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1
d'Inverno, Mark. "Agents, agency and autonomy : a formal computational model". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.586863.
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In recent years, there has been an explosion of interest in agents and multi-agent systems in a variety of areas including artificial intelligence, and software engineering. Agent technology, however, is still relatively young, and there is much debate and discussion over many important concepts and the relevant terminology. In particular, in a great deal of agent research, agents themselves are defined in wildly different ways, if at all, and this makes it extremely difficult to be explicit about their nature and functionality. These problems have arisen in part due to the lack of a common structure and language for describing and reasoning about both single agents and multi-agent systems, which might facilitate a rigorous organisation of the field. In response to this, a four-tiered theoretical formal framework for agent systems is proposed, which we use as a base from which to develop a detailed model of agents and their dimensions, the properties required by agents for effective operation, and the social organisation of multi-agent systems. This framework essentially comprises entities, objects, agents and autonomous agents, and specifies the relationships between them to provide a rigorous and detailed analysis of the structures underlying all such systems. Key to the understanding of this work is our overarching concern as computer scientists, of building computational systems. The development of formal theories and systems as proposed above is inadequate if they are irrelevant to the needs of practitioners. While the construction of any theory or model is unavoidably somewhat removed from the realities of software development, we address this concern by ensuring that the tools used are standard software engineering ones that are accessible and support practical development. In illustration of these ideas, and as a demonstration of the validity of the arguments made, we show how the framework and models developed can both provide a theoretical foundation and be applied directly to existing agent systems and theories: in particular, the Contract Net Protocol, AgentS- peak(L) and Social Dependence Networks.
2
Campbell, Peter G. "Rational agency". Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/28592.
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It is claimed that action discourse provides us with a criterion of adequacy for a theory of action; that with action discourse we have a family of concepts which a theory of action must accommodate. After an exegesis of Davidson's essay "Agency", it is argued that his semantics of action is incompatible with our concepts of motivation and responsibility for action and of attributions of action and agency, and must, therefore, be rejected. A theory of rational agency is presented within which are to be found accounts of intention, coming to intend, intentional action, and an alternative semantics of action which connects the action essentially to agency. The theory of rational agency is then used to illuminate the concepts of trying, compulsion, autonomy and involuntariness, mistake, accident, and the so-called active-passive distinction.Arts, Faculty of
Philosophy, Department of
Graduate
3
Pulman, C. G. "Manifest agency". Thesis, University of Reading, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.542274.
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Gibb, Alexander James. "Peer agency". Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.423623.
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Santos, Elder Rizzon. "Creative agency". reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/28359.
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A presente tese de doutorado descreve uma pesquisa interdisciplinar nas áreas de criatividade computacional e agentes cognitivos. A motivação para a integração dessas áreas é o estudo da habilidade humana de utilizar suas experiências prévias e conhecimento geral para resolver problemas e lidar com situações a partir do momento em que as mesmas são apresentadas. Imbuídos dessa motivação, nosso propósito é ampliar a utilização do conhecimento de agentes, inspirado na forma como, nós, humanos entendemos e vivenciamos o mundo. Nossa abordagem para concretizar essa visão de pesquisa é adotar teorias e resultados das ciências cognitivas e neurociências como fundamentação para um modelo computacional de agentes capazes de atuar criativamente. Assim sendo, adotamos a teoria do concept blending (fusão conceitual – tradução do autor) (FAUCONNIER; TURNER, 1998), advinda da lingüística cognitiva e teoria da mente como a fundação de nosso modelo. O modelo de agentes criativos proposto integra uma implementação da fusão conceitual em uma estrutura BDI. Concretamente, utilizamos a implementação da linguagem AgentSpeak fornecida pelo framework Jason, para manipular o raciocínio teórico (crenças) e prático (desejos, planos e intenções) do agente. Logo, o objeto principal de estudo desta tese é a utilização da fusão conceitual em uma estrutura de agentes inteligentes visando contribuições em criatividade computacional e agentes. Considerando a área da criatividade computacional, especificamos um modelo da fusão conceitual que define explicitamente as regras necessárias para representar uma tipologia da fusão. Ademais, a integração de uma estrutura de agentes BDI ao modelo possibilita a construção automatizada das entradas e de informações de domínio para utilizar o processo de fusão. Focando na área de agentes, nossa contribuição é caracterizada pela aplicação do processo de raciocínio criativo para fornecer alternativas de uso do conhecimento prático e teórico. Dada a especificação da fusão aqui apresentada, é possível integrar diferentes estratégias de adaptação para lidar com a falha de intenções ou outras situações que requerem adaptação. Outra funcionalidade é a capacidade de utilizar diferentes representações de conhecimento, assumindo a disponibilidade de uma definição descritiva (na linguagem OWL) da representação. O modelo de fusão conceitual também é aplicado na modelagem do raciocínio de um sistema de recomendação educacional. Finalmente, nosso modelo de fusão representa um trabalho inicial em direção a um modelo cognitivo no qual fusão, agência e outras funções cognitivas (e.g. aprendizagem) interagem para simular diferentes funcionalidades do pensamento humano.This PhD thesis describes an interdisciplinary research on computational creativity and cognitive agents. Our motivation to integrate these two areas is to study the human skill that uses previous experiences and knowledge to solve unpredicted problems and situations. Imbued by that motivation, our purpose is to improve the applicability of the agent’s knowledge, inspired in the way that we humans understand and experience the world. Our approach towards that research view is to adopt theories and results from cognitive and neural sciences as the grounding to a computational model of agents capable of acting creatively. Thus, we adopt the concept blending theory (FAUCONNIER; TURNER, 1998) – that originated from cognitive linguistics and theory of the mind – as the grounding of our model. Therefore, our proposal of creative agents integrates an implementation of concept blending into a BDI structure. In concrete terms, we use Jason’s implementation of AgentSpeak to manipulate the agent’s theoretical (beliefs) and practical (desires and intentions) reasoning. Hence, the main topic of study of this research is the utilization of concept blending in a structure of intelligent agents. Consequently, we observe our contributions under two perspectives. Regarding computational creativity, we specify a model for concept blending that explicitly defines rules to represent a blending typology. Furthermore, integrating a BDI structure to the model allows the automated construction of inputs and domain information to feed the blending process. Focusing on agents, our contribution is on the process of creative reasoning applied to supply alternative ways to use practical and theoretical knowledge. Given the blending specification defined here, it is possible to integrate different adaptation strategies to handle intention failure or other adaptation scenarios. Another feature is the possibility to work with different knowledge representations given its descriptive logics (using the OWL language) definition. The blending specification is also applied to model the reasoning of an educational recommender system. Finally, the defined model represents an initial work towards a cognition model where blending, agency and other cognitive operations (e.g. learning) interact together to simulate different features of the human thinking.
6
Evans, Zack. "Intentional agency". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88724/.
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There are two central arguments in this project. The first is a kind of ‘second-order’ argument, that is, an argument about the dialectical situation of an existing argument (namely, about the ‘free will problem’). The second is a straightforward argument about agency, but one which can be better addressed—I claim—once the second-order argument has been made. The ‘free will problem’ is widely claimed to be one of the perennial philosophical problems. But it is not one that has any widely accepted solution. The reason for this, as others have acknowledged, is due in large part to the wide range of problems that have historically been considered under the rubric of ‘the free will problem’. My proposal is straightforward: stop talking about ‘free will’ altogether! More precisely, my claim is that we could—in principle— eliminate the term. However, it may be more difficult in practise to actually cease using the term, and so my prescription is to define the term operationally, as a philosophers’ technical term. As I will go on to explain, ‘free will’ means something like: ‘whatever it is, if anything, in virtue of which people are appropriate subjects of moral responsibility’. The second argument then becomes apparent: setting aside the question of moral responsibility, we can see that there are a number of putative ‘free will’ issues that don’t go away. While most things can be sectioned off into the moral responsibility debate, as explained above, several of these issues actually turn out to depend on the concept of agency. This has not previously been recognised because of the structure of the ‘free will debate’, and especially because of its fixation on the notions of determinism and indeterminism. I then go on to sketch the outlines of a positive account of agency that can independently address those concerns which were previously thought to be about ‘free will’.
7
Morton, Julien. "Against Agency". Thesis, University of Sussex, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.508971.
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Dias, St?phane Rodrigues. "Agency via dialogue : a pragmatic, dialogue-based approach to agents". Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2016. http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/6589.
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This work addresses human communicative agency. The competence to instantiate a set of communicative procedures is taken as a component of human rationality that meets a key role of regulating our cognitive environment (a set of mental states, centrally assumptions and emotions), in order to maximize practical goals and sociability. The linguistic-inferential approach offered here for such scope of rationality covers two levels: cognitive and practical, treated hierarchically, according to the assumed regulations. We consider that the cognitive apparatus (the inferential, representational and metarepresentational basis), along with the linguistic apparatus (computation plus interpretable expressions), allows us to operate from the most basic levels of linguistic processing to higher levels (where agents consider assumptions about other minds). In the practical domain, we consider that the linguistic and communicative behavior is used by agents to affect mental states and others? courses of action, thus being in the basis of our social cognition. In this scenario, we not only interact with agents, but we also create a social agency via language. We, therefore, consider a communicative agency framework in which acts are performed within a dialogical structure. The general thesis is that communication requires the use of skills that incorporate practical rationality parameters. This regulation would be dependent on a cognitive and practical structure of agency in which human cognition represents three types of agents: individuals, group members and groups (collectives or representatives). Each of these levels presents characteristic features of communicative agency. In all of them, however, there is the possibility of disagreement among agents, cognitive or practical, in dialogue situations. We illustrate this aspect with a scenario of conflict between agents that are supposed to reach a peace agreement. The illustrative analysis focuses on real negotiation dialogues between group members and representatives of the State of Israel and of Palestine. We observe how practical goals of agents of these types regulate their cognitive and dialogical goals. As a result, we present an alternative proposal to the standard scenario of negotiation, or conflict mediation. As a theoretical benefit, ad hoc pragmatic issues (relevance to the individual qua agent, conflicts between agents) are given prominence and effective treatment. As a practical benefit, the model can be applied to the area of conflict mediation, given the downsizing of a biosocial disposition: our cognitive states are particularly affected by stimuli from a class of agents (artists), with potential effect on individual and collective agencies.
Este trabalho tem como tema ag?ncia comunicativa humana. A compet?ncia para instanciar um conjunto de procedimentos comunicativos ? tomada como um componente da racionalidade humana que cumpre a fun??o central de regula??o de nosso ambiente cognitivo (um conjunto de estados mentais, destacadamente suposi??es e emo??es) tendo em vista maximizar metas pr?ticas e sociabilidade. A abordagem lingu?stico-inferencial desse escopo de racionalidade que oferecemos abarca dois n?veis: cognitivo e pr?tico, tratados hierarquicamente em fun??o das regula??es supostas. Primeiramente, consideramos que o aparato cognitivo (base inferencial, representacional e matarrepresentacional), junto com o aparato lingu?stico (computa??o mais express?es interpret?veis), nos permite operar do n?vel mais b?sico de processamento lingu?stico a n?veis mais altos (em que se consideram suposi??es sobre outras mentes). No dom?nio pr?tico, por sua vez, consideramos que o comportamento lingu?stico-comunicativo ? usado por agentes para agir sobre estados mentais e/ou cursos de a??o de outros, estando na base de nossa cogni??o social. Nesse dom?nio, n?o apenas interagimos com agentes como tamb?m criamos uma ag?ncia social via linguagem. Consideramos, assim, um quadro de ag?ncia comunicativa em que atos s?o performados dentro de uma estrutura dial?gica. A tese geral ? a de que a comunica??o exige o uso de habilidades que incorporam par?metros de racionalidade pr?tica. Essa regula??o estaria dependente de uma estrutura cognitiva e pr?tica de ag?ncia, segundo a qual a cogni??o humana representaria agentes de tr?s tipos: indiv?duos, membros de grupos (integrantes) e grupos (agentes coletivos ou representantes). Cada um desses n?veis apresenta tra?os de ag?ncia comunicativa caracter?sticos. Em todos eles, por?m, h? a possibilidade do desacordo, cognitivo ou pr?tico, em situa??es de di?logo. Ilustramos esse quadro com um cen?rio de conflito entre agentes que supostamente visam a chegar a um acordo de paz. A an?lise ilustrativa se foca em di?logos reais de negocia??o entre membros de grupos e representantes do Estado de Israel e da Palestina que est?o encarregados do processo de paz. Observamos como os objetivos pr?ticos de agentes desses tipos regulam seus objetivos cognitivos e dial?gicos. Como consequ?ncia, apresentamos uma proposta alternativa ao cen?rio padr?o de negocia??o, ou media??o de conflito. Como benef?cio te?rico, quest?es pragm?ticas ad hoc (relev?ncia para indiv?duo qua agente, conflitos entre agentes) recebem tratamento e destaque. Como benef?cio pr?tico, o modelo pode ser aplicado na ?rea de media??o de conflitos, dado o redimensionamento de uma disposi??o biossocial: nossos estados cognitivos s?o particularmente afetados por est?mulos de agentes de uma categoria (artistas), com potencial efeito sobre ag?ncias individuais e coletivas.
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Dias, Stéphane Rodrigues. "Agency via dialogue: a pragmatic, dialogue-based approach to agents". Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/8042.
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Previous issue date: 2016This work addresses human communicative agency. The competence to instantiate a set of communicative procedures is taken as a component of human rationality that meets a key role of regulating our cognitive environment (a set of mental states, centrally assumptions and emotions), in order to maximize practical goals and sociability. The linguistic-inferential approach offered here for such scope of rationality covers two levels: cognitive and practical, treated hierarchically, according to the assumed regulations. We consider that the cognitive apparatus (the inferential, representational and metarepresentational basis), along with the linguistic apparatus (computation plus interpretable expressions), allows us to operate from the most basic levels of linguistic processing to higher levels (where agents consider assumptions about other minds). In the practical domain, we consider that the linguistic and communicative behavior is used by agents to affect mental states and others’ courses of action, thus being in the basis of our social cognition. In this scenario, we not only interact with agents, but we also create a social agency via language. We, therefore, consider a communicative agency framework in which acts are performed within a dialogical structure. The general thesis is that communication requires the use of skills that incorporate practical rationality parameters. This regulation would be dependent on a cognitive and practical structure of agency in which human cognition represents three types of agents: individuals, group members and groups (collectives or representatives).Each of these levels presents characteristic features of communicative agency. In all of them, however, there is the possibility of disagreement among agents, cognitive or practical, in dialogue situations. We illustrate this aspect with a scenario of conflict between agents that are supposed to reach a peace agreement. The illustrative analysis focuses on real negotiation dialogues between group members and representatives of the State of Israel and of Palestine. We observe how practical goals of agents of these types regulate their cognitive and dialogical goals. As a result, we present an alternative proposal to the standard scenario of negotiation, or conflict mediation. As a theoretical benefit, ad hoc pragmatic issues (relevance to the individual qua agent, conflicts between agents) are given prominence and effective treatment. As a practical benefit, the model can be applied to the area of conflict mediation, given the downsizing of a biosocial disposition: our cognitive states are particularly affected by stimuli from a class of agents (artists), with potential effect on individual and collective agencies.
Este trabalho tem como tema agência comunicativa humana. A competência para instanciar um conjunto de procedimentos comunicativos é tomada como um componente da racionalidade humana que cumpre a função central de regulação de nosso ambiente cognitivo (um conjunto de estados mentais, destacadamente suposições e emoções) tendo em vista maximizar metas práticas e sociabilidade. A abordagem linguístico-inferencial desse escopo de racionalidade que oferecemos abarca dois níveis: cognitivo e prático, tratados hierarquicamente em função das regulações supostas. Primeiramente, consideramos que o aparato cognitivo (base inferencial, representacional e matarrepresentacional), junto com o aparato linguístico (computação mais expressões interpretáveis), nos permite operar do nível mais básico de processamento linguístico a níveis mais altos (em que se consideram suposições sobre outras mentes). No domínio prático, por sua vez, consideramos que o comportamento linguístico-comunicativo é usado por agentes para agir sobre estados mentais e/ou cursos de ação de outros, estando na base de nossa cognição social. Nesse domínio, não apenas interagimos com agentes como também criamos uma agência social via linguagem. Consideramos, assim, um quadro de agência comunicativa em que atos são performados dentro de uma estrutura dialógica. A tese geral é a de que a comunicação exige o uso de habilidades que incorporam parâmetros de racionalidade prática. Essa regulação estaria dependente de uma estrutura cognitiva e prática de agência, segundo a qual a cognição humana representaria agentes de três tipos: indivíduos, membros de grupos (integrantes) e grupos (agentes coletivos ou representantes).Cada um desses níveis apresenta traços de agência comunicativa característicos. Em todos eles, porém, há a possibilidade do desacordo, cognitivo ou prático, em situações de diálogo. Ilustramos esse quadro com um cenário de conflito entre agentes que supostamente visam a chegar a um acordo de paz. A análise ilustrativa se foca em diálogos reais de negociação entre membros de grupos e representantes do Estado de Israel e da Palestina que estão encarregados do processo de paz. Observamos como os objetivos práticos de agentes desses tipos regulam seus objetivos cognitivos e dialógicos. Como consequência, apresentamos uma proposta alternativa ao cenário padrão de negociação, ou mediação de conflito. Como benefício teórico, questões pragmáticas ad hoc (relevância para indivíduo qua agente, conflitos entre agentes) recebem tratamento e destaque. Como benefício prático, o modelo pode ser aplicado na área de mediação de conflitos, dado o redimensionamento de uma disposição biossocial: nossos estados cognitivos são particularmente afetados por estímulos de agentes de uma categoria (artistas), com potencial efeito sobre agências individuais e coletivas.
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Aguilar, Jesús H. "Agency and control". Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=82814.
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The main objective of this thesis is to defend an account of the control that agents possess over their actions from the perspective of the causal theory of action, that is, a theory that sees actions as events caused by internal states of their agents. The explanatory strategy that is employed for this purpose consists in addressing three interdependent and fundamental problems concerning the possibility of this type of control. The first problem arises from the possibility of controlling an action that is itself transitively caused by previous events. The answer given to this problem is grounded on a careful description of basic actions and on an identification of the internal states that function as the sources of control. The second problem emerges from a variety of causal deviance, namely, a conceptually possible scenario that satisfies the requirements for a bodily movement to be under the control of its agent without this movement being intuitively under the control of its agent. The answer given to this problem comes from the examination of the sources of the intuitions associated with causal deviance and from the recognition of the causal contribution of epistemic features present in the antecedents of an action. The third problem results from the possibility of producing an action that can only be partially controlled. This is problematic if one accepts that producing an action entails controlling it, as is suggested in this thesis. The reply given to this problem adapts an intention-based account of action guidance to the needs of an account of degrees of control, while remaining compatible with the proposal that producing an action is sufficient to control it.
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McKay, Phyllis Kirsten. "Causation and agency". Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.417234.
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Peacock, Mark S. "On human agency". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.389884.
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Leo, Albert T. "The Closure Agency". Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School, 2015. https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/etd/163.
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Fischer, Jessica [Verfasser]. "Agency / Jessica Fischer". Berlin : Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2021. http://d-nb.info/1225740533/34.
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Taylor, Teresa Brooks. "Agency Training 101". Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University, 2012. https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu-works/3640.
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MAANI, SARA. "refugee, agency, city". Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/368942.
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My PhD dissertation titled refugee, agency, city, is a research at the intersection of critical urban theories and migration studies. It grows out of an ethnography conducted in Milan, Italy motivated by a search for collective practices of refugees claiming urban space in the years following the 2015 so-called refugee crisis. The ethnography comprises projects shaped by the interactions between refugees and self-organized solidarity groups. These projects include housing struggles, claiming asylum seekers’ rights in refugee camps, and claiming regular jobs and social recognition.
Through a multiscalar methodology, I look at (a) the spatial configuration of refugee governance in Milan, i.e. reception centers, shelters, detention and deportation center; (b) the subjects who are involved in refugee management in the place, in a scalar relation, from European Union, to the national-state, the city, and non-state actors including humanitarian third sector and multinational profit making companies; (c) the self-organized subjects of civil society such as associations, volunteers, and social movements in solidarity with migrants; and (d) the collective projects of migrants and solidarity groups as practices which struggle for solidarity and commons.
By putting the critical urban theories of scale and state in dialogue with the racial capitalism, I examine the continuous reorganization of the hierarchical interrelationships among scales and its relation to the triadization of state-civil society- migrants. For this, I look at the collective struggles of migrants and solidarity groups in relation to the challenges of (a) self-organizing body of civil society in their relation to the state apparatus and the roles they have to assume or resist to in the new models of governance, (b) asylum seekers in how they are being positioned in social life by their legal, social, and economic precarity, and (c) the encounter of migrants and solidarity groups in finding some common ground while simultaneously situated against and within multiscalar racialized asymmetric power relations.My PhD dissertation titled refugee, agency, city, is a research at the intersection of critical urban theories and migration studies. It grows out of an ethnography conducted in Milan, Italy motivated by a search for collective practices of refugees claiming urban space in the years following the 2015 so-called refugee crisis. The ethnography comprises projects shaped by the interactions between refugees and self-organized solidarity groups. These projects include housing struggles, claiming asylum seekers’ rights in refugee camps, and claiming regular jobs and social recognition. Through a multiscalar methodology, I look at (a) the spatial configuration of refugee governance in Milan, i.e. reception centers, shelters, detention and deportation center; (b) the subjects who are involved in refugee management in the place, in a scalar relation, from European Union, to the national-state, the city, and non-state actors including humanitarian third sector and multinational profit making companies; (c) the self-organized subjects of civil society such as associations, volunteers, and social movements in solidarity with migrants; and (d) the collective projects of migrants and solidarity groups as practices which struggle for solidarity and commons. By putting the critical urban theories of scale and state in dialogue with the racial capitalism, I examine the continuous reorganization of the hierarchical interrelationships among scales and its relation to the triadization of state-civil society- migrants. For this, I look at the collective struggles of migrants and solidarity groups in relation to the challenges of (a) self-organizing body of civil society in their relation to the state apparatus and the roles they have to assume or resist to in the new models of governance, (b) asylum seekers in how they are being positioned in social life by their legal, social, and economic precarity, and (c) the encounter of migrants and solidarity groups in finding some common ground while simultaneously situated against and within multiscalar racialized asymmetric power relations.
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Bullard, Clifford Owen. "Evaluating wildlife law enforcement agent and agency effectiveness : a methodology /". Thesis, This resource online, 1992. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10062009-020028/.
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Temel-Candemir, Nurcan. "Agency theory : an extended conceptualisation and reformation". Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2005. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/16188/1/Nurcan_Temel_Candemir_Thesis.pdf.
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The theory of Agency, specifically that developed by Jesen and Meckling (1976), will be the subject of examination. Agency theory has been the subject of extensive research since its introduction in modern form by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The generality of the theory of Agency appears unquestionable and it has been widely adopted. Surprisingly, however, the model correctly predicts particular phenomena under investigation in only the simplest of instances, and even in the simplest of instances there are cases where the simple agency model has limited success.
Possible reasons for this failure may lie in the assumed universalist foundation and in the common formulation regarding agent behaviour, that all agents are self-interested rationalists seeking to maximise their own utility to the disregard of their principal's interest. While the hypothesis of self-interested rationalism may be apt in some contexts it may be misleading or inadequate in others. This is especially so when the narrow interpretations of self-interested rationalism are used. Human beings are more complex in their totality than can be represented in any parsimonious model. This is particularly a problem when model predictions are not empirically supported. Aspects omitted in a model may be a source of the misfit between prediction and observation.
An extended conceptualisation and reformulation of agent behaviour is presented. An approach is developed that addresses the context of agent behaviour, the socio-environment within which the agent interacts. The context particularly refers to the institutional affiliations and interactions that influence agent behaviour through their belief structure (i.e., their Belief-Desire-Intention, BDI, model of rational action). Through the use of an institutional framework contextual analysis is incorporated into the theory of agency and ultimately agent behaviour. This agent is termed a socio-environmental rationalist agent (SERA) which is contrasted with the self-interested rationalist (SIR) agent in the existing agency literature.
This research utilises an object-oriented approach to develop a simulation of the extended conceptualisation and reformulation of agent behaviour. Simulations investigate agent behaviours and outcomes at the micro (specifically through individualised SERA and SIR formulations) and macro (specifically through a multi-agent SERA community formulation in the context of the EU financial accounting harmonisation process) levels. Netlogo is the simulation tool through which this is attained.
The simulation demonstrates how alternative formulations of rationality lead to different outcomes and these differences are evident at both levels. Importantly the extended model has outputs that are more in tune with current empirical evidence. The analysis thus demonstrates the plausibility of the extended conceptualisation and reformulation and the need to incorporate the context of behaviour more fully within the analysis of the principal-agent relationship.
Through this extended examination of agent behaviour further theoretical and practical insights regarding the understanding of agent behaviour, the principal-agent problem and relationship, multi-agent communities, and of business and society in general may be attained. This dissertation provides one step in advancing our fundamental understanding of the principal-agent problem. The scope and power of agency analysis can be substantially extended using the approach and methods outlined, particularly beyond that present in existing Agency research.
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Temel-Candemir, Nurcan. "Agency theory : an extended conceptualisation and reformation". Queensland University of Technology, 2005. http://eprints.qut.edu.au/16188/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
The theory of Agency, specifically that developed by Jesen and Meckling (1976), will be the subject of examination. Agency theory has been the subject of extensive research since its introduction in modern form by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The generality of the theory of Agency appears unquestionable and it has been widely adopted. Surprisingly, however, the model correctly predicts particular phenomena under investigation in only the simplest of instances, and even in the simplest of instances there are cases where the simple agency model has limited success. Possible reasons for this failure may lie in the assumed universalist foundation and in the common formulation regarding agent behaviour, that all agents are self-interested rationalists seeking to maximise their own utility to the disregard of their principal's interest. While the hypothesis of self-interested rationalism may be apt in some contexts it may be misleading or inadequate in others. This is especially so when the narrow interpretations of self-interested rationalism are used. Human beings are more complex in their totality than can be represented in any parsimonious model. This is particularly a problem when model predictions are not empirically supported. Aspects omitted in a model may be a source of the misfit between prediction and observation. An extended conceptualisation and reformulation of agent behaviour is presented. An approach is developed that addresses the context of agent behaviour, the socio-environment within which the agent interacts. The context particularly refers to the institutional affiliations and interactions that influence agent behaviour through their belief structure (i.e., their Belief-Desire-Intention, BDI, model of rational action). Through the use of an institutional framework contextual analysis is incorporated into the theory of agency and ultimately agent behaviour. This agent is termed a socio-environmental rationalist agent (SERA) which is contrasted with the self-interested rationalist (SIR) agent in the existing agency literature. This research utilises an object-oriented approach to develop a simulation of the extended conceptualisation and reformulation of agent behaviour. Simulations investigate agent behaviours and outcomes at the micro (specifically through individualised SERA and SIR formulations) and macro (specifically through a multi-agent SERA community formulation in the context of the EU financial accounting harmonisation process) levels. Netlogo is the simulation tool through which this is attained. The simulation demonstrates how alternative formulations of rationality lead to different outcomes and these differences are evident at both levels. Importantly the extended model has outputs that are more in tune with current empirical evidence. The analysis thus demonstrates the plausibility of the extended conceptualisation and reformulation and the need to incorporate the context of behaviour more fully within the analysis of the principal-agent relationship. Through this extended examination of agent behaviour further theoretical and practical insights regarding the understanding of agent behaviour, the principal-agent problem and relationship, multi-agent communities, and of business and society in general may be attained. This dissertation provides one step in advancing our fundamental understanding of the principal-agent problem. The scope and power of agency analysis can be substantially extended using the approach and methods outlined, particularly beyond that present in existing Agency research.
20
Matthews, Maureen Anne. "Repatriating agency : Animacy, personhood and agency in the repatriation of Ojibwe Artefacts". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.522767.
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Hammond, Mark Edward. "Urban ageing, spatial agency : generating creative agency through the medium of cohousing". Thesis, Manchester Metropolitan University, 2017. http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/619929/.
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Population ageing and urbanisation are two of the defining social changes of the 21st century, but many older people experience a loss of agency within society. Cohousing presents a potential medium for older citizens to increase their agency, but this is limited by the current conception of the architect-cohouser relationship. Spatial Agency provides an alternative approach to architectural practice in cohousing, based on the inclusion of citizens in architectural processes. This thesis investigates the limitations and opportunities of using spatial agency as the basis of the architect’s role in older people’s cohousing across two parts; a theoretical expansion of spatial agency in relation to existing examples of cohousing, and a practical testing of this expanded approach through a live collaboration. The first part of the thesis develops a hybrid theoretical framework for spatial agency that marries Bourdieu’s theories of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ with Giddens’ concept of ‘structuration’. This interprets agency as the capability to act creatively, produced by conceiving design as a mutually enabling discourse. The second part of the thesis tests this expanded interpretation of spatial agency through a two-year design-research collaboration with Manchester Urban Cohousing (MUCH), an older people’s cohousing group. This identifies barriers to spatial agency in cohousing and proposes how they may be overcome. This is achieved through practices that develop a spatial discourse between architect and cohouser, empowering all parties to act creatively through the exposure to ideas and knowledge that is otherwise unavailable to them. This enables the architect and cohouser to negotiate and realise their social, political and ethical vision through creative action.
22
Peppiatt, A. J. "Self-agency and psychosis : trauma, sense of agency and locus of control". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2013. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1408028/.
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This thesis is presented in three parts, all of which focus broadly on the experience of agency in relation to psychosis or psychotic-like experiences. Part one, a systematic review of the literature, examines whether ‘sense of agency’, a subjective awareness of intentional actions, is altered in psychosis and evaluates the evidence for different models proposed to explain such alterations. The evidence suggests SoA is altered in psychosis in a number of ways and is associated with delusions of control and other psychotic phenomena. The research with non-clinical populations, however, is less clear. Several methodological limitations were identified. Future research and clinical implications are considered. Part two is an empirical paper that investigates whether different levels of self-agency - namely, action awareness (sense of agency) and a higher order level of agency (locus of control) - are related. It also explores the potential mechanisms by which self-agency alterations contribute to the development of psychotic-like experiences. External LoC was found to mediate the relationship between childhood trauma and psychotic-like experiences. The two levels of agency (SoA and LoC) were not associated. Part three, a critical appraisal of the research, discusses conceptual and methodological issues that arose and the implications for future research in the area of agency experiences. In addition, it includes the author’s personal reflections on the research process more generally and consideration of the scientist-practitioner model.
23
Laub, H. Joan. "Transformation of human agency". Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/32276.
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The general purpose of this study was to examine transformations of human agency in natural contexts. Existing theoretical formulations have primarily been confined to laboratory investigations. Moreover, the principles generated by such theories have not been validated beyond the laboratory setting. With this purpose in mind, there were two immediate aims of the study. The first aim was to contribute to counselling theory by assessing five prominent theories of human agency and providing a basis from which to potentially establish more adequate theoretical formulations. The second aim was to contribute to counselling practice by providing concrete information and a more informed basis through which to enhance agency in clients.
A multiple case study design integrating intensive interviewing and Q-methodology was utilized for the study. Ten individuals, five women and five men, ranging in age from 28 to 64, were identified through a network of contacts for participation in the study. Based upon convergence of qualitative evidence from interviews and quantitative evidence from Q-sorts, rich, detailed narrative accounts of transformation were constructed for each individual. Each account was validated by the individual for whom each was written and by an independent reviewer. Through a comparative analysis of the ten diverse accounts of transformation,
extensive commonality was identified. Twenty-two common themes were extracted from the accounts that portrayed significant features of the transformation. Based on these themes, an abstract story of the common pattern revealed in the transformation was plotted.
Individual aspects of each of the theories of agency were validated as well as qualified in some important ways. In addition, the results extended these theories in three main ways. First, the results indicated that transformations of human agency were complex wholes that involved a configuration of features rather than any one or two isolated features. Second, the findings indicated that context played a critical role in transformations of agency. And third, the results emphasized the important role of powerful emotions in the process of transformation. The results of this study also generated a beginning holistic portrait of transformation which has implications for counsellors in terms of understanding and facilitating transformations of agency in clients.Education, Faculty of
Educational and Counselling Psychology, and Special Education (ECPS), Department of
Graduate
24
Schlosser, Markus Ernst. "The metaphysics of agency /". St Andrews, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/163.
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Lorentz, Ben. "Nietzsche's Skepticism of Agency". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_hontheses/8.
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Nietzsche’s view of the self and will seems to culminate in a naturalistic account of human agency. If we understand Nietzsche as primarily a naturalist who thinks philosophy should more or less be modeled on the sciences whose investigations are restricted to empirical observation and whose explanations, like causal explanation, are natural (rather than supernatural), then ascribing a naturalistic account of human agency to Nietzsche is appropriate. However, I argue that attributing a naturalistic account of agency, or any account of agency to Nietzsche, misunderstands Nietzsche’s skepticism. I attempt to demonstrate the primacy of Nietzsche’s skepticism by showing how “his” naturalistic “account” of agency is best understood as an instrument in the service of his purely critical and deflationary project. To show the instrumental character of his “account,” I show how the account is used to oppose traditional notions of agency without itself becoming Nietzsche’s theory of agency.
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Hamid, Jamaliah Abdul. "Agency in school leadership". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.368769.
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Schlosser, Markus E. "The metaphysics of agency". Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/163.
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Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind. In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.
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Mylne, Colin Andrew. "Luck and moral agency". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240976.
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Stejskalová, Daniela. "Analýza image STUDENT AGENCY". Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2008. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-3176.
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Tato diplomová práce se zabývá analýzou firemní image a smyslem jeho řízení z pohledu marketingu i z pohledu managementu v oblasti cestovních kanceláří. Práce obsahuje celkem pět kapitol. První kapitola se zabývá významem pojmu image obecně a způsobem jeho výzkumu. Druhá kapitola charakterizuje ?corporate identity? jako nástroj budování firemní image. A třetí kapitola shrnuje základní pravidla budování image. V návaznosti na část teoretickou jsou ve čtvrté kapitole popsány složky firemní identity společnosti Student Agency a jejich vliv na image Student Agency. Poslední, pátá kapitola, se zabývá výzkumem image Student Agency mezi zákazníky v porovnání s konkurenční firmou GTS International.
30
Hope, Claire Susan. "Politicising agency through affect". Thesis, University of Leeds, 2014. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/8645/.
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The key concern of this practice-led PhD is that lived reality and visual culture exist in a personal and political relation, one which politicises a viewer’s search for alternatives through the image. This suggests that cultural productions are an ideal context for addressing matters of social change; it also reverses the classic critiques of spectatorship within Fine Art, which emphasise critical awareness, the transmission and possession of knowledge and also activity, or participation, in the promotion of political agency in spectators. In this thesis I have used my own moving image and live performance art practice as the basis for reframing these perspectives on spectatorship. The context for this research was, in part, the enduring influence of classic critical positions in fine art practice, such as Debordian analyses of the image and Lacanian readings of the viewer. Yet, the ubiquity of viewing today, and dominance of the image, seemed to call for a new analysis of the viewer’s experience, from the viewer’s perspective. For instance, I provide a reading of a spectator’s relationship to the protagonist they view in an image using Attachment Theory, linking attachment to agency in order to challenge the common identification of separation between the viewer and image. I undertook this research as a viewer of culture and maker of artworks, but also as an artist who makes artworks from a viewer’s perspective, in order to critically rethinking our relationship to the images that we view. My own artworks respond self-consciously to viewers’ potential expectations of images, and the protagonists in them. For this reason I choreograph human interactions, which are always implicitly directed at the viewer, in a way that might prompt them to recall their own desire to find agency through images.
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Silvermint, Daniel Mark. "Oppression and Victim Agency". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/228113.
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If we want to take the agency of the oppressed seriously, we need to think about their normative situation. We need to understand what oppression does to victims, and what victims ought to do as a result. The first half of my dissertation develops a new account of oppression, one that identifies cases not by the wrongs that oppressors embody but by the burdens that victims suffer. The second half questions what kinds of moral and political actors victims can and should be. According to the prevailing "group relationship" of model of oppression, the members of a social group are oppressed when they're subordinated, marginalized, constrained, or displaced in a way that benefits the members of a different social group. In place of this prevailing view, I propose a new, effects-centered model: a person is oppressed when their autonomy or their life prospects are systematically and wrongfully burdened. I then use this account to understand the moral and political agency of the oppressed. I argue that victims have a self-regarding moral obligation to resist their oppression, grounded in considerations of objective well-being. And I develop Aristotle's account of political virtue to apply across ideal and oppressive circumstances alike, adapting it as a defense of nonviolent civil disobedience. This dissertation is the beginning of a larger research project concerned with the nature of victimhood, how injustice affects agency, and how obligations can be grounded in the absence of just institutions.
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Gentsch, Antje. "The sense of agency". Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät II, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/16579.
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Das Gefühl die eigenen Handlungen selbst zu verursachen und deren Konsequenzen zu kontrollieren, ist ein wesentlicher Bestandteil unserer Selbstwahrnehmung und wird als Erleben von Urheberschaft oder Autorenschaft bezeichnet. Die zugrunde liegenden neurokognitiven Mechanismen sind bislang nur unzureichend verstanden. In zwei Experimenten zur Handlungswahrnehmung wurde bei gesunden Probanden mittels Elektroenzephalogramm (EEG) die Hirnaktivität auf visuelles Handlungsfeedback erfasst. Reduzierte neuronale Aktivität (sensorische Attenuierung) auf selbst versus extern generiertes Feedback wurde als implizites Maß für das Erleben von Urheberschaft verwendet. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass das Ausmaß der neuronalen Attenuierung stärker von der Präsenz einer Handlung sowie vorausgehenden Hinweisreizen abhing, als von präzisen Vorhersagen durch spezifische Kontingenzregeln. Die explizite Beurteilung der eigenen Urheberschaft dagegen beruhte primär auf hoher Kontingenz von Handlung und Feedback, während externe Hinweisreize nur in Kontexten herangezogen wurden, in denen Kontingenzinformationen nicht ausreichten. Eine dritte EEG Studie untersuchte Patienten mit Zwangsstörung, welche durch abweichendes Erleben der Vollendung und Urheberschaft für Handlungsergebnisse gekennzeichnet ist. Die Ergebnisse zeigten eine fehlende neuronale Attenuierung selbst generierter Handlungskonsequenzen bei Zwangspatienten. Verkörperte Signale wurden dabei weniger stark genutzt für Vorhersagen des Handlungsfeedbacks. Zusammenfassend trägt die vorliegende Arbeit zur Validierung der sensorischen Attenuierung als implizites Maß des Erlebens von Urheberschaft bei. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Erleben von Urheberschaft auf einer Integration multipler verkörperter und externer, kontextueller Hinweisreize beruht. Dieser Integrationsmechanismus scheint bei Zwangspatienten gestört zu sein und führt möglicherweise zu dem mangelnden Gefühl von Handlungsabschluss und Urheberschaft.The experience of causing and controlling one s own actions and their consequences is a major aspect of our self-awareness, which has been termed sense of agency or experience of authorship. The underlying neural and cognitive mechanisms are still not well understood. In two consecutive experiments on action awareness, the electroencephalogram (EEG) of healthy participants was recorded to measure brain activity related to the perception of visual feedback. Reduced neuronal activity (sensory attenuation) in response to self- versus externally generated feedback was taken as an implicit measure for the sense of agency. The results showed that the amount of sensory attenuation was primarily determined by the mere presence of an action and external cues independent of highly precise predictions based on specific contingency rules. Explicit judgments of agency, in contrast, were mainly determined by high degrees of contingency between action and feedback, and external cues had an influence only in ambiguous contexts where contingency information was not reliable enough. A third EEG study investigated patients suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). OCD is characterized by lacking a sense of completion and agency for action outcomes. The results of this study revealed that OCD patients fail to suppress the consequences of their own action. Embodied signals were used less by patients for making specific predictions of the action feedback. In conclusion, the present work offers validation of sensory attenuation as an implicit measure of non-conceptual agency experience, and provides evidence that the sense of agency is based on an optimal integration of multiple embodied and external, contextual cues. Moreover, the present research reveals for the first time, to our knowledge - reduced gating of extracorporeal sensory action consequences in patients suffering from OCD, which may explain aberrant feelings of action completion and agency in these patients.
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Johansson, Linda. "Robots and Moral Agency". Licentiate thesis, KTH, Filosofi, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-32400.
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Machine ethics is a field of applied ethics that has grown rapidly in the last decade. Increasingly advanced autonomous robots have expanded the focus of machine ethics from issues regarding the ethical development and use of technology by humans to a focus on ethical dimensions of the machines themselves. This thesis contains two essays, both about robots in some sense, representing these different perspectives of machine ethics. The first essay, “Is it Morally Right to use UAVs in War?” concerns an example of robots today, namely the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used in war, and the ethics surrounding the use of such robots. In this essay it is argued that UAVs might affect how the laws of war (LOW) are interpreted, and that there might be need for additional rules surrounding the use of UAVs. This represents the more traditional approach of machine ethics, focusing on the decisions of humans regarding the use of such robots. The second essay, “The Functional Morality of Robots”, concerns the robots of the future – the potential moral agency of robots. The suggestion in this essay is that robots should be considered moral agents if they can pass a moral version of the Turing Test. This represents the new focus of machine ethics: machine morality, or more precisely, machine agency.QC 20110414
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Cabayao, Ulysses. "Posthumous Agency on Facebook". Thesis, Canberra, ACT : The Australian National University, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/118431.
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Posthumous Agency on Facebook
Abstract: The concept of agency remains contested in
anthropology. One aspect of the debate spans from those who, on
the one hand, insist that agency is exclusive to living human
beings, with all its accompanying implication, to those who, on
the other, believe that non-living, non-human things also exert
agency. Posthumous agency straddles this debate with its strange
creature: the dead human being. In this thesis, however, I seek
to examine how the dead in the context of Facebook challenge
existing literature on the agency of the dead. While the agency
of the dead has been recently garnering scholarly attention, this
interest has focused largely on the agentive capacity of the
corporeal remains of the person: corpse, ashes, bones. The dead
do not simply remain dead; they remain socially, symbolically,
and mnemonically significant. They further live on through
distributed instances of their personhood, through their material
possessions or through their surviving social relationships. I
apply Alfred Gell’s theory of the art nexus to examine how the
agency of the dead is abducted through their corporeal, material,
and social remains. Building on three thematic treatments of
posthumous agency as heuristic, I analyze the presence of the
dead on Facebook to demonstrate and expound on their posthumous
agency. The findings of this thesis affirm the fuzzy boundaries
of agency that make agency slippery enough to be applied to the
dead, to be distributed across one’s social network, and to be
shared with digital technology.
35
Bergström, Tobias. "Agency i Förgrenande Dialogsystem : En undersökning om agency i förgrenande dialogsystem i spel". Thesis, Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för informationsteknologi, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-12793.
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Frågeställningen till den här studien undersöker hur spelare upplever agency i ett förgrenande dialogsystem med tidsbegränsade valtillfällen i jämförelse med dialogsystem utan tidsbegränsningar. I bakgrunden observeras vad agency betyder och hur begreppet används samt vad tidigare studier har lett till. Kapitlet fortsätter med att diskutera vad meningsfulla val är för något och hur en berättelse kan upplevas som trovärdig. För att kunna besvara studiens frågeställning skapades två olika textbaserade spel, en med tidsbegränsningar i dialogerna och en utan. För övrigt har de inga andra skillnader. Dessa användes sedan till att mäta skillnader i hur spelarna upplevde agency genom att jämföra resultatet från två olika undersökningsgrupper, en för varje version av spelet. Resultatet bestod av ett antal åsikter från deltagarna angående sin spelupplevelse. Skillnaderna mellan grupperna var små och mängden insamlad data var för liten för att ge något säkert resultat och frågan fick inte något pålitligt svar.
36
Verame, Jhim Kiel M. "Helping users adopt and delegate agency to autonomous agents in everyday life". Thesis, University of Southampton, 2018. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/423558/.
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Autonomous agents are designed to take actions on behalf of users, acting autonomously upon data from sensors or online sources. However, the performance and actions of such agents are liable to uncertainties. As such, the design of interaction mechanisms that enable users to understand the operation of autonomous agents and flexibly delegate or regain control is an open challenge for HCI. Against this background, in this thesis we report on three studies designed to better understand how to help users interact with autonomous agents. In particular, we begin by understanding how people deal with uncertainties when delegating agency to autonomous services. We then examined the impact of different agent-designs and feedback mechanisms, inspired by the factors that encourages people to delegate agency in an everyday setting. Based on our findings, we discuss key implications for the design of future autonomous technologies and the design of interaction mechanisms to help users make the best use of such systems.
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Verhagen, Hendrikus Leonardus Engelbertus. "Agency in private international law : The Hague Convention on the law applicable to agency /". Dordrecht : The Hague : M. Nijhoff ; TMC Asser instituut, 1995. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37761452c.
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Liu, Xin. "The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency". Diss., lmu, 2010. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-117709.
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Ross, Stanley A. "Personal agency in employment groups". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/nq25147.pdf.
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Mellow, David Rodger. "Self-defense, agency, and morality". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0003/MQ34900.pdf.
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Brock, Peggy. "Aboriginal agency, institutionalisation and survival /". Title page, contents and summary only, 1991. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phb8642.pdf.
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Brewer, Bill. "Objectivity, agency and self-location". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.303509.
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Paraskevaides, Andreas. "Social constraints on human agency". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/5655.
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In this thesis, I present a view according to which folk psychology is not only used for predictive and explanatory purposes but also as a normative tool. I take it that this view, which I delineate in chapter 1, can help us account for different aspects of human agency and with solving a variety of puzzles that are associated with developing such an account. My goal is to examine what it means to act as an agent in a human society and the way in which the nature of our agency is also shaped by the normative constraints inherent in the common understanding of agency that we share with other agents. As I intend to demonstrate, we can make significant headway in explaining the nature of our capacity to express ourselves authoritatively in our actions in a self-knowing and self-controlled manner if we place this capacity in the context of our social interactions, which depend on a constant exchange of reasons in support of our actions. My main objective is to develop a promising account of human agency within a folk-psychological setting by mainly focusing on perspectives from the philosophy of action and mind, while still respecting more empirically oriented viewpoints from areas such as cognitive science and neuroscience. Chapter 2 mainly deals with the nature of self-knowledge and with our capacity to express this knowledge in our actions. I argue that our self-knowledge is constituted by the normative judgments we make and that we use these judgments to regulate our behaviour in accordance to our folk-psychological understanding of agency. We are motivated to act as such because of our motive to understand ourselves, which has developed through our training as self-knowing agents in a folk-psychological framework. Chapter 3 explores the idea that we develop a self-concept which enables us to act in a self-regulating manner. I distinguish self-organization from selfregulation and argue that we are self-regulating in our exercises of agency because we have developed a self-concept that we can express in our actions. What makes us distinct from other self-regulating systems, however, is that we can also recognize and respond to the fact that being such systems brings us under certain normative constraints and that we have to interact with others who are similarly constrained. Chapter 4 is mainly concerned with placing empirical evidence which illustrate the limits of our conscious awareness and control in the context of our account of agency as a complex, emergent social phenomenon. Finally, chapter 5 deals with the way in which agentive breakdowns such as self-deceptive inauthenticity fit with this account.
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Jubb, Robert. "Contractualism and Agency : A Defense". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.519780.
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Kervoas, Gael. "Thomas Reid's theory of agency". Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.369629.
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The Essays on the Active Powers of Man are Thomas Reid's last major work, where the Scottish philosopher presents an original theory of human agency. This thesis is a critical reconstruction of Reid's theory, showing how it completes his earlier Essays on the Intellectual Powers. It is argued that Reid's theory of agency must be understood as uncovering the essential aspects of the actions of human persons, and therefore that it provides an understanding of the nature of personality and of the agency proper to persons. If Reid's arguments often appear as negative responses to philosophers that have preceded him, Locke and Hume in particular, what underlies these criticisms is in fact a positive and coherent conception of man. The metaphysics of personal identity and agency thus constitutes the framework in which Reid develops a moral psychology in a naturalistic spirit, as well as an analysis and defence of the possibility of free agency, what he calls man's "moral liberty". By virtue of their natural constitution, human beings are able to exert their voluntary abilities according to particular reasons. They are thereby free from necessity and capable of self-government, as moral and responsible agents. Reid's theory of action and morality reveals important aspects of human nature, and especially the irreducibility of human agency and personality. The Essays on the Active Powers then constitute an essential part of his philosophy, whether it be understood as a "science of man" or as a "philosophy of common sense".
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Heinemann, Chloe Janelle. "Women's Agency in Gothic Literature". Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/595049.
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The objective of this thesis is to argue for and analyze the progression of women's agency in the first century of Gothic literature. Starting with Horace Walpole's The Castle of Otranto (1764), there are stirrings of women's agency as female protagonists begin to challenge male authority and attempt to escape the entrapment of the patriarchal hierarchy. As we move from Otranto to Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794), we can see the progression of women's agency as the heroine acquires social, financial, and romantic control through her strong moral disposition. Finally, a new level of agency appears in Charlotte Brontë's Jane Eyre (1847), as the protagonist stands up to male authority and openly declares the idea that women should be treated equally with men. Women's agency continues to evolve in Gothic works of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as in Daphne Du Maurier's Rebecca (1938) and the TV series Buffy the Vampire Slayer (1997-2003), even if some limitations are still present. These works grant women more independent agency than ever before, but they also suggest that there are still constraints, even in the twenty-first century.
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Gaskin, Richard Maxwell. "Experience, agency and the self". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0b1f3fc5-bae3-4a88-b819-01dd2c8c246f.
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Wilfrid Sellars has made familiar a distinction between manifest and scientific images of man-in-the-world. The manifest image is 'a sophistication and refinement of the image in terms of which man first came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world' ([2], p.18)/ and in its methodology 'limits itself to what correlational techniques can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events' (p.19). The scientific image, on the other hand, 'postulates imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations among perceptibles.' (ib.) This thesis is centred on a consideration of two difficulties facing anyone who takes the manifest image seriously as an autonomous image of man. In chapter 1 I consider the connection between perception and its objects, and argue that there is a disharmony between the manifest and scientific accounts of this connection. But I also suggest that the manifest image, which incorporates a certain Cartesianism or internalism, cannot lightly be dispensed with in our understanding of the nature of experience. Chapter 2 is a companion piece to chapter 1: in it I argue that the manifest view of experience accords a certain metaphysical priority to secondary over primary qualities in the constitution of any world capable of being experienced; I also suggest that the scientific image is dependent on the manifest image/ and so cannot subvert it. In chapter 3 I turn to the other main area of difficulty: freedom. I argue that free will as the incompatibilist contrues it is constitutive of the time-order; but that it carries with it implicit internal contradictions. The conflict here lies within the manifest image; the scientific image discerns no such freedom/ and so incurs no such problems. But if I am right that freedom constitutes time/ it will not be an option for us to disembarrass ourselves of the contradictions. I also argue that there is a relation of mutual dependence between freedom/ incompatibilistically construed/ and internalism. The manifest image as a whole - deeply problematic as it is - is therefore grounded in and entailed by something quite ineluctable/ namely the reality of the time-series. This is the principal conclusion of the thesis. If I succeed here/ I provide support for the claim that our difficulties with the manifest image cannot be solved by abandoning it: the manifest image/ problems and all/ must just be lived with. The remainder of the thesis explores topics related to this main thrust. Chapter 4 is really an appendix to chapter 3; it shows how no parallel difficulties attend the constitution of experiential space/ because space is (unlike time) not transcendental. In chapter 5 I examine the commitments of the notion of the transcendental self/ whose existence was deduced in chapter 3 as a condition of freedom. In particular, I aim to show how that self inherits some of the difficulties of its parent concept of freedom; but also how a distinction between transcendental and empirical components in the self can help us with the problem of privacy.
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Smith, Thomas. "The metaphysics of corporate agency". Thesis, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2007. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/804/.
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In Chapter 1, I defend “the first thesis”, which is that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used to truly say something about something that the expression ‘the East India Company’ may be used to pick out. In Chapter 2, I defend “the second thesis”, which is stronger than the first thesis, and which is that an individual i that is picked out by a standard use of the expression ‘the East India Company’ is such that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used to truly say something about i. In Chapter 3, I defend “the third thesis”, which is stronger than the second thesis, and which is that an individual i that is picked out by a standard use of the expression ‘the East India Company’ is such that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used in the senses in which they may be used to truly say something about a human person to truly say something about i. In Chapter 4, I try to assuage perplexity as to how it is possible that the third thesis is true, by telling a likely story as to how a situation in which no decision, wish, intention or belief is made or had by anything that is not a human person might evolve into one in which the East India Company makes decisions, and has wishes, intentions and beliefs (in the senses in which a human person may make and have such things). In a postscript, I sketch an explanation of why we are justified in thinking that the Company had a diminished range of mental capacities.
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Quinn, Thomas James. "Agency : humans, animals and objects". Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2017. http://bbktheses.da.ulcc.ac.uk/273/.
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My aim in this thesis is to develop an account of the powers that are fundamental to human agency, by drawing out the similarities between human agency, the agency of non-human animals, and the agency of inanimate objects. Many accounts characterise our actions in terms of mental capacities unique to human agents. But focusing on what human agency has in common with agency of other kinds provides a novel perspective from which we can investigate the features of our agency that receive less attention in the literature. I develop the account by answering two closely related questions, both of which provide the opportunity to draw out the connections between human agency, the agency of non-human animals and the agency of inanimate objects. The first question is: what are the similarities and differences between dispositions and abilities? The second question is: what are the similarities and differences between human agency and agency of other kinds? I argue against the idea that the difference between dispositions and abilities lies in the former powers being necessitated to manifest in certain conditions. Rather, what distinguishes dispositions and abilities is that the exercise of ability involves selfmovement on the part of the agent. In light of this distinction, I argue that all human actions are exercises of bodily abilities of a kind possessed by many nonhuman animals. Possession of these abilities does not require high-level mental capacities, but only that the agent possesses a conscious perspective. There are many ways in which the things that we do require uniquely human mental capacities, but our agency is grounded in powers of a kind held in common with non-human agents.
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Llona, Bemal Alvaro. ""Agency" en el Derecho Norteamericano". Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116448.
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