Tesi sul tema "Ward, colin"
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PIPPO, LAURA. "Tra Country Houses e Flat Blocks : le architetture di Amyas Connel, Basil Ward e Colin Lucas in Inghilterra (1928-1935)". Doctoral thesis, Università IUAV di Venezia, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11578/278569.
Testo completoXie, Yanmei. "Objectivity revisisted a study of the mainstream media's coverage of Colin Powell's UN presentation /". Oxford, Ohio : Miami University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=miami1155334853.
Testo completoXie, Yanmei. "OBJECTIVITY REVISISTED: A STUDY OF THE MAINSTREAM MEDIA’S COVERAGE OF COLIN POWELL’S UN PRESENTATION". Miami University / OhioLINK, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami1155334853.
Testo completoAppelgren, Karl. "The last coin of Taras? : A study of a late Tarentine coin in the collections of the Uppsala University Coin Cabinet". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för arkeologi och antik historia, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-446582.
Testo completoDenna uppsats är en analys av ett mynt from Hannibals ockupation av Taras. Den metod som tillämpas i analysdelen är Panofskys ikonologiska metod. Det teoretiska ramverket har sin utgångspunkt i uppsatsens frågeställning, och har utarbetats i dialog med modern numismatisk forskning. Diskussionsdelen fokuserar på förhållandet mellan myntet och dess historiska kontext. I uppsatsen framförs argument för att myntet är en didrachm med kraftigt reducerad vikt, och att viktreduktionen är en följd av de finansiella svårigheter som orsakades av Andra puniska kriget.
Ruettershoff, Tobias. "Counterinsurgency as ideology : the evolution of expert knowledge production in U.S. asymmetric warfare (1898-2011) : the cases of the Philippines, Vietnam and Iraq". Thesis, University of Exeter, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/20887.
Testo completoOlsen, Daniel. "Boerkriget och Kilcullen : En analys av Kilcullens COIN teorier på boerkriget 1899- 1902". Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-4015.
Testo completoThe purpose of this analysis is to promote the COIN theories that were applied as a single insurgency operation during the Boer Wars. The essential dynamics of COIN (counter insurgency) will be considered as the analysis also includes actions taken by a nation´s government to contain or suppress counterinsurgency. As well as key aspects of David Kilcullens analysis being specifically concentrated on the COIN theories and its use in the Anglo-Boer Wars, Kilcullens COIN theories also focuses on human security. This analysis will mainly focus on the critical Boer wars taking place in South Africa. It also contemplates the question of why modern COIN theory was considered an alternative in the Anglo-Boer Wars. The process is based on a qualitative textual analysis of relevant literature that vividly describes the action of the war. The theory of cultural differences provides a number of key indicators and sources used in the analysis of the material. The results show that the tactical decision-making used during the conflict was mainly based on COIN theories. Furthermore, a discussion of the operational theory and its usefulness will be presented in this analysis, and whether the analysis identifies a beneficial or destructive scene of chosen COIN tactics.
Pozzo, Di Borgo Frédéric. "L'instrumentalisation de l'ONU par les Etats-Unis lors de la crise Iraquienne". Thesis, Lyon 3, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012LYO30038/document.
Testo completoOn September 12, 2002, George Bush during a speech at the United Nations General Assembly seized the opportunity to submit the Security Council and expose to the International Community his worries concerning Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. Dictated by election requirements, referring to the United Nations was imposed on the White House because of failing neo-conservative propaganda convincing the public opinion of need for war in Iraq. This was supposed to give body to the upcoming presidential campaign’s concept of “war against terrorism”, the White House had decided to lean on the United Nations credibility and legitimacy to re-launch propaganda and disguise an illegal war into an act of self defence, by keeping the decision of war secret.The International Community was not fooled by or accomplice of this trick, but the weight of the trans-Atlantic relationship forbade the United Kingdom to set itself apart from the United States and for France to use its right to veto against its allies. These contradictions explain the 2003 Security Council crisis, where, by disagreeing the western governments faced one another on the necessity of a second resolution authorizing war.This crisis was not without consequences, for Bush’s administration or for the International Community and even so for the United Nations, since being stuck in Iraq, the United States obtained several resolutions from the Security Council without questioning their unilateralism. Being in an awkward position, the International Organisation was targeted and its headquarters in Iraq destroyed. In the chaos in the aftermath of the war, the neo-conservative administration was obliged, under electoral pressure, to give up its unilateral attitude, and let the Unieted Nations politically resolve the conflict
Abonadi, Earl E. K. "Weinberger-Powell and transformation : perceptions of American power from the fall of Saigon to the fall of Baghdad /". Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2006. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/06Jun%5FAbonadi.pdf.
Testo completoGustafsson, Hans-Emil. "Ur ett COIN perspektiv : Kriget mellan Israel och Libanon 2006". Thesis, Swedish National Defence College, Swedish National Defence College, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-780.
Testo completoI uppsatsen som följer har jag använt mig av David Galulas COIN teori. Jag har sedan använt den teorin och analyserat kriget mellan Israel och Libanon 2006. Kriget blev känt som ett misslyckande ur israelisk synpunkt, då de inte lyckades att besegra Hezbollah eller stoppa deras raketskjutningar in i Israel. Detta trots att de har den mest högteknologiska armen i mellanöstern och hade luftoperativkontroll. I denna uppsats så har jag fört ett resonemang för att svara på frågeställningen: Går Galulas teorier att använda mot en organiserad motståndare som Hezbollah? Efter att ha skrivit denna uppsats så har jag inte kommit fram till ett absolut svar, men är personligen övertygad om att det går. I fallet Hezbollah är det väldigt problematiskt i och med att de var så väl förberedda på att det skulle bli krig. Det faktum att Israel dessutom hade skurit ner på sitt försvar och inte hade utbildat sina soldater och chefer inför denna typ av krig gjorde att de inte kunde strida på ett effektivt sätt. För att Israel skulle ha lyckats vinna, tror jag att en större markoperation hade varit nödvändig då Hezbollah var så väl förberedda. Detta är i linje med det första steget i Galulas COIN teori där man med truppnärvaro strävar efter att separera befolkningen från insurgenterna i detta fall Hezbollah.
In the essay that follows I have used David Galulas COIN theory. I have then used Galulas theory and analyzed the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006. The war from the Israeli point of view was a failure, as they failed to defeat Hezbollah and stop their rockets from firing into Israel. Despite the facts that the Israel had the most technologically advanced army in the Middle East and that they had air superiority in the area. In this essay I have discussed the following question: Are Galulas theories usable against an opponent like Hezbollah? After having written this essay, I have not beenable to conclude a definite answer, however I am convinced that it is possible. The reason for the Israeli failure was the fact that the Hezbollah were so well prepared for war. Whereas the Israeli forces were ill-prepared because of a substantial decrease in numbers compared to earlier years, and because the Israeli soldiers and officers were not trained for this type of war. In my opinion, the Israeli forces would have needed to focus much more on ground operations because the Hezbollah were so well prepared. This is exactly what stage one in Galulas COIN theory advises, where through military presence, separate the civilian population from the insurgents.
Canonico, Peter J. "An alternate military strategy for the War on Terrorism". Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2004. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/04Dec%5FCanonico.pdf.
Testo completoDarveau, Routhier Florence. "Isolement du secrétaire d’État Colin Powell : regard sur les dynamiques de groupes au sein du cabinet de guerre de George W. Bush (2000-2004)". Mémoire, Université de Sherbrooke, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11143/10623.
Testo completoAbstract: This master thesis focuses on the factors that led to the marginalization of the Secretary of State Colin Powell inside the foreign policy decision-making process of the George W. Bush administration (2000-2004). More precisely, this research uses the concept of small group dynamics to explain Powell’s isolation in the decision-making process that led to military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). This thesis is a contribution to the literature relating to the decision-making process that led to those military interventions. This literature is plenteous and testifies to the consensus about Powell’s marginalization inside this administration. So far, to our knowledge, no contribution has focused on providing an explanation for this marginalization. In the first place, this research reveals that Powell’s marginalization cannot be attributed to the function he occupied in the Bush administration. By describing the small group dynamics within the war cabinet, it establishes that a series of cognitive and bureaucratic indicators are more explanatory of this isolation. The presence of a determined subgroup using bureaucratic strategies to marginalize Powell, the omnipresence of neoconservative ideology that led to important polarization within the war cabinet, and the unequal distribution of bureaucratic resources are some explanatory factors developed in this research.
Swenson, Benjamin J. "Rewriting the "Detestable" Rules of War: The "Guerrilla System" and Counterinsurgency in Napoleonic Spain and the Mexican-American War, 1808-1848". Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/673475.
Testo completoDurante la Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1814), los españoles lanzaron una insurgencia guerrillera sin precedentes que socavó el control de Napoleón sobre ese estado. El advenimiento de este “sistema” de guerra novedoso e ilegal marcó el comienzo de una era de estudios militares sobre el uso de estrategias no convencionales en campañas militares, y cambió las reglas modernas de la guerra. Una generación más tarde, durante la Guerra México-Estadounidense (1846-1848), Henry Halleck y Winfield Scott utilizaron el conocimiento de la Guerra Peninsular para implementar un innovador programa de contrainsurgencia "conciliador" dirigido al pueblo mexicano, que estableció el estándar doctrinal de los Estados Unidos informando a un consenso internacional sobre la conducta adecuada para la ocupación. La guerra española contra los franceses influyó en ambos beligerantes en México: los mexicanos intentaron montar una guerra de guerrillas siguiendo el modelo español, y los estadounidenses adaptaron sus tácticas, reglas y leyes de guerra entre 1808 y 1848 para evitar la desastrosa extralimitación imperial ejemplificada por los franceses en españa.
Oddo, John. "Traversing the 24-Hour News Cycle: A Busy Day in the Rhetorical Life of a Political Speech". Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1302368612.
Testo completoHedlund, Ragnar. ""...achieved nothing worthy of memory" : Coinage and authority in the Roman empire c. AD 260-295". Doctoral thesis, Uppsala University, Classical archaeology and ancient history, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-8511.
Testo completoThis study examines how the Roman emperors c. AD. 260–295 attempt at maintaining their power-bases through legitimation of their claims to power, with reference to various potentially powerful groups of society, such as the military, the inhabitants of the provinces and the senate in Rome. The purpose has been to discern the development of ‘Roman imperial ideology’ in an age which has frequently been referred to as an ‘age of military anarchy.’ Focus is on how claims to power could be expressed through visual media. Of such media, mainly the coins struck for the emperors c. AD 260-295 have been studied. A close investigation has been made of the iconography of these coins. Furthermore, the ways in which coin-images are modified and combined with various legends are studied. An additional purpose of this investigation has been to provide a comment on the general potential of conveying visual imagery and messages on objects such as coins and medallions.
The study argues that novel, intricate and multi-layered images were created on the coins struck for the emperors c. AD 260-295. Furthermore, it is suggested that these coin-images were created to assume the function of larger-scale expressions of imperial authority, such as triumphal arches and imperial statues. This adaption of coinage was made because there was a need for intensified communication of imperial authority. This need arose due to the incessant warfare of the age, and a process of regionalization of the empire, which was connected to this warfare. The conclusion is that these coins provide an illustration of the development of the Roman empire in the second half of the third century. This was a development by which the city of Rome lost its importance in favour of regional capitals, and ultimately in favour of Constantinople.
Oakshott, Stephen Craig School of Information Library & Archives Studies UNSW. "The Association of Libarians in colleges of advanced education and the committee of Australian university librarians: The evolution of two higher education library groups, 1958-1997". Awarded by:University of New South Wales. School of Information, Library and Archives Studies, 1998. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/18238.
Testo completoTsukayama, John K. "By any means necessary : an interpretive phenomenological analysis study of post 9/11 American abusive violence in Iraq". Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4510.
Testo completoHarris, Eleanor M. "The Episcopal congregation of Charlotte Chapel, Edinburgh, 1794-1818". Thesis, University of Stirling, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/19991.
Testo completoBrodie, Abdullah. "Colombia: Postured for Failure, a Lesson in Counterinsurgency Strategy". Scholarly Repository, 2009. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_theses/188.
Testo completoSullivan, David. "A critique of Colin Gray's theory of victory in nuclear war". Thesis, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/144400.
Testo completoKo, Chen-Tung, e 葛鎮東. "Examining and Analyzing General Colin Powell’s Roles in the Two Persian Gulf Wars". Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/yk5238.
Testo completo淡江大學
美洲研究所博士班
101
General Colin L. Powell (1937-present), a political superstar of the 1990s, has an extraordinary political and military career. He was promoted to the general rank in 1979 at the age of 41, and then in short order national security advisor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of state. He was not only the first African American to serve in each of the three important national security assignments, but also the only American in history to hold those three positions. Being propelled onto the national stage for his leading role in the overwhelming military success of Operation Desert Storm (1991), he has since then remained immensely popular among Americans due to his integrity, leadership, and the ability to transcend racial barriers. Few figures in the past quarter century have played a more prominent role in American foreign and defense policy than Colin Powell, who was deeply engaged in the most important foreign and defense policy debates, such as the uses of American force in the wake of Vietnam, the quest for America’s new role in the post Cold-War world, the interventions in Panama (1989), and the two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003). However, contrary to his popular image as a war hero, Powell was highly criticized by many top decision-makers, the presidents included, for his resistance to seeing military force as the primary foreign policy instrument in responding to crises. As a result, he was fundamentally marginalized or even isolated in the decision-making processes leading to the two Gulf Wars. Interestingly, his ultra-conservative military belief did not in any way diminish his chance in rising up the ladder of success, not at least until 2004 when George W. Bush asked him to resign as Secretary of State due to policy differences. By closely examining Powell’s military career and personal traits, as well as the evolution of military thinking since Vietnam, this dissertation seeks to unravel the myths surrounding this important, yet enigmatic figure, by analyzing what were the rationales behind Powell’s advocacy of military restraint and its linkage to his career. There are four major findings. 1. Race did play a role in Powell’s remarkable career and was major factor at numerous points in his rapid ascent. He was specifically selected and nurtured in the early 1970s to serve as evidence of the efforts by the US military to promote racial progress. In the 1990s, his image as a role model for minorities made him a sought-after figure by both the Republicans and the Democrats in order to exploit the race card to political advantage. However, his image as a political superstar obfuscated the fact that he was more a functionary figure than a strategic thinker. 2. Although Powell opposed the notion that military force should be the predominant foreign policy instrument, he closely monitored the president in times of foreign policy crises in which the use of force was considered. When the two Bushes decided to go for military options against Saddam Hussein, Powell quickly compromised, and was swayed to a pro-war stance, making himself useful by helping eliminate barriers to successful military operations. Powell’s anti-interventionist decision-making approach was based on sophisticated political calculations. It was wise for him to bank on the anti-war mentality after Vietnam and he played the role as a prudent and cautious military leader, a move which would bring him enormous popular support and, along with it, vast political capital. On the other hand, the last minute reversal on war against Hussein also saved him from antagonizing the president, the ultimate decision-maker. 3. Powell was famously known as “the reluctant warrior” because he rarely advocated military intervention as the first solution to foreign policy crises. His reluctance to the use of force grew out of the bitter lessons the US military taken from Vietnam, which include that the war power should not be monopolized by civilian leadership, that the US military power is limited, that military force should only be used as a last resort, and that the American support for US military involvement is finite. These lessons were formalized in “the Weinberger Criteria,” a list of conditions that sought to avoid another Vietnam-quagmire by strictly regulating the application of US military force. However, the lessons the military drew from Vietnam were overly generalized or even flawed, thus making the “Weinberger Criteria” inappropriate to be the guiding principle with regard to the use of force. Powell’s insistence on the “Weinberger Criteria” only made his military advice unacceptable to political leadership and marginalized his roles in the decision-making processes of the two Persian Gulf Crises. 4. Powell was politically neutral during his career, never revealing any strong ideology or political inclination, which made him easily acceptable to most Americans, both conservatives and liberals. However, this political neutrality became his major liability when the nation faced a real security crisis posed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. His archrivals in the George W Bush’s administration, the neoconservatives, though pursued a radical military approach that stood directly opposite to the prudent “Weinberger Criteria,” had, at least, strong convictions in American traditional political ideology and ideals. In a time of crisis when strong political leadership was required, President Bush determined to choose the neoconservatives over Powell to lead foreign policy, thus leading to the downfall of one of the greatest soldier-statesmen since Eisenhower, as well as the military conservatism he embodied.