Tesi sul tema "Practical philosophy"

This thesis examines Adorno's critique of Kant's practical philosophy, as it is developed in Negative Dialectics and in Adorno's published lectures. Its starting point is the conviction that Adorno's Kant critique is best understood as a critique of conceptual reification. According to Adorno, Kant reifies the foundational concepts of his practical philosophy and thereby elides their historically specific and socially contested character. The thesis begins with an elaboration ofAdorno's critique of conceptual reification, which it will apply to the foundational concepts of Kant's practical philosophy. In the second chapter it focuses on Kant's 'rescuing urge'. It argues that Kant's philosophy is motivated by the urge to save the achievements of the rationalist philosophical tradition from the onslaught of philosophical scepticism, scientific progress and sociopolitical change. It concludes that Kant achieves this salvation in part, but only at the cost of rendering concepts such as freedom so abstract and thing-like that their mediation with empirical reality becomes impqssible. In the next three chapters the thesis discusses Kant's resolution of the antinomy of freedom and determinism, his moral psychology (focusing on Kant's conception of the will) and his account of the good and the phenomenology of moral judgment. It concludes that in all these cases conceptual reification undermines the force of Kant's thought. The thesis contrasts two important concepts of Kant's practical philosophy: rational agency and maturity (Miindigkeit). Adorno is very critical of Kant's philosophy, because it imbues rational agency with unconditional value. On Adorno's analysis, rational agency is conceptually reified in modern capitalist societies. Its hypostatisation establishes a standard of self-determination, which most people fail to achieve. It is damaging to those who cannot. The thesis concludes with the suggestion that Adorno finds in maturity a more suitable concept for the elaboration of an ethics of resistance.

This thesis undertakes the Deleuzian experiment of a conceptual site development of contemporary choreography through analysis of the works of Antonia Baehr, Juan Dominguez, Xavier Le Roy and Eszter Salamon. It examines the way these works transform choreography qualitatively by elaborating singular methods which couple the issue of movement with the creation of aesthetic regimes. As opposed to a representational outline of choreography’s ontology, my thesis investigates the participatory potential of choreography by focussing on the singular relational assemblages that each choreography creates with the audience. These singular relational assemblages defy practical philosophy insofar as they require a methodology which can account for their dynamic complexity without reducing them either to pre-established categories or to a static analysis. On the basis of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s transcendental empiricism, my thesis responds to this challenge by establishing contamination and articulation as methodological concepts for an open ended inventory of what choreography can do. Contamination, on the other hand, accounts for the qualitative transformations that concern bodies in their power to assemble and to be assembled. Articulation, on the other hand, names the qualitative transformations of sense that a choreography conveys through its differential composition. Both concepts are inseparably interwoven and specified in the aesthetic regimes of the Retenu and the Dé-lire. While the Retenu scrutinizes the way movements generate a continuous transformation of body images (cinematic retenu) and sensations (cine-emotional retenu), the Dé-lire explores the choreography of temporal relations. Showing how these singular assemblages and their implicit methods critically redistribute the sensible of choreography at the turn of the twenty-first century, the four concepts of my thesis form the argument in itself. This argument highlights the ethical impact of qualitative experimental research, specifies the prolific capacities of choreography and forces practical philosophy to rethink their relation.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2017.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 175-181).
Joint practical deliberation is the activity of deciding together what to do. In this dissertation, I argue that several speech acts that we can use to alter our moral obligations - promises, offers, requests, demands, commands, and agreements - are moves within joint practical deliberation. The dissertation begins by investigating joint practical deliberation. The resulting account implies that joint deliberation is more flexible than we usually recognize, in two ways. First, we can make joint decisions not only about what we will do together, but also about what you or I will do alone. Second, we can deliberate by means of two distinct methods: propose-and-ratify, in which a proposed joint decision must be explicitly accepted to come into effect, and propose-and-challenge, in which a proposed joint decision comes into force unless it is explicitly challenged. Varying these parameters generates a botany of different kinds of proposals we can make within joint deliberation. When we look at these proposals more closely, we make a surprising discovery: for each kind of proposal we can make in joint practical deliberation, there is an everyday speech act with the very same properties. A certain kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding one's own actions has the same normative effects, under the same conditions, as a promise. One kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding one's addressee's actions has all the essential features of a command; another kind of deliberative proposal - with the same content but a different method of evaluation - looks exactly like a request. And so on. These similarities are too systematic to be coincidental. The only explanation, I argue, is that these ordinary speech acts are identical to their doppelgangers within joint practical deliberation. Promises and offers are proposals to make joint decisions about what I will do. Commands, demands, and requests are proposals to make joint decisions about whatyou will do. And agreements are joint decisions about what we will do. Call this the deliberative theory of these speech acts. Considering each speech act in turn, I defend the deliberative theory by arguing that it provides a uniquely powerful explanation of its targets' social and moral significance. Once we see how naturally these speech acts fall out of our practice of joint deliberation, theories that treat them as sui genens - as many moral philosophers now do - will come to seem redundant and nonexplanatory. Conversely, thinking of promises, offers, commands, demands, requests, and agreements as moves within joint practical deliberation allows us to give an elegant and generative theory of these phenomena that have confounded moral philosophers for so long.
by Brendan de Kenessey.
Ph. D.

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B.S.
Bachelors
Arts and Sciences
Liberal Studies

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-118).
The thesis is an exploration of the relations between know-how, abilities, and ordinary knowledge of facts. It is shown that there is a distinctively practical sort of know-how and a corresponding interpretation of 'S knows how to [phi]', and that this special sort of know-how, while possessing representational content, is not simply ordinary knowledge-that. The view rests on a novel distinction between two interpretations of the Intellectualist slogan, familiar from the work of Gilbert Ryle, that know-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The distinction allows us to clarify the issues that are at stake in the debate and see the possibility of a position that combines aspects of both Intellectualism and anti-Intellectualism. An entailment from knowhow to a certain sort of ability is defended, and it is shown that the present view preserves the possibility of appealing to know-how to block Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" against physicalism.
by Ephraim N. Glick.
Ph.D.

When, if ever, is it rational for an agent to act morally? To fully answer such a question we must appeal to a theory of practical reason. My project is to defend one such theory by determining which features we most strongly associate with practical reason and then providing a theory which best accounts for those features. One of the chief features we associate with practical reason is that it has to do somehow with correct deliberation. Recognizing this feature leads theorists as diverse as Hobbes and Kant to accept what might be called the standard view: it is correct deliberation, and correct deliberation alone, which reveals an agent's reasons. I argue that the most prominent and plausible examples of the standard view fail to show that there is any moral requirement that is rationally required for every given agent. I then argue that the inability to connect rationality and morality in this way is a severe defect of the standard view. This is because another of the chief features we associate with practical reason is that the phrase 'what is rational' is nearly synonymous with endorsing phrases such as 'what makes sense' or 'what ought to be done'. I argue that in order to preserve this synonymy we must have a theory of rationality which is capable of saying it is always irrational to violate certain moral requirements; but, this is something the standard view cannot accommodate. I argue that the theory which best captures the various features we associate with practical reason is the virtue theory of practical reason. It says that an agent has reason to perform an action just in case there is a suitable deliberative connection between that action and some motive she would have were she to have a correct or virtuous set of motivations. I include in the dissertation a discussion of how we gain knowledge about this set of motivations. I also address various naturalistic worries that the virtue theory raises.

In this thesis I aim to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? I argue that there is no incomparability among bearers of value and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. The two questions are closely related; in arguing against incomparability a positive picture of comparability emerges. The case against incomparability is a case for a new conception of comparability more capacious than has been traditionally conceived. This 'broad' conception of comparability has three distinctive features: it distinguishes incomparability from noncomparability, it includes the possibility of 'emphatic' comparability, or comparisons between 'higher' and 'lower' goods; and it makes logical space for a fourth generic value relation - what I shall call 'on a par' - beyond the standard trichotomy of relations of 'better than', 'worse than', and 'equally good'. Each of these features arises out of defects of certain incomparabilist arguments. Indeed, the approach to the broad conception of comparability via examination of incomparabilist arguments makes clear that much of the intuitive pull of incomparability depends on a narrow and impoverished conception of comparability. Investigation of comparability and incomparability is motivated by a proposed substantive account of practical justification according to which there can be no justified choice without the comparability of the alternatives. The existence of widespread incomparability, then, undermines the rationality of practical life. This thesis' argument against incomparability and for a broad conception of comparability serves to vindicate the role of practical reason in choice.

I show Means/end or "instrumental" models of practical rationality maintain that an agent is rational if she is taking efficient means to secure her most important ends. According to this view, an agent's goals are not themselves open to rational assessment. Only the efficiency of means to chosen ends is evaluated. These accounts raise an important question in contemporary debates about practical rationality: whether a complete theory of practical rationality must include a theory of value (a theory by which ends are evaluated to determine whether they are rational). After placing various means/end accounts in historical perspective and illustrating their contemporary significance, I defend a negative answer to the above question and thus embrace a form of instrumentalism. I show that certain arguments concerning the rationality of final ends are reducible to arguments about other matters pertaining to things being constituents of ends or means to final ends. Moreover, examples of irrational desires designed to show that means/end conceptions are inadequate simply appeal to our intuitions and many will not share those intuitions in all cases. The intuitive appeal of instrumental theories will be bolstered if it is emphasized that they do not permit the pursuit of every fleeting desire, but rather those which the agent herself deems most important. There are no sufficient grounds for a rejection of instrumentalism. Attempts at alternative views either collapse into instrumentalist accounts or they fail to provide the principles needed to establish a satisfactory account of rationality applicable to all agents.

This dissertation explores how and to what extent rationality can provide guidance for human action – individual and collective, private and public; particularly under the conditions of modernity. The theme is approached through an examination of Habermas' various pertinent contributions. In both the pre-communicative and the communicative phases of his work, Habermas has been concerned to show the one-sided and distorted nature of modern, instrumental rationalisation, and to invigorate the unfinished project of enlightenment. Thus he has endeavoured to develop and philosophically justify a complementary, communicative practical rationality. Communicative rationality would be employed for rationalising social interaction, whereas instrumental rationality would be restricted to human beings' interchange with nature, concerned with securing their means of material reproduction. One exception to this supposed exhaustive dichotomy is the case of human interaction entwined so closely with the means of material reproduction that if it were conducted communicatively, rather than instrumentally, it would be so inefficient as to threaten material reproduction itself. Fields of social interaction that, for the sake of material reproductive efficiency, need to be coordinated instrumentally are the economy and state administration. This study identifies and mainly concentrates on a lacuna common to Habermas' pre-communicative and communicative conceptual frameworks, one that results in an effective veto on the possibility that human agents can communicatively pursue their own ends by means of other agents. In this way, the vast range of social interactions in which the ends of human beings must inevitably be satisfied through the active involvement or consent of other human beings are a priori ceded to strategic action, contrary to Habermas' own intentions. To remedy this, my study sets out to develop philosophical justification for a revised conception of practical rationality centred on the notion of communicative negotiation.

This thesis is an examination of the foundations of practical reason. Building on the later work of Wittgenstein, I argue for a subjectivist view of moral judgment and of judgments about reasons for action. On this view, moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action can be true or false, but they are not objective. The argument for this view has the form of an inference to the best explanation. Using a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, I suggest that moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action should not be construed as referring to an ethical or normative reality that exists independently of us. There are ethical facts and facts about our reasons, but these facts arise as the result of our involvement in a linguistic practice. This provides a new way of accounting for these judgments that differs both from moral realism and expressivism. The view of reasons that emerges is closely related to, but not identical with, reasons internalism as described by Bernard Williams. I reject his argument in favour of internalism and provide a new and independent argument to support this view of our reasons. In the course of spelling out that argument, I show why internalism as described by Williams should be modified, and why this does not commit us to externalism. In the final chapters, I show that there is an important parallel between our practical predicament and the account of our epistemic condition as portrayed by Wittgenstein. The inference to the best explanation is completed by considering a number of objections to subjectivism that are based on the idea that a subjectivist account of moral judgment and of reasons fails to do justice to the ethical phenomena. I reject these objections, and suggest that a subjectivist can both be reflectively aware of his subjectivism and continue to live well.

Intentional actions are those which are performed because the subject sees something tobe said for performing them; the subject sees performing the action “in a positive light”. Intentional actions are therefore susceptible to a distinctive kind of explanation, which explains them as intentional; that is, which accounts for them in terms oftheir unique property, of being performed because the subject sees that there is something to be said for doing so. Practical reasoning is the process of figuring out what there is reason to do; that is, what actions are best supported by the considerations available to the subject. To put it another way, practical reasoning is the process of figuring out which actions there is the most to be said for; so practical reasoning explains intentional action “properly”, i.e., in terms of its special properties. Many philosophers, loosely following the lead of David Hume, have argued for a close connection between desire and intentional action. If desires explain intentional actions properly, then they must do so through practical reasoning; that being the case, how do they do it? Another sizeable group of philosophers, the anti-Humeans, have argued that desires cannot explain intentional actions properly; they claim that desires are not the right sorts of things to appear in the premises of arguments, do not count in favour of any action, do not constitute evaluations of any action, and are in any case too fickle and lawless to take part in distinctively normative forms of explanation. The central question in this thesis is, what is the role of desire in practical reasoning? I put forward a characterisation of desire which explains how some desires can explain intentional actions properly, and leaves the question open whether all intentional actions are properly explained by desires.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2015.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Practical reason can help make sense of the decisions that face humankind in a complex planetary age, and notably so regarding the development and use of technology. Human agency and functioning as a self-understanding person, as well as certain ideas related to complexity and co-evolution are crucial aspects of this side of practical reason. Exploring these aspects from different perspectives can help uncover some constructive insights into the special nature of the moral goals, and the uniquely human significance of some of our intentions and actions that inform our decision-making on the development and use of technology. The insights gained here can furthermore serve to expand certain mainstream conceptions in Western intellectual culture on the character of reason as such, which proceed from a classical, or naturalistic stance. In the latter case reason typically calls for the use of explicit criteria, and is foundational and procedural in nature. This view is important and useful. However, the model of practical argument that accompanies it paints a characteristically sceptical picture of rational choice in the moral sphere. Yet such scepticism is not always warranted. Instead, an expanded model of practical reason is called for, notably if human agency and self-understanding, as well as ideas related to complexity and co-evolution are taken seriously. In this thesis it is demonstrated that such an approach can serve to express in richer, less sceptical terms the sense of significance we find in our societal choices, and particularly so in those decisions for technology that confront humanity in an inclusive, interdependent age. In light of the above, the thesis discussion attempts to review some central naturalistic beliefs in Western intellectual culture on the nature of reason and related patterns of practical argument. The thesis aim is to point out some of their ontological and epistemological assumptions, note their particular strengths and weaknesses and relate them to models of reason employed in the natural and human sciences – especially those that concern the nature of explanation and understanding. Furthermore, these beliefs are linked to a generally sceptical, but at times unwarranted attitude towards the sphere of practical moral argument. Such matters are treated in the first two chapters of the thesis discussion. Other ways of picturing this attitude of doubt towards the moral sphere can be found in alternative notions about human agency and self-understanding, as well as from complexity and co-evolution. The concepts behind these perspectives point to certain ontological and epistemological insights which arguably take thinking beyond the normal range of naturalistic abstractions. As a result, different characterizations, or patterns, of practical reason become possible, the nature of which can help to rework the usual warrants for scepticism when it comes to judging the significance of our intentions and actions. Thinking in terms of human agency, self-understanding, complexity and co-evolution holds another advantage. These conceptualisations can also serve to formulate a defining link between practical reason and consultation, be it among individuals, communities or the institutions of society. Such ideas speak in part to emerging notions of collective maturity in the organization of human affairs, and the well-being of all peoples. More particularly, consultation can offer additional resources for replacing entrenched patterns of conflict in society with patterns that are more unifying and just. It can as well provide for a certain quality of understanding of the principles and issues involved. The exploration of these and similar ideas begins with the discussion in Chapters Three and Four, and continues into subsequent chapters. In addition to their naturalistic counterpart, these patterns of practical reason also suggest some useful notions regarding the broader import of our societal and developmental choices on a planetary scale. The thesis discussion will attempt to explore some of these ideas. Among other things, it considers the implications they have for notions of development in general viz the unfolding of humankind’s social, cultural, ethical and spiritual potential, as well as for conceptions of technology that speak to that unfolding. It will include in its study the notion of future-regarding social choices and the transformative potential of time. From there the focus will shift to what it might mean to recast existing technology aspirations in light of the urgent requirements of a co-evolving world, and with it the need to safeguard the interests of humanity as a whole. These and related topics are addressed in Chapters Five and Six. Finally, three broad questions have played an important background role in carrying out this study. First, what is the nature of the unity that exists between our capacity to know the world in an epistemological sense, and our ability to judge the moral significance of our actions? Second, on the basis of what can we make sense of our decisions about technology in so far as they might be said to contribute to an advance or a decline in human social well-being? Third, what insights can we gain into our patterns of practical reason and decisions for technology when viewed in the context of a planetary age, and considered in light of the principle of the oneness of mankind?
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die praktiese rede kan help sin maak van die besluite wat die mensdom in ʼn komplekse planetêre era in die gesig staar, veral met betrekking tot die ontwikkeling en gebruik van tegnologie. Menslike agentskap en funksionering as ’n persoon met selfbegrip, sowel as sekere idees oor kompleksiteit en ko-evolusie is almal deurslaggewende aspekte van hierdie sy van die praktiese rede. Deur hierdie aspekte vanuit verskillende perspektiewe te ondersoek, kan konstruktiewe insigte blootgelê word in die besondere aard van die morele doelwitte en die uniek-menslike betekenis van die bedoelings en handelinge wat ons besluitneming oor die ontwikkeling en gebruik van tegnologie onderlê. Die insigte wat hier verwerf word, kan daarby help om bepaalde hoofstroom-opvattings in die Westerse intellektuele kultuur oor die aard van die rede as sodanig te verruim – opvattings wat uit ’n klassieke of naturalistiese standpunt stam. Volgens laasgenoemde standpunt vereis die rede gewoonlik duidelike maatstawwe, en lê dit in wese grondslae en stel prosedures daar. Só ʼn siening is belangrik en bruikbaar, maar op grond van die model van praktiese redenering wat hiermee gepaardgaan, word ’n tipies skeptiese beeld geskets van redelike keuses binne die morele ruimte. Hierdie skeptisisme is egter nie altyd geregverdig nie. ’n Verruimde model van die praktiese rede word eerder benodig, veral as menslike agentskap en selfverstaan, asook die idees wat met kompleksiteit en ko-evolusie verband hou, ernstig opgeneem word. Só ʼn benadering kan help om die betekenis wat ons in ons maatskaplike keuses vind in ryker en minder skeptiese terme uit te druk. Dit geld veral vir daardie besluite vir tegnologie waarvoor die mensdom in ʼn inklusiewe, interafhanklike era te staan kom. In die lig hiervan is die proefskrif ‘n poging om ’n oorsig te gee van ’n paar sentrale naturalistiese opvattings binne die Westerse intellektuele kultuur oor die aard van die rede en patrone van praktiese argumentvoering wat daarmee verband hou. Die proefskrif poog om sommige van hierdie opvattings se ontologiese en epistemologiese voorveronderstellings uit te wys, hulle sterk- en swakpunte aan te toon en hulle in verband te bring met rasionele modelle wat in die natuur- en menswetenskappe gebruik word, veral dié oor die aard van verklaring en verstaan. Daarby word hierdie voorveronderstellings gekoppel aan ʼn algemeen skeptiese, maar by tye ongeregverdigde, ingesteldheid teenoor die sfeer van praktiese morele argumentvoering. Hierdie aspekte word in die eerste twee hoofstukke van die tesis behandel. Hierdie twyfel ten opsigte van die morele sfeer kan egter anders voorgestel word as alternatiewe idees oor menslike agentskap en selfverstaan in ag geneem word, asook kompleksiteit en ko-evolusie. Die begrippe wat hierdie perspektiewe ten grondslag lê, dui op bepaalde ontologiese en epistemologiese insigte wat stellig kan help dat ons denke die gebruiklike grense van naturalistiese abstraksies kan oorstyg. Die gevolg is dat die kenmerke of patrone van die praktiese rede anders verwoord kan word, wat kan bydra tot die hersiening van die gebruiklike regverdiging vir skeptisisme wanneer ons die betekenis van ons bedoelings en handelinge beoordeel. Om in terme van menslike agentskap, selfverstaan, kompleksiteit en ko-evolusie te dink, hou ook ’n verdere voordeel in. Sodanige konseptualiserings kan ook dien om ’n beslissende verband te lê tussen die praktiese rede en raadpleging [oftewel konsultasie] – of dit nou op die vlak van individue, gemeenskappe of samelewingsinstellings plaasvind. As sodanig vind hierdie gedagtes gedeeltelik aanklank by opkomende idees oor kollektiewe volwassenheid in die organisering van menslike aangeleenthede, en die strewe na die welsyn van alle samelewings wêreldwyd. In die besonder, raadpleging kan bykomende hulpmiddels bied om die ingewortelde konflikpatrone in die samelewing te help vervang met patrone wat meer verenigend en regverdig is. Dit kan ook voorsiening maak vir ʼn soort volwasse begrip van die beginsels en kwessies wat ter sprake is. Die verkenning van hierdie en verwante idees begin met die bespreking in Hoofstukke Drie en Vier en word in die daaropvolgende hoofstukke voortgesit. In onderskeiding van die naturalistiese interpretasie kan hierdie patrone van die praktiese rede vir ons ook help om die belang van ons keuses oor die samelewing en ontwikkeling op planetêre vlak in ‘n breër perspektief te plaas. Die bespreking in hierdie tesis beoog om ’n paar van hierdie idees van nader te ondersoek. Dit wil onder meer let op die implikasies van hierdie idees vir die konsep van ontwikkeling in die algemeen, met ander woorde vir die ontsluiting van die mensdom se maatskaplike, kulturele, etiese en spirituele potensiaal, asook vir die voorstellings van tegnologie wat direk op hierdie ontsluiting afgestem is. Die studie konsentreer ook op die idee van toekomsgerigte sosiale keuses en die omvormende potensiaal van tyd. Van daar verskuif die fokus na wat dit sou kon behels om bestaande tegnologiese aspirasies te herontwerp in die lig van die dringende behoefte aan ’n ko-evolusionêre wêreld, en daarmee saam die noodsaak om die belange van die mensdom in die geheel te beskerm. Hierdie en verwante onderwerpe word in Hoofstukke Vyf en Ses aangespreek. Laastens het drie oorkoepelende vrae ʼn beduidende rol gespeel as agtergrond tot die studie. Eerstens: Wat is die aard van die verband tussen ons vermoë om die wêreld in ’n epistemologiese sin te kan ken en ons vermoë om die morele betekenis van ons handelinge te kan beoordeel? Tweedens: Op grond waarvan kan ons bepaal of ons besluite oor tegnologie ‘n bydrae maak tot die bevordering van die mens se sosiale welsyn, of tot die ondermyning daarvan? Derdens: Watter insigte kan ons verkry oor ons patrone van praktiese redenering en ons besluite oor tegnologie wanneer ons dit binne die konteks van ’n planetêre era en in die lig van die beginsel van menslike eenheid beskou?

Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted more than one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the work of Immanuel Kant. The purpose of this thesis is to use that material as the basis for a sustained comparison between the two philosophies. Specifically, I aim to juxtapose and to analyse their positions on a range of foundational issues within metaphysics, within ethics – both broadly construed – and at the interface between those two fields. In doing so, I hope to contribute to three areas of research: the history of philosophy, contemporary analytic philosophy and an understanding of the methodological connections between philosophy and other disciplines. The thesis comprises five chapters and is divided into three parts, parts marked by the Kantian texts on which they are based: Part I concentrates on issues arising from the ‘theoretical’ philosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason; Part II addressed the ‘practical’ sphere of the second Critique and the Groundwork; Part III takes its orientation from the Critique of Judgement. Part I, Ch. 1: Heidegger’s Critique: The A Priori in Kant and Heidegger. Part I, Ch. 2: Language and Dasein: Intentionality and Methodology in Kant and Heidegger. Part II, Ch. 3: Anxiety in Eden: Rational Choice and Public Reason in Kant and Heidegger. Part II, Ch. 4: The Reality of Freedom: The Interaction of ‘Theoretical’ and ‘Practical’ in Kant and Heidegger. Part III, Ch.5: System, Organism, Origin: Methodology and Unresolved Problems in Kant and the ‘Early Heidegger’.

Kant remains an important resource in moral philosophy but the absence of an adequate account of moral self-development constitutes a serious gap in his wider moral theory. This study therefore seeks to illuminate the process through which an agent could develop his moral character within a Kantian framework. Firstly, I reject two interpretations of Kant's account of rational agency each of which, if true, would in its own way render moral development impossible. I also outline the interpretation of Kantian rational agency which I take to be correct and which allows development. Kant thinks development should address our radical evil - an attitude to choice which rejects the demands of the moral law. However, there are tensions in the doctrine of evil which seem to preclude an evil agent's initiating his moral development. I adopt Seiriol Morgan's rational reconstruction of evil which addresses these difficulties. In Morgan's model, the will's freedom gives it overriding reason to choose morality, as this affords it its true freedom and it knows this. This means the will which chooses evil must wilfully accept a false conception of freedom - it must be self-deceived at the most fundamental level of reason-giving. However, self-deception is prima facie paradoxical. This is addressed by applying Jean-Paul Sartre's model of bad faith, an account which can dissolve the paradoxes. What emerges is a picture of evil as a mutually supporting complex of elements involving selfishness, self-conceit and a refusal to acknowledge its own misguided attitude. This is the opponent for morality. Development involves undoing this structure through consciousness of true freedom and pursuing the ends of development such as the purification of motives, whilst remaining vigilant against further deception. In this way, the free will can acquire a character apt to express its full freedom

This thesis explores the religious underpinnings of Kant’s thought through a consideration of the related topics of the problem of evil, the nature of religious faith, the possibility of practical knowledge, and the nature of philosophy, as well as his approach to various aspects of Christian theology, such as Scripture, eschatology, and Christology. Texts from both the pre-Critical and Critical period of Kant’s works are considered, building up a picture of Kant as a philosopher deeply concerned with the cultivation and maintenance of religious faith within the bounds of reason. The links between the philosophies of Kant, Leibniz and the Pietists are also considered in order to emphasise their shared commitments in using philosophy to complement moral faith. Further, it is argued that Kant is also concerned to combat superstition, enthusiasm and immorality in the Church, which are seen as barriers to ‘true’ faith. Through these considerations, we also discern an underlying realist religious framework to discussions on religious topics in Kant’s works, even in the Critical philosophy. It is argued that Kant’s philosophy of religion and ethical theory are intended to be not only compatible with but complementary to orthodox Christianity. As a result, a number of contemporary interpretive lines surrounding Kant’s philosophy of religion that intend to dilute the Christian commitments of the Critical system are rejected. These discussions are then employed to provide context for a reading of Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason (1793) as lying within a realist religious framework. Current interpretive issues in the literature surrounding Religion are discussed in relation to this framework.

As a critical advocate of the philosophy of Enlightenment, Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) reconsidered the development of the empiricist and naturalistic philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and held that their development was connected in intricate ways to various quite specific issues arising in nineteenth-century British society. In order to respond to these issues, he established a comprehensive framework of philosophical thought as the foundation for his practical activities. In this framework, the core argument focuses on the relationship between consciousness and action. However, though Green’s philosophy has been widely investigated, no study has, as yet, focused exclusively on Green’s practical philosophy, and in particular his idea of the ethical citizen. This thesis undertakes this task and argues firstly that viewing the relationship between consciousness and action as the nexus of the human condition, Green’s practical philosophy is a coherent and consistent philosophical system which includes metaphysics; moral and ethical theory; and social and political theory. I then go on to argue that, by virtue of his philosophical system, Green founded political activity on the basis of metaphysical and moral ideas, on the one side, but on the other side, provided politics with a deep raison d’être; that is, to maintain and to provide the equality of opportunity for individuals by means of state power. Finally, I argue that while Green accordingly established a justification for state action, the nature of such state action relates closely to the self-government of individual citizens. Hence, Green’s practical philosophy provides an ethical theory of politics which underpins an important legacy for contemporary liberal political philosophy.

This play demonstrates an interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy in practice. The main character experiences loss and confusion, however, through this struggle arrives at a discovery of profound truth. If you've ever wondered how to live your life in the best way possible, the main character believes he's found the answer.

Eudaimonism once had great success in fostering a public appreciation of philosophy. In contrast, a recent editorial on the subject of bioethics was titled, "The Ethicist's New Clothes." Contemporary ethical theories have not been well popularized, and to the public these theories seem untried. But perhaps the public is right to be suspicious of ethical accounts that regard ethics as the province of those with advanced training in philosophy. Once we start thinking this, we have perhaps forgotten what ethics is meant to do, and how it is meant to do what it does for all of us. In this project, I set up a contest between ethical theories, seeking to determine which is the most practically guiding to agents. In chapters one and two I argue that a number of contemporary approaches to ethics are inappropriately inapplicable. In contrast, a version of virtue ethics, ancient eudaimonist theory, is shown to be more applicable and practical to agents than either Kant's theory or consequentialism. In chapters three and four I argue for how this is. In chapters five and six, I look to how far-ranging ethical theories' applicability may be, by considering how eudaimonist ethical theory can help to justify political organization. Stoic and Epicurean eudaimonism, for example, can justify arrangements that we might recognize as liberal, but not by attempting to remain neutral on the subject of value.

This production dissertation examines the role of the creative process in balancing intellect and intuition in the individual; and the potential of collaborative creativity to support the integration of intuition and intellect on a social level. The mythos-sphere is given as a metaphor to conceptualize the human experience, which extends from the physical, but always includes much more than one knows: inner and outer, conscious and unconscious, physical and imaginal altogether comprise this sphere of influence.

The mythic imagination aids social cohesion when there is sufficient shared experience. This research addresses a disconnect between inner experience and collective experience. This gap might be bridged by a social context that encourages awareness of our immersion in a mythic environment, built upon common ground.

The third is considered as the space between inner-outer and self-other, that allows negotiation without loss of self, and from which creative solutions emerge. A discussion of the third examines Winnicott’s transitional space and Jung’s archetypal theory. The space of the third is “expanded” by admitting the unknown and the ambiguous as real and meaningful, but “collapsed” by reductionist thinking. Participation, or being present and phenomenologically engaged, relaxes the tension wrought by protracted rational focus. Metaphor is proposed as the essential bridge that mediates the “in-between” area of the third.

Giving physical form to images emerging from the unconscious is considered as “applied metaphor.” Connecting inner with outer, known with unknown, and rational with non-rational, the creative process generates meaning for the individual. A collaborative creative process is therefore suggested as a way to develop shared meaning.

Concluding that creative collaboration encourages communication and group cohesion, a method is proposed. The production presents the application of this method via a three-day collaborative art-and-story making event, documented as an interactive digital magazine.

Keywords: expressive arts, collaboration, creativity, metaphor, participation, narrative, myth, imaginal, archetypal.

According to McGavran's theory, people "like to become Christians without crossing racial, linguistic and class barriers"; therefore, they should not be forced to do so. Instead, churches are encouraged to grow along racial, linguistic, or class lines. The emphasis is on evangelism but this includes both church planting and church renewal. The HUP theory is presented as a real phenomenon which is characteristic of much church development. Its reality as a natural human dynamic is supported with good anthropological data. The debate that has surrounded this controversial perspective is examined both in its historical and current context. Here the HUP theory with regard to sanctification is found to be inadequate and with regard to addressing the moral responsibility of the church in challenging racism is also inadequate. The "mutual acceptance" philosophy, an alternative for church development and mission is presented. The key Scripture of Ephesians 2 is examined in detail. A balance of both sanctification and moral responsibility is formulated. Ethnic churches will continue to be developed by the natural causes of sociological elements; but, the church at large, however, must pursue its theological responsibility of promoting a church that functions beyond such limitations - Christians must accept each other and express that acceptance in koinonia. Finally, the "mutual acceptance" philosophy is applied both to the church situation and to missions as a Biblically responsible approach to bringing the Gospel to the world. Several models are presented for churches in different situations and circumstances. Real examples of churches making an impact on the problem of racism and need for biblical koinonia beyond the limits of ethnicity are examined and joined with creative suggestions for church development.

In this paper, a view of non-compliance in practical healthcare is provided that identifies certain non-compliant behaviours as rational. This view of rational non-compliance is used to update a current form of doctor patient relationships with the aim of reducing non-compliance. In addition to reforming one standard doctor patient relationship model, the normative implications of understanding non-compliance as a rational form of human behaviour are described.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, 2005.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1289. Adviser: Thomas A. Schwandt. "Title from dissertation home page (viewed Nov. 9, 2006)."

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2004.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0324. Chairs: Jean C. Robinson; Russell L. Hanson. Title from dissertation home page (viewed Oct. 12, 2006).

In essence this investigation seeks to answer three central questions: 1. What does it mean to be a human being? 2. What does it means to relate in a specifically human way? 3. What is mental health and how might the church enable people to develop and sustain it even in the midst of mental illness? The thesis will argue that these three questions are in fact inextricably intertwined. In order to understand mental health it is necessary to understand human nature and the character of interpersonal relationships. In answering these questions the investigation aims to provide an understanding of human nature, interpersonal relationships and mental health which the church can utilise as a constructive analytical framework that will enable it to structure, critique and develop its practice and understanding. The investigation examines the human condition from a variety of perspectives, theology, philosophy, psychoanalysis, social psychology and psychiatry, as it seeks to develop a holistic picture of human beings, a specifically human way of relating and an adequate, inclusive understanding of mental health. The study argues that human beings are essentially relational creatures, made in the image of a relational God. Although relational by nature, human beings have fallen into patterns of distorted relationships. There is therefore the need for a process of relational redemption. This process was initiated by Christ and continues to be sustained by the church as it works with him towards the fulfilment of his ultimate purpose of shalom. The development of mental health is intricately tied in with this eschatological movement towards shalom. This movement towards shalom forms the eschatological framework within which the study works itself out. The inquiry argues that authentic human existence is fundamentally personal existence, and that the most appropriate embodiment of this is to be found within the relationship of friendship. Friendship mirrors and reveals the nature of God and shows clearly what it means for human beings to live their lives in His image.

This thesis covers the uncertainty of empirical prediction. As opposed to objectivity, I will discuss the practicality of statistics. Practicality defined as "useful" in an unbiased sense, in relation to something in the external world that we care about. We want our model of prediction to give us unbiased inference whilst also being able to speak about something we care about. For the reasons explained, the inherent uncertainty of statistics undermines the unbiased inference for many methods. Bayesian Statistics, by valuing hypotheses is more plausible but ultimately cannot arrive at an unbiased inference. I posit the value theory of money as a concept that might be able to allow us to derive unbiased inferences from while still being something we care about. However, money is of instrumental value, ultimately being worth less than an object of “transcendental value.” Which I define as something that is worth more than money since money’s purpose is to help us achieve “transcendental value” under the value theory. Ultimately, as long as an individual has faith in a given hypothesis it will be worth more than any hypothesis valued with money. From there we undermine statistic’s practicality as it seems as though without the concept of money we have no manner of valuing hypotheses unbiasedly, and uncertainty undermines the “objective” inferences we might have been able to make.

This thesis aims to provide a coherent account of free will and practical grounds to prefer it. Its goal is to develop a pragmatic understanding of agency by which to hold individuals morally accountable. The paper begins with a critique of P.F. Strawson, whose seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment” bypasses the question of free will altogether in its claims about morality. Subsequently, it proceeds to a defense of incompatibilism that traces an argument through the existing literature. From this position, it claims that neither Strawson nor traditional compatibilists can provide an account of morality that is reliable or well enough defined to play the role required of it. Instead of being left with hard determinism, however, Kant opens the door to a metaphysics that exists outside of our epistemological limits. Rather then derive an account based on this metaphysics, the necessary characteristics of a free will are derived from an account of morality and proven to be possible using Kantian epistemology. The paper concludes by positing three distinct reasons to prefer a free will framework to a deterministic framework, provided our inability to answer the question empirically. These draw on Pascal’s Wager, William James’ “The Will to Believe,” and inference to the best explanation.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.
Title from file title page. Andrea Scarantino, Eddy Nahmias, committee co-chairs; Erin McClure, committee member. Electronic text (68 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Jan. 7, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-68).

The thesis presents the hypothesis that the systematic theology of Paul Tillich (1886-1965) offers significant new benefits towards church unity. The methodology used in pursuit of this aim, is a critical analysis of Tillich's early and late thought. Tillich' s work was influenced by the German philosophical and theological schools and came to expression in American academia in his publication Systematic Theology. The results of this analysis reveal Tillich's consistent commitment to the concept of Gestalt. This finding has been broadened to include the concept that the strength of ecclesial unity is dependent upon the understanding that every ecclesial denomination is an effective element in the constituency of the whole Church. This argument is supported by a deconstruction of Tillich' s system that is keyed into the hermeneutical theories of Gadamer and Derrida. The system is then reconstructed in terms of a new Gestalt that turns on the hypothesis that there is a relationship of synthesis between philosophy and theology within the Tillichian system, rather than the complementary relationship that Tillich claims. This conclusion is based upon the system being perceived as being founded upon the Western classical philosophical and theological traditions. A critique of Tillich's incorporation of modern existential hermeneutics into this system is made principally in relation to the existentialist thought of Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. A hermeneutic of Tillich' s existential critique serves to highlight the questions that result from existential disruption rather than to label him as an existentialist per se. The system is thus moved forward into the post-modern context under new hermeneutics. An analysis of Tillich's ecclesiology reveals that this is both eschatological and Trinitarian in nature. The relationship between Tillich's system and ecclesiology is brought into dialogue by means of their being expressed in terms of an ecclesiological circle. These hermeneutics are compared and contrasted with the ecclesiologies of Zizioulas and Haight and the published ecumenical documents of The World Council of Churches in order to reveal their commonalties. When the system has thus been applied to the current ecumenical dialogue, then it becomes apparent that the raison d'etre of Tillich's system is the Church and the raison d'etre of the Church is the system. The squaring of Paul Tillich's ecclesiological circle is thus made complete.

This thesis will construct a model of person through a comparison of ideas relating to a concept of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions. Questions will be asked, such as, whether a concept of person can be constructed within these two traditions, and how can ideas developed from these traditions be utilised to construct a model of person? This thesis will provide an in depth examination of terms and concepts that will be related to a concept of person within the two traditions, examining the ontological and existential implications of those terms. This work will also develop, from a subsequent convergence of the theologies of the two traditions, a model of person that is inter-religious and dialogical. Though this work is analytical in nature, in its deconstructing philosophical and theological models relating to person, it is also constructive, taking what is useful from the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions so as to construct a new model of person through the development of the term, Atman-hypostasis which looks to understanding human personhood in the fullest mystical state (deification) within the human condition. A comparison of the two traditions has not been attempted before in relation to the theological discourse of person; neither has such an extensive examination and deconstruction of the concept person in Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions been undertaken in relation to contemporary studies; neither has a construction of this type of model of person been undertaken. This work, in constructing a new term Atmanhypostasis, which emerged from this research as an outcome of the comparison of terms and ideas relating to a concept of person in both traditions, will contribute to the academic theological field of personhood and this thesis will also contribute to the field of inter-religious dialogue in developing an anthropological model that aims to overcome the barriers that separate and divide.

Il pensiero di Giovanni Gentile e' stato spesso accusato di essere una forma di misticismo o di solipsismo. La tesi che qui si sostiene e', invece, che la cifra intima dell'attualismo gentiliano sia l'intersoggettivita'. Grazie alla letture delle fonti del pensiero di Gentile, e all'analisi dei fondamenti teorici del suo pensiero, si e' tentato di dimostrare come l'atto del pensiero prenda identita' facendosi "persona".

Thesis (MTh)--Stellenbosch University, 2000
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The story a congregation tells of itself, helps it to understand who it is, where it is coming from and where it is going. The story confirms the congregation's very existence, it reveals its character and confesses to what it stands for. This study is an attempt by the researcher to explain the identity of the Dutch Reformed Congregation of Grootmist in as scientific a manner as possible. This study will determine the identity of the parish by means of a brief historical synopsis. It is an attempt to provide a base and practice theory with which to empower the congregation to operate more effectively within the bounds of its own unique context. The second chapter (after the introductory chapter) deals with the church as seen within the context of a changing world. The church will not be able to understand itself if it cannot understand the world around it. Both the base and the practice theories of a congregation are affected when set within the unique context of a small mining community. The third chapter focuses on a broad analysis of the congregation and uses this knowledge to provide a systematic understanding of the activities of the congregation. Chapter four is spent on formulating a base theory which uses the metaphor "sojourners and strangers" to explain the nature of the church. The practical theory is explained in chapter five and guidelines are established as to how the basic theory should function in practice. The practical theory focuses mainly on establishing enriched spirituality and koinonia structures. Chapter six focuses on the important role of leadership in the implementation of the basic and practical theory. Chapter seven gives a pro active projection for further study in order to keep up the momentum of congregational renewal.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die verhaal wat In gemeente oor haarself vertel, help haar om te verstaan wie sy is, waarvandaan sy kom en waarheen sy op pad is. In Gemeente se storie bevestig dat sy bestaan, dit openbaar haar karakter en dit bely waarvoor sy staan. Hierdie skripsie is In poging deur die navorser om op In wetenskaplike wyse die identiteit van die Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk Grootmist te bepaal. Die navorser wil deur middel van In oorsigtelike geskiedenis van die gemeente verkennend te werk gaan in sy soeke na wat die identiteit van die gemeente is. Hy wil In moontlike basis - en praktykteorie vir die gemeente daarstel om die gemeente te bemagtig tot meer effektiewe modi van gemeente-wees in haar unieke konteks. Naas die inleidende hoofstuk, wil die navorser met die tweede hoofstuk poog om die kerk te plaas in die veranderende wereld waarin sy haar bevind. Die kerk kan haarself nie verstaan as sy nie haar konteks verstaan nie. Die unieke konteks van In myngemeenskap het In direkte invloed op die basis en praktykteorie van die gemeente. Die derde hoofstuk gee aandag aan In gemeente-analise waarin die profiel, strukture en funksionering van die gemeente ontleed word. Daar word deur middel van feitekennis gevolgtrekkings gemaak oor die werksaamhede van die gemeente. Die vierde hoofstuk formuleer die basisteorie vir die gemeente. Die bywoner en vreemdeling-metafoor word aangewys as die uitstaande metafoor om die wese en doel van kerkwees weer te gee. Hoofstuk vyf gee aandag aan In praktykteorie wat riglyne neerle oor hoe die basisteorie in die praktyk behoort te funksioneer. Die praktykteorie is veral gerig op die verdieping in spiritualiteit en koinonia strukture. Die sesde hoofstuk stippel In strategie vir leierskapsontwikkeling uit sod at die basis en praktykteorie in die praktyk tot sy reg kan kom. In hoofstuk sewe word In projeksie geskep vir verdere navorsing sod at die proses van gemeentevernuwing sy momentum kan behou.

This study explores the factors that affect the conversion trajectories of post-immersion missionaries. The data has been culled from focus group interviews and subjected to analysis from the perspectives of social philosophy, sociology, religious conversion theory, and Catholic Social Teaching. It follows the practical theological method known as “shared Christian praxis.”

It details the impediments to the subsequent deepening of conversion in the societal, ecclesial, interpersonal, familial, and intrapersonal spheres, namely, post-immersion depression, culture shock, feelings of guilt regarding one’s own relatively luxurious living conditions, blaming God for the obstinate pervasiveness of extreme poverty and political injustices, and communication difficulties between the missionaries and their non-missionary family members and friends.

It concludes that the aforementioned discouraging factors can be effectively countered via attention, during the post-immersion stage, to the missionaries’ expressed needs to continue to meet regularly with their respective missionary communities, to deprivatize their visions of spiritual conversion, to live a less opulent lifestyle, to participate in hands-on community service projects in conjunction with local poor people, to continue attempting to contribute to the reign of God locally, and to speak publically about their missionary experiences. It also finds that guided prayer methods, communal liturgies, mentorship, debriefing retreats for the missionaries and their families, ongoing study of the Bible and Catholic Social Doctrine, and long-term commitment to the missions, can be efficacious tools in the promotion of the consolidation and deepening of conversion and the prevention of backsliding.

This thesis proposes and explores the theory and application of pluralism in the evaluation of counselling and psychotherapy. Current models of monistic and multi-method research are seen as inadequate as each tends to actively undermine the other(s). Those that attempt to offer a broad range of data types often struggle to maintain adequate 'truth value' for all their statements and findings. A pluralist process and mechanism is proposed to provide a constructive alternative to the essentially destructive models of scientific and epistemological (generally dialectical) progress described by Kuhn, Hegel and others. It also offers an advance on previous alternatives and other pluralist models. The pluralism proposed comprises cycles of structured interaction between differing methods based on a positively framed dialogue. Utility, as variously defined from different perspectives, is seen as a prime consideration. However, the approach is not merely pragmatic as it also protects the idealist epistemological aspirations and needs of the divergent research paradigms that might be applied in evaluating counselling and psychotherapy. The thesis describes a series of studies based on this pluralist model in order to explore its practical application. Three of these studies investigated the effectiveness of counselling services. Overall, their findings were supportive of the counselling interventions studied while successfully meeting a broad range of stakeholder needs. A fourth study explored pluralism in a context dominated by reductionist concerns and produced normative data on a psychometric measure of self / ideal-self discrepancies (equated with self esteem).

This dissertation considers three broad issues which emerge from the sustainability discourse. First is the nature of the discourse itself, particularly the underlying philosophical positions which are represented. Second, is the nature of the highly complex types of problem which the discourse exposes. And third is whether the engineering profession, as it is practised currently, is adequate to deal with such problems. The sustainability discourse exposes two distinct, fundamentally irreconcilable philosophical positions. The first, “sustainable development”, considers humanity to be privileged in relation to all other species and ecosystems. It is only incumbent upon us to look after the environment to the extent to which it is in our interests to do so. The second, “sustainability”, sees humanity as having no special moral privilege and recognises the moral status of other species, ecosystems, and even wilderness areas. Thus, sustainability imposes upon us a moral obligation to take their status into account and not to degrade or to destroy them. These two conflicting positions give rise to extremely complex problems. An innovative taxonomy of problem complexity has been developed which identifies three broad categories of problem. Of particular interest in this dissertation is the most complex of these, referred to here as the Type 3 problem. The Type 3 problem recognises the systemic complexity of the problem situation but also includes differences of the domain of interests as a fundamental, constituent part of the problem itself. Hence, established systems analysis techniques and reductionist approaches do not work. The domain of interests will typically have disparate ideas and positions, which may be entirely irreconcilable. The dissertation explores the development of philosophy of science, particularly in the last 70 years. It is noted that, unlike the philosophy of science, the philosophy of engineering has not been influenced by developments of critical theory, cultural theory, and postmodernism, which have had significant impact in late 20th-century Western society. This is seen as a constraint on the practice of engineering. Thus, a set of philosophical principles for sustainable engineering practice is developed. Such a change in the philosophy underlying the practice of engineering is seen as necessary if engineers are to engage with and contribute to the resolution of Type 3 problems. Two particular challenges must be overcome, if Type 3 problems are to be satisfactorily resolved. First, issues of belief, values, and morals are central to this problem type and must be included in problem consideration. And second, the problem situation is usually so complex that it challenges the capacity of human cognition to deal with it. Consequently, extensive consideration is given to cognitive and behavioural psychology, in particular to choice, judgement and decision-making in uncertainty. A novel problem-structuring approach is developed on three levels. A set philosophical foundation is established; a theoretical framework, based on general systems theory and established behavioural and cognitive psychological theory, is devised; and a set of tools is proposed to model Type 3 complex problems as a dynamic systems. The approach is different to other systems approaches, in that it enables qualitative exploration of the system to plausible, hypothetical disturbances. The problem-structuring approach is applied in a case study, which relates to the development of a water subsystem for a major metropolis (Sydney, Australia). The technique is also used to critique existing infrastructure planning processes and to propose an alternative approach.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Revised work with minor emendations approved by supervisor.
This dissertation considers three broad issues which emerge from the sustainability discourse. First is the nature of the discourse itself, particularly the underlying philosophical positions which are represented. Second, is the nature of the highly complex types of problem which the discourse exposes. And third is whether the engineering profession, as it is practised currently, is adequate to deal with such problems. The sustainability discourse exposes two distinct, fundamentally irreconcilable philosophical positions. The first, “sustainable development”, considers humanity to be privileged in relation to all other species and ecosystems. It is only incumbent upon us to look after the environment to the extent to which it is in our interests to do so. The second, “sustainability”, sees humanity as having no special moral privilege and recognises the moral status of other species, ecosystems, and even wilderness areas. Thus, sustainability imposes upon us a moral obligation to take their status into account and not to degrade or to destroy them. These two conflicting positions give rise to extremely complex problems. An innovative taxonomy of problem complexity has been developed which identifies three broad categories of problem. Of particular interest in this dissertation is the most complex of these, referred to here as the Type 3 problem. The Type 3 problem recognises the systemic complexity of the problem situation but also includes differences of the domain of interests as a fundamental, constituent part of the problem itself. Hence, established systems analysis techniques and reductionist approaches do not work. The domain of interests will typically have disparate ideas and positions, which may be entirely irreconcilable. The dissertation explores the development of philosophy of science, particularly in the last 70 years. It is noted that, unlike the philosophy of science, the philosophy of engineering has not been influenced by developments of critical theory, cultural theory, and postmodernism, which have had significant impact in late 20th-century Western society. This is seen as a constraint on the practice of engineering. Thus, a set of philosophical principles for sustainable engineering practice is developed. Such a change in the philosophy underlying the practice of engineering is seen as necessary if engineers are to engage with and contribute to the resolution of Type 3 problems. Two particular challenges must be overcome, if Type 3 problems are to be satisfactorily resolved. First, issues of belief, values, and morals are central to this problem type and must be included in problem consideration. And second, the problem situation is usually so complex that it challenges the capacity of human cognition to deal with it. Consequently, extensive consideration is given to cognitive and behavioural psychology, in particular to choice, judgement and decision-making in uncertainty. A novel problem-structuring approach is developed on three levels. A set philosophical foundation is established; a theoretical framework, based on general systems theory and established behavioural and cognitive psychological theory, is devised; and a set of tools is proposed to model Type 3 complex problems as a dynamic systems. The approach is different to other systems approaches, in that it enables qualitative exploration of the system to plausible, hypothetical disturbances. The problem-structuring approach is applied in a case study, which relates to the development of a water subsystem for a major metropolis (Sydney, Australia). The technique is also used to critique existing infrastructure planning processes and to propose an alternative approach.

At first glance, the project of moral enhancement (making people more moral) may appear uncontroversial and obviously worth supporting; surely it is a good idea to make people better. However, as the recent literature on moral enhancement demonstrates, the situation is not so simple – there is significant disagreement over the content of moral norms as well as appropriate means by which to manipulate them. This disagreement seriously threatens many proposals to improve society via moral enhancement. In my dissertation, I develop an understanding of how, exactly, disagreement poses problems for moral enhancement. However, I also argue that there is a way forward. It is possible to bring about moral improvement without commitment to particular and controversial moral norms, but instead relying on relatively uncontroversial ideas concerning morally reliable processes. The upshot is that, while attempting to directly manipulate people’s moral ideas is objectionable, it is relatively unproblematic to focus on helping people reason better and avoid akrasia, with the justified expectation that this will generally lead to moral improvement. We should, therefore, focus not on how to bring people in line with what we take to be the right ideas, motives or behaviors. Rather, we should look to helping people determine for themselves what being moral consists in, as well as help ensure that they act on those judgments. Traditional, non-moral education, it turns out, is actually one of the best moral enhancers we have. In fact, the tools of philosophy (which is, in many aspects, concerned with proper reasoning) are central to the project of indirect moral enhancement. Ultimately, one of the best ways to make people morally better may well be to make them better philosophers.

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary bioethics. In this thesis, I aim to provide a rationalist account of personal autonomy that avoids the philosophical flaws present in theories of autonomy that are often invoked in bioethics, and that can be usefully applied to contemporary bioethical issues. I claim that we can understand the concept of autonomy to incorporate two dimensions, which I term the 'reflective' and 'practical' dimensions of autonomy. I suggest that the reflective dimension pertains to the critical reflection that agents must carry out on their motivating desires, in order to be autonomous with respect to them. I begin by rejecting prominent desire-based and historical accounts of this dimension of autonomy, before going on to defend an account based upon a Parfitian analysis of rational desires. Following this analysis of the reflective dimension of autonomy, I argue that autonomy can also be understood to incorporate a practical dimension, pertaining to the agent's ability to act effectively in pursuit of their ends. I claim that recognising this dimension of autonomy more comprehensively reflects the way in which we use the concept of autonomy in bioethics, and makes salient the fact that agents carry out their rational deliberations in the light of their beliefs about what they are able to do. I go on to argue that this latter point means that my account of autonomy can offer a deeper explanation of why coercion undermines autonomy than other prominent accounts. Having considered the prudential value of autonomy in the light of this theoretical analysis, in the latter half of the thesis I apply my rationalist account of autonomy to a number of contemporary bioethical issues, including the use of human enhancement technologies, the nature of informed consent, and the doctor-patient relationship.