecy is honoured more in the breach than in its observance, especially concerning the special forces.

The role of the Military Resort Command in disaster management is a form of implementation of the Indonesian Armed Forces’ tasks, namely the task of Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) in accordance with the mandate of Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Disaster management in the regions carried out by the the Military Resort Command involvement of government agencies and other stakeholders. Between the the Military Resort Command, government agencies and stakeholders in disaster management. Related to the role of the the Military Resort Command, this research was conducted with the aim to study the the Military Resort Command 043/ Garuda Hitam’s Strategy for disaster management in Lampung Province. This research uses a qualitative method using case studies. In addition, researchers conducted interviews, observations and documentation studies to collect data and analyzed. The Military Resort Command 043/ Garuda Hitam in disaster management is by coordinating and communicating with government agencies and other stakeholders as well as facilitating Territorial Development (Binter) activities which are one of the tasks of the Military Resort Command 043/ Garuda Hitam in Lampung Province.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Systems and Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004.
Thesis advisor(s): Raymond Buettner, Thomas Moore. Includes bibliographical references (p. 156-161). Also available online.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the change of the political and military situation worldwide. Peace keeping missions became more likely than major regional conflicts. However, the conventional combat simulations, which were developed for the combat between heavily armored forces could not handle these new situations. In these new missions the movement of ground forces becomes a major task for any commander. This thesis develops a software architecture of loosely coupled software components. These components are combined to simulate the movement of convoys. The simulation is implemented as an event step model. For visualization of the ongoing simulation a different component displays the convoy locations on a geographical display. The combination of both modules allows, the analyst to validate a given movement plan and to identify possible weak points and threats.

Thesis (Master of Strategic Studies) -- Army War College, 2006.
Title from title screen (viewed Aug. 20, 2008). "8 March 2006"--P. [iii]. "ADA449254"--URL. Includes bibliographical references (p. 15-22). Also issued in paper format.

碩士
淡江大學
國際事務與戰略研究所碩士班
104
Non-traditional security threats have been taken more seriously after the cold war because of the proliferation of globalization and the reduction of extensive military conflicts. Affected by that and other factors of the time, Armed Forces in many counties began to transform, the concept of Military Operations other than War therefore became more practical and acceptable. This research aims to discuss and understand the background and status of the Foreign Military Operations other than War from the Republic of China Armed Forces after the cold war, to achieve a better future guide. The fading of ideology after the cold war was one of the main reasons that makes our government conservative in implementing Foreign Military Operations other than War. However, we do have the capabilities to carry out most of those operations, which could not only response to the non-traditional security threats, but also to promote organization reformation and cultivate national soft power. Moreover, we could spill the experiences from those co-working operations to other diplomatic matters, which might help us to break through the diplomatic suppressions from China. After studying and comparing the key studies in the subject for both theoretically and implementing, we found out that for what we have done in Foreign Military Operations other than War is more about promoting national image but rarely about declaring national sovereignty, the structures of related laws and procedures are incomplete, and the self-narrowed policies and the outdated equipment also affect the results of operations. Therefore, we recommend the government to address more active and comprehensive policies, to improve laws and procedures, and to renew the equipment. Finally, we compared requirements for the operations of Foreign Military Operations other than War with the current status we held, and found out that except for the operations we have done before like helping to deliver emergency aids, allowed noncombatant evacuation operations and military exercises in the high sea, we should participate in protective humanitarian actions, performing bilateral or multilateral exercises associated with Military Operations other than War, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, mine clearance operations and counter-piracy operations.

Despite being demilitarized after defeat, and dominant pacifist narratives, Japanese armed forces continued to exist and be engaged in operations during the post-war period. This chapter examines the military legacies of Japan’s empire, how such legacy forces were exploited by other countries, how individuals coped with the post-war situation, and how a thread of imperial naval legacy formed the core of Japan’s post-imperial armed forces. It then examines the pivotal role of the Korean War in the development of naval forces and the creation of a National Police Reserve, and how the merged National Safety Forces provided a base upon which the Japan Self-Defense Forces were founded. This provides insight into the transformation of Japan from empire, defeat, and post-war occupation and demilitarization to democracy, revival, and Cold War re-armament within a decade. This decade would become known for the emergent Yoshida Doctrine, devoting sufficient resources to defense to ensure US support without jeopardizing economic revival, which came to symbolize Japanese security.

This chapter follows American mathematicians as they first mobilized for and then actively engaged in the war effort. It analyzes the creation of a new program of advanced instruction and research in mechanics that aimed, once and for all, to begin to fill the United States' institutional lacuna in applied mathematics. The chapter also looks at how mathematicians at Brown University engaged in teaching relatively elementary mathematics to the country's Armed Forces. Others contributed to the solution of specific problems posed by the military in contexts such as the Ballistics Research Laboratory; the Applied Mathematics Panel of the National Defense Research Committee with its pockets of expertise; Eighth Army's Operations Research Service; and the Manhattan Project. As they engaged in this war work, the chapter argues that mathematicians also managed to sustain their research momentum and other professional activities.

Abstract An especially perplexing issues in international legal regulation of non-international armed conflict is the relationship between international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). While most experts and states now recognize the complementary applicability of these two branches of law, translating this complementarity to operational practice remains difficult. This is exacerbated by characterization of military operations against transnational non-state organized armed groups transnationally. The challenge is most significant regarding authority to employ force. Neither body of law provides an ideal solution to this question in operations against non-state groups. On one hand, IHL provides expansive authority under status-based targeting, but in many situations this is too permissive. On the other hand, IHRL relies on more restrictive conduct-based targeting, but this can be ineffective in some cases in meeting a threat. This chapter asks whether operational practice has provided a practical response to this challenge. It suggests that the common practice of restricting IHL with rules of engagement that reflect IHRL principles indicates that outside the context of inter-state hostilities, IHRL provides the operational default use of force setting. This “setting” is subject to mission-specific expansion pursuant to international humanitarian law principles, but should be understood as more of a legal obligation than a purely policy-based constraint on conduct of hostilities authority.

Exposure to affective depictions of soldiers with domesticated animals such as cats and dogs encourages civilian audiences to view soldiers, militaries and even the aims of war with sympathy and approval. This chapter argues that Russia and Ukraine are currently engaged in parallel processes of creating and disseminating such depictions in order to rehabilitate the reputations of their armed forces and garner support for their military operations in eastern Ukraine. This positioning of soldiers’ bodies and animals’ bodies together, most notably in photographs circulated on social media, but also in other representations such as statues, is just one example of the wider phenomenon of digital militarism. State militaries and alliances have become very sophisticated and systematic about the use of digital technologies, especially social media and the internet, to disseminate positive messages and images about soldiers, the armed forces and war. The chapter concludes that the differing degrees of success by Russia and Ukraine can be attributed to factors that are highly dependent on context, demonstrating that militarisation is above all a set of social processes.

A central feature of long-term colonial rule in Algeria was a deep and unresolved tension, between indirect rule by local, conservative élites based on patrimonial forms of government, and plans for economic and political modernization that depended on breaking the hold of the caids and the old system of commune mixte administration. Opération Pilote revealed such contradictions. Servier supported plans of socio-economic development and modernization, the creation of a ‘New Algeria’, but in practice he supported the neo-tribalism of the bachaga Boualam, and other traditional élites, that continued to depend on patron-client relations, maraboutism, and charismatic authority. The special forces officer Hentic was unable to transform Boualam’s harkis from an incompetent ‘private’ army into a regular, trained force. Likewise the secret service supported and armed the third force movement led by the ex-MNA leader Djilali Belhadj or ‘Kobus’. Kobus, revealing wider political ambitions, acted like a predatory warlord and had catastrophic impacts in damaging COIN operations in the Ouarsenis, before his assassination by the FLN.

Set at the September 4, 1991, congressional hearing at the Rayburn Office Building, Washington, D.C., the chapter uses Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili’s testimony to a House Armed Services Committee defense panel on military operations other than war (MOOTW) to thumbnail how Operation Provide Comfort was successfully concluded. It also describes how the success of the mission led to Shalikashvili’s current position as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. It also flashes back to Shalikashvili’s tour as a major in the Vietnam War, when he served as a senior district advisor for Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In that posting he was heavily involved in pacification efforts (increasing rice production, building roads, constructing hospitals, etc.) as well Operation Fisher, another significant refugee resettlement program. Shalikashvili’s Vietnam experience would be a major developmental step leading him to being more open to the use of force than Colin Powell.

India has remained a victim of terrorism and suffered a lot in terms of life and property. The communal forces slowly and gradually formed armed groups in the name of different organizations with the sole aim of terrorizing the people in the name of Jehad. The main motto behind this is to destabilize the sovereignty of the nation and interfere in the civil and strategic set up by acts of terror. This is sort of war and indirect attack because direct attack now a days on a powerful nation is not easy and condemnable as such. India has suffered more casualties from terror attacks than any other country. The different types of groups which are present in India, can be divided into three groups that is separatist, secessionist and religious extremist. Most of these groups are funded and supported by neighboring countries and unfortunately the porous borders between India and neighboring countries have proved to be a boon for the inimical forces

Since its controversial creation in April 1948, Israel has faced conventionally symmetric as well as asymmetric and irregular threats emanating from various sources. The Israel Defense Forces remarkably overwhelmed its Arab counterparts in three conventional limited wars. However, fighting for their former homeland, the nationalism-driven Palestinians and violent actors other than state (AOTSs) created new challenges for Israel. Palestinians with close proximity to Israel employed improvised arsenal, especially rockets and shoulder launched weapons to inflict damage, death, and destruction on Israeli civilians and military. Israel responded with brutal military operations and offensive measures to prevent as well as avenge the loss of its military and civilians. The study is a concentrated effort in analysing Israel's Trinity comprising of weapon systems such as Iron Dome, Iron Fist, and armed unmanned aerial vehicles in its endeavour to countering threats.

The course of each of the wars is characterized by various types of solutions in the field of logistic security, usually implemented in very extreme conditions. These solutions are often of fundamental importance for the course of combat operations. The Berlin Operation, the Battle of Berlin (in Soviet and Russian historiography as the Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation) – an offensive operation carried out between April 16 and May 2, 1945 with the forces of three Red Army fronts. Its goal was to conquer Berlin. The logistics of the Soviet troops during World War II reached a climax of development, hitherto unknown, taking into account the needs of troops participating in the fighting during large offensive strategic operations. The content of the article presents selected issues concerning the rear protection of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front. The conditions that determined its planning and organization were presented, and the final results of the work performed were indicated. The tasks and the model of the organization of the rear of the front as well as the arrangement of the essential elements and rear devices were discussed. The aim of the article is to popularize issues related to the rear support of hostilities. According to the author, this aspect is often overlooked, usually treated very briefly or even underestimated, not to say even neglected by military historians, an aspect accompanying every armed conflict. Looking at the course of military operations through the prism of logistics, we see a completely different face of the war. You can then fully understand the words of the Swiss general A.-H. Jomini’s: “Logistics is all or almost all military activities, except for combat”. The history of the army and wars is closely related to the history of logistics. There have always been logistical problems since the beginning of warfare. They were the basic condition for the success of all kinds of activities because their purpose was to satisfy the material and other needs of soldiers and the combat equipment used by them. The way logistics function on the battlefield contributes to the development of military thought and the art of war to a varying degree. The history of wars provides us with many examples that sometimes small innovations or the implementation of unconventional solutions can change the course of history and turn the tide of victory.

Contemporary armed conflict has witnessed an increased employment of digital technologies in the conduct of hostilities. While there is broad consensus on the full applicability of the rules and principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) to the “fifth domain” of warfare, many issues remain debated. More specifically, digital technologies allow a wide range of actors other than States – such as individuals, “hacktivists”, criminal groups, non-State armed groups – to play a role in the hostilities and engage in cyber operations that have the potential of harming civilians or damaging civilian infrastructure and that may amount to serious violations of IHL. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to examine the legal grounds upon which hostile cyber operations carried out by non-State actors (NSAs) could constitute war crimes, thus entailing their individual criminal responsibility under international law. Hence, the analysis will focus on the applicability of the war crimes provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to such operations, with a view to identifying the prerequisites necessary to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction. To this end, the first part will focus on the increased involvement of NSAs in the conduct of hostilities by cyber means, taking the recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine as a pertinent case study. Subsequently, the paper will explore the conditions necessary for the application of Article 8 of the ICC Statute, with special attention devoted to those aspects that are deemed particularly problematic in light of the participation of NSAs in armed conflict. Finally, the paper seeks to highlight the limits of possible future investigations of cyber conducts possibly amounting to war crimes. These encompass not only issues of admissibility, but also the statutory limits of the Rome Statute when it comes to war crimes provisions applicable to noninternational armed conflicts.

Loitering munition has received renewed interest in the last years. Due to its proliferation and extensive use in contemporary armed conflicts, new phenomenon emerged with wide-spread discussions of what it can bring to present and future armed forces. The article aims to characterize the key attributes which distinguish this asset from both traditional unmanned aerial vehicles and guided missiles. Then, the performance of different types of loitering munition is discussed in specific operational conditions of two contemporary conflicts of high intensity – in the Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020 and during the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022-23). Based on that, the article claims that loitering munition, among other assets, contributes to the trend of democratization of air power in contested environment. Finally, the issue of counter-UAS with the focus on loitering munition specifically is identified as one of the critical challenges for the development of force protection capabilities.

Host Nation Support, i.e. support from the host country is civil and military support provided by Host Nation in times of peace, crisis or war to the armed forces and NATO organizations or other armed forces that are the territory of the host country deployed, operating in the territory, from its territory or passing through it. Mutual cooperation within the alliance and its partners creates increased security guarantees for the host country as well as for the neighboring countries of the alliance and partners. The presence of foreign troops or organizations close to NATO is not limited only to the tasks resulting from the main NATO documents, but expands the scope of the presence based on additional bilateral agreements and treaties between individual countries.

The Presidios of Tuscany have received less historiographical attention than other fortified sites on the Mediterranean coast. In this context, it is worth mentioning a place unjustly forgotten: Porto Longone (Porto o Puerto Longón in Spanish), today’s Porto Azzurro, on the island of Elba. During the twenty years following the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, Longone was an isolated enclave, Philip V of Spain’s last stronghold in Italy, whose preservation depended on a frail diplomatic and military balance. Despite its fragile situation, the fortress would be of key importance in maintaining the network of contacts with Italy within the revanchist strategy of the Spanish Bourbon and obtaining intelligence from the territories controlled by the imperial forces of Charles VI. The king’s will to turn Longone into a powerful forward base meant that some of the most experienced military engineers of the newly created Spanish Royal Corps of Engineers were stationed there, such as Antonio Montaigut de la Perille, Pedro Coysevaux or Simón Poulet. The project for Longone detailed in the plans of 1722 and 1727 written by Coysevaux was comprehensive and addressed both fortifications like the bastions of Castellón, Toledo or Zúñiga and their advanced works as well as other constructions necessary to ensure the defence of the fortress and decent service conditions for its garrison: barracks, warehouses, powder magazines and water cisterns. The War of the Polish Succession would increase the weight of the stronghold as a base for operations in Italy. From 1735 onwards, Porto Longone would be cut off from the dominions of the kings of Spain, but the previous two decades attest to the effort put into its fortification and improvement, without which its conservation would probably have been more seriously challenged by the rivals of Philip V.

The objective of this work is to study the performance of low pressure turbines operating at low Reynolds numbers by extensive experiments and to validate numerical simulation results with the experimental data. Particular attention is payed to the prediction capabilities of current numerical turbulence and transition models in order to be able to benchmark the performance of future turbine airfoil profiles and to optimise their aero design. The LPT-Cascade under consideration has been investigated at the High Speed Cascade Wind Tunnel of the Institute of Jet Propulsion to gather information about the performance of turbine airfoils under low Reynolds operating conditions. The experiments were executed in the range of Re = 40′000 to 400′000 with steady state inflow conditions at different Mach number levels. The main focus of the investigation thereby was on the range of Re = 40′000 to 70′000. The high speed cascade wind tunnel of the University of Federal Armed Forces Munich allows for an independent Reynolds and Mach number variation such that an extensive database can be generated for realistic engine operation conditions. One major test objective was related to flow separation phenomena on the suction surface and its influence on the performance of the turbine profile. For this purpose both the loss behaviour and the pressure distribution on suction and pressure surface of the blade were measured and analysed. In addition to the experiments numerical flow simulations were conducted for the same turbine profile. In order to achieve more information on the influence of different turbulence and transition models on the flow separation, transition, and reattachment behaviour, two different CFD codes were used for comparison purposes. On the one hand the CFD code TRACE, which is developed by the German Aerospace Center (DLR) and MTU Aero Engines and on the other hand the general purpose code ANSYS CFX were applied. The aim is to assess the prediction capabilities of the different codes especially in the low Reynolds number range.

While subsonic ammunition has been of military interest for years, particularly for covert operations, significant limitations of current offerings have prevented its adoption including the inability to cycle an automatic action. This and other limitations were investigated through a design exercise to establish the feasibility of a drop-in replacement relevant to the Canadian Armed Forces using commercial off the shelf components. A survey and stability analysis of commercially available 5.56 mm projectiles led to the selection of the 90 grain Sierra Matchking for this design. Three different cartridge configurations were investigated in order to evaluate the effect of reducing cartridge volume on key internal ballistic variables. A cycling impulse model was developed in order to rank candidate designs on their ability to cycle a prescribed automatic weapon. Cartridge volume, in terms of standard cartridge, straight internal bore, and custom internal diameter to realize 95% load density, was explored as a means of increasing the load density of subsonic ammunition in order to reduce muzzle velocity variance and thus increase accuracy. However, the accuracy gained by reducing cartridge volume is shown to cause significant tradeoffs in cycling impulse. Live fire testing was performed in order to determine the minimum cycling impulse required to cycle the test weapon. The results also indicate that there may exist a threshold load density above which load density does not play a significant role in muzzle velocity variance. Thus, an objective of maximizing load density may overconstrain the design for minimal benefit.

The objective of the joint National Research Council of Canada (NRC) and The Boeing Company Technology Development Program (TDP) entitled 'Canadian Vertical Lift Autonomy Demonstration' (CVLAD) is to evaluate automated and supervised autonomous flight systems on NRC Bell 412 Advanced Systems Research Aircraft (ASRA) and Royal Canadian Air Force Boeing CH-147F Chinook demonstrators. Boeing technologies such as Degraded Visual Environment Pilotage System and Advanced Vehicle Management System form the foundation of an autonomy solution that aims to satisfy Royal Canadian Air Force, US Army, and other Armed Service branch end-use objectives for force multiplication, tactical advantage, pilot assistance, reduced crew operations, and enhanced fleet productivity. The Boeing Company engaged NRC under a Cooperative Research Agreement since 2016 as part of a number of strategies to upgrade Medium-Heavy Lift H-47 Chinook capabilities prior to long-term aircraft replacement in the 2030 to 2060 timeframe. A recent achievement of the CVLAD TDP by its Boeing Phantom Works, Boeing Chinook Program, Aurora Flight Sciences, and NRC Flight Research Laboratory team was the development of Automated Flight Guidance methods addressing system safety and performance. Design and evaluation activities occurred in Boeing Software-/Hardware in-loop facilities as well as on the NRC Bell 412 ASRA. The CVLAD team is using a blend of traditional Systems Engineering 'V-Shaped' Life Cycle Model, System of Systems, and Model-Based processes to develop a cyber-physical system that aims to meet end-user concept of operations and requirements. Significant benefits of virtual development tools such as component-vehicle digital twins and surrogate inflight simulation facilities are achieved as they promote effective collaboration, efficient design, and relevant verification/validation methodologies. Business models can be made more robust by phasing the introduction of technology where effective automation provides users with near-term benefits, while providing a foundation for safe, reliable, and trusted autonomous capabilities for long-term production.

Tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) involves care for casualties in armed conflict from one’s own service (e.g., U.S. Marine Corps), other services (i.e., U.S. Army, Air Force,), allied forces, adversaries, and civilians. To minimize injury and preserve life, medics perform TCCC which includes casualty retrieval, stabilization and documentation, transport, triage, and treatment. In future scenarios, delays in evacuation are expected to require extended care including prolonged field care (PFC) over hours to days, increasing the potential for complications such as bloodstream infection (sepsis). Most medics have only simple equipment and essential medications and will need assistance at point of care to make decisions on how to treat more complex cases and perform procedures in an austere setting.We describe a project for the Defense Health Agency (DHA) over 3 years to develop and evaluate the Trauma Triage Treatment and Training Decision Support (4TDS), a real-time decision support system (DSS) to monitor casualty health. The operating 4TDS prototype uses the Samsung smart phone and tablet certified for use in the Department of Defense (DoD) Nett Warrior program. Connection to a simple VitalTag (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA) vital signs monitor placed on a casualty at point of injury (PoI) will stream patient data including heart rate, respiration rate, peripheral oxygen saturation (SpO2), and diastolic and systolic blood pressure. Nurses, technicians, and physicians can use the tablet to display an expanded data set including lab values while providing care at a Battalion Aid Station (BAS) and Field Hospital (FH).4TDS includes a Machine Learning (ML) model to indicate shock probability, risk of internal hemorrhage, and probability of the need for a massive transfusion. The shock model was trained on Mayo Clinic Intensive Care Unit (ICU) patient data, then evaluated in a 6-month “silent test” comparing shock prediction with actual clinician diagnoses. The model only uses 6 vital signs, which is suited to battlefield care, while other published results include lab tests (e.g., lactate), and produces a Receiver Operator Characteristic Curve (ROC) of 0.83 for shock detection. The model only decreases by 0.05 90 minutes, identifying shock probability well before its onset. Medic reviews indicate a 30-minute advanced warning would be more than sufficient to initiate treatment.Medics who provide PFC may need to perform life-critical procedures such as shock management, cricothyroidotomy intubation, and transfusion that may not have been used for an extended period. 4TDS includes refresher training in how to perform such a procedure, as well as whether to perform the procedure. Usability assessments with healthcare providers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force at Joint Base San Antonio, TX have demonstrated 4TDS and its capabilities align with TCCC practice. This work is supported by the US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command under Contract No. W81XWH‐15‐9‐0001.

Attention to safety and health are of ever-increasing priority to industrial organizations. Good Safety is demanded by stockholders, employees, and the community while increasing injury costs provide additional motivation for safety and health excellence. Safety has always been a strong corporate value of DuPont and a vital part of its culture. As a result, DuPont has become a benchmark in safety and health performance. Since 1990, DuPont has re-engineered itself to meet global competition and address future vision. In the new re-engineered organizational structures, DuPont has also had to re-engineer its safety management systems. A special Discovery Team was chartered by DuPont senior management to determine the “best practices’ for safety and health being used in DuPont best-performing sites. A summary of the findings is presented, and five of the practices are discussed. Excellence in safety and health management is more important today than ever. Public awareness, federal and state regulations, and enlightened management have resulted in a widespread conviction that all employees have the right to work in an environment that will not adversely affect their safety and health. In DuPont, we believe that excellence in safety and health is necessary to achieve global competitiveness, maintain employee loyalty, and be an accepted member of the communities in which we make, handle, use, and transport products. Safety can also be the “catalyst” to achieving excellence in other important business parameters. The organizational and communication skills developed by management, individuals, and teams in safety can be directly applied to other company initiatives. As we look into the 21st Century, we must also recognize that new organizational structures (flatter with empowered teams) will require new safety management techniques and systems in order to maintain continuous improvement in safety performance. Injury costs, which have risen dramatically in the past twenty years, provide another incentive for safety and health excellence. Shown in the Figure 1, injury costs have increased even after correcting for inflation. Many companies have found these costs to be an “invisible drain” on earnings and profitability. In some organizations, significant initiatives have been launched to better manage the workers’ compensation systems. We have found that the ultimate solution is to prevent injuries and incidents before they occur. A globally-respected company, DuPont is regarded as a well-managed, extremely ethical firm that is the benchmark in industrial safety performance. Like many other companies, DuPont has re-engineered itself and downsized its operations since 1985. Through these changes, we have maintained dedication to our principles and developed new techniques to manage in these organizational environments. As a diversified company, our operations involve chemical process facilities, production line operations, field activities, and sales and distribution of materials. Our customer base is almost entirely industrial and yet we still maintain a high level of consumer awareness and positive perception. The DuPont concern for safety dates back to the early 1800s and the first days of the company. In 1802 E.I. DuPont, a Frenchman, began manufacturing quality grade explosives to fill America’s growing need to build roads, clear fields, increase mining output, and protect its recently won independence. Because explosives production is such a hazardous industry, DuPont recognized and accepted the need for an effective safety effort. The building walls of the first powder mill near Wilmington, Delaware, were built three stones thick on three sides. The back remained open to the Brandywine River to direct any explosive forces away from other buildings and employees. To set the safety example, DuPont also built his home and the homes of his managers next to the powder yard. An effective safety program was a necessity. It represented the first defense against instant corporate liquidation. Safety needs more than a well-designed plant, however. In 1811, work rules were posted in the mill to guide employee work habits. Though not nearly as sophisticated as the safety standards of today, they did introduce an important basic concept — that safety must be a line management responsibility. Later, DuPont introduced an employee health program and hired a company doctor. An early step taken in 1912 was the keeping of safety statistics, approximately 60 years before the federal requirement to do so. We had a visible measure of our safety performance and were determined that we were going to improve it. When the nation entered World War I, the DuPont Company supplied 40 percent of the explosives used by the Allied Forces, more than 1.5 billion pounds. To accomplish this task, over 30,000 new employees were hired and trained to build and operate many plants. Among these facilities was the largest smokeless powder plant the world had ever seen. The new plant was producing granulated powder in a record 116 days after ground breaking. The trends on the safety performance chart reflect the problems that a large new work force can pose until the employees fully accept the company’s safety philosophy. The first arrow reflects the World War I scale-up, and the second arrow represents rapid diversification into new businesses during the 1920s. These instances of significant deterioration in safety performance reinforced DuPont’s commitment to reduce the unsafe acts that were causing 96 percent of our injuries. Only 4 percent of injuries result from unsafe conditions or equipment — the remainder result from the unsafe acts of people. This is an important concept if we are to focus our attention on reducing injuries and incidents within the work environment. World War II brought on a similar set of demands. The story was similar to World War I but the numbers were even more astonishing: one billion dollars in capital expenditures, 54 new plants, 75,000 additional employees, and 4.5 billion pounds of explosives produced — 20 percent of the volume used by the Allied Forces. Yet, the performance during the war years showed no significant deviation from the pre-war years. In 1941, the DuPont Company was 10 times safer than all industry and 9 times safer than the Chemical Industry. Management and the line organization were finally working as they should to control the real causes of injuries. Today, DuPont is about 50 times safer than US industrial safety performance averages. Comparing performance to other industries, it is interesting to note that seemingly “hazard-free” industries seem to have extraordinarily high injury rates. This is because, as DuPont has found out, performance is a function of injury prevention and safety management systems, not hazard exposure. Our success in safety results from a sound safety management philosophy. Each of the 125 DuPont facilities is responsible for its own safety program, progress, and performance. However, management at each of these facilities approaches safety from the same fundamental and sound philosophy. This philosophy can be expressed in eleven straightforward principles. The first principle is that all injuries can be prevented. That statement may seem a bit optimistic. In fact, we believe that this is a realistic goal and not just a theoretical objective. Our safety performance proves that the objective is achievable. We have plants with over 2,000 employees that have operated for over 10 years without a lost time injury. As injuries and incidents are investigated, we can always identify actions that could have prevented that incident. If we manage safety in a proactive — rather than reactive — manner, we will eliminate injuries by reducing the acts and conditions that cause them. The second principle is that management, which includes all levels through first-line supervisors, is responsible and accountable for preventing injuries. Only when senior management exerts sustained and consistent leadership in establishing safety goals, demanding accountability for safety performance and providing the necessary resources, can a safety program be effective in an industrial environment. The third principle states that, while recognizing management responsibility, it takes the combined energy of the entire organization to reach sustained, continuous improvement in safety and health performance. Creating an environment in which employees feel ownership for the safety effort and make significant contributions is an essential task for management, and one that needs deliberate and ongoing attention. The fourth principle is a corollary to the first principle that all injuries are preventable. It holds that all operating exposures that may result in injuries or illnesses can be controlled. No matter what the exposure, an effective safeguard can be provided. It is preferable, of course, to eliminate sources of danger, but when this is not reasonable or practical, supervision must specify measures such as special training, safety devices, and protective clothing. Our fifth safety principle states that safety is a condition of employment. Conscientious assumption of safety responsibility is required from all employees from their first day on the job. Each employee must be convinced that he or she has a responsibility for working safely. The sixth safety principle: Employees must be trained to work safely. We have found that an awareness for safety does not come naturally and that people have to be trained to work safely. With effective training programs to teach, motivate, and sustain safety knowledge, all injuries and illnesses can be eliminated. Our seventh principle holds that management must audit performance on the workplace to assess safety program success. Comprehensive inspections of both facilities and programs not only confirm their effectiveness in achieving the desired performance, but also detect specific problems and help to identify weaknesses in the safety effort. The Company’s eighth principle states that all deficiencies must be corrected promptly. Without prompt action, risk of injuries will increase and, even more important, the credibility of management’s safety efforts will suffer. Our ninth principle is a statement that off-the-job safety is an important part of the overall safety effort. We do not expect nor want employees to “turn safety on” as they come to work and “turn it off” when they go home. The company safety culture truly becomes of the individual employee’s way of thinking. The tenth principle recognizes that it’s good business to prevent injuries. Injuries cost money. However, hidden or indirect costs usually exceed the direct cost. Our last principle is the most important. Safety must be integrated as core business and personal value. There are two reasons for this. First, we’ve learned from almost 200 years of experience that 96 percent of safety incidents are directly caused by the action of people, not by faulty equipment or inadequate safety standards. But conversely, it is our people who provide the solutions to our safety problems. They are the one essential ingredient in the recipe for a safe workplace. Intelligent, trained, and motivated employees are any company’s greatest resource. Our success in safety depends upon the men and women in our plants following procedures, participating actively in training, and identifying and alerting each other and management to potential hazards. By demonstrating a real concern for each employee, management helps establish a mutual respect, and the foundation is laid for a solid safety program. This, of course, is also the foundation for good employee relations. An important lesson learned in DuPont is that the majority of injuries are caused by unsafe acts and at-risk behaviors rather than unsafe equipment or conditions. In fact, in several DuPont studies it was estimated that 96 percent of injuries are caused by unsafe acts. This was particularly revealing when considering safety audits — if audits were only focused on conditions, at best we could only prevent four percent of our injuries. By establishing management systems for safety auditing that focus on people, including audit training, techniques, and plans, all incidents are preventable. Of course, employee contribution and involvement in auditing leads to sustainability through stakeholdership in the system. Management safety audits help to make manage the “behavioral balance.” Every job and task performed at a site can do be done at-risk or safely. The essence of a good safety system ensures that safe behavior is the accepted norm amongst employees, and that it is the expected and respected way of doing things. Shifting employees norms contributes mightily to changing culture. The management safety audit provides a way to quantify these norms. DuPont safety performance has continued to improve since we began keeping records in 1911 until about 1990. In the 1990–1994 time frame, performance deteriorated as shown in the chart that follows: This increase in injuries caused great concern to senior DuPont management as well as employees. It occurred while the corporation was undergoing changes in organization. In order to sustain our technological, competitive, and business leadership positions, DuPont began re-engineering itself beginning in about 1990. New streamlined organizational structures and collaborative work processes eliminated many positions and levels of management and supervision. The total employment of the company was reduced about 25 percent during these four years. In our traditional hierarchical organization structures, every level of supervision and management knew exactly what they were expected to do with safety, and all had important roles. As many of these levels were eliminated, new systems needed to be identified for these new organizations. In early 1995, Edgar S. Woolard, DuPont Chairman, chartered a Corporate Discovery Team to look for processes that will put DuPont on a consistent path toward a goal of zero injuries and occupational illnesses. The cross-functional team used a mode of “discovery through learning” from as many DuPont employees and sites around the world. The Discovery Team fostered the rapid sharing and leveraging of “best practices” and innovative approaches being pursued at DuPont’s plants, field sites, laboratories, and office locations. In short, the team examined the company’s current state, described the future state, identified barriers between the two, and recommended key ways to overcome these barriers. After reporting back to executive management in April, 1995, the Discovery Team was realigned to help organizations implement their recommendations. The Discovery Team reconfirmed key values in DuPont — in short, that all injuries, incidents, and occupational illnesses are preventable and that safety is a source of competitive advantage. As such, the steps taken to improve safety performance also improve overall competitiveness. Senior management made this belief clear: “We will strengthen our business by making safety excellence an integral part of all business activities.” One of the key findings of the Discovery Team was the identification of the best practices used within the company, which are listed below: ▪ Felt Leadership – Management Commitment ▪ Business Integration ▪ Responsibility and Accountability ▪ Individual/Team Involvement and Influence ▪ Contractor Safety ▪ Metrics and Measurements ▪ Communications ▪ Rewards and Recognition ▪ Caring Interdependent Culture; Team-Based Work Process and Systems ▪ Performance Standards and Operating Discipline ▪ Training/Capability ▪ Technology ▪ Safety and Health Resources ▪ Management and Team Audits ▪ Deviation Investigation ▪ Risk Management and Emergency Response ▪ Process Safety ▪ Off-the-Job Safety and Health Education Attention to each of these best practices is essential to achieve sustained improvements in safety and health. The Discovery Implementation in conjunction with DuPont Safety and Environmental Management Services has developed a Safety Self-Assessment around these systems. In this presentation, we will discuss a few of these practices and learn what they mean. Paper published with permission.

Existing and emerging applications of artificial intelligence in armed conflicts and other systems reliant upon war algorithms and data span diverse areas. Natural persons may increasingly depend upon these technologies in decisions and activities related to killing combatants, destroying enemy installations, detaining adversaries, protecting civilians, undertaking missions at sea, conferring legal advice, and configuring logistics. In intergovernmental debates on autonomous weapons, a normative impasse appears to have emerged. Some countries assert that existing law suffices, while several others call for new rules. Meanwhile, the vast majority of efforts by States to address relevant systems focus by and large on weapons, means, and methods of warfare. Partly as a result, the broad spectrum of other far-reaching applications is rarely brought into view. One normatively grounded way to help identify and address relevant issues is to elaborate pathways that States, international organizations, non-state parties to armed conflict, and others may pursue to help secure greater respect for international law. In this commentary, I elaborate on three such pathways: forming and publicly expressing positions on key legal issues, taking measures relative to their own conduct, and taking steps relative to the behavior of others. None of these pathways is sufficient in itself, and there are no doubt many others that ought to be pursued. But each of the identified tracks is arguably necessary to ensure that international law is — or becomes — fit for purpose. By forming and publicly expressing positions on relevant legal issues, international actors may help clarify existing legal parameters, pinpoint salient enduring and emerging issues, and detect areas of convergence and divergence. Elaborating legal views may also help foster greater trust among current and potential adversaries. To be sure, in recent years, States have already fashioned hundreds of statements on autonomous weapons. Yet positions on other application areas are much more difficult to find. Further, forming and publicly expressing views on legal issues that span thematic and functional areas arguably may help States and others overcome the current normative stalemate on autonomous weapons. Doing so may also help identify — and allocate due attention and resources to — additional salient thematic and functional areas. Therefore, I raise a handful of cross-domain issues for consideration. These issues touch on things like exercising human agency, reposing legally mandated evaluative decisions in natural persons, and committing to engage only in scrutable conduct. International actors may also take measures relative to their own conduct. To help illustrate this pathway, I outline several such existing measures. In doing so, I invite readers to inventory and peruse these types of steps in order to assess whether the nature or character of increasingly complex socio-technical systems reliant upon war algorithms and data may warrant revitalized commitments or adjustments to existing measures — or, perhaps, development of new ones. I outline things like enacting legislation necessary to prosecute alleged perpetrators of grave breaches, making legal advisers available to the armed forces, and taking steps to prevent abuses of the emblem. Finally, international actors may take measures relative to the conduct of others. To help illustrate this pathway, I outline some of the existing steps that other States, international organizations, and non-state parties may take to help secure respect for the law by those undertaking the conduct. These measures may include things like addressing matters of legal compliance by exerting diplomatic pressure, resorting to penal sanctions to repress violations, conditioning or refusing arms transfers, and monitoring the fate of transferred detainees. Concerning military partnerships in particular, I highlight steps such as conditioning joint operations on a partner’s compliance with the law, planning operations jointly in order to prevent violations, and opting out of specific operations if there is an expectation that the operations would violate applicable law. Some themes and commitments cut across these three pathways. Arguably, respect for the law turns in no small part on whether natural persons can and will foresee, understand, administer, and trace the components, behaviors, and effects of relevant systems. It may be advisable, moreover, to institute ongoing cross-disciplinary education and training as well as the provision of sufficient technical facilities for all relevant actors, from commanders to legal advisers to prosecutors to judges. Further, it may be prudent to establish ongoing monitoring of others’ technical capabilities. Finally, it may be warranted for relevant international actors to pledge to engage, and to call upon others to engage, only in armed-conflict-related conduct that is sufficiently attributable, discernable, and scrutable.

The use of armed drones, particularly to conduct targeted killings outside formal war zones, is highly contentious. In the contemporary context, where conflict has moved beyond the theatres of traditional warfare to take place in undefined battle zones, and is chiefly characterized by counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations, drone use has brought to the fore critical questions on civilian casualties, the rule of law, secrecy and lack of accountability, among others. This paper has been developed as part of a project focusing on the policy implications for the UK and the EU of the use of armed drones. The analysis draws on discussions that took place at two research workshops and a simulation exercise held at Chatham House in 2019. The authors argue that the troubling questions raised by armed drone use should not just be a concern for countries that may use them in permissive ways. The EU and the UK, with a shared interest in upholding democratic values, need to work together on developing guidance on best practice for improving transparency and accountability around the use of armed drones.