Tesi sul tema "Political corruption"

This dissertation presents three essays offering explanations for the persistence of corruption despite electoral competition. The first essay, co-authored with Adam Glynn and Nahomi Ichino, asks what the effect of electoral systems is on corruption. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) proposed that plurality electoral systems should lead to lower corruption compared to proportional representation (PR) systems because the former creates a direct link between voters and politicians whom voters can hold accountable for corruption. The empirical question re- mains unresolved, however, in part due to the endogeneity of the electoral institutions and difficulties in measuring corruption. Using nonparametric methods and new data to reduce sensitivity to these problems, we find no evidence for this hypothesis. Instead, we find some evidence in the opposite direction, that PR leads to less corruption. The second essay makes a theoretical distinction between voters’ perceptions of the corruption of the political system and of individual politicians. Evidence from original interviews and focus group discussions, as well as public opinion data shows that many Ugandan citizens perceive their political system to be highly corrupt. In particular, they perceive corrupt acts to be widespread, do not expect perpetrators to be punished, and have difficulty distinguishing “honest” candidates. These characteristics cause voters who perceive the system to be highly corrupt to be less likely to punish overtly corrupt individuals by withdrawing electoral support. In some cases, they even prefer clearly corrupt candidates. The third essay argues that to understand when voters hold politicians accountable for corruption, it is necessary to understand who they perceive to be corrupt. It presents evidence from a survey experiment showing that American voters perceive copartisan politicians to be less corrupt than those from the other political party or without a party label. This pattern is consistent with motivated reasoning in which voters expend extra cognitive resources to process information that contradicts their partisan leanings rather than from the use of party labels as heuristics to avoid cognitive burdens. Furthermore, I show that the ideological orientation of the media source reporting allegations of corruption affects whether they are viewed as credible. Counterstereotypical allegations – i.e., those that come from a media source that is ideologically similar to the politician – are taken more seriously by respondents. In fact, when partisans view counterstereotypical allegations, they exhibit less bias toward copartisans. In sum, this research demonstrates that in-group favoritism poses a challenge to democratic accountability, but that motivated reasoning is bounded by the evidence voters view, and thus that media sources with well-known ideological ori- entations may serve a particularly important role in encouraging democratic accountability among their bases.
Government

Corruption indexes, such as the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator, have played a pivotal role in focusing global attention on corruption. Since they came into existence, these indexes have been influential on research and investigations into corruption. Aid donors have also relied extensively on these indexes to determine the allocation of aid to developing countries. Despite the intense anti-corruption initiatives over the past decade, corruption still remains one of the greatest stumbling blocks for sustainable development. The lack of success of these anti-corruption initiatives has cast significant doubts on the contemporary mainstream perspective on corruption. In this thesis, I examine the underlying concepts and theoretical assumptions of the mainstream approach to corruption which has its roots in neoclassical economics. It defines corruption as bribery and views it as a rent-seeking behaviour. I argue that this understanding of corruption is too narrow and does not reflect the realities of corruption. A more appropriate framework draws on the insights of institutionalism. Focusing on the institutional structures and its violation in its analysis, this alternative defines corruption as the subversion of institutions and rules of an organisation or society which results in the corrosion of the institutional and social fabric. This alternative approach provides a broader and more realistic understanding of the realities of corruption. In theory, it may be possible to construct a corruption index based on this alternative framework. In order to give the developing countries a real chance at tackling corruption, it is necessary that the international community, in particular the World Bank and IMF, alter the way they understand corruption.

This thesis involves the examination, using sophisticated statistical techniques, of whether political corruption measured at the national level, and individual level perceived corruption, can help explain a) levels and forms of political participation, and b) directions of partisanship and vote choice. It proposes that corruption creates conditions of distrust and disaffection towards political institutions and actors that has behavioural and partisan consequences. It finds that perceived corruption has limited influence: dampening turnout, although having only weak effects on extrainstitutional behaviour and on party support. Yet national level corruption is found to have highly salient contextual effects. It dampens turnout and induces higher levels of extra-institutional participation where corruption is particularly high, and particularly low, owed to citizen disillusionment in the former case, and elite responsiveness in the latter. Some nuanced theoretical explanations for the prowess of contextual effects over individual level effects, relating to the ability of contextual effects to entrench participatory forms, are offered. The same theme is analysed in regard to a British case study, and specialist data yields consistent results regarding perceived corruption. Important effects relating to perceptions of broader standards of public life determining party support in the UK are also found. The thesis also addresses two other themes. By examining the nature of perceived corruption in the UK, it finds that citizens display significant attitudinal sophistication. They are well able to differentiate corruption from other impropriety, and develop their perceptions of corruption more from consideration of institutional performance than from engrained orientations produced by processes of socialisation. Second, the thesis provides discussion of the intellectual challenge of defining and measuring corruption, shedding light on the limits, as well as the potential, of applying quantitative techniques to such a complex field of study.

The thesis has three aims. First, it engages in a theoretical discussion about how to define corruption and how to explain its occurrence. Second, it seeks to trace how privatisation policy was shaped and implemented in the first decade of privatisation in Croatia and Hungary, with reference to qualitative data gathered during interviews with elite informants and a review of literature about the period and the policy. This evidence is interpreted in light of the preceding theoretical discussion. Third, it suggests a new way of understanding behaviour that is commonly identified as corrupt, by modelling the choices that individuals face as exchange decisions and arguing that social networks provide incentives and constraints which help to explain some of the patterns of conduct observed in the case studies.

The primary goal of this thesis is to provide a comparative analysis of the institutional and organizational mechanisms designed to monitor and control political corruption at the national level. The paper will provide comparisons of these arraignments and control systems across three nations. The thesis will identify differences across countries in terms of organizational and institutional political corruption control mechanisms, and use the CPI index to suggest and identify those control mechanisms that appear to be present in nations with low CPI measurements. Finally, the thesis will conclude with the discussion concerning the future prospects for controlling political corruption in Turkey based on the comparative analysis described above.

Past research has confirmed the importance of structural and individual-level factors in predicting voter turnout and citizen trust in the government. In international research particularly, political corruption has been shown to negatively affect citizen trust, though the effect of corruption on voter turnout is mixed. To date, no research has examined the effect of corruption on voting and government trust in the United States over a relatively long period of time. In this dissertation, I aim to answer two primary research questions: how U.S. corruption affects voting and how it affects citizen trust in the government. Using many sources of data for state-level variables, and the American National Election Study (NES) for individual-level variables, I investigate these relationships using multilevel modeling (MLM) of forty-six states and approximately 22,000 individuals in my analysis of voting and forty-one states and about 7,000 individuals in my analysis of political trust. I find that corruption has a small, but significant, negative effect on voting. Surprisingly, I find no effect of corruption on a citizen’s political trust, even after assessing the impact of corruption on four other specifications of trust. I also investigate cross-level interaction effects for each analysis, and find no significant results. I conclude with a discussion of possible explanations for these findings, make policy recommendations with the knowledge gained from this research, and offer suggestions for future investigations.

This thesis consists of three essays in Political Economy: “China’s Political Business Cycle” uncovers the fact that the timing of China’s business cycle correlates to the timing of the Communist Party’s Congress and constructs a theory to explain the mechanism of the political business cycle. An empirical test of the theory derives a result consistent with the predictions of the theory. “A Theory of Dynastic Cycle” provides a politico-economic theory to explain the mechanism of the dynastic cycle, a repeating pattern in China’s theory. The core of the theory is the ruler’s trade-off between the political account and the economic account in choosing a successor. “A Politico-Economic Theory of Corruption in Non-Democracy” investigates the ruler’s incentive to have corrupt agents. The key point is that a corrupt agent has a bad reputation and is less likely to replace the incumbent ruler. The major implication is that unless there is fundamental institutional change, it is hard to eradicate corruption in non-democracy.

This dissertation analyses the effects of information on corruption cases on citizens’ electoral behaviour and the media coverage of those scandals. Corruption, defined as the abuse of public office for private gain, has lately become a very prolific research field in both academic and policy areas. Considering the main factors driving corruption, some studies have identified democratic systems as a hurdle to political scandals. Advanced democratic institutions tend to be associated with higher transparency and better political accountability mechanisms, which are the channels through which they accomplish lower levels of corruption. Factors such as an independent judiciary, press freedom, and free elections are key elements that define an advanced democracy. This thesis is composed by three empirical studies. The study presented in Chapter 2 analyses how information on local corruption affected local electoral outcomes in Spanish municipalities between 1999 and 2007, a period characterised by the surge in local scandals. We use a novel database on those corruption cases to estimate an incumbent's vote share equation, accounting for the omission of popularity shocks, something that is lacking in prior studies. As an additional enrichment to the literature we have into consideration the degree of attention that the media devoted to each case and when the judiciary was involved in the scandal, analysing whether voters react to the amount of information and to information regarding the seriousness of the case. Thus, we account for the complementarity of these institutions in the fight against corruption. Chapter 3 studies how corruption affects voter turnout using information on local scandals occurring in Spain between 1999 and 2007 and survey data. This analysis has the advantage over the previous literature as it relies on a research strategy for differentiating between the ‘mobilisation’ and ‘disaffection’ effects of corruption on voter turnout. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study that is able to analyse empirically how these two effects are influenced by partisan leanings or corruption at different times, untangling the conclusions of earlier studies. Chapter 4 studies the media coverage of 165 Spanish local scandals spanning between 2004 and 2007 by national and regional newspapers. It analyses the incentives that media outlets may have to bias the information they report on those scandals. The literature has identified ideological slant and capture on the part of the government as two political elements that may bias media coverage of scandals. The study presented in chapter 4 is an improvement respect previous papers since it analyses both ideological slant and media capture as complementary factors rather than independent drivers of media bias. As an additional contribution we also consider the role of government’s popularity on the coverage of scandals. The three empirical studies that compose this thesis provide strong evidence that, even under a biased provision of news, Spanish voters are willing to electorally punish corrupt practices. Together with the significant number of cases recently unveiled by media and investigations undertaken by individuals or citizens’ organizations through different digital platforms, we can be optimistic about the evaluation of practices to control corruption. The promotion of policies that endorse media freedom and independence would also reduce the influence of political powers on Spanish media. Taken together, these factors would have a clear positive effect on electoral accountability, allowing citizens to obtain the impartial information they need to use elections as a way to constrain corrupt practices.

Ma thèse se compose de trois articles. Les deux premiers ont pour ambition d’apporter une contribution à la littérature de la microéconomie de la corruption. Le dernier article aborde le problème de la provision de biens publics depuis un angle inédit, qui pose le bien public comme un bien de confiance. Le premier article de ma thèse s’intitule «La corruption bureaucratique et la corruption politique ne sont pas l’endroit et l’envers d’une même pièce». Il s’agit non seulement d’offrir une revue de littérature à jour sur le thème de la microéconomie de la corruption, mais aussi de rappeler l’urgence d’établir une distinction claire entre les corruptions bureaucratique et politique dans la science économique. La ligne de démarcation entre ces deux phénomènes étant jusqu’à présent restée floue, les avancées réalisées dans la modélisation de la corruption bureaucratique - en recourant au modèle principal-agent - ont paradoxalement conduit à un vide de la littérature pour ce qui est de la formalisation de la corruption politique. Néanmoins, deux branches de l’économie politique se concentrent sur les rentes et les transferts monétaires associés à la corruption politique. Je défends l’idée que les rentes proposées dans les modèles d’agence politique s’apparentent davantage à des détournements de fonds publics qu’à de véritables pots de vin politiques. De plus, les transferts monétaires présentés dans la littérature de la représentation d’intérêts (lobbying) ne correspondent pas non plus exactement à la définition du pot de vin, ce qui ne manque pas d’alimenter la confusion entre lobbying et corruption politique. Dans le second article intitulé «Quand les politiciens prennent des décisions inefficaces. Un modèle d’agence commune appliqué à la corruption politique», je propose un modèle d’agence commune simple, dans lequel deux principaux (groupes d’intérêts) tentent d’influencer la décision d’un agent (politicien). La nouveauté théorique de ce modèle réside dans l’introduction d’un écart d’information entre les principaux: tandis que le premier groupe d’intérêts est toujours en mesure d’observer l’action posée par le politicien, le second doit faire confiance à un organe de surveillance imparfait pour faire la lumière sur le choix effectif de ce dernier. Dans ce contexte, le politicien a la possibilité d’opter pour une action inefficace, pour laquelle il accepte des transferts monétaires privés (pots de vin politiques) du groupe d’intérêt disposant de plus d’information. Mon principal résultat est que l’augmentation du degré de transparence (soit la réduction de l’écart d’information entre principaux) aboutit à faire monter les pots de vin attendus. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’une transparence accrue soit une mauvaise politique. En fait, en augmentant la transparence, on améliore le bien-être attendu. L’article propose un second résultat ayant trait à l’inefficacité des salaires fixes des politiciens comme outil de lutte contre la corruption. «La provision de biens publics de confiance selon l’agence commune», le troisième et dernier article de ma thèse, montre que dans un modèle d’agence commune utilisant des biens publics de confiance, même le moindre degré d’asymétrie d’information est susceptible de conduire à l’inefficacité. Le bien public est une forme de bien de confiance, étant donné que chaque principal observe avec une certaine probabilité (au moins) un de ses attributs. Ainsi, les principaux ne sont pas nécessairement en mesure de distinguer un projet public d’un autre, et ils n’ont pas d’autre choix que de faire confiance à la parole de l’agent au moment de faire leurs contributions. Au-delà de l’inefficacité résultante, je décris le comportement des principaux vis-à-vis de leurs contributions. Le fait d’avoir accès à davantage d’information (soit le fait de pouvoir distinguer adéquatement plus souvent les projets publics les uns des autres) peut, au final, amener les principaux à contribuer moins. Enfin, je dérive la probabilité de choisir le projet inefficace. Et comme cette probabilité mesure le bien-être attendu, je conclus sur quelques considérations politiques liées à l’accès des principaux à l’information.
My thesis is composed of three articles. The first two articles aim to bring a contribution to the microeconomics of corruption literature. The last one deals with the problem of public good provision from a new perspective: the public good is also a credence good. The first paper of my thesis is called “Bureaucratic and political corruption, the same side of two different coins”. It is not only an up-to-date review of the microeconomics of corruption literature, but also a caveat that a clear distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption is direly needed in economics. Because the line separating bureaucratic and political corruption has been fuzzy, the success in modeling bureaucratic corruption - by employing the principal-agent framework - has paradoxically left a gap in the formalization of political corruption. Nevertheless, two branches of political economy focus on rents or monetary transfers associated with political corruption. I argue that the rents proposed by the political agency models resemble rather the embezzlement of public funds than actual political bribes. Moreover, the monetary transfers proposed by the lobbying literature don’t fully fit the definition of political bribes, generating confusion between lobbying and political corruption. In the second paper entitled “When politicians make inefficient decisions. A common agency model of political corruption” I present a simple common agency model in which two principals (interest groups) try to influence the decision of an agent (politician). The theoretical novelty of the model is the presence of an information gap between principals: while one interest group always observes the action implemented by the politician, the other has to rely on an imperfect court to investigate the politician’s actual choice. In this context the politician may choose an inefficient action by accepting private monetary transfers (political bribes) from the better informed interest group. My main result is that an increase in transparency (i.e. the information gap between principals diminishes) will rise the expected bribes. This doesn’t mean that increasing transparency is a bad policy. In fact, increasing transparency improves the expected welfare. A second result concerns the ineffectiveness of politicians’ flat salaries in fighting corruption. “The provision of credence public goods under common agency”, the third paper of my thesis, shows that in a common agency model featuring credence public goods even the smallest degree of information asymmetry may lead to an inefficient outcome. The public good is also a credence good as each principal observes only with some probability (at least) one of its attributes. Therefore, the principals may not distinguish a public project from another and they have to trust the agent’s word when making contributions. Besides this inefficiency result, I characterize the principals’ contributing behavior. Getting access to more information (telling the difference between the public projects more often) may, surprisingly, bring the principals to contribute less. Finally, I derive the probability of choosing the inefficient project. And since it measures the expected welfare, I reach some policy considerations regarding the principals’ access to information.

This thesis examines the relationships between political power, corruption, and witchcraft in modern Indonesia through an analysis of the discursive construction of these concepts in Indonesian society. The subject is approached through an observation of how public discourses of corruption and sorcery are used by people in an instrumental way to talk about and understand political processes in the country. The central argument of the thesis is that Indonesian society experiences contemporary politics in a context that combines values and practices of political modernity and secular rationality with those of witchcraft, sorcery, and the occult. The thesis demonstrates how Indonesian politics has been transformed into a modern-secular democracy by juxtaposing traditionalism and modernism. Both are interconnected features of contemporary Indonesian modernity. The thesis focuses on corruption and sorcery discourses within the context of the political democracy that has been established in Indonesia following the collapse of the New Order state. There is currently a great deal of expectation that the system of democracy will promote public participation - in the sense that people become involved in political processes, that civil society becomes more effective and that the holders of state powers become more accountable - which should in turn curb corruption. Unfortunately, corruption appears to be pervasive within the new democratic polity, and both corruption and sorcery persist alongside the dynamics of political contestations and power struggles. In the light of continuing corruption practices, many groups of Indonesian society initiate anti-corruption movements by mobilizing social and political resources through collective action. Anti-corruption initiatives are taken by both state institutions and civil society associations, and seek to improve public governance and promote political reform. Nevertheless, non-state actors—NGOs and civil society agencies—appear to have become the major voices of public criticism against corruption and they have taken the lead in promoting anti-corruption reforms. These actors involve educated people from the urban middle classes: social and political activists, intellectuals, artists, poets, journalists, as well as religious leaders associated with Islamic organizations: the Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), the Muhammadiyah, and the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). It is argued that the ideas and practices of anti-corruption have found new spaces of expression under the new democratic system, and that Indonesian civil society and NGO activists are determined to continue their struggles to fight corruption for the betterment of the nation despite a great deal of opposition which is mostly political. They believe that the new system of political democracy will be much more beneficial for all Indonesian people if corruption can be eliminated from state agencies and political institutions.

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Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-20T21:53:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de Albuquerque.pdf: 638657 bytes, checksum: 7e4ea5027782cb93c70e0330eb553217 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-03
CNPQ
We consider a game between a non-benevolent incumbent politician and a bu-reaucrat, where both can illegally appropriate public resources. The corrupt politician uses the resources to finance political campaigns and the bureaucrat to buy goods and services. Any illegal withdraw from the treasury diminishes the politician’s capability to improve social welfare. Politicians care about votes, bureaucrats care about money, and voters care about social welfare and are influenced by campaigns. We analyze the role of society’s educational level and of different punishing structures. We find that: i) an ill suited punishing scheme may increase state capture corruption; ii) the more educated the politician’s constituency is, the less lenient to corruption she will be; and iii) the more sensitive to marginal increases in corruption the punishing structure is, the smaller both players’ optimal illegal appropriation.
Propomos um jogo entre um político não benevolente e um burocrata, no qual ambos podem desviar recursos públicos ilegalmente. O político corrupto utiliza os recursos desviados para financiar campanhas políticas e o burocrata para comprar bens e serviços. Quanto maior a quantidade de recursos desviados, menos o político pode melhorar o bem-estar social. Políticos se importam com votos, burocratas se importam com dinheiro, e eleitores se importam com o bem-estar social e são influenciados por campanhas políticas. Analisamos o papel do nível educacional da sociedade e de diferentes estruturas de punição. Nossos principais resultados são: i) uma estrutura de punição mal elaborada pode aumentar corrupção do tipo state capture; ii) quanto mais educada a sociedade, menos o político será leniente com corrupção e menor será seu desvio ótimo; iii) quanto mais sensível a aumentos marginais de corrupção a estrutura de punição for, menor será o desvio ótimo dos jogadores.

Ma thèse se compose de trois articles. Les deux premiers ont pour ambition d’apporter une contribution à la littérature de la microéconomie de la corruption. Le dernier article aborde le problème de la provision de biens publics depuis un angle inédit, qui pose le bien public comme un bien de confiance. Le premier article de ma thèse s’intitule «La corruption bureaucratique et la corruption politique ne sont pas l’endroit et l’envers d’une même pièce». Il s’agit non seulement d’offrir une revue de littérature à jour sur le thème de la microéconomie de la corruption, mais aussi de rappeler l’urgence d’établir une distinction claire entre les corruptions bureaucratique et politique dans la science économique. La ligne de démarcation entre ces deux phénomènes étant jusqu’à présent restée floue, les avancées réalisées dans la modélisation de la corruption bureaucratique - en recourant au modèle principal-agent - ont paradoxalement conduit à un vide de la littérature pour ce qui est de la formalisation de la corruption politique. Néanmoins, deux branches de l’économie politique se concentrent sur les rentes et les transferts monétaires associés à la corruption politique. Je défends l’idée que les rentes proposées dans les modèles d’agence politique s’apparentent davantage à des détournements de fonds publics qu’à de véritables pots de vin politiques. De plus, les transferts monétaires présentés dans la littérature de la représentation d’intérêts (lobbying) ne correspondent pas non plus exactement à la définition du pot de vin, ce qui ne manque pas d’alimenter la confusion entre lobbying et corruption politique. Dans le second article intitulé «Quand les politiciens prennent des décisions inefficaces. Un modèle d’agence commune appliqué à la corruption politique», je propose un modèle d’agence commune simple, dans lequel deux principaux (groupes d’intérêts) tentent d’influencer la décision d’un agent (politicien). La nouveauté théorique de ce modèle réside dans l’introduction d’un écart d’information entre les principaux: tandis que le premier groupe d’intérêts est toujours en mesure d’observer l’action posée par le politicien, le second doit faire confiance à un organe de surveillance imparfait pour faire la lumière sur le choix effectif de ce dernier. Dans ce contexte, le politicien a la possibilité d’opter pour une action inefficace, pour laquelle il accepte des transferts monétaires privés (pots de vin politiques) du groupe d’intérêt disposant de plus d’information. Mon principal résultat est que l’augmentation du degré de transparence (soit la réduction de l’écart d’information entre principaux) aboutit à faire monter les pots de vin attendus. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’une transparence accrue soit une mauvaise politique. En fait, en augmentant la transparence, on améliore le bien-être attendu. L’article propose un second résultat ayant trait à l’inefficacité des salaires fixes des politiciens comme outil de lutte contre la corruption. «La provision de biens publics de confiance selon l’agence commune», le troisième et dernier article de ma thèse, montre que dans un modèle d’agence commune utilisant des biens publics de confiance, même le moindre degré d’asymétrie d’information est susceptible de conduire à l’inefficacité. Le bien public est une forme de bien de confiance, étant donné que chaque principal observe avec une certaine probabilité (au moins) un de ses attributs. Ainsi, les principaux ne sont pas nécessairement en mesure de distinguer un projet public d’un autre, et ils n’ont pas d’autre choix que de faire confiance à la parole de l’agent au moment de faire leurs contributions. Au-delà de l’inefficacité résultante, je décris le comportement des principaux vis-à-vis de leurs contributions. Le fait d’avoir accès à davantage d’information (soit le fait de pouvoir distinguer adéquatement plus souvent les projets publics les uns des autres) peut, au final, amener les principaux à contribuer moins. Enfin, je dérive la probabilité de choisir le projet inefficace. Et comme cette probabilité mesure le bien-être attendu, je conclus sur quelques considérations politiques liées à l’accès des principaux à l’information.
My thesis is composed of three articles. The first two articles aim to bring a contribution to the microeconomics of corruption literature. The last one deals with the problem of public good provision from a new perspective: the public good is also a credence good. The first paper of my thesis is called “Bureaucratic and political corruption, the same side of two different coins”. It is not only an up-to-date review of the microeconomics of corruption literature, but also a caveat that a clear distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption is direly needed in economics. Because the line separating bureaucratic and political corruption has been fuzzy, the success in modeling bureaucratic corruption - by employing the principal-agent framework - has paradoxically left a gap in the formalization of political corruption. Nevertheless, two branches of political economy focus on rents or monetary transfers associated with political corruption. I argue that the rents proposed by the political agency models resemble rather the embezzlement of public funds than actual political bribes. Moreover, the monetary transfers proposed by the lobbying literature don’t fully fit the definition of political bribes, generating confusion between lobbying and political corruption. In the second paper entitled “When politicians make inefficient decisions. A common agency model of political corruption” I present a simple common agency model in which two principals (interest groups) try to influence the decision of an agent (politician). The theoretical novelty of the model is the presence of an information gap between principals: while one interest group always observes the action implemented by the politician, the other has to rely on an imperfect court to investigate the politician’s actual choice. In this context the politician may choose an inefficient action by accepting private monetary transfers (political bribes) from the better informed interest group. My main result is that an increase in transparency (i.e. the information gap between principals diminishes) will rise the expected bribes. This doesn’t mean that increasing transparency is a bad policy. In fact, increasing transparency improves the expected welfare. A second result concerns the ineffectiveness of politicians’ flat salaries in fighting corruption. “The provision of credence public goods under common agency”, the third paper of my thesis, shows that in a common agency model featuring credence public goods even the smallest degree of information asymmetry may lead to an inefficient outcome. The public good is also a credence good as each principal observes only with some probability (at least) one of its attributes. Therefore, the principals may not distinguish a public project from another and they have to trust the agent’s word when making contributions. Besides this inefficiency result, I characterize the principals’ contributing behavior. Getting access to more information (telling the difference between the public projects more often) may, surprisingly, bring the principals to contribute less. Finally, I derive the probability of choosing the inefficient project. And since it measures the expected welfare, I reach some policy considerations regarding the principals’ access to information.

The present thesis describes the connection between political corruption and vice crime in Portland as it was portrayed by media and public institutions and agencies in the 1940s and 1950s. The main body of the thesis discusses attempts to rid Portland of its vice problem through the City Club's crusade against crime and crooked politicians in the late 1940s and early 1950s and Mayor Dorothy McCullough Lee's subsequent reform movements against gambling and prostitution. The thesis will analyze The Oregonian's expose' on bootlegging, gambling, prostitution and links drawn by the newspaper to the Teamster's Union and Oregon politicians. From there, the study focuses on Washington D. C. and the McClellan Committee's 1950s hearings on the mismanagement and corruption of Teamster leaders in local and national chapters. Finally, the thesis analyzes the role of Portland's two daily newspapers and their contributions to the controversies and mixed messages over vice and crime in the city between World War II and 1957.

La coexistència d’un ferm rebuig de la corrupció tant a les enquestes com al debat públic, amb la freqüent reelecció de polítics corruptes representa una paradoxa en les ciències socials. Segons algunes teories democràtiques, les eleccions haurien de servir per fer que els polítics retessin comptes; però, estudis empírics realitzats en diversos països indiquen que el càstig electoral als polítics corruptes és limitat. L’objectiu d’aquesta tesi és avaluar les actituds dels ciutadans envers la corrupció i la seva importància relativa en el vot, per tal de proporcionar una millor comprensió de la rendició de comptes de la corrupció. Una explicació recurrent de per què els votants no sancionen la corrupció de manera més severament és que no estan prou informats sobre les irregularitats que cometen els polítics (votants ignorants) o que en realitat no estan tan preocupats per la mala conducta d’aquests (votants indiferents). Aquesta tesi aporta evidències empíriques que els votants es preocupen per la corrupció i que, idealment, no volen votar el polític corrupte, però, castigar els polítics no és tan simple com sembla. Al emetre un vot els ciutadans consideren molts altres aspectes importants a més de la integritat dels polítics. Votar és una decisió multidimensional i els electors poden sacrificar la integritat d’un polític a canvi d’altres característiques que valoren. L’aclaparadora desaprovació de la corrupció a les enquestes ha estat interpretada com un biaix de desitjabilitat social. Segons aquesta posició, el rebuig a la corrupció que els ciutadans expressen a les enquestes està motivat per la seva voluntat d’expressar actituds socialment acceptades. El capítol 2 d’aquesta tesi mostra que les intencions de votar a un candidat corrupte del partit preferit no augmenten quan els enquestats poden amagar les seves respostes individuals a l’investigador, per contra augmenten quan la pregunta respecta la complexitat de la presa de decisions en les eleccions. Per tant, el principal problema de les preguntes d’enquesta estàndards sobre actituds envers la corrupció, no és el biaix de desitjabilitat social, sinó la seva incapacitat per replicar la multidimensionalitat de les eleccions reals. Respectant la complexitat de la presa de decisions en eleccions, el Capítol 3 utilitza un experiment conjoint per reflectir aquest escenari multidimensional i així mesurar la importància relativa de la corrupció en el vot. Aquest capítol proporciona clares evidències que els votants estan disposats a sacrificar la integritat d’un polític a canvi d’altres característiques valorades. Els resultats mostren que la identitat partidista determina el vot en la mateixa mesura que la corrupció. Així mateix compartir la identitat partidista amb el polític i la bona gestió de l’economia d’aquest, moderen l’efecte negatiu que la corrupció té en les seves intencions de vot. A part d’estudiar a canvi de quines característiques dels polítics els votants sacrifiquen la integritat, aquesta tesi també (i) identifica els mecanismes causals que porten als votants a (no) votar un polític corrupte (ii) explora quines característiques individuals dels votants augmenten la probabilitat que sacrifiquin la integritat i (iii) examina quines característiques dels candidats alternatius causen un major càstig al polític corrupte. El capítol 4 mostra que la disminució de la confiança cap al polític corrupte explica perquè els votants decideixen no votar-lo. El Capítol 5 identifica heterogeneïtats modestes però potencialment rellevants en les respostes dels ciutadans a la corrupció, mentre que el Capítol 6 mostra que els votants castiguen el polític corrupte i voten a l’opció alternativa quan aquest és un candidat atractiu.
La coexistencia de un firme rechazo de la corrupción, tanto en las encuestas como en el debate público, con la frecuente reelección de políticos corruptos representa una paradoja en las ciencias sociales. Según teorías democráticas estándar, las elecciones deberían servir para hacer que los políticos rindan cuentas; sin embargo, estudios empíricos realizados en varios países indican que el castigo electoral a los políticos corruptos es limitado. El objetivo de esta tesis es evaluar las actitudes de los ciudadanos hacia la corrupción y su importancia relativa en el voto, a fin de proporcionar una mejor comprensión de la rendición de cuentas de la corrupción. Una explicación recurrente de por qué los votantes no sancionan la corrupción de manera más severa es que no están suficientemente informados sobre las irregularidades que cometen los políticos (votantes ignorantes) o que en realidad no están tan preocupados por la mala conducta de éstos (votantes indiferentes). Esta tesis aporta evidencias convincentes de que los votantes se preocupan por la corrupción y que, idealmente, no quieren votar al político corrupto, sin embargo, castigar a los políticos no es tan simple como parece. Al emitir un voto los ciudadanos consideran muchos otros aspectos importantes además de la integridad de los políticos. Votar es una decisión multidimensional y los electores pueden sacrificar la integridad de un político a cambio de otras características que valoran. La abrumadora condena de la corrupción en las encuestas ha sido interpretada como un sesgo de deseabilidad social. Según esta posición, el rechazo a la corrupción que los ciudadanos expresan en las encuestas está motivado por su voluntad de expresar actitudes socialmente aceptadas. El capítulo 2 de esta tesis muestra que las intenciones de votar a un político corrupto del partido preferido no aumentan cuando los encuestados pueden ocultar sus respuestas individuales al investigador, sin embargo, aumentan cuando la pregunta respeta la complejidad de la toma de decisiones en las elecciones. Por lo tanto, el principal problema de las preguntas de encuesta estándares sobre actitudes hacia la corrupción, no es el sesgo de deseabilidad social, sino su incapacidad para replicar la multidimensionalidad de las elecciones reales. Respetando la complejidad de la toma de decisiones en elecciones, el Capítulo 3 utiliza un experimento conjoint para reflejar este escenario multidimensional y así medir la importancia relativa de la corrupción en el voto. Este capítulo proporciona claras evidencias de que los votantes están dispuestos a sacrificar la integridad de un político a cambio de otras características valiosas. Los resultados muestran que la identidad partidista determina el voto en la misma medida que la corrupción. Asimismo, compartir la identidad partidista con el político y la buena gestión de la economía de éste, moderan el efecto negativo que la corrupción tiene en sus intenciones de voto. Además de estudiar a cambio de qué características de los políticos los votantes sacrifican la integridad, esta tesis también (i) identifica los mecanismos causales que llevan a los votantes a (no) votar a un político corrupto (ii) explora qué características individuales de los votantes aumentan la probabilidad de que sacrifiquen la integridad y (iii) examina qué características de los candidatos alternativos causan un mayor castigo del político corrupto. El Capítulo 4 muestra que la disminución de la confianza hacia el político corrupto explica por qué los votantes deciden no votarlo. El Capítulo 5 identifica heterogeneidades modestas pero potencialmente relevantes en las respuestas de los ciudadanos a la corrupción. Finalmente el Capítulo 6 muestra que los votantes castigan al político corrupto y votan a la opción alternativa cuando este es un candidato atractivo.
Although vehement condemnation of corruption is widespread, the reelection of corrupt governments or politicians is all too frequent. This situation still represents a paradox in the social sciences. According to standard democratic theory, elections are expected to serve as an instrument to hold politicians to account; however, studies conducted in multiple countries indicate that voters’ punishment of malfeasant politicians is rather limited. The aim of this thesis is to assess citizens’ attitudes towards corruption and its relative importance on their voting intentions, in order to provide a better understanding of corruption accountability. A recurring explanation for why voters do not sanction corruption more severely is that they are either insufficiently informed about the wrongdoings (ignorant voters) or that they are actually not that worried about malfeasance (indifferent voters). This dissertation provides compelling evidence that voters do indeed care about corruption and that ideally, they would like to punish the corrupt politician. Nevertheless, holding politicians to account is not as simple as it may seem. Besides integrity, voters consider many other important aspects when casting a ballot. Voting is a multidimensional decision and electors may trade integrity against other characteristics that they value. In line with the indifferent voter argument, an interpretation of the overwhelming disapproval of corruption in surveys is that these answers are plagued with social desirability bias. According to this position, the rejection of corruption that citizens express in surveys is driven by their will to express socially accepted attitudes. Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that respondents’ intentions to vote for a corrupt candidate from their preferred party does not increase when the question is formulated in an unobtrusive way. However, a respondent’s intention to vote for the corrupt politician does increase when the question is formulated as a tradeoff. Therefore, the main problem of standard survey questions that ask about attitudes towards corruption is not social desirability bias, but their inability to replicate the multidimensionality of real elections. Keeping in mind the complexity of making decision in elections, Chapter 3 uses a conjoint experiment to reflect this multidimensional scenario and to thus measure the relative importance of corruption on voting intention. This chapter provides clear-cut evidence that, voters are indeed willing to trade off corruption for other valued characteristics such as partisan identity or economic performance. The results show that co-partisanship determines voting choice to the same extent as corruption. Moreover, both co-partisanship and, to some extent, economic performance, moderate the negative effect corruption has on the vote. Besides focusing on the tradeoffs that voters face when casting a vote, this dissertation also aims to increase our understanding of the tradeoff argument. This has been carried out by (i) identifying the causal mechanisms that lead voters to (not) vote for a malfeasant politician (ii) exploring what individual characteristics of voters increase the probability of them trading integrity against representation or competence and (iii) examining what characteristics of the alternative candidates cause an increased punishment of the corrupt politician. Chapter 4 shows that a drop in the level of trust felt towards the corrupt politician in question explains why voters may decide not to vote for her. Chapter 5 identifies some modest but potentially relevant heterogeneities in citizens’ responses to corruption, while Chapter 6 shows that voters punish the corrupt politician by switching to the alternative option when this is an attractive candidate.

There is a widespread public perception of corruption in Liberia's election process, yet there is little documentation on the characteristics of voters and their perceptions of electoral corruption. The purpose of this correlational study was to explore the relationship between gender, ethnicity, physical location, and perceptions about political activity during the 2005 national election. Roderick Chisolm's conceptualization of the internalist view of justification served as the theoretical construct. Data were acquired from the Afrobarometer survey (n = 1,200), which used a representative cross-sectional sample design, and were subjected to cross-tabulation analysis, a chi-square test, and a correlation analysis. The results of the analysis indicated that elections were perceived as unfair and that gender was an important predictor of perception. The analysis revealed that 26.8% of women perceived the National Election Commission as untrustworthy and 79.0% reported that they did not feel completely free to choose their preferred candidate. A chi-square test of association confirmed that among males, the belief that elections are free and fair was statistically significant (p = .002), though not for females (p = .151). Gender was moderately correlated (r = .088) with corruption of government officials. It was also found that the theoretical construct may explain the behavior of elected officials, but was not predictive of voter engagement. Recommendations to remedy this problem include widespread election reform that focuses on combating negative perceptions of voters, particularly among women, and correcting technical irregularities in Liberia's electoral processes.

This thesis addresses two central questions in the field of corruption: the relationship between corruption and some of its main determinants and the effect that these relationships have on economic development. The research presented in this thesis extends the literature on corruption in several directions. The third chapter studies the empirical relationship between press freedom and bureaucratic corruption. As one of the main democratic checks and balances, press freedom is thought to impose a curb on corruption. We investigate two related aspects. The first considers whether there exists a robust empirical relationship between press freedom and corruption. The second investigates the detail, by exploring which types of restrictions to press freedom are robustly related to corruption. Using robust regression techniques on a panel of countries we conclude that restrictions to media freedom are robustly associated to higher corruption. Also we find that both political and economic restrictions to press freedom are strongly related to corruption while legal and administrative restrictions are not. The fourth chapter studies the relationship between decentralisation, corruption and development in a dynamic macroeconomic model. We assess whether corruption is always harmful to development, whether decentralisation is always beneficial for development and the effect that corruption produces on the relationship between decentralisation and development. Our main finding from this model is that if corruption is absent, decentralisation is the best alternative for development but may not be preferable to centralisation if corruption is widespread in the economy. The fifth chapter examines the empirical relationship between decentralisation and corruption. This chapter has two main goals. First, to reconsider the available evidence in light of some newly assembled data. The second goal is to incorporate into the analysis several dimensions of decentralisation simultaneously. We find that the inconsistencies in the empirical literature arise due to the frequent omission of multiple measures of decentralisation. Secondly, that both fiscal decentralisation and constitutional centralisation are simultaneously associated with lower corruption. Finally, we find that certain forms of political decentralisation -local elections- weaken the positive effect of constitutional centralisation -unitarism- on corruption.

Political corruption is a cancer - a malignant phenomenon that affects every political system and every person in the world. Corruption undermines the very fabric of society and the faith of people in their government. It makes goods more expensive, stymies development in developing nations, and it makes both the United States and the world a more dangerous place. Because of its negative effects and universality, corruption should be studied. Its study leads to greater understanding, the discovery of effective approaches to prevention, and restored faith in political systems. Its study also illuminates and breaks down barriers to effective government while empowering officials who put constituents before themselves to act. In this analysis, modern literature and analyses are examined to gain better understanding of the nature and wider study of corruption, rankings of the American states are analyzed and a meta-study completed to rank the states along broader criteria, and one particular state - Florida - is examined closely as a case study in political corruption. Why Florida? Florida is the fourth largest state in the United States, has a racially and socioeconomically diverse population, and the highest number of convictions for corruption of any other state for the last decade. The result of this study is a deeper insight into political corruption as a field of study, better understanding of defining and measuring political corruption, and potential policy remedies to reduce it. The results come with implications for a wide variety of academic fields with vested interest in the study of political corruption along with nonacademic audiences seeking to rid themselves of this cancer of government.

China's unique system of hiring and promoting talented people within the state, under the supervision of the Communist Party, has been held up as an important institutional factor supporting its remarkably rapid and sustained economic growth. Jointly with Professor Peter L. Lorentzen, we explore this meritocracy argument in the context of Chinese leader Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign. Some question the sincerity of the campaign, arguing that it is nothing but a cover for intra-elite struggle and a purge of Xi's opponents. In the first chapter of my thesis, we use a dataset I have created to identify accused officials and map their connections. Our evidence supports the Party's claim that the crackdown is primarily a sincere effort to cut down on the widespread corruption that was undermining its efforts to develop an effective meritocratic governing system. First, we visualize the "patron-client'' network of all probed officials announced by the central government and identify the core targets of the anti-corruption campaign. Second, we use a recursive selection model to analyze who the campaign has targeted, providing evidence that even personal ties to top leaders have provided little protection. Finally, we show that, in the years leading up to the crackdown, the provinces later targeted had departed from the growth-oriented meritocratic selection procedures evident in other provinces.

In addition to its motivation, I also discuss the campaign's effects on economic efficiency. The second chapter of my thesis tests the "greasing-the-wheels'' hypothesis in the context of China's residential land market. We show that China's anti-corruption campaign, aimed at removing corruption in China's monopoly land market, caused a decrease in land transaction volumes. Furthermore, not removing any form of corruption would also lead to a similar decrease. It is only necessary to remove corruption that enables real estate developers to circumvent red tape and reduce trading costs. Our findings support the "greasing-the-wheels'' hypothesis hypothesis: when an economy has a low outcome owing to some preexisting distortions, corruption could be a positive factor in that it offers a "second-best world.''

L'économie politique est l'une des sous-disciplines de la littérature économique. Les économistes politiques étudient les effets des facteurs politiques sur les résultats économiques. Les institutions et l'influence de différentes structures institutionnelles sur les marchés sont parmi les principaux domaines de recherche de l'économie politique. Dans la littérature existante, le nombre d'analyses empiriques portant sur les déterminants des institutions est faible par rapport aux études qui se concentrent sur les effets des institutions sur les performances économiques. De plus, les analyses qui examinent l’impact de la culture, en particulier de la religion, sur les institutions sont rares. Sans aucun doute, la religion peut avoir des effets dramatiques sur les variables sociales et économiques. L’objectif de ce travail est donc d’examiner les effets de la religion et de la religiosité sur la corruption, le bonheur des individus et le comportement électoral. Nous contribuons à la littérature existante en fournissant de nouvelles preuves et en nous concentrant sur les pays non analysés dans les études précédentes. [...]
Political economy is one of the sub-diciplines of economics literature. Political economists investigate the effects of political factors on economic outcomes. Institutions and the influence of different institutional structures on markets are among the main research areas of political economy. In the existing literature, the number of empirical analyses which investigate the determinants of institutions is low in comparison to the studies that focus on the effects of institutions on economic performance. Moreover, the analyses which examine the impact of culture, specifically religion, on institutions are scarce. Without doubt, religion can have dramatic effects on social and economic variables. Hence, the aim of this work is to investigate the effects of religion and religiosity on corruption, individuals’ happiness and voting behaviour. We contribute to the existing literature by providing new evidence and by focusing on the countries which are not analysed in the previous studies. [...]

Summary in English.
According to President Thabo Mbeki, the fight against corruption is one of the principal tasks of his new government. Corruption is a central concern for a country that is in a difficult political transition and is facing strong economic demands. South Africa needs an effective government. The focus of this paper is one of the areas where corruption is thriving, the South African Police Service (SAPS). I have chosen for a study within the department of Safety and Security because this is the headquarters of the fight against corruption and the place where the rule of law should be rooted most deeply. If the justice-system is corrupt, the whole state will be polluted. According to the Parliamentary researcher for the Safety and Security Committee 'the current level of corruption within the overall criminal justice system is the factor most negatively influencing efforts to substantially improve safety and security in South Africa', undermining both public confidence and crime prevention strategies (Briefing Committee 1999:1). This is one motivation for writing a thesis on this topic: corruption is a central concern for those involved in South African politics. The theme of corruption is also at the heart of political organization. People organize themselves for certain goals. Whatever these goals are, corruption interferes with their effective pursuance. Studying corruption means studying the nature of government and the tension between the way it should use its power and the way it does. It is about the limits of human organization, the tension between the public and the private, and the slippery way people practice their ethics. This is another motivation for writing on this topic: corruption is a central concern for those involved in political science. In South Africa, there are widespread beliefs in the existence of corruption. In a survey published by Idasa in 1996, 46 percent of the respondents felt that most officials were engaged in corruption and only 6 percent believed there was a clean government (Lodge 1998:157). The police certainly does not have a dean reputation. In a newspaper poll over half of the respondents called the police 'corrupt and having no integrity' (Sowetan 28/3/96, quoted in Syed and Bruce 1997:2). Moreover, an opinion survey at the end of 1998 showed that 60 percent of the respondents thought the government was controlling corruption 'not very well' or 'not at all well' (Mail & Guardian 8/10/99:30). In this thesis, I want to put these figures into perspective. The purpose of the thesis is two-folded. Firstly, to provide for an analysis of the historical, political, social and organizational roots of corruption within the SAPS. Secondly, to confront this analysis - and the policy directions it suggests - with the practice of fighting corruption in South Africa.

Despite the pervasiveness of political corruption in Mexico, the topic has received little scholarly attention. Two objectives guide the current study: to contribute to the comparative literature on political corruption, and to incorporate corruption into an analysis of Mexican politics broadly conceived. Prompted by a host of problems with prior approaches to the study of corruption, the theoretical framework highlights the separation of the normative and behavioral dimensions of the central concept, ties corruption to a three-part model of the state and identifies bribery and extortion as two primary types of corruption. A state-society theory of corruption is presented that underscores the relative balance of state and social forces to offer routes of social mobility as the major determinant of political corruption. The direction of the imbalance between state and society determines, in turn, the bribery or extortion type of corruption dominating the system. Applying this framework, attention centers on the causes, consequences and dynamics of political corruption in Mexico. As to cause, it is argued that the overwhelming power of the Mexican state and the relative weakness of social organizations create the incentives for widespread extortion. Analysis focuses on factors internal to the state, the linkages between state and society and general aspects of society. Data on corruption are used to examine types of corruption, bureaucratic location and denouncing parties. In terms of the consequences of corruption, analysis underscores its contribution to political stability by integrating the political elite, cushioning the impact of policy, displacing political accountability and serving as a symbolic device to mobilize society. Although corruption has fostered widespread distrust of the government and governmental officials among the public, it is portrayed and seen as a non-systemic problem and hence does not erode diffuse system support. A survey of public opinion confirms high levels of distrust and shows such factors as socio-economic status and political involvement to be weak yet significant determinants of opinions towards corruption. Examination of the dynamics of corruption center on the short-term impact of the Mexican sexenio (six year political term) on the incidence and intensity of corruption and anti-corruption campaigns. Also, analysis focuses on the "crisis of corruption" characterizing Mexico in the decade of the eighties.

This research investigates the role of the Romanian press in reporting political corruption. It argues that as a part of a Romanian society tolerant to corruption, the Romanian press manages to report corruption but fails to be part of the solution to the corruption problem by holding the political elite to account. To demonstrate this, the thesis uses textual and contextual analysis by employing techniques and concepts from critical discourse analysis, political economy of the media and theories of media and democracy. To assess the role of the Romanian press reporting political corruption within the larger context of post-communist Romanian realities, the research comprises three case studies and interviews with journalists. The first case study focuses on the corruption case of one of Romania's Prime Ministers, Adrian Nastase. The second case study focuses on the case of Dan Voiculescu, a powerful politician and media owner with strong connections with Romania's communist past. The third case study is an overview of the corruption within the Romanian political realm. It shows corruption as a practice surviving decades and touching politicians irrespective of their political colour or side, Government or Opposition. The interviews provide an image of the internal state of the Romanian media: a mutually beneficial relationship shaped as barter between politicians and media owners, dodgy characters looking to protect themselves from being investigated by the legal system for their irregular deeds while trying to secure good contracts with the state for their other business endeavours. The Romanian journalist becomes almost irrelevant in such a context. The results of the study contribute to a better understanding of post-communist Romania, its problem with political corruption and the working of its media. The results also suggest that, in view of the lack of any significant research into the phenomenon of corruption in Romania, understanding the problem of political corruption and the role of the media in tackling it should be as well approached from a clear understanding of the culture of corruption in Romania.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006.
Title from electronic title page (viewed Oct. 10, 2007). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political Science." Discipline: Political Science; Department/School: Political Science.

The dissertation is made up of three papers on the political economy of corruption and rent-seeking. Two of the papers make use of the historical experience of Britain to illustrate the theoretical points being made. The first paper shows that eighteenth-century Britain displayed patterns of corruption similar to those of developing countries today. To explain anti-corruption reforms, the paper develops a model in which the political elite is split between government officials and asset-owners. Government officials can act in one of two regimes: a corrupt one in which they are free to maximize their income from the provision of government goods, and one in which a regulated system leaves no room for individual profit maximization. Faced with a change in the level of demand for government goods, officials become able to extract rents at a level that leads to other members of the elite voting to enact reforms. The logic of the model is tested using a new dataset of members of the House of Commons and its main implications are validated. The second paper develops a model of how the British political class came to give up its power to extract rents from the economy between the 1810s and the 1850s. The key of the explanation lies in understanding the bargaining process between economic agents who seek permission to engage in economic activity and a legislature that can grant such permissions. The third paper analyzes the distributive effects of corrupt interactions between government officials and citizens. Corruption is modeled as a solution to an allocation problem for a generic government good G. Beyond a transfer from citizens to the government, corruption redistributes welfare towards "insiders" who share some natural connection to the government and to other insiders. Corruption also redistributes welfare towards those who are skilled in imposing negative externalities, and encourages the imposition of such negative externalities.
Government

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
Esse trabalho é um estudo sobre a reforma política entendida enquanto seu processo no tempo. O debate iniciado na década noventa, cuja agenda baseava-se em alegadas vantagens comparativas das engenharias políticas disponíveis, avança no sentido de uma preocupação com um suposto aumento da corrupção, mobilizando inovações e outros atores institucionais, e argumentos à serviço do controle dos comportamentos individuais no processo competitivo com vistas a uma melhor fiscalização. Com base em uma bibliografia especializada e nos projetos de reforma política, identifica-se um processo de deslocamento de sentido nos termos dessa reforma, antes marcada pela polarização governabilidade ou representação, para uma chave interpretativa mais pragmática de contenção da corrupção.
This is a study on political reform as understood their process in time. The debate started in the late nineties, whose agenda was based on alleged comparative advantage of available engineering policies, moving towards a concern with an alleged increase in corruption by mobilizing the innovations and other institutional actors, and arguments in the service of control of individual behavior the competitive process in order to better policing. Based on a literature, and in the projects of political reform, a process of displacement of sense in terms of reform has identified, before marked by polarization governance or representation, and now represent an interpretive key to more pragmatic containment of corruption.

Corruption is widely considered to have adverse effects on economic development through its negative impact on the volume and quality of public investment and the efficiency of government services. Conversely, many of these macro variables are determinants of corruption. However, there are few studies of this two-way interaction at the macro level. This thesis aims to extend the current literature on corruption and development by explicit investigation of two diverse channels through which corruption and economic development interact, namely women's share in politics and pollution. For each variable, the thesis presents a theoretical model in which corruption and economic development are determined endogenously in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. We have four main results. First, female bureaucrats commit fewer corrupt acts than male bureaucrats because they have lower incentives to be corrupt. Second, corruption affects pollution directly by reducing pollution abatement resources and indirectly through its impact on development. As pollution and development appear to have an inverse U-shaped relationship, the total effect of corruption on pollution depends on the economy's level of income. Third, we confirm a simultaneous relationship between corruption and development. Fourth, for sufficiently low income levels, corruption and poverty may be permanent features of the economy. In addition to the two theoretical models, the thesis also presents an empirical investigation of the causal effect of women's share in parliament on corruption using panel data and gender quotas as instruments for women's share in parliament. Our results overturn the consensus since we find no causal effect of women's share in parliament on corruption, except in a particular case of Africa with reserved seats quotas.

The treatment of corruption in US federal law has evolved in an inconsistent manner and endured repeated seemingly erratic shifts. This dissertation considers the treatment of political and electoral corruption both comparatively between institutions and internally within institutions, using the political philosophy of Plato as a theoretical foundation. It thus offers three essays: one that examines Plato’s treatment of corruption in his seminal political works (The Republic, The Statesman, and The Laws); a second that considers the comparative treatment of corruption by Congress and the Supreme Court in the context of both electoral and official corruption; and a third that considers the internal partisan dispute within the Supreme Court over the proper treatment of campaign finance. This dissertation takes as its methodology close analysis of text, whether Supreme Court opinions, the Congressional legislative record, or Platonic dialogues; and it takes as its subject matter the character of persons who participate in the political process. Its essential observation is that the US conception of law does not give credence to the character (in the deep sense) of participants in the political process, even as such questions of character overdetermines legal debates, as present in the materials that shape corruption law itself. By careful analysis of these texts, the unspoken but critical role of character in election law can be understood. The fruit of this analysis that US election law is riven by debates over the proper contours of anti-corruption regulation that reside upon the character of those it regulates. Within the Court this has produced partisan conflict; between the Court and Congress it has produced two differing views of how the anti-corruption regime should be constructed.
Government

This work will explore the interconnections between political power and the various forms of corruption endemic in Denver in the late 19th century placing municipal corruption and election fraud into the larger political, economic, social and cultural framework. Municipal political corruption in Denver operated through a series of relationships tying together, the city police, political factions, utility and industrial leaders, con men, gamblers, protection rackets and the election of U.S. Senators. This work will explore not only the operational ties, but also how these ties served all parties, and the discourse used to rationalize the behavior and distribute blame. The dates for this study are bracketed by two significant events: a mayoral election and trial in 1889-1890, and the City Hall War in the spring of 1894. Each of these events represents a point when a rupture in the tight net of political control sparked a battle for hegemony with a concomitant turn to corruption and election fraud on the part of competing political factions. The level of municipal corruption in Denver was not necessarily unusual; however, the extent of the documentation enables a detailed analysis. Denver newspapers blamed the corruption on an unspecified "gang" and a shadowy "machine." The editors railed against the scourge of con men, and simultaneously used the ubiquitous fraud as a metaphor for trickery and corruption of all kinds. This detailed analysis reveals a more complex series of events through which a cabal of business and industry leaders seized control of both the city and the state government, giving them the political power to wage what has been called a war against labor.

While numerous studies have been conducted on the subject of political participation, research on how corruption and political trust affect the way citizens participate in politics has yet to produce consistent and clear results. The divide in perspectives surrounds whether these phenomena spur citizens to take action or, on the contrary, render them apathetic and indifferent to political events. Through using the method of regression to analyze individual level data, this study attempts to examine how political trust and perceived corruption impact non- institutionalized political participation in South Korea. While results indicate no statistically significant effects for political trust, perceived corruption is suggested to have a positive effect on non-institutionalized forms of participation.