Articoli di riviste sul tema "Skeptical inference"

Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical alternatives and so has more to recommend it, evidentially speaking. This dispute has overshadowed another possible view: skeptical dogmatism. Skeptical dogmatists hold that we are justified in believing that the common sense view is probably false. I argue that skeptical dogmatism presents some interesting complications to the dialectic between the dogmatist and the skeptic. On the one hand, even if the dogmatist’s use of Occam’s razor is sufficient to rebut skepticism, in itself it is not sufficient to refute skeptical dogmatism. On the other hand, skeptics themselves, ironically, must, given the assumptions of the paper, appeal to something like Occam’s razor in order to avoid capitulating to skeptical dogmatism.

AbstractSkeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Many hold that it undermines a key inference often used by such arguments. However, the case for skeptical theism is often kept at an intuitive level: no one has offered an explicit argument for the truth of skeptical theism. In this article, I aim to remedy this situation: I construct an explicit, rigorous argument for the truth of skeptical theism.

Coherent reasoning under uncertainty can be represented in a very general manner by coherent sets of desirable gambles. In a context that does not allow for indecision, this leads to an approach that is mathematically equivalent to working with coherent conditional probabilities. If we do allow for indecision, this leads to a more general foundation for coherent (imprecise-)probabilistic inference. In this framework, and for a given finite category set, coherent predictive inference under exchangeability can be represented using Bernstein coherent cones of multivariate polynomials on the simplex generated by this category set. This is a powerful generalisation of de Finetti's Representation Theorem allowing for both imprecision and indecision. We define an inference system as a map that associates a Bernstein coherent cone of polynomials with every finite category set. Many inference principles encountered in the literature can then be interpreted, and represented mathematically, as restrictions on such maps. We discuss, as particular examples, two important inference principles: representation insensitivity—a strengthened version of Walley's representation invariance—and specificity. We show that there is an infinity of inference systems that satisfy these two principles, amongst which we discuss in particular the skeptically cautious inference system, the inference systems corresponding to (a modified version of) Walley and Bernard's Imprecise Dirichlet Multinomial Models (IDMM), the skeptical IDMM inference systems, and the Haldane inference system. We also prove that the latter produces the same posterior inferences as would be obtained using Haldane's improper prior, implying that there is an infinity of proper priors that produce the same coherent posterior inferences as Haldane's improper one. Finally, we impose an additional inference principle that allows us to characterise uniquely the immediate predictions for the IDMM inference systems.

Abstract The classical Indian Cārvāka (“Materialist”) tradition contains three branches with regard to the means of knowledge (pramāṇas). First, the standard Cārvākas accept a single means of knowledge, perception, supporting this view with a critique of the reliability and coherence of inference (anumāna). Second, the “more educated” Cārvākas as well as Purandara endorse a form of inference limited to empirical matters. Third, radical skeptical Cārvākas like Jayarāśi attempt to undermine all accounts or technical definitions of the means of knowledge (even perception) in order to enjoy a life free from philosophical and religious speculation. These branches respectively present something akin to David Hume’s problem of induction, endorse a fallibilistic, mitigated skepticism, and embody a thoroughgoing skepticism about philosophy itself. While all three branches are skeptics about religious matters, each branch exemplifies a different variety of epistemological skepticism.

AbstractFor nonmonotonic reasoning in the context of a knowledge base $\mathcal {R}$ R containing conditionals of the form If A then usually B, system P provides generally accepted axioms. Inference solely based on system P, however, is inherently skeptical because it coincides with reasoning that takes all ranking models of $\mathcal {R}$ R into account. System Z uses only the unique minimal ranking model of $\mathcal {R}$ R , and c-inference, realized via a complex constraint satisfaction problem, takes all c-representations of $\mathcal {R}$ R into account. C-representations constitute the subset of all ranking models of $\mathcal {R}$ R that are obtained by assigning non-negative integer impacts to each conditional in $\mathcal {R}$ R and summing up, for every world, the impacts of all conditionals falsified by that world. While system Z and c-inference license in general different sets of desirable entailments, the first major objective of this article is to present system W. System W fully captures and strictly extends both system Z and c-inference. Moreover, system W can be represented by a single strict partial order on the worlds over the signature of $\mathcal {R}$ R . We show that system W exhibits further inference properties worthwhile for nonmonotonic reasoning, like satisfying the axioms of system P, respecting conditional indifference, and avoiding the drowning problem. The other main goal of this article is to provide results on our investigations, underlying the development of system W, of upper and lower bounds that can be used to restrict the set of c-representations that have to be taken into account for realizing c-inference. We show that the upper bound of n − 1 is sufficient for capturing c-inference with respect to $\mathcal {R}$ R having n conditionals if there is at least one world verifying all conditionals in $\mathcal {R}$ R . In contrast to the previous conjecture that the number of conditionals in $\mathcal {R}$ R is always sufficient, we prove that there are knowledge bases requiring an upper bound of 2n− 1, implying that there is no polynomial upper bound of the impacts assigned to the conditionals in $\mathcal {R}$ R for fully capturing c-inference.

The estimation of causal effects has a revered place in all fields of empirical political science, but a large volume of methodological and applied work ignores a fundamental fact: most people are skeptical of estimated causal effects. In particular, researchers are often worried about the assumption of no omitted variables or no unmeasured confounders. This article combines two approaches to sensitivity analysis to provide researchers with a tool to investigate how specific violations of no omitted variables alter their estimates. This approach can help researchers determine which narratives imply weaker results and which actually strengthen their claims. This gives researchers and critics a reasoned and quantitative approach to assessing the plausibility of causal effects. To demonstrate the approach, I present applications to three causal inference estimation strategies: regression, matching, and weighting.

The aim of Pyrrhonism is deceptively simple: to achieve a state of ataraxia, of tranquility and relief from perturbation. But what is the extent of the ataraxia envisioned? Must the Skeptic admit a hard distinction between disturbances apparently related to belief and there­fore subject to suspension of judgement, and extra-doxastic disturbanc­es (e.g. everyday anxiety and frustration, or even hunger and fear) that are beyond the scope of the Skeptical method? In this paper I examine passages from Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism that indicate that such a distinction may not stand up to Skeptical scrutiny and that the Skepti­cal method does not only apply to “philosophical” speculative dogma or to “intellectual” perturbation, contra Barnes’s claim that the person who perceives the fewest anomalies may make “the perfect Pyrrhonist”. But I also, following Massie’s critique of unwarranted causal inferences regarding the relation between equipollence and ataraxia, distinguish cases where tarache (disturbance) presents itself as anomalous and thus lends itself to inquiry from cases where it presents itself with an appar­ent cause and does not provoke inquiry. Thus, though an apparently extra-doxastic disturbance may actually be rooted in unconsciously-held dogma, the Skeptic cannot demarcate a special class of potentially doxastic disturbances without employing a dogmatic psychology of her own. She must instead suspend judgment regarding the entire scope of her method, entertaining the possibility that any disturbance could be relieved through the Skeptical method. In the process, ataraxia is divested of definite parameters and the Skeptical method becomes effectively endless.

AbstractThe role of statistical methods is now well recognized in health sciences since these disciplines are concerned with the study of communities or populations where the principles of sampling and statistical inference are clearly applicable. However, many medical and health sciences teachers and students have been slower to perceive the need for knowledge of biostatistical methods, even though all aspects of medical diagnosis and prognosis are governed by the laws of probability. Some of them are still skeptical about the value and importance of biostatistical principles to their fields and raise questions about the meaning, content, and nature of biostatistics and relevance of its teaching to health sciences disciplines. The purpose of this essay is to address some of these issues with the hope to invoke comments and responses from other biostatistics instructors who have encountered similar predicaments in their teaching and consulting roles to health sciences students and professionals.

I defend external world realism. I assume that the principle of inference to the best explanation is justified: roughly, a hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the total evidence is more probable than one that does not. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial contents of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skeptical hypotheses. This paper thus pursues the explanationist strategy of Laurence BonJour and Jonathan Vogel. It is an improved, more compelling defense, for at least two reasons. First, the attention to spatial properties, and in particular to what I call perspectival projections, makes the explanatory power of the realist hypothesis much more vivid and concrete. Second, the argument preserves and elucidates much that seems correct in the explanationist arguments others have offered while avoiding significant problems and shortcomings.

AbstractIn the early 17th century, the Shiʿi juristic tradition experienced the first coherent refutation ofuṣūliyya, theijtihādīrationalism used by the mujtahids, at the hands of Mulla Muhammad Amin Astarabadi (d. 1626–27). The latter rejected the efforts of leading Iraqi and Syrian jurists to applyijtihād(rational legal inference), hadith categorization, anddirāya(scrutiny and stratification of accounts) in deriving Shiʿi law. The main studies on Astarabadi'sakhbārī(traditionist) movement treat it as a reaction to the “influence” of Sunnism on the mujtahids or to their excessive “borrowings” from it, and stress the traditionists’ abhorrence of assimilating any aspect of Sunnism. Underlining the shortcomings of these explanations, this article presents Astarabadi's thought as a discursive development within the Shiʿi juristic tradition, which is part of the grand Islamic tradition. Astarabadi became skeptical of the mujtahids’ epistemology and methodology and was concerned that they jeopardized God's law and hence the believer's salvation. He protested the Safavid monarchs’ legitimation ofuṣūlīlegal authority, the latter's hierarchical features, and, ultimately, the sociopolitical domination of the ʿAmili mujtahids from Jabal ʿAmil in Syria (or modern-day South Lebanon), starting with al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki (d. 1534).

The effect of prior beliefs on reasoning and decision-making is a robust, poorly understood phenomenon, exhibiting considerable individual variation. Neuroimaging studies widely show the involvement of the left pFC in reasoning involving beliefs. However, little patient data exist to speak to the necessity and role of the left pFC in belief-based inference. To address this shortcoming, we tested 102 patients with unilateral focal penetrating traumatic brain injuries and 49 matched controls. Participants provided plausibility ratings (plausible/implausible) to simple inductive arguments and (separately) strength of believability ratings of the conclusion to those same arguments. A voxel-based lesion symptom mapping analysis identified 10 patients, all with lesions to the left pFC (BA 9 and BA 10) as rating significantly fewer arguments with highly believable conclusions as “plausible,” compared with all other patients. Subsequent analyses, incorporating the right hemisphere homologue of these patients ( n = 12) and normal controls ( n = 24), revealed patients with lesions to left pFC found fewer arguments plausible in the high believable than either of these groups, and there was no difference in the behavioral scores of the right pFC patients and normal controls. Further analysis, utilizing the belief ratings as the dependent measure, revealed a Group × Belief Rating interaction, with left pFC patients having less intense beliefs about the conclusions of moderately believable and highly believable arguments. We interpreted these results to indicate that lesions to left pFC (BA 9, BA 10) increase incredulity and make these patients more skeptical reasoners. The former can partially, but not fully, explain the latter. The other relevant factor may be that unilateral left pFC lesions disrupt hemispheric equilibrium and allow for an increased inhibitory role of the right pFC. We speculate that individual differences in belief bias in reasoning in the normal population may be a function of individual differences in the left and right pFC interactional dynamics.

The paper aims to unfold the «internal» content of Gettier’s argument as a skeptical argument against knowledge in terms of answering the question: «why he could be right when he says what he says». Our initial hypothesis is that E. Gettier does not say anything about the «accidentality of the fact that Smith has 10 coins in his pocket», but he uses the words «entailment» and «deduction», which substantiates the «truth of the conclusion», and on the basis of which he attributes «knowledge» to Smith. The article comes out at a certain time, E. Gettier uses the rhetoric of necessary and sufficient conditions, with regard to justification an analogue of the closure principle is given, there are exactly two examples – all this lead to the assumption that E. Gettier’s «justification» in the form he speaks about it in the staging part of the article – is a logical relationship between beliefs that are interconnected by the relationship of entailment and are fixed in the same way in the person’s belief system. Much of the evidence on pages two and three is an illustration of why this «logical interpretation» of reasoning doesn’t work. Contrary to most popular points of view, E. Gettier managed to show only that the implementation of formal relations between beliefs does not allow one to get to «knowledge» in the form in which he defines it. In particular, such a reading makes it possible to block various attempts to propose a «fourth condition». It must meet the task set – to restore confidence that the fulfillment of the formal relations between beliefs can help to get to «knowledge». However, within the framework of the linguistic turn paradigm, in which E. Gettier works, this is impossible, because in general, it simply lacks adequate means of discussing the persuasiveness of the inference. In this sense, «knowledge» is, by definition, a fuzzy concept that brings us back to «classical notions» in which the persuasiveness of an argument implies not only validity, but also soundness, relevance, and usefulness.

This essay explores the apologetic value of arguments for faith that are built upon premises accepted by the skeptic—the kind of argument originally denoted by the term ad hominem. I illustrate the apologetic efficacy of ad hominem argument by working with the premise of ‘factuality.’ The skeptic supposes that facts may lead to scientific inferences but not to metaphysical ones compatible with religious faith. But, by examining the meaning of factual knowledge more closely, I undertake to show that it necessarily leads to conclusions about moral truth and freewill that lie outside the limits presupposed by skeptics. I conclude by considering how this argument type enables apologists to circumvent what Eric Voegelin has called modernity’s “prohibition of questions,” its tendency to rule out arguments for faith on procedural grounds.

RAMIFIED NATURAL THEOLOGY IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION: Moving Forward from Natural Theology by Rodney Holder. New York: Routledge, 2021. 244 pages. Hardcover; $160.00. ISBN: 9780367373191. *"Natural theology" is the study of what can be learned about God from a consideration of the universe of nature, and it has often been used to support claims of God's existence. The theologian Richard Swinburne applied Bayesian probability theory to various aspects of natural theology in order to present a justification for God's existence that could be evaluated numerically. Such a method has a certain objectivity about it, he felt. Moreover, it can be applied further to support the specific claims of the Christian faith through a similar treatment of historical facts given in the Bible. This latter effort he called "ramified natural theology," and it is the subject of the present book by Rodney Holder, who held a DPhil from Oxford in astrophysics before being ordained into the Anglican ministry. *This approach to Christian teaching is to be contrasted with those that are based on taking the scriptures as doctrinally authoritative in themselves, as exemplified by the position of Karl Barth. With ramified natural theology, the scriptures must be regarded as historical documents written in good faith by the authors of the time--just as any historian would normally assume about any historical documents--but with the proviso that supernatural events such as miracles are to be accepted as possible. That is something that academic historians will not allow, and it marks a key difference between the two disciplines. Arguing from a historic basis of the scriptures is, of course, not new. What is more innovative is to combine this with a consideration of natural theology, and to use a common analytical technique such as Bayesian theory to assign overall probabilities to the truths of central Christian beliefs. *Bayesian probability theory is a well-established technique. A good illustration would be of a doctor who is visited by a patient displaying symptoms that could come from one of several diseases. But which one? It is known from published statistics what is the a priori probability for a given citizen to have each of these diseases, and the probability for each of them to give the reported set of symptoms. From this information, the doctor can multiply the numbers together to obtain the relative probabilities that the patient has each of the possible diseases. The Bayesian formula allows the doctor to quantify the relative importance of each symptom and find the most likely diagnosis. *This approach can also be used to give believability estimates for more-abstract propositions. For each alternative proposition under consideration we must propose an a priori believability, taken to resemble a probability. We then consider the likelihood that each of the propositions could give rise to a set of given observations, and we finally apply the Bayesian formula. This may persuade us that one initial proposition is much more believable than another, but it does depend on the formation of numerical estimates of believability. These might be objective numbers that we do not know very well, or they may be intrinsically subjective in nature. It seems to me that the most important cases are unavoidably subjective, but quantifying one's degree of belief may be helpful in order to make progress. *Holder applies this type of analysis to the philosopher David Hume's skeptical evaluation of miracles. Hume argued that for a reported miracle, the proposition that it is mistaken is always more probable than the proposition that it is true--but we can put some numbers into this. Suppose that there is testimony T that a given miracle M has occurred, and that God G is proposed as the source of this miracle. Holder calculates a formula which I write here (slightly re-expressed) in order to give a flavor of the contents of the book: P(G|T) = P(G) {P(M|G) + P(T|~M)} / {P(G) P(M|G) + P(T|~M)}. *This is to be interpreted as saying that the probability that God is the source of the miracle as attested, P(G|T), is to be evaluated in terms of three quantities: the a priori likelihood of God's existence, P(G), the probability that God will perform this miracle, P(M|G), and the probability P(T|~M) that this testimony will be obtained when such a miracle did not occur (Hume's mistaken testimony). These numbers are clearly uncertain, but if we are sufficiently confident in the smallness of P(T|~M), and are willing to believe that God may perform miracles, then even a small initial belief in God can be enhanced by a large numerical factor by the testimony of the miracle. *Holder begins his account by discussing the natural theology of God as the First Cause of the universe and of its apparent physical fine-tuning to give intelligent life. Fuller accounts of these subjects have been given elsewhere (including in my own book) and can be referred to. Holder is concerned to provide enough information to justify the application of the Bayesian method to support a proposed belief in God, but most chapters in the book use Bayesian method to support belief in the Christian teaching of the death and resurrection of Jesus, using as factual evidence the material recorded in the Gospels and in other places. Extremely high levels of credibility can be claimed using this method, which can be combined with the natural theology arguments. Holder argues that the conclusions follow convincingly even when the assumptions and numerical probabilities that are used are allowed to vary considerably. *There are, however, some deficiencies in the Bayesian method that may impede its use. It might be questionable, as Holder accepts, to take the different pieces of evidence for the Resurrection in the New Testament as independent witness accounts. This they probably are, I would happily agree, but a determined skeptic might want to write off entire accounts at one go. After all, the later church had no hesitation in dismissing the so-called apocryphal gospels--for good reasons, needless to say--but we must be justly confident that the accepted gospels are the genuine article. Since the main reason that skeptics usually have for doubting this is that they disbelieve the contents, their argumentation may often seem circular. Holder is quite good at rejecting the methodology of skeptical scholars such as Bultmann. *A more serious problem is that the Bayesian method cannot convince the total skeptic. That is, if someone's initial belief value of a proposition is zero, then multiplying this value by a large numerical Bayesian factor will still give zero. For this reason, as Holder states but perhaps not strongly enough, the employment of another method such as "inference to the best explanation" may be indispensable. In this way, one might perhaps convince the skeptic to accept some kind of nonzero likelihood of God after all, and then the Bayesian method may help--at least to make it clear that evidence can indeed be cumulative and can be used to give ordered reasons for belief when strong enough. But the total skeptic may require a different kind of approach. Hume simply disbelieved in miracles. There are people today who likewise disbelieve in miracles, and there are those today who would likewise reject them "on principle," whatever the evidence presented. *Even with these reservations, the Bayesian method provides a healthy contrast to the kind of vagueness that often seems to beset theological discussion. It proposes attributing defined numerical values to all quantities and evaluates their consequences. Even if the reader is unconvinced by the method's claimed precision, it does at least give a clear indication of where a well-specified argument is capable of leading. *Even without the Bayesian aspects, the book is useful in collecting together quite a lot of material that is relevant for presenting the Christian faith. I would, however, point to two areas that are not very well covered. One is the entire topic of biological evolution, which has been the subject of so much familiar controversy and really needs a bit of clear discussion to decide whether it adds to the natural theology. The other is that incidental textual details found in the New Testament are themselves capable of adding considerably to our belief in the documents' historical authenticity. F. F. Bruce and, more recently, Peter Williams have published accessible studies of this, and it is an area that strongly merits being taken into consideration. *Throughout the book Holder's writing is clear and readable, although some of the on-the-fly references to various philosophers and theologians might frustrate a beginner. One must digest a fair bit of mathematics at the level illustrated above. It seems to me that, on the whole, the book is a graduate-level text whose hefty price-tag (even the e-version is not inexpensive--$48.95) will deter many potential readers. Still, within its given remit and despite a few limitations, the book does a good job. It can be well recommended for theological libraries and researchers in the area. I suspect, however, that the conclusions may need to be de-mathematized a little in order to convince ordinary citizens. *Reviewed by Peter J. Bussey, Emeritus Reader in Physics at the University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK.

It is well-known from probability theory that network-based methods like Bayesian networks constitute remarkable frameworks for efficient probabilistic reasoning. In this paper, we focus on qualitative default reasoning based on Spohn’s ranking functions for which network-based methods have not yet been studied satisfactorily. With constraint networks, we develop a framework for iterative calculations of c-representations, a family of ranking models of conditional belief bases which show outstanding properties from a commonsense and formal point of view, that are characterized by assigning possible worlds a degree of implausibility via penalizing the falsification of conditionals. Constraint networks unveil the dependencies among these penalty points (and hence among the conditionals) and make it possible to compute the penalty points locally on so-called safe sub-bases. As an application of our framework, we show that skeptical c-inferences can be drawn locally from safe sub-bases without losing validity.

The artificial grammar learning paradigm is a classic method of investigating the influence of universal constraints on shaping learning biases on language acquisition. While this method has been used extensively by linguists to test theoretical claims in generative grammar, one of the most prevalent frameworks in language acquisition, several studies have questioned whether artificial grammar learning reflects language acquisition enough to allow us to use it to draw inferences about the validity of universal constraints, particularly those arising from phonetic naturalness. The current study tests whether artificial grammar learning shows the effect of one robust phonetic naturalness constraint: the restriction on nasal harmony patterns arising from the sonority hierarchy. Nasal harmony is of particular interest because it is one of the few types of harmony that occurs between consonants and vowels, which is an under-researched topic. The results, contrary to the skeptical concerns, showed that participants (n = 120) could learn an artificial grammar involving a natural pattern, but could not learn one corresponding to an arbitrary/phonetically unmotivated pattern in the same way or to the same degree. This study contributes epistemic support to the large body of work using artificial grammar experiments to test phonological operations.

The central question of this paper is: what has Kant’s Refutation of Idealism argument proven, if anything? What is the real scandal of philosophy and universal human reason? I argue that Kant’s Refutation argument can only be considered as sound if we assume that his target is what I call ‘metaphysical external-world skepticism’ (rather than traditional ‘epistemological external-world skepticism’). What is in question is not the ‘existence’ of outside things, but their very ‘nature’, that is, the claim that the thing outside us, which appears to us as persistent body in space, exists in itself as a substantia noumenon. Assuming the indirect-realist view that we only immediately know ideas and that their putative objects are known by inference, the metaphysical external-world skeptic doubts that the nature of things outside oneself is mind-independent.

For those of us for whom “literary Darwinism,” which bases its “scientific” approach to literary criticism on evolutionary psychology, has seemed an intellectual disaster, but who continue to believe that it is important to incorporate science cooperatively into our study of literature; for those who are concerned about how art and literature matter in a world so troubled and dangerous; for those convinced Darwinians who find themselves skeptical about and uneasy with the mechanico-materialist version of Darwinism that Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett have made popular; for those who find that the science they credit is yet inadequately attentive to women's perspectives, Richard Prum's The Evolution of Beauty offers a potentially marvelous option. A distinguished ornithologist, Prum has undertaken an enormously ambitious project, whose implications run from evolutionary biology to aesthetics. From the perspective of a very unscientific literary guy and a wannabe birder, I slightly distrust my enthusiasm for the book. But Prum's arguments are creatively provocative and brilliantly argued, even when they get rather iffily hypothetical; his ornithological studies are intrinsically fascinating, even to nonbirders, and at the same time they have potentially transformative implications. What he has to say, even if his inferences can and should be challenged, deserves the most serious engagement.

Customarily one begins a discussion about the effectiveness of international law by quoting Louis Henkin’s famous remark that “almost all nations obey almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” For some, this empirical claim supports the notion that international law is a vital tool for furthering international cooperation across a broad range of issue areas. For others, the implicit suggestion that international law’s mere existence might be driving states’ behavior is a calamity of causal inference. Even if Henkin’s claim is empirically correct, effectiveness does not follow from compliance. For a third group, Henkin’s claim may not even be empirically correct. In at least some areas of international law, noncompliance may be relatively high. Deploying the same suspect causal reasoning that the second group worries about, international law skeptics have sometimes suggested that we might infer ineffectiveness on the basis of such noncompliance.

Background/Context This article explains the idea of a neopragmatic postmodernist test theory and offers some thoughts about what changing notions concerning the nature of and meanings assigned to knowledge imply for educational assessment, present and future. Purpose Advances in the learning sciences—particularly situative and sociocognitive stances—call into question the adequacy of the trait and behaviorist psychological perspectives under which educational measurement evolved. This article argues nevertheless that its models and methods, appropriately reconceived and extended as necessary, can be useful in assessment framed in a contemporary view of learning. Research Design This is an analytic essay. Conclusions/Recommendations The model-based reasoning that characterizes test theory is useful not because it measures extant traits defined and evidenced in the same way for all students, but because it helps us organize our thinking, marshal and interpret evidence, and communicate our inferences and their grounding to others. A skeptical attitude about models in assessment makes our uses of them more flexible, more powerful, and, ultimately, more effective at meeting and fulfilling the aims of education than they would be if we believed that they accurately captured the totality of the phenomenon. Our understandings of students’ learning and programs’ effects are enriched by multiple perspectives and diverse sources of evidence, some new or previously neglected but others with familiar (albeit reconceived) forms.

Bredo C. Johnsen1 misconceives my strictures concerning acceptance of the following principle (where ‘p’ stands for any empirical proposition):(1) If A both knows that p and knows that p entails q, then A can come to know that q.Johnsen seems unaware that my criticism was intended to apply only after (1) is made to appear in its most plausible light; that is, only after its consequent is interpreted as: ’It is logically possible for A to know that q.’ Without this interpretation (1) might be dismissed simply on the grounds that A suffers from some physical or psychological disability that prevents him from drawing inferences from what he knows.Properly interpreted, (1) remains acceptable as long as the propositions substituted for p and q are such that it is at least logically possible for A to get evidence enough to make them known. Agreement on this point is itself enough to render Johnsen's own examples irrelevant. For instance, even though it may be physically impossible for A to get adequate evidence that in the constellation Andromeda there is a planet intermediate in size between Venus and Earth, the foregoing is still a fit substitution instance for q; but since such a q does not suffice to falsify the consequent of (1), it does nothing to generate any skeptical argument, either.

Abstract Background and Hypothesis Voice atypicalities are potential markers of clinical features of schizophrenia (eg, negative symptoms). A recent meta-analysis identified an acoustic profile associated with schizophrenia (reduced pitch variability and increased pauses), but also highlighted shortcomings in the field: small sample sizes, little attention to the heterogeneity of the disorder, and to generalizing findings to diverse samples and languages. Study Design We provide a critical cumulative approach to vocal atypicalities in schizophrenia, where we conceptually and statistically build on previous studies. We aim at identifying a cross-linguistically reliable acoustic profile of schizophrenia and assessing sources of heterogeneity (symptomatology, pharmacotherapy, clinical and social characteristics). We relied on previous meta-analysis to build and analyze a large cross-linguistic dataset of audio recordings of 231 patients with schizophrenia and 238 matched controls (>4000 recordings in Danish, German, Mandarin and Japanese). We used multilevel Bayesian modeling, contrasting meta-analytically informed and skeptical inferences. Study Results We found only a minimal generalizable acoustic profile of schizophrenia (reduced pitch variability), while duration atypicalities replicated only in some languages. We identified reliable associations between acoustic profile and individual differences in clinical ratings of negative symptoms, medication, age and gender. However, these associations vary across languages. Conclusions The findings indicate that a strong cross-linguistically reliable acoustic profile of schizophrenia is unlikely. Rather, if we are to devise effective clinical applications able to target different ranges of patients, we need first to establish larger and more diverse cross-linguistic datasets, focus on individual differences, and build self-critical cumulative approaches.

ABSTRACTI offer an epistemic framework for theorising about faith. I suggest that epistemic faith is a disposition to believe or infer according to particular methods, despite a kind of tendency to perceive an epistemic shortcoming in that method. Faith is unjustified, and issues into unjustified beliefs, when the apparent epistemic shortcomings are actual; it is justified when the epistemic worries are unfounded.Virtuous faith is central to a great deal of epistemology. A rational agent will manifest faith in their perceptual abilities, in determining which experts and testifiers to trust, in their a priori reasoning, and in the epistemic capacities that are specific to their social environment. To ignore faith is to ignore a crucial element of our social and individualistic epistemic lives.One exercises faith when one forms beliefs despite a kind of apparent epistemic shortcoming, which may or may not correspond to a genuine weakness in evidential support. For example, standing on a bridge one knows to be safe, despite one's natural but irrational fear, can manifest a kind of epistemic faith. So too can forming perceptual beliefs, or engaging in logical inferences, despite lacking a dialectically satisfying response to skeptical arguments. The same goes for beliefs that are informed by one's ideological stance – these too count as manifestations of faith, and under some circumstances, such faith is epistemically appropriate. One upshot of my project will be that an intuitively appealing neutrality ideal for education and discourse is untenable. I'll conclude with some discussion of practical questions about whether, when, and why it can be worthwhile engaging seriously with people who have radically opposed views and frameworks.

HOW TO BE A BETTER SCIENTIST by Andrew C. Johnson and John P. Sumpter. New York: Routledge, 2019. 247 pages, index. Paperback; $23.95. ISBN: 9781138731295. *It is hard to imagine the need for yet another offering in the crowded field of generalized science books. This is especially true in the case of Johnson and Sumpter's broad How to Be a Better Scientist, which lacks an obvious audience or niche. However, the authors largely achieve their stated aim of producing a book that is not only accessible but also relevant to aspiring and established scientists alike, including those at every career stage--from beginning students to seasoned principal investigators (PIs). The tone of the slim volume is light and leavened with great dollops of humor, yet the topics are so well mined that occasional nuggets of wisdom make the book even more interesting and appealing. *Breadth rules over depth, with chapters covering everything from how to choose a graduate school sponsor and research project, to how to secure grant funding and to design a conference poster. The individual chapters and the overall organization span the range from planning experiments and seeking jobs, to making the most of scientific meetings and social media, but the overall view is from the proverbial 30,000 feet rather than close up. The vocabulary is simple, the mood informal and breezy rather than stuffy or preachy, and the writing mostly crisp and to the point. Each chapter ends with a handy concluding checklist reiterating major "take-home" messages. *Late-career scientists might appreciate the practical advice on keeping a busy lab running effectively while supervising students and postdocs. Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that most of the "hands-on," step-by-step advice provided here (such as how to create and present a conference talk, how to plan and submit a manuscript, and where to seek funding) would not already be well known to experienced scientists, even if it might be nice for them to skim the chapters and see the world of scientific investigation through the fresh eyes of newbies. Indeed, most of the practical advice dispensed here is aimed squarely at the beginning, or even aspiring, scientist. Still, the authors make clear that even a late-stage scientist's career is best considered a "work in progress," and there is practical advice for more-seasoned scientists, including how to deal with collaborators, funders, administrators, and media. *The authors offer appropriate examples to support their arguments, such as the discovery that gastric ulcers are caused not by stress but by pathogenic bacteria, demonstrating that while it is difficult to overturn conventional wisdom, scientific data typically achieve this effect in the end. Occasional references are provided, but readers are generally left on their own to hunt down sources for further reading. However, the focus is largely on practical advice. Readers are urged to join ResearchGate, to use many subheadings in their writing, and to use figures in place of words in explaining results. *Still, this is by no means a technical book. The authors make clear in their foreword that they never intended to write a technical book or to engage in philosophical exploration or description of any or all particular branches of scientific investigation. Instead, Johnson and Sumpter draw on their many years of combined experience as professional scientists, including publication of numerous articles and supervision of dozens of graduate students, in seeking to halt the spread of what they characterize as "poor science": boring or impenetrable writing, lackluster talks, unfocused projects, and (worst of all, in their view) unhappy scientists. The authors write of witnessing many aspiring scientists abandon their career goals due not only to an unfortunate inability to do good science but also to an exasperating inability to find fulfillment and joy in their work. *One of the major themes of the book--handled often and well--is that science is a brutal battleground that poses great psychological perils for its practitioners. The authors make clear that recurring setbacks and frustrations play a huge role in how scientific findings, and individual scientists themselves, advance. They also make clear that such frustration is not anomalous but instead routine. There are multiple detailed sections on how to handle criticism and rejection, and even an entire chapter on "When Things Are Not Going Well" (sample advice: "Do not try to work yourself out of trouble"). It is both refreshing and admirably constructive for Johnson and Sumpter to advocate, indeed urge, that scientists of all ages and experiences take solid steps to protect their time, sanity, lifestyle, and emotional health. Again and again, the authors recommend that scientists find a balanced life outside the lab. They argue that to become a better scientist, one must become a better person. The focus on scientific integrity and, in particular, on admitting mistakes and telling one's story with honesty and transparency, is commendable. *Indeed, apart from its "something for everyone" approach, the book's true strength lies in its recognition of communication as a central focus of science. Yes, too many scientists forget the scientific method's all-important final step: to share one's findings. "The need to communicate well in science is not appreciated as much as it should be" (p. 110). The authors urge that scientists should be able to explain their work--what they do and why it matters--to parents or other family members. They further advise dedication of large blocks of time to writing. "Easy reading is damn hard writing" (p. 144). *However, the authors' mostly thorough exploration of communication leaves one huge boulder unturned, which exposes the book's central weakness. Much is made of the importance of scientists explaining their findings to other scientists, but in today's world it is just as crucial for scientists to communicate the relevance of their findings to critics outside science. How should one explain research to skeptics and deniers who question the legitimacy of scientific findings, let alone the need for science in the first place? Is a better poster, or even more data, really the best way to handle vaccination doubters and climate change deniers? Regrettably, the authors barely touch on this topic. *My second criticism of the book involves a different focus. Although the authors pointedly wished to steer clear of anything smacking of philosophy (or even academic debate), I found myself at times wishing they would have at least acknowledged some of the numerous and important philosophical ideas concerning the proper undertaking of science. For example, one of the topics they mention throughout the book, both directly and indirectly, involves how one knows when one has collected sufficient data to test one's hypothesis and justify conclusions. Unfortunately, this is never dealt with in depth or head on, with the result that some of the advice becomes contradictory ("Be thorough and don't take shortcuts" versus "Don't be a perfectionist"). How much trust should we put in our findings and conclusions? How do we know if they are true? How do we know when to stop doing replicates of experiments--do we base the decision on statistical inference alone? or on something more? I appreciate that the authors sought to provide practical guidance rather than venturing into potentially pedantic territory, but even simple recognition of such issues, with references as to where to explore further, would be a big boon to scientists of all levels in search of self-improvement. There is also virtually no mention of faith. *How to Be a Better Scientist is fun to read. It will provoke smiles, raise eyebrows, and bring useful rewards. Overall, there is much to recommend here, but like the best of science, there remains a never-ending list of further questions to be addressed. *Reviewed by Alexander J. Werth, Professor of Biology, Hampden-Sydney College, Hampden Sydney, VA 23943.

Our paper addresses the problem of a two-fold approach to skeptical inferences in the context non-monotonic logics. We tackle the problem through the analysis of ambiguous theories, such as the Nixon Diamond, as instantiated in non-monotonic inheritance networks, and the notion of an extension. Our paper presents a detailed description of the inner mechanisms underlying both approaches to skeptical inference, i.e. direct and indirect skepticism, and how each information processing policy is applied to ambiguous networks like the Nixon Diamond. Finally, we discuss the extent and limitation of each approach, and we propose an alternative stance towards the existence of diverging implementations to skeptical inferences in non-monotonic reasoning.

AbstractMoore and Russell thought that perceptual knowledge of the external world is based on abductive inference from information about our experience. Sosa maintains that this ‘indirect realist’ strategy has no prospects of working. Vogel disagrees and thinks it can and does work perfectly well, and his reasoning (and variations on that reasoning) seem initially promising, moreso than other approaches. My aim, however, will be to adjudicate this dispute in favor of Sosa’s pessimistic answer, and in doing so, to better uncover the important role abductive inference does have in a wider theory of perceptual knowledge, even if it doesn’t feature in any promising vindication of (anti-skeptical) indirect realism.

The multiverse is often invoked by naturalists to avoid a design inference from the fine-tuning of the universe. I argue that positing that we live in a naturalistic multiverse (NM) makes it plausible that we currently exist in a problematic skeptical scenario, though the exact probability that we do is inscrutable. This, in turn, makes agnosticism the rational position to hold concerning the reliability of our reasoning skills, the accuracy of our sensory inputs, and the veracity of our memories. And that means that agnosticism is also the rational position to hold concerning all the beliefs derived from those sources, which includes nearly all of them. Consequently, there is an unacceptable skeptical cost to accepting a NM, thereby requiring a rejection of the NM as a counter to fine-tuning or a rejection of naturalism itself.

AbstractIn his 1912 book The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell advocates an indirect realism with regard to physical objects. Only two years later, in his book Our Knowledge of the External World and the paper “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, he changes his method in philosophy. Instead of inferring the existence of physical objects, he now sets out to construct them out of sense-data. As I will argue in this article, the main argument from The Problems of Philosophy can be rationally reconstructed as an inference to the best explanation which infers to unobservable objects. The main motivation for the new approach in Our Knowledge of the External World, on the other hand, is to establish a more direct variant of realism, in particular because Russell became skeptical with regard to inferences to unobservable objects. As I will argue, the resulting theory of the physical world loses so much in simplicity that it becomes an unattractive alternative to his earlier position, and Russell’s reason for rejecting simplicity as a criterion of theory choice turns out to be inconsequential.

Abstract We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Compared to neutral settings, skepticism is significantly lower when it is self-threatening, and not enhanced when it is self-serving. These results shed light on a new channel that individuals can use to protect their beliefs in communication situations: they exercise skepticism in a motivated way, that is, in a way that depends on the desirability of the conclusions that skeptical inferences lead to. We propose two behavioral models that can generate motivated skepticism. In one model, the Receiver freely manipulates his beliefs after having made skeptical inferences. In the other, the Receiver reasons about evidence in steps and the depth of his reasoning is motivated.

Abstract In an interesting paper, Casasanto, Daniel & Tom Gijssels. 2015. What makes a metaphor an embodied metaphor? Linguistics Vanguard 1(1). 327–337 introduce a skeptical view of recent studies into the embodied character of metaphorical source domains. According to the authors, there cannot be conclusive evidence on the matter thus far, since, for a metaphor to be embodied, specific simulations must be modality-specific and not simply restricted to modality-specific activity brain areas. In line with this, I argue that metaphors reflect a connection between perception, memory, and consciousness (embodied extended mind). The Embodied Extended Mind Theory (EEMT) introduced in this paper is indebted to Active Inference (AIF), a process theory for the comprehension of intelligent agency. EEMT defends the idea that language bears traces of nonlinguistic, bodily acquired information that reflects biological processes of energy exchange and conservation. Therefore, it is assumed that what makes a metaphor embodied is not only the relation between a source domain and a target domain in ad hoc regions in the brain, but the alignment of multiple independent systems during the (re)construction of events. Central to this is the idea that humans use stored perceptual maps, the combination of which permits us to manipulate concepts as part of complex event partitioning.

Summary Sherwin Carlquist’s work was filled with inferences of xylem function, and yet he did not carry out xylem physiological or biomechanical measurements. Moreover, his quantitative analyses were rudimentary and he disliked the standard scientific practice of quantifying uncertainty with statistical analyses. Also, took few pains to explain to other functional xylem biologists why his comparative approach was useful and appropriate. Here, I discuss why nevertheless his papers are extremely valuable contributions to inferences of xylem function. The most important insight is that Sherwin used a valid and essential approach for the inference of biological function, known as the comparative method. Together with optimality models, population biology (including xylem physiology), and studies of developmental potential, the comparative method is an indispensable part of a maximally supported inference of xylem structure–function relation. Detecting his insightful inferences of function often requires reading around his various idiosyncrasies, including the lack of statistics and instead his reliance on his extraordinary memory to detect patterns. With this guide to reading Carlquist’s work, I hope to give functional xylem physiologists better access to the richest and most wide-ranging body of functional hypotheses found in the xylem literature.

Skeptical of prevailing depictions and recommendations regarding the gender gap in entrepreneurial self-efficacy (ESE), our aim is to raise and examine alternative interpretations and inferences. We question the common belief that women are under-confident with respect to entrepreneurship and whether this is a “problem” that needs fixing. The findings from two distinct datasets indicate, instead, that women are as likely as men to possess accurate entrepreneurial confidence, which is less likely than over-confidence to be associated with proclivities potentially detrimental to business venturing. Our analysis therefore calls for revised portrayals of—and suggestions for—the ESE of both women and men.

Abstract Evaluative studies of inductive inferences have been pursued extensively with mathematical rigor in many disciplines, such as statistics, econometrics, computer science, and formal epistemology. Attempts have been made in those disciplines to justify many different kinds of inductive inferences, to varying extents. But somehow those disciplines have said almost nothing to justify a most familiar kind of induction, an example of which is this: “We’ve seen this many ravens and they all are black, so all ravens are black.” This is enumerative induction in its full strength. For it does not settle with a weaker conclusion (such as “the ravens observed in the future will all be black”); nor does it proceed with any additional premise (such as the statistical IID assumption). The goal of this paper is to take some initial steps toward a justification for the full version of enumerative induction, against counterinduction, and against the skeptical policy. The idea is to explore various epistemic ideals, mathematically defined as different modes of convergence to the truth, and look for one that is weak enough to be achievable and strong enough to justify a norm that governs both the long run and the short run. So the proposal is learning-theoretic in essence, but a Bayesian version is developed as well.

AbstractThe transformers that drive chatbots and other AI systems constitute large language models (LLMs). These are currently the focus of a lively discussion in both the scientific literature and the popular media. This discussion ranges from hyperbolic claims that attribute general intelligence and sentience to LLMs, to the skeptical view that these devices are no more than “stochastic parrots”. I present an overview of some of the weak arguments that have been presented against LLMs, and I consider several of the more compelling criticisms of these devices. The former significantly underestimate the capacity of transformers to achieve subtle inductive inferences required for high levels of performance on complex, cognitively significant tasks. In some instances, these arguments misconstrue the nature of deep learning. The latter criticisms identify significant limitations in the way in which transformers learn and represent patterns in data. They also point out important differences between the procedures through which deep neural networks and humans acquire knowledge of natural language. It is necessary to look carefully at both sets of arguments in order to achieve a balanced assessment of the potential and the limitations of LLMs.

PurposeThis study aims to provide a conceptual framework to investigate the effects of consumer attitudes toward brands and attitudes toward a series of fashion oriented print advertisements with and without homosexual themes, on consumer willingness to buy from brands. The influence of consumer skepticism and inferences of manipulative intent (IMI) as moderators between these variables is also investigated. This study also closes various research gaps identified within the literature.Design/methodology/approachA self-administered survey instrument was designed using established scales to collect data through an online questionnaire. Fashion advertisements namely one advertisement representing homosexual content and one heterosexual advertisement were used in the study within subjects (e.g. male and female) design. Statistical techniques, specifically factor analysis, regressions and multiple regressions are used to analyze the data.FindingsThe findings indicate significant and positive relationships between attitude toward the brand and advertisement as well as willingness to buy for both males and females. The moderation analyses noted that consumer skepticism enhanced the relationship between attitude toward the brand and attitude toward the advertisement, but weakened the relationship between attitude toward the advertisement and willingness to buy, only for the female cohort. Similarly, a weakening effect of IMI was noted on the relationship between attitude toward the advertisement and willingness to buy.Research limitations/implicationsThe current study contributes to the literature on homosexual imagery in advertising. In applying the persuasion knowledge model, the current study demonstrates the applicability of the model to homosexual themes in fashion advertising while accounting for the effects of consumer skepticism and IMI.Practical implicationsThe current research highlights the importance of accounting for gender differences when introducing homosexual themes in fashion advertisements. Heterosexual males and females differ in their attitudes toward homosexual themes in fashion advertising, as well as how skeptical they are with regards to the motives of the advertiser. While a great deal of acceptance is already present in today's society, these differences still need to be accounted for in future fashion advertising campaigns.Originality/valueThe present study represents an examination of consumer responses to a series of fashion advertisements in Australia and provides useful implications to marketers of fashion products. The study further contributes to the literature on consumer skepticism and IMI with regards to cause-related advertising.

Abstract Background:Although advances in the field of Assisted Reproduction have improved significantly the reproductive outcome for infertile couples, success rates nonetheless remain low. Furthermore, several infertile couples are skeptical of using experimental or even established ART treatments, resulting in the need for reproductive health professionals to discuss other models which might best benefit patients who need fertility care.Clinical case series:All patients that were referred to our clinic for primary infertility (no positive pregnancy test after at least 2 years of unprotected intercourse) and had been either offered to proceed with IVF or had already a history of at least 1 failed IVF cycle, in the course of 1 year (March 2018-February 2019) were included in this study. All patients were younger than 42 years of age, AMH less than 1 ng/mL, FSH less than 12 IU/L (follicular phase FSH normal range 2.8-9.3 IU/L) and normal ovulation was present. Couples were counseled regarding a novel integrative model of achieving spontaneous pregnancy through expectant management while modifying key parameters affecting female fertility, developed after evidence-based appraisal of all relative literature. All 14 patients were examined for insulin resistance, subclinical thyroid disease, thrombophilia, and chronic endometritis and were offered the appropriate treatment, aiming for optimal (as opposed to within normal range) figures. For chronic endometritis both spouses received a one-month long triple antibiotic treatment. All patients were given careful personalized nutritional and vitamin supplementation guidelines. Regarding the psychological component of fertility all patients underwent monthly homeopathy and/or weekly acupuncture courses. All patients were designed to be followed-up for 6 months after completion of treatment (9 months after antibiotic treatment). 3 patients dropped out before receiving full treatment (rate 21%). 2 patients did not have a positive pregnancy test. All 9 remaining patients came back with a positive pregnancy test (rate 81% of those who completed treatment) on the first month of follow-up that resulted in an uncomplicated pregnancy and delivery of healthy singleton babies. Conclusion:This is the first case series indicating that expectant management could be the answer to some cases of infertility. Poor responders are sometimes reluctant to be involved in the global trend of IVF and ART, therefore a more holistic integrative approach might balance the imbalances and increase their fecundity. However, no causal inferences should be made from this consecutive case series regarding the efficacy of the investigated treatment.