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1
Jankiewicz, Szymon, e Nadezhda Knyaginina. "Language Conflicts in Russia’s Education System". European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online 16, n. 1 (1 aprile 2019): 188–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117_01601009.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This article analyses changes to the language policy in Russia in 2017, and their effects on the state (national) languages of Russia’s republics within the education system. In July 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Council on Interethnic Relations, addressing the language rights of the Russian-speaking population and stressing the existing limit of the power of Russia’s 22 ethnic republics to introduce compulsory study of their official languages. The President’s statements provoked widespread prosecutorial inspections in the republics’ schools and a new round of public discussion about language policy. Public discontent in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Komi led to protests against both ethnic Russians and the native speakers of languages recognised as co-official with Russian (‘state languages of the republics’). The authorities of some republics publicly disagreed with the position taken by the federal government. In other republics, however, the President’s speech did not trigger any public discussion. In many republics, it looks like the regional authorities will ultimately accept the decision of the federal government and speakers of republican languages will not actively defend their languages. Effectively, the balance of rights of the federation and the republics for the establishment of state languages, achieved in the 1990s, was violated.
2
Arshin, Konstantin. "RUSSIANS AS A «STATE-FORMING PEOPLЕ» OR «STATE-FORMING PEOPLE» AS RUSSIANS (Response to the article by V.A. Achkasova “Why do Russians need the status of a “state-forming people?”)". Political Expertise: POLITEX 19, n. 2 (2023): 333–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu23.2023.212.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article disputes the point of view that the introduction of the term state-forming people into Article 68 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation is a legal nonsense and has only the consequence that it irritates the ethnocratic elites of the national republics that are part of Russia. From the author's point of view, the Russians have never asserted themselves as a state-forming people. The culture of the Russian people was inclusive, which allowed it to include the most important elements of the culture of other peoples. Slogan "Russia for the Russians", popular among modern Russian nationalists and nationalists of the early 20th century, turns out to be borrowed, and its initial understanding was associated with the assertion of the need for Russia's development and as a reaction (!) to the actions of the ethnocratic elites of the outlying territories of the country. In Soviet times, it was the Russians who brought a lot of good to the peoples of the RSFSR and the union republics. An analysis of the current state in terms of the formation of the Russian nation has shown that, according to sociological studies, it is regions (where Russians are the majority) who are more positive about the idea of the Russian nation and are ready to form it. On the contrary, residents of national republics are more inclined to emphasize their regional identities to the detriment of their general civic identity. The author agrees with a number of political scientists who argue that the basis of the nation is the development of civil society, and only if a developed civil society appears in Russia, the project of a general civil Russian nation can be successfully implemented.
3
Mironov, B. N. "Derusification of Administration in USSR". Modern History of Russia 11, n. 2 (2021): 436–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2021.209.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Non-Russian peoples were represented in Russian power structures long before the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, but less than the democratic norm, which suggests de facto ethnic discrimination in the Empire. In Soviet times, the actual ethno-political inequality of peoples in the USSR was gradually overcome, and participation of non-Russians in power structures grew systematically and even accelerated, and the role of Russians decreased accordingly. The increase in non-Russians’ share in governmental bodies was almost exclusively due to an increase in their ethnic status. By 1979, Russians had a very small majority in all government structures in the USSR as a whole, except for the legislative branch, which roughly corresponded to their higher share in the country’s population (50.8 % in 1989). However, the situation was different in the Union republics. Only in the Russian Federation did all peoples, Russian and non-Russian, participate in governmental bodies in proportion to their numbers and in full compliance with the democratic norm. In Belarus, Moldova, and Uzbekistan, titular ethnic groups were underrepresented, and Russians were overrepresented. In Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Estonia, the representation of Russians was below the democratic norm, and in nine republics it was higher, but despite this, they did not have a majority in any union republic. This situation developed as a result of the center’s national policy, which aimed at strengthening the authorities with national personnel, accelerating the modernization of the Union republics and raising the level of development in the lagging republics to the level of the most developed republics.
4
Yakhshiyan, O. Yu. "CONSISTENCY OF THE PROVISIONS ON THE ALL-RUSSIAN CIVIL IDENTITY CONTAINED IN THE DOCTRINAL DOCUMENTS ON THE STATE NATIONAL POLICY OF RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS-SUBJECTS OF THE FEDERATION". Vestnik Universiteta, n. 12 (3 febbraio 2021): 176–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.26425/1816-4277-2020-12-176-183.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article contains a comparative analysis of doctrinal documents in the field of state national policy at the federal and regional-republican levels for consistency of provisions on the Russian nation and all-Russian civil identity. The paper considers in detail the interpretation of the relevant provisions in the Strategy of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025. The author draws on the publications of Russian ethnopolitologists, which study the practice of politicizing the titular ethnic identity in a number of republics of the Russian Federation with the prospect of identifying ethnic and regional identities. Reference to the corpus of concepts (strategies) of national policy in the republics – subjects of the Russian Federation allowed us to identify the accepted provisions on the all-Russian civil identity contained in the federal Strategy, and the republican-ethnic accents in its interpretation, and the provisions that have not yet been picked up. In particular, the analysis of doctrinal documents of the republics showed that one of the most important provisions of the Federal Strategy on Preservation of Russian Cultural Dominance (a Single Cultural-Civilizational Code), common to all the peoples of Russia, as the basis of all-Russian civil identity has not received a response in concepts (strategies) of the Russian republics.
5
Aksiutin, Yurii M. "The Russian Identity in Southern Siberian Republics: Transformation Dynamics and Basis Perception According to the Opinion Polls of 2013-2019". RUDN Journal of Political Science 24, n. 4 (7 dicembre 2022): 732–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-1438-2022-24-4-732-756.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The structure of the identity of Russians (including those in Southern Siberia) began to transform after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the revival of ethnic identities or the strengthening of different local and territorial ones. The first case was typical for titular Russian ethnic groups, while Russians didn’t have such an evident option. The Russians mostly levelled their identities down and could not find themselves among the vague new Russian identity. The beginning of the 2010s was characterized by not only discussions of the content of Russian identity and the basis for national policy, but also huge generation changes. The purpose of this article is to analyze the dynamics of Russian identity and discover typical features of Russian identity bases among the inhabitants of Khakassia, Tyva and Altai Republics. The analysis is based on opinion polls held in these polyethnocultural regions. As seen from the poll results, about 30 % consider themselves to be inhabitants of Russia. Russian identity is of high priority for people in Khakassia and Altai Republics (it is the first grade in their identities’ structure), while in the Tyva Republic Russian and regional identities are equal. The study discovered that 35-45 % of titular ethnic groups marked Russian citizenship as the basis of their identification: hence, the Russian identity is mostly a mixture of civil and state identities (about one-third of respondents noted “civil identity”). Approximately the same proportion of Russians noted the social and cultural nature of Russian identity.
6
Chung, Kyung Taek. "A Study on Ethnic-Language Problems in Tatarstan as a Subject of Russian Federation". Korean Association of Slavic Languages 28, n. 2 (31 ottobre 2023): 181–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.30530/jsl.2023.28.2.181.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Tatarstan, which declared independence on August 30, 1990, a year before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, gained equal status with 15 federal republics and further promoted sovereign independence, but remained as a national republic in the Russian Federation through a treaty with the Russian Federation in February 1994.
In the process of gaining sovereignty, the Tatar language law was enacted in July 1992, the Tatar language was established as a national language along with Russian, a 10-year republic-level program was enacted in April 1994, and the Latin Translation Act was adopted in September 2001.
But the push for linguistic independence was only natural, causing discontent and confusion among Russians and other Russian-speaking minorities, with the indigenous-led Tatar population barely exceeding half of the republic's population, and causing checks from the Russian federal government. In particular, parents' dissatisfaction with the decline in Russian education time due to the increase in the number of Tatar education hours in school education has increased, and the negative effects of text replacement, such as the possibility of interaction with Turkey in the Muslim-led ethnic republic.
This eventually resulted in the addition of Russian to the list of more languages, allowing all ethnic republics to learn Russian in more education classes, and allowing only Cyril-based notation to be established. It was a change in the Russian federal government's ethnic-language policy, concerned about the enormous influence of the establishment and expansion of the identity of the Tatar and the Tatar languages, the most populous and traditional ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation.
7
Klimenko, Liudmila, Zuriet Zhade e Irina Petrulevich. "IDENTITY OF THE POPULATION OF THE MULTIETHNIC SOUTH OF RUSSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIETAL INTEGRATION OF THE MACROREGION". CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 22, n. 3 (27 settembre 2021): 136–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.3.011.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The South of Russia is characterized by a complex structure, a contradictory history of interethnic relations and active migration processes. All of the above creates difficulties for the region’s societal integration and strengthening of macroregional ties. The state’s national strategy presupposes the formation of a positive civic identity of Russia’s population while preserving its ethnocultural diversity. The self-determination processes of ethnosocial groups in the post-Soviet space have revealed a competition between the civic and ethnic components in the identity of the national republics’ population. Therefore, the structural and dynamic dimension of the identity of the multiethnic population in the South of Russia is being actualized. The article empirically characterizes the complex identity of the population in the multiethnic subregions of the Russian South in terms of the region’s societal (macrolevel) integration. Based on the sociological research conducted in early 2021 in the Rostov region, the Republic of Adygea and the Republic of Daghestan, the nature of the local residents’ identity along the following axes is analyzed: (1) civic, regional and ethnic identifications; (2) I- and we-identifications; (3) primordial and constructed forms of identity. Modern sociological measurements demonstrate that in the structure of cognitive I-identifications of the population of the Russian South, primordial (gender, marital status) and constructed civic (Russian citizen) identity components prevail. In the Rostov region, the core of the respondents’ identity comprises a macroregional component (resident of the South of Russia). Whereas in the North Caucasian republics in question, ethnic (in Adygea and Daghestan), confessional and republican (in Daghestan) identifications compete with the all-Russian identity. At the emotional we-identity level, residents of the Russian South most often indicate affinity with groups of everyday communication (people of the same generation and occupation) and supra-ethnic constructed communities (citizens of Russia). A strong orientation towards the South Russian identity is also manifested among the Rostov residents, while ethnic, religious and republican identification complexes have greater significance in the national republics of the Northern Caucasus. Comparative analysis with the results of 2010-2011 studies (conducted using identical instruments in the Rostov region and Adygea) shows a stable predominance of constructed civic and macroregional identities in the subregions dominated by the Russian population, and ethnic and North Caucasian identities—in the republican segment. The continuing discrepancy in the identity content structure in the ethnoterritorial segments of the Russian South may have disintegration potential and slow down the formation of a supra-ethnic societal integrity of a multi-component macroregion.
8
Modest, Kolerov. "World Revolution Against Russia: the Factor of the Ukraine in the Cause of Russia Fragmentation for the Sake of World Soviet Republics (1923)". Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 1, n. 2014 (28 febbraio 2024): 127–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2024-0-1-127-136.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The history of Russia transforming into the USSR is the history of fragmentation of Russian into the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and other union republics of the USSR initiated by the Bolsheviks on the basis of their doctrine. In other words, the history of the Bolshevik project of world revolution, or the World Soviet Republics, that was supposed to be realized in the world mosaic of ethno national states. This concept was clearly evident in the process of USSR Constitution preparation in 1924 (it came into force in 1923)
9
Lityński, Adam. "Ukraina na drodze do suwerenności. Uwagi historyka prawa. Recenzja: A. Olechno, Ewolucja konstytucyjnych podstaw systemu rządów Ukrainy, Białystok 2019, ss. 290". Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica 20, n. 2 (2021): 233–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.15290/mhi.2021.20.02.13.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The author deals with the history of the formation of a sovereign state – Ukraine in the twentieth century. The author begins with the activities of Ukrainians after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Among Ukrainian politicians, there were different ideas: autonomy within the Federation Republic of Russia or as a sovereign state. The idea of fighting for a sovereign Ukraine was prevalent. Simon Petlura was the main proponent of this direction. Territorial affairs were very contentious. Which country should compose a sovereign Ukraine in the future? In this matter, the Ukrainians came into conflict with all their neighbours. Thus, the Ukrainians were almost in a siege. Between 1918 and 1920 the Ukrainians fought the most serious battles against the Russian Bolsheviks. In Ukraine there was also a civil war with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. At that time Simon Petlura allied himself with Poland against the Russian Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian people did not support this alliance. Ukraine was conquered by Bolshevik Russia. For several decades, Ukraine became one of the republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As you know, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – contrary to its name – was a centralised state in which terror prevailed for decades. In 1991 – under Michael Gorbachev – Ukraine was one of the republics of the USSR that left the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics fastest. For the first time in its history, Ukraine became a sovereign state.
10
Davis, Howard, e Anna Sosnovskaya. "Representations of otherness in Russian newspapers: the theme of migration as a counterpoint to Russian national identity". Journal of Intercultural Communication 9, n. 3 (30 settembre 2009): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.36923/jicc.v9i3.486.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This article examines the coverage of migration topics in a selection of Russian newspapers with nationwide circulations in the first six months of 2005 and tries to answer to the question: how does the Russian national press represent people and features which are significantly different from so-called Russian character and national identity?
The analysis is based on three main themes: immigration, the national project, and Russians abroad. The coverage of immigration addresses issue of Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in the former Soviet republics; immigrants, refugees and displaced persons on territories of Russia; and labour force decline and ‘brain drain’ from the Russian Federation. The discourse on migration is conducted within the framework of the developing national project on construction of a new identity for Russia and Russians. The national project is expressed in terms of the consolidation of Russian society and creation of unified values.
The conclusion is that representatives of ‘others’ who differ from Russians significantly in terms of language and culture or who are territorial outsiders are represented in the press in three main ways. Firstly, there is a benevolent attitude expressed in terms of traditional ties to sisters and brothers from the fifteen Soviet republics. Secondly, there is a predominantly aggressive stance towards those who are seen as not wanting to assimilate or not wanting to engage with Russia and regard it as the older brother. Representations of the Chinese and the Baltic states fit this category. Finally, there is an ambivalent response, mainly in relation to stories of Russians abroad in Europe or North America, toward the interactions between Russian and non-Russian attitudes, values, etc. When the question of Russian national identity surfaces, there is a consistent message but it is differently articulated according to the diversity of the Russian press.
11
Burov, Vladilen G. "Reflections on Russian civilization". Civilization studies review 3, n. 1 (2021): 241–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2713-1483-2021-3-1-241-251.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Russian scientists (academicians Smirnov A.V., Tishkov V.A.) defend the idea that Russia is not a monoreligious country, that the Russian people are multinational. Representatives of the former Soviet republics, now sovereign states, live on the territory of the current Russian Federation. As a result of the civilizational role of Russia, they have in many respects become Russians, regardless of their ethnicity (Ukrainian, Belarusian, Armenian, Georgian, Kazakh, Moldovan, Uzbek, etc.). The European civilizational project is local, it does not have a universal status – like any other local civilizational project. Similarly, European values cannot be considered universal. Exactly the same point of view is held by Chinese politicians and scientists. In China, they constantly emphasize the specifics of their civilization and the attributes associated with it. Currently, the country has launched a broad campaign to promote the “basic socialist values”, they are subordinated to the common goal – to transform China into a rich, democratic, civilizational, harmonious socialist state. This goal should be achieved by 2049 – the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Peopleʼs Republic of China.
12
Laitin, David D. "Identity in formation: the russian-speaking nationality in the post-Soviet diaspora". European Journal of Sociology 36, n. 2 (novembre 1995): 281–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003975600007566.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Data from 1991 surveys, from elections, and from elite discourse in Estonia and Bashkortostan are presented. Despite significant historical and demographic differences in these two post-Soviet republics, the Russian population in both places had similar reactions in regard to the collapse of the Union. In both republics, Russians were wary of assimilation, yet they neither planned to exit in large numbers nor to organise politically as Russians. Furthermore, in both republics, elite discourse was framing a new identity, which can be called the ‘Russian-speaking nationality’. This nationality is likely to be secular, Soviet, and includes all non-titulars whose primary language is Russian. While it is unlikely that this emergent nationality will be the same in all post-Soviet republics, in large part because incentives from the titulars will be markedly different, the data show in the early period after the Soviet collapse, in two ‘most different cases’, the dynamics of Russian identity re-formation have been quite similar.
13
DUNCAN, PETER J. S. "CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN IDENTITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST". Historical Journal 48, n. 1 (marzo 2005): 277–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x04004303.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This is a review of recent English-language scholarship on the development of Russian identity since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The first part examines literature on the economic and political changes in the Russian Federation, revealing how scholars became more sceptical about the possibility of Russia building a Western-type liberal democracy. The second part investigates approaches to the study of Russian national identity. The experience of empire, in both the tsarist and Soviet periods, gave Russians a weak sense of nationhood; ethnic Russians identified with the multi-national Soviet Union. Seeking legitimacy for the new state, President El'tsin sought to create a civic identity focused on the multi-national Russian Federation. The Communist and nationalist opposition continued to promote an imperial identity, focused on restoring the USSR or creating some other formation including the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet republics. The final section discusses accounts of the two Chechen wars, which scholars see as continuing Russia's imperial policy and harming relations with Russia's Muslim population. President Putin's co-operation with the West against ‘terrorism’ has not led the West to accept Russia as one of its own, due to increasing domestic repression and authoritarianism.
14
Bakhlova, Olga V., e Igor V. Bakhlov. "Nation-building mechanisms and correlation of identities: regional dimension (experience of the republics of Mari El and Mordovia, 2013–2019)". Finno-Ugric World 12, n. 3 (26 ottobre 2020): 286–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.15507/2076-2577.012.2020.03.286-302.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Introduction. Nation-building is a long-term historical process that covers many areas, directions and levels. The complex composition of the Russian population and the federative structure actualize its regional dimension. The specifics and dynamics of this dimension are shown on the example of the Republics of Mari El and Mordovia, and their peoples who participated in the formation of the Russian State for centuries. The main tasks touch upon the characterization of regulatory options for the correlation of identities, content and vectors of discursive practices of national authorities, coupling mechanisms of nation-building from the perspective of identity politics to relate to the experience of both republics. Materials and Methods. The main sources were official documents of the Republic of Mari El and the Republic of Mordovia, materials that form the content of Republican Internet portals. The research was based on system, dialectical and institutional approaches, modernist constructivism and instrumentalism. The key methods are historical and diachronic, as well as multi-level and comparative analysis, and document study. Results and Discussion. The paper revealed constants and dominants of the experience of the republics of Mari El and Mordovia in the context of nation-building and identity politics. It defined dynamic changes in the period 2013–2019 and their correlation with the previous development of the Republics as Soviet autonomies and national-state entities within the Russian Federation. It emphasizes the main internal points for the specified period that demonstrate the adjustment of reference points in the ratio of identities. Conclusion. The experience of the Republics of Mari El and Mordovia in the studied perspective is evaluated as positive, but it testifies the maintenance of continuing limitations of the institutional plan both for the positioning of regional elites and for promoting effective mechanisms of nation-building at the regional level. The evolution of their practices is associated with a decrease in the value of ethnic capital as a political tool, reduction / elimination of attributes of post-Soviet strategies for sovereignization, and constructive activation of ethno-cultural organizations in Russian national projects.
15
Lityński, Adam. "GEORGIAN ATTEMPTS TO BECOME INDEPENDENT. 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF DECLARATION OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA (1918)". Roczniki Administracji i Prawa 1, n. XVIII (30 giugno 2018): 109–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.5989.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
After February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, the nations of the previous Russian Imperium began their efforts to get their independency, among them were three nations of Transcaucasia: Armenians (Armenia), Azeris (Azerbaijan), Georgians (Georgia). After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 3rd March 1918, Bolshevik Russia in reality handed over the territory of Transcaucasia to Germans and Turks. Especially Turkey became aggressive and expansive. Armenia together with Azerbaijan and then together with Georgia set up Trans-caucasian Federal Democratic Republic which collapsed soon. There were significant discrepancies among the nations. Azerbaijan wanted to get union with Turkey, but Georgia preferred Germany and Armenia counted on “white” Russia (ge¬neral Denikin). Each of these three countries set up own independent republics, among other Democratic Republic of Georgia. Soon Germany and Turkey lost the First World War, but north Caucasus was attacked by troops of General Denikin supported by England and France. Later on, in 1920, Bolsheviks entered this territory. The Red Army of Bolsheviks conquered each of the independent republics one by one, set up own governments and in¬corporated the territories into Russian Socialistic Federal Soviet Republic [RSFSR]. On 16 March 1921, RSFSR signed friendship agreement with Turkey. As a result of this agreement, Russia and Turkey divided the territory of Transcaucasian between them.
16
Mironov, Boris. "De-Russification of Government as a Factor in the Disintegration of the USSR". Russian History 47, n. 4 (8 settembre 2021): 362–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/18763316-12340017.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Abstract In the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1990, the political inequality of the nationalities’ representation in institutions of governance was overcome, non-Russians’ participation in the power structures increased, and Russians’ role in administration correspondingly decreased. The increased non-Russian percentage in governance was mainly due to the introduction of the democratic principle in government formation, according to which ethnicities should participate in proportion to their number. By 1990 in the USSR overall, Russians had a slight majority in all power structures, corresponding roughly to their higher share in the country’s population. In the union republics, however, the situation was different. Only in the RSFSR did all peoples, Russian and non-Russian, participate in government administration in proportion to their numbers, following the democratic norm. Elsewhere, Russians were underrepresented and therefore discriminated against in all organs of power, including the legislative branch. Representatives of non-Russian titular nationalities, who on average filled two-thirds of all administrative positions, predominated in disproportion to their numbers. Given these representatives’ skill majority in legislative bodies, republican constitutions permitted them to adopt any laws and resolutions they desired, including laws on secession from the USSR; and the executive and judicial authorities, together with law enforcement, would undoubtedly support them. Thus, the structural prerequisites for disintegration were established. Thereafter, the fate of the Soviet Union depended on republican elites and the geopolitical environment, because of the Center’s purposeful national policy, aimed toward increasing non-Russian representation among administrative cadres and the accelerated modernization and developmental equalization of the republics.
17
Achkasov, Valery. "Ethnic factor in the regional policy of Russia Bookreview: Shabaev Y. P., Omarov M. A. Regionalism and ethnicity in Russia: historical evolution and modern political practices. Moscow: Russian State University for the Humanities Publ., 2021. 513 p." Political Expertise: POLITEX 18, n. 3 (2022): 331–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu23.2022.307.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The monograph under review is devoted to the study of Russian regionalism. The authors consider its various historical forms and come to the conclusion that the formation and expansion of the Russian state inevitably strengthened the regionalist forms of state administration and interaction between the central government and the regions. At the same time, the authors prove that in the history of Russia, regionalization and centralization were not mutually exclusive, but complementary directions of development. The ethnic factor has always played a significant role in regional politics, so the focus of the work is on the consideration of the ideology and political practices associated with ethnic regionalism. A significant place in the monograph is occupied not only by a description of the origins and political evolution of regionalist ideas in Russia, but also by an analysis of the features of Soviet and post-Soviet ethnic regionalism. The need to improve regional policy in modern Russia is convincingly substantiated. Indeed, in modern conditions, there is a need for a new type of partnership between the federal center and the regions of the Russian Federation, and, in fact, the response to the coronavirus pandemic laid the foundation for developing a model for quickly countering new risks, primarily by combining the efforts of federal and regional authorities. The conclusions formulated by the authors are convincingly supported by the study of a number of cases: the republics of the North Caucasus, the Finno-Ugric republics of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tatarstan, the modern Russian "regionalism", the Republic of Crimea.
18
Mironov, B. N. "Why Hadn’t the Russian Federation Collapse in 1991?" Modern History of Russia 13, n. 3 (2023): 678–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu24.2023.310.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Parade of the sovereignties of the autonomous republics in 1990–1991 led to the disintegration of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova and brought the Russian Federation to the brink of collapse. The main centers of separatism in the Russian Federation were Chechnya and Dagestan, but separatist sentiments and movements were widespread in Ingushetia, Tuva, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia and Buryatia. In the 1990s from 31 to 75 points of ethno-territorial tensions in Russia were recorded. Researchers expresses different points of view on the reasons for the development of nationalism in the autonomous republics. According to one of them, in the republics, under the influence of Moscow’s national policy, ambitious national elites were formed, which became the driving force behind the development of separatism. In this article, this point of view is tested on the data of the all-Union population censuses of 1926, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989. The analysis of the national composition of the governing bodies in 1917–1989 allows us to propose the following periodization of the process of indigenization of management in autonomies: 1) 1917–1939 — intensive increase in the ethno-political status of the titular peoples and national minorities in general and negative discrimination against Russians, 2) 1940–1956 — democratic alignment of ethnic statuses, 3) 1956–1989 — moderate increase in the ethno-political status of the titular peoples and non-Russian ethnic groups in general and negative discrimination against Russians. Increasing the representativeness and role of non-Russian ethnic groups and the decline in the representativeness and role of Russians in the administration of autonomies were the main trends in the Soviet period.
19
Remington, Thomas F. "After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia. By Daniel S. Treisman. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. 262p. $57.50." American Political Science Review 95, n. 1 (marzo 2001): 247–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055401722010.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Daniel Treisman offers an ingenious explanation for the fact that the Russian Federation held together after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Unlike the three other ethnic federa- tions in the communist world-Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR itself-the Russian Federation, which was the largest of the 15 nationally based constituent republics in the Soviet Union, avoided disintegration. Many observers in the early 1990s feared the same pressures that had led to powerful separatist movements among the Soviet republics would prove too strong for the fragile central government to resist. Yet, Russia managed to maintain itself as a federal state, albeit weak. The one constituent republic in which separatism ultimately led to armed confrontation was Chech- nia, where a brutal war began in 1994, paused in 1996, and erupted again in 1999.
20
Yuzbekova, К. Sh, e А. V. Starodubtsev. "THE RHETORIC OF MAINTAINING THE SPECIAL STATUS OF THE REPUBLICS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CENTRALISATION". Вестник Пермского университета. Политология 17, n. 4 (2023): 50–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2023-4-50-67.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article answers the question of how the heads of republics characterise the status of the subjects of the federation they lead in the conditions of centralisation. Based on the idea of the importance of rhetorical representation of the status of a subject of the federation and using quantitative content analysis of the speeches of the heads of the republics dedicated to the days of the constitution and the days of the republic in the period from 2000 to 2021, the authors show that 1) even during the centralisation of the political system in Russia, republican leaders find suitable rhetorical tools that allow them to emphasise the special status of their regions; 2) they utilise communication opportunities with the local community to articulate their stance on issues important for evaluating the status of the republics.
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Velychenko, Stephen. "Restructuring and the Non-Russian Past". Nationalities Papers 22, n. 2 (1994): 325–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999408408330.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The official interpretation of the histories of the nations of the USSR emerged between 1934 and 1953 on the basis of decrees signed by Stalin and/or the Central Committee. This interpretation subsumes the histories of the non-Russian Republics within the “history of the USSR” that begins not in 1917 or 1922 in Moscow, but in prehistoric Asia. The official view recognized the non-Russian nations and republics as separate historical entities, yet imposed upon their pasts a Russocentric statist framework while denying the Russians a separate history of the RSFSR. Within this scheme the history of non-Russian nationalities before they became part of the tsarist state was built around the idea of “oppression” of “the people” and their “struggle” against native and foreign ruling classes. Russian and non-Russian “working people” were assumed always to have been “fraternal” while non-Russian political leaders, before and after incorporation, were judged according to their sympathy and/or loyalty to Russia. Russian political and cultural tutelage of non-Russians was stressed and activists in nineteenth-century national movements were labelled “reactionary” if they were not radical socialists. Official historiography admitted that non-Russians suffered political and cultural oppression but not economic colonialism under tsarist rule. In keeping with the logic of Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia, the official view argued that tsarist economic development was “progressive” for non-Russians because it centralized production and tied “outlying regions” of the empire to the world market. Accordingly, the non-Russian “national bourgeoisie” were “reactionary” because both threatened the integration supposedly demanded by the forces of production. By contrast, during the twenties and the thirties, Russian/non-Russian relations in the Tsarist Empire were presented in terms of Lenin's Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Historians argued that tsarist centralism impeded the development in non-Russian provinces and that “national liberation movements” were “progressive” responses to Russian economic colonialism.
22
Mihranyan, A. A., e D. A. Dinets. "VECTORS OF RUSSIAN-MONGOLIAN COOPERATION". Geoeconomics of Energetics, n. 4 (8 febbraio 2024): 55–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.48137/26870703_2023_24_4_55.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article notes the dominance of multi-vectorism in Mongolia’s foreign policy at the present stage, which is due to the complexity and contradictory nature of the geopolitical situation, as well as the expectation of increased risks of ensuring the national security of the Mongolian People’s Republic. In this regard, the authorities of the republic are strengthening cooperation with the so-called «third neighbor» (USA, Japan, South Korea, Australia, EU countries, etc.) in the hope of balancing the influence of the two main neighbors: Russia and China.In relations with China, Mongolia’s growing dependence on China in the economic sphere (China steadily retains the first place in the MNR’s foreign trade turnover) raises concerns. Until a certain point, such a role was played by Mongolia’s second neighbor - Russia (more precisely, the Soviet Union, where the republic was integrated practically at the level of union republics), which fully ensured the republic’s economic and political security. When forming the strategy of cooperation between Russia and Mongolia, the Russian side has to take into account the concerns of the Mongolian side: the growing volume of economic cooperation between Russia and China significantly increases Mongolia’s fears about Russia’s inability to resist Chinese influence. In this regard, Mongolia positions the expansion of cooperation with «third neighbors» as an integral part of ensuring its national interests.
23
Trifonova, Elizaveta Dmitrievna, e Ekaterina Alekseevna Babintseva. "Russian-Belarusian relations of the late 1990s – early 2000s: the view of French researchers". Международные отношения, n. 4 (aprile 2023): 15–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0641.2023.4.68875.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article identifies and analyzes the views of modern French researchers on the relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. The study of the works of French scientists makes it possible to analyze Russia's foreign policy not only in relation to its closest neighbor, the Republic of Belarus, but also in relation to the entire post-Soviet space. The subject of the study is the relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus in the late 1990s - early 2000s. The article is an attempt to fill the gap in French historiography and analyze the relations between the two former Soviet republics through the prism of French studies. The article also examines the assessments that French authors give to integration associations in the post-Soviet space, as well as to the interaction between the two states in the military and economic spheres. The study is relevant due to the fact that it is the first time the French works devoted to Russian-Belarusian relations in the post-Soviet period have been analysed. Historical, narrative, and comparative-historical methods of historical research were used as the main methods. The author comes to the conclusion that, according to the majority of French researchers, since the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus have been the strongest and most stable compared to other former Soviet republics, despite the obvious great dependence of Belarus on Russia. Moreover, the participation of both countries in the same integration associations and the creation of a common Union State not only speaks about the similar interests of both countries, but it further strengthens the relationship between them.
24
Shkel, Stanislav N. "Chained by one chain: Mechanisms of electoral mobilization at the local level in the Russian ethnic republics". Ars Administrandi (Искусство управления) 13, n. 3 (2021): 381–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2218-9173-2021-3-381-405.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Introduction: researchers of the Russian elections have long noticed that in a number of ethnic republics the level of electoral mobilization and political conformism of voters is higher than the average in Russia. Despite the fairly numerous statistical evidence of the existence of this political phenomenon, we still know relatively little about the specific causal mechanisms for the reproduction of electoral activity in these republics. Objectives: identifying the factors bringing about a high level of electoral mobilization in ethnic republics in Russia. Methods: analysis of qualitative data collected through focus groups method in five regions: Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Tatarstan, Komi Republic, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and Chuvash Republic. Results: as the result of the study it is concluded that a high level of electoral mobilization is caused by the combination of three factors, each of which affects different categories of voters. The institutional factor in the form of political machines involves into the electoral process those employed in public sector and industrial enterprises. The density of social networks resulting from specificity of rural way of life influences the electoral behavior of entrepreneurs and self-employed people living in the countryside. Finally, the Soviet legacy continues to determine the high political activity of the older generation, acting as a significant cultural factor. At the same time, there has been no empirical proof to a number of explanations whereby religion or ethnic culture of non-Russian ethnic groups is viewed as factors that simplify electoral mobilization. Conclusions: evidence on the role of the solidarity norms in rural areas during elections makes it possible to conclude that the consolidation and high intensity of horizontal relationships do not always promote the reproduction of civil society institutions and grass-roots democratic practices. As it is shown in the experience of the Russian ethnic republics, this element of social consolidation may well be integrated into the design of authoritarian elections. Thus, informal networks of grass-roots solidarity can be used not only by the opposition, but also by local authorities to increase electoral mobilization, which, in the current political context, rather strengthens authoritarian orders and practices than creates threats to them.
25
Людмила Владиславовна, Клименко. "DYNAMICS OF ETHNO-GENDER ATTITUDES OF THE POPULATION OF THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA IN THE SOCIAL-PROFESSIONAL SPHERE". STATE AND MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT SCHOLAR NOTES 4, n. 4 (dicembre 2021): 214–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2079-1690-2021-1-4-214-219.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article analyses the dynamics of gender attitudes of the South Russian population using the material of the repeated comparative sociological research conducted from 2004 to 2020. In the article the author analyses the attitude to the possibilities of career promotion for the female population in education, medicine, business, finance, production, politics and security agencies. In the conformist republics (the Republic of Ingushetia, the Republic of Dagestan) there is an increasing conservative trend, whereas the transitive republics (the Karachay-Cherkessia Republic, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic) are described by the approving stable attitude among the female and growing neutral attitude among the male population. Although, gender attitudes of the title nation in the Republic of Adygea are inclined to the conformist’s pole. Modernized orientations and gender subgroups coming closer within the given attitudes have been detected in Rostov region over the number of years. In general, a substantial part of the female population of various South Russian subregions is targeted at the deconstruction of traditional gender display. Simultaneously there is an incongruity of ethno-territorial segments within the attitudes towards the female socio-professional ambitions, which turns into the factor hindering societal integration of the multicultural South of Russia.
26
Людмила Владиславовна, Клименко. "DYNAMICS OF ETHNO-GENDER ATTITUDES OF THE POPULATION OF THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA IN THE SOCIAL-PROFESSIONAL SPHERE". STATE AND MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT SCHOLAR NOTES 4, n. 4 (dicembre 2021): 214–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2079-1690-2021-1-4-214-219.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article analyses the dynamics of gender attitudes of the South Russian population using the material of the repeated comparative sociological research conducted from 2004 to 2020. In the article the author analyses the attitude to the possibilities of career promotion for the female population in education, medicine, business, finance, production, politics and security agencies. In the conformist republics (the Republic of Ingushetia, the Republic of Dagestan) there is an increasing conservative trend, whereas the transitive republics (the Karachay-Cherkessia Republic, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic) are described by the approving stable attitude among the female and growing neutral attitude among the male population. Although, gender attitudes of the title nation in the Republic of Adygea are inclined to the conformist’s pole. Modernized orientations and gender subgroups coming closer within the given attitudes have been detected in Rostov region over the number of years. In general, a substantial part of the female population of various South Russian subregions is targeted at the deconstruction of traditional gender display. Simultaneously there is an incongruity of ethno-territorial segments within the attitudes towards the female socio-professional ambitions, which turns into the factor hindering societal integration of the multicultural South of Russia.
27
Chung, Kyung-Taek. "A Study on the Ethnic-Language Situation in Chechnya". Korean Association of Slavic Languages 27, n. 2 (31 ottobre 2022): 89–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.30530/jsl.2022.27.2.89.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Among the nine federal subjects of the North Caucasus, the special region with the greatest ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity of the Russian Federation, the Chechen Republic, or Cheznya, is more special. Chechen language, the native language of the Chechens, is now one of the two state languages of the Republic of Chechen and one of the 14 state languages of Dagestan. The Chechens were forced to move to the Kazakh soviet republic and Central Asia by Stalin in 1944, along with the Ingushes, Kalmyks, Karachays, Balkars and Crimean Tatars, and were deprived of national organization and language for 13 years until they returned to their original region in 1957, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, suffered bloody disputes immediately during the process of independence from the Russian Federation and eventually failed to become independent and remain within the Russian Federation. The absolute majority (95%) of the inhabitants of the Chechen Republic are indigenous Chechens, whose numbers and proportions are very high although the Stalin’s forced migraton policy also distributes Russians, Kumyks, Avars, Nogais and Ingushes. The situation of ethnic-language in Chechen Republic is different from other ethnic republics in North Caucasus, but the adoption of the Law on education of Russian Federation on July 25, 2018, which set the voluntary learning of ethnic languages is expected to strengthen the status of Russian and expand the use area, while the status of Chechen and the use area are expected to be reduced. Although the population and its proportion of the Chechens' absolute majority in the Chechen Republic may slow the decline or extinction of indigenous mother tongues compared to other ethnic republics, but it can seriously make the crisis of Chechen language due to the policies of the Russians and the Russian Federation that move toward the Russian superiority. This study tried to analyze the current situation of the Chechnya through as much data as possible, but it was almost impossible to access the latest data, although it was not the intention of the Russian federal government. More detailed research on language situations requires continuous efforts.
28
Dunlop, John B. "Will a Large-Scale Migration of Russians to the Russian Republic Take Place over the Current Decade?" International Migration Review 27, n. 3 (settembre 1993): 605–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019791839302700306.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Given the headlong and convulsive pace of political change occurring in the republics of the former Soviet Union, predictions concerning future developments in that area of the world must necessarily be tenuous and hedged about with caveats. The question of the likely scale of in-migration from the other former union republics into the Russian Republic over the remainder of this decade is, however, so politically charged and so important that analysts and forecasters can ill afford to ignore it. One suspects that Western policy-makers are increasingly going to have to focus their attention upon the fate of the 25.3 million ethnic Russians living in that part of the former Soviet Union now called the “Near Abroad” (blizhnee zarubezh'e).
29
Kiryukhin, Denys. "Russia’s Policy towards Donbas Since 2014: The Nation-Building Process and Its Ideology". Russian Politics 8, n. 2 (21 giugno 2023): 147–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00802003.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Abstract This study examines the ideology of the nation-building process in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The key features of this process are uncovered through a discourse analysis of school textbooks published in the People’s Republics and in Transnistria, and of the ‘Russian Donbas’ ideology. This is compared to the history and interpretations of the concept of ‘Novorossiya’. This research demonstrates the difference between Donbas and other the post-Soviet contested states, and highlights the role of the Russian government and Russian radical right-wing intellectuals in the formation of the ‘Russian Donbas’ ideology. It concludes that, although Russia had a decisive influence on the development of the conflict in Donbas, Donbas also affected the ideological transformation of Putin’s Russia.
30
Fierman, W. "A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF LANGUAGE ECOLOGY AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA". Al-Farabi 76, n. 4 (15 dicembre 2021): 114–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.48010/2021.4/1999-5911.09.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In the late Soviet era, the domains of use of languages were largely a function of ethnic groups’ status in the Soviet administrative hierarchy. Russian was at the top; below it were the eponymous languages of the non-Russian 14 “Union Republics;” all other languages were used in relatively narrow sets of domains. The “Union Republic languages” included five in Central Asia-- Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek. These languages’ use in fewer domains than most other Union Republic languages profoundly affected their expansion into new domains after 1991. Two other factors affecting this primarily rooted in the Soviet era were the ethnic composition of the republics upon the USSR’s collapse and their populations’ language repertoires. In addition to these “Soviet heritage factors,” language policy and ecology have also been shaped by each country’s nation building project, its international orientation, the nature of its political system, and its economic resources. Russian today remains more widely used in high prestige domains in Central Asia than in all other former Soviet republics except Belarus. However, Russian is less used in a wide variety of domains in Central Asia than it is in “autonomous” units of the former RSFSR.
31
Arslanov, Rafael A., e Elizaveta D. Trifonova. "Russian-Central Asian Relations in the Works of Modern French Researchers". RUDN Journal of Russian History 19, n. 4 (15 dicembre 2020): 979–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-8674-2020-19-4-979-995.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article examines the views of modern French researchers on the relations between Russia and the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. This allows us to identify various interpretations of Russian foreign policy, and to understand the main approaches of French scholars analyzing the goals and tasks of Russian geostrategy in the region. As the article demonstrates, French historiography, along with the objectivist view on the Central Asian vector in Russian foreign policy, also includes works of ideological nature. Special emphasis is put on French works that focus on Russian political authors who speak of Russias neo-imperialism. These studies explain the Russian policy in Central Asia through the ruling elites ambition to resurrect an empire in the post-Soviet space and to return superpower status to Russia. Of special interest is the position of authors who try to explain the Russian attitude to the Central Asian region as, on the one hand, an expression of nostalgic feelings harbored by a great part of the population about the nations former greatness, assuming that these feelings have an impact on the leaderships policies, and on the other hand, as the Russian leaderships attempt to use Russias active return to the international arena for the consolidation and self-identification of society. It is observed that some French authors speak of a New Great Game. This very popular concept considers the actions of Russia and other powers operating in the region (USA and China) as a continuation of the historical rivalry between the Russian and British empires in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Russian authors have always been interested in French historiography; this is due to the latters scientific prestige and objectivity, and in particular its application of methodologies that further develop the tradition of the Annales School. At the same time, the growing French scholarship on the issue of Russia and post-Soviet Central Asian republics has not yet been subject to close and complex consideration, which defines the novelty of the article.
32
Shkel, Stanislav. "Bastions of Tradition: The Ethnic Factor and Political Machines in Russian Regions". Russian Politics 4, n. 1 (27 febbraio 2019): 76–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401004.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The regional machines created by the Russian governors in the mid-1990s turned out to be most effective in the ethnic republics. This phenomenon is supported by several facts, with the primary as follows: the density of the patronage networks among the rural ethnic minorities, and the economic heritage of the Soviet period and ethnical institutionalization. These factors allowed regional elites to integrate ethnic minorities into the clientelism structure to distribute symbolic and material benefits in exchange for their electoral support. However, at present, the federal authorities have considerably reduced the autonomy of the ethnic republics and deprived them of many ethnic preferences. Basing on the analysis of the electoral statistics from the Russian Presidential Election of 2018, this article researches the political consequences caused by the changed relationship between the center and the regions, as well as the changes in functioning of regional political machines in the circumstances where the governors’ institutional and resource autonomy has been reduced. The data analysis allowed for the discovery of the diversified electoral behavior of ethnic minorities in different republics. The reasons for the above diversification have been explained based on a comparative analysis of five case studies (the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Tatarstan, the Komi Republic, the Chuvash Republic, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)).
33
Lityński, Adam. "Armenii droga do leninowsko-kemalowskiego rozbioru (1917–1921)". Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne 70, n. 1 (12 ottobre 2018): 67–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/cph.2018.1.2.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
After the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, the former nations of the Russian Empire searched for the possibility of forming their own independent countries. The situation was the same with three nations of Transcaucasia, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. After the separatist Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (signed on the 3rd of March 1918), Bolshevik Russia in practice gave away the Transcaucasia region to Germany and Turkey. Especially Turkey assumed an aggressive and annexationist stance at the time. And it was the Armenians who mainly put up the resistance. Armenia, together with Azerbaijan and Georgia, first created the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. However, the state was short-lived and it soon collapsed due to different approaches to preserving independence by the three countries. Azerbaijan tried to unite with Turkey, Georgia with Germany,while Armenia counted on the White movement Russians (led by General Denikin). Each of the three countries formed separate independent republics and one of them was the First Republic of Armenia. Germany and Turkey lost the First World War soon after but Caucasia was first attacked from the north by the White General Anton Denikin, who was supported by England and France. And later (in 1920) the country was invaded by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks, thanks to the military might of the Red Army, overthrew the independent governments of those republics one by one. Subsequently, they introduced their own governments and annexed the countries into the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The RSFSR signed the Treaty of Brotherhood with Turkey on the 16th of March 1921, which was mainly directed against Great Britain and France. In order to realize this alliance, Russia and Turkey divided between themselves the Armenianlands.
34
Smith, Jeremy. "The Battle for Language: Opposition to Khrushchev's Education Reform in the Soviet Republics, 1958–59". Slavic Review 76, n. 4 (2017): 983–1002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.273.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Nikita Khrushchev's proposal to give parents of non-Russian children the choice of whether to send their children to a school with education in their own tongue, or to a Russian school, was first advanced at the end of 1958. It immediately provoked a furious response from leaders of the non-Russian republics of the multi-national Soviet Union, and was an issue contributing to political purges in Azerbaijan and Latvia in 1959. In this article, Jeremy Smith uses documents from archives in four Soviet republics to analyze the responses from the republics. Smith shows that republic leaders were mostly agreed on an alternative solution to the question of language of instruction, and pursued different strategies both to oppose the introduction of the reform and to obstruct its implementation once it was passed. The episode also underlines the uncertainty involved in center-periphery relations in the USSR.
35
Erokhina, Elena A. "DISPROPORTIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS OF RUSSIA IN THE ASSESSMENTS OF RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGISTS: THE ETHNOSOCIAL ASPECT (USING THE EXAMPLE OF ASIAN RUSSIA)". Society and Security Insights 6, n. 4 (28 dicembre 2023): 13–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.14258/ssi(2023)4-01.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article is devoted to the problem of disproportion in the regional development of the national republics of Asian Russia: the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Buryatia, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the Republic of Tyva, the Republic of Khakassia. The problems of demographic development of regions (decrease in average life expectancy and the share of the population, including Russian, “Western” migration trend), quality of life (decrease in income and employment), development of industry and agriculture are considered. The empirical basis of the study was a comparative analysis of indicators of average life expectancy at birth, average per capita income, employment and unemployment levels based on Rosstat data. The results of research by Russian sociologists studying these regions were used as secondary sources of information. A serious lag in the quality of life of the national regions of the Siberian and Far Eastern districts from the Russian average has been revealed. The conclusion is made about the need to overcome the view of Asian Russia as an exclusively resource storehouse.
36
Zinoviev, Vasily P. "A chronicle of state associations on the territory of Russia during the Revolution and the Civil War (1917-1922)". Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, n. 482 (2023): 104–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/15617793/482/11.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article analyzes the collapsing of the Russian Empire and the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The process is presented as a chronicle of the creation and liquidation of state formations from 28 February 1917 to 30 December 1922 on the territory of the country, including Poland, Finland and the territories of Turkey and Austria, where Russian troops were stationed. The chronicle records the formation of 150 different authorities that claimed to be all-Russian or regional power, organized by Russian political forces or interventionist troops. The chronicle is based on information from encyclopedias and reference books. Statistics on the creation of organizations show that state construction was most intensive in 1917 (24 new formations were created), 1918 (60), and 1918 (22). During this three-year period, Anti-Bolshevik forces were more active than others and formed 50 governments, interventionists formed 17 governments, the Soviet authorities established 31 states. Some governments claimed the all-Russian status -- the Omsk government of Alexander Kolchak, the Special Meeting of Anton Denikin, the Government of the South of Russia of Pyotr Wrangel. The governments of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Finland, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Khiva and Bukhara had nationwide claims. Most of the governments were regional and opportunistic, formed by local political and military circles, which were supported by the Whites, the Reds, or the interventionists. In 1920-1922, anti-Soviet forces were able to organize 4 governments, the interventionists 1, the construction of Soviet state structures was confidently underway = 32 states of different levels and 3 democratic state structures were created in the Far East under the control of the Bolsheviks. The result of state construction on 30 December 1922 recorded 7 sovereign states (USSR, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Tannu-Tuva People's Republic) and two governments without territory - the Belarusian People's Republic and the Karelian United government in Vyborg. The Soviet Union was a unique, extremely complex state entity: it included 4 union republics - the RSFSR, the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, the Belarusian SSR. The Transcaucasian SFSR consisted of the Azerbaijani SSR, the Armenian SSR and the union of the Georgian SSR and the Abkhaz SSR. In addition, formally, the Soviet Union did not include two People's Soviet republics - Bukhara and Khorezm, with which the RSFSR had union treaties. The USSR included 2 labor communes, 8 autonomous republics and 12 autonomous regions. The basis of Soviet state-building was the principle of national self-determination. The Soviet experience of assembling a single state is now in demand again due to the growth of nationalism on the territory of the former USSR and the desire of Russia's geopolitical opponents to use it to destroy the country and seize its resources.
37
Yemelianova, Galina M. "Islam and Nation Building in Tatarstan and Dagestan of the Russian Federation". Nationalities Papers 27, n. 4 (dicembre 1999): 605–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/009059999108858.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This article is based on the preliminary results of a project on “Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Soviet Tatarstan and Dagestan,” which began in March 1997 and ended in September 1999. These two out of Russia's 21 autonomous republics were chosen for comparative research because, although they are both Muslim, there are obvious geographical, ethnic, cultural, and political differences between them. Each republic also represents a distinctive model of the evolution of Muslim society and its relations with Russian culture in general and with the Russian political center in particular.
38
Zaynitdinov, N. A. "Indication of Nationality in the Passport of a Citizen of the Russian Federation as a Form of Implementation of the Right to Nationality". Actual Problems of Russian Law 15, n. 1 (20 febbraio 2020): 46–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1994-1471.2020.110.1.046-053.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Constitutionalists in Russia have disagreed on the possibility of specifying nationality of a citizen in the passport. It is believed that at present the indication of nationality in the passport is not made, but it turns out that this is not the case. Implicit declaration of nationality with the help of a special insert is possible for citizens living in the republics and for native speakers of non-Russian state languages of republics. This state of affairs creates inequality for residents of different types of constituent entities of the Russian Federation and for citizens of different nationalities. Nationality of Russians as a national majority is not expressed in the Russian Federation through the statehood itself and through the institution of citizenship as it is done in foreign countries where nationality is not indicated in the passport. The author substantiates an erroneous stance of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on inadmissibility of specifying nationality of a citizen in his or her passport. It is concluded that it is desirable to restore indication of nationality in the passport for all citizens with the aim of the fullest implementation of the right to nationality in the context of the Russian Federation.
39
Berrios Callejas, Sonia A. "Perception of Emotions and Cultural Distance Among International Students in Russia". DEMIS. Demographic research 1, n. 2 (2021): 194–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.19181/demis.2021.1.2.15.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The accurate perception of culture-specific emotions of the people living in the host country, may be the most significant, and yet the most underestimated challenge for the international students in the process of adjusting to a new culture. The latest report of the Institute of International Education (IIE) about Russia, confirmed that, in the year 2020, around 353,000 international students are currently studying in the Russian Federation. The studies of van de Vijver in 2007 and 2009 have confirmed that the foreign students from former Soviet republics or former USSR countries (students from post-soviet states, not including Russia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) have lower degrees of perceived cultural distance with Russian culture, this can be explained by the fact that the students from former Soviet republics can speak Russian language fluently, and share religion and traditions with Russian culture. Consequently, the group of students from former USSR countries adapt better to Russia in comparation to the rest of international students. The results of our study in 2020, revealed that the perception of Russian culture-specific emotions among international students studying in the Russian Federation, is significantly predicted by the similarity between the culture of the international students living in Russia and the culture of Russian society. Moreover, our study confirmed that the group of students from former Soviet republics, or former USSR countries, perceived more similarities with Russian national culture; therefore, this result is consistent with the findings of the aforementioned studies of van de Vijver in 2007 and 2009. Thus, we can consider that the accurate recognition of Russian culture-specific emotions and the perceived similarities to Russian cultural standards, may be very significant for the international students studying in the Russian Federation, especially for their process of adjusting to Russian culture. Nevertheless, further research on this topic is needed.
40
Marabyan, K. P. "Contemporary Russia Policy for the Southern Caucasus". MGIMO Review of International Relations, n. 4(37) (28 agosto 2014): 92–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-4-37-92-100.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The bilateral relations between Russia on the one hand, and the countries of the Southern Caucasus region on the other hand are examined in the article. The main directions of Russian policy in the Southern Caucasus region are examined there. The article focusses attention to the value of the Southern Caucasus region for Russia and also to the key role of Russia in the Southern Caucasus region. The overview of Russian-Azerbaijani, Russian-Armenian and Russian- Georgian relations is given in the article. Russian relations with unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and with partially recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia are examined in the context of above-mentioned bilateral relations. The Caucasian direction of Russian foreign policy is of great importance in questions of ensuring Russian national security. The Caucasian crisis of2008 showed potential conflictness of the region and safety hazard of Russia. Now other processes proceed already in the region. Armenian intention to join the Customs union, the change of Georgian leadership and signing of the agreement on association with EU by Georgia start new mechanisms of interaction between the region countries on the one hand and Russia on the other hand. The relation format between region republics can be changed. The main purpose of the article is to show Russian role in questions of the South Caucasus regional security. The region has the conflict territories, from which the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the Abkhazian Republic and the South Ossetia Republic are distinguished especially. And Russia won't be able to keep aloof in case of escalation of the conflicts around above-mentioned subjects. The vital questions for the region are peace and stability. And Russia plays a key role in these questions.
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Penter, Tanja, e Ivan Sablin. "Soviet federalism from below: The Soviet Republics of Odessa and the Russian Far East, 1917–1918". Journal of Eurasian Studies 11, n. 1 (gennaio 2020): 40–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1879366520901922.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In early 1918, the Bolshevik-dominated Third Congress of Soviets declared the formation of a new composite polity—the Soviet Russian Republic. The congress’s resolutions, however, simultaneously proclaimed a federation of national republics and a federation of soviets. The latter seemed to recognize regionalism and localism as organizing principles on par with nationalism and to legitimize the self-proclaimed Soviet republics across the former Russian Empire. The current article compared two such non-national Soviet republics, those in Odessa and the Russian Far East. The two republics had similar roots in the discourses and practices of the Russian Empire, such as economic and de facto administrative autonomy. They also took similar organizational forms, were run by coalitions, and opposed their own inclusion into larger national and regional formations in Ukraine and Siberia. At the same time, both of the Soviet governments functioned as ad hoc committees and adapted their institutional designs and practices to the concrete—and very different—social and international conditions in the two peripheries. The focus of the Odessa and Far Eastern authorities on specific problems and their embeddedness in the peculiar contexts reflected the very idea of federalism as governance based on decentralization and nuance but contradicted the party-based centralization and the exclusivity of the ethno-national federalism in the consolidated Soviet state.
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Milaeva, Oksana V. "Features of electoral models in the national republics of the Siberian Federal district (2007–2019)". LOCUS people society cultures meaning 11, n. 3 (2020): 100–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.31862/2500-2988-2020-11-3-100-119.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The purpose of the article is to describe electoral models in the national republics of the Siberian Federal District of the Russian Federation. The elections of the federal, regional and local levels in the republics of Tyva, Altai, Khakassia (2007–2019) are analyzed. The study is based on statistical and comparative analysis methods for three groups of indicators: 1) statistics on voter turnout and the level of support for the «United Russia» party; 2) socio-economic indicators of regional development; 3) ethnic localization of the population and the level of urbanization. The sources of research are official statistics, electoral statistics of republican election commissions. The results of the analysis allow us to identify the characteristics and differences in the electoral models of the republics based on the analyzed indicators. The Republic of Tyva represents the most conservative clientist political model with signs of institutionalization. The pattern of traditionalist electoral behavior of ethnically localized and low-urbanized communities with a high density of social ties and personal contacts, administratively controlled due to financial dependence on the Central budget and subsidies, is constantly reproduced. The Altai Republic is a less conservative model associated with the demonstrated electoral absenteeism of the majority ofthe voters. The active part of the electorate has a tendency to transform electoral patterns over the course of two cycles. The electoral patterns of the Republic of Khakassia demonstrate a non-conformist electoral pattern of the active electorate, which is due to the lower dependence of the population on budget transfers and social payments, and a higher level of income than in other republics under consideration. It should be noted that the level of support for the ruling party has gradually decreased, even with the most administrated and clientist voting patterns, and that absentee electoral behavior patterns have been transformed into a more active political position expressed through protest voting.
43
Lutskyi, Roman, e Oleksandra Push. "The existence of Putin's Russia is a Threat to International Law and Order (on the example of aggressive actions in Ukraine)". Kwartalnik Prawa Międzynarodowego I, n. I (30 settembre 2022): 43–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0015.9873.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article analyzes the causes, preconditions, geopolitical and geohistorical goals of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The reaction of the West to the Russian geostrategy of revenge has been clarified. It has been proven that the hybrid war which has been going on since February 2014 has created a deep crisis in the global security system. The Russian Federation, having violated the norms and principles of international law, bilateral and large-scale agreements, annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. Russia attacked Ukraine without declaring war and again called into question the international order in Europe on February 24, 2022, when the Russian leader announced the launch of a "special military operation" against Ukraine. He called its goal the "demilitarization" of the country. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began shelling the cities of Ukraine and its military and civilian infrastructure. The recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics by Russian President Vladimir Putin preceded this madness on February 21, 2022. However, the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation has deep historical roots. The absorption of Ukraine and its human resources is one of the key tasks in the development of the project of Russian imperialism. The current process of formation and development of Putin's Russia has always been accompanied by war with Ukraine. Russia aimed to destroy our young state. The history of relations between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples is a chronicle of wars, the liberation struggles of Ukrainians, and a consistent policy of Russification and assimilation of our people.
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Stetsenko, Vladimir. "Population Dynamics and Settlement Transformation of Russians in the Russian Federation in 1990–2010". DEMIS. Demographic Research 3, n. 3 (30 settembre 2023): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.19181/demis.2023.3.3.10.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This article compares national census data of 1989, 2002, and 2010 to offer a quantitative description of the distribution dynamics of the Russian people in 1989–2010 based on a classification of Russian regions by the share of Russians in their population and using the Eckel index. Research has found that in regions of the Russian Federation where Russians constitute the absolute or the relative majority, despite the ongoing process of depopulation of Russians, censuses indicate no decline in the share of Russians in the population. The article analyzes the reasons behind this fact. Having contrasted the magnitude of changes in the size of the population of Russians and other peoples of the region in the period concerned, the author concludes specific demographic factors, such as natural Russian population growth/decline as well as migration or assimilation processes, to prevail in the respective region. The author identifies the key regions that were the origin or the destination of migration of Russians in the period under consideration and examines the reasons for such migration. It is found that Russians migrated to such regions as Belgorod Oblast, Moscow, Kaliningrad Oblast, Krasnodarsky Krai, Tyumen Oblast. Among regions that saw a considerable migration outflow of Russians are several republics of the North Caucasus, the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Tuva, Koryak Okrug, as well as some regions of the Russian Arctic. A special focus is given to a trend that has been present in recent censuses, namely, the growing number of people who “did not specify their ethnicity”. If that trend persists, it will evidently lead to a distortion of the overall picture of the ethnic composition of Russia and its regions.
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Poberezhnaya, I. A. "Issues of publishing regulatory legal acts in state languages of republics within the Russian Federation". Izvestiya MGTU MAMI 8, n. 4-5 (20 ottobre 2014): 146–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/2074-0530-67456.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article is devoted to the procedure of publishing regulatory legal acts in state languages of republics within the Russian Federation. The matters are relevant for development of the Russian legislation. The article investigates in detail the regulatory legal acts in the sphere of law-making of the republics being the part of the Russian Federation, the analysis is carried out. The problems of legal regulation of procedure of publishing regulatory legal acts in state languages of republics within the Russian Federation are revealed.
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Anichkin, E. S., I. Yu Mankovskiy e Yu I. Kolpakova. "Formation and development of the highest state authorities of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic from self-declaration to admission to the Russian Federation". Law Enforcement Review 7, n. 3 (26 settembre 2023): 45–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.52468/2542-1514.2023.7(3).45-54.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The subject of this study is a scientific understanding of the formation and development of the supreme state authorities of the People's Republics of Donbass (DPR, LPR) as unrecognized states from the time of their self-declaration in 2014 to their admission to the Russian Federation in 2022.The purpose of the study is to identify the main features, stages of formation and development of institutions of supreme state power (the head of state, parliament, government and courts) in the republics of Donbass in the period from 2014 to 2022.The methodological basis of the research was a wide range of general and special methods of scientific cognition. Dialectical, analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction were used as general scientific methods. Comparative-legal, system-structural and formal-legal methods were used as special methods. General scientific methods, especially dialectical ones, allowed us to study the factors and the process of evolution of the constitutional status of the supreme state authorities of the DPR and LPR in the conditions of military confrontation with the mother state and political rapprochement with Russia. Using the comparative legal method, a comparative analysis of the status of the highest state authorities of the DPR, LPR and the Russian Federation was carried out. The system-structural method was used in the study of intra-system changes in the constitutional status of the studied authorities. With the help of the formal legal method, a study of normative legal sources was conducted, which made it possible to form the logic of the presentation of the material and the conceptual apparatus of the declared topic.The procedure for the formation and activities of the state authorities of the DPR and LPR are regulated by an array of legal acts, the norms of which reflect both the identity of the power institutions of the republics of Donbass and the tendency to the reception of constitutional and legal institutions existing in Russia. This allows us to state with confidence the presence of a number of features in the process of evolution of the highest state authorities of the republics of Donbass, which reflect the focus on integration with a more developed state system of Russia, the formation in a short historical time, the proximity of the mechanism of organization and content of the competence of the highest state authorities of the two republics, caused, including their formation in the conditions of the special the legal regime of martial law.The results of the study can be useful at the present stage of integration of new subjects of the Russian Federation into the legal system of the Russian Federation and into the system of its state authorities.The conclusion is reasoned that the transformation of the institutions of the supreme power of the republics of Donbass has passed two stages and is currently in the third. The first stage is characterized by the formation of its own republican system of supreme state authorities (2014-2018). The second stage is characterized by further improvement and transformation of the status of the supreme state authorities of the republics against the background of increased Russian legal influence (November 2018-2022). The third stage is explained by the adoption of the DPR and the LPR into our state in September 2022 and the beginning of systematic work to change legislation regarding the creation of higher state authorities of new subjects of Russia.
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Borgoiakova, Tamara G., Aurika V. Guseinova e Karina A. Pokoiakova. "Languages of Minority Ethnic Groups of Southern Siberia: Status-Discursive Representation in the Socio-Cultural Context". Polylinguality and Transcultural Practices 19, n. 3 (30 settembre 2022): 439–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2618-897x-2022-19-3-439-452.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the status-discursive representation of the indigenous languages on the example of the Republics of Southern Siberia with the involvement of empirical sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic material. The presence of zones of social consensus in the conditions of the trilingual communicative space of the republics, which is organized according to a single model “two state languages (Russian and titular) + language/languages of the respective indigenous ethnic groups”, is revealed. They are due to the common legal support of indigenous nations and their languages in the international and Russian official discourse, as well as the positive perception of minority ethnic groups in associative portrayal by speakers of the respective republican state languages. The prospects for minimizing the exclusion zones of contacting peoples refer to the inclusion of measures of more active support of the indigenous idioms in the relevant legal acts of the republican level. Certain zones of problematizing of socio-cultural mutual understanding in the Altai Republic are associated with a higher level of adherence of the Chelkans to their native idiom compared to loyalty to the second state language of their republic (Altai), which may be due to the actualization of their need for a correlation of ethnic and linguistic status, which is absent among Shors and Tuvan Todzhans.
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Manakov, Andrei. "Russian language knowledge by the titular peoples of the republics of Russia and Neighboring countries". Pskov Journal of Regional Studies 17, n. 3 (2021): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.37490/s221979310015994-6.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Language policy in Russia and neighboring countries should be carried out taking into account the ethno-demographic processes taking place in the post-Soviet space. The purpose of the article is to assess the level of Russian language proficiency by the titular peoples of the republics of the Russian Federation and the neighboring countries in the dynamics since 1989. Scientific novelty is associated with a unified view of the indicated processes within the entire post-Soviet space. The study was based on the population censuses results, the results of sociological surveys, and expert assessments. The difficulty of comparative analysis of the population censuses results of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods in Russia and other countries of the post-Soviet space is associated with different formulations of the question of Russian language proficiency. According to the population censuses results in the countries of the near abroad, only in three of them the level of the Russian language proficiency of the titular peoples has increased. Russian is the official language of the Republic of Belarus, where Russian has been the official language since 1995, as well as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where Russian is the official language. The author revealed the relationship between the degree of Russian language proficiency of the titular peoples of the neighboring countries and the specific weight of the Russian-speaking population living in them. For this reason, a sharp decrease in the Russian-speaking population in the neighboring countries can be considered as a factor inhibiting integration processes in the post-Soviet space.
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Shkel, Stanislav N. "Who is to Blame? Centralization and Titular Ethnic Groups’ Electoral Behavior in the Russian Republics". Ars Administrandi (Искусство управления) 14, n. 3 (2022): 422–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2218-9173-2022-3-422-453.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Introduction: the electoral behavior of voters in many Russian republics is characterized by higher support for incumbents. However, recently some of them have witnessed a decrease in electoral support for the Russian president from representatives of the titular ethnic groups. Objectives: to find the answer to the following research question: why do representatives of the titular ethnic groups reduce electoral support for the Russian president in some ethnic republics, while this does not happen in other republics? Methods: the study uses qualitative data collected by focus groups in four Russian republics: Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Chuvashia, and Komi. Results: the analysis of the data made it possible to identify the main factors that determine the change in the electoral behavior of titular ethnic groups’ representatives. The results of the study suggest that a decrease in the electoral support for the Russian president among the titular ethnic groups occurs only if they consider both levels of government – federal and regional – to blame for the infringement of their ethno-cultural rights. This, in turn, stems from two factors: (1) the fragmented structure of regional elites and (2) the choice of a loyalty strategy by the head of the region in response to pressure from the center. Conclusions: the latest reforms in ethno-linguistic policy in Russia did not remain unnoticed and influenced the electoral processes in a number of ethnic republics. In some of them, the titular ethnic groups significantly reduced the electoral support of the Russian government and ceased to be a significant link in the mechanics of political machines. In others, their electoral behavior remains stable. This allows us to conclude that the structure of the current the Russian president electoral majority is undergoing changes. Moreover, although these changes are not tectonic and are rather local in nature, ignoring them may lead to the fact that researchers and experts in the future may not notice the onset of more fundamental changes.
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Bdoyan, David, e Sergei Suslin. "The future of Russian federalism in the context of relations between Russia and partially recognized and unrecognized states of the post-Soviet space". Национальная безопасность / nota bene, n. 2 (febbraio 2023): 55–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0668.2023.2.40397.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The object of the study is the future of Russian federalism in the context of the possible inclusion of new subjects into the Russian Federation. The subject of this research is the probability of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Republic of Abkhazia, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic becoming parts of Russia. The analysis is carried out through examining the history of the formation of the objects of research, their relationship with Russia and the comments of public administration officials on the prospects of these relationships. This research is relevant because of global transformation processes brought about by Russia’s special military operation. The scientific novelty of the work is proved by the absence of a comprehensive analysis of potential integration processes between the Russian Federation and the members of the partially recognized and unrecognized states of the post-Soviet space, caused by the aggravation of the international political situation. Based on the results of the analysis, different approaches to potential integration processes have been developed, among them are: Republics becoming a part of the Russian Federation following a referendum, the creation of a supranational entity or inclusion of the aforementioned state entities into an existing one. Following the executed analysis, the authors came to the conclusion that currently the most optimal form of unification, taking Russian interests and the foreign policy situation into account, is the entry of some of these states into a joint supranational entity with Russia, following the example of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.