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Articoli di riviste sul tema "Prisoners dilemma"

Autore: Grafiati

Pubblicato: 4 giugno 2021

Ultima modifica: 27 aprile 2022

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1

Gilbert, Daniel R. "The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Prisoners of the Prisoner's Dilemma". Business Ethics Quarterly 6, n. 2 (aprile 1996): 165–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857621.

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AbstractThe Prisoner's Dilemma is a popular device used by researchers to analyze such institutions as business and the modern corporation. This popularity is not deserved under a certain condition that is widespread in college education. If we, as management educators, take seriously our parts in preparing our students to participate in the institutions of a democratic society, then the Prisoner's Dilemma—as clever a rhetorical device as it is—is an unacceptable means to that end. By posing certain questions about the prisoners in the Prisoner's Dilemma, I show that management educators have created a Prisoners Dilemma, whereby they intellectually imprison themselves and their students by continuing to appeal to the Prisoner's Dilemma. These questions are not encouraged by the advocates of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

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2

Gendin, Sidney. "Prisoners' dilemma for prisoners". Criminal Justice Ethics 8, n. 1 (gennaio 1989): 23–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0731129x.1988.9991848.

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3

Marren, Patrick. "Prisoners' dilemma". Journal of Business Strategy 32, n. 3 (3 maggio 2011): 50–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02756661111122009.

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4

Maier, Katharina H., e Rosemary Ricciardelli. "The prisoner’s dilemma: How male prisoners experience and respond to penal threat while incarcerated". Punishment & Society 21, n. 2 (13 febbraio 2018): 231–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1462474518757091.

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Drawing on interview data with 56 former prisoners in Canada, we examine how male prisoners understand, experience, and respond to threat while incarcerated. We show that prisoners face a variety of different and often competing threats, resulting from prisoner interactions (e.g. threat of physical violence for being a “snitch”) on the one side, and institutional powers and procedures on the other side (e.g. threat of delayed release from prison). These threats are competing insofar as countering a prisoner threat opens the door to threat on the institutional level (i.e. administrative uncertainties) and vice versa. As a consequence, we show how feeling threatened for prisoners becomes paramount and in many cases unavoidable as the different threats in prison are difficult, if not impossible, to handle in unison. However, in an effort to stay physically safe and work toward their release, prisoners must find viable strategies to navigate different prison environments, particularly as they move between prisons of differing security classifications. We draw on Giddens' notion of “ontological insecurity” to draw attention to prisoners' feelings of perpetual vulnerability and insecurity. In addition, we build on Luhmann's conceptualization of risk and danger to explain how male prisoners experience and respond to moments of “danger” when they are faced with competing threats and must decide how to best navigate them.

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5

Daniel, G., M. Arce e Todd Sandler. "The Dilemma of the Prisoners' Dilemmas". Kyklos 58, n. 1 (febbraio 2005): 3–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2005.00275.x.

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6

Stephens, Glenn. "The Prisoners' Dilemma". Rationality and Society 6, n. 4 (ottobre 1994): 520–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463194006004006.

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7

Blonski, Matthias, e Giancarlo Spagnolo. "Prisoners’ other Dilemma". International Journal of Game Theory 44, n. 1 (30 marzo 2014): 61–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0419-9.

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8

Friedman, Daniel, e Ryan Oprea. "A Continuous Dilemma". American Economic Review 102, n. 1 (1 febbraio 2012): 337–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.337.

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We study prisoners' dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90 percent. Control sessions with repeated matchings over eight subperiods achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases, and, with one-second subperiods, they approach continuous levels. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner's dilemma. (JEL C72, C78, C91)

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9

Lu, Gong Shu, Cun Bin Li e Xian Li. "New Nash Equilibrium Based on Generic Risk Element Transmission Theory". Advanced Materials Research 424-425 (gennaio 2012): 410–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.424-425.410.

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Nash equilibrium is the foundation of traditional game theory, while the benefits of game players under the Nash equilibrium are constant, so the core idea of generic risk transmission was applied to traditional static game. Accordingly a risk static game model, in which the benefits of players were subject to triangular distribution, was constructed. Then we obtained different equilibrium states under the different risk types of players. Furthermore, the classic Prisoners’ Dilemma was used to demonstrate the practice value of risk game. Through analyzing and solving the risk Prisoners’ Dilemma model which changed from the classic Prisoner's Dilemma model according to actual situation, the Pareto improvement strategy combination could be achieved. The new equilibrium result can give an appropriate explanation why there is always some prisoners conceal the corpus delicti in adventure

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10

Sumner, Jennifer, e Lori Sexton. "Same Difference: The “Dilemma of Difference” and the Incarceration of Transgender Prisoners". Law & Social Inquiry 41, n. 03 (2016): 616–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12193.

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This article examines the “dilemma of difference” transgender prisoners pose and face within a sex-segregated prison system organized around the pursuit of safety and security. Our analysis uses data from a study of the culture and experiences of transgender prisoners in four men's prisons. Using qualitative data from interviews with transgender prisoners, focus groups with prisoners, and focus groups with staff, our findings reveal a common contention that transgender prisoners are (according to staff) and should be (according to prisoners) treated like everyone else, despite their unique situations. This further demonstrates the stakes that this dilemma carries for the prison regime and transgender prisoners' roles in challenging it without engaging in overt resistance—which carries high stakes for them. Accordingly, we elucidate how the rigidity of an institutional structure built on inherent contradictions can have the potential to complicate the achievement of institutional goals.

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11

Gowda, M. V. Rajeev. "Teaching the prisoners' dilemma". Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 15, n. 4 (settembre 1996): 646–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1520-6688(199623)15:4<646::aid-pam8>3.0.co;2-h.

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12

Nowak, Martin A. "Prisoners of the dilemma". Nature 427, n. 6974 (febbraio 2004): 491. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/427491a.

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13

Grossman, Peter Z. "The Dilemma of Prisoners". Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, n. 1 (marzo 1994): 43–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002794038001003.

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14

Ockenfels, Peter. "Cooperation in prisoners' dilemma". European Journal of Political Economy 9, n. 4 (novembre 1993): 567–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(93)90041-r.

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15

Khadjavi, Menusch, e Andreas Lange. "Prisoners and their dilemma". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 92 (agosto 2013): 163–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.015.

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16

Maroni, Maroni, e Nenny Dwi Ariani. "Problematic Dilemma of The Limitation of Granting Remission for Corruption Prisoners". FIAT JUSTISIA:Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 12, n. 2 (30 luglio 2018): 95. http://dx.doi.org/10.25041/fiatjustisia.v12no2.939.

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Corruption is an extraordinary crime, so the law enforcement for corruption cases must also be done extraordinarily. Therefore, the corruption prisoners or corruptors should be differentiated by their pattern of guidance in Penitentiary. The difference in the process of fostering in Penitentiary is in the form of limitation of granting remission for corruptors. The existence of such restrictive policy poses a problem dilemma to the guidance of current corruption prisoners based on Penitentiary System. This is because the penitentiary system essentially sees the crime of "deprivation of liberty" against a person is only "temporary" so that there is a reduction in criminal or remission for every prisoner. The problem is how to overcome the dilemma of granting remission for corruptors in the perspective of the correctional system. The research method is normative juridical with the regulation of law and doctrinal approach. The result of this research is to overcome the dilemma of granting remission for corruptors by revising Government Regulation Number 99 of 2012 on Terms and Procedures Implementation of Rights of Citizens Correctional Penitentiary that distinguishes the requirements for corruption prisoners that cause losses of state in the high or low nominal. For the corruption prisoners that doing corruption in the high nominal to get the special requirement for granting remission should be added in the high profile corruption prisoners are required to accomplish morality education on the nation and homeland patriotism at their expenses. While the lower profile ones are required to following the common standard coaching for general prisoners. Keywords: Remissions, Corruption Prisoners, Corruption, Correctional System

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17

Shah, Syed Arshad Hussain, Syed Akhter Hussain Shah e Mahmood Khalid. "Incompatibility of Laws and Natural Resources: A Case Study of Land Revenue Laws and Their Implications in Federal Areas of Pakistan". Pakistan Development Review 46, n. 4II (1 dicembre 2007): 1105–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v46i4iipp.1105-1117.

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Better rule of law would generate economic growth, which would in turn build constituencies for democratic reforms [Root and May (2006)]. Consider prisoners dilemma, to Law and Economics Scholars, the inevitability of prisoner’s dilemmas arising to block potentially efficient exchanges explains the need for and consequently the adoption of contract law. When the law enforces contracts, it permits the participants in a potential prisoners’ dilemma the option of escaping the dominant strategy equilibrium of non-cooperation, which prevents the achievement of efficient exchanges, by permitting the parties to effectively pre-commit to future cooperative behavior. Mutual pre-commitments can produce the efficient cooperate-cooperate equilibrium. The existence of contract law then tends to foster efficient cooperative behaviour. Institutions are considered to provide the mechanisms by which individuals can resolve social dilemmas [Steins (1999)]. They are sets of rules that people have created in order to control/regulate the behavior of people using a natural resource. Several layers of institutions are important for institutional development and economic performance. These layers, from the slowest moving to the fastest moving are: human motivations and social institutions, political institutions, legal institutions and private institutions [Azfar (2006)]. Institutions perform their role to frame rules, procedure and enabling environment for implementation of rules. Rights of individuals are recognised and recognised through institutions as well.

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18

Bar-Gill, Oren, e Omri Ben-Shahar. "The Prisoners' (Plea Bargain) Dilemma". Journal of Legal Analysis 1, n. 2 (2009): 737–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jla/1.2.737.

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19

King, Preston. "Modernity: Prisoners’ dilemma in colour". New Community 18, n. 2 (gennaio 1992): 229–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.1992.9976297.

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20

Ye, Zhongxing, e Jingshu Chen. "Prisoners' Dilemma Supergame on Rectangle Lattice". Open Journal of Applied Sciences 03, n. 01 (2013): 7–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojapps.2013.31b1002.

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21

Tullock, Gordon. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma". Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (1985): 1073. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1882937.

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22

Çetin e Bingol. "Iterated Prisoners Dilemma with limited attention". Condensed Matter Physics 17, n. 3 (settembre 2014): 33001. http://dx.doi.org/10.5488/cmp.17.33001.

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23

Andreoni, J., e H. Varian. "Preplay contracting in the Prisoners' Dilemma". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96, n. 19 (14 settembre 1999): 10933–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.19.10933.

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24

Gregory, Bernadette. "Hunger striking prisoners: the doctors' dilemma". BMJ 331, n. 7521 (13 ottobre 2005): 913.1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.331.7521.913.

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25

Tullock, G. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma". Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, Supplement (1 gennaio 1985): 1073–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/100.supplement.1073.

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26

Lambertini, Luca. "Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games". Journal of Economic Theory 77, n. 1 (novembre 1997): 181–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2328.

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27

White, Mark D. "Kantian Ethics and the Prisoners' Dilemma". Eastern Economic Journal 35, n. 2 (31 marzo 2009): 137–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/eej.2008.20.

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28

Shaw, P. "The tortoise and the prisoners' dilemma". Mind 105, n. 419 (1 luglio 1996): 475–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/105.419.475.

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29

Stewart, Hamish. "The Law of Damages and the Prisoners' Dilemma: A Comment on ‘Pure and Utilitarian Prisoners' Dilemmas’". Economics and Philosophy 13, n. 2 (ottobre 1997): 231–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100004491.

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Kuhn and Moresi (1995) (henceforth, K&M) have proposed a useful taxonomy for classifying prisoners' dilemmas (henceforth, PDs). This comment is concerned with K&M's observation that legal penalties for defection can transform PDs into cooperative games, and their argument that the role of the law may vary depending on how the PD is classified by their taxonomy. The purpose of this note is to support K&M's analysis by demonstrating that the law of damages, as understood by economic analysis, already performs the function that K&M assign to legal penalties for defection.

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30

Gibbons, Robert, e Leaf Van Boven. "Contingent social utility in the prisoners’ dilemma". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 45, n. 1 (maggio 2001): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00170-0.

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31

Bhaskar, V., George J. Mailath e Stephen Morris. "Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma". Review of Economic Dynamics 11, n. 3 (luglio 2008): 515–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2007.10.004.

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32

Harrington, Joseph E. "Cooperation in a one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma". Games and Economic Behavior 8, n. 2 (gennaio 1995): 364–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80006-5.

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33

Sissons Joshi, Mary, Vijay Joshi e Roger Lamb. "The Prisoners' Dilemma and city-centre traffic". Oxford Economic Papers 57, n. 1 (gennaio 2005): 70–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpi006.

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34

Nawaz, Ahmad. "The Strategic Form of Quantum Prisoners' Dilemma". Chinese Physics Letters 30, n. 5 (maggio 2013): 050302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0256-307x/30/5/050302.

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35

Nishihara, Ko. "A resolution of N -person prisoners' dilemma". Economic Theory 10, n. 3 (17 settembre 1997): 531–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050172.

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36

Hurley, S. L. "Newcomb's Problem, Prisoners' Dilemma, and collective action". Synthese 86, n. 2 (febbraio 1991): 173–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00485806.

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37

Robèrt, Karl-Henrik, e Göran Broman. "Prisoners' dilemma misleads business and policy making". Journal of Cleaner Production 140 (gennaio 2017): 10–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.08.069.

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38

van Damme, Eric. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma". Journal of Economic Theory 47, n. 1 (febbraio 1989): 206–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90111-7.

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39

Mulyana, Agus, Aulia Iskandarsyah, Ahmad Gimmy Prathama Siswadi e Wilis Srisayekti. "Social Value Orientation On Corruption Prisoners". MIMBAR : Jurnal Sosial dan Pembangunan 35, n. 1 (24 giugno 2019): 245–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.29313/mimbar.v35i1.4479.

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Abstract (sommario):

Social value orientation is a psychological factor that can influence cooperative behavior. In social values orientation, the prosocial type promotes cooperation while proself type is not. A social dilemma is a situation where to be cooperative or not. Corruption behavior is one of the contexts of social dilemmas. Someone who commits corruption means he/she shows non-cooperative behavior. It is hypothesized that someone who commits corruption is a self-type social values orientation because he/she prioritizes personal interests and is not cooperative. This study aims to explore how social value orientation types on corruption prisoners. Data collection in this study used a questionnaire distributed to participants and interview. The study found that not all corruptors are proself types and focused on personal interest. Individuals of prosocial types who focus on common interests can also commit corruption. Corruption perpetrators believe that anyone who is in their position will commit corruption. There is another psychological aspect that can encourage someone to commit corruption.

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40

Tait Jarboe, Andrew. "The Prisoner Dilemma: Britain, Germany, and the Repatriation of Indian Prisoners of War". Round Table 103, n. 2 (4 marzo 2014): 201–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2014.898501.

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41

Weinrath, Michael, Jillian Carrington e Caroline Tess. "Pretrial Detainees, Sentenced Prisoners, and Treatment Motivation". International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 63, n. 15-16 (22 giugno 2019): 2693–712. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306624x19857665.

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A dilemma for corrections practitioners is treatment for pretrial detainees. They are innocent until proven guilty and are not required to take treatment, but many may benefit from intervention. To assess the general level of treatment interest and potential differences, a sample of 221 male remand and sentenced Canadian provincial prisoners completed several Client Evaluation of Self and Treatment (CEST) scales. Prisoner treatment motivation and its correlates were assessed by examining univariate, bivariate, and multivariate effects for demographic attributes, legal factors, risk, perceptions of personal/family/pressure for treatment, and depression. It was found that about 36% to 40% of study subjects expressed moderate to strong motivation for treatment. Age, pressure, and depression were the only correlates consistently associated with treatment motivation. There were no differences found between remand and sentenced prisoners. Results indicated that pretrial detainees have a definite interest in undertaking programming.

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42

Duca, Stefano, e Heinrich H. Nax. "Groups and scores: the decline of cooperation". Journal of The Royal Society Interface 15, n. 144 (luglio 2018): 20180158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0158.

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Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one's score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain cooperation in two-player prisoner's dilemmas and donation games. However, these prior studies focused on pairwise interactions, with no experiment studying reputation mechanisms in more general group interactions. In this paper, we focus on groups and scores, proposing and testing several scoring rules that could apply to multi-player prisoners' dilemmas played in groups, which we test in a laboratory experiment. Results are unambiguously negative: we observe a steady decline of cooperation for every tested scoring mechanism. All scoring systems suffer from it in much the same way. We conclude that the positive results obtained by scoring in pairwise interactions do not apply to multi-player prisoner's dilemmas, and that alternative mechanisms are needed.

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43

MENESTREL, M. LE. "A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY". International Game Theory Review 08, n. 04 (dicembre 2006): 655–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001168.

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This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners' Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for cooperation. The model characterizes the situations in which cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium. When rational individuals are not solely concerned by the consequences of their behavior but also care for the process by which these consequences are obtained, there is no one single rational solution to a Prisoners' Dilemma. Rational behavior depends on the payoffs at stake and on the procedural utility of individuals. In this manner, this model of procedural utility reflects how ethical considerations, social norms or emotions can transform a game of consequences.

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44

Rusciano, Frank Louis. "The Prisoners' Dilemma as an Extended Arrow Problem". Western Political Quarterly 43, n. 3 (settembre 1990): 495. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/448701.

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45

Kirchkamp, Oliver. "Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners’ dilemma". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 43, n. 2 (ottobre 2000): 239–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00118-9.

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46

Kawai, Hiroki, Takashi Tsuzuki e Itsuki Chiba. "Context effects by simultaneous presentation in prisoners dilemma". Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Japanese Psychological Association 79 (22 settembre 2015): 1EV—090–1EV—090. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/pacjpa.79.0_1ev-090.

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47

Szilagyi, Miklos N. "Quantitative relationships between collective action and prisoners' dilemma". Systems Research and Behavioral Science 17, n. 1 (gennaio 2000): 65–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-1743(200001/02)17:1<65::aid-sres272>3.0.co;2-u.

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48

Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, e Randy T. Simmons. "The layered prisoners' dilemma: Ingroup versus macro-efficiency". Public Choice 65, n. 1 (aprile 1990): 61–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00139291.

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49

Linster, Bruce G. "STOCHASTIC EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA". Economic Inquiry 32, n. 2 (aprile 1994): 342–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1994.tb01334.x.

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Rusciano, F. L. "The Prisoners' Dilemma as an Extended Arrow Problem". Political Research Quarterly 43, n. 3 (1 settembre 1990): 495–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/106591299004300305.

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