Articoli di riviste sul tema "Political corruption – Economic aspects – East Asia"

The article deals with the prospects for Russia’s “pivot to the East” taking into account main chances as well as risks in the context of growing challenges in East Asia. The author stresses that national and regional misbalances in East Asia are the results of the dynamic development of East Asian countries during the last 15 years. “Middle class trap” is at the agenda as the main common problem in China and ASEAN member countries. The analysis focuses also on such issues as broad scaled corruption and state-controlled legal system, quality of political, social institutions and social lifts, role of nationalism and culture. Regional misbalances in infrastructure and R&D as well as the crisis of regional institutions are characterized as new challenges to integration trends in East Asia and Asia-Pacific area in general. According to the author’s view, there are three different types of policies to meet the domestic challenges and to overcome “middle class trap”: Japanese, South Korean and Chinese. Prime Minister Ikeda’s “income-doubling plan” accompanied by public activity is described as an effective reform-oriented policy. South Korea’s transition from dictatorship to democratic society and more flexible economy is another type of positive reform policy. According to China’s modern domestic strategy, a lot of attention is paid to administrative measures against corruption, modification of social policy, reforms of banks, etc. At the same time, public activities and legal system, in spite of some improvements, are still under rigid administrative control. Meanwhile, the role of law will be crucial factor of successful development of East Asian countries at the stage of “middle class economy”. To a large scale, the prospects for regional integration depend on growing creative role of China (for example, investments into regional infrastructure and establishment of special bank, initiations of the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area). At the same time, China will continue cooperation and dialogue with other countries, first of all with the USA. ASEAN members increase their activity to improve sub-regional cooperation and relations with United States and Japan in order to couterbalance China’s influence in East Asia. Finally, the author describes Russia’s policy towards East Asia and the Pacific, including brief history, main trends and key priorities at the current stage. “Free Vladivostok port” and some other initiatives to realize more flexible economic strategy towards East Asia and Pacific will give opportunity for Russia to promote its integration into the Pacific Area. Transition of Russia’s export structure from resources and energy to innovation goods and services is at the agenda.

Purpose Economic statecraft is a critical aspect of China’s foreign policy and has played a vital role in China’s relations with its Asian neighbors. The Chinese economic ties with Asia are significant not only because China is the second largest economy in today’s world but also because it has an important impact on regional economic co‐operation and international supply chains. Relentless growth in military buildup and more assertive foreign policy led many pundits to focus almost exclusively on political and military aspects of the Chinese grand strategy in Asia. The purpose of this study is to re‐examine this picture by studying China’s economic statecraft in the region. Design/methodology/approach This paper will address following research questions: How does the Chinese foreign economic policy serve its political aspirations in East Asia? Why has China increasingly relied on a combination of economic pressures and incentives to achieve its foreign policy objectives? How effective is China’s economic diplomacy as a strategic weapon? What are the limitations of such policy? What challenges does Beijing face in exercising its economic power in East Asia? Findings Beijing has a comprehensive, long-term grand strategy in Asia, and economic statecraft is a major component of it. Economic statecraft is a double-edged sword. It has given the People’s Republic of China more political influence but frictions and disputes between China and its trading partners are growing as well. Even with the slower growth of the Chinese economy, China will continue to be a game changer for the region. The economic diplomacy has long been part of the foreign policy toolkit used by the People’s Republic of China and will play more important role in the years to come. Research limitations/implications Thus far, China’s expanding economic ties with many countries in the world have not generated significant spillover effects. Although China is the dominant economic partner for every country in East Asia, its “soft power” remains to be weak. With the slower growth of the Chinese economy, another looming issue is whether China is going to be able to make a shift away from a trade- and export-led growth model that brought its dramatic economic success. All these could lead China’s economic statecraft less potent. Meanwhile, it should be noted that Asian economies that once relied on the USA are reaching a turning point as China comes to the fore, a trend that may challenge the existing international order. Should this momentum continue, it could alter the balance of power between Washington and Beijing in the region. Practical implications For Beijing, economic statecraft concerns both the economic dimension of foreign policy and the strategic dimension of economic policy. Although there is a growing literature on China’s soft power and military capabilities, the study of the economic dimensions of China’s foreign policy remains underdeveloped. With rising confidence and sophistication, Beijing has deployed economic resources to achieve geopolitical aims. Originality/value Needless to say, China’s economic statecraft has already triggered heated debate in the United States, Asia and elsewhere in the international community. However, the study of the Chinese economic diplomacy has received relatively little scholarly attention in the English-speaking world. This paper will fill a gap in the analysis and literature.

The subject of this research is the migration processes with regards to national, regional and international security. The author examines threats to security of the Far East related to external and domestic migration; as well as similar processes in the countries of Northeast Region and their impact upon the state of regional security overall. The goal of this work is to analyze this phenomenon in Northeast Asia, and the influence of migration processes upon regional security. The link between migration and security is bilateral. On one side is security of the countries and societies directly affected by migration; while on the other – security of actual people who comprise the migration flows. The research employs the comparative and historical approaches, which allow analyzing the peculiarities of formation of the “agenda” of regional security in the Northeast Asia, including the questions of migration, as well as trace the transformation of national approaches towards ensuring regional security along with the threats themselves in the sphere of migration. The Russian political science does not currently contain works that view the problems of migration in Northeast Asia in the context of regional and international security (despite the fact, that there is multiple research on migration overall). Migration is a not a potential challenge, it is a real threat to security. None of the countries in the region was able to avoid the influence of at least separate aspects of migration processes.

This study investigates the impact of Kyoto Protocol and four institutional factors i.e. political stability, property rights, corruption and freedom of trade on the growth of per capita CO2 emissions in Asia and the Pacific region for the period of 1971-2009. The region consists of East Asia, South Asia and the Pacific islands are the fastest growing economic region and the source of global greenhouse gas emissions. A dynamic panel data model based on the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) technique is utilized to examine these impacts. The findings indicate only Kyoto commitment (Kcom), Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (Kcdm) and Corruption (COR) describe statistically significant positive effects on CO2 emissions.

The article considers models of political transformation in East Asian countries. The analysis of political practices of transformation of the countries of East and South-East Asia is carried out in the study. The research contains the factors that influenced the successful implementation of modernization projects in the states of the region. The specific features of the political transformations of the states of the region associated with the formation of non-Western democracies on the basis of “development authoritarianisms” are revealed. Carrying out large-scale transformations is connected with the need to establish sovereignty in the postcolonial period and ensure national security in the current geopolitical conditions. The success of the East Asian model of transformation is also associated with the preservation of elements of traditional regulation, a unique synthesis of traditions and innovations based on a special, synthetic way, non-Western and nonmobilization type. Governments and national leaders play a special role in the political practices of non-Western modernization, ensuring the planning of modernization strategies. A separate role in the transformation belongs to the competent bureaucracy with a minimum degree of corruption. And the transformations were carried out by authoritarian methods. Non-Western modernization is of interest both from a theoretical and empirical point of view, especially given the effect of the non-Western approach to transformation, embodied in the so-called Asian economic miracle and contributing to national consolidation in Southeast and East Asia. For developing countries, it is important to choose the ways of their socio-political and economic development, especially in the context of globalization. The study of the experience of the countries of Southeast and East Asia allows us to identify the main directions of their development that have transformed societies, and to determine an acceptable development strategy for the state. Back in the 1990s, concepts were put forward according to which the 21st century would be the era of domination of the Asia-Pacific civilization, which replaces the Euro-Atlantic one. The modernization of the countries of Southeast Asia is becoming a factor in reformatting the established world order, creating a new balance of power in the international arena and new centres of influence in political and economic relations.

The article considers macroeconomic and social factors of the upsurge of socio-political instability in the Arab world. The Arab countries are compared with other states in the Arab-Muslim world, as well as with the economically fast-growing economies of East and South Asia. It is concluded that Arab countries loosely fit into the promising growth model of the XX century and they are in need of profound reforms.

This essay examines the politics of regional economic construction in East Asia based on the comparative politics framework of Kopstein and Lichbach (2009). The framework highlights three important aspects of domestic politics, namely: interests, identities, and institutions and relates these aspects to the global (or regional) context. The essay stresses the importance of domestic politics to regional affairs and therefore, should be considered in future assessments of the prospects of regional economic construction. It suggests a research agenda in aid of ongoing regionalization processes.

Pessimism and skepticism dominate this most recent work by Martha Brill Olcott, one of the leading scholars of Central Asia and the Eurasian realm. Her central theme is that, even with abundant natural resources, an educated population, and a situation between East and West, Kazakhstan's seemingly bright future and promised prosperity failed to materialize. In short, political and economic corruption has dominated the transition from Soviet dependency to post-Soviet independence.

What are the economic, political, institutional, socio-cultural, and geographical determinants of financial development in developing countries? This paper uses the two-way fixed effects (with clustered standard errors) and annual panel data from 1980 to 2018 for 69 developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, East and South Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean to address this question. The principal component analysis is employed to construct a financial development index based on three financial development indicators. This study builds on the previous studies by introducing new potential determinants of financial development such as the perception of corruption, and by exploring important quadratic and interaction effects. The results show that national income, trade openness, indices of political stability and Polity2 (a democracy score), perception of corruption, the predominant religion in the countries, and geographical factors such as territorial access to the sea explain the differences in the levels of financial development across countries and regions. A rise in national income leads to a higher level of financial development and countries with a high perceived level of corruption have a lower level of financial development. There is strong evidence of threshold effects as trade openness has a diminishing marginal effect on financial development while the auxiliary growth regressions show that financial development has an increasing marginal effect on national income. Of the five regions studied, East and South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have the highest and lowest levels of financial development, respectively. Also, fuel-exporting countries, least developed countries, and landlocked countries tend to have lower levels of financial development. These results have relevant policy implications for developing countries in their continued efforts to achieve better financial development and ultimately, sustainable economic development.

AbstracUThe article reviews the problems caused by the conflict of interests between certain Southeast Asian countries and other states, China foremost, which aroused from oil and gas field development on disputable offshore sections. At the same time the positions of the region's leading transnational corporations in the field of oil and gas policy and their relationships with the countries-ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) members are outlined. Separately are represented the foreign policy stands of Indonesia, Vietnam, Brunei, Philippines and Malaysia on territorial disputes over offshore oil and gas fields. These processes are pushing both European and American business to abandon the conventional schemes and accept the new conditions of their activity in Southeast Asia.

AbstractThe contribution explores the implications of international migration on the research of democratisation processes. It focuses on the notion of democratic citizenship as a set of rights. Democratisation processes are thus conceptualised as processes in which rights are acquired, institutionalised and expanded. Expansion has two aspects: one is the inclusion of new groups of persons into the community of those entitled to rights, the other is the inclusion of new types of rights such as liberal, political, social, economic or cultural rights. Citizenship, which links the entitlement of rights to national belonging, must be rethought in the light of international migration.The repercussions of migration on citizenship rights and citizenship concepts have been explored in the context of labour immigrant incorporation within Western liberal democracies. For East Asia, however, these issues are largely unexplored. Labour migration in East Asia differs in several aspects from the Western template: labour-receiving countries in East Asia include authoritarian regimes as well as democracies in different states of consolidation. Furthermore, labour migration is predominantly temporary. Drawing on the theoretical insights of 'Western' debates, the article identifies the legitimate democratic representation as well as the conditions, the characteristics and the effects of struggles for migrants' rights as important fields of research on the nexus between labour migration and democratisation in East Asia.

All kinds of illegal trafficking, prostitution, pornography, gambling, fraud and counterfeiting, computer crime, corruption, piracy, illegal immigration and many other criminal activities can pose a threat to national and even international security if conducted by larger criminal groups or organizations. The phenomenon of organized crime has acquired a transnational character due to the increasing globalization of financial markets and communications as well as technological development. The three countries of East Central Europe – The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – can be of interest in terms of organized crime as recent political and economic developments in these countries have made them attractive to such criminal activities. Another problematic region in terms of organized criminal activities is the region of Central Asia which includes several countries of the former Soviet Union – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

The immense structural inequalities of the global social /political economy can no longer be contained through consensual mechanisms of state control. The ruling classes have lost legitimacy; we are witnessing a breakdown of ruling-class hegemony on a world scale. There is good and evil among mankind; thus it necessitates the conflict between the good and evil on Earth. We are in for a period of major conflicts and great upheavals. It's generally regarded that Mencius (c.371- c.289 B.C) a student of Confucianism developed his entire philosophy from two basic propositions: the first, that Man's original nature is good; and the second, that Man's original nature becomes evil when his wishes are not fulfilled. What is good and what is evil? Philosophers of all ages have thought over this question. Each reckoned that he had solved the question once and for all, yet within a few years the problem would re-emerge with new dimensions. Repeated acts of corruption and evil action makes a man corrupt and takes away a man from his original nature. Still now majority of the people of the world give compliance to corruption because of social pressures, economic pressures, cultural pressures and political pressures. The conflict between good and evil is ancient on earth and is prevalent to this day. May be the final confrontation between the descendants of Cain and Abel is at our doorsteps. During the 2nd World War America with its European allies went into world wide military campaign to defeat Germany, Italy and Japan. When the Second World War ended in 1945 the United States of America came out as victorious. America was the first country to detonate atomic bomb in another country. During that period Russia fell into competition with America in politically colonizing countries after countries. With the fall of Communism Russia terminated its desire wanting to be the champion of the oppressed of the world. The situation in Russia continues to deteriorate, a country which until only a few years ago was a superpower. Russians are deeply disillusioned today with the new politicians in Russia, who they says "promise everything and give nothing." The Russians still strongly oppose a world order dominated by the United States. If anyone looks at or investigates the situations in other countries it can be seen that at present almost all countries of the world are similar or same in the forms of structures of corruption and evil. The Worldwide control of humanity‘s economic, social and political activities is under the helm of US corporate and military power. The US has established its control over 191 governments which are members of the United Nations. The last head of state of the former Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev on December 2012, at a conference on the future of the Middle East and the Black Sea region in the Turkish city of Istanbul, has warned the US of an imminent Soviet-like collapse if Washington persists with its hegemonic policies. Mass public protest occurred against US hegemony are mainly from Muslim countries of South East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, North Africa and Africa. The latest mass protests erupted in September 2012 when the divine Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was insulted by America and Israel. There were strong mass protests by people from Indonesia to Morocco and in the European countries by mostly immigrants and Australia were there are Muslim populations. This worldwide protest had occurred while the rise of the masses is ongoing against corrupt rulers in West Asia and North Africa. The masses of the people are thirsty and desperate for justice, dignity, economic welfare and human rights. Most major religions have their own sources of information on the Last Age of Mankind or the End of Times, which often include fateful battles between the forces of good and evil and cataclysmic natural disasters. Humans are evolving to a final stage of their evolution towards a 'New Age‘ that is to come which the corrupt does not understand. At present times a final battle of good versus evil on Earth will ensue. The World powers (leaders) and their entourages who are really detached from the masses have organized to keep aloft the present world order that degenerates the masses in corruption, keeps the people in unhappiness, and deprives the masses from economic well being, education and keeps promoting wars and conflicts to support corruption and evil. We are at the ?End of Times?. The Promised Messiah will come to set right what is wrong, no doubt. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/bioethics.v4i1.14264 Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2013; 4(1):9-19

The immense structural inequalities of the global social /political economy can no longer be contained through consensual mechanisms of state control. The ruling classes have lost legitimacy; we are witnessing a breakdown of ruling-class hegemony on a world scale. There is good and evil among mankind; thus it necessitates the conflict between the good and evil on Earth. We are in for a period of major conflicts and great upheavals. It's generally regarded that Mencius (c.371-c.289 B.C) a student of Confucianism developed his entire philosophy from two basic propositions: the first, that Man's original nature is good; and the second, that Man's original nature becomes evil when his wishes are not fulfilled. What is good and what is evil? Philosophers of all ages have thought over this question. Each reckoned that he had solved the question once and for all, yet within a few years the problem would re-emerge with new dimensions. Repeated acts of corruption and evil action makes a man corrupt and takes away a man from his original nature. Still now majority of the people of the world give compliance to corruption because of social pressures, economic pressures, cultural pressures and political pressures. The conflict between good and evil is ancient on earth and is prevalent to this day. May be the final confrontation between the descendants of Cain and Abel is at our doorsteps. During the 2nd World War America with its European allies went into world wide military campaign to defeat Germany, Italy and Japan. When the Second World War ended in 1945 the United States of America came out as victorious. America was the first country to detonate atomic bomb in another country. During that period Russia fell into competition with America in politically colonizing countries after countries. With the fall of Communism Russia terminated its desire wanting to be the champion of the oppressed of the world. The situation in Russia continues to deteriorate, a country which until only a few years ago was a superpower. Russians are deeply disillusioned today with the new politicians in Russia, who they says "promise everything and give nothing." The Russians still strongly oppose a world order dominated by the United States. If anyone looks at or investigates the situations in other countries it can be seen that at present almost all countries of the world are similar or same in the forms of structures of corruption and evil. The Worldwide control of humanity‘s economic, social and political activities is under the helm of US corporate and military power. The US has established its control over 191 governments which are members of the United Nations. The last head of state of the former Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev on December 2012, at a conference on the future of the Middle East and the Black Sea region in the Turkish city of Istanbul, has warned the US of an imminent Soviet-like collapse if Washington persists with its hegemonic policies. Mass public protest occurred against US hegemony are mainly from Muslim countries of South East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, North Africa and Africa. The latest mass protests erupted in September 2012 when the divine Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was insulted by America and Israel. There were strong mass protests by people from Indonesia to Morocco and in the European countries by mostly immigrants and Australia were there are Muslim populations. This worldwide protest had occurred while the rise of the masses is ongoing against corrupt rulers in West Asia and North Africa. The masses of the people are thirsty and desperate for justice, dignity, economic welfare and human rights. Most major religions have their own sources of information on the Last Age of Mankind or the End of Times, which often include fateful battles between the forces of good and evil and cataclysmic natural disasters. Humans are evolving to a final stage of their evolution towards a ?New Age‘ that is to come which the corrupt does not understand. At present times a final battle of good versus evil on Earth will ensue. The World powers (leaders) and their entourages who are really detached from the masses have organized to keep aloft the present world order that degenerates the masses in corruption, keeps the people in unhappiness, and deprives the masses from economic well being, education and keeps promoting wars and conflicts to support corruption and evil. We are at the ?End of Times?. The Promised Messiah will come to set right what is wrong, no doubt. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/bioethics.v4i2.16372 Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2013; 4(2) 9-21

In this article I examine public evaluations of quality of governance in East Asia and analyze the effects of perceived governance quality on regime support. I distinguish between two modes of governance, democratic and law-based, and examine which mode of governance matters. It was found that East Asian democracies suffered various governance deficits in the eyes of their publics. It was also revealed that a weak rule of law remained the most notable governance malaise across much of the region. The micro-level analysis shows that perceived quality of governance shaped regime allegiance and institutional confidence but not all aspects of governance mattered. It was shown that law-based governance served as the major source of regime support regardless of regime types. On the whole, public support for the prevailing system of government across much of the region depended on quality of law-based governance as well as national economic performance. Yet, evidence indicates that democratic governance encourages citizen skepticism of the ongoing political order, supporting the thesis of assertive citizenship. Overall, the findings suggest that establishing a strong rule of law constitutes one of the major challenges to regime consolidation across much of East Asia.

Migration is the most common social phenomenon in the modern world. First of all it helps people to improve their financial situation and living conditions. Besides, the decision on migration can be taken due to the unstable safety in the country. The paper presents the migration process from and to the Middle East, in particularly the process of emigration to Western Europe (mainly illegal emigration of refugees, emigration of elite and religious minorities). Moreover, it shows the migration process to the countries of the Middle East, especially in the context of economic migration in the Persian Gulf, taking into consideration features, forms, sources and consequences of this phenomenon. The main hypothesis of the presented concept is the assumption that migration directly affects international relations and is often associated with risk. The issue of migration in many Western countries has become an important and urgent issue related to security and terrorism. Therefore, the European Union began to perceive the flow of illegal migrants as a source of risk that could be a threat to European safety. One should realize that analyzed phenomenon affects almost all aspects of the functioning of society. Moreover, we should emphasize the inestimable economic potential brought by immigrants, especially because of the society aging in Western Europe. Consequently, it is necessary to establish agreements between EU countries and countries-exporters of immigrants, not only on a bilateral basis, but also at a multilateral level. In the countries of emigrants there is no elaborated migration policy, besides there are no signs of improvement in the political, economic and social situation in the Middle East – on the contrary the situation is worsening, that will certainly contribute to an increase of emigrants who want to leave the region.

AbstractThis paper overviews people's sense of trust as it is reflected in the response data of questionnaire surveys. I will study the variability of people's trust systems in order to explore the stability over time and the change due to the short-term changes of economic and political conditions. To begin with, I will explain briefly the history of our longitudinal and cross-national survey on national character. Secondly, I will summarize some aspects of people's sense of trust in our longitudinal survey of Japanese national character. Thirdly, I will present cross-national comparative analysis of trust in our seven-country survey and our East Asia survey. Fourthly, I will consider the acculturation of the Japanese immigrants in Brazil, Hawaii, and the West Coast of USA. Finally, I will provide some comments on cross-national scaling of trust for our future research.

The purpose of this article is to re-examine the perspective on the relationship between East Asia’s growth economy and its underdevelopment of state welfare, by analyzing the Korean case between the 1960s and the 1980s, when active governmental intervention in the economy led to rapid economic growth. This article aims to answer the questions ‘Was state welfare genuinely underdeveloped under the growth economy of East Asia?’ and ‘If so, which factors hindered its development?’ To this end, this article first refutes the perspective regarding the underdevelopment of state welfare in East Asian growth economies, through an empirical analysis of the following: overlooking diverse indices in measuring the level of state welfare, a comparison without considering different budget systems, negligence of output aspects, giving undue value to quantitative methods and paying little attention to welfare beneficiary aspect. The article traces the reasons why the growth economy experienced the underdevelopment of state welfare using comprehensive frameworks: large-scale resource distribution to defense and education, low level of electoral competition, underdevelopment of socialist political parties, political authoritarianism and weak opposition, lack of social citizenship and preservation of family values, underdevelopment of trade unionism, and inactivation of civil society.

AbstractSociological analysis of interpersonal trust has focused primarily on general trust, neglecting the role of particular trust. Some analysis of social capital in Asian countries, however, reveals that activities in voluntary associations are grounded on particular trust, posing an important question to Putnam’s thesis linking general trust to democracy and economic development. In order to understand the working of particular trust, we took a comparative cultural perspective to trust. Based on the cultural psychology of Korean trust, trust is characterized as a corollary to the intimacy of relationship. Different degrees of interpersonal trust work through the mediating process of caring mind (maum in Korean vernacular) which is afforded when we see social acts directed upon us. Granting an innate bias of granting trust toward close others, we postulate that human beings engage in activities of trust working. Four types of tactics typically employed in forming trust were provided. Subsequently, a comparative cultural analysis of trust was presented by analyzing indigenous concepts (trust, guanxi, amae, & woori) characteristically representing cultural aspects of trust in different cultures with emphasis on East Asian countries. This comparative analysis characterizes that trust in East Asia is laden heavily with relational affective properties, while trust in theWest relies on cognitive properties. Despite these differences, common features allow meaningful understanding of how trust is constructed and maneuvered in each culture.

In response to Barry Wilkinson's (1996) criticisms of the culturalist and institutionalist explanations of the structure of business in East Asia, this paper examines the influence of culture at the macro- and meso-level of business activity in Hong Kong. Aspects of Wilkinson's critique are criticized as unhelpful, whereas other aspects of it are taken as valid and are addressed. A theoretical framework is outlined which synthesises culturalist and institutionalist explanations constituted by combinations of models from formal market and hierarchy perspectives and informal network perspectives. This enables sufficient complexity to identify cultural influences, and reflects a general submission that only complex models contain the multiple social, political, economic and other influences inherent in cultural investigation. Simple organizational models, based upon assumptions of the market, are shown to be culture-bound in Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism and of little validity in the Hong Kong context. The considerable methodological problems and research issues associated with this desirable synthesis of the culturalist and institutionalist explanations are discussed. Particular emphasis is placed upon the relevance of a 'network' approach, along with implications for 'strategy'. In addition, the implications for the promotion of 'intercultural' and interdisciplinary approaches amongst social scientists interested in Hong Kong and other 'Confucian Dynamic' economies are outlined.

<p>The aim of this study is to analyze Mahathir’s policy through a historical approach to the political developments and challenges in Malaysia. In addition, the author uses secondary data in order to collect several resources related to the topic. The comeback of Mahathir Mohammad, the Father of Malaysian modernization, in the Malaysian 14^th general election after leaving the political stage for more than a decade draws many global eyes. As the great critics of the corruption and downturn of Malaysian economic conditions, he decided to run in Malaysia once again. During his previous administration, his mega-project named Pembangunan Putra Jaya and his famous foreign policy “Look East Policy” became a part of his identity. The “Look East Policy” was developed in order to increase domestic economic growth and because Malaysia needed to learn and adopt cultural features from Japan and Korea, such as discipline and hard work. Through this policy, Malaysia began cooperating with East countries (Japan and Korea). In addition, Mahathir had been opposing Western values and deemed them incompatible with Asia. The West considers Mahathir to be an obstacle in uniting Western and Asian countries following the emergence of Asian values since the 1990s. Overall, this study suggests that Mahathir is only focused on his country’s national interest and sovereignty and maintaining Malaysia’s international standing.</p><p><strong>Bahasa Indonesia Abstract</strong>: Tujuan <em>paper</em> ini adalah untuk menganalisis kebijakan Mahathir melalui perspektif sejarah terhadap perkembangan politik dan tantangan di Malaysia. Selain itu, Penulis menggunakan data sekunder untuk mengumpulkan berbagai literatur terkait dengan topik tersebut. Kembalinya Mahathir Muhammad, Bapak Modernisasi Malaysia, dalam Pemilihan Umum ke-14 setelah meninggalkan panggung politik lebih dari satu dekade telah menarik perhatian masyarakat global. Sebagai kritikus pada korupsi dan kemunduran ekonomi Malaysia, dia memutuskan untuk maju dalam pemilihan umum sekali lagi. Selama pemerintahan sebelumnya, Mahathir dengan proyek megah yaitu Pembangunan Putra Jaya dan kebijakan luar negerinya, terkenal dengan <em>“Look East Policy”</em> menjadi bagian dari identitasnya. Kebijakan <em>“Look East</em><em> Policy</em><em>”</em> dikembangkan untuk meningkatkan pertumbuhan ekonomi domestik dan karena Malaysia perlu belajar dan mengadopsi budaya dari Jepang dan Korea, seperti kedisiplinan dan kerja keras. Melalui Kebijakan tersebut, Malaysia telah melakukan kerjasama dengan negara Timur (Jepang dan Korea). Selain itu, Mahathir menolak penerapan nilai-nilai Barat dan menganggap bahwa nilai Barat tidak sesuai dengan Asia. Negara-negara Barat menganggap Mahathir sebagai penghalang persatuan negara Barat dengan negara Asia sejak berkembangnya paham <em>“Asian Values”</em> pada tahun 1990an. Secara Keseluruhan, <em>paper</em> ini berpendapat bahwa Mahathir hanya fokus kepada kepentingan dan kedaulatan negaranya dan menjaga eksistensi Malaysia di dunia internasional.</p><p> </p>

The article attempts to develop a system of parameters for an objective and comprehensive assessment of the efficiency of the nuclear power industry in terms of its contribution to the country’s economic and social development, as well as its environmental well-being and its geopolitical position. Currently, nuclear power industry makes up a significant part of the energy supplies in the developed countries throughout the world. However, in the developing economies, including those of East and Southeast Asia, it plays a less prominent role. Nevertheless, in recent years, China has been the leader in commissioning new atomic facilities, thanks to the consistent implementation of its state program for the development of the nuclear power industry. Forecasts indicate that in the near future, the share of atomic energy will remain stable and account for about 10 % of all global energy capacity, which is confirmed by the estimates made during the study. However, in the long term nuclear energy cannot be ignored as an economically efficient and environmentally friendly source of energy, as well as a factor in improving the quality of life of the population when developing a strategy for the sustainable development of a country. The article examines the already existing assessment criteria for the economic efficiency of nuclear power plants (NPPs), and proposes new standards for the assessment of its contribution to the development of the community and a country’s stance on the global political stage. The article also identifies the main obstacles to the further development of the industry in the modern world. The research showed that the main specific feature of an NPP operation from the economic point of view is extremely high initial construction and commissioning costs, with relatively low further operation costs, which determines long payback lines and liquidity shortages reducing the attractiveness of such projects for potential investors. These peculiarities determine the leading role of state authorities in the launch, operation and modernization of nuclear power facilities.

The article contains an information about the alignment of the Silk Road Economic Belt with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Russian integration projects the main of which is the Eurasian Economic Union. Complex Chinese initiative has many different aspects and dimensions relating to trade, investment, transport infrastructural, cultural and humanitarian issues. The author considers the problem of alignment in many aspects including the current state of Russian academic expertise and the possible ways of using the project in order to improve socioeconomic situation in the Russian territories in the Central Asia, Siberia and the Far East. The author stresses the security concerns, which seemed to be underestimated by China on the early stages of the program implementation. In this context, the author pays special attention to the threats of international terrorism, the rais ing instability in the states-participants, transnational crime and drug market. The author concludes that the project will not bring positive consequences unless Chinese authorities will closely cooperate with Russia and the regional organizations it associated with. As a result, it is possible to reach a partner cooperation between the states (although different in their economic potential), under which China will benefit effective using of its resources and overcome the current economic isolation of the Сentral Asian states. From the other hand, Russia will get a chance to improve the situation of economic inequality between its internal regions. Russian military and political power may guarantee successful assimilation of Chinese financial investments.

As protestors filled Tahrir Square in Cairo in January 2011, Western diplomats, academics, and political pundits were searching for the best political analogy for the promise—and problems—of the Arab Uprising. Whereas neoconservative skeptics fretted that Egypt and Tunisia might go the way of post-revolutionary Iran, Hillary Clinton and Madeleine Albright praised Indonesia’s democratization as the ideal model for the Arab Spring. During her 2009 visit to Indonesia, Clinton proclaimed: “If you want to know whether Islam, democracy, modernity, and women’s rights can coexist, go to Indonesia.” Certainly Indonesia of May 1998 is not Egypt of January 2011, yet some comparisons are instructive. Still reeling from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, middle class Indonesians were fed up with corruption, cronyism, and a military that operated with impunity. On 21 May 1998 Soeharto resigned after three decades of authoritarian rule. Despite fits of starts and stops, the democratic transition has brought political and economic stability. Whereas academics and pundits have debated the merits of the Indonesia model for democratic transition, in this article I consider how the notion of Indonesia as a model for the Arab Spring has reconfigured transnational Muslim networks and recalibrated claims to authority and authenticity within the global umma.An increasing body of scholarship devoted to global Muslim networks offers important insights into the longue durée of merchant traders and itinerant preachers connecting the Middle East with Southeast Asia. In his critique of Benedict Anderson’s famous explanation of “imagined communities” as the result of print capitalism within national borders, historian Michael Laffan argued that Indonesian nationalism had important roots in global Muslim networks connecting the Dutch East Indies with Cairo’s famous al-Azhar University.

In the initial period of the COVID 19 pandemic (February–September 2020), Japan succeeded in minimizing the mortality rate and reducing the damage to the economy. The Japanese experience has both positive and negative aspects. Among the G7 countries, Japan recorded the best иге among the states of East Asia the worst indicators of overall and excessive mortality. From an economic perspective, the pandemic strongly affected inbound and outbound tourism, which will take years to recover. Employment opportunities in the tourism and other contact-intensive industries will be reduced by approximately one million jobs, primarily affecting part time and temporary workers. At the same time, the overall unemployment rate will hardly exceed one-third of the OECD average generally because of the ample financial support, long-term commitments among core employees in Japan, and job retention practices of domestic companies. In the macroeconomic realm, the Japanese government embarked on an extension of quantitatively easing measures of monetary expansionary steps in fiscal sphere and universal stimulus in growth-enhancing structural policies. This approach actually follows the logic of a long-standing reflationary Abenomics, which is expected to continue despite the abrupt resignation of S. Abe. At least, Japan’s newly elected Prime Minister Yo. Suga has indicated his support for current monetary and fiscal policies. He also hinted at a need to reduce the administrative red tape and to accelerate the digitalization in the economy. The package of anti-crisis measures in Japan turned out to be one of the largest in the world, and its implementation could increase the budget deficit and public debt, that is, cause the emergence of problems relevant to most other countries.

The article is a detailed response to the text by Martin Müller “In Search for the Global East”, written on the basis of the experience of a scientist specializing in post-socialist realities, and included in the global circulation of social and humanitarian knowledge. It deals with the possibility of reflection of the place of the post-socialist part of the world in the world as a whole, from the point of view of a community formed by those who live in the post-socialist space and those who explore different aspects of post-socialist life. The genealogy of discussions about the Global South and the Global North, which are fundamental for such disciplines as geography (political, economic, and human) and urban studies, as well as the formation of the conceptual link of “development = the global South” in the political history of the second half of the twentieth century and in the intellectual history of this period is discussed. It is argued that the Global South is actively discussed in the global debates of geographers, urbanists, and historians. It also occupies a prominent place in transnational, big stories about what is happening in the world, and with the world. At the same time, the post-socialist world (Müller proposes the name “Global East” for it) occupies an insignificant place in these narratives. “Development” (no matter how different and controversial it may be) in relation to that part of the “global” which is comprised from Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, is understood as a task of national governments, and which must be solved by following Western recipes. The article explains the reasons for the lack of understanding of what this region means today, as well as the difficulties of conducting and popularizing research about it, in particular, the ongoing post-colonial decentralization of the West as a privileged place of knowledge production. The conclusion of the article is that much more research is needed in which different perceptions of the global are compared, including the ones generated in/by the “Global East”.

AbstractThe career of the Danish-born botanist Nathaniel Wallich, superintendent of the Calcutta Botanic Garden from 1815 to 1846, illustrates the complex nature of botanical science under the East India Company and shows how the plant life of South Asia was used as a capital resource both in the service of the Company's economic interests and for Wallich's own professional advancement and international reputation. Rather than seeing him as a pioneer of modern forest conservation or an innovative botanist, Wallich's attachment to the ideology of ‘improvement’ and the Company's material needs better explain his longevity as superintendent of the Calcutta garden. Although aspects of Wallich's career and botanical works show the importance of circulation between Europe and India, more significant was the hierarchy of knowledge in which indigenous plant lore and illustrative skill were subordinated to Western science and in which colonial science frequently lagged behind that of the metropolis.

AbstractEuropean Studies in China developed very rapidly in the last twenty years. The reasons for that are not only because of the smooth evolution of EU-China relations and wider and deeper economic interdependence between two economic giants, but also the relevance of the European models to China's domestic political and social development, as well as China's external relations. The article reviews the evolution of the European Studies in China and finds out that more and more research on European affairs relates to China's internal and external development. Two major aspects of the learning process are exploited further. Firstly, European models for China's domestic political and social development, including European party politics and Democratic Socialism, European social policy and social security systems, and European regional policies. Secondly, European models for China's foreign policy and external relations, including European neighbourhood policy, European concept of effective multilateralism, Europe as an example of peaceful rise, and functionalism as the way to East Asian regional integration. The EU or Europe has higher profile in China than any other Asia Pacific country. From the domestic political and social development and China's preference in international affairs we can see the silhouette of the European models. Chinese would like to learn more from Europe than the United States. It also shows clearly that the role of the EU as a social power.

Singapore in the Malay Peninsula was targeted by the British East India Company (EIC) to be the epicentre of their direct rule in Southeast Asia. Seeking new sources of revenue at the end of the 18th century, after attaining domination in India, the Company sought to extend its reach into China, and Malaya was the natural region to do this, extending outposts to Penang and Singapore. The latter was first identified as a key site by Stamford Raffles. The EIC Governor General Marquess Hastings (r. 1813-1823) planned to facilitate Raffle’s attention on the Malay Peninsula from Sumatra. Raffles’ plan for Singapore was approved by the EIC’s Bengal Government. The modern system of administration came into the Straits Settlements under the EIC’s Bengal Presidency. In 1819 in Singapore, Raffles established an Anglo-Oriental College (AOC) for the study of Eastern languages, literature, history, and science. The AOC was intended firstly to be the centre of local research and secondly to increase inter-cultural knowledge of the East and West. Besides Raffles’ efforts, the EIC developed political and socio-economic systems for Singapore. The most important aspects of the social development of Singapore were proper accommodation for migrants, poverty eradication, health care, a new system of education, and women’s rights. The free trade introduced by Francis Light (and later Stamford Raffles) in Penang and Singapore respectively gave enormous opportunities for approved merchants to expand their commerce from Burma to Australia and from Java to China. Before the termination of the China trade in 1833 Singapore developed tremendously, and cemented the role of the European trading paradigm in the East.

A huge wave of mass protests for the last years has lead to a collapse of many longstanding traditional regimes in some Arab states (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen). In other states (Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Morocco) a serious aggravation of political situation occurred. Many experts in Russia as well as abroad share an opinion that the phenomenon of the “Arab revolution" or the so cold "Arab Spring" has the same basic pattern: after the beginning of unrest in North Africa and the Middle East the Islamist political parties, organizations and groups are gaining strength, popularity and influence. The main content of the article is focused on the analysis of religious, political, socio-economic and other aspects of the contemporary ideology and practice of the radical Islam, its threats and challenges. The current situation in the region has favored the creation of a new political alliance in the Greater Middle East. Now the US administration's policy in the Middle East is aimed at the advancement of the of the radical Islam front to Iran, North Caucasus region and Central Asia. This policy corresponds to the global strategic interests of the U.S. regional partners including Petro-Islamic States, Turkey and even Israel. Analyzing the situation around Syria the author notes that the steps undertaken by the members of the new regional alliance to eliminate B. Assad - another victim of the "Arab Spring" – can, first of all, aggravate an extremely unstable situation in Syria, and, secondly, create a real perspective of the radical Islam advancement right up to the borders of the Russian Federation.

Migration has been a central concern of many areas in the writing of European history, and even more so when dealing with the histories of the white settler colonies of North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. In contrast, migration overseas constitutes a mere footnote (if it is mentioned at all) in densely populated China and India, where the total number of those who migrated out of the country in the last couple of centuries was a relatively small percentage of those who did not. In his thought-provoking and far-reaching essay, Adam McKeown challenges us to look beyond the normative model of “global” migration that focuses solely on European migration. Through innovative research and the compilation of range of data on China, India, central Asia, Japan, Siberia, south-east Asia that are seldom collated and analyzed together, McKeown demonstrates that Asian migration from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries was comparable in volume to the trans-oceanic migrations from Europe. The term “global” as the theme of McKeown's essay, used as an adjective, evocatively captures the migration patterns and circulations of the modern world. But the concept of global is also the definition of the process underlying the modern economic and political system that through its very logic of reproduction creates unequal and uneven terrains. My comments explore some aspects of this unequal terrain.

Bangladesh, a developing country, has one of the highest rates of age-standardized mortality due to non-communicable diseases (NCDs). The prevalence of NCDs is steadily increasing within all population groups, including indigenous communities in Bangladesh. Indigenous people, non-dominant communities of society, are individuals having distinctive social, economic or political systems, and preserving own languages, cultures and beliefs. Contemporary research proposes that negative health behaviors, especially tobacco use, unhealthy diets, physical inactivity, and alcohol consumption are becoming escalating problems in Bangladesh. Indigenous communities with low health literacy are less receptive to health information and are unlikely to embrace positive health behaviors. Three major barriers to change health behaviors toward preventing NCDs among indigenous people in Bangladesh are: unawareness of the severity and/or importance of NCDs; absence of health literacy or knowledge on NCDs; and lack of advocacy for health intervention programs for indigenous patients suffering from NCDs. Intertwined within socio-economic delusions and discrepancies, indigenous people miss out on health care to prevent NCDs. Mass media campaigns have both an extensive coverage and an awareness-constructing potential to educate and influence intended audiences’ attitudes on changing health related behaviors. Bangladesh can change health behaviors within indigenous communities by adopting some effective strategies, including using multifaceted mass media to intensify coverage of the health campaigns, underpinning stereotyping health beliefs and conveying unidentified details about NCDs, and developing risk-reduction strategies for indigenous patients suffering from NCDs. Multi-stakeholder and intergovernmental mechanisms and mass media campaigns can be effective options for changing health behaviors of indigenous people in Bangladesh.South East Asia Journal of Public Health Vol.6(2) 2016: 17-22

This paper explores Thomas De Quincey’s seminal text Confessions of an English Opium Eater, examining the artistic vision of the writer and locating the author and his text within the context of the growing British Imperial project in the early 19th century. By locating the substance of his addiction, opium, within the economic, political, and cultural discourses that were developing in Britain at the time, this paper aims to deconstruct the ambivalent relationship that De Quincey, and by extension large segments of British society, had towards an imagined construction of the Orient. By analyzing the Gothic elements of De Quincey’s text, I argue that these images of the East are the signs of growing Orientalist discourse. They squarely locate Romantic tropes within the narrative of British Imperialism. In addition to exploring the fissured imagination of Asia that marks De Quincey’s work, this paper also briefly analyzes the psychological aspects of De Quincey’s contemplation of his addiction and presents a brief account of the role, opium played within the Romantic movement of the early 19th century. Through De Quincey’s opium-induced hallucinations, I attempt to analyze a mode of reflecting and presenting the sublime which was intrinsically linked to an imagined East that revisits the intersection of discourses of art, lived experiences, and the cultural and political anxieties of the era in which the primary text was produced to create a glimpse of the larger discursive function of De Quincey’s confessional memoir. This paper can thus be read as an intervention to re-engage with the links between Romantic aesthetic imaginations and the colonial enterprise of Empire building in the early 19th century.

A global outbreak of coronavirus (COVID-19) has profoundly escalated social, political, economic, and cultural disparities, particularly among the marginalized migrants of the global South, who historically remained key sufferers from such disparities. Approximately 8 million, such workers from Bangladesh, migrated from their homelands to work in neighboring countries, specifically in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East, and also contribute significantly to their country’s economy. As many of the migrant workers work on temporary visas, scholars have expressed concerns about their physical and psychological health such as joblessness, mortality, abuses, daunting stress, and inhabitable living environment. Embracing the theoretical frameworks of critical–cultural communication, this article explores two research questions: (1) What are the emerging narratives of experiencing realities and disparities among the Bangladeshi migrants at the margins? (2) How the migrants negotiated and worked on overcoming the adversities? In doing so, we have closely examined 85 Facebook Pages (number of subscribers: 10,000-1 million), dedicated to issues of Bangladeshi migrant workers to qualitatively analyze emerging mediated discourses (textual, visual, and audiovisual). Our analysis reveals several aspects, including, (1) impact of job insecurities on migrants and their families, (2) living conditions of and abuses on migrants works, (3) negotiations of mental stress by the marginalized migrants, and (4) how community support helps the migrants to survive during the pandemic.

The problem of significant shadow economy in Ukraine has been very important since Ukraine independence. But due to its peculiarities as an economic phenomenon, it is difficult to assess completely the degree of its influence on the development of the national economy. Besides, the influence of external and internal destabilization factors of economic and political environment in Ukraine (military aggression in the East, annexation of the Crimea, the pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by SARS-CoV-2, high levels of corruption, etc.) distract attention from equally important problems of the development of the national economy. In the context of the impact of shadow economy on the national one, the volume of lost GDP and decrease in tax revenues are more considered more often, but the impact caused by shadow level of the national economy is reflected not only in the above-mentioned indicators of the Ukrainian economy development, but also in many others. This particularly concerns the level of inflationary processes as an essential indicator that, combining the economic and social aspects of the country's development, reflects the state of the national economy and its future development prospects. The existing relationship between inflation and the level of shadow economy is reflected in the direct correlation between these indicators and is characterized as direct. At the same time, like the strengthening of inflation processes results in the increase in the level of shadow economy, the increase in the level of shadow economy results in the inflation growth. That is, the identified connection is bilateral, but not equivalent. Available statistics data do not confirm a significant decrease in the level of shadow economy with the decrease of inflation, which is due to the need of carrying out significant and thorough work on its development, which is not limited by the level of inflation decrease. The decrease in the level of shadow economy in Ukraine by 1% will potentially reduce the inflation rate by 2%. The existence of such connection creates the possibility of regulating inflation level due to the level of the shadow economy decrease, expanding the existing tools for regulating inflationary processes, as well as the additional opportunities for further development of the Ukrainian economy.

The high quality of life in the modern sense is directly related to energy consumption and associated with the provision of «clean» food products and environment, comfortable housing, public and private transport. Increasing the availability of energy for the developing countries allows their residents to live longer and more comfortably. At the same time, in the developed European countries with high quality of life, energy consumption is decreasing due to the implementation of energy efficiency and energy saving policies. The Human Development Index, the world’s best-known and most widely used integrated assessment of quality of life, does not include energy consumption indicators. The aim of our research is to study the relationship between energy consumption and quality of life, and prove the need to consider energy consumption indicators in order to improve the methodology framework for assessing quality of life. Using the method of cluster analysis, 77 countries of the world are grouped according to a set of indicators that characterize income, energy consumption, use of renewable energy sources, and CO2 emissions. As a result, the relationship between the level of human development, which is a universal characteristic of quality of life, and these indicators was identified and evaluated. It has been proved that the most prosperous countries in terms of quality of life and energy use are those in which relatively low indicators of primary energy consumption and CO2 emission are combined with high incomes and human development level. The progressive structure of energy consumption ensures the achievement of a higher quality of living, while high energy consumption is not a sufficient condition for this. Against the background of low levels of total primary energy consumption and GDP per capita, CO2 emissions, as well as a low share of renewable energy in total energy consumption, high quality of life is present mainly in the «new» EU member states, which provide it through rational energy consumption. The average level of human development is inherent in a group of countries of the former USSR (which includes Ukraine), as well as some countries in Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. At the same time, countries such as China and South Korea are reducing energy consumption owing to technological progress and have a positive dynamics of human development indicators. Instead, low levels of energy consumption in the former Soviet Union and Latin America are due to insufficient sustainability of economic and social development, human development in particular. The obtained results substantiate the need to improve the methodology for assessing the quality of life taking into consideration energy consumption indicators.

After a century of its retreat from political and social stages in East Asia, Confucianism eventually found its revival together with the economic industrialization in the region. The awakening consciousness of the traditional Confucian values leads to a reconsideration of their implication on a modern society. Certainly China has experienced massive social and cultural transformations during the last century, an era marked with rapid adoption of Western norms and ideas. In the mean time, Chinese cultural heritages have never been totally cut and the Chinese people and the Chinese society today are still considerably shaped by China’s unique past and its traditional cultural identity, especially by the Confucian traditions. Despite the disruptive scholarly debates on the actual relevance of Confucianism and modernization, there are precious elements within the Confucian values which provide the relevance of Confucianism to the future, such as an ethic of responsibility and the understanding of the humanistic meaning of life. This paper endeavors to explore and discuss various aspects of the relationship between the old Confucian traditions and the modern Chinese cultural identity, including Confucianism as a way of life, Chinese understanding of morality and value relationships, and recent Confucian influence on Chinese politics. On the base of this examination, considerations will be given to demonstrate that Confucian teachings did not perished but are still relevant in modern China. A proper appreciation of these values can help to better comprehend Chinese contemporary society and Chinese cultural identity.

While many young creative workers are braving precaritization presumably with the drive of aspiration, this article focuses on the other end of their career path: disillusionment. Informed by the experiences of five self-proclaimed wenyi qingnian – loosely translated as cultural youth – in Hong Kong, this article tracks their aspirations which kept them hoping and going till they were disillusioned and decided to quit. Drawing together two lines of research – on precarity and on failure – our study fills in a gap of the scholarship on creative work and workers that is dominated by concerns with precarity and related abuses. We attend not only to the abuse, exploitation and precarity of creative work, but to a more open understanding of how and why young creative practitioners leave. We do so with an unusual deployment of longitudinal inquiry that does not only concern itself with struggles of creative workers but also with the termination of such struggles. We observe four dimensions of failure: their increasingly precarious way of life; their disillusionment with creativity; the urgency posed by their ‘ageing’; and the specific local political situation. As transpired, only one factor is immediately related to precarity. This article argues to include ‘failure’ as a significant phase of creative work, that warrants further investigation and may open up more understanding on precarity, or in general, creative work and workers. While precarity is dominantly defined in economic and market-related terms – with good reasons – we see the need to loosen it up to acknowledge more aspects of precarity and experiences of creative work. This article is part of the Special Issue Creative Labour in East Asia.

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Abstract. Rivers provide a large number of ecosystem services and riparian people depend directly and indirectly on water availability and quality and quantity of the river waters. The country's economy and the people's well-being and income, particularly in agriculturally dominated countries, are strongly determined by the availability of sufficient water. This is particularly true for the country of Myanmar in South-east Asia, where more than 65 % of the population live in rural areas, working in the agricultural sector. Only a few studies exist on river basins in Myanmar at all and detailed knowledge providing the basis for human–water research is very limited. A deeper understanding of human–water system dynamics in the country is required because Myanmar's society, economy, ecosystems and water resources are facing major challenges due to political and economic reforms and massive and rapid investments from neighbouring countries. However, not only policy and economy modify the need for water. Climate variability and change are other essential drivers within human–water systems. Myanmar's climate is influenced by the Indian Monsoon circulation which is subject to interannual and also regional variability. Particularly the central dry zone and the Ayeyarwady delta are prone to extreme events such as serious drought periods and extreme floods. On the one hand, the farmers depend on the natural fertiliser brought by regular river inundations and high groundwater levels for irrigation; on the other hand, they suffer from these water-related extreme events. It is expected that theses climatic extreme events will likely increase in frequency and magnitude in the future as a result of global climate change. Different national and international interests in the abundant water resources may provide opportunities and risks at the same time for Myanmar. Several dam projects along the main courses of the rivers are currently in the planning phase. Dams will most likely modify the river flows, the sediment loads and also the still rich biodiversity in the river basins, to an unknown extent. Probably, these natural and anthropogenically induced developments will also impact a special type of farming; we call it alluvial farming in the river floodplains and on sandbars in the Ayeyarwady River basin in Myanmar, which is called Kaing and Kyun, respectively. Relevant aspects for future development of Myanmar's river basins combine environment-water-related factors, climate, economic and social development, water management and land use changes. Research on these interplays needs to capture the spatial and temporal dynamics of these drivers. However, it is only possible to gain a full understanding of all these complex interrelationships if multi-scale spatiotemporal information is analysed in an inter- and trans-disciplinary approach. This paper gives a structured overview of the current scientific knowledge available and reveals the relevance of this information with regard to human–environment and particularly to human–water interactions in Myanmar's river basins. By applying the eDPSIR framework, it identifies key indicators in the Myanmar human–water system, which has been shown to be exemplary by giving an example of use related to alluvial farming in the central dry zone.

Social innovations are activities aiming at implementation of social objectives, including mainly the improvement of life of individuals and social groups, together with public policy and management objectives. The essay indicates and discusses the most important contemporary problems, solving of which requires social innovations. Social innovations precondition the progress of civilisation. The world needs not only new technologies, but also new solutions of social and institutional nature that would be conducive to achieving social goals. Social innovations are experimental social actions of organisational and institutional nature that aim at improving the quality of life of individuals, communities, nations, companies, circles, or social groups. Their experimental nature stems from the fact of introducing unique and one-time solutions on a large scale, the end results of which are often difficult to be fully predicted. For example, it was difficult to believe that opening new labour markets for foreigners in the countries of the European Union, which can be treated as a social innovation aiming at development of the international labour market, will result in the rapid development of the low-cost airlines, the offer of which will be available to a larger group of recipients. In other words, social innovations differ from economic innovations, as they are not about implementation of new types of production or gaining new markets, but about satisfying new needs, which are not provided by the market. Therefore, the most important distinction consists in that social innovations are concerned with improving the well-being of individuals and communities by additional employment, or increased consumption, as well as participation in solving the problems of individuals and social groups [CSTP, 2011]. In general, social innovations are activities aiming at implementation of social objectives, including mainly the improvement of life of individuals and social groups together with the objectives of public policy and management [Kowalczyk, Sobiecki, 2017]. Their implementation requires global, national, and individual actions. This requires joint operations, both at the scale of the entire globe, as well as in particular interest groups. Why are social innovations a key point for the progress of civilisation? This is the effect of the clear domination of economic aspects and discrimination of social aspects of this progress. Until the 19th century, the economy was a part of a social structure. As described by K. Polanyi, it was submerged in social relations [Polanyi, 2010, p. 56]. In traditional societies, the economic system was in fact derived from the organisation of the society itself. The economy, consisting of small and dispersed craft businesses, was a part of the social, family, and neighbourhood structure. In the 20th century the situation reversed – the economy started to be the force shaping social structures, positions of individual groups, areas of wealth and poverty. The economy and the market mechanism have become independent from the world of politics and society. Today, the corporations control our lives. They decide what we eat, what we watch, what we wear, where we work and what we do [Bakan, 2006, p. 13]. The corporations started this spectacular “march to rule the world” in the late 19th century. After about a hundred years, at the end of the 20th century, the state under the pressure of corporations and globalisation, started a gradual, but systematic withdrawal from the economy, market and many other functions traditionally belonging to it. As a result, at the end of the last century, a corporation has become a dominant institution in the world. A characteristic feature of this condition is that it gives a complete priority to the interests of corporations. They make decisions of often adverse consequences for the entire social groups, regions, or local communities. They lead to social tensions, political breakdowns, and most often to repeated market turbulences. Thus, a substantial minority (corporations) obtain inconceivable benefits at the expense of the vast majority, that is broad professional and social groups. The lack of relative balance between the economy and society is a barrier to the progress of civilisation. A growing global concern is the problem of migration. The present crisis, left unresolved, in the long term will return multiplied. Today, there are about 500 million people living in Europe, 1.5 billion in Africa and the Middle East, but in 2100, the population of Europe will be about 400 million and of the Middle East and Africa approximately 4.5 billion. Solving this problem, mainly through social and political innovations, can take place only by a joint operation of highly developed and developing countries. Is it an easy task? It’s very difficult. Unfortunately, today, the world is going in the opposite direction. Instead of pursuing the community, empathic thinking, it aims towards nationalism and chauvinism. An example might be a part of the inaugural address of President Donald Trump, who said that the right of all nations is to put their own interests first. Of course, the United States of America will think about their own interests. As we go in the opposite direction, those who deal with global issues say – nothing will change, unless there is some great crisis, a major disaster that would cause that the great of this world will come to senses. J.E. Stiglitz [2004], contrary to the current thinking and practice, believes that a different and better world is possible. Globalisation contains the potential of countless benefits from which people both in developing and highly developed countries can benefit. But the practice so far proves that still it is not grown up enough to use its potential in a fair manner. What is needed are new solutions, most of all social and political innovations (political, because they involve a violation of the previous arrangement of interests). Failure to search for breakthrough innovations of social and political nature that would meet the modern challenges, can lead the world to a disaster. Social innovation, and not economic, because the contemporary civilisation problems have their roots in this dimension. A global problem, solution of which requires innovations of social and political nature, is the disruption of the balance between work and capital. In 2010, 400 richest people had assets such as the half of the poorer population of the world. In 2016, such part was in the possession of only 8 people. This shows the dramatic collapse of the balance between work and capital. The world cannot develop creating the technological progress while increasing unjustified inequalities, which inevitably lead to an outbreak of civil disturbances. This outbreak can have various organisation forms. In the days of the Internet and social media, it is easier to communicate with people. Therefore, paradoxically, some modern technologies create the conditions facilitating social protests. There is one more important and dangerous effect of implementing technological innovations without simultaneous creation and implementation of social innovations limiting the sky-rocketing increase of economic (followed by social) diversification. Sooner or later, technological progress will become so widespread that, due to the relatively low prices, it will make it possible for the weapons of mass destruction, especially biological and chemical weapons, to reach small terrorist groups. Then, a total, individualized war of global reach can develop. The individualisation of war will follow, as described by the famous German sociologist Ulrich Beck. To avoid this, it is worth looking at the achievements of the Polish scientist Michał Kalecki, who 75 years ago argued that capitalism alone is not able to develop. It is because it aggressively seeks profit growth, but cannot turn profit into some profitable investments. Therefore, when uncertainty grows, capitalism cannot develop itself, and it must be accompanied by external factors, named by Kalecki – external development factors. These factors include state expenses, finances and, in accordance with the nomenclature of Kalecki – epochal innovations. And what are the current possibilities of activation of the external factors? In short – modest. The countries are indebted, and the basis for the development in the last 20 years were loans, which contributed to the growth of debt of economic entities. What, then, should we do? It is necessary to look for cheaper solutions, but such that are effective, that is breakthrough innovations. These undoubtedly include social and political innovations. Contemporary social innovation is not about investing big money and expensive resources in production, e.g. of a very expensive vaccine, which would be available for a small group of recipients. Today’s social innovation should stimulate the use of lower amounts of resources to produce more products available to larger groups of recipients. The progress of civilisation happens only as a result of a sustainable development in economic, social, and now also ecological terms. Economic (business) innovations, which help accelerate the growth rate of production and services, contribute to economic development. Profits of corporations increase and, at the same time, the economic objectives of the corporations are realised. But are the objectives of the society as a whole and its members individually realised equally, in parallel? In the chain of social reproduction there are four repeated phases: production – distribution – exchange – consumption. The key point from the social point of view is the phase of distribution. But what are the rules of distribution, how much and who gets from this “cake” produced in the social process of production? In the today’s increasingly global economy, the most important mechanism of distribution is the market mechanism. However, in the long run, this mechanism leads to growing income and welfare disparities of various social groups. Although, the income and welfare diversity in itself is nothing wrong, as it is the result of the diversification of effectiveness of factors of production, including work, the growing disparities to a large extent cannot be justified. Economic situation of the society members increasingly depends not on the contribution of work, but on the size of the capital invested, and the market position of the economic entity, and on the “governing power of capital” on the market. It should also be noted that this diversification is also related to speculative activities. Disparities between the implemented economic and social innovations can lead to the collapse of the progress of civilisation. Nowadays, economic crises are often justified by, indeed, social and political considerations, such as marginalisation of nation states, imbalance of power (or imbalance of fear), religious conflicts, nationalism, chauvinism, etc. It is also considered that the first global financial crisis of the 21st century originated from the wrong social policy pursued by the US Government, which led to the creation of a gigantic public debt, which consequently led to an economic breakdown. This resulted in the financial crisis, but also in deepening of the social imbalances and widening of the circles of poverty and social exclusion. It can even be stated that it was a crisis in public confidence. Therefore, the causes of crises are the conflicts between the economic dimension of the development and its social dimension. Contemporary world is filled with various innovations of economic or business nature (including technological, product, marketing, and in part – organisational). The existing solutions can be a source of economic progress, which is a component of the progress of civilisation. However, economic innovations do not complete the entire progress of civilisation moreover, the saturation, and often supersaturation with implementations and economic innovations leads to an excessive use of material factors of production. As a consequence, it results in lowering of the efficiency of their use, unnecessary extra burden to the planet, and passing of the negative effects on the society and future generations (of consumers). On the other hand, it leads to forcing the consumption of durable consumer goods, and gathering them “just in case”, and also to the low degree of their use (e.g. more cars in a household than its members results in the additional load on traffic routes, which results in an increase in the inconvenience of movement of people, thus to the reduction of the quality of life). Introduction of yet another economic innovation will not solve this problem. It can be solved only by social innovations that are in a permanent shortage. A social innovation which fosters solving the issue of excessive accumulation of tangible production goods is a developing phenomenon called sharing economy. It is based on the principle: “the use of a service provided by some welfare does not require being its owner”. This principle allows for an economic use of resources located in households, but which have been “latent” so far. In this way, increasing of the scope of services provided (transport, residential and tourist accommodation) does not require any growth of additional tangible resources of factors of production. So, it contributes to the growth of household incomes, and inhibition of loading the planet with material goods processed by man [see Poniatowska-Jaksch, Sobiecki, 2016]. Another example: we live in times, in which, contrary to the law of T. Malthus, the planet is able to feed all people, that is to guarantee their minimum required nutrients. But still, millions of people die of starvation and malnutrition, but also due to obesity. Can this problem be solved with another economic innovation? Certainly not! Economic innovations will certainly help to partially solve the problem of nutrition, at least by the new methods of storing and preservation of foods, to reduce its waste in the phase of storage and transport. However, a key condition to solve this problem is to create and implement an innovation of a social nature (in many cases also political). We will not be able to speak about the progress of civilisation in a situation, where there are people dying of starvation and malnutrition. A growing global social concern, resulting from implementation of an economic (technological) innovation will be robotisation, and more specifically – the effects arising from its dissemination on a large scale. So far, the issue has been postponed due to globalisation of the labour market, which led to cheapening of the work factor by more than ten times in the countries of Asia or South America. But it ends slowly. Labour becomes more and more expensive, which means that the robots become relatively cheap. The mechanism leading to low prices of the labour factor expires. Wages increase, and this changes the relationship of the prices of capital and labour. Capital becomes relatively cheaper and cheaper, and this leads to reducing of the demand for work, at the same time increasing the demand for capital (in the form of robots). The introduction of robots will be an effect of the phenomenon of substitution of the factors of production. A cheaper factor (in this case capital in the form of robots) will be cheaper than the same activities performed by man. According to W. Szymański [2017], such change is a dysfunction of capitalism. A great challenge, because capitalism is based on the market-driven shaping of income. The market-driven shaping of income means that the income is derived from the sale of the factors of production. Most people have income from employment. Robots change this mechanism. It is estimated that scientific progress allows to create such number of robots that will replace billion people in the world. What will happen to those “superseded”, what will replace the income from human labour? Capitalism will face an institutional challenge, and must replace the market-driven shaping of income with another, new one. The introduction of robots means microeconomic battle with the barrier of demand. To sell more, one needs to cut costs. The costs are lowered by the introduction of robots, but the use of robots reduces the demand for human labour. Lowering the demand for human labour results in the reduction of employment, and lower wages. Lower wages result in the reduction of the demand for goods and services. To increase the demand for goods and services, the companies must lower their costs, so they increase the involvement of robots, etc. A mechanism of the vicious circle appears If such a mass substitution of the factors of production is unfavourable from the point of view of stimulating the development of the economy, then something must be done to improve the adverse price relations for labour. How can the conditions of competition between a robot and a man be made equal, at least partially? Robots should be taxed. Bill Gates, among others, is a supporter of such a solution. However, this is only one of the tools that can be used. The solution of the problem requires a change in the mechanism, so a breakthrough innovation of a social and political nature. We can say that technological and product innovations force the creation of social and political innovations (maybe institutional changes). Product innovations solve some problems (e.g. they contribute to the reduction of production costs), but at the same time, give rise to others. Progress of civilisation for centuries and even millennia was primarily an intellectual progress. It was difficult to discuss economic progress at that time. Then we had to deal with the imbalance between the economic and the social element. The insufficiency of the economic factor (otherwise than it is today) was the reason for the tensions and crises. Estimates of growth indicate that the increase in industrial production from ancient times to the first industrial revolution, that is until about 1700, was 0.1-0.2 per year on average. Only the next centuries brought about systematically increasing pace of economic growth. During 1700- 1820, it was 0.5% on an annual average, and between 1820-1913 – 1.5%, and between 1913-2012 – 3.0% [Piketty, 2015, p. 97]. So, the significant pace of the economic growth is found only at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. Additionally, the growth in this period refers predominantly to Europe and North America. The countries on other continents were either stuck in colonialism, structurally similar to the medieval period, or “lived” on the history of their former glory, as, for example, China and Japan, or to a lesser extent some countries of the Middle East and South America. The growth, having then the signs of the modern growth, that is the growth based on technological progress, was attributed mainly to Europe and the United States. The progress of civilisation requires the creation of new social initiatives. Social innovations are indeed an additional capital to keep the social structure in balance. The social capital is seen as a means and purpose and as a primary source of new values for the members of the society. Social innovations also motivate every citizen to actively participate in this process. It is necessary, because traditional ways of solving social problems, even those known for a long time as unemployment, ageing of the society, or exclusion of considerable social and professional groups from the social and economic development, simply fail. “Old” problems are joined by new ones, such as the increase of social inequalities, climate change, or rapidly growing environmental pollution. New phenomena and problems require new solutions, changes to existing procedures, programmes, and often a completely different approach and instruments [Kowalczyk, Sobiecki, 2017].

In this critically insightful and highly readable book of political ethnogra- phy, Aisha Ahmad, a political scientist at University of Toronto, seeks to explain how and why Islamist movements continue to militarily prevail and politically succeed in forming proto-states, over clan, ethnic, and/or tribal based competitions, amidst the chaos and disorder of civil wars across the contemporary Muslim world, from Mali to Mindanao. To this end, Ahmad seeks to go beyond the usual expositions that center the explanatory power of Islamist ideologies and identities, which dominate the scholarly fields of political science, international relations, security studies as well as the global public discourse shaped by journalists, politicians, and the punditry of shouting heads everywhere. Through a deep, immersive study of power in Afghanistan and Soma- lia, Ahmad demonstrates the profoundly symbiotic relationship between Islamists and the local business class. While recognizing the interconnec- tions between violent conflict and illicit trade is nothing new, Ahmad’s explication of the economic logics of Islamist proto-states furnishes a nov- el two-stage dynamic to explain the indispensability and ubiquity of this Islamist-business alliance in conflict zones. The first is the gradual social process of conversion of the business class’ worldview and practice to align them with Islamist identity formations, which is “aimed at mitigating un- certainty and improving access to markets” (xvii). Alongside this long-term socialization is a second, short-term political-economic dynamic of rapid shift in the business class’s collective patronage of a new Islamist faction, based on the assumption that it will lower the cost of business. The for- midable alliance between business class interests and Islamist institutions brings forth the new Islamist proto-state. Chapter one of the book adum- brates this two-stage argument and offers justifications for the two case studies, namely the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The second chapter unpacks the two-stage dynamic in detail. We learn that in modern civil wars across the Muslim world, business communi- ties intentionally adopt ardent Islamist identities as a practical means to- ward building trust and lowering cost. Islamist factions, aspiring toward hegemony, offer the possibility of economic relationships that transcend the ethnic boundaries which limit rival factions rooted in clan, tribal, or ethno-linguistic social formations. This leads to the second, faster conver- gence of business-Islamist interests, wherein the Islamist groups leverage their broader social identity and economic market to offer stronger secu- rity at a lower cost. This development of an economy of scale leads the local business elites to throw their financial support behind the Islamists at a critical juncture of militant competition. Once this threshold is met, Islamist factions rapidly conquer and consolidate territories from their rel- atively socially constrained rivals to form a new proto-state, like the Taliban regime and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). When we look at the timeline of their development (the Taliban in 1994 and the ICU in 2006), we notice a similar length of gestation, about 15 years of war. This similarity may be coincidental, but the political-military threshold is the same. Both societ- ies, ravaged by civil war, reached a stalemate. At this critical juncture the positional properties of Islamist formations in the field of civil war factions gives the Islamists a decided economic (cost analysis) and social (trust building across clan/tribal identities) advantage. Chapters three to six examine each of the two processes for the se- lected sites of inquiry. Thus chapters three and five, respectively, explore the long-term Islamist identity construction within the smuggling industry in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland, and the Somali business elites’ gradual convergence with Islamists. In chapter four, Ahmad explores the second dynamic in the context of rising security costs during the Afghan civil war. Mullah Omar’s Taliban provided the order and security across the borderland that had previously eluded the variety of industries. This allowed the Taliban to expand on the backs of voluntary donations, rather than extortions like their rival tribal warlords, which in turn allowed them to recruit and retain more disciplined fighters (81). The source of these donations was the business class, especially those involved in the highly lucrative transit trade, which, before the rise of Taliban, paid immense op- portunity cost at the hands of rapacious local and tribal warlord fiefdoms and bandits. Instead of the multitude of checkpoints crisscrossing south- ern Afghanistan and the borderlands, the Taliban presented a simplified administration. While the rest of the world took notice of their repressive measures against women’s mobility, education, and cultural expression, the men of the bazaar appreciated the newly acquired public safety to ply their trade and the lowered cost of doing business. Chapter six, “The Price of Protection: The Rise of the Islamic Courts Union,” demonstrates a similar mutually beneficial Islamist-business relationship emerging out of the incessant clan-based militia conflicts that had especially plagued southern Somalia since the fall of the last national government in 1991. Businesspeople, whether they were tycoons or small business owners, had to pay two types of tax. First was what was owed to the local racket or warlord, and the second was to the ever-fragmenting sub-clan militias and their checkpoints on the intercity highways. Unlike their rival, the Transitional Federal Government (TGF), ICU forged their supra-clan institutional identity through a universalist legal discourse and practice rooted in Islamic law and ethics. They united the courts and their associated clan-based militias, including al-Shabaab. Ahmad demonstrates, through a synthesis of secondary literature and original political ethnogra- phy, the economic logics of ICU’s ability to overcome the threshold of ma- terial and social support needed to establish the rule of law and a far-reach- ing functioning government. If the Taliban and the ICU had solved the riddle of creating order and security to create hegemonic proto-states, then what was their downfall? Chapter seven gives us an account of the international interventions that caused the collapse of the two proto-states. In the aftermath of their de- struction, the internationally supported regimes that replaced them, de- spite immense monetary and military aid, have failed to gain the same level of legitimacy across Afghanistan and Somalia. In chapter eight, Ahmad expands the scope of analysis to North/Western Africa (Al-Qaeda in the Is- lamic Maghrib: AQIM), Middle East (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: ISIS), and South Asia (Tahrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan: TTP). At the time of this book’s publication, these movements were not yet, as Ahmad posits, closed cases like the Taliban and the ICU. Thus, the data from this chapter’s comparative survey furnishes suggestive arguments for Ahmad’s larger thesis, namely that Islamist proto-states emerge out of a confluence of economic and security interests rather than mere ideological and identity politics. The epistemic humility of this chapter signals to this reader two lines of constructive criticism of some aspects of Ahmad’s sub- stantiation of this thesis. First, the juxtaposing of Islamist success against their clan-/tribal iden- tity-based rivals may be underestimating the element of ethnic solidarity in those very Islamists’ political success. The most glaring case is the Taliban, which in its original formation and in its post-American invasion frag- mentations, across the Durand Line, was more or less founded on a pan- or-tribal Pashtun social identity and economic compulsions relative to the other Afghan ethno-linguistic communities. How does one disaggregate the force of ethnic solidarity (even if it is only a necessary condition, rather than a cause) from economic calculus in explaining the rise of the Taliban proto-state? The second issue in this juxtaposition is that when we compare a suc- cessful Islamist movement against socially limited ethnocentric rivals, we discount the other Islamist movements that failed. Explanations for those Islamists that failed to create a proto-state along the lines of the ICU or the Taliban, such as al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (Somalia) or Gulbuddin Hekmat- yar’s Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan), needed to be more robustly taken into account and integrated into the substantiation of Ahmad’s thesis. Even in the section on ISIS, it would have been helpful to integrate the case of Jabhat al-Nusra’s (an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria) inability to create a proto-state to rival ISIS. We must ask, why do some Jihadi Islamist movements prevail against each other and why do others fail? Perhaps some of these Islamist movements appear too early to scale up their operation (i.e., they precede Ahmad’s ‘critical juncture’), or they were too embroiled and too partisan in the illicit trade network to fully leverage their Islamist universalism to create the trust and bonds that are the first part of Ahmad’s two-stage dy- namic. Possible answers would need to complement Ahmad’s excellent po- litical ethnography with deeper quantitative dives to identify the statistical variations of these critical junctures: when does the cost of warlords and mafias’ domination outweigh the cost of Islamist-Jihadi movements’ social- ly repressive but economically liberating regimes? At which point in the social evolution of society during an unending civil war do identities forged by the bonds of blood give way to those imagined through bonds of faith? These two critical suggestions do not diminish Ahmad’s highly teach- able work. This book should be read by all concerned policy makers, schol- ars in the social sciences and humanities, and anyone who wants to go be- yond ‘culture talk’ historical causation by ideas and identity and uncover structuralist explanations for the rise of Jihadi Islamist success in civil wars across the Muslim world. It is especially recommended for adoption in cog- nate courses at the undergraduate level, for its combination of erudition and readability. Maheen ZamanAssistant ProfessorDepartment of HistoryAugsburg University

In this critically insightful and highly readable book of political ethnogra- phy, Aisha Ahmad, a political scientist at University of Toronto, seeks to explain how and why Islamist movements continue to militarily prevail and politically succeed in forming proto-states, over clan, ethnic, and/or tribal based competitions, amidst the chaos and disorder of civil wars across the contemporary Muslim world, from Mali to Mindanao. To this end, Ahmad seeks to go beyond the usual expositions that center the explanatory power of Islamist ideologies and identities, which dominate the scholarly fields of political science, international relations, security studies as well as the global public discourse shaped by journalists, politicians, and the punditry of shouting heads everywhere. Through a deep, immersive study of power in Afghanistan and Soma- lia, Ahmad demonstrates the profoundly symbiotic relationship between Islamists and the local business class. While recognizing the interconnec- tions between violent conflict and illicit trade is nothing new, Ahmad’s explication of the economic logics of Islamist proto-states furnishes a nov- el two-stage dynamic to explain the indispensability and ubiquity of this Islamist-business alliance in conflict zones. The first is the gradual social process of conversion of the business class’ worldview and practice to align them with Islamist identity formations, which is “aimed at mitigating un- certainty and improving access to markets” (xvii). Alongside this long-term socialization is a second, short-term political-economic dynamic of rapid shift in the business class’s collective patronage of a new Islamist faction, based on the assumption that it will lower the cost of business. The for- midable alliance between business class interests and Islamist institutions brings forth the new Islamist proto-state. Chapter one of the book adum- brates this two-stage argument and offers justifications for the two case studies, namely the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The second chapter unpacks the two-stage dynamic in detail. We learn that in modern civil wars across the Muslim world, business communi- ties intentionally adopt ardent Islamist identities as a practical means to- ward building trust and lowering cost. Islamist factions, aspiring toward hegemony, offer the possibility of economic relationships that transcend the ethnic boundaries which limit rival factions rooted in clan, tribal, or ethno-linguistic social formations. This leads to the second, faster conver- gence of business-Islamist interests, wherein the Islamist groups leverage their broader social identity and economic market to offer stronger secu- rity at a lower cost. This development of an economy of scale leads the local business elites to throw their financial support behind the Islamists at a critical juncture of militant competition. Once this threshold is met, Islamist factions rapidly conquer and consolidate territories from their rel- atively socially constrained rivals to form a new proto-state, like the Taliban regime and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). When we look at the timeline of their development (the Taliban in 1994 and the ICU in 2006), we notice a similar length of gestation, about 15 years of war. This similarity may be coincidental, but the political-military threshold is the same. Both societ- ies, ravaged by civil war, reached a stalemate. At this critical juncture the positional properties of Islamist formations in the field of civil war factions gives the Islamists a decided economic (cost analysis) and social (trust building across clan/tribal identities) advantage. Chapters three to six examine each of the two processes for the se- lected sites of inquiry. Thus chapters three and five, respectively, explore the long-term Islamist identity construction within the smuggling industry in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland, and the Somali business elites’ gradual convergence with Islamists. In chapter four, Ahmad explores the second dynamic in the context of rising security costs during the Afghan civil war. Mullah Omar’s Taliban provided the order and security across the borderland that had previously eluded the variety of industries. This allowed the Taliban to expand on the backs of voluntary donations, rather than extortions like their rival tribal warlords, which in turn allowed them to recruit and retain more disciplined fighters (81). The source of these donations was the business class, especially those involved in the highly lucrative transit trade, which, before the rise of Taliban, paid immense op- portunity cost at the hands of rapacious local and tribal warlord fiefdoms and bandits. Instead of the multitude of checkpoints crisscrossing south- ern Afghanistan and the borderlands, the Taliban presented a simplified administration. While the rest of the world took notice of their repressive measures against women’s mobility, education, and cultural expression, the men of the bazaar appreciated the newly acquired public safety to ply their trade and the lowered cost of doing business. Chapter six, “The Price of Protection: The Rise of the Islamic Courts Union,” demonstrates a similar mutually beneficial Islamist-business relationship emerging out of the incessant clan-based militia conflicts that had especially plagued southern Somalia since the fall of the last national government in 1991. Businesspeople, whether they were tycoons or small business owners, had to pay two types of tax. First was what was owed to the local racket or warlord, and the second was to the ever-fragmenting sub-clan militias and their checkpoints on the intercity highways. Unlike their rival, the Transitional Federal Government (TGF), ICU forged their supra-clan institutional identity through a universalist legal discourse and practice rooted in Islamic law and ethics. They united the courts and their associated clan-based militias, including al-Shabaab. Ahmad demonstrates, through a synthesis of secondary literature and original political ethnogra- phy, the economic logics of ICU’s ability to overcome the threshold of ma- terial and social support needed to establish the rule of law and a far-reach- ing functioning government. If the Taliban and the ICU had solved the riddle of creating order and security to create hegemonic proto-states, then what was their downfall? Chapter seven gives us an account of the international interventions that caused the collapse of the two proto-states. In the aftermath of their de- struction, the internationally supported regimes that replaced them, de- spite immense monetary and military aid, have failed to gain the same level of legitimacy across Afghanistan and Somalia. In chapter eight, Ahmad expands the scope of analysis to North/Western Africa (Al-Qaeda in the Is- lamic Maghrib: AQIM), Middle East (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: ISIS), and South Asia (Tahrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan: TTP). At the time of this book’s publication, these movements were not yet, as Ahmad posits, closed cases like the Taliban and the ICU. Thus, the data from this chapter’s comparative survey furnishes suggestive arguments for Ahmad’s larger thesis, namely that Islamist proto-states emerge out of a confluence of economic and security interests rather than mere ideological and identity politics. The epistemic humility of this chapter signals to this reader two lines of constructive criticism of some aspects of Ahmad’s sub- stantiation of this thesis. First, the juxtaposing of Islamist success against their clan-/tribal iden- tity-based rivals may be underestimating the element of ethnic solidarity in those very Islamists’ political success. The most glaring case is the Taliban, which in its original formation and in its post-American invasion frag- mentations, across the Durand Line, was more or less founded on a pan- or-tribal Pashtun social identity and economic compulsions relative to the other Afghan ethno-linguistic communities. How does one disaggregate the force of ethnic solidarity (even if it is only a necessary condition, rather than a cause) from economic calculus in explaining the rise of the Taliban proto-state? The second issue in this juxtaposition is that when we compare a suc- cessful Islamist movement against socially limited ethnocentric rivals, we discount the other Islamist movements that failed. Explanations for those Islamists that failed to create a proto-state along the lines of the ICU or the Taliban, such as al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (Somalia) or Gulbuddin Hekmat- yar’s Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan), needed to be more robustly taken into account and integrated into the substantiation of Ahmad’s thesis. Even in the section on ISIS, it would have been helpful to integrate the case of Jabhat al-Nusra’s (an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria) inability to create a proto-state to rival ISIS. We must ask, why do some Jihadi Islamist movements prevail against each other and why do others fail? Perhaps some of these Islamist movements appear too early to scale up their operation (i.e., they precede Ahmad’s ‘critical juncture’), or they were too embroiled and too partisan in the illicit trade network to fully leverage their Islamist universalism to create the trust and bonds that are the first part of Ahmad’s two-stage dy- namic. Possible answers would need to complement Ahmad’s excellent po- litical ethnography with deeper quantitative dives to identify the statistical variations of these critical junctures: when does the cost of warlords and mafias’ domination outweigh the cost of Islamist-Jihadi movements’ social- ly repressive but economically liberating regimes? At which point in the social evolution of society during an unending civil war do identities forged by the bonds of blood give way to those imagined through bonds of faith? These two critical suggestions do not diminish Ahmad’s highly teach- able work. This book should be read by all concerned policy makers, schol- ars in the social sciences and humanities, and anyone who wants to go be- yond ‘culture talk’ historical causation by ideas and identity and uncover structuralist explanations for the rise of Jihadi Islamist success in civil wars across the Muslim world. It is especially recommended for adoption in cog- nate courses at the undergraduate level, for its combination of erudition and readability. Maheen ZamanAssistant ProfessorDepartment of HistoryAugsburg University

This paper aims to portray the overall picture of poverty in the world and mentions the key solution to overcome poverty from a critical perspective. The data and figures were quoted from a number of researchers and organizations in the field of poverty around the world. Simultaneously, the information strengthens the correlations among poverty and lack of education. Only appropriate philosophies of education can improve the country’s socio-economic conditions and contribute to effective solutions to worldwide poverty. In the 21st century, despite the rapid development of science and technology with a series of inventions brought into the world to make life more comfortable, human poverty remains a global problem, especially in developing countries. Poverty, according to Lister (2004), is reflected by the state of “low living standards and/or inability to participate fully in society because of lack of material resources” (p.7). The impact and serious consequences of poverty on multiple aspects of human life have been realized by different organizations and researchers from different contexts (Fraser, 2000; Lister, 2004; Lipman, 2004; Lister, 2008). This paper will indicate some of the concepts and research results on poverty. Figures and causes of poverty, and some solutions from education as a key breaker to poverty will also be discussed. Creating a universal definition of poverty is not simple (Nyasulu, 2010). There are conflicts among different groups of people defining poverty, based on different views and fields. Some writers, according to Nyasulu, tend to connect poverty with social problems, while others focus on political or other causes. However, the reality of poverty needs to be considered from different sides and ways; for that reason, the diversity of definitions assigned to poverty can help form the basis on which interventions are drawn (Ife and Tesoriero, 2006). For instance, in dealing with poverty issues, it is essential to intervene politically; economic intervention is very necessary to any definition of this matter. A political definition necessitates political interventions in dealing with poverty, and economic definitions inevitably lead to economic interventions. Similarly, Księżopolski (1999) uses several models to show the perspectives on poverty as marginal, motivation and socialist. These models look at poverty and solutions from different angles. Socialists, for example, emphasize the responsibilities of social organization. The state manages the micro levels and distributes the shares of national gross resources, at the same time fighting to maintain the narrow gap among classes. In his book, Księżopolski (1999) also emphasizes the changes and new values of charity funds or financial aid from churches or organizations recognized by the Poor Law. Speaking specifically, in the new stages poverty has been recognized differently, and support is also delivered in limited categories related to more specific and visible objectives, with the aim of helping the poor change their own status for sustainable improvement. Three ways of categorizing the poor and locating them in the appropriate places are (1) the powerless, (2) who is willing to work and (3) who is dodging work. Basically, poverty is determined not to belong to any specific cultures or politics; otherwise, it refers to the situation in which people’s earnings cannot support their minimum living standard (Rowntree, 1910). Human living standard is defined in Alfredsson & Eide’s work (1999) as follows: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” (p. 524). In addition, poverty is measured by Global Hunger Index (GHI), which is calculated by the International Food Policy Institute (IFPRI) every year. The GHI measures hunger not only globally, but also by country and region. To have the figures multi-dimensionally, the GHI is based on three indicators: 1. Undernourishment: the proportion of the undernourished as a percentage of the population (reflecting the share of the population with insufficient calorie intake). 2. Child underweight: the proportion of children under age 5 who are underweight (low weight for their age, reflecting wasting, stunted growth or both), which is one indicator of child under-nutrition. 3. Child mortality: the mortality rate of children under 5 (partially reflecting the fatal synergy of inadequate dietary intake and unhealthy environments). Apart from the individual aspects and the above measurement based on nutrition, which help partly imagine poverty, poverty is more complicated, not just being closely related to human physical life but badly affecting spiritual life. According to Jones and Novak (1999 cited in Lister, 2008), poverty not only characterizes the precarious financial situation but also makes people self-deprecating. Poverty turns itself into the roots of shame, guilt, humiliation and resistance. It leads the poor to the end of the road, and they will never call for help except in the worst situations. Education can help people escape poverty or make it worse. In fact, inequality in education has stolen opportunity for fighting poverty from people in many places around the world, in both developed and developing countries (Lipman, 2004). Lipman confirms: “Students need an education that instills a sense of hope and possibility that they can make a difference in their own family, school, and community and in the broader national and global community while it prepare them for multiple life choices.” (p.181) Bradshaw (2005) synthesizes five main causes of poverty: (1) individual deficiencies, (2) cultural belief systems that support subcultures of poverty, (3) economic, political and social distortions or discrimination, (4) geographical disparities and (5) cumulative and cyclical interdependencies. The researcher suggests the most appropriate solution corresponding with each cause. This reflects the diverse causes of poverty; otherwise, poverty easily happens because of social and political issues. From the literature review, it can be said that poverty comes from complex causes and reasons, and is not a problem of any single individual or country. Poverty has brought about serious consequences and needs to be dealt with by many methods and collective effort of many countries and organizations. This paper will focus on representing some alarming figures on poverty, problems of poverty and then the education as a key breaker to poverty. According to a statistics in 2012 on poverty from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), nearly half the world's population lives below the poverty line, of which is less than $1.25 a day . In a statistics in 2015, of every 1,000 children, 93 do not live to age 5 , and about 448 million babies are stillborn each year . Poverty in the world is happening alarmingly. According to a World Bank study, the risk of poverty continues to increase on a global scale and, of the 2009 slowdown in economic growth, which led to higher prices for fuel and food, further pushed 53 million people into poverty in addition to almost 155 million in 2008. From 1990 to 2009, the average GHI in the world decreased by nearly one-fifth. Many countries had success in solving the problem of child nutrition; however, the mortality rate of children under 5 and the proportion of undernourished people are still high. From 2011 to 2013, the number of hungry people in the world was estimated at 842 million, down 17 percent compared with the period 1990 to 1992, according to a report released by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) titled “The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2013” . Although poverty in some African countries had been improved in this stage, sub-Saharan Africa still maintained an area with high the highest percentage of hungry people in the world. The consequences and big problems resulting from poverty are terrible in the extreme. The following will illustrate the overall picture under the issues of health, unemployment, education and society and politics ➢ Health issues: According a report by Manos Unidas, a non- government organization (NGO) in Spain , poverty kills more than 30,000 children under age 5 worldwide every day, and 11 million children die each year because of poverty. Currently, 42 million people are living with HIV, 39 million of them in developing countries. The Manos Unidas report also shows that 15 million children globally have been orphaned because of AIDS. Scientists predict that by 2020 a number of African countries will have lost a quarter of their population to this disease. Simultaneously, chronic drought and lack of clean water have not only hindered economic development but also caused disastrous consequences of serious diseases across Africa. In fact, only 58 percent of Africans have access to clean water; as a result, the average life expectancy in Africa is the lowest in the world, just 45 years old (Bui, 2010). ➢ Unemployment issues: According to the United Nations, the youth unemployment rate in Africa is the highest in the world: 25.6 percent in the Middle East and North Africa. Unemployment with growth rates of 10 percent a year is one of the key issues causing poverty in African and negatively affecting programs and development plans. Total African debt amounts to $425 billion (Bui, 2010). In addition, joblessness caused by the global economic downturn pushed more than 140 million people in Asia into extreme poverty in 2009, the International Labor Organization (ILO) warned in a report titled The Fallout in Asia, prepared for the High-Level Regional Forum on Responding to the Economic Crisis in Asia and the Pacific, in Manila from Feb. 18 to 20, 2009 . Surprisingly, this situation also happens in developed countries. About 12.5 million people in the United Kingdom (accounting for 20 percent of the population) are living below the poverty line, and in 2005, 35 million people in the United States could not live without charity. At present, 620 million people in Asia are living on less than $1 per day; half of them are in India and China, two countries whose economies are considered to be growing. ➢ Education issues: Going to school is one of the basic needs of human beings, but poor people cannot achieve it. Globally, 130 million children do not attend school, 55 percent of them girls, and 82 million children have lost their childhoods by marrying too soon (Bui, 2010). Similarly, two-thirds of the 759 million illiterate people in total are women. Specifically, the illiteracy rate in Africa keeps increasing, accounting for about 40 percent of the African population at age 15 and over 50 percent of women at age 25. The number of illiterate people in the six countries with the highest number of illiterate people in the world - China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh and Egypt - reached 510 million, accounting for 70 percent of total global illiteracy. ➢ Social and political issues: Poverty leads to a number of social problems and instability in political systems of countries around the world. Actually, 246 million children are underage labors, including 72 million under age 10. Simultaneously, according to an estimate by the United Nations (UN), about 100 million children worldwide are living on the streets. For years, Africa has suffered a chronic refugee problem, with more than 7 million refugees currently and over 200 million people without homes because of a series of internal conflicts and civil wars. Poverty threatens stability and development; it also directly influences human development. Solving the problems caused by poverty takes a lot of time and resources, but afterward they can focus on developing their societies. Poverty has become a global issue with political significance of particular importance. It is a potential cause of political and social instability, even leading to violence and war not only within a country, but also in the whole world. Poverty and injustice together have raised fierce conflicts in international relations; if these conflicts are not satisfactorily resolved by peaceful means, war will inevitably break out. Obviously, poverty plus lack of understanding lead to disastrous consequences such as population growth, depletion of water resources, energy scarcity, pollution, food shortages and serious diseases (especially HIV/AIDS), which are not easy to control; simultaneously, poverty plus injustice will cause international crimes such as terrorism, drug and human trafficking, and money laundering. Among recognizable four issues above which reflected the serious consequences of poverty, the third ones, education, if being prioritized in intervention over other issues in the fighting against poverty is believed to bring more effectiveness in resolving the problems from the roots. In fact, human being with the possibility of being educated resulted from their distinctive linguistic ability makes them differential from other beings species on the earth (Barrow and Woods 2006, p.22). With education, human can be aware and more critical with their situations, they are aimed with abilities to deal with social problems as well as adversity for a better life; however, inequality in education has stolen opportunity for fighting poverty from unprivileged people (Lipman, 2004). An appropriate education can help increase chances for human to deal with all of the issues related to poverty; simultaneously it can narrow the unexpected side-effect of making poverty worse. A number of philosophies from ancient Greek to contemporary era focus on the aspect of education with their own epistemology, for example, idealism of Plato encouraged students to be truth seekers and pragmatism of Dewey enhanced the individual needs of students (Gutex, 1997). Education, more later on, especially critical pedagogy focuses on developing people independently and critically which is essential for poor people to have ability of being aware of what they are facing and then to have equivalent solutions for their problems. In other words, critical pedagogy helps people emancipate themselves and from that they can contribute to transform the situations or society they live in. In this sense, in his most influential work titled “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1972), Paulo Freire carried out his critical pedagogy by building up a community network of peasants- the marginalized and unprivileged party in his context, aiming at awakening their awareness about who they are and their roles in society at that time. To do so, he involved the peasants into a problem-posing education which was different from the traditional model of banking education with the technique of dialogue. Dialogue wasn’t just simply for people to learn about each other; but it was for figuring out the same voice; more importantly, for cooperation to build a social network for changing society. The peasants in such an educational community would be relieved from stressfulness and the feeling of being outsiders when all of them could discuss and exchange ideas with each other about the issues from their “praxis”. Praxis which was derived from what people act and linked to some values in their social lives, was defined by Freire as “reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it” (p.50). Critical pedagogy dialogical approach in Pedagogy of the Oppressed of Freire seems to be one of the helpful ways for solving poverty for its close connection to the nature of equality. It doesn’t require any highly intellectual teachers who lead the process; instead, everything happens naturally and the answers are identified by the emancipation of the learners themselves. It can be said that the effectiveness of this pedagogy for people to escape poverty comes from its direct impact on human critical consciousness; from that, learners would be fully aware of their current situations and self- figure out the appropriate solutions for their own. In addition, equality which was one of the essences making learners in critical pedagogy intellectually emancipate was reflected via the work titled “The Ignorant Schoolmaster” by Jacques Rancière (1991). In this work, the teacher and students seemed to be equal in terms of the knowledge. The explicator- teacher Joseph Jacotot employed the interrogative approach which was discovered to be universal because “he taught what he didn’t know”. Obviously, this teacher taught French to Flemish students while he couldn’t speak his students’ language. The ignorance which was not used in the literal sense but a metaphor showed that learners can absolutely realize their capacity for self-emancipation without the traditional teaching of transmission of knowledge from teachers. Regarding this, Rancière (1991, p.17) stated “that every common person might conceive his human dignity, take the measure of his intellectual capacity, and decide how to use it”. This education is so meaningful for poor people by being able to evoking their courageousness to develop themselves when they always try to stay away from the community due the fact that poverty is the roots of shame, guilt, humiliation and resistance (Novak, 1999). The contribution of critical pedagogy to solving poverty by changing the consciousness of people from their immanence is summarized by Freire’s argument in his “Pedagogy of Indignation” as follows: “It is certain that men and women can change the world for the better, can make it less unjust, but they can do so from starting point of concrete reality they “come upon” in their generation. They cannot do it on the basis of reveries, false dreams, or pure illusion”. (p.31) To sum up, education could be an extremely helpful way of solving poverty regarding the possibilities from the applications of studies in critical pedagogy for educational and social issues. Therefore, among the world issues, poverty could be possibly resolved in accordance with the indigenous people’s understanding of their praxis, their actions, cognitive transformation, and the solutions with emancipation in terms of the following keynotes: First, because the poor are powerless, they usually fall into the states of self-deprecation, shame, guilt and humiliation, as previously mentioned. In other words, they usually build a barrier between themselves and society, or they resist changing their status. Therefore, approaching them is not a simple matter; it requires much time and the contributions of psychologists and sociologists in learning about their aspirations, as well as evoking and nurturing the will and capacities of individuals, then providing people with chances to carry out their own potential for overcoming obstacles in life. Second, poverty happens easily in remote areas not endowed with favorable conditions for development. People there haven’t had a lot of access to modern civilization; nor do they earn a lot of money for a better life. Low literacy, together with the lack of healthy forms of entertainment and despair about life without exit, easily lead people into drug addiction, gambling and alcoholism. In other words, the vicious circle of poverty and powerlessness usually leads the poor to a dead end. Above all, they are lonely and need to be listened to, shared with and led to escape from their states. Community meetings for exchanging ideas, communicating and immediate intervening, along with appropriate forms of entertainment, should be held frequently to meet the expectations of the poor, direct them to appropriate jobs and, step by step, change their favorite habits of entertainment. Last but not least, poor people should be encouraged to participate in social forums where they can both raise their voices about their situations and make valuable suggestions for dealing with their poverty. Children from poor families should be completely exempted from school fees to encourage them to go to school, and curriculum should also focus on raising community awareness of poverty issues through extracurricular and volunteer activities, such as meeting and talking with the community, helping poor people with odd jobs, or simply spending time listening to them. Not a matter of any individual country, poverty has become a major problem, a threat to the survival, stability and development of the world and humanity. Globalization has become a bridge linking countries; for that reason, instability in any country can directly and deeply affect the stability of others. The international community has been joining hands to solve poverty; many anti-poverty organizations, including FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), BecA (the Biosciences eastern and central Africa), UN-REDD (the United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), BRAC (Building Resources Across Communities), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), WHO (World Health Organization) and Manos Unidas, operate both regionally and internationally, making some achievements by reducing the number of hungry people, estimated 842 million in the period 1990 to 1992, by 17 percent in 2011- to 2013 . The diverse methods used to deal with poverty have invested billions of dollars in education, health and healing. The Millennium Development Goals set by UNDP put forward eight solutions for addressing issues related to poverty holistically: 1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 2) Achieve universal primary education. 3) Promote gender equality and empower women. 4) Reduce child mortality. 5) Improve maternal health. 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. 7) Ensure environmental sustainability. 8) Develop a global partnership for development. Although all of the mentioned solutions carried out directly by countries and organizations not only focus on the roots of poverty but break its circle, it is recognized that the solutions do not emphasize the role of the poor themselves which a critical pedagogy does. More than anyone, the poor should have a sense of their poverty so that they can become responsible for their own fate and actively fight poverty instead of waiting for help. It is not different from the cores of critical theory in solving educational and political issues that the poor should be aware and conscious about their situation and reflected context. It is required a critical transformation from their own praxis which would allow them to go through a process of learning, sharing, solving problems, and leading to social movements. This is similar to the method of giving poor people fish hooks rather than giving them fish. The government and people of any country understand better than anyone else clearly the strengths and characteristics of their homelands. It follows that they can efficiently contribute to causing poverty, preventing the return of poverty, and solving consequences of the poverty in their countries by many ways, especially a critical pedagogy; and indirectly narrow the scale of poverty in the world. In a word, the wars against poverty take time, money, energy and human resources, and they are absolutely not simple to end. Again, the poor and the challenged should be educated to be fully aware of their situation to that they can overcome poverty themselves. They need to be respected and receive sharing from the community. All forms of discrimination should be condemned and excluded from human society. When whole communities join hands in solving this universal problem, the endless circle of poverty can be addressed definitely someday. More importantly, every country should be responsible for finding appropriate ways to overcome poverty before receiving supports from other countries as well as the poor self-conscious responsibilities about themselves before receiving supports from the others, but the methods leading them to emancipation for their own transformation and later the social change.

There is a tendency in academic literature to compare and contrast reli- gions to try to understand the motivations of the convert. What are the costs and benefits of conversion? What is gained and what is lost? Thinking in these utilitarian terms can lead to a focus on causality and materiality, rather than the metaphysical and ephemeral aspects of religious thought and practice. Furthermore, religious conversion to Islam is often mired in the same prejudices and stereotypes of the orient found in western and predominantly Judeo-Christian depictions of the Middle East, the region that Islam is most often associated with. In Everyday Conversions: Islam, Domestic Work, and South Asian Migrant Women in Kuwait, Attiya Ahmad moves away from the emphasis on what distinguishes religious traditions and discursive communities to focus on what religious conversion means to the individual convert. Ahmad seeks to counter the notion that conver- sion must have some material benefit to the convert and instead looks at the quotidian character of religious transformation. Ahmad argues in her eth- nographic work that conversion can be understood through the minutiae of daily interactions, conversations, and affections that develop over time. She follows the lives of migrant domestic workers in the Gulf and their relationships with their employers as well as their own families over the course of their conversions and argues that it is neither the strength of the da'wa movement in Kuwait, nor the benefits gained by conversion to the employee/employer relationship that effectively describes the reason the women convert (although Ahmad is admittedly not looking for causality). Instead, Ahmad writes: “I have sought to tell a more modest and mundane set of stories that convey moments of slippage, tension and traces of feel- ings, thoughts and impressions of everyday conversion” (194). The strengths of Ahmad’s ethnography lie in its attention to detail and equanimity in representing the challenges of migration and domestic labor. Ahmad is careful not to create victims, nor inflate the value of the women’s migration and conversion to their economic or personal well-being. In this approach, there are hints of Lila Abu-Lughod’s and Saba Mahmood’s work with women who appear to be in marginal or precarious positions. Like these feminist ethnographers, Ahmad is attuned to the ethics and politics of representation, but with an eye towards transnational and cultural stud- ies. In its theoretical framing, the ethnography calls to mind the work of Michel DeCerteau in The Practice of Everyday Life, which rejects theories of production to focus on the consumer. Furthermore, by placing conversion in light of transnational migration, Ahmad also shows how the individu- al convert navigates her conversion through the complex nexus of Kuwait City as well as her own home town. Thus, the individual convert as artist of her own conversion is the primary subject of Ahmad’s book. My one cri- tique of the book would be in the area of theory, where Ahmad is hesitant to challenge others who have written on the subject of Islamic religious faith and practice, despite the theoretical weight evident in her ethnography. In the introduction, Ahmad begins with Talal Asad and Saba Mah- mood’s seminal arguments in the field of anthropology of Islam, which she argues “relativize and provincialize secular modern understandings of sub- jectivity, agency and embodied practice” (9). She distinguishes her work from Asad and Mahmood’s by utilizing a transnational feminist framework that highlights the process of “mutual constitution and self-constituting othering, as well as sociohistorical circumstances” (10). Ahmad wants to go beyond discursive narratives of secular liberalism and the Islamic piety movement. Specifically, Ahmad follows the approach of Eve Sedgewick, who eschews Judith Butler’s “strong theory” in exchange for an approach that looks at factors that “lie alongside” gender performativity (23). Ahmad does this by showing “how religious conversion also constitutes a complex site of interrelation through which religious traditions are configured and reconfigured together” (24). Instead of showing conflict or contrasting discursive traditions, Ahmad contends that the best way to understand the lives and stories of her interlocutors are in the quotidian affairs of the households they work and live in. She divides the chapters into the affec- tive experiences the women have as a result of their migration experiences, which in turn spur their conversions. Chapters one and two cover the political and geographic terrain that the women must cut across, which produces an overwhelming feeling of being neither here nor there, but temporarily suspended between states, households, and religions. Chapter one paints a somewhat grim picture of the politically precarious position of migrant women within the kefala sys- tem, labor laws, and bans on migrations often creating impossible condi- tions for migrant woman. Chapter two sets out to “discern, document and describe” (66) the migratory experience and why it produces uncertainty about one’s place in the world. It follows the women back and forth between Kuwait and their home countries, emphasizing the socio-historical context that requires a transnational feminist framework. The four women that Ah- mad follows throughout the book share their migratory journeys and their sense of “suspension” between two households. This chapter segues neatly into chapter three, where the women share how being a female migrant and domestic laborer requires knowledge of cross-cultural norms regarding gender, all of which require the women to be naram, “a gendered, learned capability of being malleable that indexes proper womanhood” (122). In their own eyes, a successful domestic worker from South Asia bends to the norms of the society they are in, and they attribute male and female migrant failure to being too sakht, or hard and unyielding. Here, I would have liked a stronger connection between how she describes naram and how Mahmood describes malaka. Does being naram lay the groundwork for women’s conversion to Islam, a religion which requires the ability to engage in rituals entailing patience, modesty, and steadfastness? Ahmed hints at this connection in the conclusion to the chapter—“Being naram resonates with the fluid, flexible student-centered pedagogies of Kuwait’s Islamic dawa movement, thus facilitating domestic worker’s deepening learning of Islamic precepts and practices” (123)—but she could have spent more time discussing the overlap in the concepts in either chapter three or five, where she discusses the da'wah movement. Chapters four and five deal directly with questions of religious thought and practice and illustrate how the women grapple with Islamic practices in the household as their relationships with their employers deepen. Chapter five is about the household and the everyday conversations or “house talk” that Ahmad argues are the touchstones for the women’s conversion. The daily relations in the household make blending and layering practices of Is- lam onto older traditions and rituals seem easy and natural. Ahmad argues that “the work undertaken by domestic workers—such as tending to family members during trips and caring for the elderly or the infirm—necessari- ly involves the disciplining and training of their comportment, affect and sense of self ” (129) and makes Islamic practices easier to absorb as well. Chapter 6 is a foray into the da'wah movement classroom. Like Mahmood’s Politics of Piety, Ahmad shows how the teachers and students use the space to create “intertwining stories” of patience in the face of hardship and the eventual rewards that come from this ethical re-fashioning, which mirror their own hardships as converts and help them deal with the dilemmas of being female migrant and domestic workers. The chapter ends with a sense of uncertainty, returning to the themes of temporality and suspension that began the book. Ahmad can’t say whether the conversions will remain fixed pieces or will bend and move with the women as their circumstances change. In the epilogue, Ahmad follows the “ongoing conversions” of her inter- locutors as some of them return home as Muslims and encounter new chal- lenges. As a book that focuses on the everyday, it is fitting to end on a new day and possibly, a new conversion. The strength of Ahmad’s ethnography is in giving center-stage to the considerable creativity and diligence mi- grant women show in piecing together their own conversions. This piecing together is perfectly captured by the book’s cover, which features Azra Ak- samija’s “Flocking Mosque”. The structure of a flower illustrates how believ- ers form a circular and geometric shape when gathered in devotion to God. Like Aksamija’s patterns, which build into a circular design, Ahmad’s chap- ters each represent a key piece of the story of migrant domestic workers’ conversion to Islam as a gradual process that blends nations, households, and individuals together to create a narrative about the women’s newfound faith. Scholars should read this book for its textured and detailed observa- tions about migrant women’s daily lives and for its treatment of religious conversion as a gradual process that unfolds in the everyday experiences of individuals. It would also be a great book for students as theory takes a back seat to the ethnography. The book is a refreshing, graceful approach to the subject of religious conversion and Islamic faith. Ahmad stays focused on telling her interlocutors’ stories while navigating often conflicting posi- tions. Rehenuma AsmiAssistant Professor of Education and International StudiesAllegheny College

There is a tendency in academic literature to compare and contrast reli- gions to try to understand the motivations of the convert. What are the costs and benefits of conversion? What is gained and what is lost? Thinking in these utilitarian terms can lead to a focus on causality and materiality, rather than the metaphysical and ephemeral aspects of religious thought and practice. Furthermore, religious conversion to Islam is often mired in the same prejudices and stereotypes of the orient found in western and predominantly Judeo-Christian depictions of the Middle East, the region that Islam is most often associated with. In Everyday Conversions: Islam, Domestic Work, and South Asian Migrant Women in Kuwait, Attiya Ahmad moves away from the emphasis on what distinguishes religious traditions and discursive communities to focus on what religious conversion means to the individual convert. Ahmad seeks to counter the notion that conver- sion must have some material benefit to the convert and instead looks at the quotidian character of religious transformation. Ahmad argues in her eth- nographic work that conversion can be understood through the minutiae of daily interactions, conversations, and affections that develop over time. She follows the lives of migrant domestic workers in the Gulf and their relationships with their employers as well as their own families over the course of their conversions and argues that it is neither the strength of the da'wa movement in Kuwait, nor the benefits gained by conversion to the employee/employer relationship that effectively describes the reason the women convert (although Ahmad is admittedly not looking for causality). Instead, Ahmad writes: “I have sought to tell a more modest and mundane set of stories that convey moments of slippage, tension and traces of feel- ings, thoughts and impressions of everyday conversion” (194). The strengths of Ahmad’s ethnography lie in its attention to detail and equanimity in representing the challenges of migration and domestic labor. Ahmad is careful not to create victims, nor inflate the value of the women’s migration and conversion to their economic or personal well-being. In this approach, there are hints of Lila Abu-Lughod’s and Saba Mahmood’s work with women who appear to be in marginal or precarious positions. Like these feminist ethnographers, Ahmad is attuned to the ethics and politics of representation, but with an eye towards transnational and cultural stud- ies. In its theoretical framing, the ethnography calls to mind the work of Michel DeCerteau in The Practice of Everyday Life, which rejects theories of production to focus on the consumer. Furthermore, by placing conversion in light of transnational migration, Ahmad also shows how the individu- al convert navigates her conversion through the complex nexus of Kuwait City as well as her own home town. Thus, the individual convert as artist of her own conversion is the primary subject of Ahmad’s book. My one cri- tique of the book would be in the area of theory, where Ahmad is hesitant to challenge others who have written on the subject of Islamic religious faith and practice, despite the theoretical weight evident in her ethnography. In the introduction, Ahmad begins with Talal Asad and Saba Mah- mood’s seminal arguments in the field of anthropology of Islam, which she argues “relativize and provincialize secular modern understandings of sub- jectivity, agency and embodied practice” (9). She distinguishes her work from Asad and Mahmood’s by utilizing a transnational feminist framework that highlights the process of “mutual constitution and self-constituting othering, as well as sociohistorical circumstances” (10). Ahmad wants to go beyond discursive narratives of secular liberalism and the Islamic piety movement. Specifically, Ahmad follows the approach of Eve Sedgewick, who eschews Judith Butler’s “strong theory” in exchange for an approach that looks at factors that “lie alongside” gender performativity (23). Ahmad does this by showing “how religious conversion also constitutes a complex site of interrelation through which religious traditions are configured and reconfigured together” (24). Instead of showing conflict or contrasting discursive traditions, Ahmad contends that the best way to understand the lives and stories of her interlocutors are in the quotidian affairs of the households they work and live in. She divides the chapters into the affec- tive experiences the women have as a result of their migration experiences, which in turn spur their conversions. Chapters one and two cover the political and geographic terrain that the women must cut across, which produces an overwhelming feeling of being neither here nor there, but temporarily suspended between states, households, and religions. Chapter one paints a somewhat grim picture of the politically precarious position of migrant women within the kefala sys- tem, labor laws, and bans on migrations often creating impossible condi- tions for migrant woman. Chapter two sets out to “discern, document and describe” (66) the migratory experience and why it produces uncertainty about one’s place in the world. It follows the women back and forth between Kuwait and their home countries, emphasizing the socio-historical context that requires a transnational feminist framework. The four women that Ah- mad follows throughout the book share their migratory journeys and their sense of “suspension” between two households. This chapter segues neatly into chapter three, where the women share how being a female migrant and domestic laborer requires knowledge of cross-cultural norms regarding gender, all of which require the women to be naram, “a gendered, learned capability of being malleable that indexes proper womanhood” (122). In their own eyes, a successful domestic worker from South Asia bends to the norms of the society they are in, and they attribute male and female migrant failure to being too sakht, or hard and unyielding. Here, I would have liked a stronger connection between how she describes naram and how Mahmood describes malaka. Does being naram lay the groundwork for women’s conversion to Islam, a religion which requires the ability to engage in rituals entailing patience, modesty, and steadfastness? Ahmed hints at this connection in the conclusion to the chapter—“Being naram resonates with the fluid, flexible student-centered pedagogies of Kuwait’s Islamic dawa movement, thus facilitating domestic worker’s deepening learning of Islamic precepts and practices” (123)—but she could have spent more time discussing the overlap in the concepts in either chapter three or five, where she discusses the da'wah movement. Chapters four and five deal directly with questions of religious thought and practice and illustrate how the women grapple with Islamic practices in the household as their relationships with their employers deepen. Chapter five is about the household and the everyday conversations or “house talk” that Ahmad argues are the touchstones for the women’s conversion. The daily relations in the household make blending and layering practices of Is- lam onto older traditions and rituals seem easy and natural. Ahmad argues that “the work undertaken by domestic workers—such as tending to family members during trips and caring for the elderly or the infirm—necessari- ly involves the disciplining and training of their comportment, affect and sense of self ” (129) and makes Islamic practices easier to absorb as well. Chapter 6 is a foray into the da'wah movement classroom. Like Mahmood’s Politics of Piety, Ahmad shows how the teachers and students use the space to create “intertwining stories” of patience in the face of hardship and the eventual rewards that come from this ethical re-fashioning, which mirror their own hardships as converts and help them deal with the dilemmas of being female migrant and domestic workers. The chapter ends with a sense of uncertainty, returning to the themes of temporality and suspension that began the book. Ahmad can’t say whether the conversions will remain fixed pieces or will bend and move with the women as their circumstances change. In the epilogue, Ahmad follows the “ongoing conversions” of her inter- locutors as some of them return home as Muslims and encounter new chal- lenges. As a book that focuses on the everyday, it is fitting to end on a new day and possibly, a new conversion. The strength of Ahmad’s ethnography is in giving center-stage to the considerable creativity and diligence mi- grant women show in piecing together their own conversions. This piecing together is perfectly captured by the book’s cover, which features Azra Ak- samija’s “Flocking Mosque”. The structure of a flower illustrates how believ- ers form a circular and geometric shape when gathered in devotion to God. Like Aksamija’s patterns, which build into a circular design, Ahmad’s chap- ters each represent a key piece of the story of migrant domestic workers’ conversion to Islam as a gradual process that blends nations, households, and individuals together to create a narrative about the women’s newfound faith. Scholars should read this book for its textured and detailed observa- tions about migrant women’s daily lives and for its treatment of religious conversion as a gradual process that unfolds in the everyday experiences of individuals. It would also be a great book for students as theory takes a back seat to the ethnography. The book is a refreshing, graceful approach to the subject of religious conversion and Islamic faith. Ahmad stays focused on telling her interlocutors’ stories while navigating often conflicting posi- tions. Rehenuma AsmiAssistant Professor of Education and International StudiesAllegheny College

This study explores individual and contextual explanations of why some people perceive themselves as being mobile and others do not. While subjective social position in recent decades has become an important topic of sociological enquiry, only a handful of studies explicitly investigate the nature of subjective perception of intergenerational mobility. When assessing their performance in comparison to their parents, individuals are likely to consider many other aspects of their lives than the attainment of socio-economic position. For empirical analysis, I operationalise an objective indicator of intergenerational mobility, often assumed to be the central explanation of perceptions of mobility, by means of intergenerational educational trajectories. In addition to exploring individual-level explanations, I use multilevel mixed-effects Poisson regression models to test how contextual environment is associated with perceived intergenerational mobility across 35 societies in Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. Results indicate that an objective measure of intergenerational mobility and other individual-level factors are important explanations of subjective intergenerational mobility. Further, the difference in economic development between individuals’ birth years and the year of interview is the most salient contextual factor explaining perceived intergenerational mobility, while contemporary economic development and short-term economic growth also reduce the likelihood of perceived downward mobility. The findings of this study contribute to sociological literature by highlighting the importance of contextual environment and factors beyond socio-economic characteristics for individuals’ perception of intergenerational mobility.

The article provides a comparative review of the history, current status and areas of scientific activity of the Sociological Association of Ukraine (SAU), its creative ties with the European and world sociological community, in particular, joint research with Polish scientists. It emphasizes that most of the Ukrainian sociologists SAU members work in universities, the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and public opinion research centers. Numerous sociological (theoretical and empirical) studies on various issues of vital activity of modern Ukrainian society are carried out by their efforts. It is noted that in addition to studying the issues of social transformation in its political, economic, legal, social and cultural aspects, that have become traditional for Ukrainian sociology, in recent years Ukrainian sociologists have turned to the analysis of such problems as external and internal migration (the problem of internally displaced persons); military conflict in the east of Ukraine and the volunteer movement; social inequality, including in its new manifestations, including those caused by the digitalization of public life. It is emphasized that today the most pressing issue of sociological reflection is the changes that occur in Ukraine after the last presidential election. Attention is focused on the fact that the victory of the political rookie in these elections was due to the huge social disappointments of the Ukrainians, since their expectations provoked by the Revolution of Dignity were not fulfilled. The first and most important disappointment, according to sociological studies, is the fact that peace has not reigned in the country. Second, the living standards of Ukrainian citizens have not improved. Third, the fight against corruption did not bring significant results. Fourth, social inequality deepened: the rich became richer, and the poor became poorer. The fifth disappointment is the inefficiency of the declared reforms: judicial, medical, educational, customs, electoral, etc. It is emphasized that the effectiveness of the new government depends, among other things, on its consideration of such features of the mass consciousness of the Ukrainian population as a critical level of distrust of all institutions of power; value and ideological ambivalence and uncertainty. The conclusions are formulated about the unlikeliness of return of Ukraine to the orbit of Russian political and economic influence, as well as the victory of radical nationalist ideology in our country.

IntroductionFor over five years, Romanians have been using their bodies in public spaces to challenge politicians’ disregard for the average citizen. In a region low in standards of civic engagement, such as voter turnout and petition signing, Romanian people’s “citizenship of the streets” has stopped environmentally destructive mining in 2013, ousted a corrupt cabinet in 2015, and blocked legislation legalising abuse of public office in 2017 (Solnit 214). This article explores the democratic affordances of collective resistive walking, by focusing on Romania’s capital, Bucharest. I illustrate how walking in protest of political corruption cultivates a democratic public and reconfigures city spaces as spaces of democratic engagement, in the context of increased illiberalism in the region. I examine two sites of protest: the Parliament Palace and Victoriei Square. The former is a construction emblematic of communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu and symbol of an authoritarian regime, whose surrounding area protestors reclaim as a civic space. The latter—a central part of the city bustling with the life of cafes, museums, bike lanes, and nearby parks—hosts the Government and has become an iconic site for pro-democratic movements. Spaces of Democracy: The Performativity of Public Assemblies Democracies are active achievements, dependent not only on the solidity of institutions —e.g., a free press and a constitution—but on people’s ability and desire to communicate about issues of concern and to occupy public space. Communicative approaches to democratic theory, formulated as inquiries into the public sphere and the plurality and evolution of publics, often return to establish the significance of public spaces and of bodies in the maintenance of our “rhetorical democracies” (Hauser). Speech and assembly, voice and space are sides of the same coin. In John Dewey’s work, communication is the main “loyalty” of democracy: the heart and final guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings of neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in the uncensored news of the day, and in gatherings of friends in the living rooms of houses and apartments to converse freely with one another. (Dewey qtd. in Asen 197, emphasis added) Dewey asserts the centrality of communication in the same breath that he affirms the spatial infrastructure supporting it.Historically, Richard Sennett explains, Athenian democracy has been organised around two “spaces of democracy” where people assembled: the agora or town square and the theatre or Pnyx. While the theatre has endured as the symbol of democratic communication, with its ideal of concentrated attention on the argument of one speaker, Sennett illuminates the square as an equally important space, one without which deliberation in the Pnyx would be impossible. In the agora, citizens cultivate an ability to see, expect, and think through difference. In its open architecture and inclusiveness, Sennett explains, the agora affords the walker and dweller a public space to experience, in a quick, fragmentary, and embodied way, the differences and divergences in fellow citizens. Through visual scrutiny and embodied exposure, the square thus cultivates “an outlook favorable to discussion of differing views and conflicting interests”, useful for deliberation in the Pnyx, and the capacity to recognise strangers as part of the imagined democratic community (19). Also stressing the importance of spaces for assembly, Jürgen Habermas’s historical theorisation of the bourgeois public sphere moves the functions of the agora to the modern “third places” (Oldenburg) of the civic society emerging in late seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe: coffee houses, salons, and clubs. While Habermas’ conceptualization of a unified bourgeois public has been criticised for its class and gender exclusivism, and for its normative model of deliberation and consensus, such criticism has also opened paths of inquiry into the rhetorical pluralism of publics and into the democratic affordances of embodied performativity. Thus, unlike Habermas’s assumption of a single bourgeois public, work on twentieth and twenty-first century publics has attended to their wide variety in post-modern societies (e.g., Bruce; Butler; Delicath and DeLuca; Fraser; Harold and DeLuca; Hauser; Lewis; Mckinnon et al.; Pezzullo; Rai; Tabako). In contrast to the Habermasian close attention to verbal argumentation, such criticism prioritizes the embodied (performative, aesthetic, and material) ways in which publics manifest their attention to common issues. From suffragists to environmentalists and, most recently, anti-precarity movements across the globe, publics assemble and move through shared space, seeking to break hegemonies of media representation by creating media events of their own. In the process, Judith Butler explains, such embodied assemblies accomplish much more. They disrupt prevalent logics and dominant feelings of disposability, precarity, and anxiety, at the same time that they (re)constitute subjects and increasingly privatised spaces into citizens and public places of democracy, respectively. Butler proposes that to best understand recent protests we need to read collective assembly in the current political moment of “accelerating precarity” and responsibilisation (10). Globally, increasingly larger populations are exposed to economic insecurity and precarity through government withdrawal from labor protections and the diminishment of social services, to the profit of increasingly monopolistic business. A logic of self-investment and personal responsibility accompanies such structural changes, as people understand themselves as individual market actors in competition with other market actors rather than as citizens and community members (Brown). In this context, public assembly would enact an alternative, insisting on interdependency. Bodies, in such assemblies, signify both symbolically (their will to speak against power) and indexically. As Butler describes, “it is this body, and these bodies, that require employment, shelter, health care, and food, as well as a sense of a future that is not the future of unpayable debt” (10). Butler describes the function of these protests more fully:[P]lural enactments […] make manifest the understanding that a situation is shared, contesting the individualizing morality that makes a moral norm of economic self-sufficiency precisely […] when self-sufficiency is becoming increasingly unrealizable. Showing up, standing, breathing, moving, standing still, speech, and silence are all aspects of a sudden assembly, an unforeseen form of political performativity that puts livable life at the forefront of politics […] [T]he bodies assembled ‘say’ we are not disposable, even if they stand silently. (18)Though Romania is not included in her account of contemporary protest movements, Butler’s theoretical account aptly describes both the structural and ideological conditions, and the performativity of Romanian protestors. In Romania, citizens have started to assemble in the streets against austerity measures (2012), environmental destruction (2013), fatal infrastructures (2015) and against the government’s corruption and attempts to undermine the Judiciary (from February 2017 onward). While, as scholars have argued (Olteanu and Beyerle; Gubernat and Rammelt), political corruption has gradually crystallised into the dominant and enduring framework for the assembled publics, post-communist corruption has been part and parcel of the neoliberalisation of Central and Eastern-European societies after the fall of communism. In the region, Leslie Holmes explains, former communist elites or the nomenklatura, have remained the majority political class after 1989. With political power and under the shelter of political immunity, nomenklatura politicians “were able to take ethically questionable advantage in various ways […] of the sell-off of previously state-owned enterprises” (Holmes 12). The process through which the established political class became owners of a previously state-owned economy is known as “nomenklatura privatization”, a common form of political corruption in the region, Holmes explains (12). Such practices were common knowledge among a cynical population through most of the 1990s and the 2000s. They were not broadly challenged in an ideological milieu attached, as Mihaela Miroiu, Isabela Preoteasa, and Jerzy Szacki argued, to extreme forms of liberalism and neoliberalism, ideologies perceived by people just coming out of communism as anti-ideology. Almost three decades since the fall of communism, in the face of unyielding levels of poverty (Zaharia; Marin), the decaying state of healthcare and education (Bilefsky; “Education”), and migration rates second only to war-torn Syria (Deletant), Romanian protestors have come to attribute the diminution of life in post-communism to the political corruption of the established political class (“Romania Corruption Report”; “Corruption Perceptions”). Following systematic attempts by the nomenklatura-heavy governing coalition to undermine the judiciary and institutionalise de facto corruption of public officials (Deletant), protestors have been returning to public spaces on a weekly basis, de-normalising the political cynicism and isolation serving the established political class. Mothers Walking: Resignifying Communist Spaces, Imagining the New DemosOn 11 July 2018, a protest of mothers was streamed live by Corruption Kills (Corupția ucide), a Facebook group started by activist Florin Bădiță after a deadly nightclub fire attributed to the corruption of public servants, in 2015 (Commander). Organized protests at the time pressured the Social-Democratic cabinet into resignation. Corruption Kills has remained a key activist platform, organising assemblies, streaming live from demonstrations, and sharing personal acts of dissent, thus extending the life of embodied assemblies. In the mothers’ protest video, women carrying babies in body-wraps and strollers walk across the intersection leading to the Parliament Palace, while police direct traffic and ensure their safety (“Civil Disobedience”). This was an unusual scene for many reasons. Walkers met at the entrance to the Parliament Palace, an area most emblematic of the former regime. Built by Communist dictator, Nicolae Ceaușescu and inspired by Kim Il-sung’s North Korean architecture, the current Parliament building and its surrounding plaza remain, in the words of Renata Salecl, “one of the most traumatic remnants of the communist regime” (90). The construction is the second largest administrative building in the world, after the Pentagon, a size matching the ambitions of the dictator. It bears witness to the personal and cultural sacrifices the construction and its surrounded plaza required: the displacement of some 40,000 people from old neighbourhood Uranus, the death of reportedly thousands of workers, and the flattening of churches, monasteries, hospitals, schools (Parliament Palace). This arbitrary construction carved out of the old city remains a symbol of an authoritarian relation with the nation. As Salecl puts it, Ceaușescu’s project tried to realise the utopia of a new communist “centre” and created an artificial space as removed from the rest of the city as the leader himself was from the needs of his people. Twenty-nine years after the fall of communism, the plaza of the Parliament Palace remains as suspended from the life of the city as it was during the 1980s. The trees lining the boulevard have grown slightly and bike lanes are painted over decaying stones. Still, only few people walk by the neo-classical apartment buildings now discoloured and stained by weather and time. Salecl remarks on the panoptic experience of the Parliament Palace: “observed from the avenue, [the palace] appears to have no entrance; there are only numerous windows, which give the impression of an omnipresent gaze” (95). The building embodies, for Salecl, the logic of surveillance of the communist regime, which “created the impression of omnipresence” through a secret police that rallied members among regular citizens and inspired fear by striking randomly (95).Against this geography steeped in collective memories of fear and exposure to the gaze of the state, women turn their children’s bodies and their own into performances of resistance that draw on the rhetorical force of communist gender politics. Both motherhood and childhood were heavily regulated roles under Ceaușescu’s nationalist-socialist politics of forced birth, despite the official idealisation of both. Producing children for the nationalist-communist state was women’s mandated expression of citizenship. Declaring the foetus “the socialist property of the whole society”, in 1966 Ceaușescu criminalised abortion for women of reproductive ages who had fewer than four children, and, starting 1985, less than five children (Ceaușescu qtd. in Verdery). What followed was “a national tragedy”: illegal abortions became the leading cause of death for fertile women, children were abandoned into inhumane conditions in the infamous orphanages, and mothers experienced the everyday drama of caring for families in an economy of shortages (Kligman 364). The communist politicisation of natality during communist Romania exemplifies one of the worst manifestations of the political as biopolitical. The current maternal bodies and children’s bodies circulating in the communist-iconic plaza articulate past and present for Romanians, redeploying a traumatic collective memory to challenge increasingly authoritarian ambitions of the governing Social Democratic Party. The images of caring mothers walking in protest with their babies furthers the claims that anti-corruption publics have made in other venues: that the government, in their indifference and corruption, is driving millions of people, usually young, out of the country, in a braindrain of unprecedented proportions (Ursu; Deletant; #vavedemdinSibiu). In their determination to walk during the gruelling temperatures of mid-July, in their youth and their babies’ youth, the mothers’ walk performs the contrast between their generation of engaged, persistent, and caring citizens and the docile abused subject of a past indexed by the Ceaușescu-era architecture. In addition to performing a new caring imagined community (Anderson), women’s silent, resolute walk on the crosswalk turns a lifeless geography, heavy with the architectural traces of authoritarian history, into a public space that holds democratic protest. By inhabiting the cultural role of mothers, protestors disarmed state authorities: instead of the militarised gendarmerie usually policing protestors the Victoriei Square, only traffic police were called for the mothers’ protest. The police choreographed cars and people, as protestors walked across the intersection leading to the Parliament. Drivers, usually aggressive and insouciant, now moved in concert with the protestors. The mothers’ walk, immediately modeled by people in other cities (Cluj-Napoca), reconfigured a car-dominated geography and an unreliable, driver-friendly police, into a civic space that is struggling to facilitate the citizens’ peaceful disobedience. The walkers’ assembly thus begins to constitute the civic character of the plaza, collecting “the space itself […] the pavement and […] the architecture [to produce] the public character of that material environment” (Butler 71). It demonstrates the possibility of a new imagined community of caring and persistent citizens, one significantly different from the cynical, disconnected, and survivalist subjects that the nomenklatura politicians, nested in the Panoptic Parliament nearby, would prefer.Persisting in the Victoriei Square In addition to strenuous physical walking to reclaim city spaces, such as the mothers’ walking, the anti-corruption public also practices walking and gathering in less taxing environments. The Victoriei Square is such a place, a central plaza that connects major boulevards with large sidewalks, functional bike lanes, and old trees. The square is the architectural meeting point of old and new, where communist apartments meet late nineteenth and early twentieth century architecture, in a privileged neighbourhood of villas, museums, and foreign consulates. One of these 1930s constructions is the Government building, hosting the Prime Minister’s cabinet. Demonstrators gathered here during the major protests of 2015 and 2017, and have walked, stood, and wandered in the square almost weekly since (“Past Events”). On 24 June 2018, I arrive in the Victoriei Square to participate in the protest announced on social media by Corruption Kills. There is room to move, to pause, and rest. In some pockets, people assemble to pay attention to impromptu speakers who come onto a small platform to share their ideas. Occasionally someone starts chanting “We See You!” and “Down with Corruption!” and almost everyone joins the chant. A few young people circulate petitions. But there is little exultation in the group as a whole, shared mostly among those taking up the stage or waving flags. Throughout the square, groups of familiars stop to chat. Couples and families walk their bikes, strolling slowly through the crowds, seemingly heading to or coming from the nearby park on a summer evening. Small kids play together, drawing with chalk on the pavement, or greeting dogs while parents greet each other. Older children race one another, picking up on the sense of freedom and de-centred but still purposeful engagement. The openness of the space allows one to meander and observe all these groups, performing the function of the Ancient agora: making visible the strangers who are part of the polis. The overwhelming feeling is one of solidarity. This comes partly from the possibilities of collective agency and the feeling of comfortably taking up space and having your embodiment respected, otherwise hard to come by in other spaces of the city. Everyday walking in the streets of Romanian cities is usually an exercise in hypervigilant physical prowess and self-preserving numbness. You keep your eyes on the ground to not stumble on broken pavement. You watch ahead for unmarked construction work. You live with other people’s sweat on the hot buses. You hop among cars parked on sidewalks and listen keenly for when others may zoom by. In one of the last post-socialist states to join the European Union, living with generalised poverty means walking in cities where your senses must be dulled to manage the heat, the dust, the smells, and the waiting, irresponsive to beauty and to amiable sociality. The euphemistic vocabulary of neoliberalism may describe everyday walking through individualistic terms such as “grit” or “resilience.” And while people are called to effort, creativity, and endurance not needed in more functional states, what one experiences is the gradual diminution of one’s lives under a political regime where illiberalism keeps a citizen-serving democracy at bay. By contrast, the Victoriei Square holds bodies whose comfort in each other’s presence allow us to imagine a political community where survivalism, or what Lauren Berlant calls “lateral agency”, are no longer the norm. In “showing up, standing, breathing, moving, standing still […] an unforeseen form of political performativity that puts livable life at the forefront of politics” is enacted (Butler 18). In arriving to Victoriei Square repeatedly, Romanians demonstrate that there is room to breathe more easily, to engage with civility, and to trust the strangers in their country. They assert that they are not disposable, even if a neoliberal corrupt post-communist regime would have them otherwise.ConclusionBecoming a public, as Michael Warner proposes, is an ongoing process of attention to an issue, through the circulation of discourse and self-organisation with strangers. For the anti-corruption public of Romania’s past years, such ongoing work is accompanied by persistent, civil, embodied collective assembly, in an articulation of claims, bodies, and spaces that promotes a material agency that reconfigures the city and the imagined Romanian community into a more democratic one. The Romanian citizenship of the streets is particularly significant in the current geopolitical and ideological moment. In the region, increasing authoritarianism meets the alienating logics of neoliberalism, both trying to reduce citizens to disposable, self-reliant, and disconnected market actors. Populist autocrats—Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, the Peace and Justice Party in Poland, and recently E.U.-penalized Victor Orban, in Hungary—are dismantling the system of checks and balances, and posing threats to a European Union already challenged by refugee debates and Donald Trump’s unreliable alliance against authoritarianism. In such a moment, the Romanian anti-corruption public performs within the geographies of their city solidarity and commitment to democracy, demonstrating an alternative to the submissive and disconnected subjects preferred by authoritarianism and neoliberalism.Author's NoteIn addition to the anonymous reviewers, the author would like to thank Mary Tuominen and Jesse Schlotterbeck for their helpful comments on this essay.ReferencesAnderson, Benedict R. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 2016.Asen, Robert. “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90.2 (2004): 189-211. 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Introduction“From every kind of man obedience I expect; I’m the Emperor of Japan.” (“Miyasama,” from Gilbert and Sullivan’s musical The Mikado, 1885)This commentary is facilitated by—surprisingly resilient—oriental stereotypes of an imagined Japan (think of Oscar Wilde’s assertion, in 1889, that Japan was a European invention). During the Victorian era, in Britain, there was a craze for all things oriental, particularly ceramics and “there was a craze for all things Japanese and no middle class drawing room was without its Japanese fan or teapot.“ (V&A Victorian). These pastoral depictions of the ‘oriental life’ included the figures of men and women in oriental garb, with fans, stilt shoes, kimono-like robes, and appropriate headdresses, engaging in garden-based activities, especially tea ceremony variations (Landow). In fact, tea itself, and the idea of a ceremony of serving it, had taken up a central role, even an obsession in middle- and upper-class Victorian life. Similarly, landscapes with wild seas, rugged rocks and stunted pines, wizened monks, pagodas and temples, and particular fauna and flora (cranes and other birds flying through clouds of peonies, cherry blossoms and chrysanthemums) were very popular motifs (see Martin and Koda). Rather than authenticity, these designs heightened the Western-based romantic stereotypes associated with a stylised form of Japanese life, conducted sedately under rule of the Japanese Imperial Court. In reality, prior to the Meiji period (1868–1912), the Emperor was largely removed from everyday concerns, residing as an isolated, holy figure in Kyoto, the traditional capital of Japan. Japan was instead ruled from Edo (modern day Tokyo) led by the Shogun and his generals, according to a strict Confucian influenced code (see Keene). In Japan, as elsewhere, the presence of feudal-style governance includes policies that determine much of everyday life, including restrictions on clothing (Rall 169). The Samurai code was no different, and included a series of protocols that restricted rank, movement, behaviour, and clothing. As Vincent has noted in the case of the ‘lace tax’ in Great Britain, these restrictions were designed to punish those who seek to penetrate the upper classes through their costume (28-30). In Japan, pre-Meiji sumptuary laws, for example, restricted the use of gold, and prohibited the use of a certain shade of red by merchant classes (V&A Kimono).Therefore, in the governance of pre-globalised societies, the importance of clothing and textile is evident; as Jones and Stallybrass comment: We need to understand the antimatedness of clothes, their ability to “pick up” subjects, to mould and shape them both physically and socially—to constitute subjects through their power as material memories […] Clothing is a worn world: a world of social relations put upon the wearer’s body. (2-3, emphasis added)The significant re-imagining of Japanese cultural and national identities are explored here through the cataclysmic impact of Western ideologies on Japanese cultural traditions. There are many ways to examine how indigenous cultures respond to European, British, or American (hereafter Western) influences, particularly in times of conflict (Wilk). Western ideology arrived in Japan after a long period of isolation (during which time Japan’s only contact was with Dutch traders) through the threat of military hostility and war. It is after this outside threat was realised that Japan’s adoption of military and industrial practices begins. The re-imagining of their national identity took many forms, and the inclusion of a Western-style military costuming as a schoolboy uniform became a highly visible indicator of Japan’s mission to protect its sovereign integrity. A brief history of Japan’s rise from a collection of isolated feudal states to a unified military power, in not only the Asian Pacific region but globally, demonstrates the speed at which they adopted the Western mode of warfare. Gunboats on Japan’s ShorelinesJapan was forcefully opened to the West in the 1850s by America under threat of First Name Perry’s ‘gunboat diplomacy’ (Hillsborough 7-8). Following this, Japan underwent a rapid period of modernisation, and an upsurge in nationalism and military expansion that was driven by a desire to catch up to the European powers present in the Pacific. Noted by Ian Ferguson in Civilization: The West and the Rest, Unsure, the Japanese decided […] to copy everything […] Japanese institutions were refashioned on Western models. The army drilled like Germans; the navy sailed like Britons. An American-style system of state elementary and middle schools was also introduced. (221, emphasis added)This was nothing short of a wide-scale reorganisation of Japan’s entire social structure and governance. Under the Emperor Meiji, who wrested power from the Shogunate and reclaimed it for the Imperial head, Japan steamed into an industrial revolution, achieving in a matter of years what had taken Europe over a century.Japan quickly became a major player-elect on the world stage. However, as an island nation, Japan lacked the essentials of both coal and iron with which to fashion not only industrial machinery but also military equipment, the machinery of war. In 1875 Japan forced Korea to open itself to foreign (read: Japanese) trade. In the same treaty, Korea was recognised as a sovereign nation, separate from Qing China (Tucker 1461). The necessity for raw materials then led to the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), a conflict between Japan and China that marked the emergence of Japan as a major world power. The Korean Peninsula had long been China’s most important client state, but its strategic location adjacent to the Japanese archipelago, and its natural resources of coal and iron, attracted Japan’s interest. Later, the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), allowed a victorious Japan to force Russia to abandon its expansionist policy in the Far East, becoming the first Asian power in modern times to defeat a European power. The Russo-Japanese War developed out of the rivalry between Russia and Japan for dominance in Korea and Manchuria, again in the struggle for natural resources (Tucker 1534-46).Japan’s victories, together with the county’s drive for resources, meant that Japan could now determine its role within the Asia-Pacific sphere of influence. As Japan’s military, and their adoption of Westernised combat, proved effective in maintaining national integrity, other social institutions also looked to the West (Ferguson 221). In an ironic twist—while Victorian and Continental fashion was busy adopting the exotic, oriental look (Martin and Koda)—the kimono, along with other essentials of Japanese fashions, were rapidly altered (both literally and figuratively) to suit new, warlike ideology. It should be noted that kimono literally means ‘things that you wear’ and which, prior to exposure to Western fashions, signified all worn clothing (Dalby 65-119). “Wearing Things” in Westernised JapanAs Japan modernised during the late 1800s the kimono was positioned as symbolising barbaric, pre-modern, ‘oriental’ Japan. Indeed, on 17 January 1887 the Meiji Empress issued a memorandum on the subject of women’s clothing in Japan: “She [the Empress] believed that western clothes were in fact closer to the dress of women in ancient Japan than the kimonos currently worn and urged that they be adopted as the standard clothes of the reign” (Keene 404). The resemblance between Western skirts and blouses and the simple skirt and separate top that had been worn in ancient times by a people descended from the sun goddess, Amaterasu wo mikami, was used to give authority and cultural authenticity to Japan’s modernisation projects. The Imperial Court, with its newly ennobled European style aristocrats, exchanged kimono silks for Victorian finery, and samurai armour for military pomp and splendour (Figure 1).Figure 1: The Meiji Emperor, Empress and Crown Prince resplendent in European fashions on an outing to Asukayama Park. Illustration: Toyohara Chikanobu, circa 1890.It is argued here that the function of a uniform is to prepare the body for service. Maids and butlers, nurses and courtesans, doctors, policemen, and soldiers are all distinguished by their garb. Prudence Black states: “as a technology, uniforms shape and code the body so they become a unit that belongs to a collective whole” (93). The requirement to discipline bodies through clothing, particularly through uniforms, is well documented (see Craik, Peoples, and Foucault). The need to distinguish enemies from allies on the battlefield requires adherence to a set of defined protocols, as referenced in military fashion compendiums (see Molloy). While the postcolonial adoption of Western-based clothing reflects a new form of subservience (Rall, Kuechler and Miller), in Japan, the indigenous garments were clearly designed in the interests of ideological allegiance. To understand the Japanese sartorial traditions, the kimono itself must be read as providing a strong disciplinary element. The traditional garment is designed to represent an upright and unbending column—where two meters of under bindings are used to discipline the body into shape are then topped with a further four meters of a stiffened silk obi wrapped around the waist and lower chest. To dress formally in such a garment requires helpers (see Dalby). The kimono both constructs and confines the women who wear it, and presses them into their roles as dutiful, upper-class daughters (see Craik). From the 1890s through to the 1930s, when Japan again enters a period of militarism, the myth of the kimono again changes as it is integrated into the build-up towards World War II.Decades later, when Japan re-established itself as a global economic power in the 1970s and 1980s, the kimono was re-authenticated as Japan’s ‘traditional’ garment. This time it was not the myth of a people descended from solar deities that was on display, but that of samurai strength and propriety for men, alongside an exaggerated femininity for women, invoking a powerful vision of Japanese sartorial tradition. This reworking of the kimono was only possible as the garment was already contained within the framework of Confucian family duty. However, in the lead up to World War II, Japanese military advancement demanded of its people soldiers that could win European-style wars. The quickest solution was to copy the military acumen and strategies of global warfare, and the costumes of the soldiery and seamen of Europe, including Great Britain (Ferguson). It was also acknowledged that soldiers were ‘made not born’ so the Japanese educational system was re-vamped to emulate those of its military rivals (McVeigh). It was in the uptake of schoolboy uniforms that this re-imagining of Japanese imperial strength took place.The Japanese Schoolboy UniformCentral to their rapid modernisation, Japan adopted a constitutional system of education that borrowed from American and French models (Tipton 68-69). The government viewed education as a “primary means of developing a sense of nation,” and at its core, was the imperial authorities’ obsession with defining “Japan and Japaneseness” (Tipton 68-69). Numerous reforms eventually saw, after an abolition of fees, nearly 100% attendance by both boys and girls, despite a lingering mind-set that educating women was “a waste of time” (Tipton 68-69). A boys’ uniform based on the French and Prussian military uniforms of the 1860s and 1870s respectively (Kinsella 217), was adopted in 1879 (McVeigh 47). This jacket, initially with Prussian cape and cap, consists of a square body, standing mandarin style collar and a buttoned front. It was through these education reforms, as visually symbolised by the adoption of military style school uniforms, that citizen making, education, and military training became interrelated aspects of Meiji modernisation (Kinsella 217). Known as the gakuran (gaku: to study; ran: meaning both orchid, and a pun on Horanda, meaning Holland, the only Western country with trading relations in pre-Meiji Japan), these jackets were a symbol of education, indicating European knowledge, power and influence and came to reflect all things European in Meiji Japan. By adopting these jackets two objectives were realised:through the magical power of imitation, Japan would, by adopting the clothing of the West, naturally rise in military power; and boys were uniformed to become not only educated as quasi-Europeans, but as fighting soldiers and sons (suns) of the nation.The gakuran jacket was first popularised by state-run schools, however, in the century and a half that the garment has been in use it has come to symbolise young Japanese masculinity as showcased in campus films, anime, manga, computer games, and as fashion is the preeminent garment for boybands and Japanese hipsters.While the gakuran is central to the rise of global militarism in Japan (McVeigh 51-53), the jacket would go on to form the basis of the Sun Yat Sen and Mao Suits as symbols of revolutionary China (see McVeigh). Supposedly, Sun Yat Sen saw the schoolboy jacket in Japan as a utilitarian garment and adopted it with a turn down collar (Cumming et al.). For Sun Yat Sen, the gakuran was the perfect mix of civilian (school boy) and military (the garment’s Prussian heritage) allowing him to walk a middle path between the demands of both. Furthermore, the garment allowed Sun to navigate between Western style suits and old-fashioned Qing dynasty styles (Gerth 116); one was associated with the imperialism of the National Products Movement, while the other represented the corruption of the old dynasty. In this way, the gakuran was further politicised from a national (Japanese) symbol to a global one. While military uniforms have always been political garments, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, as the world was rocked by revolutions and war, civilian clothing also became a means of expressing political ideals (McVeigh 48-49). Note that Mahatma Ghandi’s clothing choices also evolved from wholly Western styles to traditional and emphasised domestic products (Gerth 116).Mao adopted this style circa 1927, further defining the style when he came to power by adding elements from the trousers, tunics, and black cotton shoes worn by peasants. The suit was further codified during the 1960s, reaching its height in the Cultural Revolution. While the gakuran has always been a scholarly black (see Figure 2), subtle differences in the colour palette differentiated the Chinese population—peasants and workers donned indigo blue Mao jackets, while the People’s Liberation Army Soldiers donned khaki green. This limited colour scheme somewhat paradoxically ensured that subtle hierarchical differences were maintained even whilst advocating egalitarian ideals (Davis 522). Both the Sun Yat Sen suit and the Mao jacket represented the rejection of bourgeois (Western) norms that objectified the female form in favour of a uniform society. Neo-Maoism and Mao fever of the early 1990s saw the Mao suit emerge again as a desirable piece of iconic/ironic youth fashion. Figure 2: An example of Gakuran uniform next to the girl’s equivalent on display at Ichikawa Gakuen School (Japan). Photo: Emerald King, 2015.There is a clear and vital link between the influence of the Prussian style Japanese schoolboy uniform on the later creation of the Mao jacket—that of the uniform as an integral piece of worn propaganda (Atkins).For Japan, the rapid deployment of new military and industrial technologies, as well as a sartorial need to present her leaders as modern (read: Western) demanded the adoption of European-style uniforms. The Imperial family had always been removed from Samurai battlefields, so the adoption of Western military costume allowed Japan’s rulers to present a uniform face to other global powers. When Japan found itself in conflict in the Asia Pacific Region, without an organised military, the first requirement was to completely reorganise their system of warfare from a feudal base and to train up national servicemen. Within an American-style compulsory education system, the European-based curriculum included training in mathematics, engineering and military history, as young Britons had for generations begun their education in Greek and Latin, with the study of Ancient Greek and Roman wars (Bantock). It is only in the classroom that ideological change on a mass scale can take place (Reference Please), a lesson not missed by later leaders such as Mao Zedong.ConclusionIn the 1880s, the Japanese leaders established their position in global politics by adopting clothing and practices from the West (Europeans, Britons, and Americans) in order to quickly re-shape their country’s educational system and military establishment. The prevailing military costume from foreign cultures not only disciplined their adopted European bodies, they enforced a new regime through dress (Rall 157-174). For boys, the gakuran symbolised the unity of education and militarism as central to Japanese masculinity. Wearing a uniform, as many authors suggest, furthers compliance (Craik, Nagasawa Kaiser and Hutton, and McVeigh). As conscription became a part of Japanese reality in World War II, the schoolboys just swapped their military-inspired school uniforms for genuine military garments.Re-imagining a Japanese schoolboy uniform from a European military costume might suit ideological purposes (Atkins), but there is more. The gakuran, as a uniform based on a close, but not fitted jacket, was the product of a process of advanced industrialisation in the garment-making industry also taking place in the 1800s:Between 1810 and 1830, technical calibrations invented by tailors working at the very highest level of the craft [in Britain] eventually made it possible for hundreds of suits to be cut up and made in advance [...] and the ready-to-wear idea was put into practice for men’s clothes […] originally for uniforms for the War of 1812. (Hollander 31) In this way, industrialisation became a means to mass production, which furthered militarisation, “the uniform is thus the clothing of the modern disciplinary society” (Black 102). There is a perfect resonance between Japan’s appetite for a modern military and their rise to an industrialised society, and their conquests in Asia Pacific supplied the necessary material resources that made such a rapid deployment possible. The Japanese schoolboy uniform was an integral part of the process of both industrialisation and militarisation, which instilled in the wearer a social role required by modern Japanese society in its rise for global power. Garments are never just clothing, but offer a “world of social relations put upon the wearer’s body” (Jones and Stallybrass 3-4).Today, both the Japanese kimono and the Japanese schoolboy uniform continue to interact with, and interrogate, global fashions as contemporary designers continue to call on the tropes of ‘military chic’ (Tonchi) and Japanese-inspired clothing (Kawamura). References Atkins, Jaqueline. Wearing Propaganda: Textiles on the Home Front in Japan, Britain, and the United States. Princeton: Yale UP, 2005.Bantock, Geoffrey Herman. Culture, Industrialisation and Education. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1968.Black, Prudence. “The Discipline of Appearance: Military Style and Australian Flight Hostess Uniforms 1930–1964.” Fashion & War in Popular Culture. Ed. Denise N. Rall. Bristol: Intellect/U Chicago P, 2014. 91-106.Craik, Jenifer. Uniforms Exposed: From Conformity to Transgression. 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