Bibliografie tematiche / Security protocol

Indice

Articoli di riviste
Tesi
Libri
Capitoli di libri
Atti di convegni
Rapporti di organizzazioni

Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Security protocol"

Autore: Grafiati

Pubblicato: 4 giugno 2021

Ultima modifica: 14 marzo 2023

Cita una fonte nei formati APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard e in molti altri stili

Scegli il tipo di fonte:

Consulta la lista di attuali articoli, libri, tesi, atti di convegni e altre fonti scientifiche attinenti al tema "Security protocol".

Accanto a ogni fonte nell'elenco di riferimenti c'è un pulsante "Aggiungi alla bibliografia". Premilo e genereremo automaticamente la citazione bibliografica dell'opera scelta nello stile citazionale di cui hai bisogno: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver ecc.

Puoi anche scaricare il testo completo della pubblicazione scientifica nel formato .pdf e leggere online l'abstract (il sommario) dell'opera se è presente nei metadati.

Articoli di riviste sul tema "Security protocol"

Younes, Osama, e Umar Albalawi. "Securing Session Initiation Protocol". Sensors 22, n. 23 (23 novembre 2022): 9103. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s22239103.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

The session initiation protocol (SIP) is widely used for multimedia communication as a signaling protocol for managing, establishing, maintaining, and terminating multimedia sessions among participants. However, SIP is exposed to a variety of security threats. To overcome the security flaws of SIP, it needs to support a number of security services: authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. Few solutions have been introduced in the literature to secure SIP, which can support these security services. Most of them are based on internet security standards and have many drawbacks. This work introduces a new protocol for securing SIP called secure-SIP (S-SIP). S-SIP consists of two protocols: the SIP authentication (A-SIP) protocol and the key management and protection (KP-SIP) protocol. A-SIP is a novel mutual authentication protocol. KP-SIP is used to secure SIP signaling messages and exchange session keys among entities. It provides different security services for SIP: integrity, confidentiality, and key management. A-SIP is based on the secure remote password (SRP) protocol, which is one of standard password-based authentication protocols supported by the transport layer security (TLS) standard. However, A-SIP is more secure and efficient than SRP because it covers its security flaws and weaknesses, which are illustrated and proven in this work. Through comprehensive informal and formal security analyses, we demonstrate that S-SIP is secure and can address SIP vulnerabilities. In addition, the proposed protocols were compared with many related protocols in terms of security and performance. It was found that the proposed protocols are more secure and have better performance.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Rekha, H., e M. Siddappa. "Model Checking M2M and Centralised IOT authentication Protocols." Journal of Physics: Conference Series 2161, n. 1 (1 gennaio 2022): 012042. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2161/1/012042.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Abstract It is very difficult to develop a perfect security protocol for communication over the IoT network and developing a reliable authentication protocol requires a detailed understanding of cryptography. To ensure the reliability of security protocols of IoT, the validation method is not a good choice because of its several disadvantages and limitations. To prove the high reliability of Cryptographic Security Protocols(CSP) for IoT networks, the functional correctness of security protocols must be proved secure mathematically. Using the Formal Verification technique we can prove the functional correctness of IoT security protocols by providing the proofs mathematically. In this work, The CoAP Machine to Machine authentication protocol and centralied IoT network Authentication Protocol RADIUS is formally verified using the well-known verification technique known as model checking technique and we have used the Scyther model checker for the verification of security properties of the respective protocols. The abstract protocol models of the IoT authentication protocols were specified in the security protocol description language and the security requirements of the authentication protocols were specified as claim events.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Günther, Felix. "Modeling advanced security aspects of key exchange and secure channel protocols". it - Information Technology 62, n. 5-6 (16 dicembre 2020): 287–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/itit-2020-0029.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

AbstractSecure connections are at the heart of today’s Internet infrastructure, protecting the confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of communication. Achieving these security goals is the responsibility of cryptographic schemes, more specifically two main building blocks of secure connections. First, a key exchange protocol is run to establish a shared secret key between two parties over a, potentially, insecure connection. Then, a secure channel protocol uses that shared key to securely transport the actual data to be exchanged. While security notions for classical designs of these components are well-established, recently developed and standardized major Internet security protocols like Google’s QUIC protocol and the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.3 introduce novel features for which supporting security theory is lacking.In my dissertation [20], which this article summarizes, I studied these novel and advanced design aspects, introducing enhanced security models and analyzing the security of deployed protocols. For key exchange protocols, my thesis introduces a new model for multi-stage key exchange to capture that recent designs for secure connections establish several cryptographic keys for various purposes and with differing levels of security. It further introduces a formalism for key confirmation, reflecting a long-established practical design criteria which however was lacking a comprehensive formal treatment so far. For secure channels, my thesis captures the cryptographic subtleties of streaming data transmission through a revised security model and approaches novel concepts to frequently update key material for enhanced security through a multi-key channel notion. These models are then applied to study (and confirm) the security of the QUIC and TLS 1.3 protocol designs.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

He, Xudong, Jiabing Liu, Chin-Tser Huang, Dejun Wang e Bo Meng. "A Security Analysis Method of Security Protocol Implementation Based on Unpurified Security Protocol Trace and Security Protocol Implementation Ontology". IEEE Access 7 (2019): 131050–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2940512.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Nam, Junghyun, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Minkyu Park, Juryon Paik e Dongho Won. "On the Security of a Simple Three-Party Key Exchange Protocol without Server’s Public Keys". Scientific World Journal 2014 (2014): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/479534.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Authenticated key exchange protocols are of fundamental importance in securing communications and are now extensively deployed for use in various real-world network applications. In this work, we reveal major previously unpublished security vulnerabilities in the password-based authenticated three-party key exchange protocol according to Lee and Hwang (2010): (1) the Lee-Hwang protocol is susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack and thus fails to achieve implicit key authentication; (2) the protocol cannot protect clients’ passwords against an offline dictionary attack; and (3) the indistinguishability-based security of the protocol can be easily broken even in the presence of a passive adversary. We also propose an improved password-based authenticated three-party key exchange protocol that addresses the security vulnerabilities identified in the Lee-Hwang protocol.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Amin, Ruhul, SK Hafizul Islam, Muhammad Khurram Khan, Arijit Karati, Debasis Giri e Saru Kumari. "A Two-Factor RSA-Based Robust Authentication System for Multiserver Environments". Security and Communication Networks 2017 (2017): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2017/5989151.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

The concept of two-factor multiserver authentication protocol was developed to avoid multiple number of registrations using multiple smart-cards and passwords. Recently, a variety of two-factor multiserver authentication protocols have been developed. It is observed that the existing RSA-based multiserver authentication protocols are not suitable in terms of computation complexities and security attacks. To provide lower complexities and security resilience against known attacks, this article proposes a two-factor (password and smart-card) user authentication protocol with the RSA cryptosystem for multiserver environments. The comprehensive security discussion proved that the known security attacks are eliminated in our protocol. Besides, our protocol supports session key agreement and mutual authentication between the application server and the user. We analyze the proof of correctness of the mutual authentication and freshness of session key using the BAN logic model. The experimental outcomes obtained through simulation of the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) S/W show that our protocol is secured. We consider the computation, communication, and storage costs and the comparative explanations show that our protocol is flexible and efficient compared with protocols. In addition, our protocol offers security resilience against known attacks and provides lower computation complexities than existing protocols. Additionally, the protocol offers password change facility to the authorized user.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Ko, Yongho, Jiyoon Kim, Daniel Gerbi Duguma, Philip Virgil Astillo, Ilsun You e Giovanni Pau. "Drone Secure Communication Protocol for Future Sensitive Applications in Military Zone". Sensors 21, n. 6 (15 marzo 2021): 2057. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s21062057.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) plays a paramount role in various fields, such as military, aerospace, reconnaissance, agriculture, and many more. The development and implementation of these devices have become vital in terms of usability and reachability. Unfortunately, as they become widespread and their demand grows, they are becoming more and more vulnerable to several security attacks, including, but not limited to, jamming, information leakage, and spoofing. In order to cope with such attacks and security threats, a proper design of robust security protocols is indispensable. Although several pieces of research have been carried out with this regard, there are still research gaps, particularly concerning UAV-to-UAV secure communication, support for perfect forward secrecy, and provision of non-repudiation. Especially in a military scenario, it is essential to solve these gaps. In this paper, we studied the security prerequisites of the UAV communication protocol, specifically in the military setting. More importantly, a security protocol (with two sub-protocols), that serves in securing the communication between UAVs, and between a UAV and a Ground Control Station, is proposed. This protocol, apart from the common security requirements, achieves perfect forward secrecy and non-repudiation, which are essential to a secure military communication. The proposed protocol is formally and thoroughly verified by using the BAN-logic (Burrow-Abadi-Needham logic) and Scyther tool, followed by performance evaluation and implementation of the protocol on a real UAV. From the security and performance evaluation, it is indicated that the proposed protocol is superior compared to other related protocols while meeting confidentiality, integrity, mutual authentication, non-repudiation, perfect forward secrecy, perfect backward secrecy, response to DoS (Denial of Service) attacks, man-in-the-middle protection, and D2D (Drone-to-Drone) security.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Wang, Ying Lian, e Jun Yao Ye. "Research on Applied-Information Technology in Hierarchical Network Security Protocols Designing Based on Public Key". Advanced Materials Research 951 (maggio 2014): 169–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.951.169.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

This paper proposed an applied-information technology in hierarchical network security protocols designing model based on public key, the designing of the protocols is to be completed in several layers. Each sub-protocol achieved a sub-goal that it should complete, and provided data interface to a higher sub-protocol. And then merged the sub-protocol of each layer, to complete the protocols designing. In the previous research, the security of the protocol in applied-information technology was always regarded as a whole, which caused the protocols designing to be tremendous complexity. The hierarchical model in applied-information technology simplifies the process of security protocols designing, and make the protocols designing more clear or less cost, the security proof more simpler.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Du, Jinze, Chengtai Gao e Tao Feng. "Formal Safety Assessment and Improvement of DDS Protocol for Industrial Data Distribution Service". Future Internet 15, n. 1 (31 dicembre 2022): 24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/fi15010024.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

The Data Distribution Service (DDS) for real-time systems is an industrial Internet communication protocol. Due to its distributed high reliability and the ability to transmit device data communication in real-time, it has been widely used in industry, medical care, transportation, and national defense. With the wide application of various protocols, protocol security has become a top priority. There are many studies on protocol security, but these studies lack a formal security assessment of protocols. Based on the above status, this paper evaluates and improves the security of the DDS protocol using a model detection method combining the Dolev–Yao attack model and the Coloring Petri Net (CPN) theory. Because of the security loopholes in the original protocol, a timestamp was introduced into the original protocol, and the shared key establishment process in the original protocol lacked fairness and consistency. We adopted a new establishment method to establish the shared secret and re-verified its security. The results show that the overall security of the protocol has been improved by 16.7% while effectively preventing current replay attack.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Bala, Suman, Gaurav Sharma, Hmani Bansal e Tarunpreet Bhatia. "On the Security of Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols". Scalable Computing: Practice and Experience 20, n. 1 (9 marzo 2019): 93–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.12694/scpe.v20i1.1440.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

The group key agreement protocol enables to derive a shared session key for the remote members to communicate securely. Recently, several attempts are made to utilize group key agreement protocols for secure multicasting in Internet of Things. This paper contributes to identify the security vulnerabilities in the existing protocols, to avoid them in future constructions. The protocols presented by Gupta and Biswas have been found insecure to ephemeral secret key leakage (ESL) attack and also, malicious insiders can impersonate an honest participant. Additionally, the protocol presented by Tan is also ESL-insecure. We also present a fix to the Tan's protocol to make it secure.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Più fonti

Tesi sul tema "Security protocol"

O'Shea, Nicholas. "Verification and validation of security protocol implementations". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4753.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Security protocols are important and widely used because they enable secure communication to take place over insecure networks. Over the years numerous formal methods have been developed to assist protocol designers by analysing models of these protocols to determine their security properties. Beyond the design stage however, developers rarely employ formal methods when implementing security protocols. This may result in implementation flaws often leading to security breaches. This dissertation contributes to the study of security protocol analysis by advancing the emerging field of implementation analysis. Two tools are presented which together translate between Java and the LySa process calculus. Elyjah translates Java implementations into formal models in LySa. In contrast, Hajyle generates Java implementations from LySa models. These tools and the accompanying LySa verification tool perform rapid static analysis and have been integrated into the Eclipse Development Environment. The speed of the static analysis allows these tools to be used at compile-time without disrupting a developer’s workflow. This allows us to position this work in the domain of practical software tools supporting working developers. As many of these developers may be unfamiliar with modelling security protocols a suite of tools for the LySa process calculus is also provided. These tools are designed to make LySa models easier to understand and manipulate. Additional tools are provided for performance modelling of security protocols. These allow both the designer and the implementor to predict and analyse the overall time taken for a protocol run to complete. Elyjah was among the very first tools to provide a method of translating between implementation and formal model, and the first to use either Java for the implementation language or LySa for the modelling language. To the best of our knowledge, the combination of Elyjah and Hajyle represents the first and so far only system which provides translation from both code to model and back again.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Dowling, Benjamin James. "Provable security of internet protocols". Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2017. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/108960/1/Benjamin%20James_Dowling_Thesis.pdf.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Secure communications over the Internet are typically established by first running an authenticated key exchange protocol, which computes a secret key between two users, which is then utilised in an encryption protocol. In this work we examine novel security properties of the most prominent communications protocols, including the Transport Layer Security and Secure Shell protocols. We introduce new security frameworks for analysing security properties of protocols involving negotiation, multiple ciphersuites, long-term key reuse, and time synchronisation. Our results have increased confidence in the security of real-world protocols, and our analyses of next-generation protocols have informed their development by standardisation bodies.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Choi, H. J. "Security protocol design by composition". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.597633.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

The aim of this research is to present a new methodology for the systematic de sign of compound protocols from their parts. Some security properties can be made accumulative, i.e. can be put together without interfering with one another, by carefully selecting the mechanisms which implement them. Among them are authentication, secrecy and non-repudiation. Based on this observation, a set of accumulative protocol mechanisms called protocol primitives are proposed and their correctness is verified. These protocol primitives are obtained from common mechanisms found in many security protocols such as challenge and response. They have been carefully designed not to interfere with each other. This feature makes them flexible building blocks in the proposed methodology. Equipped with these protocol primitives, a scheme for the systematic construction of a complicated protocol from simple protocol primitives is presented, namely, design by composition. This design scheme allows the combination of several simple protocol parts into a complicated protocol without destroying the security properties established by each independent part. In other words, the composition frame work permits the specification of a complex protocol to be decomposed into the specifications of simpler components, and thus makes the design and verification of the protocol easier to handle. Benefits of this approach are similar to those gained when using a modular approach to software development. The applicability and practicality of the proposed methodology are validated through many design examples of protocols found in many different environments and with various initial assumptions. The method is not aimed to cover all existent design issues, but a reasonable range of protocols is addressed.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Gibson-Robinson, Thomas. "Analysing layered security protocols". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:35c9e4e5-6540-4e1d-9fcc-a98f8f60c20a.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Many security protocols are built as the composition of an application-layer protocol and a secure transport protocol, such as TLS. There are many approaches to proving the correctness of such protocols. One popular approach is verification by abstraction, in which the correctness of the application-layer protocol is proven under the assumption that the transport layer satisfies certain properties, such as confidentiality. Following this approach, we adapt the strand spaces model in order to analyse application-layer protocols that depend on an underlying secure transport layer, including unilaterally authenticating secure transport protocols, such as unilateral TLS. Further, we develop proof rules that enable us to prove the correctness of application-layer protocols that use either unilateral or bilateral secure transport protocols. We then illustrate these rules by proving the correctness of WebAuth, a single-sign-on protocol that makes extensive use of unilateral TLS. In this thesis we also present a full proof of the model's soundness. In particular, we prove that, subject to a suitable independence assumption, if there is an attack against the application-layer protocol when layered on top of a particular secure transport protocol, then there is an attack against the abstracted model of the application-layer protocol. In contrast to existing work in this area, the independence assumption consists of eight statically-checkable conditions, meaning that it can be checked statically, rather than having to consider all possible runs of the protocol. Lastly, we extend the model to allow protocols that consist of an arbitrary number of layers to be proven correct. In this case, we prove the correctness of the intermediate layers using the high-level strand spaces model, by abstracting away from the underlying transport-layers. Further, we extend the above soundness results in order to prove that the multi-layer approach is sound. We illustrate the effectiveness of our technique by proving the correctness of a couple of simple multi-layer protocols.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Modesti, Paolo <1966&gt. "Verified security protocol modeling and implementation with AnBx". Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/1234.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

AnBx is an extension of the Alice & Bob notation for protocol narrations to serve as a specification language for a purely declarative modelling of distributed protocols. AnBx is built around a set of communication and data abstractions which provide primitive support for the high-level security guarantees, and help shield from the details of the underlying cryptographic infrastructure. Being implemented on top of the OFMC verification tool, AnBx serves not only for specification and design, but also for security analysis of distributed protocols. Moreover the framework, keeping apart the protocol logic from the application logic, allow for automatic generation of Java source code of protocols specified in AnBx. We demonstrate the practical effectiveness of our approach with the specification and analysis of two real-life e-payment protocols, obtaining stronger and more scalable security guarantees than those offered by the original ones. In the second part of the thesis we formally analyze the Secure Vehicle Communication system (SeVeCom), using the AIF framework which is based on a novel set-abstraction technique. We report on two new attacks found and verify that under some reasonable assumptions, the system is secure.
AnBx è un'estensione della notazione Alice & Bob per la descrizione di protocolli, ed è utilizzato come linguaggio di specifica per la modellazione puramente dichiarativa dei protocolli distribuiti. AnBx è costituito da un insieme di astrazioni sui dati e sui modi di comunicazione che forniscono il supporto di base per le proprietà di sicurezza ad alto livello, schermando i dettagli della infrastruttura crittografica sottostante. AnBx, essendo implementato sul tool di verifica OFMC, è utilizzabile non solo per specifica e la progettazione ma anche per l'analisi della sicurezza dei protocolli distribuiti. Inoltre il framework consente la generazione automatica del codice Java di protocolli descritti in AnBx, mantenendo separate la logica del protocollo dalla logica dell'applicazione. L'efficacia del nostro approccio è mostrata nella specifica ed nell'analisi di due protocolli di pagamento elettronico usati nel mondo reale, realizzando proprietà di sicurezza più forti e più scalabili rispetto a quelle delle versioni originali. Nella seconda parte della tesi analizziamo in maniera formale il sistema di comunicazione veicolare sicura (SeVeCom) utilizzando il framework AIF, che è basato su una nuova tecnica di set-abstraction. Nel corso del lavoro abbiamo trovato due nuovi attacchi, e verificato che sotto ragionevoli ipotesi il sistema è sicuro.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Dobson, Lucas E. "Security analysis of session initiation protocol". Thesis, Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Jun/10Jun%5FDobson.pdf.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Thesis (M.S. in Computer Science)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010.
Thesis Advisor(s): Dinolt, George ; Eagle, Chris. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 13, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Session initiation protocol, voice over IP, information security, siproxd, linphone, Qutecom, osip, eXosip Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-78). Also available in print.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Araya, Cristian, e Manjinder Singh. "Web API protocol and security analysis". Thesis, KTH, Data- och elektroteknik, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-208934.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

There is problem that every company has its own customer portal. This problem can be solved by creating a platform that gathers all customers’ portals in one place. For such platform, it is required a web API protocol that is fast, secure and has capacity for many users. Consequently, a survey of various web API protocols has been made by testing their performance and security. The task was to find out which web API protocol offered high security as well as high performance in terms of response time both at low and high load. This included an investigation of previous work to find out if certain protocols could be ruled out. During the work, the platform’s backend was also developed, which needed to implement chosen web API protocols that would later be tested. The performed tests measured the APIs’ connection time and their response time with and without load. The results were analyzed and showed that the protocols had both pros and cons. Finally, a protocol was chosen that was suitable for the platform because it offered high security and fast connection. In addition, the server was not affected negatively by the number of connections. Reactive REST was the web API protocol chosen for this platform.
Det finns ett problem i dagens samhälle gällande att varje företag har sin egen kundportal. Detta problem kan lösas genom att skapa en plattform som samlar alla kundportaler på samma plats. För en sådan plattform krävs det ett web API protokoll som är snabb, säker och har kapacitet för många användare. Därför har en undersökning om olika web API protokolls prestanda samt säkerhetstester gjorts. Arbetet gick ut på att ta reda på vilket web API protokoll som erbjuder hög säkerhet och hög prestanda i form av svarstid både vid låg och hög belastning. Det ingick också i arbetet att göra en undersökning av tidigare arbeten för att ta reda på om eventuella protokoll kunde uteslutas. Under arbetet utvecklades också plattformens backend som implementerade de olika web API protokollen för att sedan kunna utföra tester på dessa. Testerna som utfördes var svarstid både med och utan belastning, uppkopplingstid samt belastning. Resultaten analyserades och visade att protokollen hade både för- och nackdelar. Avslutningsvis valdes ett protokoll som var lämpad för plattformen eftersom den hade hög säkerhet samt snabbast uppkopplingstid. Dessutom påverkades inte servern negativt av antalet uppkopplingar. Reactive REST valdes som web API protokoll för denna plattform.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Jones, Benjamin Edward. "Improving security in the FDDI protocol". Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/23700.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Hsu, Yating. "Formal Analysis of Network Protocol Security". The Ohio State University, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1317230784.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Hanna, Youssef. "Verifying sensor network security protocol implementations". [Ames, Iowa : Iowa State University], 2008.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Più fonti

Libri sul tema "Security protocol"

Dorgham, Sisalem, a cura di. SIP security. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K: Wiley, 2009.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Jones, Benjamin Edward. Improving security in the FDDI protocol. Monterey, Calif: Naval Postgraduate School, 1992.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Eric, Vyncke, a cura di. IPv6 security. Indianapolis, IN: Cisco Systems, 2009.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

United Service Institution of India, a cura di. Integrated maritime security: Governing the ghost protocol. New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2014.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Miller, Derek. The security needs assessment protocol: Improving operational effectiveness through community security. New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2008.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Miller, Derek. The security needs assessment protocol: Improving operational effectiveness through community security. New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2008.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

1969-, Rudnick Lisa B., e United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, a cura di. The security needs assessment protocol: Improving operational effectiveness through community security. New York: United Nations, 2008.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Hehir, Stephen. A security target for the X.435 protocol. Teddington: National Physical Laboratory, 1995.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Kaksonen, Rauli. A functional method for assessing protocol implementation security. Espoo [Finland]: Technical Research Centre of Finland, 2001.

Cerca il testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Armando, Alessandro, e Gavin Lowe, a cura di. Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16074-5.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Più fonti

Capitoli di libri sul tema "Security protocol"

Saïdi, Hassen, Victoria Stavridou e Bruno Duterte. "Protocol Codesign". In Security Protocols, 106–13. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11542322_14.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Stavridou, Victoria. "Protocol Codesign". In Security Protocols, 114–18. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11542322_15.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Kelsey, John, Bruce Schneier e David Wagner. "Protocol interactions and the chosen protocol attack". In Security Protocols, 91–104. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bfb0028162.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Schoenmakers, Berry. "Protocol". In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, 990. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_11.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Hess, Andreas V., Sebastian A. Mödersheim e Achim D. Brucker. "Stateful Protocol Composition". In Computer Security, 427–46. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99073-6_21.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Paulson, Lawrence C. "The Yahalom Protocol". In Security Protocols, 78–84. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/10720107_11.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Køien, Geir M. "Security Protocol Verification". In Entity Authentication and Personal Privacy in Future Cellular Systems, 209–19. New York: River Publishers, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003338147-8.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Weik, Martin H. "protocol security option". In Computer Science and Communications Dictionary, 1362. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-0613-6_15000.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Ma, Jianfeng, Changguang Wang e Zhuo Ma. "Security Access Protocol". In Security Access in Wireless Local Area Networks, 87–134. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00941-9_3.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Myrvang, Per Harald, e Tage Stabell-Kulø. "Cordial Security Protocol Programming". In Security Protocols, 62–84. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04904-0_11.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Atti di convegni sul tema "Security protocol"

Tan, Yang, e Bo Lv. "Mistakes of a Popular Protocol Calculating Private Set Intersection and Union Cardinality and its Corrections". In 3rd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (CAIML 2022). Academy and Industry Research Collaboration Center (AIRCC), 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5121/csit.2022.121209.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

In 2012, De Cristofaro et al. proposed a protocol to calculate the Private Set Intersection and Union cardinality (PSI-CA and PSU-CA). This protocol's security is based on the famous DDH assumption. Since its publication, it has gained lots of popularity because of its efficiency (linear complexity in computation and communication) and concision. So far, it's still considered one of the most efficient PSI-CA protocols and the most cited (more than 170 citations) PSI-CA paper based on the Google Scholar search. However, when we tried to implement this protocol, we couldn't get the correct result of the test data. Since the original paper lacks of experimental results to verify the protocol's correctness, we looked deeper into the protocol and found out it made a fundamental mistake. Needless to say, its correctness analysis and security proof are also wrong. In this paper, we will point out this PSI-CA protocol's mistakes, and provide the correct version of this protocol as well as the PSI protocol developed from this protocol. We also present a new security proof and some experimental results of the corrected protocol.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Pinto, Lucas W. P., e Jéferson C. Nobre. "Comparação entre as Extensões Bundle Security Protocol, Streamlined Bundle Security Protocol e Bundle Protocol Security Specification para o Bundle Protocol". In IV Workshop Pré-IETF. Sociedade Brasileira de Computação - SBC, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5753/wpietf.2017.3611.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Este documento tem como objetivo apresentar um estudo comparativo entre as extensões desenvolvidas para o Bundle Protocol conhecidas como Bundle Security Protocol, Streamlined Bundle Security Protocol e Bundle Protocol Security Specification. Apresenta ao decorrer do trabalho os motivos que levaram ao desenvolvimento de tais extensões, que não foram consideradas relevantes no principio do desenvolvimento do Bundle Protocol. Por fim, explana as diferentes características de cada extensão e as compara entre si.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Wang, Zhiqiang, Quanqi Li, Yazhe Wang, Biao Liu, Jianyi Zhang e Qixu Liu. "Medical Protocol Security". In CCS '19: 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363253.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Bassil, Carole, Ahmed Serhrouchni e Nicolas Rouhana. "Simple voice security protocol". In Proceeding of the 2006 international conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1143549.1143622.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

McDermott, J. "Visual security protocol modeling". In the 2005 workshop. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1146269.1146293.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Cha, Eun-Chul, Hyoung-Kee Choi e Sung-Jae Cho. "Evaluation of Security Protocols for the Session Initiation Protocol". In 2007 16th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icccn.2007.4317885.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Martin, Cynthia E., e Jeffrey H. Dunn. "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Protocol Security Assessment". In MILCOM 2007 - IEEE Military Communications Conference. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/milcom.2007.4455200.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Qing-gui, Hu. "The new IPv6 security protocol-limited transmission protocol". In 2017 First International Conference on Electronics Instrumentation & Information Systems (EIIS). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eiis.2017.8298705.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Zisiadis, Dimitris, Spyros Kopsidas e Leandros Tassiulas. "Voice Interactive Personalized Security Protocol: Definition and Security Analysis". In 2007 3rd IEEE Workshop on Secure Network Protocols. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/npsec.2007.4371621.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Dunbar, DeJean. "Survey of Secure Network Protocols: United States Related Domains". In 3rd International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (CAIML 2022). Academy and Industry Research Collaboration Center (AIRCC), 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5121/csit.2022.121207.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Over time, the HTTP Protocol has undergone significant evolution. HTTP was the internet's foundation for data communication. When network security threats became prevalent, HTTPS became a widely accepted technology for assisting in a domain’s defense. HTTPS supported two security protocols: secure socket layer (SSL) and transport layer security (TLS). Additionally, the HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) protocol was included to strengthen the HTTPS protocol. Numerous cyber-attacks occurred in the United States, and many of these attacks could have been avoided simply by implementing domains with the most up-to-date HTTP security mechanisms. This study seeks to accomplish two objectives: 1. Determine the degree to which US-related domains are configured optimally for HTTP security protocol setup; 2. Create a generic scoring system for a domain's network security based on the following factors: SSL version, TLS version, and presence of HSTS to easily determine where a domain stands. We found through our analysis and scoring system incorporation that US-related domains showed a positive trend for secure network protocol setup, but there is still room for improvement. In order to safeguard unwanted cyber-attacks, current HTTP domains need to be extensively investigated to identify if they possess security-related components. Due to the infrequent occurrence of HSTS in the evaluated domains, the computer science community necessitates further HSTS education.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Rapporti di organizzazioni sul tema "Security protocol"

Symington, S., S. Farrell, H. Weiss e P. Lovell. Bundle Security Protocol Specification. RFC Editor, maggio 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc6257.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

McDermott, J. Visual Security Protocol Modeling. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, gennaio 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada464079.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Kuhn, D. R., K. Sriram e D. C. Montgomery. Border gateway protocol security. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-54.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Birrane, E., e K. McKeever. Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec). RFC Editor, febbraio 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc9172.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Birrane, E., A. White e S. Heiner. Default Security Contexts for Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec). RFC Editor, febbraio 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc9173.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Farrell, S., M. Ramadas e S. Burleigh. Licklider Transmission Protocol - Security Extensions. RFC Editor, settembre 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc5327.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Atkinson, Randall J. Security for the Internet Protocol. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, novembre 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada301902.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Atkinson, R. Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol. RFC Editor, agosto 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc1825.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Kent, S., e R. Atkinson. Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol. RFC Editor, novembre 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc2401.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Hollenbeck, S. Transport Layer Security Protocol Compression Methods. RFC Editor, maggio 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc3749.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Offriamo sconti su tutti i piani premium per gli autori le cui opere sono incluse in raccolte letterarie tematiche. Contattaci per ottenere un codice promozionale unico!