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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Analyse de canaux auxiliaires"
Palao Vicente, Juan Jose. "Las tropas auxiliares del exercitus Hispanicus". Revue des Études Anciennes 112, nr 1 (2010): 169–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rea.2010.6658.
Pełny tekst źródłaSinte, Aurélie. "Répéter, redire, reformuler : analyse plurisémiotique de conférences TEDx". SHS Web of Conferences 46 (2018): 01001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20184601001.
Pełny tekst źródłaTossa, Comlan Zéphirin. "Auxiliaires et séries verbales dans les langues Gbe". Canadian Journal of Linguistics/Revue canadienne de linguistique 38, nr 3 (wrzesień 1993): 331–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008413100022532.
Pełny tekst źródłaMinguzzi, Antonio, i Renato Passaro. "Apprentissage et culture d'entreprise dans les PME : une analyse explorative intersectorielle". Revue internationale P.M.E. 10, nr 2 (16.02.2012): 45–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1009023ar.
Pełny tekst źródłaKateb, Kamel, Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin i Guillaume Wunsch. "Démographie: Analyse et synthèse. Volume VIII- Observation, méthodes auxiliaires, enseignement et recherche". Population (French Edition) 62, nr 1 (1.01.2007): 205. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20451005.
Pełny tekst źródłaUribe, José Ignacio, Carlos Augusto Viáfara i Yanira Marcela Oviedo. "Efectividad de los canales de búsqueda de empleo en Colombia en el año 2003." Lecturas de Economía, nr 67 (31.07.2009): 43–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.17533/udea.le.n67a2020.
Pełny tekst źródłaPerron, Amélie, Caroline Dufour, Emily Marcogliese i Marilou Gagnon. "La dénonciation infirmière en contexte de pandémie de COVID-19: une analyse de contenu de la plate-forme « Je dénonce »". Aporia 12, nr 1 (26.08.2020): 76–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.18192/aporia.v12i1.4840.
Pełny tekst źródłade Larquier, Guillemette, i Géraldine Rieucau. "Candidatures spontanées, réseaux et intermédiaires publics : quelle information et quels appariements sur le marché du travail français ?" Articles 70, nr 3 (5.10.2015): 486–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1033407ar.
Pełny tekst źródłaCychnerski, Tomasz. "Les marques des traits morphosyntaxiques et les contraintes morphonologiques dans la flexion substantivale roumaine". Linguistica Copernicana 18 (25.01.2022): 263–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/lincop.2021.017.
Pełny tekst źródłaLehoux, Guylaine. "Vers une société sans papier ?" Documentation et bibliothèques 31, nr 3 (29.10.2018): 125–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1052781ar.
Pełny tekst źródłaRozprawy doktorskie na temat "Analyse de canaux auxiliaires"
Moignot, Bénédicte. "Caractérisation des sous-unités principales et auxiliaires des canaux sodium dépendant du potentiel exprimées dans le système nerveux central de l'insecte periplaneta americana". Phd thesis, Université d'Angers, 2010. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00491350.
Pełny tekst źródłaDehbaoui, Amine. "Analyse Sécuritaire des Émanations Électromagnétiques des Circuits Intégrés". Thesis, Montpellier 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011MON20020.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe integration of cryptographic primitives in different electronic devices is widely used today incommunications, financial services, government services or PayTV.Foremost among these devices include the smart card. According to a report published in August 2010, IMS Research forecasts that the smart card market will reach 5.8 billion units sold in this year. The vast majority is used in telecommunications (SIM) and banking.The smart card incorporates an integrated circuit which can be a dedicated processor for cryptographic calculations. Therefore, these integrated circuits contain secrets such as secret or private keys used by the symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. These keys must remain absolutely confidential to ensure the safety chain.Therefore the robustness of smart cards against attacks is crucial. These attacks can be classifiedinto three main categories: invasive, semi-invasive and non-invasive.Non-invasive attacks can be considered the most dangerous, since this kind of attack can be achieved without any contact with the circuit.Indeed, while using electronic circuits that compose them are subjected to variations in current and voltage. These variations generate an electromagnetic radiation propagating in the vicinity of the circuit.These radiations are correlated with secret information (eg a secret key used for authentication). Several attacks based on these leakages were published by the scientific community.This thesis aims to: (a) understand the different sources of electromagnetic emanations of integrated circuits, and propose a localized near field attack to test the robustness of a cryptographic circuit and (b) propose counter-measures to these attacks
Bukasa, Sébanjila Kevin. "Analyse de vulnérabilité des systèmes embarqués face aux attaques physiques". Thesis, Rennes 1, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019REN1S042/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaDuring this thesis, we focused on the security of mobile devices. To do this, we explored physical attacks by perturbation (fault injections) as well as by observation, both based on electromagnetic emissions. We selected two types of targets representing two categories of mobile devices. On the one hand, the microcontrollers that equip IoT devices. And on the other hand the System-on-Chip (SoC) that can be found on smartphones. We focused on the chips designed by ARM. Through physical attacks we wanted to show that it was possible to affect the microarchitecture on which the entire functioning of these systems is based. All the protections that can be implemented later at the software level are based on the microarchitecture and therefore become ineffective when it is attacked. For IoT devices, we have highlighted the possibility of obtaining information or total control of the device by means of a fault injection. In this case, fault injections are used as software attack triggers. They also allow software protection to be bypassed. For smartphone devices, we were initially able to extract information contained within a SoC, using electromagnetic listening and characterization of its behavior. In a second step, we were able to show that in the event of a fault, random behaviours can occur, we characterized and proposed explanations for these behaviours. Demonstrating and on systems more advanced than IoT, it is still possible to use physical attacks. Finally, we proposed possible improvements in relation to our various findings during this work
Wurcker, Antoine. "Etude de la sécurité d’algorithmes de cryptographie embarquée vis-à-vis des attaques par analyse de la consommation de courant". Thesis, Limoges, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015LIMO0068/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaCryptography is taking an ever more important part in the life of societies since the users are realising the importance to secure the different aspects of life from citizens means of payment, communication and records of private life to the national securities and armies. During the last twenty years we learned that to mathematically secure cryptography algorithms is not enough because of the vulnerabilities brought by their implementations in a device through an alternative means to get information: side channels. Whether it is from power consumption, time or electromagnetic emissions ... those biases have been evaluated and, since their discovery, the researches of new attacks follow new countermeasures in order to guarantee security of algorithms. This thesis is part of this process and shows several research works about attacks and countermeasures in the fields of side channel and fault injections analysis. The first part is about classic contributions where an attacker wants to recover a secret key when the second part deals with the less studied field of secret specifications recovery
Guiga, Linda. "Software protections for artificial neural networks". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2022. http://www.theses.fr/2022IPPAT024.
Pełny tekst źródłaIn a context where Neural Networks (NNs) are very present in our daily lives, be it through smartphones, face and biometrics recognition or even in the medical field, their security is of the utmost importance. If such models leak information, not only could it imperil the privacy of sensitive data, but it could also infringe on intellectual property.Selecting the correct architecture and training the corresponding parameters is time-consuming -- it can take months -- and requires large computational resources. This is why an NN constitutes intellectual property. Moreover, once a malicious user knows the architecture and/or the parameters, multiple attacks can be carried out, such as adversarial ones. Adversarial attackers craft a malicious datapoint by adding a small noise to the original input, such that the noise is undetectable to the human eye but fools the model. Such attacks could be the basis of impersonations. Membership attacks, which aim at leaking information about the training dataset, are also facilitated by the knowledge of a model. More generally, when a malicious user has access to a model, she also has access to the manifold of the model's outputs, making it easier for her to fool the model.Protecting NNs is therefore paramount. However, since 2016, they have been the target of increasingly powerful reverse-engineering attacks. Mathematical reverse-engineering attacks solve equations or study a model's internal structure to reveal its parameters. On the other hand, side-channel attacks exploit leaks in a model's implementation -- such as in the cache or power consumption -- to uncover the parameters and architecture. In this thesis, we seek to protect NN models by changing their internal structure and their software implementation.To this aim, we propose four novel countermeasures. In the first three, we consider a gray-box context where the attacker has partial access to the model, and we leverage parasitic models to counter three types of attacks.We first tackle mathematical attacks that recover a model's parameters based on its internal structure. We propose to add one -- or multiple -- parasitic Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) at various locations in the base model and measure the incurred change in the structure by observing the modification in generated adversarial samples.However, the previous method does not thwart side-channel attacks that extract the parameters through the analysis of power or electromagnetic consumption. To mitigate such attacks, we propose to add dynamism to the previous protocol. Instead of considering one -- or several -- fixed parasite(s), we incorporate different parasites at each run, at the entrance of the base model. This enables us to hide a model's input, necessary for precise weight extraction. We show the impact of this dynamic incorporation through two simulated attacks.Along the way, we observe that parasitic models affect adversarial examples. Our third contribution is derived from this, as we suggest a novel method to mitigate adversarial attacks. To this effect, we dynamically incorporate another type of parasite: autoencoders. We demonstrate the efficiency of this countermeasure against common adversarial attacks.In a second part, we focus on a black-box context where the attacker knows neither the architecture nor the parameters. Architecture extraction attacks rely on the sequential execution of NNs. The fourth and last contribution we present in this thesis consists in reordering neuron computations. We propose to compute neuron values by blocks in a depth-first fashion, and add randomness to this execution. We prove that this new way of carrying out CNN computations prevents a potential attacker from recovering a small enough set of possible architectures for the initial model
Di, Battista Jérôme. "Étude des techniques d'analyse de défaillance et de leur utilisation dans le cadre de l’évaluation de la sécurité des composants de traitement de l’information". Thesis, Montpellier 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011MON20011/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe purpose of failure analysis is to locate the source of a defect in order to characterize it, using different techniques (laser stimulation, light emission, electromagnetic emission...). Moreover, the aim of vulnerability analysis, and particularly side-channel analysis, is to observe and collect various leakages information of an integrated circuit (power consumption, electromagnetic emission ...) in order to extract sensitive data. Although these two activities appear to be distincted, they have in common the observation and extraction of information about a circuit behavior. The purpose of this thesis is to explain how and why these activities should be combined. Firstly it is shown that the leakage due to the light emitted during normal operation of a CMOS circuit can be used to set up an attack based on the DPA/DEMA technique. Then a second method based on laser stimulation is presented, improving the “traditional” attacks by injecting a photocurrent, which results in a punctual increase of the power consumption of a circuit. These techniques are demonstrated on an FPGA device
Goyet, Christopher. "Cryptanalyse algébrique par canaux auxiliaires". Paris 6, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012PA066329.
Pełny tekst źródłaAlgebraic Side Channel Attacks (ASCA) are a new kind of attack presented at CHES2009 by Renauld and Standaert. They showed thatside-channel information leads to effective algebraic attacks, butthese results are mostly experiments strongly based on a SAT-solver. In this talk, we will present a theoretical study which explains andcharacterizes the algebraic phase of these attacks. We study a moregeneral algebraic attack based on Grobner basis methods. We show thatthe complexity of the Grobner basis computations in these attacksdepends on a new notion of algebraic immunity that we define, and onthe distribution of the leakage information of the cryptosystem. Weillustrate this analysis by two examples of attacks on block-ciphersAES and PRESENT with usual leakage models: the Hamming weight and theHamming distance models. Finally, a new criterion for effectivealgebraic side channel attacks is defined. This easily computablecriterion unifies both SAT and Grobner attacks. This criterion alsorestricts the choice of resisting S-Box against ASCA. At CHES 2009, Renauld, Standaert and Veyrat- Charvillon introduced a new kind of attack called algebraic side-channel attacks (ASCA). They showed that side-channel information leads to effective algebraic attacks. These results are mostly experiments since strongly based on the use of a SAT solver. This article presents a theoretical study to explain and to characterize the algebraic phase of these attacks. We study more general algebraic attacks based on Gröbner meth- ods. We show that the complexity of the Gröbner basis com- putations in these attacks depends on a new notion of alge- braic immunity defined in this paper, and on the distribution of the leakage information of the cryptosystem. We also study two examples of common leakage models: the Hamming weight and the Hamming distance models. For instance, the study in the case of the Hamming weight model gives that the probability of obtaining at least 64 (resp. 130) linear relations is about 50% for the substitution layer of PRESENT (resp. AES). Moreover if the S-boxes are replaced by functions maximizing the new algebraic immunity criterion then the algebraic attacks (Gröbner and SAT) are intractable. From this theoretical study, we also deduce an invariant which can be easily computed from a given S-box and provides a suffi- cient condition of weakness under an ASCA. This new invari- ant does not require any sophisticated algebraic techniques to be defined and computed. Thus, for cryptographic engi- neers without an advanced knowledge in algebra (e. G. Gröb- ner basis techniques), this invariant may represent an inter- esting tool for rejecting weak S-boxes. We describe a lattice attack on DSA-like signature schemes under the assumption that implicit infor- mation on the ephemeral keys is known. Inspired by the implicit oracle of May and Ritzenhofen presented in the context of RSA (PKC2009), we assume that the ephemeral keys share a certain amount of bits without knowing the value of the shared bits. This work also extends results of Leadbitter, Page and Smart (CHES2004) which use a very similar type of partial information leakage. By eliminating the shared blocks of bits between the ephemeral keys, we provide lattices of small dimension (e. G. Equal to the number of signatures) and thus obtain an efficient attack. More precisely, by using the LLL algorithm, the complexity of the attack is polynomial. We show that this method can work when ephemeral keys share certain amount of MSBs and/or LSBs, as well as contiguous blocks of shared bits in the middle. Under the Gaussian heuristic assumption, theoretical bounds on the number of shared bits in function of the number of signed messages are proven. Experimental results show that we are often able to go a few bits beyond the theoretical bound. For instance, if only 2 shared LSBs on each ephemeral keys of 200 signed messages (with no knowledge about the secret key) then the attack reveals the secret key. The success rate of this attack is about 90% when only 1 LSB is shared on each ephemeral keys associated with about 400 signed messages
Le, Thanh-Ha. "Analyses et mesures avancées du rayonnement électromagnétique d'un circuit intégré". Grenoble INPG, 2007. http://www.theses.fr/2007INPG0097.
Pełny tekst źródłaAnalyze two methods: DifferentiaI Power Analysis (DP A) and the Correlation Power Analysis (CP A). The attacks DPA and CPA are based on a power consumption mode!. However, because of the complexity of the circuit, the fact of having a rigorous model is not realistic. We proposed a new method, Partitioning Power Analysis (PP A), which makes it possible to improve the performance of an attack without a precis consumption mode!. Side channel attacks depend closely on the quality of measured signaIs. The performance of an attack can be definitely reduced if the noise level is too high or if the signaIs are not weIl aligned. We proposed solutions based on signal processing techniques to reduce the noise and the effects generated by the signal misalignment. These solutions make it possible to improve the attack effectiveness
Lomne, Victor. "Power and Electro-Magnetic Side-Channel Attacks : threats and countermeasures". Thesis, Montpellier 2, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010MON20220.
Pełny tekst źródłaIn cryptography, a cipher is considered as a black-box, and an attacker has only access to plaintexts and ciphertexts. But a real world cryptographic device leaks additionnal sensitive informations during a cryptographic operation, such as power consumption or electro-magnetic radiations. As a result, several techniques, called Side-Channel Attacks, allow exploiting these physical leakages to break ciphers with a very low complexity in comparison with methods of classical cryptanalysis. In this work, power and electro-magnetic Side-Channel Attacks are firstly studied from an algorithmic point-of-view, and some improvements are proposed. Then, a particular attention is given on the exploitation of the electro-magnetic side-channel, and a simulation flow predicting magnetic radiations of ICs is proposed and validated on two microcontrollers. Finally, some countermeasures allowing to protect ciphers against these threats, based on balanced logic styles, are presented and evaluated
Belaïd, Sonia. "Security of cryptosystems against power-analysis attacks". Thesis, Paris, Ecole normale supérieure, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015ENSU0032/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaSide-channel attacks are the most efficient attacks against cryptosystems. While the classical blackbox attacks only exploit the inputs and outputs of cryptographic algorithms, side-channel attacks also get use of the physical leakage released by the underlying device during algorithms executions. In this thesis, we focus on one kind of side-channel attacks which exploits the power consumption of the underlying device to recover the algorithms secret keys. They are gathered under the term power-analysis attacks. Most of the existing power-analysis attacks rely on the observations of variables which only depend on a few secret bits using a divide-and-conquer strategy. In this thesis, we exhibit new kinds of attacks which exploit the observation of intermediate variables highly dependent on huge secrets. In particular, we show how to recover a 128-bit key by only recording the leakage of the Galois multiplication’s results between several known messages and this secret key. We also study two commonly used algorithmic countermeasures against side-channel attacks: leakage resilience and masking. On the one hand, we define a leakage-resilient encryption scheme based on a regular update of the secret key and we prove its security. On the other hand, we build, using formal methods, a tool to automatically verify the security of masked algorithms. We also exhibit new security and compositional properties which can be used to generate masked algorithms at any security order from their unprotected versions. Finally, we propose a comparison between these two countermeasures in order to help industrial experts to determine the best protection to integrate in their products, according to their constraints in terms of security and performances
Książki na temat "Analyse de canaux auxiliaires"
Filser, M. Canaux de distribution: Description, analyse, gestion. Paris: Vuibert, 1989.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaJ, Mususa Ulimwengu. Scolarisation de la femme et croissance économique: Analyse des canaux de transmission. [Kinshasa]: Université de Kinshasa, Faculté des sciences économiques, Institut des recherches économiques et sociales, Centre d'analyse et de prospectives économiques, 1997.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaInstitut de documentation, de recherches et d'études maritimes (Côte d'Ivoire), red. Analyse de la rentabilité des entreprises du secteur maritime en Côte d'Ivoire: Secteur no 24.30, Transports maritimes et lagunaires, Secteur no 24.50, Auxiliaires de transport maritime. Abidjan: Institut de documentation, de recherches et d'études maritimes, 1985.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaEdward, Bittar E., red. Membranology and subcellular organelles. Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1992.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaCzęści książek na temat "Analyse de canaux auxiliaires"
MIAN, Ammar, Guillaume GINOLHAC, Jean-Philippe OVARLEZ, Arnaud BRELOY i Frédéric PASCAL. "Détection de changements basée sur les covariances de séries d’images SAR". W Détection de changements et analyse des séries temporelles d’images 1, 83–120. ISTE Group, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.51926/iste.9056.ch3.
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