Tesi: "Prisoners dilemma"

1

Stevens, Adele. "A paradigm for the study of paranoia in the nonclinical population: prisoners' dilemma game". Thesis, University of London, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.589431.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

A growing body of research shows that paranoia is common in the general population. This thesis reports two studies that examined the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) as a paradigm for evaluation of nonclinical paranoia. The PDG is a well-validated paradigm, used widely in social psychological research but only used in one study to date to examine paranoia. The PDG captures three key qualities that are at the heart of paranoia - it is interpersonal, it concerns threat, and it concerns perception of others' intentions towards the self. The aim of Study 1 was to investigate whether the PDG captures the interpersonal nature of paranoia specifically. Study 1 found that higher state paranoia was significantly associated with selection of the competitive PDG choice in a nonclinical population (n=110). Crucially, state paranoia was only significantly associated with competitive PDG choice when participants believed that they were playing the PDG against another person, and not when playing against a computer, confirming the interpersonal nature of the association. The aim of Study 2 was to investigate if fear, which is " relevant to paranoia, motivated the choice to compete on the PDG in those experiencing elevated levels of paranoia. In Study 2, we used a self-report questionnaire to assess fear and greed, in addition to state paranoia in a nonclinical population (n=149). Higher state paranoia was associated with competition on the PDG based on fear (but not with competition based on greed). It was concluded that the PDG paradigm does capture the essential interpersonal nature of paranoia and is a useful methodology for studying nonclinical paranoia. 3

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

2

Wendelheim, Felix, e Rickard Carls. "Aktörers beteenden på köpcentrummarknaden". Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-172371.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

3

Sampaio, Angelo Augusto Silva. "Metacontingência, dilema do prisioneiro e cooperação: efeitos da interação verbal e da forma de apresentação da consequência cultural". Universidade de São Paulo, 2016. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/47/47132/tde-05082016-152149/.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Em uma metacontingência, respostas de dois ou mais indivíduos interagindo (denominadas um culturante) produzem estímulos (denominados de consequências culturais) capazes de afetar a recorrências daquelas respostas. Resultados de experimentos sobre metacontingência têm sido tratados como demonstrações de um tipo de seleção cultural. Além de sugerir a importância de interações verbais entre participantes, alguns desses experimentos têm empregado tarefas baseadas no dilema do prisioneiro repetido (iterated prisoners dilemma, IPD) interpretando-o, porém, como a programação apenas de contingências operantes. O Experimento 1 avaliou se um IPD com mais de 200 tentativas produziria escolhas cooperativas simultâneas de modo fidedigno e se a interação verbal entre participantes aumentaria a cooperação. 4 quartetos de universitários utilizaram 4 computadores conectados em rede (sem contato visual) e foram expostos a condições com ou sem permissão para usar uma sala de bate-papo pelo computador (chat) em um delineamento de linhas de base múltiplas entre quartetos. Os resultados demonstraram claramente que escolhas cooperativas unânimes podem ocorrer fidedignamente em um IPD e que a interação verbal entre participantes aumenta rapidamente tais escolhas. Esses resultados destacam a semelhança entre estudos sobre IPD e sobre metacontingências, nos quais são programadas consequências para comportamentos inter-relacionados de vários indivíduos. No Experimento 2, uma consequência cultural foi sobreposta às consequências já programadas pelo IPD: os quartetos podiam produzir pontos iguais para todos os participantes (feedback do mercado) contingentes a diferentes números de escolhas cooperativas. Como no Experimento 1, condições nas quais o uso do chat eram ou não permitidos foram arranjadas em um delineamento de linhas de base múltiplas entre quartetos. A interação verbal promoveu rápida e marcadamente a seleção cultural pelo feedback do mercado. Um quarteto apresentou algum controle dos culturantes pelo feedback do mercado antes das interações verbais, mas após o uso do chat a produção das consequências culturais aumentou substancialmente. O Experimento 3 replicou o Experimento 2 apresentando o feedback do mercado da mesma forma que os pontos do IPD, i.e., sem diversos estímulos verbais que sugerem a sua produção pelo quarteto como um todo. A interação verbal promoveu ao menos algum controle das escolhas pelo feedback do mercado em 2 dos 3 quartetos, sugerindo que a forma de apresentação da consequência cultural é irrelevante para os efeitos de uma consequência cultural. Os resultados dos 3 experimentos destacam a importância da interação verbal para a seleção cultural. Além disso, sugerem que um IPD programa uma situação análoga à programada em estudos sobre metacontingência, esclarecendo as diferenças entre os procedimentos empregados no estudo do IPD e de metacontingências e permitindo que avanços em uma área possam ser aproveitados pela outra
In a metacontingency, responses of two or more interacting individuals (a culturant) produce stimuli (called cultural consequences) that affect the recurrence of those responses. Results of metacontingency experiments are said to demonstrate a kind of cultural selection. Besides suggesting the importance of verbal interactions between participants, some of these experiments have used tasks based on the iterated prisoner\'s dilemma (IPD) interpreting it, however, as programming only operant contingencies. Experiment 1 examined whether an IPD with 200-plus trials would produce simultaneous cooperative choices reliably and whether verbal interaction between participants would increase cooperation. 4 quartets of undergraduate and graduate students used 4 networked computers (without visual contact), and were exposed to conditions with or without permission to use the computer chat room in a multiple baseline design between quartets. Results clearly demonstrate that unanimous cooperative choices can occur reliably in an IPD, and that verbal interaction between participants rapidly increases such choices. These results highlight the similarity between IPD and metacontingencies studies, both of which program consequences for inter-related behaviors of many individuals. In Experiment 2, a cultural consequence was superimposed on the consequences already programmed by the IPD: quartets could produce equal points for all participants (market feedback) contingent on different numbers of cooperative choices. As in Experiment 1, we arranged conditions in which chat use were or not allowed in a multiple baseline design between quartets. Verbal interaction quickly and markedly promoted cultural selection by the market feedback. One quartet presented some control of culturants by the market feedback before verbal interactions, but production of cultural consequences increased substantially after using the chat. Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 presenting the market feedback the same way that the IPD points, i.e., without several verbal stimuli that suggest its production by the quartet as a whole. Verbal interaction promoted at least some control of the choices by the market feedback in 2 of the 3 quartets, suggesting that the form of cultural consequence presentation is irrelevant for the effects of a cultural consequence. The results of the three experiments highlight the importance of verbal interaction for cultural selection. Furthermore, they suggest that an IPD program a situation analogous to the one employed in metacontingency studies, clarifying differences between procedures used in the study of IPD and of metacontingencies, and allowing advances in one area be employed by another

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

4

Dabrowski, Peter. "Surplus Cities : An Investigation in Density Externalities and a Consequent New Approach to Urbanism". Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-185743.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

The founding premise of this paper is simple; that urban density has positive externalities and that these are unaccounted for in the developers’ density choice. This paper looks at the incentive structure of individual developers though a theoretical perspective and shows that the density choice is a suboptimal product of a prisoner’s dilemma game. Two mechanisms are proposed to achieve the optimal level of density. The first is an Inverse Density Tax which fixes the incentive structure at the agent level by internalizing the positive externalities of density. The second is the Supply Buffer which solves the regulation problem. The disconnect between what is good for a city and what policies are actually practiced by planners is addressed by suggesting a new approach to urbanism called the Surplus Cities approach which suggests a more positive approach to urbanism instead of the multitude of normative approaches that encompass the existing urban planning profession. The significance of the model in the paper is that it shows that the optimum density a developer should build is not the commonly accepted quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, but greater due to positive externalities of density. In addition this paper presents the tools to a) achieve the optimal level of density and b) introduce a separation of powers in municipal government between planning the city and controlling real estate supply which restrains the growth of cities; as has been a prominent subject of contemporary urban economics discourse.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

5

Gert, Johan. "TV-marknaden för sändningsrättigheter kopplade till sportevenemang : En spelteoretisk analys". Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2003. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-1825.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Background: Sporting events conveyed by the TV medium affect people and can give many unforgettable experiences. Sport may be synonymous with excitement and drama or just serve as entertainment. Through TV broadcasts from different sporting events, millions of televiewers all over the world have enjoyed athletic feats of extreme top class. TV broadcast sport always attracts a great number of viewers, also in Sweden. The prices of broadcasting rights to sporting events have risen strongly during the last decade, much as a consequence of the increasing competition between different TV companies both internationally and in Sweden. The development of prices is also a result of the monopoly situation which exists in the sales link of broadcasting rights, where the sport organizations and the companies holding the original rights, have learnt to make the most of their market power.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the TV market concerning the broadcasting rights to sporting events. This is done starting from Robert Axelrod's theory of co-operation. The thesis is that different TV companies, through an implicit kind of co-operation, could be able to counteract the monopoly situation, which exists in the retail link of broadcasting rights. This might be done in a way that lowers the price of the rights to a level closer to the marginal cost.

Method: The basis of this paper is mainly Robert Axelrod's theory of co- operation, used in a qualitative study starting from a scientific hermeneutic point of view. The frame of reference is built on an already existing theory applied on a problem, which gives the paper a deductive character. The material has been gathered from literature, newspapers and the Internet completed with interviews with representatives of the studied TV channels on the Swedish market.

Results: The results show that it can be rational for TV channels to co-operate concerning the broadcasting rights of sporting events. An absolute condition for achieving a mutual co-operation is that the discount rate is high enough and that the parties can put aside any possible jealousy. But there are problems if the parties value their own rights considerably less than those of their competitors. If they exploit the opponent and he answers by making a counter defection, the counter defection will not seem deterrent. This makes it more difficult to achieve a mutual co-operation. It is difficult to give a verdict on the opportunities of co-operation on the Swedish market, as we do not know exactly how the parties value the different rights. Listing the rights gives a negative influence on the possibilities of achieving a mutual co-operation between certain TV channels, because it destroys the possibilities of certain channels to retaliate. At the same time the possibility of mutual co-operation increases between the channels which are not involved in the restrictions. This happens because the parties are fewer and it leads to an increased degree of interaction. If co-operation is achieved the prices of the broadcasting rights can be cut down which would reduce the deadweight loss which arises as a result of the monopoly situation in the sales link.

Bakgrund: Sportögonblick förmedlade genom TV-mediet berör och kan ge många oförglömliga upplevelser. Sport kan vara synonymt med spänning och dramatik eller enbart tjäna som underhållning. Genom TV-utsändningar från olika sportevenemang har miljontals tittare världen över kommit i åtnjutande av idrottsprestationer av yttersta världsklass. TV-utsänd sport får ofta höga tittarsiffror, så även i Sverige. Priserna på sändningsrättigheter kopplade till sport har under det senaste decenniet stigit kraftigt, mycket till följd av en allt större konkurrens mellan olika TV-bolag, både internationellt och i Sverige. Prisutvecklingen är också ett resultat av den monopolsituation som finns i försäljningsledet av sändningsrättigheter, där idrottsorganisationer och rättighetsbolag, som äger de ursprungliga rättigheterna, har lärt sig att utnyttja sin marknadsmakt.

Syfte: Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att analysera TV-marknaden när det gäller sändningsrättigheter kopplade till sportevenemang. Detta görs utifrån en spelteoretisk ansats, i form av Robert Axelrods samarbetsteori, som bygger på studier av upprepade spel av fångarnas dilemma. Tesen är att olika TV-bolag genom en implicit form av samarbete, som går ut på att TV-bolagen i framtiden enbart bjuder på de sändningsrättigheter de har idag, skulle kunna motverka de negativa effekter som den monopolsituation som finns i försäljningsledet av sändningsrättigeter genererar, på ett sådant sätt att priset på rättigheterna sjunker till en nivå som ligger närmare marginalkostnaden för produktion.

Metod: Uppsatsen utgår från Robert Axelrods samarbetsteori, som har använts i en kvalitativ studie med ett hermeneutiskt vetenskapsideal som utgångspunkt. Referensramen bygger på redan befintlig teori, som appliceras på en problemställning, vilket gör att uppsatsen är deduktiv till sin karaktär. Material har inhämtats med hjälp av litteratur, tidningar och Internet, och har därtill kompletterats med kortare intervjuer med företrädare för de studerade TV-kanalerna på den svenska marknaden.

Resultat: Resultatet visar att det kan vara rationellt för TV-kanaler att samarbeta när det gäller sändningsrättigheter kopplade till sportevenemang. En absolut förutsättning för att uppnå ömsesidigt samarbete är att diskonteringsfaktorn är tillräckligt hög och att parterna kan lägga eventuell avundsjuka därhän. Men det finns problem, om parterna till exempel värderar sina egna rättigheter betydligt lägre än konkurrenternas. Om de exploaterar motståndaren och denne svarar med ett motavhopp, verkar motavhoppet inte avskräckande. Detta försvårar möjligheterna att uppnå ömsesidigt samarbete. Det är svårt att uttala sig om förutsättningarna för samarbete på den svenska marknaden, då vi inte vet exakt hur parterna värderar olika rättigheter. En listning av rättigheter inverkar negativt på möjligheterna att nå ömsesidigt samarbete mellan vissa TV-kanaler, eftersom den omintetgör vissa kanalers möjligheter att utöva vedergällning. Samtidigt ökar dock möjligheterna till ömsesidigt samarbete mellan de kanaler som inte omfattas av restriktionerna eftersom aktörerna blir färre till antalet, vilket leder till att interaktionsgraden ökar. Om ett samarbete kommer till stånd, kan priserna på rättigheterna pressas, vilket skulle reducera den allokeringsförlust som uppkommer till följd av monopolsituationen i försäljningsledet.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

6

Pereira, Marcelo Alves. "Dilema do prisioneiro contínuo com agentes racionais e classificadores de cooperação". Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/59/59135/tde-08012013-222525/.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

O dilema do prisioneiro (DP) é um dos principais jogos da teoria dos jogos. No dilema do prisioneiro discreto (DPD), dois prisioneiros têm as opções de cooperar ou desertar. Um jogador cooperador não delata seu comparsa, já um desertor delata. Se um cooperar e o outro desertar, o cooperador fica preso por cinco anos e o desertor fica livre. Se ambos cooperarem, ficam presos por um ano e, se ambos desertarem, ficam presos por três anos. Quando o DP é repetido, a cooperação pode emergir entre agentes egoístas. Realizamos um estudo analítico para o DPD, que produziu uma formulação da evolução do nível médio de cooperação e da tentação crítica (valor de tentação que causa mudança abrupta do nível de cooperação). No dilema do prisioneiro contínuo (DPC), cada jogador apresenta um nível de cooperação que define o grau de cooperação. Utilizamos o DPC para estudar o efeito da personalidade dos jogadores sobre a emergência da cooperação. Para isso, propusemos novas estratégias: uma baseada na personalidade dos jogadores e outras duas baseadas na comparação entre o ganho obtido e a aspiração do jogador. Todas as estratégias apresentavam algum mecanismo de cópia do estado do vizinho com maior ganho na vizinhança, mecanismo este, herdado da estratégia darwiniana. Os resultados mostraram que o DPC aumenta o nível médio de cooperação do sistema, quando comparado ao DPD. No entanto, as diferentes estratégias não aumentaram a cooperação comparado à cooperação obtida com a estratégia darwiniana. Então propusemos o uso do coeficiente de agrupamentos, coeficiente de Gini e entropias de Shannon, Tsallis e Kullback-Leibler para classificar os sistemas, em que os agentes jogam o DPD com a estratégia darwiniana, quanto ao nível de cooperação. Como analisamos valores de médias configuracionais, tais classificadores não foram eficientes ao classificar os sistemas. Isso é consequência da existência de distribuições de extremos nos resultados que compõem as médias. As distribuições de extremos suscitaram uma discussão acerca da definição do regime de cooperação no dilema do prisioneiro. Discutimos também as consequências de utilizar apenas valores médios nos resultados ignorando seus desvios e as distribuições.
Prisoner\'s dilemma (PD) is one of the main games of game theory. In discrete prisoner\'s dilemma (DPD), two prisoners have the options to cooperate or to defect. A cooperator player does not defect his accomplice, while a defector does. If one player cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets jailed for five years and the defector goes free. If both cooperate, they get jailed during one year and if both defect, they get jailed during three years. When this game is repeated, cooperation may emerge among selfish individuals. We perform an analytical study for the DPD, that produced a formulation for the evolution of the mean cooperation level and for the critical temptation values (temptation values that promote abrupt modifications in the cooperation level). In continuous prisoner\'s dilemma (CPD), each player has a level of cooperation that defines his/her degree of cooperation. We used the CPD to study the effect of the players\' personality on the emergence of cooperation. For this, we propose new strategies: one based on the players\' personality and two others based on the comparison between the player\'s obtained payoff and the desire one. All strategies present some mechanism that copies the state of the neighbor with the highest payoff in the neighborhood, mechanism inherited from the Darwinian strategy. The results showed that the CPD increases the average cooperation level of the system when compared to DPD. However, different strategies do not increased the cooperation compared to cooperation obtained with the Darwinian strategy. So, we propose the use of cluster coefficient, Gini coefficient and entropy of Shannon, Tsallis and Kullback-Leibler as classifiers to classify systems, in which the individuals play DPD with Darwinian strategy, by the cooperation level. As configurational averages were analyzed, such classifiers were not efficient in classifying the systems. This is due to the existence of distributions with extreme values of the results that compose the means. Distributions with extremes values emerged a discussion about the definition of the cooperation state in the prisoner\'s dilemma. We also discussed the consequences of using only average results in the analysis ignoring their deviations and distributions.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

7

Estenberg, Gabriel. "The National Security Perspective Revisited. States’ Energy Security and the Environmental Security". Thesis, Malmö universitet, Fakulteten för kultur och samhälle (KS), 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-22800.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

The purpose of this thesis is to counterargue Simon Dalby’s claim that the national security perspective should be replaced by a global security perspective. Dalby argues that the national security is inappropriate to capture the current issues regarding the environmental security. To counterargue Dalby’s claim, I represent the national security perspective by using the perspective of states’ energy security, and compare current trends and issues regarding states’ energy security and the environmental security. This is done to argue that states can either chose to enhance their own energy security or the environmental security. Prisoners' Dilemma is then used as a theoretical framework on an explanatory example to provide insights about a dilemma, called the Energy- Environment Dilemma in this thesis, that curbs states’ ability to commit themselves to the cause of protecting the environmental security. The explanatory example used is the strategic importance of the Northwest passage for the U.S. and Canada. The results of this thesis suggests that the national security perspective, in combination with Prisoners’ Dilemma, is useful to provide insights about the Energy-Environmental Dilemma. Replacing it with a global security perspective would be to ignore a perspective which can provide insights about a challenge for states to commit to the cause of protecting the environmental security.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

8

Strömberg, Sara. "Sveriges inställning till EMU : underkastelse av kollektivet kontra nationell obundenhet". Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2002. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-1579.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

After Sweden became a member of the European Union, EU, the debate regarding the Swedish participation in the EU’s currency co-operation, the European Monetary Union, EMU, has been intense. One of the biggest issues has been how our national economic politics will work within such a monetary union. What instrument will remain for the national economic politics within the EMU are highly uncertain. The question whether we will be able to affect our own economy or not has long been the essence in the Swedish debate. At the same time that Sweden got membership in the EU, Austria became a member as well. Austria is just like Sweden a small open economy with many similarities to Sweden with regard to politics and economics. One big difference between the countries though, is that Austria at once became a member of the currency co-operation and joined the EMU from the start of it. The debates regarding the EMU has been very much alike in the two countries, though it differs in one important question. One big question that has been raised in Austria is the potential of a wider co-operation within the EMU than at present. This discussion has led to suggestions of a wider co-operation through discussions between the EMU-countries, larger possibilities for sanctions against countries which are not following the common economic plan or even suggestions about a politic union. There is very much a discussion in the spirit of collectivism. In Sweden non of this is even an issue. Here the whole debate is focused on the national possibilities and losses in a monetary union. How the country will be able to optimise its own good within the EMU is the only thing of interest in the Swedish debate. The point of view is always the national good and has never the collectivism in mind.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

9

Lee, Cheuk-wah, e 李焯華. "Confucianism and the prisoner's dilemma". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2001. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31953104.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

10

Lee, Cheuk-wah. "Confucianism and the prisoner's dilemma". Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 2001. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk:8888/cgi-bin/hkuto%5Ftoc%5Fpdf?B23457296.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

11

Wäckerle, Manuel, Bernhard Rengs e Wolfgang Radax. "An Agent-Based Model of Institutional Life-Cycles". MDPI, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g5030160.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social structures. We show how endogenized trust and exogenously given leader authority influences institutional change, i.e., diversity in institutional life-cycles. It turns out that these governed institutions (de)structure in cyclical patterns dependent on the overall evolution of trust in the artificial society, while at the same time, influencing this evolution by supporting social learning. Simulation results indicate three scenarios of institutional life-cycles. Institutions may, (1) build up very fast and freeze the artificial society in a stable but fearful pattern (ordered system); (2) exist only for a short time, leading to a very trusty society (highly fluctuating system); and (3) structure in cyclical patterns over time and support social learning due to cumulative causation of societal trust (complex system).

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

12

Wier, Joseph S. Jr, e Reshoud Fahed Musbeh Afnan Al. "Syrian civil war: solving the prisoner’s dilemma". Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44690.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Most international observers believe there are no suitable solutions to the Syrian civil war. They are wrong. By initially establishing the integral principle that the fighting in Syria is a microcosm of the regional cold war being fought between Iran and Saudi Arabia, we recognize that any resolution must satisfy these veto players. Utilizing game theory to evaluate the war, our research deconstructs the problematic position the parties have backed themselves into: perpetual fighting even though peace is more beneficial to everyone involved. The lens of the prisoner’s dilemma, which focuses on rational players acting counter to their best interests due to a lack of trust, helps us identify why both groups are driven to continue down a violent path instead of indulging in suspicion during the peace process. This analysis effectively demonstrates what the international community has failed to realize: a military stalemate is the optimal circumstance for reaching a lasting peace in Syria. This utilization of game theory, while obviously relevant to resolving one of today’s most precarious conflicts, also has larger implications for civil wars. These sorts of clashes are increasingly more commonplace, and an effective resolution knowledge base is necessary for a stable international environment.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

13

Antonsson, Sigfrid. "How an Organization can Work better with their Suppliers DHL Express in Borås and their Recruitment Companies". Thesis, Högskolan i Borås, Institutionen Ingenjörshögskolan, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hb:diva-18920.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

When a project work was performed at DHL Express in Borås in spring 2007 the time of theprocesses at the terminal was measured. DHL Express in Borås is working with tworecruitment companies and the employees could therefore be divided into two groups; thepermanent employees and the hired employees. There were a slight difference in performancebetween these two groups of employees and it was then questioned if DHL Express in Boråsreally was working in the best way with the recruitment companies.The theories that were used in this thesis work was; complexity theories by Murray Gell-Mann, Game theory by John Forbes Nash and Lean. These three theories were used at thesame time to get the best outcome.The methods that were used was investigating the contracts between DHL Express and therecruitment companies, interviews with the employees at the tactical level that are in contactwith the recruitment companies in their daily work with base from the contracts,conversations and discussions with employees, pictures was also taken to document parts ofthe terminal at DHL Express in Borås.The result of the thesis work was that a “best-way-package” how DHL Express in Boråsshould work with the recruitment companies was set up. This “best-way-package” could beapplied on any terminal at DHL Express if wanted.
Uppsatsnivå: D

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

14

Sedlacek, Sabine, e Gunther Maier. "Green Building Councils: Their Economic Role as Governance Institutions". WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2012. http://epub.wu.ac.at/3419/1/sre%2Ddisc%2D2012_02.pdf.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Green Building Councils (GBCs) have been established in many different countries in recent years. This paper discusses the role such organizations can play in the respective construction and real estate industry and under what circumstances a GBC can contribute positively to the development of a "greener" or "more sustainable" stock of buildings. The paper investigates the main informational problem of the industry by looking at the relation between a developer and an investor from an economic point of view. We argue that the investor's uncertainty about the true quality of a building and the corresponding incentive for the developer to cheat may lock them into a prisoners' dilemma trap. The corresponding barriers for a transition toward a "greener" buildings market are analyzed. GBCs are described as institutions of economic governance that can assist the economy in overcoming these problems. They can act as third party institutions in transactions between developers and investors. By certifying the quality of a building, they can reduce the risk for the investor to be cheated by the developer and also increase the incentive to develop good quality buildings for the developer. This task, however, raises some severe management challenges for the GBCs. (author's abstract)
Series: SRE - Discussion Papers

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

15

Earnest, Michael J. "Extortion and Evolution in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmc_theses/51.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a two player game where playing rationally leads to a suboptimal outcome for both players. The game is simple to analyze, but when it is played repeatedly, complex dynamics emerge. Recent research has shown the existence of extortionate strategies, which allow one player to win at least as much as the other. When one player plays such a strategy, the other must either decide to take a low payoff, or accede to the extortion, where they earn higher payoff, but their opponent receives a larger share. We investigate what happens when one player uses this strategy against an ``evolutionary'' player, who makes small changes to her strategy over time to increase her score, and show that there are cases where such a player will not evolve towards the optimal strategy of giving in to extortion.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

16

Wheeler, Andrew Michael. "Heuristics vs rationale in a 2-person prisoner's dilemma /". Available to subscribers only, 2006. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1240706681&sid=21&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

17

Williams, Jenna. "Nonclinical paranoia and values in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game". Thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2014. http://digirep.rhul.ac.uk/items/41b3ffba-b3b2-18e5-9ac6-ec869f0dea69/1/.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Paranoia is increasingly considered to be a common phenomenon in the general population and is not just a symptom of diagnosable psychiatric disorders. Recently, Ellett, Allen-Crooks, Stevens, Wildschut & Chadwick (2013) argued that distrust-based competition in the Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG) is a novel behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia. The present study sought to replicate the finding of Ellett et al. (2013) and to extend their research by looking to the social psychology literature on human values as additional potential motivations for competition in the PDG. Additionally, the study sought to examine relationships between paranoia in the nonclinical population and human values, and offer support for a recently refined theory of human values (Schwartz et al., 2012). Consistent with prediction, higher trait paranoia was associated with valuing face, that is, holding a commitment to security and power through maintaining one's public image and avoiding humiliation, and lower trait paranoia was associated with valuing universalism-tolerance, that is, showing acceptance and understanding for others. Secondly, and consistent with prediction, the current findings replicated that of Ellett et al. (2013) to show that distrust-based PDG competition is a behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia. Thirdly, the present research offered a secondary behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia based on a commitment to valuing power. Lastly, the study offered support for the circular structure of values in Schwartz's (2012) refined theory. Collectively, the current findings provided further evidence for the role of the PDG in the measurement and investigation of nonclinical paranoia, and more specifically provided a foundation for further research into the role that values could play in furthering this understanding.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

18

Angus, Simon Douglas Economics Australian School of Business UNSW. "Economic networks: communication, cooperation & complexity". Awarded by:University of New South Wales. Economics, 2007. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/27005.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

This thesis is concerned with the analysis of economic network formation. There are three novel sections to this thesis (Chapters 5, 6 and 8). In the first, the non-cooperative communication network formation model of Bala and Goyal (2000) (BG) is re-assessed under conditions of no inertia. It is found that the Strict Nash circle (or wheel) structure is still the equilibrium outcome for n = 3 under no inertia. However, a counter-example for n = 4 shows that with no inertia infinite cycles are possible, and hence the system does not converge. In fact, cycles are found to quickly dominate outcomes for n > 4 and further numerical simulations of conditions approximating no inertia (probability of updating > 0.8 to 1) indicate that cycles account for a dramatic slowing of convergence times. These results, together with the experimental evidence of Falk and Kosfeld (2003) (FK) motivate the second contribution of this thesis. A novel artificial agent model is constructed that allows for a vast strategy space (including the Best Response) and permits agents to learn from each other as was indicated by the FK results. After calibration, this model replicates many of the FK experimental results and finds that an externality exploiting ratio of benefits and costs (rather than the difference) combined with a simple altruism score is a good proxy for the human objective function. Furthermore, the inequity aversion results of FK are found to arise as an emergent property of the system. The third novel section of this thesis turns to the nature of network formation in a trust-based context. A modified Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) model is developed which enables agents to play an additional and costly network forming action. Initially, canonical analytical results are obtained despite this modification under uniform (non-local) interactions. However, as agent network decisions are 'turned on' persistent cooperation is observed. Furthermore, in contrast to the vast majority of non-local, or static network models in the literature, it is found that a-periodic, complex dynamics result for the system in the long-run. Subsequent analysis of this regime indicates that the network dynamics have fingerprints of self-organized criticality (SOC). Whilst evidence for SOC is found in many physical systems, such dynamics have been seldom, if ever, reported in the strategic interaction literature.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

19

Yardimci, Ulaş Izmen. "Enough is as good as a feast : a simple model of choice overload". Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/18013.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Mestrado em Economia
O pressuposto fundamental da teoria económica neoclássica é a racionalidade dos agentes econômicos. No entanto, no tempo, desvios sistemáticos desta suposição foram observados. Vários desses desvios dizem respeito ao processo de tomada de decisão e um deles é a carga aparentemente contraditória que se origina do número abundante de alternativas disponíveis. O comportamento sub-ótimo causado por esse fardo que é chamado de "sobrecarga de escolha" foi observado em experimentos de campo e de laboratório e posteriormente introduzido em alguns modelos econômicos modernos. Esta dissertação fornece um modelo simples para sobrecarga de escolha. Ao dividir o fenômeno em três partes, o fator de novidade, o custo de avaliar as escolhas e o pesar antecipado, examina os elementos que constituem a sobrecarga de escolha. Posteriormente, este trabalho fornece um exemplo do papel da sobrecarga no contexto do Dilema do Prisioneiro.
The fundamental assumption of neoclassical economic theory is the rationality of economic agents. Nonetheless, in time, systematic deviations from this assumption has been observed. A number of such deviations pertains to the decision-making process and one of them is the rather seemingly contradictory burden originating from the abounding number of alternatives available. Suboptimal behavior caused by this burden that is called "choice overload" has been observed in field and laboratory experiments and subsequently introduced into some modern economic models. This dissertation provides a simple model for choice overload. By breaking the phenomenon into three parts, the novelty factor, the cost of evaluation of choices, and the anticipated regret, it examines the elements that constitute choice overload. Subsequently, this work provides an example of the role choice overload may play in the context of Prisoner's Dilemma.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

20

Macedo, Diego de Queiroz. "Experimentos em simulações paralelas do Dilema do Prisioneiro com n jogadores". Universidade de São Paulo, 2011. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/3/3141/tde-12122011-133530/.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

O Dilema do Prisioneiro com n jogadores é um problema que ilustra a dificuldade na formação da cooperação em sociedades de indivíduos racionais. Diversos trabalhos foram feitos no sentido de compreender melhor os fatores que influenciam o surgimento e a evolução da cooperação nessas sociedades, sendo que muitos desses mostraram que a simulação deste tipo de problema carece de escalabilidade, o que impede a realização de experimentos que envolvam uma grande quantidade de agentes ou de parâmetros de teste. Este trabalho tem o intuito de aplicar conceitos de computação paralela para tratar este problema. Para tal, foi desenvolvido um sistema denominado PS2 E2 , evolução de um trabalho anterior, cuja utilização em alguns cenários possibilitou a verificação da influência de alguns parâmetros tais como o tamanho da população e a expressividade do modelo de representação de estratégias na utilidade global de um conjunto de agentes que jogam o Dilema do Prisioneiro com n jogadores.
The n-Player Prisoners Dilemma is a problem that illustrates the difficulty of cooperation formation in societies composed of rational individuals. Several studies were made to better understand the factors that influence the emergence and evolution of cooperation in these societies. Many of these showed that the simulation of this type of problem lacks scalability, which hinders the achievement of experiments involving a large number of agents or test parameters. This work intends to apply parallel computing concepts to treat this problem. To this end, it was developed a system called PS2 E2 , an evolution of a previous work, whose utilization in some scenarios allowed the verification of the influence of some parameters such as the population size and the expressiveness of the strategy representation model in the global utility of a society of agents that play the n-Player Prisoner Dilemma.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

21

Lopez, Carlos Ramiro. "An Exploration of Cooperation during an Asymmetric Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2020. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1707264/.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Researchers investigated how the contingent delivery of a cultural consequence on target culturants in an asymmetric iterated prisoner's dilemma game (IPDG) affected players' choices. The asymmetric IPDG creates an analogue to income disparities created by wage gaps and other cultural practices that create wealth inequalities between different members of the population and allows researchers to explore how these inequalities affect cooperation between players. Six undergraduate students divided into three dyads participated in an ABABCDCD reversal design. An asymmetric IPDG was arranged in Condition A and C such that one player received a greater number of points regardless of the second participants' selections - analogue to contingencies that produce income inequalities from wage gaps. In Condition B and D, a metacontingency was arranged such that delivery of a cultural consequence (CC; bonus points equally distributed among the dyad) was contingent on the oscillating production of target aggregate products (AP) across two consecutive cycles. When participants' coordinated responding and contacted the target AP→ CC relation, the wage gap was reduced. However, individual contingencies are in direct competition for the "wealthier" player, reducing the probability of cooperative responding. Results showed the CC selected certain oscillations between target APs resulting in a decrease of a point disparity between the players while also establishing equal points between the players during certain conditions.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

22

Morford, Zachary H. "The Effects of Fines on Cooperation in a Four-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma Game". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2011. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc84257/.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Cooperation is an important area of investigation for behavior analysis. The prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) provides a useful scenario for studying cooperation in a behavior analytic paradigm. The PDG can be coupled with the concept of the metacontingency to investigate how various contingency arrangements support and promote cooperation in a group. Players in this experiment participated in a PDG and, in some conditions, were given the ability to fine other players but could not talk. The goal of this experiment was to investigate how players’ ability to fine one another affected the players’ patterns of cooperation, and whether fining itself was affected by the addition of a shared group consequence. The data show that participants cooperated in some conditions, but the fines did not seem to affect players’ rates of cooperation.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

23

Wong, Rosanna Yin Mei. "Effects of cultural priming on cooperation in prisoner's dilemma among bicultural individuals /". View Abstract or Full-Text, 2002. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?SOSC%202002%20WONG.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Thesis (M. Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-70). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

24

Rogers, Jonathan Charles Edwin. "Videogames and Friendships: Contextual Factors That Influence the Willingness to Aggress Following the Playing of a Violent Videogame". BYU ScholarsArchive, 2011. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/2805.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Participants (N = 73) in the present research were assigned to play a violent videogame (Super Smash Brothers) with either a supportive or an ambivalent friend. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants were assigned to play the game either competitively or cooperatively. Subsequent aggression toward their friend was assessed by measuring participants' competitive or cooperative behavior in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Results revealed no differences in aggression as a function of friendship type or game strategy, although means were in predicted directions. The influence of context on exposure to violent media is discussed, as are issues of power and sample type as possible reasons for the nonsignificant findings.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

25

GUIGNOT, JACQUES. "Application des stratégies neuronales au dilemme des prisonniers". Paris 13, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1998PA132062.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Nous definissons, dans le cadre du dilemme des prisonniers, le concept de strategie neuronale. L'ensemble des strategies existantes pour le dilemme des prisonniers est evalue par rapport a l'ensemble des strategies neuronales. Nous utilisons les capacites d'apprentissage des reseaux de neurones pour definir des strategies adaptatives. Enfin, une selection est operee parmi les strategies neuronales, qui met en evidence l'existence de strategies originales, distinctes des strategies classiques, aux performances satisfaisantes.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

26

Leivas, Fernanda Rodrigues. "Dinâmicas estocásticas em teoria de jogos : percolação, cooperação e seus limites". reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/183168.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

O estudo de Teoria de Jogos tem se expandido para diversas áreas, tendo sua aplicação inicial na economia, hoje é utilizado na psicologia, na filosofia e tem um papel importantíssimo na biologia evolutiva. O seu sucesso está ligado ao fato de que os jogos têm o poder de prever interações usando conceitos simples como a cooperação e a competição. Dentre os jogos há o famoso de Dilema do Prisioneiro (PD), em que indivíduos completamente racionais devem optar entre cooperar ou trair (desertar) seu companheiro de jogo. A estratégia dominante e o equilíbrio de Nash, para o PD, é a deserção mútua visto que os indivíduos são sempre tentados a não cooperar. O dilema é que eles obteriam um ganho melhor se cooperassem mutuamente. Na vida real os indivíduos se encontram em várias situações nas quais eles devem optar entre ser egoístas ou altruístas e, frequentemente, acabam optando pelo altruísmo. Mesmo com a previsão da deserção na teoria clássica dos jogos, em 1992 Nowak e May (NOWAK; MAY, 1992) mostraram que cooperação é mantida em jogos com interação espacial e evolutivos A partir dessa descoberta, estudos de jogos em diversos tipos de rede foram propostos, entre eles as redes diluídas (que possuem sítios vacantes). Nesse tipo de rede foi observado que certas densidades favorecem a cooperação, particularmente próximo ao limiar de percolação para regras de atualização estocásticas (com ruído). Porém a probabilidade de troca do Replicador, mesmo sendo estocástica, não se encaixa nesse padrão observado. Descobrimos que esse comportamento anômalo está relacionado com estruturas formadas entre buracos e desertores que impedem alguns indivíduos de ter acesso ao ruído, assim a informação não flui livremente na rede. Consequentemente o sistema fica preso em um estado congelado, que pode ser quebrado com algum tipo de perturbação. Também abordamos a relação entre o limiar de percolação por sítio e a cooperação de uma forma mais quantitativa do que já foi apresentada até então, acompanhamos o desenvolvimento da cooperação dentro dos clusters e mostramos como o limiar de percolação afeta as estruturas básicas da rede.
The study of Game Theory, having its initial application in economics, has expanded to several areas and is now used in psychology, philosophy and plays a major role in evolutionary biology. Its success is related to the fact that games have the power to predict and study interactions using simple concepts such as cooperation and competition. Among the games there is the famous Prisoner Dilemma (PD), where completely rational individuals have to choose between cooperating or betraying their game partner. The dominant strategy and the Nash equilibrium for PD is mutual desertion as individuals are always tempted to not cooperate. The dilemma is that they would get a higher payoff if they mutually cooperated. In real life, individuals find themselves in various situations where they must choose to be selfish or altruistic, and often they choose altruism. Even with the prediction of defection in classical game theory, in 1992, Nowak and May (NOWAK; MAY, 1992) showed that cooperation is maintained in evolutionary spatial games. With this discovery, the study of games on several types of networks was proposed, among them the diluted networks (which have vacant sites) In this type of lattice, it was observed that at certain densities cooperation is promoted, particularly close to the percolation threshold for stochastic updating rules. However, the exchange probability of the Replicator dynamics, despite being stochastic, does not obey this observed pattern. We found that this anomalous behavior is related to structures formed between holes and defectors that prevent some individuals from having access to noise, so information does not flow freely in the network. Consequently the system becomes trapped in a frozen state, but this state can be broken by perturbing the system. We also address the relationship between the percolation threshold and cooperation in a more quantitative way than has been presented lately, by following the development of cooperation within clusters and showing how the percolation threshold affects the basic structures of the lattice.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

27

Nordström, Marcus. "The Dilemma of Homo Moralis : Preference evolution in the prisoner's dilemma under assortative matching in finite populations without equilibrium assumptions". Thesis, KTH, Skolan för datavetenskap och kommunikation (CSC), 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-181952.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Evolutionary game theory has made a big contribution to our understanding of evolutionary and economical processes. Recently, in the article Homo Moralis by Ingela Alger and Jörgen Weibull, a model extending classical evolutionary game theory in two ways is designed. Firstly the matching processes is allowed to be assortative and secondly the evolution is designed in such a way that it acts on preferences instead of strategies. They prove that an individual with a certain morality preference in such a setting can not be outperformed by an individual with another preference. To obtain the results, the authors model the population as a continuum and assume that equilibrium always is reached. In this thesis we design a model where these assumptions are relaxed and then test through computer simulations whether the results hold for the prisoner’s dilemma game. In our experiments we find no case where the results do not hold.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

28

Grose, Jonathan. "Honesty and cooperation : emotions as cues and the evolution of the prisoner's dilemma". Thesis, University of Bristol, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.486101.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

I argue that cooperative behaviour can evolve in a modified prisoner's dilemma (PD) that includes signalling. My broad project is one of explaining the emergence of cooperation at a societal level without Hobbesian enforcement. The strategy that I adopt is to use an evolutionary game theoretic approach to study the cultural evolution of a micro-level interaction, in this case the one-shot PD. I begin, in chapter two, by analysing Brian Skynns' model of the PD within which I find an important weakness. Any model that incorporates signalling into the PD requires an account of how the honesty of those signals is secured. Without such security, and Skynns does not address this, a deceptive strategy can invade and drive cooperation to extinction. In chapter three, therefore, I investigate mechanisms that prevent signals from being subverted, Chapter four goes on to examine empirical and theoretical literature on deception and its detection. I find that human deception detection ability is better than chance but not by an impressive margin. The study of deception detection is tightly linked to that of emotional responses. Hence I target such responses as potential signals in the PD. In chapter five I see what light recent results on the neurobiology of emotions can shed on our ability, or lack of, to produce deceptive emotional displays. I conclude that work by Joseph Ledoux and, in particular, Antonio Damasio provides an explanation of why displays are difficult to fake. I thus answer the concern 'that I initially raised about Skyrms' modified PD model. The fmal chapter buttresses my conclusion from chapter five. I demonstrate that, by considering the time of life at which common-interest and conflict-of-interest interactions occur, one can explain why the honesty of emotional displays has remained unsubverted by deceptive strategies in the long-run. Hence, I offer a response to Hobbesian scepticism about the possibility of honest cooperation.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

29

Long, Sunny (Sunny X. ). "Testing theoretical game theory results on a large scale : prisoner's dilemma on Facebook". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/85443.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 77-79).
In my research, I designed and implemented an online game accessable to a large diverse audience via the Facebook social network to test out game theoretic results and study social interactions. In this game, we designed scenarios that mirrored classic game theory situations, most prominantly the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. The game allows for Facebook users to play each other in the Prisoner's Dilemma game while competing for a common goal. We then gather data on strategies employed by players and compare them to classic game theoretic results and try to explain similarities and differences. We also look at social factors that were prominant in decision-making for players. Analysis includes disecting which factors (e.g. gender, age, etc.) affect players' decisions and understanding winning strategies. We discovered that under the social setting of the experiment, factors that came into play for users' decision-making included gender as well as potential payoffs. On the other hand, game play history and whether or not two people were friends were not significant in decision-making. Despite a high overall cooperation rate (over 70%), the top players predominantly betrayed their opponents while never playing the same opponent too many times. The game is implemented in Ruby on Rails while all data analysis is done via Python scripts.
by Sunny Long.
M. Eng.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

30

Galbraith, Todd William. "Examining Friendship Dynamics in Social Anxiety with Iterated Games of the Prisoner’s Dilemma". Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/409829.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Psychology
Ph.D.
Individuals with social anxiety have been shown to have higher levels of friendship impairment and greater difficulty establishing close relationships than persons without social anxiety. However, the mechanisms associated with such impairment have not been widely examined. Previous research suggests that deficiencies in prosocial behaviors (e.g., low warmth, limited self-disclosure, and constrained cooperation) during interpersonal exchanges may partially explain their difficulties developing close relationships. The present study aimed to examine the effect that rejection may have on prosocial behaviors, as well as other factors associated with developing and maintaining friendships, including trust, perceived likeability, closeness/connectedness, using an iterated, computerized version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Participants with high (n = 56) and low (n = 35) social anxiety were asked to play the PD game with another participant (actually an experimental confederate) whom they met at the start of the study. Participants were led to believe that they were playing the PD game against the other participant but were actually playing against a computer that was programmed with a strategy meant to initially facilitate cooperation. Cooperation, or giving, in the PD game was measured primarily by the number of tokens that the participant shared with his/her partner. Additionally, participants were randomized to either rejection or non-rejection conditions. Partway through the study, those in the rejection condition were exposed to a programmed decrease in giving by their partner as well as an ambiguous in-person rejection (administered by the experimenter). Participants in the non-rejection condition were not exposed to either the programmed or in-person manipulations. Outcomes of interest included total giving during the PD game, constriction of giving, and the use of particular strategies following rejection in the PD game, as well as various measures of relationship quality collected at the end of each round of play. It was hypothesized that individuals with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would exhibit less total giving and a constricted response to low partner giving and also be less likely to use prosocial strategies to encourage cooperation (i.e., a coaxing strategy) following rejection by the partner compared to those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Additionally, we anticipated that those with high social anxiety in the rejection condition would provide lower ratings of the following relationship quality domains following the rejection condition: trust, closeness/connectedness, and perceived likeability than those with low social anxiety in the rejection condition. Overall, results provided little support for these hypotheses. However, there were several significant main effects that highlighted differences among those with high and low social anxiety. For example, individuals with high social anxiety had greater ratings of the expectancy of future rejection and of the importance of their next turn for maintaining the quality of their relationship with their partner. Additionally, there was a trend level (p = .08) social anxiety group by rejection condition interaction on the participant’s trust of his/her partner, such that those with high social anxiety exhibited reductions in relationship trust following rejection whereas those with low social anxiety did not. Implications of these findings as well as limitations and future directions of study are also explored.
Temple University--Theses

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

31

Hanley, James E. "The role of non-cooperative games in the evolution of cooperation /". view abstract or download file of text, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9986740.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-123). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

32

Mélon, Lela. "Overcoming the prisoner's dilemma of European corporations : from shareholder primacy to sustainable company law". Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2018. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=238697.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

33

Edelstein, Jonathan. "THE PRISONER DILEMMA: A BIOETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE OF INCARCERATED POPULATIONS". Master's thesis, Temple University Libraries, 2019. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/591995.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Urban Bioethics
M.A.
Correctional populations account for about 2% of persons in the United States, who have a unique right to health care guaranteed by the Constitution per court decisions. However, the quality and breadth of this care is not standardized, and incarceration itself creates risk factors for one’s health. A review of the literature was done to evaluate the health and access to care of prison populations. Prison populations are largely minorities from poor neighborhoods with low socioeconomic status who usually have limited engagement with health services prior to incarceration; there is a large amount of morbidity of chronic diseases in prisons, and prisoners are at increased risk for communicable diseases, substance abuse and mental illness. Former inmates are also at increased risk of death following release. While advances such as telemedicine help to bridge the gaps in correctional health, more research needs to be done to assess the needs of this population, and more education and linkage to care should be accomplished to do right by these populations and ensure they get the care they need. This will in turn lead to better health outcomes in this population and may have a beneficial effect on the communities from which these prisoners come.
Temple University--Theses

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

34

Tabak, Benjamin A. "Associations of the Oxytocin Receptor Gene (OXTR) and Emotional Reactions to Betrayal in an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma". Scholarly Repository, 2011. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations/604.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Recent research has shown that variation in the gene encoding for the oxytocin receptor (OXTR) contributes to individual differences in social-cognitive and emotional functioning in both clinical and non-clinical populations. OXTR has been associated with prosocial behavior, positive and negative emotionality, empathy, maternal sensitivity, and stress reactivity. To date, no study has investigated OXTR in the context of behavioral and emotional reactions to betrayals in trust. The present study examined how variation in 10 SNPs on OXTR may contribute to individual differences in behavior, emotional reactions, and perceptions following a betrayal in trust in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Following correction for multiple testing, one SNP (rs237887) and two haplotypes (A-rs237887, C-rs2268490; G-rs237887, C-rs2268490) were significantly associated with positive emotional reactions to betrayal. In addition, one haplotype (C-rs9840864, T-rs2268490) was significantly associated with negative emotional reactions to betrayal. The present findings suggest that variation on OXTR may contribute to individual differences in emotional reactions to betrayals in trust.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

35

Mienaltowski, Andrew S. "Age differences in interpersonal problem solving examining interpersonal conflict in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game /". Atlanta, Ga. : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/24709.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009.
Committee Chair: Fredda Blanchard-Fields; Committee Member: Ann Bostrom; Committee Member: Christopher Hertzog; Committee Member: Jack Feldman; Committee Member: Paul Corballis

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

36

Allen, Rhani. "Paranoia in the nonclinical population". Thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2012. http://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/33da0afe-23a8-dba0-ae50-1c7058d069d8/7/.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

A growing body of research demonstrates that paranoia is common in the general population. Four studies are presented that investigate factors associated with paranoia and naturalistic change in non-clinical groups. First, two experimental studies examine paranoia in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG), an interpersonal research paradigm, where two players have the choice to cooperate or compete with each other. The dominant and rational choice for both players is to compete, however each players' individual reward would be greater if they both played cooperatively. Study 1 found that higher state paranoia was associated with the choice to compete. However the competitive choice can be selected due to distrust of the other player, or in order to maximise personal gain. The second experimental study employs a Three-Choice version of the PDG (PDG-Alt) that includes the option to withdraw, the rational choice when distrust of the other player is high. Higher state paranoia was associated with the withdrawal choice. These studies conclude that the withdrawal choice in the PDG –Alt provides a potential behavioral marker of state paranoia. Second, two studies examine naturalistic change in nonclinical paranoia. Idiosyncratic accounts of a single past paranoid experience are elicited and variations in dimensions known to be important in clinical paranoia are examined. Results show that levels of preoccupation, distress, impact on well being and conviction that harm was intentional significantly reduce over time. However the amount of time passed since the experience occurred is not significantly associated with level of change. Finally, in Study 4 a qualitative investigation is presented that identifies themes associated with change in nonclinical experiences of paranoia. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the theoretical, clinical and research implications of the findings.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

37

Berger, Ulrich. "Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games". Elsevier, 2009. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5590/1/2009_BioSys.pdf.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34].

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

38

Mienaltowski, Andrew S. "Age Differences in Interpersonal Problem Solving: Examining Interpersonal Conflict in an Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma Game". Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/24709.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Studies of life span development in everyday problem solving suggest two trajectories of change in adulthood: individuals become less effective at solving well-defined instrumental problems but more effective at managing ill-defined interpersonal problems. Two experiments were conducted to examine the ability of young and older adults to effectively manage an interpersonal problem that has a well-defined measure of instrumental success. Participants played an iterated Prisoner s Dilemma game with same-age, computer-simulated strangers (Experiment 1) and friends (Experiment 2). Success was dependent upon one s ability to put aside self-interest and cooperate with a partner. Computer-simulated partners reciprocated the participants decisions 100% of the time or behaved in a more self-interested manner. Young and older adults tendencies to create conflict with the reciprocating partner and their defensive reactions to the selfish partner were examined. Although young adults outperformed older adults when playing the game on their own, they did not carry this performance advantage into the interactive rounds. In fact, despite their success when playing alone, young adults were no more successful than older adults when interacting with others. Young and older adults both cooperated more with friends than with strangers and more with the reciprocating partner than the selfish partner. However, when the participants first interaction was with a selfish stranger, older adults were more cooperative than young adults and consequently accrued more reward. This is consistent with previous research demonstrating that older adults use more passive interpersonal problem solving strategies than young adults, and it also partially supports the prediction that advancing age leads to more effective strategy implementation when solving interpersonal problems.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

39

Charlton, Shawn R. "The relationship between behavioral measures of self-control temporal discounting and the single-player iterated prisoner's dilemma /". Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2006. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3233748.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006.
Title from first page of PDF file (viewed December 6, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 137-148).

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

40

Novotný, Martin. "Behavior of certain EU member states in debt crisis (application of game theory)". Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-142251.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Thesis uses game theory to explain behavior of certain states in the European sovereign-debt crisis. The goal is to find out, if those states use strategies leading to equilibrium i.e. if they maximize their expected utility. Theoretical part is based mainly on repeated games and Bayesian game. Thesis summarizes development of European sovereign-debt crisis and key economic indicators. It constructs a game model of the crisis and further analyses situation of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Greece as players in the game. The game model is then tested on key conflict situations such as relations of France and Germany, first Greek bailout negotiations or Spanish bank bailout negotiations. The results show that chosen states do maximize their expected utility in one election period. However maximization of utility in two or more election periods is limited by the parameters of democratic election system - length of election periods and information asymmetry between voters and politicians. The costs of elimination of information asymmetry would be higher than the costs of debt crisis. So even considering the costs of debt crisis the states are in long term equilibrium.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

41

Borges, Paulo Sérgio da Silva. "Model of strategy games based on the paradigm of the iterated prisoner s dilemma employing fuzzy sets". reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 1996. https://repositorio.ufsc.br/handle/123456789/111356.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

42

Hatzopoulos, Vasilis. "Co-evolution of strategy and structure in the prisoner's dilemma under different selection schemes and link creation mechanisms". Thesis, Imperial College London, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.512052.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

43

Van, der Merwe Martijn. "Non-cooperative games on networks". Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/79930.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Thesis (MSc)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: There are many examples of cooperation in action in society and in nature. In some cases cooperation leads to the increase of the overall welfare of those involved, and in other cases cooperation may be to the detriment of the larger society. The presence of cooperation seems natural if there is a direct bene t to individuals who choose to cooperate. However, in examples of cooperation this bene t is not always immediately obvious. The so called prisoner's dilemma is often used as an analogy to study cooperation and tease out the factors that lead to cooperation. In classical game theory, each player is assumed to be rational and hence typically seeks to select his strategy in such a way as to maximise his own expected pay-o . In the case of the classical prisoner's dilemma, this causes both players to defect. In evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, it is assumed that players have limited knowledge of the game and only bounded rationality. Games in evolutionary game theory are repeated in rounds and players are a orded the opportunity to adapt and learn as this repetition occurs. Past studies have revealed that cooperation may be a viable strategy if the prisoner's dilemma is placed in an evolutionary context, where the evolutionary tness of a strategy is directly related to the pay-o achieved by the player adopting the strategy. One of the mechanisms that promote the persistence of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma is structured interaction between players. A mathematical framework for representing the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (ESPD) is developed in this thesis. The mathematical framework is used to undertake an analytical approach (i.e. avoiding the use of simulation) towards investigating the dynamics of the ESPD with a path, cycle, plane grid or toroidal grid as underlying graph. The objective of this investigation is to determine the likelihood of the emergence of persistent cooperation between players. The ESPD on a path or a cycle admits two fundamentally di erent parameter regions; large values of the temptation-to-defect parameter are not capable of inducing persistent cooperation, while small values of this parameter allow for the possibility of persistent cooperation. It is found that the likelihood of cooperation increases towards certainty as the order of the underlying graph increases if the underlying graph is a path or cycle. The state space of the ESPD with a plane or toroidal grid graph as underlying graph grows very quickly as a function of the graph order. The automorphism classes of game states are enumerated to determine exactly how fast the size of the state space of the game grows as a function of the order of the underlying graph. Finally, the dynamics of the ESPD is investigated for a grid graph as underlying graph (in cases where the state space is small enough) by means of constructing the corresponding state graphs of the ESPD.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Daar is baie voorbeelde van samewerking in the gemeenskap en in die natuur. In sommige gevalle lei samewerking tot 'n toename in die algehele welvaart van die betrokkenes, terwyl samewerking in ander gevalle tot nadeel van die bre er gemeenskap mag wees. Die voorkoms van samewerking blyk natuurlik te wees indien daar 'n direkte voordeel vir die individue is wat kies om saam te werk. In voorbeelde van samewerking is s o 'n voordeel egter nie altyd voor-diehand- liggend nie. Die sogenaamde prisoniersdilemma word dikwels as voorbeeld in die studie van samewerking gebruik om die faktore wat na samewerking lei, te ontbloot. In klassieke speleteorie word daar aangeneem dat elke speler rasioneel is en dus poog om sy spelstrategie op s o 'n manier te kies dat sy eie verwagte uitbetaling gemaksimeer word. In die geval van die klassieke prisoniersdilemma veroorsaak dit dat beide spelers mekaar verraai. In evolusion^ere speleteorie, daarenteen, word daar slegs aangeneem dat elke speler oor beperkte kennis van die spel en begrensde rasionaliteit beskik. Spele in evolusion^ere speleteorie word in rondtes herhaal en spelers word die geleentheid gebied om gedurende hierdie herhalingsproses aan te pas en te leer. Vorige studies het getoon dat samewerking 'n lewensvatbare strategie is indien die prisoniersdilemma in 'n evolusion^ere konteks gespeel word, waar die evolusion^ere ksheid van 'n strategie direk afhang van die uitbetaling van 'n speler wat die strategie volg. Een van die meganismes wat volhoubare samewerking in die evolusion^ere prisoniersdilemma voortbring, is gestruktureerde interaksie tussen spelers. 'n Wiskundige raamwerk word vir die voorstelling van die evolusion^ere prisoniersdilemma in hierdie tesis ontwikkel. Hierdie wiskundige raamwerk word gebruik om 'n analitiese studie (met ander woorde sonder die gebruik van simulasie) van die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma op 'n pad, siklus, rooster in die vlak, of rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek van stapel te stuur. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die waarskynlikheid vir die ontstaan van volhoubare samewerking tussen spelers te bepaal. Die prisoniersdilemma op 'n pad of siklus as onderliggende gra ek het twee fundamenteel verskillende parametergebiede tot gevolg; groot waardes van die versoeking-om-te-verraai parameter lei nie tot volhoubare samewerking nie, terwyl volhoubare samewerking wel vir klein waardes van hierdie parameter moontlik is. Daar word gevind dat die kans vir volhoubare samewerking toeneem tot sekerheid namate die orde van die onderliggende gra ek groei. Die toestandsruimte van die prisoniersdilemma met 'n rooster in die vlak of 'n rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek groei baie vinnig as 'n funksie van die orde van die gra ek. Die outomor smeklasse van die speltoestande word getel met die doel om te bepaal presies hoe vinnig die toestandsruimte van die spel as 'n funksie van die orde van die onderliggende gra ek groei. Die dinamika van die prisoniersdilemma met 'n rooster in die vlak of 'n rooster op die torus as onderliggende gra ek word laastens deur middel van konstruksies van die ooreenstemmende toestandsgra eke ondersoek (in gevalle waar die toestandsruimte klein genoeg is).

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

44

Kiani, Amirkiarash. "Study of Tied-up Capital Level in Supply Chain in Vehicle Sector". Thesis, Högskolan i Borås, Institutionen Ingenjörshögskolan, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hb:diva-16641.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

In vehicle industry, it has been trends towards focusing on pull-basedsystems and elimination of waste (Lean), which decrease the tied-up capitallevel in the focal factory. Research by Holweg & Miemczyk (2002)showed that the relevant supply chain has low inventory level in the focalfactory, but at upstream and especially downstream; the tied-up capitallevel is dramatically higher in comparison to the focal factory.By conducting research and extensive literature reviews, this volatilityof tied-up capital level has been studied and analysed with regard topush and pull systems. As the three main causes of this unevenness; bullwhipeffect, CODP position in supply chain and intensity level of supplierrelationship have been identified and explained.As a practical solution for decreasing the tied-up capital level of finishedvehicles, implementation of centralised warehouse structure hasbeen suggested and discussed.Moreover, as an application of game theory in logistics, iterated prisoners’dilemma has been discussed as the base for a progressive relationshipwith suppliers (upgrading to win-win game) which is requisite for the successof pull-based supply chains.
Program: BSc in Industrial Engineering - International Business Engineering

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

45

Elliott, Stuart W. (Stuart William). "Steps toward a psychological calculus for game theory : application of a model of categorization to the repeated prisoner's dilemma". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13123.

Testo completo

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

46

Simões, Patrício Manuel Vieira. "Cooperation in rats playing an interated Prisoner's dilemma game : influence of a game matrix formed with qualitatively distinct payoffs". Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.12/955.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

Dissertação de Mestrado em Etologia
O Dilema do Prisioneiro Reiterado (repetido) (DPR) é o paradigma centra! no estudo da cooperação de animais não-humanos. Este jogo formaliza os requerimentos descritos por Trivers (1971) para que a cooperação surja e se mantenha por reciprocidade. Neste jogo dois jogadores podem escolher numa jogada entre cooperar ou não cooperar: A cooperação mútua fornece a ambos os jogadores um reforço R (Reward), enquanto a não cooperação mútua fornece um reforço P (Punishment). Se um dos jogadores cooperar e o seu adversário não o fizer, o primeiro recebe um reforço S (Sucker) e o último recebe T (Temptation). Os reforços deste jogo terão que seguir as inequações T>R>P>S e 2R>T+S. O dilema deste jogo surge do facto de independentemente do que o adversário fizer, a escolha de um jogador que produz um maior reforço é não cooperar (T>R e P>S). No entanto ambos os jogadores receberiam um reforço maior se ambos cooperassem. Ser reiterado significa que existem um número não especificado de jogadas em que o resultado de uma determinada jogada poderá ser influenciado pelo resultado das anteriores. Axelrod e Hamilton (1981) mostraram que a cooperação poderá tornar-se sustentada num jogo DPR e que a estratégia Tit-For-Tat (TFT), em particular, é uma solução robusta para este problema. A estratégia TFT comanda um jogador a cooperar no encontro inicial e em encontros posteriores a copiar a decisão anterior do adversário. Apesar do grande sucesso ao nível da investigação teórica, existem poucos dados empíricos que suportem a reciprocidade (e por consequência o DPR) como a explicação principal para a cooperação nos animais. De facto, e ao nível de estudos laboratoriais, animais sujeitos a uma matriz de jogo conforme ao DPR mostraram valores diminutos de cooperação. O insucesso em manter a cooperação através de um paradigma DPR experimentalmente controlado, levou os investigadores a questionar que mecanismos poderão prevenir a emergência da cooperação nestes moldes. Uma abordagem alternativa utilizada foi experimentalmente controlar um dos jogadores num jogo do DPR, sendo na maior parte dos casos usada a estratégia TFT. Estes estudos mostraram que os animais sob o paradigma DPR dão prioridade às consequências de curto prazo, enquanto desvalorizam o resultado de jogadas futuras. Para mais, as contingências de reforço, quer locais, quer passadas (como por exemplo, a magnitude de reforço entre os resultados T, R, P e S) podem modificar a probabilidade de cooperação do animal. Partindo do princípio que jogar o DPR pode ser considerado uma tarefa de condicionamento operante, Stephens e Clements (1998) desenvolveram um modelo teórico que explora a relação entre os processos de aprendizagem e os equilíbrios teóricos do jogo utilizando matrizes de jogo com reforços positivos (recompensas), reforços negativos (castigos) ou ambos. A grande maioria dos estudos laboratoriais no DPR utiliza uma matriz de reforços positivos (na prática unidades de comida ou de dinheiro, se em humanos). No entanto este modelo apresenta um cenário interessante que deriva da aplicação de uma matriz de jogo em que os reforços S e P sejam: i) universalmente e sem ambiguidade considerados castigos e ii) qualitativamente distintos dos reforços T e R. Usando este tipo de matriz heterogénea, o modelo de Stephens e Clements prevê que os jogadores exibam elevados níveis de cooperação (entre os 60% e os 100%, dependendo da taxa de aprendizagem). Segundo o nosso conhecimento, tal matriz nunca foi aplicada em estudos de cooperação em animais não-humanos. Uma abordagem exclusivamente económica do DPR parece insuficiente para explicar a divergência entre predições teóricas e dados empíricos, visto que a estrutura clássica deste jogo não captura a sofisticação cognitiva que parece estar envolvida na cooperação por reciprocidade. Em concreto, os animais deverão ter capacidade de reconhecer o seu adversário como um indivíduo, compensar a diminuição do valor de reforço futuros e ter capacidade de memória suficiente para cumprir obrigações recíprocas de modo a que a cooperação por reciprocidade se mantenha. Para além dos obstáculos cognitivos, também as interacções sociais em si mesmas poderão limitar ou estimular a cooperação visto que a simples presença de um conspecífico poderá ter um valor de reforço não nulo. Deste modo, os reforços que os experimentadores tencionam dar numa experiência podem ser totalmente discordantes dos experienciados pelos animais. Esta dissertação pretende examinar as escolhas de ratazanas quando sujeitas a um jogo do DPR utilizando uma matriz de jogo constituída por reforços positivos (T- 4 pepitas de chocolate e R- 1 pepita de chocolate) e reforços negativos (P- 1 beliscão na cauda e S- 3 beliscões na cauda). Os animais jogaram contra um conspecífico programado para responder segundo uma estratégia TFT ou uma estratégia aleatória. As tendências cooperativas e as estratégias globais dos animais foram analisadas e os possíveis constrangimentos cognitivos e sociais que possam explicar as observações foram discutidos. Os resultados mostraram que quando as decisões são reciprocadas (oponente TFT), as ratazanas mostram níveis de cooperação sustentada de aproximadamente 60% por sessão, significativamente maior que os 12% de cooperação observada em ratazanas que jogaram contra uma estratégia aleatória. O sujeitos que jogaram contra um oponente TFT parecem ter adoptado uma estratégia de jogo sub-óptima, mostrando níveis altos de cooperação sustentada e de não cooperação sustentada e alta probabilidade de "perdão". Ratazanas que jogaram contra uma estratégia aleatória pareceram mostrar uma estratégia de jogo a tender para o óptimo. Observou-se que a presença e posição de um conspecífico influenciou as decisões das ratazanas quando estas envolviam dois reforços positivos de diferente valor. Esta influência social foi nula quando a decisão envolvia dois reforços negativos. Este reforço externo proveniente da componente social dos animais poderá modificar o valor da matriz de jogo recebida pelos animais num contexto de DPR. Foi observada uma preferência por parte das ratazanas em entrar nos compartimentos imediatamente adjacentes ao conspecífico quando os reforços entregues eram positivos.Esta influência externa poderá modificar as tendências cooperativas e as estratégias de jogo das ratazanas sujeitas a um jogo DPR. Estes animais mostraram-se sensíveis a contingências de reforço passadas e cooperaram significativamente menos contra uma estratégia TFT (cerca de 26%) quando previamente submetidas a uma estratégia aleatória. Este estudo demonstra que animais não-humanos podem apresentar altos níveis de cooperação sustentada num contexto DPR cuja matriz de jogo seja constituída por reforços positivos e negativos. No entanto, quer os níveis de cooperação observados, quer as estratégias adoptadas pelas ratazanas contra um oponente conspecífico são influenciados por efeitos sociais e de contingências de reforço passadas. Tal implica que uma perspectiva exclusivamente económica é insuficiente para explicar comportamentos cooperativos em animais. Não obstante, o DPR representa ainda uma ferramenta válida para o estudo da cooperação se se considerar os efeitos sociais e históricos próprios das interacções cooperativas entre os animais.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

47

Bello, Madina. "Médiation et résolution des conflits armés : le cas du conflit ivoirien (1999 - 2007)". Thesis, Montpellier, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015MONTD002.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

La Côte d’Ivoire, pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest prospère et stable depuis le début de l’indépendance de 1960, bascule dans une longue et douloureuse guerre, le 24 décembre 1999, à la suite d’une mutinerie de soldats. S’en suit alors un intense ballet diplomatique visant à rétablir la paix et la Côte d’Ivoire assiste alors à plusieurs tentatives de médiation internationale. Cette recherche vise à comprendre la notion de succès en médiation en proposant de modéliser le conflit ivoirien à partir d’un modèle de la théorie des jeux, celui du dilemme du prisonnier
Often cited as a model of peace and stability, Ivory Coast, a West African economic powerhouse, was embroiled in a civil war in September 2002 that disrupted the institutional order. During this time, the country was divided into the Southern and Northern zones. The former, a coastal area, is referred to as the "Governmental Zone". The Northern is the area that was captured in September 2002, by a few thousand army mutineers. Between the two North and South divide lies the buffer zone called the Zone de confiance, which served as a military buffer zone between the North and the South. How did the division occur? How did the several mediation work? Could we ensure that the signing of a peace agreement guaranteed a mediation success?

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

48

Szabó, Josef. "How to avoid Copenhagen : An experimental economic approach to climate negotiations". Thesis, Högskolan Dalarna, Nationalekonomi, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:du-5944.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

This study got its origin in the failed climate negotiations in the Copenhagen 2009 summit. By conducting a public good game, with participants from China and Sweden, my study indicates that previous studies on public good games can predict the outcome of the game to a quit large extent even though most of my statistical tests came out statistically insignificant. My study also indicates that by framing the game as climate negotiations there were no statistical significant difference on the level of contributions in comparison to the unframed versions of the game. The awareness of the issues with emissions, global warming and other environmental problems are pretty high but even so when push comes to shove gains in the short run are prioritized to gains in the long run. There are however hypothetical willingness to come to term with the environmental issues. The results of the study indicate that the outcome of the Copenhagen summit can be avoidable but would need additional experiments made on cultural differences and behavior.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

49

Gaines, David Alexander. "INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE COGNITIVE ABILITIES OF ALTERNATE LEARNING CLASSIFIER SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES". UKnowledge, 2006. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/250.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

The Learning Classifier System (LCS) and its descendant, XCS, are promising paradigms for machine learning design and implementation. Whereas LCS allows classifier payoff predictions to guide system performance, XCS focuses on payoff-prediction accuracy instead, allowing it to evolve "optimal" classifier sets in particular applications requiring rational thought. This research examines LCS and XCS performance in artificial situations with broad social/commercial parallels, created using the non-Markov Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game-playing scenario, where the setting is sometimes asymmetric and where irrationality sometimes pays. This research systematically perturbs a "conventional" IPD-playing LCS-based agent until it results in a full-fledged XCS-based agent, contrasting the simulated behavior of each LCS variant in terms of a number of performance measures. The intent is to examine the XCS paradigm to understand how it better copes with a given situation (if it does) than the LCS perturbations studied.Experiment results indicate that the majority of the architectural differences do have a significant effect on the agents' performance with respect to the performance measures used in this research. The results of these competitions indicate that while each architectural difference significantly affected its agent's performance, no single architectural difference could be credited as causing XCS's demonstrated superiority in evolving optimal populations. Instead, the data suggests that XCS's ability to evolve optimal populations in the multiplexer and IPD problem domains result from the combined and synergistic effects of multiple architectural differences.In addition, it is demonstrated that XCS is able to reliably evolve the Optimal Population [O] against the TFT opponent. This result supports Kovacs' Optimality Hypothesis in the IPD environment and is significant because it is the first demonstrated occurrence of this ability in an environment other than the multiplexer and Woods problem domains.It is therefore apparent that while XCS performs better than its LCS-based counterparts, its demonstrated superiority may not be attributed to a single architectural characteristic. Instead, XCS's ability to evolve optimal classifier populations in the multiplexer problem domain and in the IPD problem domain studied in this research results from the combined and synergistic effects of multiple architectural differences.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

50

Zuo, Xingdong. "Derivation of the Lindblad Equation for Open Quantum Systems and Its Application to Mathematical Modeling of the Process of Decision Making". Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för matematik (MA), 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-38711.

Testo completo

Abstract (sommario):

In the theory of open quantum systems, a quantum Markovian master equation, the Lindblad equation, reveals the most general form for the generators of a quantum dynamical semigroup. In this thesis, we present the derivation of the Lindblad equation and several examples of Lindblad equations with their analytic and numerical solutions. The graphs of the numerical solutions illuminate the dynamics and the stabilization as time increases. The corresponding von Neumann entropies are also presented as graphs. Moreover, to illustrate the difference between the dynamics of open and isolated systems, we prove two theorems about the conditions for stabilization of the solutions of the von Neumann equation which describes the dynamics of the density matrix of open quantum systems. It shows that the von Neumann equation is not satisfied for modelling dynamics in the cognitive contextin general. Instead, we use the Lindblad equation to model the mental dynamics of the players in the game of the 2-player prisoner’s dilemma to explain the irrational behaviors of the players. The stabilizing solution will lead the mental dynamics to an equilibrium state, which is regarded as the termination of the comparison process for a decision maker. The resulting pure strategy is selected probabilistically by performing a quantum measurement. We also discuss two important concepts, quantum decoherence and quantum Darwinism. Finally, we mention a classical Neural Network Master Equation introduced by Cowan and plan our further works on an analogous version for the quantum neural network by using the Lindblad equation.

Gli stili APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO e altri

Tesi sul tema "Prisoners dilemma"

Cita una fonte nei formati APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard e in molti altri stili