Bibliografie tematiche / Prisoners dilemma

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Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Prisoners dilemma"

Autore: Grafiati
Pubblicato: 4 giugno 2021
Ultima modifica: 27 aprile 2022

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Articoli di riviste sul tema "Prisoners dilemma"

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Gilbert, Daniel R. "The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Prisoners of the Prisoner's Dilemma". Business Ethics Quarterly 6, n. 2 (aprile 1996): 165–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857621.

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AbstractThe Prisoner's Dilemma is a popular device used by researchers to analyze such institutions as business and the modern corporation. This popularity is not deserved under a certain condition that is widespread in college education. If we, as management educators, take seriously our parts in preparing our students to participate in the institutions of a democratic society, then the Prisoner's Dilemma—as clever a rhetorical device as it is—is an unacceptable means to that end. By posing certain questions about the prisoners in the Prisoner's Dilemma, I show that management educators have created a Prisoners Dilemma, whereby they intellectually imprison themselves and their students by continuing to appeal to the Prisoner's Dilemma. These questions are not encouraged by the advocates of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Gendin, Sidney. "Prisoners' dilemma for prisoners". Criminal Justice Ethics 8, n. 1 (gennaio 1989): 23–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0731129x.1988.9991848.

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Marren, Patrick. "Prisoners' dilemma". Journal of Business Strategy 32, n. 3 (3 maggio 2011): 50–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02756661111122009.

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Maier, Katharina H., e Rosemary Ricciardelli. "The prisoner’s dilemma: How male prisoners experience and respond to penal threat while incarcerated". Punishment & Society 21, n. 2 (13 febbraio 2018): 231–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1462474518757091.

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Drawing on interview data with 56 former prisoners in Canada, we examine how male prisoners understand, experience, and respond to threat while incarcerated. We show that prisoners face a variety of different and often competing threats, resulting from prisoner interactions (e.g. threat of physical violence for being a “snitch”) on the one side, and institutional powers and procedures on the other side (e.g. threat of delayed release from prison). These threats are competing insofar as countering a prisoner threat opens the door to threat on the institutional level (i.e. administrative uncertainties) and vice versa. As a consequence, we show how feeling threatened for prisoners becomes paramount and in many cases unavoidable as the different threats in prison are difficult, if not impossible, to handle in unison. However, in an effort to stay physically safe and work toward their release, prisoners must find viable strategies to navigate different prison environments, particularly as they move between prisons of differing security classifications. We draw on Giddens' notion of “ontological insecurity” to draw attention to prisoners' feelings of perpetual vulnerability and insecurity. In addition, we build on Luhmann's conceptualization of risk and danger to explain how male prisoners experience and respond to moments of “danger” when they are faced with competing threats and must decide how to best navigate them.
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Daniel, G., M. Arce e Todd Sandler. "The Dilemma of the Prisoners' Dilemmas". Kyklos 58, n. 1 (febbraio 2005): 3–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2005.00275.x.

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Stephens, Glenn. "The Prisoners' Dilemma". Rationality and Society 6, n. 4 (ottobre 1994): 520–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463194006004006.

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Blonski, Matthias, e Giancarlo Spagnolo. "Prisoners’ other Dilemma". International Journal of Game Theory 44, n. 1 (30 marzo 2014): 61–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0419-9.

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Friedman, Daniel, e Ryan Oprea. "A Continuous Dilemma". American Economic Review 102, n. 1 (1 febbraio 2012): 337–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.337.

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We study prisoners' dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90 percent. Control sessions with repeated matchings over eight subperiods achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases, and, with one-second subperiods, they approach continuous levels. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner's dilemma. (JEL C72, C78, C91)
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Lu, Gong Shu, Cun Bin Li e Xian Li. "New Nash Equilibrium Based on Generic Risk Element Transmission Theory". Advanced Materials Research 424-425 (gennaio 2012): 410–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.424-425.410.

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Nash equilibrium is the foundation of traditional game theory, while the benefits of game players under the Nash equilibrium are constant, so the core idea of generic risk transmission was applied to traditional static game. Accordingly a risk static game model, in which the benefits of players were subject to triangular distribution, was constructed. Then we obtained different equilibrium states under the different risk types of players. Furthermore, the classic Prisoners’ Dilemma was used to demonstrate the practice value of risk game. Through analyzing and solving the risk Prisoners’ Dilemma model which changed from the classic Prisoner's Dilemma model according to actual situation, the Pareto improvement strategy combination could be achieved. The new equilibrium result can give an appropriate explanation why there is always some prisoners conceal the corpus delicti in adventure
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Sumner, Jennifer, e Lori Sexton. "Same Difference: The “Dilemma of Difference” and the Incarceration of Transgender Prisoners". Law & Social Inquiry 41, n. 03 (2016): 616–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12193.

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This article examines the “dilemma of difference” transgender prisoners pose and face within a sex-segregated prison system organized around the pursuit of safety and security. Our analysis uses data from a study of the culture and experiences of transgender prisoners in four men's prisons. Using qualitative data from interviews with transgender prisoners, focus groups with prisoners, and focus groups with staff, our findings reveal a common contention that transgender prisoners are (according to staff) and should be (according to prisoners) treated like everyone else, despite their unique situations. This further demonstrates the stakes that this dilemma carries for the prison regime and transgender prisoners' roles in challenging it without engaging in overt resistance—which carries high stakes for them. Accordingly, we elucidate how the rigidity of an institutional structure built on inherent contradictions can have the potential to complicate the achievement of institutional goals.
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Più fonti

Tesi sul tema "Prisoners dilemma"

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Stevens, Adele. "A paradigm for the study of paranoia in the nonclinical population: prisoners' dilemma game". Thesis, University of London, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.589431.

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A growing body of research shows that paranoia is common in the general population. This thesis reports two studies that examined the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) as a paradigm for evaluation of nonclinical paranoia. The PDG is a well-validated paradigm, used widely in social psychological research but only used in one study to date to examine paranoia. The PDG captures three key qualities that are at the heart of paranoia - it is interpersonal, it concerns threat, and it concerns perception of others' intentions towards the self. The aim of Study 1 was to investigate whether the PDG captures the interpersonal nature of paranoia specifically. Study 1 found that higher state paranoia was significantly associated with selection of the competitive PDG choice in a nonclinical population (n=110). Crucially, state paranoia was only significantly associated with competitive PDG choice when participants believed that they were playing the PDG against another person, and not when playing against a computer, confirming the interpersonal nature of the association. The aim of Study 2 was to investigate if fear, which is " relevant to paranoia, motivated the choice to compete on the PDG in those experiencing elevated levels of paranoia. In Study 2, we used a self-report questionnaire to assess fear and greed, in addition to state paranoia in a nonclinical population (n=149). Higher state paranoia was associated with competition on the PDG based on fear (but not with competition based on greed). It was concluded that the PDG paradigm does capture the essential interpersonal nature of paranoia and is a useful methodology for studying nonclinical paranoia. 3
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Wendelheim, Felix, e Rickard Carls. "Aktörers beteenden på köpcentrummarknaden". Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-172371.

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Sampaio, Angelo Augusto Silva. "Metacontingência, dilema do prisioneiro e cooperação: efeitos da interação verbal e da forma de apresentação da consequência cultural". Universidade de São Paulo, 2016. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/47/47132/tde-05082016-152149/.

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Em uma metacontingência, respostas de dois ou mais indivíduos interagindo (denominadas um culturante) produzem estímulos (denominados de consequências culturais) capazes de afetar a recorrências daquelas respostas. Resultados de experimentos sobre metacontingência têm sido tratados como demonstrações de um tipo de seleção cultural. Além de sugerir a importância de interações verbais entre participantes, alguns desses experimentos têm empregado tarefas baseadas no dilema do prisioneiro repetido (iterated prisoners dilemma, IPD) interpretando-o, porém, como a programação apenas de contingências operantes. O Experimento 1 avaliou se um IPD com mais de 200 tentativas produziria escolhas cooperativas simultâneas de modo fidedigno e se a interação verbal entre participantes aumentaria a cooperação. 4 quartetos de universitários utilizaram 4 computadores conectados em rede (sem contato visual) e foram expostos a condições com ou sem permissão para usar uma sala de bate-papo pelo computador (chat) em um delineamento de linhas de base múltiplas entre quartetos. Os resultados demonstraram claramente que escolhas cooperativas unânimes podem ocorrer fidedignamente em um IPD e que a interação verbal entre participantes aumenta rapidamente tais escolhas. Esses resultados destacam a semelhança entre estudos sobre IPD e sobre metacontingências, nos quais são programadas consequências para comportamentos inter-relacionados de vários indivíduos. No Experimento 2, uma consequência cultural foi sobreposta às consequências já programadas pelo IPD: os quartetos podiam produzir pontos iguais para todos os participantes (feedback do mercado) contingentes a diferentes números de escolhas cooperativas. Como no Experimento 1, condições nas quais o uso do chat eram ou não permitidos foram arranjadas em um delineamento de linhas de base múltiplas entre quartetos. A interação verbal promoveu rápida e marcadamente a seleção cultural pelo feedback do mercado. Um quarteto apresentou algum controle dos culturantes pelo feedback do mercado antes das interações verbais, mas após o uso do chat a produção das consequências culturais aumentou substancialmente. O Experimento 3 replicou o Experimento 2 apresentando o feedback do mercado da mesma forma que os pontos do IPD, i.e., sem diversos estímulos verbais que sugerem a sua produção pelo quarteto como um todo. A interação verbal promoveu ao menos algum controle das escolhas pelo feedback do mercado em 2 dos 3 quartetos, sugerindo que a forma de apresentação da consequência cultural é irrelevante para os efeitos de uma consequência cultural. Os resultados dos 3 experimentos destacam a importância da interação verbal para a seleção cultural. Além disso, sugerem que um IPD programa uma situação análoga à programada em estudos sobre metacontingência, esclarecendo as diferenças entre os procedimentos empregados no estudo do IPD e de metacontingências e permitindo que avanços em uma área possam ser aproveitados pela outra
In a metacontingency, responses of two or more interacting individuals (a culturant) produce stimuli (called cultural consequences) that affect the recurrence of those responses. Results of metacontingency experiments are said to demonstrate a kind of cultural selection. Besides suggesting the importance of verbal interactions between participants, some of these experiments have used tasks based on the iterated prisoner\'s dilemma (IPD) interpreting it, however, as programming only operant contingencies. Experiment 1 examined whether an IPD with 200-plus trials would produce simultaneous cooperative choices reliably and whether verbal interaction between participants would increase cooperation. 4 quartets of undergraduate and graduate students used 4 networked computers (without visual contact), and were exposed to conditions with or without permission to use the computer chat room in a multiple baseline design between quartets. Results clearly demonstrate that unanimous cooperative choices can occur reliably in an IPD, and that verbal interaction between participants rapidly increases such choices. These results highlight the similarity between IPD and metacontingencies studies, both of which program consequences for inter-related behaviors of many individuals. In Experiment 2, a cultural consequence was superimposed on the consequences already programmed by the IPD: quartets could produce equal points for all participants (market feedback) contingent on different numbers of cooperative choices. As in Experiment 1, we arranged conditions in which chat use were or not allowed in a multiple baseline design between quartets. Verbal interaction quickly and markedly promoted cultural selection by the market feedback. One quartet presented some control of culturants by the market feedback before verbal interactions, but production of cultural consequences increased substantially after using the chat. Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 presenting the market feedback the same way that the IPD points, i.e., without several verbal stimuli that suggest its production by the quartet as a whole. Verbal interaction promoted at least some control of the choices by the market feedback in 2 of the 3 quartets, suggesting that the form of cultural consequence presentation is irrelevant for the effects of a cultural consequence. The results of the three experiments highlight the importance of verbal interaction for cultural selection. Furthermore, they suggest that an IPD program a situation analogous to the one employed in metacontingency studies, clarifying differences between procedures used in the study of IPD and of metacontingencies, and allowing advances in one area be employed by another
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Dabrowski, Peter. "Surplus Cities : An Investigation in Density Externalities and a Consequent New Approach to Urbanism". Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-185743.

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The founding premise of this paper is simple; that urban density has positive externalities and that these are unaccounted for in the developers’ density choice. This paper looks at the incentive structure of individual developers though a theoretical perspective and shows that the density choice is a suboptimal product of a prisoner’s dilemma game. Two mechanisms are proposed to achieve the optimal level of density. The first is an Inverse Density Tax which fixes the incentive structure at the agent level by internalizing the positive externalities of density. The second is the Supply Buffer which solves the regulation problem. The disconnect between what is good for a city and what policies are actually practiced by planners is addressed by suggesting a new approach to urbanism called the Surplus Cities approach which suggests a more positive approach to urbanism instead of the multitude of normative approaches that encompass the existing urban planning profession. The significance of the model in the paper is that it shows that the optimum density a developer should build is not the commonly accepted quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, but greater due to positive externalities of density. In addition this paper presents the tools to a) achieve the optimal level of density and b) introduce a separation of powers in municipal government between planning the city and controlling real estate supply which restrains the growth of cities; as has been a prominent subject of contemporary urban economics discourse.
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Gert, Johan. "TV-marknaden för sändningsrättigheter kopplade till sportevenemang : En spelteoretisk analys". Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2003. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-1825.

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Background: Sporting events conveyed by the TV medium affect people and can give many unforgettable experiences. Sport may be synonymous with excitement and drama or just serve as entertainment. Through TV broadcasts from different sporting events, millions of televiewers all over the world have enjoyed athletic feats of extreme top class. TV broadcast sport always attracts a great number of viewers, also in Sweden. The prices of broadcasting rights to sporting events have risen strongly during the last decade, much as a consequence of the increasing competition between different TV companies both internationally and in Sweden. The development of prices is also a result of the monopoly situation which exists in the sales link of broadcasting rights, where the sport organizations and the companies holding the original rights, have learnt to make the most of their market power.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the TV market concerning the broadcasting rights to sporting events. This is done starting from Robert Axelrod's theory of co-operation. The thesis is that different TV companies, through an implicit kind of co-operation, could be able to counteract the monopoly situation, which exists in the retail link of broadcasting rights. This might be done in a way that lowers the price of the rights to a level closer to the marginal cost.

Method: The basis of this paper is mainly Robert Axelrod's theory of co- operation, used in a qualitative study starting from a scientific hermeneutic point of view. The frame of reference is built on an already existing theory applied on a problem, which gives the paper a deductive character. The material has been gathered from literature, newspapers and the Internet completed with interviews with representatives of the studied TV channels on the Swedish market.

Results: The results show that it can be rational for TV channels to co-operate concerning the broadcasting rights of sporting events. An absolute condition for achieving a mutual co-operation is that the discount rate is high enough and that the parties can put aside any possible jealousy. But there are problems if the parties value their own rights considerably less than those of their competitors. If they exploit the opponent and he answers by making a counter defection, the counter defection will not seem deterrent. This makes it more difficult to achieve a mutual co-operation. It is difficult to give a verdict on the opportunities of co-operation on the Swedish market, as we do not know exactly how the parties value the different rights. Listing the rights gives a negative influence on the possibilities of achieving a mutual co-operation between certain TV channels, because it destroys the possibilities of certain channels to retaliate. At the same time the possibility of mutual co-operation increases between the channels which are not involved in the restrictions. This happens because the parties are fewer and it leads to an increased degree of interaction. If co-operation is achieved the prices of the broadcasting rights can be cut down which would reduce the deadweight loss which arises as a result of the monopoly situation in the sales link.


Bakgrund: Sportögonblick förmedlade genom TV-mediet berör och kan ge många oförglömliga upplevelser. Sport kan vara synonymt med spänning och dramatik eller enbart tjäna som underhållning. Genom TV-utsändningar från olika sportevenemang har miljontals tittare världen över kommit i åtnjutande av idrottsprestationer av yttersta världsklass. TV-utsänd sport får ofta höga tittarsiffror, så även i Sverige. Priserna på sändningsrättigheter kopplade till sport har under det senaste decenniet stigit kraftigt, mycket till följd av en allt större konkurrens mellan olika TV-bolag, både internationellt och i Sverige. Prisutvecklingen är också ett resultat av den monopolsituation som finns i försäljningsledet av sändningsrättigheter, där idrottsorganisationer och rättighetsbolag, som äger de ursprungliga rättigheterna, har lärt sig att utnyttja sin marknadsmakt.

Syfte: Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att analysera TV-marknaden när det gäller sändningsrättigheter kopplade till sportevenemang. Detta görs utifrån en spelteoretisk ansats, i form av Robert Axelrods samarbetsteori, som bygger på studier av upprepade spel av fångarnas dilemma. Tesen är att olika TV-bolag genom en implicit form av samarbete, som går ut på att TV-bolagen i framtiden enbart bjuder på de sändningsrättigheter de har idag, skulle kunna motverka de negativa effekter som den monopolsituation som finns i försäljningsledet av sändningsrättigeter genererar, på ett sådant sätt att priset på rättigheterna sjunker till en nivå som ligger närmare marginalkostnaden för produktion.

Metod: Uppsatsen utgår från Robert Axelrods samarbetsteori, som har använts i en kvalitativ studie med ett hermeneutiskt vetenskapsideal som utgångspunkt. Referensramen bygger på redan befintlig teori, som appliceras på en problemställning, vilket gör att uppsatsen är deduktiv till sin karaktär. Material har inhämtats med hjälp av litteratur, tidningar och Internet, och har därtill kompletterats med kortare intervjuer med företrädare för de studerade TV-kanalerna på den svenska marknaden.

Resultat: Resultatet visar att det kan vara rationellt för TV-kanaler att samarbeta när det gäller sändningsrättigheter kopplade till sportevenemang. En absolut förutsättning för att uppnå ömsesidigt samarbete är att diskonteringsfaktorn är tillräckligt hög och att parterna kan lägga eventuell avundsjuka därhän. Men det finns problem, om parterna till exempel värderar sina egna rättigheter betydligt lägre än konkurrenternas. Om de exploaterar motståndaren och denne svarar med ett motavhopp, verkar motavhoppet inte avskräckande. Detta försvårar möjligheterna att uppnå ömsesidigt samarbete. Det är svårt att uttala sig om förutsättningarna för samarbete på den svenska marknaden, då vi inte vet exakt hur parterna värderar olika rättigheter. En listning av rättigheter inverkar negativt på möjligheterna att nå ömsesidigt samarbete mellan vissa TV-kanaler, eftersom den omintetgör vissa kanalers möjligheter att utöva vedergällning. Samtidigt ökar dock möjligheterna till ömsesidigt samarbete mellan de kanaler som inte omfattas av restriktionerna eftersom aktörerna blir färre till antalet, vilket leder till att interaktionsgraden ökar. Om ett samarbete kommer till stånd, kan priserna på rättigheterna pressas, vilket skulle reducera den allokeringsförlust som uppkommer till följd av monopolsituationen i försäljningsledet.

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Pereira, Marcelo Alves. "Dilema do prisioneiro contínuo com agentes racionais e classificadores de cooperação". Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/59/59135/tde-08012013-222525/.

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Abstract (sommario):
O dilema do prisioneiro (DP) é um dos principais jogos da teoria dos jogos. No dilema do prisioneiro discreto (DPD), dois prisioneiros têm as opções de cooperar ou desertar. Um jogador cooperador não delata seu comparsa, já um desertor delata. Se um cooperar e o outro desertar, o cooperador fica preso por cinco anos e o desertor fica livre. Se ambos cooperarem, ficam presos por um ano e, se ambos desertarem, ficam presos por três anos. Quando o DP é repetido, a cooperação pode emergir entre agentes egoístas. Realizamos um estudo analítico para o DPD, que produziu uma formulação da evolução do nível médio de cooperação e da tentação crítica (valor de tentação que causa mudança abrupta do nível de cooperação). No dilema do prisioneiro contínuo (DPC), cada jogador apresenta um nível de cooperação que define o grau de cooperação. Utilizamos o DPC para estudar o efeito da personalidade dos jogadores sobre a emergência da cooperação. Para isso, propusemos novas estratégias: uma baseada na personalidade dos jogadores e outras duas baseadas na comparação entre o ganho obtido e a aspiração do jogador. Todas as estratégias apresentavam algum mecanismo de cópia do estado do vizinho com maior ganho na vizinhança, mecanismo este, herdado da estratégia darwiniana. Os resultados mostraram que o DPC aumenta o nível médio de cooperação do sistema, quando comparado ao DPD. No entanto, as diferentes estratégias não aumentaram a cooperação comparado à cooperação obtida com a estratégia darwiniana. Então propusemos o uso do coeficiente de agrupamentos, coeficiente de Gini e entropias de Shannon, Tsallis e Kullback-Leibler para classificar os sistemas, em que os agentes jogam o DPD com a estratégia darwiniana, quanto ao nível de cooperação. Como analisamos valores de médias configuracionais, tais classificadores não foram eficientes ao classificar os sistemas. Isso é consequência da existência de distribuições de extremos nos resultados que compõem as médias. As distribuições de extremos suscitaram uma discussão acerca da definição do regime de cooperação no dilema do prisioneiro. Discutimos também as consequências de utilizar apenas valores médios nos resultados ignorando seus desvios e as distribuições.
Prisoner\'s dilemma (PD) is one of the main games of game theory. In discrete prisoner\'s dilemma (DPD), two prisoners have the options to cooperate or to defect. A cooperator player does not defect his accomplice, while a defector does. If one player cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets jailed for five years and the defector goes free. If both cooperate, they get jailed during one year and if both defect, they get jailed during three years. When this game is repeated, cooperation may emerge among selfish individuals. We perform an analytical study for the DPD, that produced a formulation for the evolution of the mean cooperation level and for the critical temptation values (temptation values that promote abrupt modifications in the cooperation level). In continuous prisoner\'s dilemma (CPD), each player has a level of cooperation that defines his/her degree of cooperation. We used the CPD to study the effect of the players\' personality on the emergence of cooperation. For this, we propose new strategies: one based on the players\' personality and two others based on the comparison between the player\'s obtained payoff and the desire one. All strategies present some mechanism that copies the state of the neighbor with the highest payoff in the neighborhood, mechanism inherited from the Darwinian strategy. The results showed that the CPD increases the average cooperation level of the system when compared to DPD. However, different strategies do not increased the cooperation compared to cooperation obtained with the Darwinian strategy. So, we propose the use of cluster coefficient, Gini coefficient and entropy of Shannon, Tsallis and Kullback-Leibler as classifiers to classify systems, in which the individuals play DPD with Darwinian strategy, by the cooperation level. As configurational averages were analyzed, such classifiers were not efficient in classifying the systems. This is due to the existence of distributions with extreme values of the results that compose the means. Distributions with extremes values emerged a discussion about the definition of the cooperation state in the prisoner\'s dilemma. We also discussed the consequences of using only average results in the analysis ignoring their deviations and distributions.
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Estenberg, Gabriel. "The National Security Perspective Revisited. States’ Energy Security and the Environmental Security". Thesis, Malmö universitet, Fakulteten för kultur och samhälle (KS), 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-22800.

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The purpose of this thesis is to counterargue Simon Dalby’s claim that the national security perspective should be replaced by a global security perspective. Dalby argues that the national security is inappropriate to capture the current issues regarding the environmental security. To counterargue Dalby’s claim, I represent the national security perspective by using the perspective of states’ energy security, and compare current trends and issues regarding states’ energy security and the environmental security. This is done to argue that states can either chose to enhance their own energy security or the environmental security. Prisoners' Dilemma is then used as a theoretical framework on an explanatory example to provide insights about a dilemma, called the Energy- Environment Dilemma in this thesis, that curbs states’ ability to commit themselves to the cause of protecting the environmental security. The explanatory example used is the strategic importance of the Northwest passage for the U.S. and Canada. The results of this thesis suggests that the national security perspective, in combination with Prisoners’ Dilemma, is useful to provide insights about the Energy-Environmental Dilemma. Replacing it with a global security perspective would be to ignore a perspective which can provide insights about a challenge for states to commit to the cause of protecting the environmental security.
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Strömberg, Sara. "Sveriges inställning till EMU : underkastelse av kollektivet kontra nationell obundenhet". Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2002. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-1579.

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After Sweden became a member of the European Union, EU, the debate regarding the Swedish participation in the EU’s currency co-operation, the European Monetary Union, EMU, has been intense. One of the biggest issues has been how our national economic politics will work within such a monetary union. What instrument will remain for the national economic politics within the EMU are highly uncertain. The question whether we will be able to affect our own economy or not has long been the essence in the Swedish debate. At the same time that Sweden got membership in the EU, Austria became a member as well. Austria is just like Sweden a small open economy with many similarities to Sweden with regard to politics and economics. One big difference between the countries though, is that Austria at once became a member of the currency co-operation and joined the EMU from the start of it. The debates regarding the EMU has been very much alike in the two countries, though it differs in one important question. One big question that has been raised in Austria is the potential of a wider co-operation within the EMU than at present. This discussion has led to suggestions of a wider co-operation through discussions between the EMU-countries, larger possibilities for sanctions against countries which are not following the common economic plan or even suggestions about a politic union. There is very much a discussion in the spirit of collectivism. In Sweden non of this is even an issue. Here the whole debate is focused on the national possibilities and losses in a monetary union. How the country will be able to optimise its own good within the EMU is the only thing of interest in the Swedish debate. The point of view is always the national good and has never the collectivism in mind.

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Lee, Cheuk-wah, e 李焯華. "Confucianism and the prisoner's dilemma". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2001. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31953104.

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Lee, Cheuk-wah. "Confucianism and the prisoner's dilemma". Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 2001. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk:8888/cgi-bin/hkuto%5Ftoc%5Fpdf?B23457296.

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Libri sul tema "Prisoners dilemma"

1

Petropoulou, Dimitra. International trade, minimum quality standards and the prisoners' dilemma. London: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008.

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Ryan, Michael J. Intervening duality representations and resolutions of the prisoners dilemma. Hull: University of Hull. Department of Economics, 1996.

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The prisoners' dilemma political economy and punishment in contemporary democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

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Simons, Frank D. You don't cry for heroes: (the POW dilemma). [Rochester, IN]: Civil Fact Finding Commission for POW/MIA in Southeast Asia, 1988.

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Marcus Adrianus Leonardus Maria van Assen. Essays on actor models in exchange networks and social dilemmas. [S.l: s.n.], 2001.

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Brown, John M. G. Moscow bound: Policy, politics, and the POW/MIA dilemma. Eureka, Calif: Veteran Press, 1993.

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Cable, John. Reciprocity in the prisoners' dilemma: A new look at profit-sharing, participation and work organisation. Coventry: University of Warwick Department of Economics, 1989.

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Cable, John. Why is participatory production not the norm?: A prisoners' dilemma in the choice of work organisation. Coventry: Department of Economics, University of Warwick, 1986.

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Prisoner's dilemma. London: Atlantic, 2010.

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Powers, Richard. Prisoner's dilemma. New York: Beech Tree Books, 1988.

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Capitoli di libri sul tema "Prisoners dilemma"

1

Nalebuff, Barry. "Prisoners’ Dilemma". In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 1489–95. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_285.

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Churchman, David. "Prisoners’ Dilemma". In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies, 1–2. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11795-5_61-1.

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Helmold, Marc. "Prisoners’ Dilemma and Negotiation Types". In Successful International Negotiations, 25–29. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33483-3_2.

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Seifi, Shahla. "Prisoners’ Dilemma: A Method for Analysis". In Approaches to Global Sustainability, Markets, and Governance, 57–91. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6498-1_4.

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Ling, Yun, Jian Liu, Ping Zhu e Guiyi Wei. "Rigorous Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Prisoners’ Dilemma Game". In Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 312–21. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06944-9_22.

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de Jasay, Anthony. "Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Theory of the State". In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 1495–503. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_286.

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Burkhardt, Thomas, Armin Leopold e Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger. "Markov Simulation of an Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma Experiment". In Operations Research Proceedings, 223–28. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_36.

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Holler, Manfred J., e Barbara Klose-Ullmann. "The Prisoners’ Dilemma, but Who Are the Players?" In Scissors and Rock, 39–57. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44823-3_3.

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Solà, Carles. "The Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma: Reciprocity and Group Size Effects". In Experimental Economics: Financial Markets, Auctions, and Decision Making, 211–25. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0917-2_14.

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Majeski, Stephen, Greg Linden, Corina Linden e Aaron Spitzer. "A Spatial Iterated Prisoners Dilemma Game Simulation With Movement". In Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 161–67. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03366-1_12.

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Atti di convegni sul tema "Prisoners dilemma"

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Ashlock, Daniel, Christopher Kuusela e Nicholas Rogers. "Hormonal systems for prisoners dilemma agents". In 2011 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2011.6031990.

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Bakshi, Tuli, Arindam Sinharay e Tanmoy Som. "A novel soft set theoretic prisoners' dilemma game model". In 2016 3rd International Conference on Recent Advances in Information Technology (RAIT). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/rait.2016.7507894.

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Agudo, J. Enrique, e Colin Fyfe. "Reinforcement Learning for the N-Persons Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma". In 2011 Seventh International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cis.2011.111.

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Al-Khalifa, Hend S., Henda Chorfi, Afnan A. Al-Subaihin, Amal Al-Ibrahim e Maha Al-Yahya. "Incorporating the Prisoners' Dilemma in Peer-Assessment: An Experimental Study". In 2011 11th IEEE International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies (ICALT). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icalt.2011.99.

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Leas, Mikaela, Emily Dolson, Riley Annis, Joshua Nahum, Laura Grabowski e Charles Ofria. "The Prisoners Dilemma, Memory, and the Early Evolution of Intelligence". In Proceedings of the Artificial Life Conference 2016. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-33936-0-ch068.

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Sun, He. "Analysis on the Problems in Online Shopping Under Prisoners Dilemma". In 2021 International Conference on Enterprise Management and Economic Development (ICEMED 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.210601.059.

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Lai, Xiang-Hong, Wen-Ping Wang e Yu-Tian Zhang. "Prisoners' Dilemma of Endogenous Spillovers and Investment Equilibrium Strategies of Exogenous". In 2008 4th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wicom.2008.2655.

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Gao, Jingxing. "Analysis on Open Account in China from the Perspective of Prisoners’ Dilemma". In 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.224.

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Kautz, Karlheinz, e Bjarke Nielsen. "Principals Agents and Prisoners: An Economical Perspective on Information Systems Development Practice". In InSITE 2006: Informing Science + IT Education Conference. Informing Science Institute, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.28945/3041.

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Information systems development takes place within an economical context. However, the economical conditions, which shape systems development in practice, are hardly researched. In this paper we are investigating the question how a given price structure influences systems development projects. Our analysis is based on a multi case study and a Grounded Theory inspired research approach. Our work is informed by economic theories, which deal with the relationship of suppliers and customers and their mutual dependency. We thus apply principal-agent theory and economic game theory in form of the prisoner’s dilemma. As a result we provide three interlinked models for understanding the impact of pricing structure on systems development practice. The main elements of these models are pricing structure, risk distribution and price level, and opportunistic behavior. We discuss how these elements are interrelated and examine their impact on information systems development in practice.
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Schoenherr, Jordan Richard, e Robert Thomson. "Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: the Social Dilemmas of Cybersecurity". In 2020 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cybersa49311.2020.9139644.

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Rapporti di organizzazioni sul tema "Prisoners dilemma"

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Vásquez, José. A prisoner's dilemma classroom activity (video case study). Bristol, UK: The Economics Network, settembre 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.53593/n2992a.

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Kunreuther, Howard, Gabriel Silvasi, Eric Bradlow e Dylan Small. Deterministic and Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Experiments in Interdependent Security. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, agosto 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/t0341.

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List, John. Friend or Foe? A Natural Experiment of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, marzo 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12097.

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Ashenfelter, Orley, e David Bloom. Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, settembre 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4447.

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Ashenfelter, Orley, David Bloom e Gordon Dahl. Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Evidence from Long Run Play. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, febbraio 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18834.

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Cedros, Christopher R. Lone-Wolf Terrorist Radicalization and the Prisoner's Dilemma: Ensuring Mutual Cooperation Between at-Risk Muslim Americans and Local Communities. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, settembre 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1008888.

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