Tesi sul tema "Overtime law and legislation"

Culpable homicide is the unlawful negligent killing of a fellow human being. As such it is in many respects a 'residual' crime being the verdict prosecutors may expect when they are unable to prove the intention to kill when prosecuting for murder. A feature of this was that in the past when defences such as, for instance, intoxication or provocation were raised at murder trials, convictions of culpable homicide were almost automatic. In recent years, under the influence of the 'purist' current in our Criminal law, intoxication has become a defence to culpable homicide and provocation resulting in loss of self-control has also become a defence to culpable homicide. These developments are unacceptable to some writers on criminal law and a move away from the purist approach to the 'traditional' or pragmatic approach is to be expected. Greater emphasis will be placed on practical results than on the achievement of logical consistency. This could result in the law of culpable homicide becoming more socially effective than it is at present.

The purpose of this thesis is to propose the fundamental regulatory policy basis for a future domestic legislation governing private space activities in those States where their industry has or aspires to have a preponderant role in the pursuit of space activities and which have not yet crafted their national space regulatory framework. This study is based on the premises that the international legal framework governing space activities provides the fundamental basis for national space legislations and that the legislative experience of the countries which have adopted a domestic space legal scenario presents a useful model for delineating the principal basis of national legislation for those countries without specific national regulatory framework. The proposal is analyzed in light of Law Reform and participatory theory, conceived as a multifold dynamic process, requiring a national effort based on high level of State and private sector participation.

As a result of maritime piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, especially in the West Africa sub-region, off the coast of Nigeria the researcher started carrying out research in 2014 on the laws pertaining to piracy. In this regard Nigeria does not have the legal framework to effectively address the threat of piracy off its coast but a Bill entitled: “Piracy and Other Unlawful Acts at Sea (and Other Related Offences) Act” has been forwarded to the Nigerian National Assembly in order to criminalise ‘piracy and other unlawful acts at sea’. For this reason, the researcher deems it necessary to examine the provisions of the Bill to determine whether it is adequate to address the threat of piracy or whether there is a need to reform or improve it. As a result of the research, it was revealed that the Bill will never achieve the purpose for which it was drafted as the legal framework on piracy of the Bill has many limitations which makes it easier for perpetrators to escape punishment. In order to achieve the goal of this Bill, the researcher deemed it necessary to contribute by drafting maritime piracy legislation for Nigeria that effectively addresses the threat of piracy off its coast, relying on the preparatory work for UNCLOS and other global, continental and regional instruments relevant to maritime piracy. Relied upon also are comparative analyses of piracy legal system of Anglophone African States and Nigerian legislation. This draft legislation amends the limitations of the Bill and is in accordance with legal notions of piracy which emerge from the combination of the principles of criminal and international law.

According to § 2 of the swedish Competition Law it does not apply to agreements between employers and employees regarding salary and other working conditions. In the EC-treaty there is no such exception, but the European Court of Justice has established one. The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there are any differences between the two exceptions and, if so, how those differences effects the possibility to challenge swedish collective agreements from a competition law standpoint.

This research thesis is a policy assessment of the factors that contribute to the current status in treating autism. The policy assessment begins with a description of the key components that that influence policy outcomes in regard to autism. After developing a policy model that outlines various components of issues and approaches to the policy has on Autism, the paper examines several issues with regard to Autism policy, including the lack of insurance coverage, state legislation, waiting lists, evidence vs. non evidence treatments, and the high price for treatments. The paper also examines current approaches to Autism, and potential solutions. Solution analysis on current policy alternatives is provided and, this suggests that increasing knowledge and awareness of the affects of autism on society needs further attention along with proper funding for early treatment.

This thesis considers interpretive provisions in human rights legislation in the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand and two Australian jurisdictions: the Australian Capital Territory and the State of Victoria. It deals with the relationship between certain common law interpretive principles which protect human rights and the rules under the interpretive provisions. It also considers what effect the interpretive provisions have on the overall approach to statutory interpretation, particularly in terms of their impact on the roles of intention and purpose. One of the themes of the thesis is that it is possible to identify a common methodology for the application of the various interpretive provisions. This is facilitated by an emphasis on the concept of purpose, which is flexible and capable of being identified and applied at higher levels of abstraction than the concept of intention as commonly applied by the courts. Despite this common methodology, the results of attempts at legislative rights-consistent interpretation in the relevant jurisdictions differ. We shall see that the UK courts have taken a broader interpretive approach than have their New Zealand and Australian counterparts. This will be explained by reference to the respective contexts of the human rights legislation in each jurisdiction, particularly in terms of legislative history. It will be argued that the purpose of the UK legislation to provide remedies in domestic courts for breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights provides the basis for the UK courts’ approach. The absence of this factor is the primary point of distinction between the UK on the one hand, and New Zealand and Australia on the other, though other issues will be explored. Finally, while as a matter of the interpretation of the UK legislation, and especially of the relevant interpretive provision, the approach of the UK courts is defensible, the significant risk to the principle of legal certainty which it poses will be highlighted.

There is an overlap between the transfer pricing concepts that apply under tax and under customs regimes. This thesis aims to demonstrate (i) that customs and tax laws often share common principles in respect of related-party transactions; (ii) that transfer pricing as agreed to under one discipline should be recognized under the other; (iii) that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines constitute a body of rules that is appropriate to supplement the related party provisions of the GATT/WTO Valuation Code ("GVC"); and (iv) that such guidelines are generally in accordance with the provisions of the GVC and its general principles and objectives. This thesis also analyzes the tax and customs value of imported goods, and identifies which additions to or deductions from customs value might have to be taken into account in comparing tax and customs results. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the circumstances and conditions under which the introduction of transfer pricing compensatory adjustments to transaction value would be consistent with Article 1 of the GVC.

Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The Internet is coming more and more into focus of national and international legislation. Especially with regard to copyright law, the rapid growth of the Internet, its global character, its novel technical applications and its private and commercial use by millions of people makes the control over a work complicated and raises copyright problems all over the world. Present legislation is therefore challenged to avoid gaps in the law. Considering the rapid growth of online providers and users in South Africa, it is likely that copyright disputes with regard to the Internet will evolve here soon. In this dissertation, the "world" of the Internet and its lawfulness with regard to existing South African copyright law will be examined. The examination tries to establish whether South African copyright law is able to cope with the present Internet problems and whether it leads to reasonable results. The first chapter of this dissertation will give an overview of the basic principles of the Internet, including the history, development and function of the Internet. Furthermore the changing aspects by means of diqital technology will be discussed. Because the global character of the Internet lead to "international" infringements, governments are considering the prospect of reaching international accord on the protection of intellectual property in the digital era. In chapter two, the present international harmonisation of copyright law will be introduced. Especially the quick adoption of the World Intellectual Property Organisation Treaties in December 1996 demonstrated that an international realisation for a call for action is existing. In chapter three, the application of South African copyright law with regard to the Internet will be discussed. First, it will be examined if a digital work on the Internet is protected in the same way as a "traditional" work. Second, the various rights of the copyright holder are discussed in connection with the use of a work on the Internet. Third, the potential application of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder to various actions on the Internet, such as caching, Web linking and operating an online service will be discussed. The Internet is a worldwide entity, and, as such, copyright infringement on this system is an international problem. The scenario of global, simultaneous exploitation of works on the Internet conflicts sharply with the current system of international copyright protection, which is firmly based on national copyright laws with territorial effects. Section four provides therefore an overview of the applicable law on an international net and analyses the necessity and borders of protection.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Nasionale en internasionale wetgewing fokus in In toenemende mate op die Internet. Die versnelde groei van die Internet, sy wêreldkarakter, sy nuwe tegnologiese aanwendings en sy private en kommersiële gebruik deur miljoene mense maak beheer oor In werk baie gekompliseerd en skep veral outeursregprobleme regoor die wêreld. Wetgewing soos dit tans is, word dus uitgedaag om die leemtes in die reg te ondervang. Gegewe die vinnige groei van gekoppelde verskaffers en gebruikers in Suid-Afrika, is dit waarskynlik dat - outeursreggeskille met betrekking tot die Internet binnekort ook hier gaan ontwikkel. In hierdie verhandeling gaan die "wêreld" van die Internet en sy wettigheid onder bestaande Suid-Afrikaanse outeursregwetgewing ondersoek word. In die ondersoek word gepoog om vas te stelof Suid-Afrikaanse outeursregwetgewing geskik is om die Internetprobieme wat tans bestaan te hanteer en of dit lei tot aanvaarbare resultate. Die eerste hoofstuk van die verhandeling sal In oorsig gee van die basiese beginsels van die Internet, insluitende die geskiedenis, ontwikkeling en funksie van die Internet. Verder sal die veranderende aspekte as gevolg van digitale tegnologie bespreek word. Die wêreldkarakter van die Internet gee aanleiding tot "internasionale" inbreukmakings en om hierdie rede oorweeg regerings die moontlikheid van internasionale ooreenkomste oor die beskerming van intellektuele eiendom in die digitale era. In hoofstuk twee word die bestaande internasionale harmonisering van outeursreg bespreek. Veral die vinnige aanname van die World Intellectual Property Organisation se verdrae in Desember 1996, illustreer dat daar In internasionale bewustheid is dat iets in die verband gedoen moet word. In die derde hoofstuk word die aanwending van die Suid-Afrikaanse outeursreg met betrekking tot die Internet bespreek. Eerstens word ondersoek of a digitale werk op die Internet op dieselfde wyse as 'n "tradisionele" werk beskerm kan word. Tweedens word die verskillende regte van die outeursreghebbende in verband met die gebruik van 'n werk op die Internet, bespreek. Derdens word die potensiële aanwending van die eksklusiewe regte van die outeursreghebbende op verskillende aksies op die Internet, soos byvoorbeeld kasberging, web koppeling en die werking van 'n gekoppelde diens, bespreek. Die Internet is 'n wêreldwye verskynsel en sodanig is outeursreginbreukmaking op hierdie stelsel 'n internasionale probleem. Die scenario van 'n wêreldwye, gelyktydige uitbuiting van werke op die Internet is in skerp konflik met die huidige stelsel van internasionale outeursregbeskerming wat stewig gegrond is op nasionale wetgewing met territoriale werking. Hoofstuk vier bied daarom 'n oorsig oor die toepaslike reg op 'n internasionale netwerk en analiseer die nodigheid en ook grense van beskerming.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.
Includes bibliography
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: South African law does not recognise an inherent right to the existing, unobstructed view from a property. Nevertheless, seemingly in disregard of this general principle, property owners often attempt to protect such views and courts sometimes in fact grant orders that provide such protection. This dissertation aims to establish whether South African law does indeed not acknowledge a right to a view and whether there are any exceptions to the general rule against the recognition of the right to a view. The principle that the existing view from a property is not an inherent property right is rooted in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. This principle was received in early South African case law. Inconsistency in the application of the principle in recent case law renders its development uncertain. An analysis of recent decisions shows that the view from a property is sometimes protected in terms of servitudes or similar devices, or by virtue of legislation. In other instances, property owners attempt to prevent the erection of a neighbouring building that will interfere with their existing views, based either on a substantive right or an administrative shortcoming. When the protection of view is based on a limited real right (servitudes or similar devices) or legislation, it is generally effective and permanent. Conversely, when it is founded on a substantive right to prevent building on neighbouring land or an administrative irregularity rendering a neighbouring building objectionable, the protection is indirect and temporary. A comparative study confirms that the position regarding the protection of view is similar in English and Dutch law. Constitutional analysis in terms of the methodology developed by the Constitutional Court in FNB indicates that cases where view is protected are not in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The investigation concludes with an evaluation of policy considerations which show that the position with regard to a right to a view in South African law is rooted in legitimate policy rationales.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: 'n Inherente reg op die bestaande, onbelemmerde uitsig vanaf 'n eiendom word nie deur die Suid-Afrikaanse reg erken nie. Desnieteenstaande poog eienaars dikwels om die uitsig vanaf hul eiendomme te beskerm en soms staan die howe bevele tot dien effekte toe. Dit skep die indruk dat die Suid-Afrikaanse reg wel die bestaande uitsig vanaf 'n eiendom as 'n inherente eiendomsreg erken of dat sodanige uitsig minstens onder sekere omstandighede beskerm kan word. Hierdie verhandeling het ten doel om onsekerhede betreffende die algemene beginsel oor 'n reg op uitsig uit die weg te ruim en om lig te werp op gevalle waar 'n onbelemmerde uitsig wel beskerm word. Die Romeinse en Romeins-Hollandse reg het nie 'n reg op uitsig erken nie. Hierdie posisie is deur vroeë regspraak in die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel opgeneem. 'n Ondersoek na latere Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak toon egter aan dat howe wel onder sekere omstandighede, skynbaar strydig met die gemeenregtelike beginsel, beskerming aan die onbelemmerde uitsig vanaf eiendomme verleen. 'n Eerste kategorie sake behels gevalle waar die uitsig vanaf 'n eiendom deur 'n beperkte saaklike reg, in die vorm van 'n serwituut of 'n soortgelyke maatreël, of ingevolge wetgewing beskerm word. In 'n tweede kategorie sake word die beskerming van 'n uitsig deur middel van 'n aanval op die goedkeuring van 'n buureienaar se bouplanne bewerkstellig. Sodanige aanval kan óf op 'n substantiewe reg óf op 'n administratiewe tekortkoming berus. Die onderskeie kategorieë verskil wat betref die doelmatigheid en omvang van die beskerming wat verleen word. 'n Saaklike reg of wetgewing verleen meestal effektiewe en permanente beskerming. Hierteenoor het 'n aanval op die goedkeuring van 'n buureienaar se bouplanne hoogstens indirekte en tydelike beskerming van die uitsig tot gevolg. Regsvergelyking bevestig dat die Engelse en Nederlandse reg die Suid-Afrikaanse posisie ten opsigte van'n reg op uitsig tot 'n groot mate eggo. Grondwetlike analise aan die hand van die FNB-metodologie dui daarop dat die gevalle waar uitsig wel beskerming geniet nie strydig is met artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996 nie. Bowendien regverdig beleidsgronde die behoud van die huidige beginsel in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg.

This dissertation is a literature study of the legal regime of political parties in post-apartheid South Africa. A constitutional perspective is adopted throughout the study in order to confine the topic to the realm of South African law. Hence, the focus of the study is to identify legal rights contained in chapter two of the Constitution and to also identify other provisions of the Constitution that have a bearing on political parties. As mentioned in the conclusion, section 19 of the Constitution, set the scene for the development of this study. An analysis of the constitutional provisions highlighted in this study, case law and present legislation dealing with political parties reveals that there is a need for comparative research and the adoption of adequate legislation to regulate the functioning of political parties in South Africa. It is submitted that the regulation of parties by statute is required to ensure a just political order whereby the functioning of political parties is in line with the Constitution.

Since the beginning of the history of aviation, the use of aircraft for military purposes revealed an efficient and dangerous weapon in the arsenal of a State. First it was used as observatory post, and then the aircraft took a more active role in combat until it became a destructive and deadly weapon. The definition of military aircraft in international law is not clear as States only wish to regulate international civil air navigation and not state aircraft. On the other hand, the Law of armed conflict defines the status of every aircraft with their respective duties and rights in the conduct of hostilities. The interception of civil aircraft by military aircraft shall be done in accordance with the international standards adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization in virtue of the Chicago Convention and it's limited to determine the identity of the aircraft. The use of deadly force against civilian aircraft in flight is equivalent of pronouncing the death sentence of its occupants without the hearing of a trial. Respecting the international standards of interception of civil aircraft is a necessity.

Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is a medical system with a unique medical philosophy that continues to guide the contemporary turning out of new pharmaceutical formulae. The clinically-proved effective components of these formulae are being extracted by means of modern technology. Natural Chinese medicines account for approximately 30% of the global sales volume of all medicines, and the international market-size of the TCM industry is increasing rapidly. The TCM industry depends on the patent protection of the results of its R&D no less than does any other industry. However, the patent examination guidelines of many important jurisdictions are hostile to the granting of patents to TCM products and processes. This is partly attributable to the vast differences between the philosophies of TCM and Western medicine, and to the imperfect understanding in many jurisdictions (particularly where Western Medicine is dominant) of the former. To this considerable degree, patent law fails to accommodate the TCM industry. Consequently, the TCM inventor will be left open to the depredations of the ‘free-rider’ phenomenon, the circumstance in which the inventor loses the benefits of his invention, and his investment in it, to a purloiner. The research examines the compatibilities between patent law and TCM, and argues that patent policy shall be adjusted to better accommodate the characteristics of TCM. Other forms of IPR protection are also discussed in comparison with patent with the purpose of illustrating the significance of patent in protecting TCM inventions.
published_or_final_version
Law
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy

How did EU and US legislation go from initially appearing to be the same, if not mirroring each other, to differing significantly in their execution of competition legislation goals? Why did the US take a more authoritative tone in enforcing interstate competition legislation? And if the EU is so inclined to mimic US policies 50 years ago, why didn’t their competition enforcement take the same form today? I hypothesize that the US and EU’s legislative history with regulating governmental supremacy is part of the clue to answering for these differences.

Legislation design methods currently employed by individual California state legislators allow defects to be built into the bills that eventually become laws. A dearth of consistent performance measures for legislation makes it difficult to quantify the magnitude of the problem. There is evidence, however, that defective legislation causes legislative rework, amendments, repeals, human suffering, and economic loss.

Individual legislators need a repeatable and data-focused process to prevent and correct legislative defects before they are submitted to the California State Legislature. This thesis presents an adapted Lean Six Sigma (LSS) framework to be used by individual legislators for investigating societal problems and designing legislative solutions. An analysis of the literature has identified LSS areas that need to be adapted for a legislative environment. Use of the framework by individual legislators is expected to generate evidence-based legislation with customized solutions and performance measures that can deliver maximum value to citizens.

General Introduction

The process of the institutionalisation of law that started at the end of the 18th century was followed by a general wave of codification throughout Europe. The French codification of 1804 was exemplary for all the others. The “law in books” was complete, certain, clear, and undisputable. From then on, the law in books had priority over the “law in action”. Law in books was a critique of law in action that preceded the French Revolution. Judicial activism was proscribed, and judges were called to apply the rules issued by the legislator.

This ideal of the French Revolution is still framing our pattern of legal thinking. It is dominant throughout the 19th century with the école de l’exégèse in France, Begriffjurisprudenz in Germany, and analytical jurisprudence in Anglo-American legal systems. Legal formalism or the deductive application of rules is the only form of judicial reasoning that is allowed. The science of law, as a consequence, was confined to a theoretical support and elaboration of this judge-centred approach to law.

This view on law and legal science persisted throughout the last century. It started being criticized in the late 1960s, a critique that paved the path for a more active role of the judge. New theories of interpretation were proposed so as to supplement the law in books with theoretically justified methodologies to determine its meaning.

The findings of legal theory are still, to a large extent, premised on the central role of the judge in the legal system. Although this evolution may be applauded for having contributed to a more dynamic attitude towards the law, the role of the legislator remains largely underexposed. Legal theory takes the law as “just there”, and limits its theoretical undertakings to law as it is. Law, so it is said, is the result of political decision-making. Once it comes into being however, it is separated from politics. Politics, that is, is thought of as impure, at least when compared to the methods of legal reasoning and decision-making.

This brings us to the theme of this book. Some of the questions I propose to explore are: Where does the law come from? What are the premises of a theory that considers law separated from politics? What does it mean for a legislator to be bound to the rules of a constitution throughout the process of legislation? Does the constitution consist of rules to be followed by the legislator or is its role merely confined to be a political programme?

These and other questions frame the main problem this book proposes to deal with. They are triggered by the fact of the exponential growth of today’s legal systems. Complaints about both the increasing volume of legislation and its decreasing quality in most European countries have raised the question as to whether collaboration between legislators and legal theory can help to articulate and to solve that problem.

As a matter of fact, although the complaints are made with an ever-stronger voice, solutions are by no means obvious. Legislation as a matter of politics is not rational. Politics is a power game, resulting in compromises that are framed into a legislative or statutory structure. This power game seems to have its own logic, the results of which most of the time outweigh any other form of logic.

Legal theory for its part is considered, from the perspective of politics at least, to be a “theoretical” approach to legal problems. It contributes to the description and systematisation of existing valid law. It shows up, like Minerva’s owl, after the sunset of legislative activity. From that perspective, there is not much hope that legal theory can usefully intervene in the process of legislation or regulation, i.e. before or during the creation of rules. Legal theory then is confined to “legal science” or “legal dogmatics”.

I propose to consider the problem of legislation from another angle. The premises of the problem are that, although legislation and regulation is the result of a political process, they can be the object of a theoretical study. Using an approach analogous to e.g. Hans Kelsen in legal theory ,the main idea is not to primarily focus on the content of rules and concepts, but rather on the structure and function of legal systems.

In the approach of this book, the focal point is on problems that are common to most legal systems and not on the characteristics, viz. the content of concepts that are specific for one or more legal systems. The creation of law, so is my claim, has become a problem.

Kelsen’s approach leaves legislation and regulation – apart from their formal validity aspects – outside the scope of study. The creation of rules relies on value judgments that are according to him not fit for theoretical study. In short, the creation of legal rules is a matter of politics and politics is not fit for scientific study.

This position is an understandable one, though it is only partially acceptable. Rule creation is a matter of choice. The legitimation of this choice is found in the democratic character of the regulating process and not in some science of values. In other words, would one try to mould legislation into the frame of a science, we would face something like “scientific politics”, as Marxism propagated, and which is, for several reasons, unacceptable.

A different standpoint is to study legislative problems from the angle of legal theory. This approach I propose to call legisprudence. The object of study of legisprudence is the rational creation of legislation and regulation. As to its method, it makes use of the theoretical insights and tools of current legal theory. Whereas the latter has been dealing most of the time dealing with problems of the application of law by the judge, legisprudence explores the possibilities of the enlargement of the field of study as to include the creation of law by the legislator.

Within this new approach, a variety of new question and problems – e.g. the validity of norms, their meaning, the structure of the legal system, etc. - are raised. They are traditionally dealt with from the perspective of the judge or are taken for granted by classical legal theory. However, when shifting our attention from the judge to the legislator, the same questions arise: In what sense does the legislator have to take the systematicity of the legal order into account? What counts as a valid norm? What meanings can be created and how? to mention but a few.

Traditional legal science or legal dogmatics covers many of these questions with the cloak of sovereignty. Legislators are sovereign, they decide what will count as a valid norm, and its meaning. Whether and how a rule and its meaning fit with the legal system, is then a matter of interpretation – and this is the task of the judge and the legal scientist.

On this view, the process of legislation seems to be inappropriate for theoretical inquiry. After long decades of legalism in legal reasoning, it can be said that the dominant views in legal theory resulting from that, have precisely barred the way for inquiring into the position of the legislator. Everything happens behind the veil of sovereignty as far as legislation properly so called is concerned, and behind the veil of legality when it comes to the execution of legislative acts. These veils conceal a great part of ignorance related to the possibilities of an alternative theoretical reflection on rule making. Sovereignty itself, so one can say, creates silence about this alternative, so that it becomes “sovereignty in silence” .

Sovereignty of the ruler prevents his rules from being questioned in any other than binary terms. Validity is a good example of that. The only question that is worthwhile putting is: Is this propositional content a valid rule yes or no? As a consequence, questions on its efficacy, effectivity, efficiency, or acceptability are not in order.

The claim of legisprudence is that these questions, like others, are important ones, and that they can be analysed with the help of legal theory.

The book is divided into three parts.

In the first part, I propose to explore the three basic tenets of the Modern philosophical project as Descartes inaugurated it. These three tenets are: rationality, the individuality of the subject, and freedom. A brief sketch of what is meant by them is offered in the first chapter.

Rationality as it is dealt with in the Modern philosophical project means that what is rational is self-evident. Self-evidence is certainty and certainty is the mark of truth. The question for whom something is certain is however left out of view. The subject, that is, has himself immediate access to reason and truth upon the use of his rational capacities. The latter are presumed to be identical in and for all. The subject’s reflection on himself leads to the true insight that he is a res cogitans.

The subject thinks of himself as an ”I”, that is, as an individual. Others are not thought of as others, but rather as representations or ideas. The subject as an individual is a product of thought, that is, upon the Modern approach of rationality, a theoretical idea.

As a result of rationality as self-evidence and the subject as an individual, practical reason is confined to free will. Freedom as the third basic tenet of the Modern philosophical project is limited to following the commands of God and the rules of the country. These commands and rules are found “out there”, without questioning either their origin or their purpose.

The main critique of the Modern philosophical project as it is briefly set out in the first chapter is that it is based on the so-called "scholastic fallacy”. This fallacy involves that rationality is presupposed identical in everyone’s head. On the supposition that all subjects are ontologically rational as Descartes suggests, their use of their rational capacities would result in an identical outcome that is truth. The universality of reason is, however, a hidden premise of the Modern philosophical project. It unfolds from a “view from nowhere”. This view of rationality is challenged as an unreflected one, and the methodological device of this book is to avoid this type of fallacies.

Chapter 2 focuses on the idea of science as it comes up with the Modern philosophical project. The infinite universe is substituted for the Aristotelian closed world. Mathematics becomes the appropriate method of the scientia nova that Descartes and Galileï initiate. As Descartes’ method aims at being a mathesis universalis it is believed to include the aptitude to deal with any problem, theoretical as well as practical.

The subsequent epistemologization of philosophy tacitly presupposes that mathematics belongs to the very nature of reality. From there, it follows that philosophy is thought of as a theory of reality. On an alternative view, mainly advocated by, e.g. Heidegger, it is claimed that mathematics as a method of science is a matter of choice. If the method is a matter of choice, the scientia nova can be articulated as a liberation from the shackles of ecclesiastical authority, and hence as a matter of freedom. Another consequence is that the scientia nova can articulate true propositions about reality, without having direct access to it. The distinction between a theory of reality and a theory about reality is illustrated with the help of the conflict between Galileï and the Church.

Chapter 3 concentrates on the subject and rationality. Both the subject and rationality are put in context, that is, a context of participation. With this approach, I propose to challenge the self-evidentiary character of rationality as well as the idea of the isolated and ontologically anchored Cartesian subject. Relying on George Herbert Mead’s theory of the subject, I argue that the subject is first and foremost an “intersubject”.

The subject, it is argued, is a social subject whose self emerges through interaction with others. The substitution of a subject of meaning for a subject of truth concretises the critique of the Cartesian subject in the first chapter. Both the subject and meaning, so it is argued, emerge from interaction in a context of participation. The subject’s self includes a social as well as an individual pole. These two poles and the interaction between them have been neglected throughout the Modern philosophical project. By articulating them, an attempt is made to take the subject qua subject seriously.

A similar contextualisation is operated with rationality. Rationality, even in its rationalistic appearance, is not self-revealing. The idealisation of rationality in the Modern philosophical project, that is, its decontextualisation, obscures the fact that it is historically situated. This situatedness refers to its emergence and operation in a specific context. This recontextualisation shows it as one conception of rationality among others. The Modern philosophical project held its conception of rationality to be a reflection of reality, upon its belief in the direct access to the latter.

The distinction between conceptions on the one hand and a concept on the other is the methodological device that serves to further articulate the concept of freedom. This is the theme of chapter 4. Freedom is related to the emergence of science in the 17th century. While the subject and rationality were connected to a context of participation in the foregoing chapters, attention will be drawn to the characteristics of the concept of freedom in this chapter.

The basic premise of the theory of freedom proposed in this chapter comes to saying that in the absence of any external limitation, subjects are free to act as they please. If they want to act, however, freedom unlimited as it is called must be determined. This means that from the infinite range of possibilities, a choice has to be made. Without a choice, everything remains possible though no action can occur. To make a choice implies that the concept of freedom is concretised. This concretisation is called a conception. Action is possible, so it is argued further, on two types of conceptions. One is a conception of freedom, the other a conception about freedom. A conception of freedom is a conception of the subject himself; a conception about freedom on the contrary is a conception of someone else.

On the basic premise of the theory of freedom advocated throughout the book, freedom is unlimited. This includes a priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom. Therefore, his acting on conceptions about freedom must be justified. This requirement of justification is connected to the idea of freedom as principium. A principium has a twofold meaning. The first is a starting point; the second is that a principle is also a leitmotiv.

Freedom unlimited is the starting point of political philosophy as it is found in Hobbes and Rousseau. They will be our main discussion partners throughout the book. Their theory of the social contract as the basis of the construction of political space is premised by the idea of freedom unlimited. They do neglect though the second aspect of freedom as principium, that is, freedom as the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. This aspect is briefly elaborated in chapter 4 where Hobbes’ theory is diagnosed as a theory about freedom, while it purports to be a theory of freedom.

Freedom as principium and the priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom that it involves is identified as the basic principle of legisprudence. It holds, summarizing, that law can only be legitimate if it is legitimated to operate as an alternative for failing social interaction. The idea of freedom as principium will be elaborated in chapter 8 where I proceed to the identification of the principles of legisprudence.

The second part of the book is dedicated to the problem of legalism and legitimation.

Chapter 5 explores the reason for the absence of a theory of legislation until now. The main reason is that law, from the very beginning of the Modern philosophical project, is unfolded as a reflection of reality. The obscuration of the embedment of law in the realm of politics is explained as a strategy of practical reason. This strategy is at the basis of what is identified as strong legalism. Strong legalism is the dominant pattern of thought in legal thinking. It holds that normativity is a matter of rule following, irrespective of where the rules come from. It easily fits the idea of the provisional morality Descartes has sketched, but that never came to a real end.

The main characteristics of strong legalism are pointed from a reading of Hobbes and Rousseau. The characteristics identified are: representationalism, universality or the neglect of the time dimension, concealed instrumentalism, and etatism. These characteristics of the legalistic thought pattern are supported and corroborated by a type of legal science that finds its roots in the Modern philosophical project.

Over against this form of legalism that is labelled “strong legalism” chapter 6 explores the contours of a different brand of legalism that I propose to mark as “weak legalism”.

Weak legalism or “legalism with a human face” comprises a critique of strong legalism in that the latter neglects the position of the subject qua subject. As it will be discussed in the first part of the book, the Modern philosophical project makes the subject the preponderant actor in reality. He is, however, an actor in a play written in advance by others and not an auctor or an agent.

To take the subject qua subject seriously, as weak legalism purports, entails placing him in a context with others. This part of chapter 6 joins the insights articulated in the first part of the book, more specifically in chapter 2. Others, and not just “otherness” as a representation of the subject, belong to the subject’s context. If it is in this context that the self and meaning emerge, this process is not necessarily conflict-free. Hobbes and Rousseau conclude from this fact that social interaction leads to war. It provides them with an argument to substitute interaction based on legal rules from social interaction based on conceptions of freedom. The former are issued by the sovereign and can be qualified as conceptions about freedom.

Hobbes and Rousseau hold that this substitution is ipso facto legitimate. On the theory of freedom that was sketched out in chapter 4, this substitution however needs to be legitimated.

Chapter 7 deals with the issue of legitimation. I distinguish to begin with between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories of legitimation. On the former, law is legitimated if it corresponds to at least one transcendent true norm. On the latter, no transcendent content is available. This is proper to a democratic theory of legitimation upon which the demos determines the ends of action as well as the means to realise them.

Apart from this difference between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation process they embrace is the same. This dynamic refers to the direction of the legitimation chain. In jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation chain runs from a transcendent norm to a rule of the sovereign. In non-jusnaturalistic theories exemplified by Hobbes and Rousseau the dynamics of the chain runs from an initial consent to the social contract to the set of rules issued by the sovereign.

The dynamic of the chain in both type of theories, so it is argued, is irreversible. The operationalisation of political space ensuing from the social contract is what legislation is about according to the Modern philosophical project. Taken as it stands, the initial consent of the subjects to the social contract or their proxy to the sovereign is an action on a conception of freedom. They do give, though, a proxy to the sovereign to issue subsequent limitations of their freedom that are yet unknown when subscribing the contract .From the “moment” of the contract, the sovereign is legitimated in substituting conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom. The initial proxy contained in the contract covers any of his limitations of freedom. As both Hobbes and Rousseau argue, the rules of the sovereign are always morally correct. As a consequence, they cannot be criticized for whatever reason. Would this be possible then the chain of legitimation initiated by the social contract would be reversed.

On strong legalism, however the chain is unidirectional. The sovereign transforms any propositional content into a true norm, which allows for the qualification of sovereignty as a black box.

Chapter 7 ends with the articulation of some possibilities of reversing the chain of legitimation in what is called the proxy model. On this idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain, a more general approach is initiated. This approach leads to the claim that a legislator’s limitations of freedom are to be justified. They are deemed legitimate and legitimated on a general proxy. The latter however affects he reflexive character of freedom of the subject. On the idea of a general proxy, any of his conceptions of freedom can a priori be replaced by conceptions about freedom. The general approach to the idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain comes to say that this substitution must be justified. Sovereigns, that is, should give reasons for their rules.

This is basically what legisprudence as a theory of rational legislation comes to. Its more concrete articulation is the topic of the third part of the book.

Chapter 8 starts with the exploration of an alternative for the proxy model of legitimation that was investigated in the previous chapters. The alternative is labelled the trade-off model. On this model, the subjects trade off conceptions of freedom for conceptions about freedom. This comes to saying that the substitution of conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom must be justified. No rule can be held legitimate if this justification or legitimation is lacking.

The trade off model is based on freedom as principium in its twofold meaning. Freedom unlimited as was argued in chapter 4 is both the starting point and the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. It follows from there that subjects are primarily to act on conceptions of freedom. A substitution of a conception about freedom for conceptions of freedom can only be legitimate if it is legitimated or justified as an alternative for failing social interaction. This is the first principle of legisprudence that is called the “principle of alternativity”. The second principle is the principle of necessity of the normative density. Rules should not automatically contain sanctions. If sanctions are included, this requires a specific justification. Rules with a sanction embrace a double reduction of freedom. First, the pattern of behaviour is imposed and second its realisation is enforced. Before realising a rule with the help of force alternative means of achievement of its goals are to be outweighed.

The third principle of legisprudence is the principle of temporality. The limitation of freedom on a conception about freedom must be justified as “on time”. Any justification is embedded in a context. This means that if it is successful it will only be temporarily so. The principle of temporality then requires a justification over time, and not only on the moment that a rule is issued.

The principle of coherence is the fourth principle of legisprudence. It requires that rules, both judicial and legislative make sense as a whole. The principle of coherence thus identified is elaborated in a theory that I propose to call the “level theory of coherence”, and that makes part of legisprudence.

At the end of the chapter, the principles of legisprudence are focused on from the position of the legislator before they are further explored in chapter 9. This chapter concretises the operationalisation of the principles of legisprudence. The principles of legisprudence, so it is argued, are to be read within the context of one another. Upon weighing and balancing their relative weight in the process of legislation, the ruling of the sovereign can be said to be legisprudentially optimal.

Legisprudential optimality on its turn is further concretised in chapter 10. The sovereign has to discharge of his duties throughout the legislative process while taking the circumstances of legislation into account. These circumstances are the fact that subjects interact with each other on the basis of conceptions of freedom. These circumstances result from the theory of freedom that was set out in chapter 4 and further elaborated in the subsequent chapters.

The duties of the sovereign throughout the process of legislation amount to a duty of fact finding, problem formulation, weighing and balancing of alternatives, prognosis, retrospection, taking future circumstances into account and finally a duty to correction.

Finally, a brief sketch is offered of the concept of validity according to legisprudence. Apart from the necessity of formal validity, both efficacy and axiological validity are briefly commented upon. From the diagnosis of some theories of validity that mainly focus on only one of the aspects of validity, the concept of validity according to legisprudence is called “network validity”.

Projects like this book would never begin, let alone come to an end, without the help of a large number of people. I will not enter into a detailed description of their contribution. Suffice to mention their names with the hope that they will recognize some of their thoughts, reflections, critiques and encouragements somewhere in the book.

The persons that come to my mind are Aulis Aarnio, Maurice Adams, Manuel Atienza, John Bell, Samantha Besson, Guido Calabresi, Tom Campbell, Carine Caunes, Emilios Christodoulidis, Wochiech and Aga Cyrul, Martine de Clerq, Pieter Dehon, Erwin Depue, Johan Desmet, David Dhooge, Guillaume Drago, Hugues Dumont, Philip Eijlander, Michiel Elst, René Foqué, Benoit Frydman, Tito Gallas, Philippe Gérard, René Gonzalez, Guy Haarscher, Mark Hunyadi, Sheldon Leader, Maria-Isabelle Köpke-Tinturé, Neil MacCormick, Francesco Laporte, Luzius Mader, Frank Michelman, Charles-Albert Morand, Dwight Newman, François Ost, Juliane Ottmann, Richard Parker, Trinie Parker, Aleksander Peczenik, Chaïm Perelman, Vlad Perju, Kauko Pietillä, Juha Pöhöynen, Daniel Priel, Pekka Riekinen, Thomas Roberts, Eric Rossiaux, Geoffrey Samuel, Jerzy Stelmach, Andreas Takis, Benoît Timmermans, Philippe Thion, Hannu Tolonen, Michel Troper, François Tulkens, Stamatios Tzitzis, François Vallançon, Koen Van Aeken, Wibren Van der Burg, Mark Van Hoecke, Michiel Vandekerckhove, Frederik Vandendriesche, Rob van Gestel, Scott Veatch, Roger Vergauwen, Amaryllis Verhoeven, Michel Villey, Jeremy Waldron, Kenneth Winston, Willem Witteveen, Wochiech Zadurski and Marek Zyrk-Zadurski.

Thomas Roberts helped me with the linguistic corrections of the text.

I have a special debt to Mark Van Bellingen and Lilly De Vooght for their views on the context of participation, the idea of a hermeneutical point of view and their critique on the “view from nowhere”.

1\
Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Sex offender legislation is designed to make communities feel safer, with little or no empirical data utilized in the law's creation. The existing research indicates that rates of rapes have decreased since major sex offender legislation was developed and implemented. However, the research has also demonstrated that no significant effect occurred regarding recidivism rates following the passage of sex offender legislation.

Veterans treatment courts (VTCs) and agencies that work with veterans experiencing posttraumatic stress and substance use disorders have been unable to provide evidence-based treatment that includes veterans' families in recovery and treatment. This limitation has resulted in treatment gaps that appear to have had an adverse impact on veterans and their families. The purpose of this qualitative content analysis was to examine the formulation of AB 2371, a 2012 legislative amendment to California code PC 1170.9, and evaluate whether lawmakers considered family-oriented treatment in passing the amendment. Schneider and Ingram's theory of social construction of target populations constituted the theoretical foundation. The focus of the central research question was on the consideration given during the formulation and implementation of AB 2371 that resulted in exclusion of families from eligibility for treatment in VTCs. Data consisted of publicly available documents from 4 years before and 2 years after enactment of AB 2371. Data were collected and analyzed in a manner consistent with Dunn's policy analysis framework. Data were analyzed through selective coding using a continuous, iterative process and were critically evaluated to determine whether legislative and administrative considerations may have affected the social construct of care for veterans and their families. Findings show that children and families were not considered in the initial policy inputs related to the formulation of AB 2371. A recommendation stemming from this study includes advising policy makers, VTCs, and service providers to support the inclusion of families and children in the VTC service matrix, which may result in positive social change by improving recovery and treatment for veterans.

Micro-economic reform is a primary objective of modern Australian socio-economic policy. The key outcome targetted by this reform is increased efficiency, measured by a range of factors, including cost reduction, increased savings, and a more facilitative environment for business activity. These benefits are sought by the proponents of reform as part of a push to increase national prosperity, but concerns that social equity is undermined by it are expressed by opponents of that reform. The debate between efficiency and equity is raging in current Australian tax policy, a key site for micro-economic reform. As Government Budget restructuring occurs in Australia, demographic change (eg, the ageing population) undermines the ability of public funded welfare to provide retirement benefits. Responsibility for self-funded retirement is an important contributor to increasing private savings. Investment in growth assets such as corporate stock is increasing in Australia, however concerns about volatility of asset values and yield stimulate the importance of investment risk management techniques. Financial contract innovation utilising financial derivatives is a dominant mechanism for that risk management. Synthetic equity products which are characterised by capital protection and enhanced yield are popular and efficient equity risk management vehicles, and are observed globally, particularly in the North American market. Financial contract innovation, risk management using financial derivatives, and synthetic equity products suffer from an adverse tax regulatory response in Australia, which deprives Australian investors from access to important savings vehicles. The negative Australian tax response stems from anachronistic legislation and jurisprudence, which emphasises tax outcomes based on legal form. The pinnacle of this approach is the tax law insistence on characterisation of financial contracts as either debt or equity, despite some important financial similarities between these two asset types. Since derivatives produce transactions with novel legal forms this approach is unresponsive to innovation. The negative tax result also stems from a perception that the new products are tax arbitrage vehicles, offering tax benefits properly available to investment in stocks, which is thought to be inappropriate when the new products resemble debt positions (particularly when they are capital protected and yield enhanced). The negative tax response reflects administrative concerns about taxpayer equity and revenue leakage. This approach seeks to impose tax linearity by proxy: rather than utilising systemic reform to align the tax treatment of debt and equity, the current strategy simply denies the equity tax benefits to a variety of innovative financial contracts. It deprives Australians of efficiency enhancing savings products, which because of an adverse tax result are unattractive to investors. The weakness of the current approach is illustrated by critical analysis of three key current and proposed tax laws: the ???debt dividend??? rules in sec. 46D Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (the ???Tax Act???); the 1997 Budget measures (which seek to integrate related stock and derivative positions); and the proposals in the Taxation of Financial Arrangements Issues Paper (which include a market value tax accounting treatment for ???traded equity,??? and propose a denial of the tax benefits for risk managed equity investments). The thesis develops a model for financial analysis of synthetic equity products to verify the efficiency claims made for them. The approach is described as the ???Tax ReValue??? model. The Tax ReValue approach isolates the enhanced investment returns possible for synthetic equity, and the model is tested by application to the leading Australian synthetic equity product, the converting preference share. The conclusions reached are that the converting preference share provides the key benefits of enhanced investment return and lower capital costs to its corporate issuer. This financial efficiency analysis is relied upon to support the assertion that a facilitative tax response to such products is appropriate. The facilitative response can be delivered by a reformulation of the existing tax rules, or by systemic reform. The reformulation of the existing tax rules is articulated by a Rule of Reason, which is proposed in the thesis as the basis for the allocation and retention of the equity tax benefits. To avoid concerns about taxpayer equity and revenue leakage the Rule of Reason proposes a Two Step approach to the allocation of the equity tax benefits to synthetics. The financial analysis is used to quantify non-tax benefits of synthetic equity products, and to predict whether and to what extent the security performs financially like debt or equity. This financial analysis is overlayed by a refined technical legal appraisal of whether the security contains the essential legal ???Badges of Equity.??? The resulting form and substance approach provides a fair and equitable control mechanism for perceived tax arbitrage, whilst facilitating efficient financial contract innovation. The ultimate source of non-linearity in the taxation of investment capital is the differential tax benefits provided to equity and debt. To promote tax linearity the differentiation needs to be removed, and the thesis makes recommendations for systemic reform, particularly concerning the introduction of a system of ???Franked Debt.??? The proposed system of ???Franked Debt??? would align the tax treatment of debt and equity by replacing the corporate interest deduction tax benefit with a lender credit in respect of corporate tax paid. This credit would operate mechanically like the existing shareholder imputation credit. The interface of this domestic tax credit scheme with the taxation of International investment capital, and the problems occasioned by constructive delivery of franking credits to Australian taxpayers via synthetics, are resolved by the design and costings of the new system, which has the potential to be revenue positive.

Background: Drugs have become an essential necessity in public health, people and the government has become willingly to spend more money on the country’s healthcare system to restore health, save lives, preventing disease and epidemics. Drugs should be properly regulated throughout development, production, importation and subsequent distribution to ensure it is prescribed with safe, effective and of good quality standards. The structure of drug regulations today has evolved over time. During the process, the scope of legislative and regulatory power expanded in result of a series of disastrous events related to pharmaceutical products, the adoption of more restrictive legislative were put in place for stronger safeguard to the public. In comparison to Singapore, Taiwan, US and EU where the drug regulatory system is highly structured, flexible and innovative, Hong Kong (HK) has a relatively simple and stubborn drug regulatory system and drug approval is greatly dependent on the approval status of the advance countries. According to the current registration system in HK, a new drug usually takes about 18-24 months to obtain an approval, and this figure is far behind the standard of Singapore in which medicine could be registered in 60 days. It is vital to have speedy approval process with high standards in safety, efficacy and quality on all approved drugs. If drugs are approved in a rush manner, it will lead to serious adverse drug reactions (ADR), or even deaths in consumption of unsafe, and ineffective drugs. On the other hand, slow approval will make patients suffer and increase the mortality rate to due inaccessibility of appropriate medicines to sustain life and combat diseases. With reference to the initiatives and innovative regulatory frameworks in the abovementioned countries, the modification of the local drug regulatory system is strongly recommended. Aim: 1. To examine the regulatory frameworks between Singapore, Taiwan, US and EU which affect the evaluation timeline required for new drugs approval. 2. As the first study to examine the drug regulations in HK, the regulatory barriers for new drugs submission will be explored and whether the regulatory initiatives from the abovementioned countries may result in an improvement in the overall drug regulation system HK. Method: This dissertation is a literature review and it will employ concentration in the drug regulation systems in Singapore, Taiwan, US and EU with varying levels of pharmaceutical regulation capacities. Search engines including Google, MedLine, PubMed (database up to 2012) with key words search of “Department of Health (DoH), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), European Union (EU), Taiwan FDA, Health Sciences Authority, evaluation routes, drug registration requirement, review timeline, Centre for Drug Evaluation, Pharmaceutical Evaluation Reports, risk management systems, pharmacovigilance, drug legislation”. Results: With an in-depth evaluation of the HK’s guideline and supporting document required for new drug submission, it is highly recommended that unnecessary documents at new drug submission (NDA) should be elimination to facilitate the new drugs approval process. The regulatory frameworks between all studied countries vary significantly in which implementation of initiatives (e.g. multiple evaluation routes, in-house evaluation system) from individual country affects the standards of new drugs approval and the evaluation timeline required to grant approvals. Conclusion: The regulatory frameworks in HK shall be revised with reference to numerous initiatives developed in the regulatory systems in Singapore, Taiwan, Us and EU. The possible key regulatory barriers which leads to the delays in new drugs approvals in HK includes duplication of certificates, limited number of Pharmacy and Poison Board meetings, the requirement of endorsement of new drugs approvals at the legislative council , absence of in-house evaluation system which allows full assessment of submission dossier, deficiency of clinical trials with the inclusion of local population, absence of electronic submission, multiple evaluation routes and rigorous post-marketing pharmacovigilance monitoring system. If the Department of Health (DoH) in Hong Kong could scrutinize the current regulatory frameworks with referenced to these countries, it will improve the overall drug regulatory system and reduce drug lag due to unnecessary barriers.
published_or_final_version
Public Health
Master
Master of Public Health

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2000.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation is an attempt at reconciling the existing (and until recently predominant) private law concept of ownership and the property rights espoused by the new constitutional order. The attempts at land reform in South Africa and Germany are used as specifie examples of the manner in which the whole property law order in both these legal systems is developed through legislative and judicial initiative, on the basis of the constitutional provisions concerning property protection and regulation. The purpose of the investigation is to determine to what extent constitutional development of the private law of property will result in a property law order serving the socio-economic and political goals of economic growth and self-fulfilment and empowerment of the individual. Focus is placed on the influence of the constitutional protection and regulation of property as a mechanism for developing the private law of ownership in Germany and South Africa. In the first part of the exposition, the choice of legal comparison as course of inquiry is substantiated, and the terminological difficulties connected with an investigation into the development of the private law of property by the constitutional protection and regulation of property are discussed. Attention is given to the use of the terms "ownership" and "property" in the private law and in the constitutional context. The term "tenure" is also discussed in the context of land reform in South Africa. Further, the usc of terms such as "public interest", "common weal" and "public purposes" is discussed. The use of these terms are particularly complicated by the fact that each of them are often used in more than one sense, and that the use of these di fferent terms overlap to varying extents. The second part of the exposition contains information on the background of the constitutional property orders as they arc found in Germany and South Africa. The drafting histories of the South African and German constitutional property clauses indicate that in both these legal systems, the constitutional property clauses have hybrid ideological foundations. Both contain a compromise between, on the one hand, classical liberalism (which affords the holders of rights a high degree of individual freedom and autonomy) and, on the other hand, social democracy (which allow stronger regulatory measures, also upon private properly). Further, some of the structural aspects connected to constitutional protection and regulation of property in Germany and South Africa are discussed. The positively phrased property guarantee in art 14 GG is compared with the negatively phrased "guarantee" of s 25 Fe, whereby the transitional property guarantee in s 28 JC is also considered. Further, the basic structure and stages of an inquiry into the constitutional property clause are discussed, with reference to differences between the German and South African methods. These differences are not of such a nature that it excludes further comparison. Ilowever, it is necessary to keep the differences in the judicial system in mind when conducting a comparison of the present nature. Therefore, a brief overview of the judicial systems of Germany and South Africa is provided, with specific reference to the manner in which the courts resolved certain property questions. The principles underlying the constitutional orders of Germany and South Africa are also discussed with specific reference to their significance for the treatment of property issues. In particular, the meaning of the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) and the social wei fare state (Sozialstaat) for the solution of problems connected to property is discussed. It is indicated that the legitimacy of the legal order in general and property law in particular, depends on the degree of success in the implementation of these values. Further, it is indicated that the implementation of these values also determines the importance of private property and/or regulation thereof in a specific legal system. In the third part of the exposition, the relevance of the constitutional protection and regulation for the private law of ownership is discussed. The expansion of the concept of property by the application of a "purely" constitutional definition thereof raises the question as to the continued relevance of the private law concept of ownership. This issue is discussed with reference to the protection of property in terms of the constitution in comparison with the scope of property in private law. It is indicated that the "exclusively constitutional" concept of property is by no means based only on Constitutional law. The role of the private law concept of ownership in a constitutional order is then elucidated. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the limitations on property endorsed by the constitutional order. Two main kinds of limitation are possible: (i) limitation of property through vertical operation of the constitution (ie a broad category of legislative and administrative deprivation (regulation), and a more specialised category, namely expropriations), and (ii) limitation through horizontal operation of the constitution (ie through the inroads allowed on property rights by the protection of other rights in the Bill of Rights). It is indicated that the application of the public interest / public purposes requirements are sometimes intended to protect individual interest above those of society in general. In other cases, the public interest / public purposes requirement is aimed at securing the interests of the society at large. Further, it is indicated that the purpose of constitutional "interference" in the area of private property law is to correct imbalances in the relations among private persons which are regarded by the law as "equals," even if they are not equal for all practical purposes. The fourth part of the exposition concentrates on the land reform programmes in Germany (after the reunification of 1990) and South Africa (since 1991) in order to analyse the attempts by the legislature and judiciary to give effect to the improved property order as anticipated by constitutional development of property. In both Germany and South Africa political changes made land reform programmes essential: In South Africa the land reform programme was introduced to reverse the injustices created by colonialism and apartheid. A tripartite programme is employed for this purpose. The new kinds of land rights created through this system of land reform are indicated. The manner in which this body of law is treated by the courts is also analysed with reference to its relevance for the development of Property Law in general. In Germany a property and land reform programme became necessary with the reunification. On the one hand, the socialist property order in the former GDR had to be replaced by the property order already existing in the FGR, and on the other hand the individual claims for restitution of the land and enterprises taken by the GDR state or its Soviet predecessor had to be balanced against the claims that present occupiers of such land have to it. The influence of legislation and litigation connected to these issues on the development of Property Law is discussed. The final part of the exposition is a summary of the conclusions drawn during the course of the analysis.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In 'n poging om in hierdie uiteensetting die bestaande (en tot onlangs nog oorheersende) privaatregtelike begrip "eiendom" te versoen met die breër eiendomsbegrip wat deur die nuwe grondwetlike bestel gepropageer word, word die grondhervormingsprogramme in Suid Afrika en Duitsland gebruik as voorbeelde van die wyse waarop die bestaande Eiendomsreg in beide regsisteme deur die wetgewer en die howe ontwikkel word. Die doel van die ondersoek is om vas te stel tot watter mate die grondwetlike ontwikkeling van privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg sal bydra tot die totstandkoming van 'n eiendomsregtelike regsorde waarin die sosio-ekonomiese en politieke doelwitte van ekonomiese groei en die vrye ontwikkeling en bemagtiging van die individu gedien word. Die klem word geplaas op die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van eiendom as 'n meganisme waardeur die privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg in Duitsland en Suid- Afrika ontwikkel kan word. Die eerste deel van die uiteensetting begrond die keuse van regsvergelying as metode van analise en bespreek die terminologiese probleme wat in 'n ondersoek na die grondwetlike ontwikkeling van die privaatregtelike eiendomsreg kan opduik. Aandag word gegee aan die gebruik van begrippe wat verband hou met eiendom en publieke belang in sowel die privaatreg as in die grondwetlike konteks. Die gebruik van verskillende terme, veral in Engels, kan problematies wees, en daarom word dit breedvoeriger bespreek. In die tweede deel van die uiteensetting word die agtergrond waarteen die grondwetlike bestelle van Duitsland en Suid-Afrika funksioneer, bespreek: Eers word die formulering van die eiendomsklousules in Suid-Afrika en Duitsland vanuit 'n historiese perspektief ondersoek. In beide regsisteme is die grondwetlike eiendomsklousules op 'n kompromis tussen verskillende ideologieë gebaseer. Enersyds op klassieke liberalisme, in terme waarvan eienaars en ander reghebbendes 'n hoë mate van individuele vryheid en outonomie toegeken word; andersyds op sosiaal-demokratiese denke, in terme waarvan strenger regulerende maatreëls (ook op privaat eiendom) geduld moet word. Dan word sommige van die strukturele aspekte verbonde aan die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van eiendom in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika bespreek. Die positief geformuleerde eiendomswaarborg in art 14 GG word vergelyk met die negatiewe formulering in art 25 FG en die positiewe waarborg in art 28 lG. Verder word die basiese struktuur en fases van 'n grondwetlike ondersoek in die beskerming en regulering van eiendom bespreek, met spesifieke verwysing na die verskille in die Duitse en Suid-Afrikaanse benaderings. Hierdie verskille is nie van so 'n aard dat dit regsvergelyking kortwiek nie. Nogtans is dit noodsaaklik dat die benaderingsverskille in ag geneem word vir 'n meer diepgaande vergelyking. Daarom word 'n vlugtige oorsig oor die rol van die howe in die hantering van eiendomsvraagstukke in grondwetlike konteks verskaf. Verder word die beginsels onderliggend aan die grondwetlike bestelle in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika bespreek met spesifieke verwysing na die betekenis daarvan vir die beskerming en regulering van eiendom. Daar word veral klem gelê op die regstaat- en sosiaalstaatbeginsels. Die legitimi teit van die regsorde in die algemeen, en meer spesifiek die Eiendomsreg, hang af van die mate van sukses waarmee hierdie beginsels in die gemeenskap geïmplementeer word. Daar word verder aangedui dat die toepassing van hierdie beginsels die mate van individuele vryheid in die uitoefening van eiendomsreg en/of die graad van regulering van eiendomsreg in 'n bepaalde regstelsel bepaal. Die derde deel van die uiteensetting konsentreer op die betekenis van die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van eiendom vir die privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg. Die uitgebreide eiendomsbegrip wat in die grondwetlike konteks aangewend word, gee aanleiding tot die vraag na die sin van 'n voortgesette enger eiendomsbegrip in die privaatreg. Hierdie kwessie word bespreek met verwysing na die beskerming van eiendom in terme van die grondwet, en word vergelyk met die omvang van die eiendomsbegrip in die privaatreg. Daar word aangedui dat die sogenaamde uitsluitlik grondwetlike eiendomsbegrip geensins eksklusief aan die Grondwetlike Reg is nie. Die rol van die privaatregtelike eiendomsbegrip in 'n grondwetlike bestel word vervolgens uiteengesit. Verder word die beperkings op eiendom in die grondwetlike konteks geanaliseer. In beginsel is twee soorte beperkings regverdigbaar: (i) Beperking van eiendomsreg deur die vertikale aanwending van die grondwet, dit wil sê deur die breër kategorie wetgewende en administratiewe ontnemings (regulerings) van eiendomsreg en deur 'n enger en meer spesifieke kategorie, naamlik onteiening; en (ii) beperking van eiendomsreg deur horisontale aanwending van die grondwet, dit wil sê deur die inbreuk op eiendomsregte wat toegelaat word as gevolg van die uitwerking van die beskerming van ander regte in die Handves vir Menseregte. Daar word aangedui dat die vereiste van publieke belang in twee teenoorstaande opsigte gebruik word: Enersyds om die individuele belang bo dié van die gemeenskap te stel, en andersyds om die gemeenskap se belange as sulks te beskerm. Daar word ook aangedui dat grondwetlike "inmenging" met privaatregtelike eiendomsreg daarop gemik is om ongebalanseerdhede in die regsverhoudings tussen persone wat deur die reg as "gelykes" bejeën word en in effek nie gelyk is nie, uit te skakel. In die vierde deel van die uiteensetting word die grondhervormingsprogramrne in Duitsland (sedert hervereniging in 1990) en Suid-Afrika (sedert 1991) bespreek. Die klem val op die pogings van die wetgewer en howe om die verbeterde eiendomsbestel, soos wat dit in die grondwet in die vooruitsig gestel word, te konkretiseer. In beide regstelsels het politieke veranderinge 'n grondhervormingsprogram onontbeerlik gemaak: Die grondhervormingsprogram in Suid-Afrika het ten doelom die ongeregtighede in die grondbesitstelsel wat ontstaan het as gevolg van kolonialisme en apartheid uit te skakel. Vir dié doel berus die grondhervormingsprogram op drie verwante, maar uiteenlopende, beginsels. Die nuwe vorme van grondregte wat uit hierdie sisteem ontstaan, word aangedui, en die wyse waarop hierdie deel van die reg deur die howe hanteer word, word bespreek met verwysing na die betekenis daarvan vir die ontwikkeling van die Eiendomsreg. In Duitsland is die noodwendigheid van 'n grondhervormingsprogram aan die hervereniging van die DDR en die BRD gekoppel. Die sosialisties-georienteerde eiendomsbestel wat in die "oostelike" deel van Duitsland aanwending gevind het, moes vervang word deur die bestel wat reeds in die "westelike" deel van die "nuwe" staat in werking was. Verder moet die grondeise van persone wat grond of besigheidseiendom verloor het gedurende die sosialistiese regeringstyd en die voorafgaande Sowjetiese besetting, opgeweeg word teen die aansprake wat huidige besitters op sulke grond het. Die invloed van wetgewing en regspraak hieroor op die Eiendomsreg word geanaliseer. Die laaste deel van die uiteensetting bevat 'n samevatting van die gevolgtrekkings wat deur die loop van die analise gemaak is.

The commercial space transportation industry is growing with the technology that creates more capable spacecrafts to access space. However, there are still some academic discussions related to the delimitation of the outer space and the definition of space objects that could interfere with the regulation of this growing space activity. Because these discussions are not predicted to be solved soon, the developing space policies must attempt to clarify these issues between the parts avoiding the retard in the development of the industry. Moreover, these policies have to promote public-private partnerships and the emersion of private entrepreneurs for a faster development of a safe, reliable, and affordable commercial space transportation.

This thesis presents an analysis of the South African Parliament’s attempts to create a mechanism to enable oversight of delegated legislation. The question sought to be addressed is, whether Parliament has done anything to create a mechanism to oversee the delegation of its law-making authority to the executive and if so, whether any of these efforts have been successful. This paper illustrated how the making of delegated legislation is not foreign to South Africa’s system of separation of powers as provided for in our Constitution and as interpreted by our courts. It is shown how, despite what the Constitution allows, recent law-making efforts have not strengthened Parliament’s ability to oversee delegated legislation. Instead legislators purposefully sought to curb attempts to improve rule-making and delegated legislation. Similarly, efforts to make delegated legislation more accessible to the public have been missing from government’s list of priorities. The South African Parliament’s efforts to scrutinise delegated legislation is contrasted with the efforts of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature and several foreign legislatures. Finally, it is indicated how Parliament, after more than 20 years since the promulgation of the final Constitution, has failed to create a permanent mechanism to enhance and strengthen its oversight of delegated legislation.

This thesis looks at the drafting and operation of amending legislation in the light of two paradigms of statute law. Part One examines the paradigm which developed in Great Britain in the nineteenth century. That paradigm emphasized the fragmentary character of the statute law. Ilbert analysed the techniques of amendment and concluded in favour of the use of indirect amendment and against the use of textual amendment. Another paradigm of statute law developed in the United States, Canada and Australia in the nineteenth century. It emphasizes the potential coherence of the statute law and tries to realise this potential through statute revision and the use of textual amendment. The consequences of the use of textual amendment for the operation of amending enactments are examined. The thesis also considers the argument that the use of re-enactment as a technique of amendment is undesirable because it opens up for parliamentary amendment more of the act proposed to be amended than do other techniques of amendment. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

The purpose of this study was to review the provision of public and private retirement funding in both South Africa and the United Kingdom and the role of taxation in encouraging greater private provision for retirement. The study described the basis of taxation and determination of ‘taxable income’ in each jurisdiction, before addressing the relationship between taxation and retirement funding in each jurisdiction respectively. Both jurisdictions have introduced significant reforms of their systems of retirement funding and these reforms were accordingly addressed in the present research. The study compared the two jurisdictions based on the above mentioned areas to determine similarities or differences. The study concluded with recommendations, these being that South Africa should assess the feasibility of providing greater State provided retirement funding by possibly including a mandatory contribution, such as that used by the UK for its single-tier flat rate New State Pension. A further recommendation was that South Africa should encourage greater provision of private retirement funding by considering even greater tax deductions for contributions.

My thesis addresses the question of whether an imposed traditional justice system operating through traditional courts is still relevant in South Africa. I interrogate whether traditional courts are necessary in a constitutional democracy outside of the existing western type courts system. The Constitution, in terms of chapter 12, recognises traditional leaders and enjoins government to enact national legislation that provides for the role of traditional leadership at a local level. As a unitary democratic state with diverse cultures, the Constitution also acknowledges and grounds diversity which could be interpreted as permitting legal pluralism. I argue that the Constitution envisages recognition and application of the indigenous system within the existing courts of law and subject to the Constitution. Traditional leaders must be recognised in line with the injunction that customary law must be developed and applied by courts. Any other different construction on how traditional courts may be rationalised promotes the interest of traditional leaders and creates an unstable pluralist legal system enabling inequality and discrimination contrary to constitutional imperatives.

The objective of this research was to draw a relationship between legal and institutional frameworks in a country, and the competitiveness of that country as a destination for investment either as real investment or portfolio investment for infrastructure development.

Thirty years after it has achieved its independence, the Republic of Chad, which has faced a long political instability, decided to exploit its oil resources in order to achieve its development objectives. Owing to the difficulties encountered in mobilizing financial resources for the realization of the project, the Government obtained from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) a loan US$39.5 millions. The loan Agreement, signed between the two parties on 29 March 2001 included a provision referring to the Petroleum Revenue Management Program, described in schedule 5 of the Agreement. This Petroleum Revenue Management Program imposed a number of obligations, related to the actions to be undertaken by the Chadian Government prior to the release of the funds by the Bank, and to the modalities to be followed in the course of the management of the oil revenues. These obligations are also known as governance conditionalities. This theses raised the issues of the legitimacy of the Bank's Governance conditionality, its impact on both the sovereignty of the borrower to freely determine the use of its resources and the effectiveness of the loan.

FDI plays an important role in economic life. It is arguably an even more significant driving force behind economic growth than trade in goods and services nowadays.
China and Canada are both important FDI absorbers, but their FDI laws display various characteristics due to their different economic bases, political structures and legal systems etc. In order to guide FDI practice in the two countries and to draw on Canada's experience for China's FDI law, this thesis mainly introduces the FDI policies of China and Canada, analyzes the FDI law systems of the two countries, and expounds their general regulations on FDI.

The South African economy has seen an increase in small businesses since 1994. This increase has been caused by an increase in unemployment rate and government interventions to promote small businesses. The government has through the National Treasury introduced various tax legislations to simplify and facilitate the tax processes that small businesses have to comply with. The discussion contained in this treatise seeks to critically analyse the tax implications for small and micro businesses. One of the small business tax legislations, Small Business Corporations, is discussed in chapter 2. The Small Business Corporation legislation provides for two key concessions to qualifying small businesses. The first concession is the progressive tax rates that are lower than normal tax rates at taxable income level below R300 000. The second concession is the special capital allowances that the qualifying small business is entitled to. The tax amnesty for small businesses was introduced in July 2006 to provide an opportunity to small businesses which were not up to date with their tax affairs, to regularise their tax affairs. Small businesses had to meet certain requirements and pay an amnesty levy ranging from 2 to 5 percent of their taxable income. The tax amnesty on small businesses was not as effective as intended, however a slight increase in the South African taxpayer base was achieved. The voluntary disclosure programme has recently been introduced in November 2010, to provide an opportunity for all businesses to voluntarily disclose their previous defaults without being subjected to criminal prosecution and penalties. The government further attempted to simplify the tax compliance process by introducing turnover tax legislation. The turnover tax provides for a single tax system that does away with the need to account for normal tax, capital gains tax, secondary tax on companies and value added tax. The turnover tax system is optional to qualifying small businesses. The turnover tax is calculated by simply applying a tax rate to taxable turnover. Small businesses need carefully consider whether turnover tax will be beneficial to them. It is not advisable for small businesses that are making losses to adopt turnover tax. Another small business tax legislation that promises to be effective is the venture capital incentive. This legislation provides for deduction of expenditure actually incurred in the acquisition of shares by qualifying businesses. It appears that, given the challenges that small businesses still face, the government still has a lot more to do to simplify the tax process for small businesses.

This thesis analyses the extraterritorial dimension of patent systems in light of recent judicial trends, ending with the United States Supreme Court's landmark 2007 ruling in AT&T v. Microsoft. The discussion examines (i) the economic interest of nations in issuing and maintaining patent rights; (ii) the legal arguments against a unilateral extraterritorial extension of domestic patents, leading to the legal presumption against extraterritorial extension; (iii) the evolution of this doctrine in United States legislation and jurisprudence and forays against it, especially in recent decades; and (iv) the impact of globalization and of the nature of patentable information in the digital age on the issue of the extraterritorial extension of patent rights. The general conclusions are that, in the modern age, patent rights need to be extended beyond the domestic jurisdiction, and that the appropriate manner for nations to achieve this extension is not unilaterally but through bilateral and multilateral treaties.

The history of constructive dismissals in South Africa imitated from the English law in 1986, when an employee successfully challenged the employer on this particular concept after an incident relating a forced resignation. From the literature it is clear that constructive dismissal, as we know it today, originated from our English counterparts. Being a relatively new concept, the South African labour laws caught on at a rapid pace. The leading case on which the South African authors leaned towards was the English case of Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough). In South Africa constructive dismissals were given statutory force in unfair dismissal law and is defined as the coerced or forced termination of a contract of employment resultant in from the conduct of the employer. There are many forms in which constructive dismissals would postulate that could justify an employee to lay claim to constructive dismissal. Examples thereof are the amendment of the contract of employment, rude language and sexual harassment. It is eminent that certain elements should be present before an employee would have reasonable prospects of succeeding with such a claim. Constructive dismissal comes into the equation when an employer behaves in such a manner that eventually and ultimately leads to the employee, being the receiving party, in the employment relationship, to terminate the employment contract. This termination must be the direct result of the conduct of the employer that irreparably frustrated the relationship and made it impossible for the employee to remain in the service of the employer in question. It appears that the courts have taken a firm stance on coerced or forced resignation, in its various forms tantamount to breach of contact, that any sufficiently unreasonable conduct by an employer may justify that the employee to terminate services and lay claim to the fact that he had been constructively dismissed. It needs to be mentioned that the fact that the mere fact that the employer acted in an unreasonable manner would not suffice and it is up to the employee to prove how the conduct of the employer justified the employee to leave and claim that the employer’s conduct resulted in a material or fundamental beach of the employment contract. In dealing with the contingency of the concept of constructive dismissals it has been expressly provided for in numerous systems of labour law. As is seen herein, a constructive dismissal consists in the termination of the employment contract by reason of the employee’s rather than the employer’s own immediate act. The act of the employee is precipitated by earlier conduct on the part of the employer, which conduct may or may not be justified. Various authors and academics endeavoured to defined constructive dismissal and all had the same or at least some of the elements present, to justify constructive dismissal. The most glaring element being the termination of employment as a result of the any conduct that is tantamount to a breach going to the root of the relationship by the employer, that frustrated the relationship between the employer and the employee and rendered it irreparable. The employee resigns or repudiates the employment contract as a result of the employer normally not leaving the employee any other option but to resign. This can also be termed as coerced or forced resignations and are commonly better known as “constructive dismissal”. The employee is deemed to have been dismissed, even though it is the employee who terminated the employment contract. The most important element to mention is the employee terminated the employment contract, ie resigned yet this is regarded as a dismissal, it is however for the employee to first lay a claim at the proper authority and the employee must prove his / her allegation before it can be a constructive dismissal. As will become clear, that the onus of proof is on the employee to show that the termination of employment resulted from the conduct of the employer. Equally true as in all cases of constructive dismissal, including cases of sexual harassment, being a ground for constructive dismissal, the employee must prove that to remain in service would have been unbearable and intolerable. Sexual harassment is one of the most difficult forms of constructive dismissals, in many cases there are no witnesses and the employee either “suffers in silence or opt to place her dignity at stake to prove her case. It seems as though the test is to determine if the employer’s conduct evinced a deliberate and oppressive intention to have the employment terminated and left the employee with only one option that of resignation to protect her interests. Employees have a right to seek statutory relief and needs to be protected. If a coerced or forced resignation had taken place irrespective whether the employee resigned or not. It is against this back drop that constructive dismissals was given legality and are now recognized as one of the four forms of dismissals in terms of the Act.

This piece aims to prove that a compulsory retirement age can no longer be justified in South Africa as a constitutional state. In times where people are gradually reaching older ages due to advances in a variety of fields, it seemed that the concept of a compulsory retirement age requires an in depth consideration. This is especially measured against the backdrop of equality and discrimination legislation within The Republic of South Africa. The development of social security law provides the larger framework in which to understand the concept and intentions around retirement. Discrimination and equality legislation demonstrates that age as a listed ground for discrimination does not necessarily simplify the jurisprudence pertaining to it, especially where alternatives have been developed for continued employment. The main point of reference in the South African justice system concerning discrimination disputes is the Harksen v Lane test, whereas the principle encapsulated in Waco v Schweitzer, relates particularly to discrimination based on age. These judgements and subsequent application will be illustrated and considered during the course of this research. The influence of fund rules and fixed-term contracts on the situation will aim to show the reality of the situation. In an effort to show that the problem of an ageing workforce and retirement is not localised to South Africa, an international overview of other constitutional countries is included for context. The comparison goes further to include non-constitutional countries to illustrate the global issue. This comparison was also included in an effort to find alternative strategies that may be utilised in South Africa for retirement and age discrimination legislations and social policies.

We are habituated to an hyperactive legislature and the proliferation of legislation. The legislature hurtles along, causing Anglo-American legal systems to degenerate into massive, and often meaningless, contradictory or trivial blocks of rules and norms, and ones which are beyond the ordinary citizen or corporation to know and fully to meet. Legislation’s demands are ever-increasing: it grows in volume, in ambition, and it seems to recognise no end to its capacity and entitlement to regulate the most detailed, most banal or most technical of affairs. It has lost any means by which to prioritise those matters with which it ought concern itself. The situation has been brought about by conflating an authority which Parliament acquired in the 17th and 18th Centuries with the legislation it produces. I seek to separate the two and show that there is no justification for attributing to legislation such legitimacy and authority as Parliament as an institution acquired historically. But because legislation-making has been based upon this assumption, there is a loss when Parliament legislates hyperactively because there exist normative reasons why Parliament should perhaps not act in such an unrestrained manner, but ones which, partly owing to the underlying assumptions about the authority of legislation, remain unaddressed. For so long as those who would claim for Parliament an entitlement ambitiously to legislate and without restraint fail to confront these considerations, there remains a normative loss when Parliament legislates in the manner they would advocate. I seek to diagnose a presently less than fully justified conferral upon legislation of authority and an accompanying incompleteness in the arguments of those who would seek to justify an activist and ambitious role for Parliament via legislation. This is not to say that there is no justification for Parliament’s current disposition, but that the foundation upon which Parliament’s hyperactivity in legislation has been built is attended with a failure of those who advance such a position to confront and to meet arguments which run counter to that claim.

The recent amendments made to employment laws and in particular the rewriting of the South African Labour Relations Act has brought into focus the diverse and conflicting interests of employers and employees, which is a concern of labour law analysts. This appraisal of South African of strike law examines the statutory and judicially established labour law in regard to the phenomenon of collective industrial action by employees and the regulation of its occurrence. Historical developments in strike law are traced from the early 1900’s. A period of segregated trade unionism, led ultimately to the introduction of a more inclusive system of regulation, which has in turn been modified to bring the law into line with the new constitutional imperatives. Industrial action occurred, often unregulated and regardless of statutory limitations, and in particular that industrial action which related to mass protest action, now recognized as a specific form of strike. The now repealed Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 is examined with regard to its strike regulating provisions, and identification of what were then new, unrecognized forms of strike action. It has allowed concepts and principles to be developed, under the unfair labour practice jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, much of which has been incorporated in the new Labour Relations Act. The legislation on strike law, which has been developed over the years, has been refined by the constitutional imperatives introduced to the national legal system. The relevant aspects of the new Constitution Act 108 of 1996 and its pervasive effect on strike law are examined. The right to strike in South African labour law, together with the protection of collective bargaining, is now constitutionally entrenched, and the right to strike is now accepted as a necessary adjunct to collective bargaining. It is necessary to give effect to the Constitution in national legislation, and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 endeavours to accomplish this in chapter IV in regard to strike law, which, it could be argued, limits rather than gives expression to the right to strike. iii The Labour Relations Act of 1995 is then discussed with reference to protected and prohibited strikes, and unregulated strike action. It will be evident that the Act has endeavoured to contain unprocedural and productivity draining industrial action, by subjecting rights disputes to arbitration and Labour Court adjudication, subject to certain exceptions. The recourse to lock-out, as the employer’s prerogative and general corollary of strike action, is briefly discussed. The case law relating to strikes is discussed in respect of both the 1956 Act and the new Labour Relations Act of 1995. Among the issues explored are the strike provisions which have been developed in statute and labour related common law, such as the identification of issues in dispute, notice of strike, the issuing of ultimatums, the audi altarem partem rule and the court’s approach to protected and unprotected strikes. The intention is to determine trends resulting from amendments to the law and draw inferences regarding, in particular, the unregulated form of strikes that occur within the scope of the protections offered by the Act. It is the intention to determine whether the desired effect has been achieved by implementing legislative reforms in response to public policy considerations.

BBBEE is currently on everyone’s minds and the uncertainty surrounding the changes to the Codes of Good Practice as well as the Sector Codes leaves business owner’s with a feeling of uncomfortable anticipation. The changes to the Codes of Good Practice has set the tone and most of the Sector Codes are being modelled around the Codes. Business owners will have to adapt to the changes and plan in advance in order to avoid being without a compliant BEE certificate. This will entail a strategic analysis of the company’s financial position as well as a strategic BEE plan for the 12 months they will be rated on.

The present study is designed to examine the structure and development of international and Canadian laws which attempt to regulate the ocean disposal of toxic waste by at-sea incineration. It begins by describing some of the hazardous wastes which are creating dangerous environmental problems in Canada and other nations, by introducing the reader to the types of toxic materials subject to incineration and dumping at sea, and to the nature of the hazards these materials create. With this background in mind, the historical development of ocean dumping laws is then described, beginning with the major international treaties that presently regulate dumping activities. The Canadian laws, which emerged in order to implement the international treaty obligations, are then examined, together with an outline of how these laws are actually administered in the Canadian constitutional and political context. Emerging political strategies to improve the management and disposal of toxic waste are examined, including the increased use of incineration technology. The actual use and legal regulation of ocean incineration is then described, in an attempt to determine whether this type of ocean disposal is a useful and controllable waste management option. Current Canadian policy and legal proposals on ocean incineration are examined in light of ongoing international controversy over the advisability of its use as a waste management strategy. The study examines several jurisdictional, economic, scientific, and political problems which, in the Canadian context, cast doubt upon the ability of government to obtain either public acceptance of ocean incineration, or adequate legal control over at-sea incineration operations. In particular, the relevant legal, political and administrative decision-making processes are reviewed, to identify areas in which improvements are needed. It is concluded that government should move away from incremental law and policy formation, and start to experiment with new forms of decision-making processes, in order to deal with such complex and difficult issues. It is recommended that the government seek to respond in new and innovative ways to these problems. Resolving the question of the desirability of ocean incineration is seen as a possible "pilot project" to test the ability of Canadian legal and political institutions to meet the future challenges posed by such environmental issues. The policies and legislation discussed in the study are reported as of June 30, 1988.
Law, Peter A. Allard School of
Graduate