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Cassan, Elodie Buzon Frédéric de. "La théorie cartésienne du jugement". S. l. : S. n, 2008. http://doxa.scd.univ-paris12.fr:8080/theses-npd/th0494531.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaMathieu, Louise. "Descartes et la question de Dieu : la place et la fonction de l'idée de Dieu dans la pensée cartésienne". Dijon, 2004. http://www.theses.fr/2004DIJOL022.
Pełny tekst źródłaDescartes declare on several occasions want to defend God, to fight impious persons, bring to infidels and persons who turn away church, the proof about the existence of God but also give them sound doctrine on transsubstantiation, divine liberty, God, eternals thruths. He says also speak about Infiny only for subject himself and speak about with great dignity. Lastly, he’s forever repeating that he look for the truth in the things for to go with insurance in this existence. For that, it obtains a method and will try to find the proof of the existence of God not in the world, i. E. In the empirical experiment, nor in the Scriptures which he however considers higher than his thoughts, but in his spirit. Only, by this step where the reason starts to conceptualize the name of the transcendence and to want to subject it to his diktat, Descartes is not, according to us, more speaking about God of the Bible but to work out an subject-object of the metaphysics which has the name of God but who is not God. All in all, while bringing his own conception, while protesting his christianity and his respect for the religion of his childhood (catholicism), one should do to wonder about his philosophy as much as on the man who was Descartes. Can Descartes think himself christian and to insist on his love of God, in his writings, when Christ misses of his philosophy and that his “théodicée” is reduced only to some lines in the meditations three and six ? What Descartes look for ? To affirm his belief in God for better subjecting himself to him ? To prove the existence of God with an aim of making him a solid base for his new philosophy, which does include a physics as well as a metaphysics or to work out his own "metaphysical subject-object" ? The intentions of the author, sincere or not, did they show, through his attempts to present doctrines coherent and acceptable on God, the impossibility of saying anything truth and valid on God that the sacred Texts tell to us ? The only proof of the existence of God who prevails isn't is the fact that the Christ who is God and the miracles so that we can finally believe that God is love and that his is alive?
Guenancia, Pierre. "Recherches sur les problèmes du sens et le fondement de l'objectivité dans les philosophies de la conscience : Descartes et l'intelligence du sensible". Paris 4, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997PA040140.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe first part of this work examines the problem of the perception of sensitive things in various texts by Descartes, namely in tat of the 2nd meditation devoted to the analysis of the piece of wax and shows that there is no opposition between sensitivity and understanding for the simple reason that it is always understanding that comes to knowledge. Therefore, in Descartes, the mind is not divided into faculties to which different types would correspond. The conception of the soul as a thing that thinks comes under a different light through this result, for the sensitive is not reluctant to the thought. It is the sensualism and the empiric idea of a sensitive knowledge that are criticized by Descartes, it is neither the senses nor the sensitive. The second part shows how the Cartesian analyses of passions state that the latter are not enemies to reason but on the contrary are necessary to the satisfaction of the soul united to the body whose importance in morality is therefore emphasized. Reasoning and sensivity are no more opposed here than in the field of knowledge and it is even the principle of such a duality which is questioned. Even more relevant than this distinction is the one Descartes kept on making between direct knowledge and reflexive knowledge, the latter characterizing, for him, understanding in its specific use. The conclusion shows how the analysis of the knowledge of sensitive things and that of passions merge, and how Cartesian metaphysics can naturally apply to knowledge and the practice of the world
Delia, Luigi. "La verità filosofica nel pensiero di Descartes : studio storico, critico e semantico". Dijon, 2007. http://www.theses.fr/2007DIJOL025.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe question of truth, that is of its research and of the proper experiences that allow to grasp it (the necessity of the method); of its possibility and of its origin; of its characteristics and of the choices that imply it; of its constraining force and of its intellectual formation; of its coherence and of its correspondence; of its univocallity and of its diverse discursive modulation (distinction of the three primitive notions); of the use, last, that we must rightly make of it in light of science’s progress and of human moral development, is not a localised question but indeed transpires through all the Cartesian philosophy project. The defended thesis was fixed around a triple objective: to reconstruct the intellectual context within which is shaped the Cartesian idea of truth; to conduct an enquiry within Descartes’ work, aiming to think over the main interpretative problems linked to this notion; to conduct a lexical study dedicated to the negative register about truth
Dumont, Pascal. "L'art d'émerveiller : étude sur la pensée esthétique de Descartes". Paris 1, 1993. http://www.theses.fr/1993PA010559.
Pełny tekst źródłaStarzynski, Wojciech. "Les implications théologiques et religieuses dans la métaphysique de Descartes". Paris 4, 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002PA040069.
Pełny tekst źródłaSILVA, PRISCILA ALBA DA. "TRUTH X VERISIMILITUDE: NOTES FROM RENÉ DESCARTES (1596-1650) AND GIAMBATTISTA VICO (1668-1744)". PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2016. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=27504@1.
Pełny tekst źródłaCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
Partindo da análise das obras de René Descartes (1596-1650) e da concepção de retórica enquanto uma metalinguagem, fornecida tanto por Roland Barthes quanto por Haroldo de Campos, investigamos certa tensão entre Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) e o filósofo francês. Atrito forjado a partir da leitura indireta do retor napolitano das obras de Descartes. Este trabalho trata, portanto, da diferença entre a certificação do conhecimento em Descartes e Vico, diferença que, segundo elucidamos, pode ser situada na tensão entre os conceitos de verdade e verossimilhança, respectivamente, bem como nos conceitos de sentido e senso. Em 1699, Giambattista Vico assumiu a cátedra de Retórica na Universidade Real de Nápoles. A partir deste ano e, até o ano de 1707, o filósofo proferiu discursos de abertura dos anos letivos nesta instituição. Esses discursos nos chegam sob o título de Orazioni Inaugurali (1699-1707), donde foram analisadas, na presente dissertação, às duas primeiras, concernentes aos anos de 1699 e 1700. Tal análise procurou nuançar não apenas o entrelaçamento entre forma e conteúdo como, também, a partir disso, sugerir que a verossimilhança viquiana incide formalmente em seus textos, assim como a verdade cartesiana seria derivada de certa estrutura textual.
Analyzing the works of René Descartes (1596-1650) and the conception of rhetoric as a meta language, provided both by Roland Barthes and by Haroldo de Campos, we investigated tension between Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) and the French philosopher. Misunderstanding forged from indirect reading of Neapolitan rector of the works of Descartes. This work analyzes the difference between the certification of knowledge in Descartes and Vico, a difference that, according elucidated, may be located in the tension between the concepts of truth and verisimilitude, respectively, as well as the concepts of way and sense. In 1699, Giambattista Vico took over the chair of Rhetoric at the Royal University of Naples. From this year by the year 1707, the philosopher gave opening speeches of school years at this institution. These talks come in under the heading of Orazioni Inaugurali (1699-1707), from which were analyzed in the present work the first two, pertaining to the years 1699 and 1700. This analysis sought to nuance not only the interweaving between form and content as, also, from there, suggest that the verisumilitude viquiana focuses formally in his writings, as well as the Cartesian truth would be derived from certain textual structure.
Feller, Waldemar. "Descartes e as humanidades". [s.n.], 1998. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/251102.
Pełny tekst źródłaTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação
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Doutorado
Cavaillé, Jean-Pierre. "Descartes la fable du monde /". Paris : J. Vrin : EHESS, 1991. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb35490084g.
Pełny tekst źródłaVeloso, Filho Isaú Ferreira. "A estética cartesiana entre a Teoria dos afetos e o Gosto subjetivo". reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFOP, 2015. http://www.repositorio.ufop.br/handle/123456789/6378.
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O principal objetivo desta dissertação é avaliar em que medida os escritos de Descartes sobre música podem ser consideradas de cunho estético, isto é, possibilitam se pensar em uma estética cartesiana. Com vista a atingi-lo, é necessário avaliarmos o contexto musical no qual o filósofo está inserido, e escreve a sua primeira obra, o Compêndio de música em 1618. Desta forma, poderemos ajuizar em que medida o autor adere ou distancia dos ditames da teoria dos afetos, e como esta influencia numa análise estética do autor. Que nos parece, neste primeiro momento, ser composto por tons claramente racionalistas. Outra fonte essencial acerca do seu pensamento musical, e que iremos dissecar na dissertação, são as cartas que ele troca com seu amigo Marin Mersenne entre os anos de 1629 e 1631. Momento em que o filósofo parece estar distante da visão racionalista do seu tempo, representada por seu interlocutor Mersenne, buscando uma interpretação sobre o prazer proporcionado pela música que leve em consideração questões inerentes ao gosto subjetivo dos ouvintes. Gosto este, que é característica das estéticas modernas. No decorrer dos treze anos entre a escrita do seu primeiro livro e as cartas trocadas com Mersenne iremos apontar as mudanças operadas no discurso cartesiano sobre a música e, por conseguinte, os reflexos na sua visão estética. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT: The main objective of this dissertation is to evaluate to what extent the writings of Descartes about music can be considered an aesthetic imprint, so, that it is possible to think of him aesthetic Cartesian. In order to achieve that, it is necessary to evaluate the musical context in which the philosopher is inserted, and writes his first work, the Music Compendium in 1618. In this way, we can assess the extent to which the author adheres or distance from the dictates of the theory of affections, and how this influences an aesthetic analysis of the author. Which seems to us, at this moment, to be composed of clearly rationalist tones. Another essential source about this musical thinking and we will dissect in the dissertation, are the letters that he exchange with his friend Marin Mersenne, between the years 1629 and 1631. Moment that the philosopher seems to be far from the rationalist view of his time, represented by his interlocutor Mersenne, seeking an interpretation about the pleasure provided by music that takes into account issues related to the subjective liking of the listeners. A liking that is characteristic of the modern aesthetic. During the thirteen years between the writing of his first book ant letters exchanged with Mersenne, we will point out the changes made in Cartesian discourse about music, and therefore, the impact on their aesthetic vision.
Gasparri, Giuliano. "La ricezione della teoria cartesiana delle verità eterne nella seconda metà del XVII secolo". Paris, EPHE, 2005. http://www.theses.fr/2005EPHE5013.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis study deals with the fortune and developments of the theory on the creation of eternal truths in cartesianism, between 1650 and 1700. The history of the Cartesian opinion on eternal truths, which was first enunciated in Descartes’ letters to Marin Mersenne in 1630 (AT I, 145-153), touches on many philosophical problems, ranging from the status of logics and mathematics axioms to theological questions about the relationship between possible and divine omnipotence. All the most important philosophers took part in the seventeenth century debate on the idea that eternal truths depend from God’s will, as one of the most difficult questions that rational theology tried to solve. This work concerns the opinions on this subject among others by Louis de La Forge, Pierre Cally, Robert Desgabets, Jean Sperlette, Pierre-Sylvain Régis, Pierre Poiret, Claude Clerselier, Nicolas Malebranche, Simon Foucher, Louis de la Ville, Pierre Daniel Huet, Jean du Hamel, Henri Lelevel, Adrian Heereboord, Christoph Wittich, Frans Burman, Lambert Van Velthuysen, Arnold Geulincx, Baruch Spinoza, Cornelis Bontekoe, Pierre Bayle, Samuel Pufendorf, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Jean le Clerc, Jean-Robert Chouet, Antoine le Grand, John Locke, Samuel Parker, John Sergeant, Henry Moore, Ralph Cudworth, George Rust, Samuel Clarke, John Norris
Devillairs, Laurence. "La connaissance des attributs divins chez Descartes". Paris 4, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/1999PA040253.
Pełny tekst źródłaOliveira, Erico Andrade Marques de. "Le rôle de la méthode dans la constitution de la physique cartésienne". Paris 4, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006PA040110.
Pełny tekst źródłaIn our thesis, we try to demonstrate how the Cartesian physics, specially that of the Traité and of the Principes, is constituted from the mathesis. From this angle, we tried to see in the mathesis, on the one hand, a discipline that is able to substitute ambiguous representations, originated in the sensitive experience, through scientific codes, providing these codes a grammar - composed by laws which support the building of a net of empirical propositions. Thus, the mathesis enabled a “figuration” of nature, showing through experience the size of the compatibility between the real and the simulacrum of science. On the other hand, we tried to emphasize the normative role of the mathesis that constrains the sciences to display their results according to a common deductive order, which goes from the simplest results to the most obscure ones, demonstrating the conceptual dependence grade between them
Kambouchner, Denis. "La problématique cartésienne de l'affectivité". Paris 10, 1990. http://www.theses.fr/1990PA100109.
Pełny tekst źródłaIn his last published work (the treatise of the passions of the soul), descartes has tackled an "obscure and confused" matter that he had "never studied before". The fact is that the theory of emotions cannot achieve cartesian anthropology without imposing on the assertions of cartesian metaphysics several remarkable complications. In the course of a systematic analysis, organized around the main problems of the theory of passions (their general definition; their psycho-physiological explanation; their classification; their function of "use"; their submission to reason or to will; the relationship between affectivity and morality), one can give clear indication of a stratified structure of cartesian soul, which can be related to the distinction between its proper functions and those which imply its union to the body. The "inferior" functions of the soul, among which the passions take place, are intimately combined with brain functions in a functioning of man which can be qualified as animal. If the soul as "reasonable" can regard itself as exterior to this functioning, it appears nevertheless much more necessary. To the soul's life than it could seem to be, according to the meditations. The assurance of the "real distinction" between mind and body has therefore to be reinterpreted with respect to these conditions
Marsan, Eddy. "Etude comparative et critique de l'exigence de systeme chez lulle et descartes". Toulouse 2, 1992. http://www.theses.fr/1992TOU20021.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe description of the work of lull and then of the cartesian system reveals that both are upheld by the desire for systematic architectronics. Lull , in the thirth century and descartes in the seventh century attempted to constitue a unique method which would enable the return to the various sciences. Even if descartes, who was familiar with the work of lull, denies any relation between his work and lull's great art, it should, however, be noted that he takes up the lullian idea of total knowledge. Indeed, the french philosopher joins the same neo-platonic filiation as lull and seems only to criticize lull's endeavour severely to dissimulate the relation with his own work. Lull and descartes break with an attitude of contemplation of nature and try to impose systematic knowledge. Lull and descartes do not go against catholic tradition. They lilit thelselves to transcribing the message of tradition in terms of the conquering thought of western christianity. The essential proximity which is revealed between contemporary logic and the lullian and cartesian systems is that of their autonomy. Basing their work on founding intuition and deliberately cutting themselves off reality appear as autonomous attempts: the person who conceives the system provides proof of it, but this proof may be without any value for someone who does no accept the initial postulat which is identified with the founding intuition
Urrutia, Soto Álvaro. "Sobre la teoría de lo mental en Descartes: indagaciones acerca de la dualidad mente-cuerpo en las Meditaciones Metafísicas de Cartesio". Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2017. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/143604.
Pełny tekst źródłaLa obra presente se propone como objetivo indagar distintas vertientes o corrientes que puede adquirir la „teoría de lo mental‟ cartesiana con el motivo de entregar la versión que, a mi juicio, es la más justa y provechosa con respecto a las pretensiones del mismo autor como con lo que se quiere conseguir de él. De ninguna manera pretendo afirmar que la posición a la cual he llegado luego de esta investigación debe ser entendida como una posición definitiva o estandarizada de la filosofía cartesiana. Ante las típicas críticas surgidas por la caricaturización que Gilbert Ryle realizó sobre la filosofía de Descartes me propongo analizar si todo el conjunto de las mismas, englobadas por la general presunción del „fantasma dentro de la máquina‟ son, en definitiva, críticas válidas y acertadas a la hora de desprestigiar el sistema de Cartesio. Dicho de otro modo, me pregunto si toda crítica que apela al „dualismo cartesiano‟ es válida sólo por invocar al dualismo como un elemento reprochable de suyo. Pienso que las variables en cuanto a perspectivas que pueden surgir de un Descartes „dualista anómalo‟ son lo suficientemente amplias como para contraatacar al menos a algunos de los argumentos esbozados por los autores que condenan el dualismo, de modo que la teoría cartesiana de lo mental aún puede permanecer de pie en algunos campos de batalla (lo cual de ninguna manera afirma su veracidad). El motivo de un análisis tal consiste en demostrar que el pensamiento cartesiano no es tan fútil y tan fácil de combatir como colectivamente se piensa luego de los esfuerzos de Ryle.
Sciaccaluga, Nicoletta. "Potentia naturalis : rôle et disparition d'une notion centrale dans la physique du jeune Descartes". Caen, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008CAEN1507.
Pełny tekst źródłaVasco, Nathalie. "Descartes et Saint-Augustin". Paris 1, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997PA010516.
Pełny tekst źródłaIrimia, Gheorghe-Florin. "Descartes et l’imaginaire littéraire et scientifique baroque". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023UBFCH039.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis research work revolves around two complementary centers of interest. On the one hand, the aim is to shed light on the Cartesian way of considering the question of objectivity, and on the other hand, to show the anchoring of Cartesian thought in a broader cultural horizon, which is commonly, and perhaps also roughly, called "baroque", from the aesthetic studies of Heinrich Wölfflin and the generalization of the Wölfflinian concept of "baroque" to literature by Jean Rousset and, then, to the whole of the cultural productions of the end of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century by Didier Souillet.By virtue of this research topic, I relate Baroque scholarly culture to several major themes in Cartesian physics and metaphysics: the critique of likeness; the sensible/material relation; the geometrical understanding of matter; the metaphysical understanding of the world as pure exteriority; the relation between understanding, imagination, and the senses; the euristic value of imagination; the multiple meanings of the concept of "nature"; and the free divine institution of the principles of nature.Similarly, I discuss how Baroque literature sometimes views reality as a dreamlike or theatrical representation - particularly in Calderón's Life is a Dream and Shakespeare's The Tempest - and I highlight how Descartes draws from the Baroque literary imagination the main themes of the first two Metaphysical Meditations.Third, I present the place of curiosity, admiration, and the "curious sciences" in Baroque scholarly culture, from the Baroque vogue for the marvellous to the wonder of the technical productions of the time and their ability to deceive the viewer, to show how these dominants of Baroque scholarly culture determine the evolution of Cartesian thought about nature, from Cartesian interest in optical illusion experiments to the critique of likeness and the mechanistic approach to nature
Troncoso, Saavedra Luis Tirso. "“La Metáfora arquitectónica en el Discurso del Método”". Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2006. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/110372.
Pełny tekst źródłaPricladnitzky, Pedro Falcão. "Os fundamentos metafísicos da física cartesiana : a natureza da substância extensa". reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/140251.
Pełny tekst źródłaChevalier, Olivia. "La méthode analytique cartésienne : entre mathématiques et philosophie première". Paris 10, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008PA100195.
Pełny tekst źródłaSince about his way to proue in mathematics and metaphysics Descartes talks in the singular of his "voie analytique ", our aim is to define the univocal use of what lie calls « analysis », understood as a thought process. Indeed, this point raines a problem because of the lack of logical sirnilarities between the proofs in these two disciplines. Descartes says that the analytic way allows us to discover truths while constructing the solution to a problem (the problem of Pappus or of certainty). Then, analyzing, for Descartes, amounts to proving while constructing the solution to a problem. So, we try to understand the links existing between the proof of truths (a truth is established once we have discovered it) and the method which gives the procedures of it. Hence we talk of Cartesian "analytic method". We then redraw the steps of the conception of the notion of analysis which, to us, seem to lead to its Cartesian meaning, insisting on the important role algebra plays in its formation. Afterwards, we draw the criteria which bear certain properties to this analytic thought process, and which enable us to recognize it; finally, we exhibit the limit of this univocal conception when Descartes cornes to handle the notion of infinity. The stakes of our study are the following ones exhibit a Cartesian "theory of proof"; the impossibility to disconnect Descartes as mathernatician and philosopher; the latter point serving a general thesis (at least true until the 18`h century) essential to us the impossibility to separate the history of truth from the history of mathematics
Confalonieri, Sara. "Impossibility results : from geometry to analysis : a study in early modern conceptions of impossibility". Paris 7, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA070060.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis dissertation deals with impossibility results in the context of early modern geometry (XVIlth century). The main problems and questions I shall address in my study are the following. How did early modem geometers prove (or argued for) the impossibilities of solving construction problems by prescribed means? Can we identify similar structures and similar roles in different instances of these impossibility arguments? My starting point is one of the first exemples of algebraic thinking in geometry, namely, Descartes' epoch-making « La Géométrie » (1637). My examination of « La Géométrie » mainly concerns the methodological points of this treatise: the foundations of the distinction between geometrical and mechanical curves, and the classification of curves and problems. A general thesis I advance in my work is that conditional impossibility claims exerted a twofold methodological, or metatheoretical role. Firstly, they contribute to frame the demarcation between acceptable and non acceptable curves. Secondly, conditional impossibility claims enter in the classification of problems on the ground of the curves which construct them, sketched in the third Book of « La Géométrie » an( commented by Van Schooten in his latin editions from 1649 and 1659. The presence of impossibility claims in a treatise, like Descartes' « Géométrie », devoted to lay down the fundamentals of a method to solve all problems of geometry, is not surprising, in so far such a method should provide the guidelines in order to solve each problem according to the most adequate means
Dauvois, Daniel. "La représentation chez Descartes". Paris 4, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1997PA040112.
Pełny tekst źródłaRivera, Víctor Samuel. "Una "gramática universal" cartesiana". Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/101422.
Pełny tekst źródłaLima, Jair Araújo de. "A temporalidade nas substâncias infinita, pensante e extensa do sistema cartesiano". reponame:Repositório Institucional da UnB, 2007. http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/2866.
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Os conceitos de substância e temporalidade podem ser considerados como dois elementos essenciais para a compreensão de diversos aspectos da metafísica e da física cartesiana. As substâncias finitas (res cogitans e rex extensa) dependem da substância infinita (Deus) em diversos aspectos, principalmente no que concerne à criação, bem como à permanência no ser. Portanto, Deus, a substância por excelência, determina o caráter substancial daquilo que é finito e isso influencia diretamente o aspecto temporal das substâncias finitas. As repercussões dessa influência podem ser observadas na noção de duração, presente no pensamento, e também na teoria física cartesiana no que se refere à criação e à conservação do movimento. Tendo como base as obras Discurso do Método, Meditações e Princípios da Filosofia, observaremos a relevância dos conceitos de substância e de temporalidade na filosofia de Descartes. Assim sendo, a pretensão no presente trabalho é defender a existência de um estreito vínculo entre a substancialidade e a temporalidade. _________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT
The concepts of substance and temporality can be considered as two essential elements to understand several aspects of Cartesian metaphysics and physics. The finite substances (res cogitans and res extensa) depend on the infinite substance (God) in manly aspects, especially those concerned to creation and permanence in being. As a result, God, the substance per excellence, determines the substantial character for everything that is finite and this influences directly the temporal aspects of finite substances. Repercussions of this influence can be observed in the idea of duration, which is present in the action of thinking, and in the Cartesian physics theory about creation and movement conservation. Based on the books Discourse on the Method, Meditations on First Philosophy and Principles of Philosophy, we will examine the meaning of the concepts of substance and temporality in Descartes’ philosophy. In view of the above, the aim of the present work is to defend the existence of a narrow link between substantiality and temporality.
Loyola, Maureira Diego. "El geómetra, o, Apuntes para una interpretación no dualista de la filosofía cartesiana". Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2010. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/109944.
Pełny tekst źródłaBouvier, Alban. "Essai d'anthroposociologie de l'argumentation philosophiques : hétérogénéités et dissonances dans les Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes et dans le Contrat social de Rousseau". Paris 4, 1991. http://www.theses.fr/1991PA040221.
Pełny tekst źródłaWhat thought processes are required from the reader of a philosophical work for him to understand it and possibly give his assent ?. .
Grumelier, Alix. "Les analogies dans la métaphysique de Descartes". Thesis, Nantes, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020NANT2022.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe soul and God are the two principle objects of inquiry in Descartes' metaphysics. This doctoral dissertation will establish that Descartes employs a recurrent strategy to address these immaterial and supersensible objects: analogy. Descartes relies heavily on this technique, which can be divided into analogy of proportion and analogy of attribution. After analysing the relationship between metaphor, comparison, and analogy of proportion, I examine the role of analogies in five chapters, each dedicated to: ontological argument; the first a posteriori proof; sui causa; the creation of eternal truths; and knowledge of God and the soul, independently of proof of their existence. This dissertation thus proposes a nonexhaustive mapping of analogy in Cartesian metaphysics, showcasing their main uses, which are genetic, pedagogic, cathartic, clarifying and constitutive. I acknowledge and respond to counterarguments, concluding that Descartes' ideas constituted a modernisation of theological analogy, rather than a reform
Macris-L'Hoest, Marie-Claire. "Descartes opticien : le problème de la réfraction chez Descartes et ses contemporains". Paris 1, 1985. http://www.theses.fr/1985PA010252.
Pełny tekst źródłaPastén, Recabarren Camilo. "Escepticismo cartesiano a causa de la infecundidad del cogito: una interpretación de la doctrina cartesiana sin Dios". Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2011. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/110011.
Pełny tekst źródłaWong, Alexandre. "Les figures de la volonté dans la philosophie de Descartes". Paris 1, 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002PA010615.
Pełny tekst źródłaGonzalez, Solange. "Le lieu chez Descartes". Paris 4, 2004. http://www.theses.fr/2004PA040234.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe noncompletion of Descartes'Regulae and the disappearance of the syntagma of mathesis universalis in later works lead us to believe a self-denial on Descartes behalf wich express itself in his failure to structure reality. To investigate the question of Descartes'locus presumes follow the evolution of his thought and allows a transversal course of his work. The notion of locus permits such a voyage by expressing itself first trough a paradox that leads us to the heart of Descartes' philosophy: we expect to find its definition in the field of physics and we are surprised to know that bodies fill no locus, because they don't move from one locus to another and, more radically, whereas every movement is relative, we can legitimately consider that the same body does and does not move. Such a conception seems not to allow a mathematical physics. Such a failure has also to be connected to an evolution in Cartesian's conceptions improved in the Regulae, especially concerning the part of imagination; The exertion of ingenium nevrtheless supposes the existence of a body that incarnates. So that it is possible to wonder in Which way the world is the locus of God (Eucharisty) as is the body the locus of the soul
Onishi, Yoshitomo. "Volonté et indifférence chez Descartes". Paris 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA010509.
Pełny tekst źródłaBarbero, Odette. "L'expérience cartésienne : un pouvoir constitutif pour une philosophie du sujet". Dijon, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008DIJOL022.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe concept of experience as I actually can present it in the constitution of the objects of knowledge like cogito, freedom, union of soul and body, has an original feature distinguishes the Cartesian from the meaning of the concept of experience as empiricism takes it for granted. With this notion, Descartes makes the mind capable of knowing. The certain experience does not only lead to capture some subject but it is also a mark of an evident fact or an imminent certitude. It is the same for passions which are considered as an experimentation of self and a use of rights that freedom confers, and which is the result of an actual experience and about which no doubt is possible. The experience of simple natures and common notions, like the experience of an intuitive relation between being and thought, is an absolute knowledge to which is connected a methodical order of principles and truths. In the same way, the experience of freedom and the one of the union of soul and body asserts that they are present in front of the understanding. For that reason, the Cartesian experience increases the notion of subject which can only think on the ground of his own perceptions of mind. But also, it put forward the idea of a wilful subject and not a research of deep inside mind which would lead to a self’affectation but not to a proper appreciation which distinguishes the generous soul. The Cartesian experience, in its various patterns, among which we might not forget scientific experimentation is a very philosophical one. It puts rights of subject and these of philosophy which, far away from rhetoric’s and the weight of built up knowledge, is a free and innovating way of thinking
Gormier, Laurence. "La question de l'union de l'âme et du corps à partir de la pensée de Descartes : âme-corps, méditation, méthode". Lyon 3, 2003. https://scd-resnum.univ-lyon3.fr/out/theses/2003_out_gormier_l.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaBitbol-Hespériès, Annie. "Le principe de vie chez Descartes et ses prédécesseurs". Paris 4, 1989. http://www.theses.fr/1988PA040158.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis thesis is dealing with the life principle in Descartes' philosophy. The cartesian life principle is linked with dualism that is with the difference between soul and body. The cartesian life principle is therefore completely new: as explained in “L’homme” (p. 202) and "Les passions de l'âme", article 107 (at,xi,p407), it is not linked with the soul, but is the heat in the heart, the famous "Feu sans lumière". I demonstrate that this conception is completely new and that it has nothing to do with either the aristotelician or the galenic "innate heat". I thus explain Descartes' examples and compare his explanations on the movement of the heart to Aristotle's and Harvey's conceptions. I also examine the keplerian idea on that topic. While working on my thesis i identified some cartesian anatomical sources
Palma, Lohse Emilio Eugenio. "Bacon y Descartes: las bases filosóficas de la ciencia moderna". Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2010. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/109956.
Pełny tekst źródłaAgostini, Siegrid. "Claude Clerselier, editore e traduttore di René Descartes". Paris, EPHE, 2007. http://www.theses.fr/2007EPHE5007.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe aim of this thesis is to give a historic reconstruction of the figure of Claude Clerselier and emphasize not only the role he played in the edition and translation of some works by René Descartes, but also in the defence of the Cartesian theses on the Eucharist. The principal source for the reconstruction of the relationships and debates is constituted by the manuscript n. 366 (Sentimens de Mr Descartes et de ses sectateurs sur le Mystère de l’Eucharistie. Recueil curieux et rare) in town library of Chartres : the documents included in this manuscript are mostly some letters or abstracts of letters written and received by Clerselier between 1654 and 1681. Clerselier is also important because of his activity of editor and translator of Descartes. To outline the portrait of the activity of Clerselier editor I first examined the Préfaces to the edition of the Lettres which constitute some sources, very rich in information; the same Lettres are a very important testimony because from them comes out Clerselier’s willing to celebrate the greatness of Descartes and reconstruct an edifying image of this philosopher. My thesis is made up of two volumes. The volume I contains, after an introduction, four chapters followed by a conclusion, a general chronological table of Clerselier’s correspondence, and a bibliography (some manuscripts, some printed sources and some studies). The volume II contains the transcription of the letters of the manuscript n. 366, according to the alphabetical order of the correspondents (Bertet, Daniel, Denis, Desgabets, Fabri, Malaval, Pastel, Poisson, Terson, Vinot, Viogué)
Kaposi, Dorottya. "La liberté de l’esprit selon Descartes : la doctrine de la volonté et la question de l’individualité". Paris 4, 2007. http://www.theses.fr/2007PA040052.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe main purpose of this study is to examine the role of the Cartesian doctrine of the will in the establishment of the ego’s individuality, as well as its consequences for the individual responsibility and for the problem of the relation of the “I” to other subjects. An analysis of Descartes’s early writings establishes that the development of his doctrine of freedom can be accounted for neither by the treatment of theological or moral questions arising from study of the traditional concept of “liberum arbitrium”, nor, as might be suggested by its appearance in the Fourth Meditation, with reference to his attempt to formulate a theory which could explain the causes of error. This point is clearly connected to the problem which arises when one considers that the inquiries and intellectual procedures of the ego may be determined quite independently of it by external circumstances and powers. Hence, the consideration that the Cartesian ego refuses to depend on the influence of any Other requires, first, an analysis of the possible relationship between the “I” and the Other and, second, an investigation of the modalities according to which the “I” can consider thoughts and actions as its own. My analysis of the status of will in this framework reveals a link between the problem of imputation and the question of alterity, two issues which must be treated in relation to each other. In conclusion, I try to show that it is only in the realm of morality that man, the concept of whom is related to Descartes’s doctrine of the union of body and mind, can have access to a real relation with the other “selves” as “free causes”, forming with them a community of moral subjects
Elemzésem fő célja megvizsgálni a karteziánus akarat-doktrina szerepét az ego individualitásának megalapozásában, valamint hogy ez a kérdéskör hogyan függ össze az individuális felelősség és a másikhoz való viszony problémáival. Descartes korai írásainak elemzése alapján megállapíthatjuk, hogy a szabadság doktrinájának megformálása nem annak köszönhető, hogy a szerző a hagyományos szabad akarat fogalom használatából eredő teológiai és morális kérdéseket tárgyalná, s nem is annak, hogy egy olyan elméletet akarna megalkotni, amely képes megmagyarázni a tévedés okát – mint ahogy azt a IV. Elmélkedésben való megjelenése sugallná. Gondolatmenetének fejlődése lényegileg összefügg annak a lehetőségnek a problémájával, hogy az ego intellektuális tevékenységét külső, tőle független körülmények és erők határozhatnák meg. Ha észrevesszük tehát, hogy a karteziánus ego elutasítja a másik befolyását, ebből két kérdés vizsgálata kerül előtérbe: egyrészt, az énnek a másikhoz való viszonyának problémaköre, másrészt pedig az a kérdés, hogy mi teszi lehetővé, hogy az én önmagához tartozónak tekintse saját gondolatait és cselekedeteit. Az akarat státuszának ebben a keretben történő elemzése megmutatja a tulajdoníthatóság és az alteritás problémái közti mély kapcsolatot, amelyeket így egymással összefüggésben szükséges tárgyalni. Munkánk végén megpróbáljuk megmutatni, hogy az ember, akinek fogalma a test-lélek egységének tanítására épül, egyedül a morál keretei között képes a többi „én”-nel mint „szabad okok”-kal való reális viszony kiépítésére, és létrehozni velük a morális szubjektumok együttesét
Bourgeois-Gironde, Sacha. "La reconstruction analytique du cogito". Nantes, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1998NANT3020.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe cogito yields the first certainty on my existence. This certainty is grounded in formal properties of the cartesian dictum, especially its inferential aspect and its performatoriness. A method to define those properties and envision their relation to the nature of my mind has to be sought for. An analytic reconstruction of the cogito must avoid the generalization of both its overt and its mental properties by showing how its epistemic value is articulated upon its semantical scope and content. Beside the meaningfulness of the terms it comprehends, the fact that the cogito is a first-person utterance in the present tense is particularly relevant to the understanding of an indexical or perspectival mode of identification involved in those semantic features. Their role is to make me conceive of an ineliminable subjective way of presenting an objective thought. The other way round, i can but admit that this thought is present to my mind because it is related to some objective trait of my environment. This individuating link bears a general and referential constraint upon the interpretation of the cogito as a singular thought within a mental context. Nonetheless, even though the cogito as a pure intellection is still countable among the particular modes of cogitation, it refers in a special way to the mind itself wherein those thoughts occur. New semantic paradoxes arise when self-identification of a mind has to be brought about by a self-referring procedure. If the cogito is such a procedure, then it definitely cannot allow for a comprehensive knowledge of my essence. This knowledge is only conceivable, and must be completed by a further elucidation of a referential content of my thought. The transition from + cogito, ergo sum ; to + ego sum res cogitans ; is then interpreted as a deduction of an objective guarantee from an irreducible first-person account of my essence
Aucante, Vincent. "L'horizon métaphysique de la médecine de Descartes". Paris 4, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1997PA040304.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe Descartes medicine is facing an odd paradox : parangon of the method in his discourse, always promised in his letters, its obvious deficiencies implicate unavoidably to suspect the whole philosopher's work, and particularly the efficiency of the method. Far from following rigorously a synthetic or an analytic order, the medicine is revealing itself to be a compromise of both, where the experientia has got actually the privilege. The explanation of all the physiology with the Cartesian physic is the only part systematically developed. Following the direct observation more than thesis of Galen or Paracelsus, the recombining of the "fabric" of human body has in fact a precarious status because it can be modified by any new discovery. In other respects, the physiology is nothing but a preliminary required for the development of a practical medicine, with pathology, etiology and therapeutics. Sparse in all the corpus, the many indications once got together reveal an important implication of the mind. It is then proved that the real subject of the Cartesian medicine is not the body alone, but the body causing pain in the soul. The incompletion of Cartesian medicine appears to result from a dual difficulty : on the one hand to discover all the wheels of the bodily machine, and on the other hand to understand the union of mind and body, which is only really known by god
Roger, Julia. "Descartes et ses livres : l'édition comme geste philosophique". Caen, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015CAEN1027.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe present work finds its origins in the lack of interest of Descartes for the books. This lack of interest stems from the vanity of likely knownledges they convey and their materiality which prevent the reader to grab the truth they could hold. This lack of personal interest of Descartes for the book as an object is an epistemological condemnation which takes place at the heart of a critique of authority: What makes authority for knowing the truth? Can a media such as the book be used to teach true philosophy? What is an author and what is a book? The present work aims at questionning these subjects through the prism of publishing. The study of Descartes books editorial properties is at the core of this thesis and allows to understand how Descartes, a disappointed reader, was so much involved in the publishing of his works: Discours de la méthode, Meditationes de prima philosophia, Principia philosophiae, Specimina philosophiae and Passions de l’âme
Caravedo, Durán Joan. "El uso equívoco de los términos "formal" y "material" en las Meditaciones metafísicas". Bachelor's thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2013. http://tesis.pucp.edu.pe/repositorio/handle/123456789/5306.
Pełny tekst źródłaTesis
Cardoso, Regis. "A recusa da experiencia da loucura como razão de duvidar no projeto cartesiano de critica do conhecimento". [s.n.], 2009. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281920.
Pełny tekst źródłaDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: Este trabalho tem por objetivos: A) tentar entender os motivos da recusa cartesiana da experiência da loucura, no plano de sua crítica ao conhecimento na Primeira Meditação. B) verificar se não inserida numa perspectiva cartesiana, a adesão à loucura como experiência cética, poderia ser sustentada. C) analisar criticamente as interpretações que Foucault e Derrida realizam sobre a recusa cartesiana da loucura por um lado, e a admissão da experiência dos sonhos por outro. Quanto ao primeiro objetivo, foi verificado que a adesão à experiência da loucura travaria todo o empenho filosófico cartesiano. Quanto ao segundo objetivo, a partir da análise de um recente artigo intitulado "O argumento da loucura", verificou-se que a loucura pode sim ser sustentada como artifício cético. Finalmente, concluímos que há, tanto em Foucault, quanto em Derrida inexatidões interpretativas no tocante às suas análises sobre a recusa da loucura por Descartes.
Abstract: This work has for objectives: A) try understand the reasons of the Cartesian refusal of the experience of madness in the plan of its critical one to the knowledge in the First Meditation. B) verify if not inserted in a cartesian perspective, the adhesion to madness as skeptical experience, could be supported. C) to critically analyze the interpretations that Foucault and Derrida realize on the cartesian refusal of madness on the one hand, and the admission of the experience of the dreams another one. How much to the first objective, it was verified that the adhesion to the experience of madness would stop the cartesian philosophical persistence. How much to the second objective, from the analysis of one recent intitled article "the argument of madness", was verified that madness can yes be supported as skeptical artifice. Finally, we conclude that, as much in Foucault, how much in Derrida exist interpretative mistake, in regards to its analysis on the refusal of madness for Descartes.
Mestrado
Doutor em Filosofia
Ramos, José Portugal dos Santos 1983. "Método e ciência em Descartes". [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279995.
Pełny tekst źródłaTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Huimanas
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Resumo: O propósito desta tese é explicar o método cartesiano por meio da lógica matemática que opera a sua constituição. Defende-se nesta pesquisa que, a partir dessa explicação do método, Descartes encontram meios que viabilizam a orientação de suas experimentações científicas. As experimentações científicas são iniciadas, então, quando Descartes encontra previamente uma determinada demonstração geométrica e visa, a partir desta, justificar os resultados da reconstrução de um fenômeno físico. No entanto, tal reconstrução requer outros meios da aplicação do método, pois neste momento trata-se da investigação de objetos que compõem um fenômeno físico. Nesta perspectiva, a aplicação do método de Descartes prescreve dois procedimentos de investigação científica, a saber, os procedimentos de redução e reconstrução. Sustenta-se nesta pesquisa que esses procedimentos requerem objetos manipuláveis que possibilitem, por meio do uso de suposições e analogias, a justificação experimental dos efeitos observados nos objetos físicos (ou seja, do fenômeno físico investigado). As obras de Descartes utilizadas nesta pesquisa são o Discurso do método e Ensaios complementares: A Geometria, a Dióptrica, os Meteoros, e ainda as Regras para orientação do espírito
Abstract: This thesis aims to explain the cartesian method through the mathematical logic which operates its constitution. It is defended in this thesis that, in this explanation of the method, Descartes finds geometric demonstrations that can guide his scientific experimentations. The scientific experimentations are started, so, when Descartes previously finds a particular geometrical demonstration and aims, through such demonstration, to justify the results of the reconstruction of physical phenomenon. However, such a reconstruction requires other means of the method's application, because in this moment it treats on the investigation of objects which compose a physical phenomenon. At this prospect, the application of Descartes' method prescribes two procedures of scientific enquiry, to wit, the ones of reduction and reconstruction. It is maintained in this thesis that such procedures require controllable objects which make possible, through suppositions and analogies, the experimental justification of the effects observed in the physics objects (i. e., as an investigated physical phenomenon). The works of Descartes used here are the Discourse on the Method and Complementary Essays: Geometry, Dioptrics, Meteors, and also Rules for the Direction of the Mind
Doutorado
Filosofia
Doutor em Filosofia
Beveraggi, Hervé. "La liberté spéculative chez Descartes et Spinoza". Aix-Marseille 1, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997AIX10068.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe problem of freedom of thought in general, and more particulary in front of truth, which can be called speculative truth, does not find a satisfying explanation with descartes and spinoza, the representatives of the efforts from reasoning reason to include the problem of freedom of thought in a system of rationality. Both philosophers include it inside different ontologies, confront it to theories of truth which are different as well. For, speculative truth indeed, manifests itself in front of the couple truth - error : falsehood prevents it, it a source of constraint, truth only provides the highest feeling of freedom for descartes, or is merely synonymous with freedom for spinoza. But, on the other hand, it seems impossible for us to speak about freedom if we connot refuse what is true, if it necessarily asserts itself into us. If descartes manages to safeguard the experience of free - will while affirming the possibility for the individual to think of whatever he wants, and to think whatever he wants about a true idea, it is then at the expenses of contradictions inner to his system as far as the following relationships are concerned : freedom - transparency of thought, freedom - truth, freedom - divine conscience. Spinoza avoids these contradictions by refusing free - will, from the systematic criticism of its foundations, but affirms a free necessity wich is no longer really a freedom, consisting in an inner necessity of the mathematical type, and assigns it in a third genre of knowledge, inaccessible in the end
Safou, Jean-Bernard. "Husserl et la métaphysique de Descartes : essai d'une interprétation phénoménologique du projet cartésien de la Mathesis universalis". Paris 4, 1999. http://www.theses.fr/1999PA040047.
Pełny tekst źródłaComtois, Nicolas. "Préparation à la lecture des Méditations de Descartes". Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/27862.
Pełny tekst źródłaSavini, Massimiliano. "Le développement de la méthode cartésienne dans les Provinces-Unies (1643-1665)". Paris, EPHE, 2002. http://www.theses.fr/2002EPHE5013.
Pełny tekst źródłaOur research purposes to reconstruct the debate on the methodus cartesiana that took place in the Netherlands in the period relevant to the early diffusion of Cartesianism. Among the mainly discussed questions between Cartesians and anti-Cartesians there was one relevant to the method followed by Descartes. The rejection of the traditional logic that is present in the Discours de la méthode seemed to give rise to an "epistemological gap" that could not be filled up, and Descartes' early opponents emphasized the lack of a formal instrument that could be able to prove the theses backed up in the Discours de la méthode or in the Meditationes de prima philosophia. The first publication directed against the Cartesian philosophy (Martin Schoock's Admiranda methodus of 1643) questions the methodus Cartesii and the Cartesian refusal of the logic. This criticism is also present in the works published by Jacobus Revius and Ciriacus Lentulus between 1648 and 1654. After Descartes' death (1650) the Dutch Cartesians were forced to prove that one could "reconstruct" both the method and the logic utilized by Descartes. Among those who intervened in this debate there were Johann Clauberg (Defensio cartesiana), Daniel Lipstorp (Specimina philosophiae cartesianae) and Tobias Andreae (Assertio methodi cartesianae, 1653-1654). The study of the methodus cartesiana led us both to reconstruct the genesis and the articulation of the discussion on Descartes' method, and to show the inner developments of Cartesianism that match to this discussion. The chronological limits of the research are on the one hand the publication of Schoock's Admiranda methodus (1643), on the other Clauberg's death (1665)