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Articoli di riviste sul tema "National Iranian American Council"
1
Yungblud, V. T., e A. I. Sennikov. "The Kurdish Movement’s Factor in US Politics at the Peak of Iran and Afghanistan Crises, 1979 – January 1981". MGIMO Review of International Relations 16, n. 5 (13 novembre 2023): 28–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2023-5-92-28-57.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
At the close of 1979, the United States encountered a critical need to realign its Middle East strategy in the wake of the capture of the American Embassy in Tehran by supporters of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah R. Khomeini on November 4, and the subsequent deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on December 25. Faced with the challenges presented by the Iranian and Afghan crises, the United States' analytical, intelligence, and military bodies navigated various resources in search of viable solutions.This study delves into the consideration of the Kurdish factor as a potential instrument in shaping the regional landscape. The National Security Council (NSC), State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the US Department of Defense all scrutinized the Kurdish movement, evaluating its prospects for advancing American interests. Drawing from documents obtained from the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA, this article tracks the evolution of US policy concerning the Kurdish movement and its utility in realizing Washington's strategic objectives during the most critical phases of the Iran and Afghanistan crises.The analysis underscores the fundamental flaw in the initial evaluation of events in Afghanistan and Iran, misinterpreting them as a calculated move within a Soviet strategy to extend influence into the Persian Gulf region. This misconception was the primary cause of the Carter administration's failure in utilizing the Kurds as a counterforce against the Khomeini regime and its erroneous perceptions of the Iranian political regime's vulnerabilities. Inconsistencies in Washington's relationship with Tehran hindered the formulation of a coherent approach toward the Afghan-Iranian direction.
2
Yungblud, V. T., e A. I. Sennikov. "THE U.S. IN SEARCH OF AN ANSWER TO THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE: THE KURDISH CASE, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1979". Вестник Пермского университета. История, n. 2 (61) (2023): 70–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2219-3111-2023-2-70-83.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
As a result of the capture of the American embassy by supporters of the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah R. Khomeini, the U.S. lost the chances for a quick restoration of its positions in the Middle East. The events unfolding in Tehran demanded a serious and balanced response from the adminis-tration of John Carter. Under these conditions, the American government and its analytical structures began to look for tools to influence and put pressure on the Islamic regime. One of the potential levers of American policy could be the Kurdish issue, which was again openly put on the agenda after the Islamic revolution of 1978–1979. The potential of the Iranian Kurds in terms of countering the Khomeini regime, their controlla-bility and the conformity of their struggle with U.S. interests have become the subject of analytical work of the state services. The article examines the place and role of the Kurdish question in the search for U.S. res-ponses to the challenges of the Iranian crisis caused by the capture of the U.S. embassy in November 1979. Based on a wide range of documents from the U.S. National Archives, the John Carter Presidential Library, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Council of National U.S. security, the author traces the course of developing a policy towards Iran and a position regarding the national movement of Ira-nian Kurds. The context of regional policy and the influence of the Afghan issue on the Iranian course of Washington are also traced. As a result of the development of decisions, the line of Secretary of State S. Vance prevailed, demanding to refrain from active aggressive actions against Iran, to ignore the Kurdish movement. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan also had an impact, turning the entire political situa-tion in the Middle East upside down.
3
Fatima, Noor, e Sajida Begum. "Leadership Role of Hassan Rouhani and Nuclear Deal of Iran". Global International Relations Review I, n. I (30 dicembre 2018): 43–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/girr.2018(i-i).05.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Hassan Rouhani had been serving as secretary to Supreme National Security Council for 16 years. Hassan Rouhani was the person who was tasked to lead the team of technically, politically and legally expert's negotiators on nuclear program of Iran to start talks with the western powers to decreased the tension between IAEA body and foreign ministry of Iran on reports published by the IAEA and adoption of the UN Security Council resolution condemning Iran. Iran's nuclear program was started in the era of the reign of Raza Shah Pahlavi before the Islamic Revolution. It was not only another country providing nuclear technology but also America. Iran's foreign policy will not be affected by the slogans, but we will safely defend our national interests. Hassan Rouhani After elected as President in 2013, promised that he would work to bring relief in economic sanctions on the country due to which the economy was destroyed and life was difficult for the Iranian people. Iran's hardliner leaders had been opposing the any deal and talks on the matter of nuclear program. On the other end reformist groups in the Iran always favored the new ideas and negotiations on nuclear program and when the balance of power turned in favor of President Rouhani when won the elections in 2013 and he gave the green signal to the negotiators.
4
Ling, Peter J. "Why Reagan was not impeached". European Journal of American Culture 40, n. 3 (1 settembre 2021): 201–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/ejac_00053_1.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In the aftermath of Watergate and Vietnam, Congressional investigations uncovered the largely unknown activities of the CIA and other agencies, which included arming and interfering in the domestic politics of regimes in both Central America and Iran. These programmes had also involved supporting reactionary regimes in ways that some saw as drawing the United States into conflicts, like Vietnam, without public knowledge or consent. In 1987, it was revealed that the Reagan administration had operated a clandestine policy in Nicaragua that evaded the restrictions placed upon the executive by the Boland Amendment in terms of aid given to the Nicaraguan Contras and that National Security Council (NSC) staff had lied to Congress and concealed these illegal actions. They had solicited funds from foreign allies and smuggled arms to the Contra insurgents in support of their efforts to topple the Sandinista regime. Contrary to the Arms Export Control Act and to its own publicly stated policy, the administration had also sold arms, particularly missiles, to Iran, which had been branded a sponsor of international terrorism since the Iranian revolution, and which was currently at war with its neighbour, Iraq. Such deals had formed part of ‘arms for hostages’ negotiations that were also contrary to official policy. Finally, it was disclosed that profits from the arms sales had been diverted to fund the Contras and hence to evade Congressional restrictions on funding. This article explores why these illegal actions did not result in President Reagan’s impeachment. It considers the merits of the administration’s claims that this was a ‘rogue operation’ by zealots within the NSC, and the success of its efforts to present Reagan as eager to cooperate with efforts to discover the truth of what had happened. It reviews the interactions between the Tower Commission, Congressional investigations and Office of Independent Counsel probe (Lawrence Walsh) and shows how these contributed to Reagan’s ‘escape’ from impeachment. It reviews the argument that Reagan’s underlying health problems contributed to his lax management of NSC operations and it considers the importance of televised testimony, particularly that of Oliver North, in shaping public opinion in the administration’s favour. Finally, it considers how this significant episode in 1980s politics foreshadowed major trends in US politics that can be seen as culminating in the present, acute partisan divide, Donald Trump’s double impeachment, and a manifest decline in public trust and respect for American political institutions.
5
Cohen, Ariel. "Power or Ideology". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, n. 3 (1 luglio 2005): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.463.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.
6
Cohen, Ariel. "Power or Ideology". American Journal of Islam and Society 22, n. 3 (1 luglio 2005): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.463.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.
7
Panova, Iryna O., e Oleksandr K. Zhevaho. "The Historical and Theoretical Aspects of the Study of the Formation of Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran". PROBLEMS OF ECONOMY 2, n. 52 (2022): 32–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-0712-2022-2-32-38.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The article is aimed at highlighting the historical and theoretical aspects of the study of the formation of foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the present stage is based on a combination of historically formed interests of the State and the ideology of the Islamic revolution – the so-called «Khomeinism». Balancing a pragmatic and a revolutionary approach is enshrined in the country’s political system itself and, thanks to a significant economic, demographic and military base, allows Iran to hold a strong position in the international arena. At the same time, the initial course of confrontation with a number of regional and global actors, coupled with the development of the national nuclear program, creates obstacles for Iran’s full functioning in the international arena. The geopolitical position of the Islamic Republic is as profitable as it is quite complicated. Being at the crossroads of several world regions and approaching the world’s key energy basins provides Tehran with ample opportunities to advance its own influence and cooperation with neighboring countries. At the same time, Iran is surrounded by zones of regional instability and its rivals or competitors. To counter external threats, Tehran has developed a flexible strategy based on a wide range of pro-Iranian non-governmental organizations – the so-called «Axis of Resistance» – and an asymmetrical action instrumentarium, which include the use of both hard and soft power methods. Currently, the degree of confrontation with regional adversaries (Israel and the Gulf countries) and a global opponent (the United States) is gaining a threatening scale. However, Iran is generally characterized by a periodic change in the cycles of aggravation of tension and d?tente in relations with its opponents. At the same time, Tehran’s pragmatism has its manifestation in maintaining relations and dialogue with its opponents in order to achieve certain goals, despite the confrontational discourse of official statements. In addition to the activities strictly along the perimeter of the State (that includes the Middle East, South Caucasus, Central and South Asia), Iran, to the best of its own capabilities and the regime of international sanctions, establishes relations with many countries of the world, from members of the UN Security Council - Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China to the countries of Africa and Latin America. To promote its discourse on the international stage, Tehran uses a wide network of cultural, religious, educational and charitable organizations. This approach allows to win supporters and generate financial flows for the regional activities of the IRI around the world.
8
Thomas, Clive. "The National Council of Canadian Labour". Relations industrielles 12, n. 1-2 (17 febbraio 2014): 55–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1022580ar.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Summary The position of the National Council of Canadian Labour towards the Canadian Congress is that the CLC is simply the newest and the most spectacular "front" for international (American) unionism created in Canada. The author explains briefly in this article the reasons for such a statement.
9
Morady Moghaddam, Mostafa, e Fatemeh Mozafari. "Orientalist representation of Iranian women in three American newspapers". International Review of Pragmatics 15, n. 1 (19 gennaio 2023): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18773109-01501005.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Abstract This article explores three famous American newspapers as an attempt to find out how Iranian women are depicted in these three American newspapers. Three national newspapers (The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and The Washington Post) were consulted as authority to gain information about Iranian women. Two hundred and thirteen headlines about Iranian women were identified in these three newspapers published over a period of 10 years. Through qualitative corpus analysis, we noticed that Iranian women are represented with regard to five generic categories (patterns): Ethics and Dress Coding (EDC); Political Activism (PA); Political System (PS); Social Condition and Trends (SCT); and Praising Comments (PC). The patterns identified in these three newspapers regarding Iranian women indicate that material culture (physical aspect of culture) is highlighted by the American press when referring to Iranian women. The article also concludes that these three newspaper agencies manifest a pseudo-logical representation of Iranian women, which fails to acknowledge the dynamic life of Iranian women, and ignores local identities at the expense of globalization.
10
Blejwas, Stanislaus A. "The National Polish American–Jewish American Council A Short History". Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry 19, n. 1 (gennaio 2007): 257–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/polin.2007.19.257.
Testo completoTesi sul tema "National Iranian American Council"
1
Austin, Allan W. "FROM CONCENTRATION CAMP TO CAMPUS: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL JAPANESE AMERICAN STUDENT RELOCATION COUNCIL, 1942-1946". University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2001. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin990210250.
Testo completo
2
Zuercher, Friesen Deborah Kae. "Indigenous American Samoan Educators’ Perceptions of their Experiences in a National Council of Accreditation for Teacher Education (NCATE) Accredited Program". Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1182301897.
Testo completo
3
Mays, Sylvia B. "The characteristics, functions, behaviors and effectiveness of development officers in American public community colleges". Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/53894.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This national study developed a descriptive data base for the characteristics, functions, leader behaviors, and effectiveness ratings of development officers who belong to the National Council for Resource Development. These data were examined with respect to their relationship to institutional size, community wealth, size of staff, and age of the foundations.
Twelve percent of these development officers were minorities and 43 percent were female. The mean age of the development officers was 44 years and more than 30 percent held doctoral degrees. Their graduate majors clustered in four disciplines, while their graduate degrees were overwhelmingly in education. They reported little previous experience in development work, though most prior work experience had been in the field of education. Nearly 70 percent reported directly to the presidents of their institutions. Almost 92 percent of these institutions were found to have foundations and more than half of these foundations were less than five years old.
Development officers indicated that the functional area of greatest importance and the one for which they had the greatest responsibility was that of program planning. Two of the most important program planning functions were those of: (a) identifying funding sources, and (b) cultivating potential funding sources. Yet, the functional area of least importance and the one for which development officers reported the least responsibility, was that of fund raising. This finding was partially explained by the artificial grouping of the functions and by the fact that most development officers reported sharing rather than carrying primary responsibility for the fund raising functions.
Development officers rated high on both the task-oriented and on the person-oriented dimensions of the leadership scale. They were rated by their supervisors as high in overall effectiveness. They were also rated as effective in both fund raising and in "friend raising." Younger development officers were perceived as more effective than their older counterparts. No other relationships were found between characteristics, leader behaviors, functions, effectiveness, and situational differences among institutions.
lmplications for these findings include pre-service and in-service education as well as use in the selection and the evaluation of development officers.Ed. D.
4
Engelbrecht, Gysbert Adriaan. "Going it alone? : an evaluation of American concerns about the international criminal court". Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/52869.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an exciting new development in the international system. It is not without its detractors, however, amongst others the United States. The fact that the United States takes a strong stance against the ICC creates uncertainty in the international system. This uncertainty is linked to the role of the United States as the only remaining superpower in this system. The main concern of the United States about the ICC is that an American might be brought before the court in terms of politically motivated charges. To illustrate this concern, the United States offers five basic arguments. These five are condensed into three arguments that form the main body of this thesis. They are the questions related to the jurisdiction of the ICC, the role of the United Nations Security Council in the functioning of the ICC, and the influence that the United States constitution might have on the ICC. Close attention is also paid to the political implications of the stance taken by the United States, both in terms of the specific arguments, and in general. The different arguments are tested against certain criteria, which include the stipulations of the ICC Statute and other counter arguments. From these comparisons, certain evaluations can be made, from which conclusions are drawn. For various reasons, none of the arguments put forward have merit when tested against the stipulations of the ICC Statute. What this implies is that the United States does not have real evidence to back its main concern about the ICC. Even though the possibility exists that an American could be charged before the court, there are sufficient safeguards to protect such a person from actually appearing before the court. The very real political implication then becomes that the United States is undermining its position and relative power in the international system by taking such a unilateral st
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Internasionale Kriminele Hof (IKH) is 'n opwindende ontwikkeling in die internasionale sisteem. Dit is egter nie sonder opponente nie, wat onder andere die Verenigte State van Amerika insluit. Die feit dat Amerika so sterk standpunt teen die hof inneem, skep onsekerheid in die internasionale sisteem. Die onsekerheid hou verband met Amerika se rol as die enigste oorblywende supermoontheid binne die sisteem. Amerika se hoof besorgdheid met die IKH is dat 'n Amerikaner dalk in terme van polities-gemotiveerde aanklagte voor die hof gedaag sal word. Hierdie besorgdheid word geïllustreer deur vyf basiese argumente wat geopper word. Hierdie argumente word in drie spesifieke argumente wat die basis van die tesis vorm, gefokus. Die argumente is die vrae in terms van die jurisdiksie van die IKH, die rol van die Veiligheidsraad van die Verenigde Nasies in die funksionering van die IKH, en die invloed wat die Amerikaanse grondwet op die IKH het. Daar word ook gekyk na die politieke implikasies van die Amerikaanse standpunt, beide in terme van die spesifieke argumente en in die algemeen. Die verskillende argumente word teen sekere kriteria getoets, wat die stipulasies van die IKH Statuut en ander teenargumente behels. Vanaf hierdie vergelykings kan evaluerings gedoen word, waarvan daar gevolgtrekkings gemaak word. Vir verskeie redes het nie een van die spesifieke argumente meriete as dit teen die bepalings van die IKH Statuut getoets word nie. Dit impliseer dat Amerika nie werklik bewyse vir hul hoof besorgdheid met betrekking tot die IKH het nie. Selfs al is die moontlikheid daar dat 'n Amerikaner wel voor die hof gedaag kan word, is daar voldoende waarborge om so persoon teen 'n verskyning voor die hof te beskerm. Die werklike politieke implikasie is nou dat Amerika sy posisie en relatiewe mag in die internasionale sisteem met sy eensydige standpunt teen die IKH ondermyn. Hierdie punt kan ook verdere uitgebreide implikasies hê.
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Giberson, Gregory A. "Institutionalized on the Margins: An Organizational History of the Preparation of Teachers of College Composition". [Tampa, Fla.] : University of South Florida, 2004. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/SFE0000374.
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Jenkins, James Fitzhugh. "The foundations of Red Power : The National Indian Youth Council 1968-1973". Thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/24093.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The period from 1969 until 1973 represented the height of “Red Power” for American Indians. Pan-tribal activists participated in hundreds of demonstrations and dozens of militant takeovers demanding tribal sovereignty. The National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) was at the forefront of this period of direct action even though it continued to receive funding for educational programs and advocated reform through legal means. Operating under an entirely new leadership, the NIYC of the early 1970s resembled the Youth Council of the mid-1960s by continuing to balance indirect action and legal reform with direct action and militant language. But by the end of 1973, the Youth Council ceased supporting direct action as a legitimate tactic for pressuring social change. By 1973 it became clear that pan-tribal protests could quickly upset the gains that American Indians were making in federal reform.
Wealthy benefactors funded the NIYC throughout the period, but they never overtly pushed the Youth Council into a more moderate direction. Instead, outside funding increased the NIYC’s operational space and allowed it to gain a modicum of power within the federal agency responsible for Indians, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The NIYC found itself able to pressure the BIA into negotiating on a range of issues, and the NIYC developed allies that shared its goals and ideology within the agency. However, the NIYC’s continued ability to negotiate with the federal government was vulnerable to controversy, and the highly confrontational episodes led by the American Indian Movement (AIM) tended to upset the pace of reform within the federal government. AIM’s 1972 takeover of the BIA national headquarters and AIM’s 71-day occupation of Wounded Knee created setbacks for the NIYC even as the events garnered national attention and support. Moreover, the political climate became receptive to supporting the self-determination of tribal governments, and pan-tribal organizations like the NIYC had to shift their focus in the context of newly empowered tribes. Foundation support allowed the NIYC to help open the way for tribes to negotiate with the U.S. state directly, and this very success made pan-tribal demonstrations increasingly obsolete by the mid-1970s.text
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David, Andrew Nicholas. "Fighting for national security: building the national security state in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations". Thesis, 2018. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/31876.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Between 1953 and 1963, during the administrations of President Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy, the United States government transformed the way it formulated and executed foreign and defense policies. These changes gave the White House its own foreign policy staff, in the form of the National Security Council, and increased the powers of the Secretary of Defense. Most of these changes began under Eisenhower in the 1950s. Eisenhower, however, delayed making several key reforms despite the recommendations of his staff. He believed some reforms were unnecessary and remained ambivalent about others. Moreover, he wanted to avoid sending complex reorganization legislation through Congress, which Eisenhower feared would allow legislators to interfere in matters of the Executive Branch. Democrats in the 1960 presidential election capitalized on the failure to push through these reforms. The Democratic attacks proved remarkably compelling to a bipartisan audience. Kennedy used this bipartisan agreement to enact many of the reforms Eisenhower had ignored. The motivating factor for many of these decisions was not merely an attempt by either President to concentrate power in the White House, it was a belief that the post-1945 world was so unstable that only giving the White House unfettered access and oversight of the levers of power could ensure the safety of the nation.
This work merges Diplomatic History with the field of American Political Development to examine these dramatic changes to the structure of the US government. Historians traditionally have examined these Kennedy era administrative changes in isolation. Studying them together with those that took place under Eisenhower yields a more complete picture of how the national security state developed. Despite Eisenhower’s reluctance to adopt some of the reforms embraced by Kennedy, both presidents believed that major reforms were necessary. Any sound analysis of the ways the contemporary United States makes its foreign and defense policies requires understanding momentous changes that took place during the transformational period of the early Cold War
Libri sul tema "National Iranian American Council"
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Mahdī, Muḥammad Maḥmūd. Amrīkā wa-jamāʻāt al-ḍaghṭ: Īrān wa-muʼassasāt ṣunʻ al-qarār al-siyāsī. al-Qāhirah: al-ʻArabī lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 2023.
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Crabb, Cecli V. American national security: A presidential perspective. Pacific Grove, Calif: Brooks/Cole, 1991.
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Smith, Elaine M. Mary McLeod Bethune and the National Council of Negro Women: Pursuing a true and unfettered democracy : for the Mary McLeod Bethune Council House, National Historic Site, National Park Service. [Montgomery]: Alabama State University, 2003.
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Shoemaker, Christopher C. The NSC staff: Counseling the council. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1991.
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Eleanor, Arnold, e National Extension Homemakers Council (U.S.), a cura di. Voices of American homemakers. [Hollis, N.H: National Extension Homemakers Council], 1985.
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1950-, O'Brien Michael J., e Lyman R. Lee, a cura di. Setting the agenda for American archaeology: The National Research Council archaeological conferences of 1929, 1932, and 1935. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001.
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Council, American Craft. Creating a new craft culture: American Craft Council conference 2009. New York: American Craft Council, 2010.
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W, Swafford Polly, e Council on National Literatures, a cura di. Potpourri magazine: Council on National Literatures annual awards in poetry and fiction, 1995-2003. Wilmington, DE: Published for the Bagehot Council by Griffon House Publications, 2004.
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Meter, Crabb Cecil Van. American national security: A presidential perspective. Pacific Grove, Calif: Brooks/Cole, 1991.
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The National Council of Negro Women and the feminist movement, 1935-1975. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 1985.
Cerca il testo completoCapitoli di libri sul tema "National Iranian American Council"
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Yazdanjoo, Morteza. "Narrative Trajectories of National Identity in Iranian Cinema". In Modern American Literature and Contemporary Iranian Cinema, 42–61. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003347781-3.
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Henry, Charles P. "The National Council for Black Studies". In Black Studies and the Democratization of American Higher Education, 95–119. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-35089-9_4.
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Wainwright, Darius. "Anglicising Iranian Society and Culture Through Education: The UK Foreign Office and the British Council". In American and British Soft Power in Iran, 1953-1960, 153–81. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88414-7_6.
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Lang, Clarence. "Freedom Train Derailed: The National Negro Labor Council and the Nadir of Black Radicalism". In Anticommunism and the African American Freedom Movement, 161–88. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230620742_6.
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Olfos, Raimundo, Masami Isoda e Soledad Estrella. "Multiplication of Whole Numbers in the Curriculum: Singapore, Japan, Portugal, the USA, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile". In Teaching Multiplication with Lesson Study, 25–35. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28561-6_2.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
AbstractThis chapter shows how the teaching of multiplication is structured in national curriculum standards (programs) around the world. (The documents are distributed by national governments via the web. Those documents are written in different formats and depths. For understanding the descriptions of the standards, we also refer to national authorized textbooks for confirmation of meanings.) The countries chosen for comparison in this case are two countries in Asia, one in Europe, two in North America, and two in South America: Singapore, Japan, Portugal, the USA (where the Common Core State Standards (2010) are not national but are agreed on by most of the states), Mexico, Brazil, and Chile, from the viewpoint of their influences on Ibero-American countries. (The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) standards (published in 2000) and the Japanese and Singapore textbooks have been influential in Latin America. Additionally, Portugal was selected to be compared with Brazil). To distinguish between each country’s standard and the general standards described here, the national curriculum standards are just called the “program.” The comparison shows the differences in the programs for multiplication in these countries in relation to the sequence of the description and the way of explanation. The role of this chapter in Part I of this book is to provide the introductory questions that will be discussed in Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to explain the features of the Japanese approach. (As is discussed in Chap. 1, the Japanese approach includes the Japanese curriculum, textbooks, and methods of teaching which can be used for designing classes, as has been explored in Chile (see (Estrella, Mena, Olfos, Lesson Study in Chile: a very promising but still uncertain path. In Quaresma, Winsløw, Clivaz, da Ponte, Ní Shúilleabháin, Takahashi (eds), Mathematics lesson study around the world: Theoretical and methodological issues. Cham: Springer, pp. 105–122, 2018). The comparison focuses on multiplication of whole numbers. In multiplication, all of these countries seem to have similar goals—namely, for their students to grasp the meaning of multiplication and develop fluency in calculation. However, are they the same? By using the newest editions of each country’s curriculum standards, comparisons are done on the basis of the manner of writing, with assigned grades for the range of numbers, meanings, expression, tables, and multidigit multiplication. The relationship with other specific content such as division, the use of calculators, the treatment of multiples, and mixed arithmetic operations are beyond the scope of this comparison. Those are mentioned only if there is a need to show diversity.
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BLEJWAS, STANISLAUS A. "The National Polish American– Jewish American Council:". In Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry Volume 19, 257–86. The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2kcwnw6.17.
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"Kissinger and the National Security Council". In The Last American Diplomat. I.B.Tauris, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9780755624034.ch-005.
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Davidson, Donald L. "Protestant Peacemaking: The National Council of Churches". In Nuclear Weapons and the American Churches, 117–48. Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429045363-5.
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"Introduction – The Origins and Significance of National Security Council Entrepreneurs". In National Security Entrepreneurs and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 3–29. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9780228004271-004.
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"An Ill-Fated Success: Robert McFarlane and the “Iranian Initiative,” 1981–85". In National Security Entrepreneurs and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 151–96. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9780228004271-008.
Testo completoAtti di convegni sul tema "National Iranian American Council"
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Klevens, Jay. "North American High Voltage Interlaboratory Comparison". In NCSL International Workshop & Symposium. NCSL International, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51843/wsproceedings.2020.19.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This is the report for an interlaboratory comparison (ILC) of high voltage measurements performed by ten labs in the USA and Canada from 2018-2019. The measurement ranges were 20-100 kV dc and 15-70 kV rms at 60 Hz ac. The ILC was designed to verify strengths and reveal weaknesses in high voltage measurements in commercial, military and energy sector calibration laboratories. The ILC was performed among members of NCSL International, with the generous support of National Research Council Canada (NRC).
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Ghoshal, Debarshi Patanjali, e Hannah Michalska. "Finite-interval kernel-based identification and state estimation for LTI systems with noisy output data* This work was supported by The National Science & Engineering Research Council of Canada". In 2019 American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/acc.2019.8815058.
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Curtis, Timothy L., Douglas Perrault, Christopher Williams e Neil Bose. "Maneuvering of the C-SCOUT AUV". In SNAME 26th American Towing Tank Conference. SNAME, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.5957/attc-2001-011.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In September of 1998, a collaborative effort between the Institute for Marine Dynamics (IMD) of the National Research Council of Canada and the Ocean Engineering Research Centre of Memorial University of Newfoundland began to design a streamlined AUV to serve as a testbed for /MD and graduate level research. This A UV, the C-SCOUT, is expected to serve as a test-bed to assist in the development of future control and propulsion systems, the testing of vehicle components, and as a general research and development tool for years to come. Future versions of C-SCOUT can be configured for a wide variety of missions including search and survey, under ice operations, iceberg profiling, oceanographic sampling, and mine detection and countermeasures.
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Ding, Yueheng, Xinggang Yan, Zehui Mao e Sarah K. Spurgeon. "Decentralised Sliding Mode Tracking Control for a Class of Nonlinear Interconnected Systems**This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 61922042 and 62020106003, China Scholarship Council for 3 years' study at the University of Kent, and Qing Lan Project." In 2021 American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/acc50511.2021.9483425.
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Riccobono, Loredana, Giuseppe Insalaco e Giovanni Viegi. "Use Of A Customer Satisfaction Survey By An Institute Of The National Research Council Of Italy: A Tool To Make The Service Of Sleep Medicine Center Of Better Quality For The Patients". In American Thoracic Society 2012 International Conference, May 18-23, 2012 • San Francisco, California. American Thoracic Society, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1164/ajrccm-conference.2012.185.1_meetingabstracts.a6470.
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Datta, I., e S. Ando. "Measurement of Pressure, Added Mass and Damping Coefficients for a Destroyer Model using the Marine Dynamic Test Facility". In SNAME 24th American Towing Tank Conference. SNAME, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.5957/attc-1995-035.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The Marine Dynamic Test Facility (MDTF) is a five degree-of-freedom forced oscillation test apparatus being purchased jointly by the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) and the National Research Council of Canada (NRC). When completed, it will be installed in the towing tank of the Institute for Marine Dynamics (IMD) in St. John's, Newfoundland. The apparatus is designed to perform complex experiments with surface ships, submarines, underwater vehicles, etc. by putting them through pre-defined arbitrary trajectories, measuring the reaction forces and extracting the hydrodynamic characteristics of the vehicles from the measured data. There are also other novel applications which this apparatus could be put to. Currently IMD has a pilot version of the MDTF, with only dynamic heave and pitch, and variable yaw offset, capabilities. The pilot rig was used in a recent experiment to oscillate a destroyer model in pure heave and pure pitch modes in calm water. One purpose was to measure the added mass and damping coefficients. As well, the model was instrumented with 19 pressure transducers to measure the radiation pressure on the model hull as function of oscillation frequency, amplitude and forward speed. These data are vital for the proper validation of numerical codes, particularly since good experimental data on radiation load and pressure are relatively rare. This paper outlines the main features of the experimental technique, describes the data analysis procedures and presents results that show the validity of the approach. The huge amount of data gathered are still in the process of being analyzed and only some representative results are presented.
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Murray, J., e G. Fudge. "Construction and Commissioning of the Offshore Engineering and Seakeeping Basin at the Institute for Marine Dynamics". In SNAME 22nd American Towing Tank Conference. SNAME, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.5957/attc-1989-021.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The National Research Council of Canada is presently constructing and preparing to commission a 75 m x 32 m x 3.5 m Offshore Engineering and Seakeeping Basin at the Institute for Marine Dynamics in St. John's, Newfoundland. The Basin will be capable of simulating waves, wind and current, for use in both commercial and research programs. The first stage of commissioning and calibration will focus on preparing the Basin, scheduled for completion in February 1990, for commercial testing of moored and free running vessels. Waves are gene rated in the Basin by means of a 192 segment wave machine, mounted in a "J" configuration. Short and long-crested monochromatic and random waves will be generated using the snake principle. Passive wave absorption is utilized in the Basin using expanded metal sheets of varying porosities and spacings. These are located at all Basin wall locations not supporting wave generators. A bank of 24 analog controlled fans is used to generate wind. Turbulence spectra and velocity profiling are established by fluctuating the speed of the fans using precalibrated drive signals. Surface current is generated by setting up water circulation within the Basin. Submersible pumps are used to charge manifolds positioned at various levels below the surface. The data acquisition system, controlled by a microVAX-II computer, is capable of variable rate sampling of 128 channels of A/0 and can simultaneously output 16 channels of DIA. The microVAX is networked to a local VAX 3200 used for synthesis of drive signals and test data reduction and analysis. Model motions in six degrees-of-freedom are measured using an optical tracking system, consisting of three vertical and two horizontal cameras, and light emitting diodes positioned on the model.
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Szeto, Kei, e Stefan Grochowalski. "Maneuvering Simulation Model Based oh Ship Design Parameters". In SNAME 22nd American Towing Tank Conference. SNAME, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.5957/attc-1989-057.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The knowledge of maneuvering characteristics of ships under different conditions is paramount from the safety and operation point of view. The maneuvering characteristics can be predicted in a number of ways: model scale maneuvering test, numerical calculation using hydrodynamic theories and numerical simulation based on semispherical formulas. The first and second approaches require detailed information of the hull geometry and other particulars. The model test prediction is often costly since it requires model construction, specialized equipment and testing facilities, etc. The theoretical prediction is less expensive than the model test but it usually requires substantial amount of computer resources, and CPU time in particular. On the other hand, semiempirical prediction does not require detailed ship information or extensive use of computer facilities, and it is the least expensive. However, it can only predict the general maneuvering characteristics for a given combination of ship basic parameters – principle dimensions, rudder and propeller particulars. Such general maneuvering characteristics would be essential for applications in ship design, port planning and maritime policy making. Using the semiempirical prediction at the early stage of a ship design, the designer can optimize the ship basic parameters in relation to maneuverability and other mission requirements. The port authorities and regulatory agencies can consult the semiempirical prediction in their decision making process regarding port development, traffic control and navigational requirements for different classes of ships. Bearing this in mind, a hydrodynamic derivative-type maneuvering simulation model has been developed at the Institute for Marine Dynamics ( IMD) of the National Research Council Canada. The development of the model was based on published information. The simulation model can predict the maneuvering characteristics of a ship if its hydrodynamic derivatives, rudder and propeller geometry are known. In addition, it can also predict maneuvering characteristics of merchant ships based on its basic design parameters including: length, beam, draft, block and waterplane coefficients, displacement, rudder and propeller geometry, etc. The model allows continuous engine speed and rudder angle inputs for simulation of both standard and arbitrary maneuvers. The model can also predict the influence of different propulsion systems and operating conditions oo the maneuvering behavior. It incorporates the effect of a bow thruster and the different response characteristic of steam and diesel power plants. In addition, the effects of bank and channel, current, shallow water and wind on the maneuvering behavior are incorporated. The mathematical formulations of the basic maneuvering model, thruster, propulsion plants and various environmental effects are described in Section 2 and 3. A carputer software package has been developed according to the mathematical formulations described. The package utilizes the existing carputer facilities at IMD. It is designed to be user-friendly and operates interactively according to the instructions of the user. The structure and usage of the simulation software are described in Section 4. A discussion of the accuracy of the simulation model is based on comparisons with model scale and sea trial results and the conclusions are presented in section 5 and 6, respectively.
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Akinlabi, Stephen, Mukul Shukla e Tshilidzi Marwala. "Laser Beam Forming: Experimental Investigation and Statistical Analysis of the Effects of Parameters on Bending Angle". In ASME 2013 International Manufacturing Science and Engineering Conference collocated with the 41st North American Manufacturing Research Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/msec2013-1215.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Laser Beam Forming (LBF), a non-contact manufacturing process has become a viable manufacturing process for shaping of metallic components. The capability of LBF and bending demands more on experimental studies to identify optimized parameter settings and also establish the probable influence of process parameters on the response i.e. the resulting bending angles in the present work. The experiments on laser forming process of 3 mm steel plate were conducted using a 4.4 kW Nd: YAG laser (Rofin DY 044), at the Council for Science and Industrial Research - National Laser Centre (CSIR-NLC), Pretoria, South Africa. This paper investigates the effects of five important process parameters such as namely laser power, beam diameter, number of scan tracks, scan velocity and cooling effect on the resulting formed sample curvature. Statistical tools combined with the Taguchi robust Design of Experiment, based on the L-27 Taguchi Orthogonal array (TOA) have been used. The samples were successfully formed to different curvatures following the experimental design. Both the Taguchi analysis and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) established that the number of scan irradiation had the maximum effect while cooling effect coolant flow had the least contribution on the bending angle of formed components. Regression analysis was also conducted on the experimental data and a linear model relating all the influencing parameters was developed with an R-square value of around 98% showing the goodness of fit of the model. The regression model confirms that the experimentally measured bending angles were in good agreement with the model predicted values. This model can ultimately be used to estimate the bending angle in LBF of 3 mm steel plate within the study range of parameters.
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Baldao, Thayna Pires, Marcos R. O. A. Maximo e Cecilia de Azevedo Castro Cesar. "Decision-making for 5×5 Very Small Size Soccer Teams**Thayna Pires Baldão would like to thank Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) for her undergraduate research scholarship. The authors also thank ITAndroids' sponsors: Altium, Cenic, Intel, ITAEx, MathWorks, Metinjo, Micropress, Polimold, Rapid, SolidWorks, STMicroelectronics, Wildlife Studios, and Virtual.PYXIS." In 2020 Latin American Robotics Symposium (LARS), 2020 Brazilian Symposium on Robotics (SBR) and 2020 Workshop on Robotics in Education (WRE). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/lars/sbr/wre51543.2020.9307041.
Testo completoRapporti di organizzazioni sul tema "National Iranian American Council"
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Vo, Thao, Susan Lyons, Felice Levine, Nathan Bell e Ye Tong. State of the Field: Gender and Racial Equity in Educational Measurement. American Educational Research Association, aprile 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/aera20241.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This report is the result of a collaborative initiative of the American Educational Research Association (AERA), the National Council on Measurement in Education (NCME), and Women in Measurement (WIM) aimed at understanding the current state of gender and racial equity within the educational measurement field. Based on a survey of professionals’ experiences and perceptions, the study documents disparities across racial and gender groups and offers recommendations for creating a more diverse, equitable, and inclusive profession.
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Boyle, M., e Elizabeth Rico. Terrestrial vegetation monitoring at Fort Matanzas National Monument: 2019 data summary. National Park Service, maggio 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.36967/nrds-2293409.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The Southeast Coast Network (SECN) conducts long-term terrestrial vegetation monitoring as part of the nationwide Inventory and Monitoring Program of the National Park Service (NPS). The vegetation community vital sign is one of the primary-tier resources identified by SECN park managers, and it is currently conducted at 15 network parks (DeVivo et al. 2008). Monitoring plants and their associated communities over time allows for targeted understanding of ecosystems within the SECN geography, which provides managers information about the degree of change within their parks’ natural vegetation. 2019 marks the first year of conducting this monitoring effort at four SECN parks, including Fort Matanzas National Monument (FOMA). Nine vegetation plots, located on Anastasia and Rattlesnake Islands, were established at Fort Matanzas National Monument in June. Data collected in each plot included species richness across multiple spatial scales, species-specific cover and constancy, species-specific woody stem seedling/sapling counts and adult tree (greater than 10 centimeters [3.9 inches {in}]) diameter at breast height (DBH), overall tree health, landform, soil, observed disturbance, and woody biomass (i.e., fuel load) estimates. This report summarizes the baseline (year 1) terrestrial vegetation data collected at Fort Matanzas National Monument in 2019. Data were stratified across two dominant broadly defined habitats within the park (Maritime Upland Forests/Shrublands and Maritime Open Uplands). Noteworthy findings include: Eighty-two vascular plant taxa (species or lower) were observed across nine vegetation plots, including eight species not previously documented within the park. The most frequently encountered species in each broadly defined habitat included: Maritime Upland Forests and Shrublands: saw palmetto (Serenoa repens), yaupon (Ilex vomitoria), southern/eastern red cedar (Juniperus silicicola + virginiana), American beautyberry (Callicarpa americana), and American burnweed (Erectites hieraciifolius). Maritime Open Uplands: sea oats (Uniola paniculata), earleaf greenbriar (Smilax auriculata), and dixie sandmat (Euphorbia bombensis). ne non-native species, Brazilian pepper (Schinus terebinthifolia), categorized as invasive by the Florida Exotic Pest Plant Council (FLEPPC 2019) was encountered in one Maritime Upland Forest and Shrubland plot during this monitoring effort. There were not any rare plants tracked by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS 2020) found during this monitoring effort. All plants located in these monitoring plots are fairly common throughout Florida, as well as across the Southeast Coast. Three species observed, however, are on the FDACS 2020 list of commercially exploited plants within the state. These include saw palmetto, cinnamon fern (Osmundastrum cinnamomeum), and coontie (Zamia integrifolia var. umbrosa). Southern/eastern red cedar and cabbage palmetto (Sabal palmetto) were the most dominant species within the tree stratum of the Maritime Upland Forest and Shrubland habitat type. Species that dominated the sapling and seedling strata of this type included yaupon and cabbage palmetto. More than 75% of the trees measured in the parks Maritime Upland Forest and Shrubland habitat type were alive and experiencing healthy vigor. Of the 22 trees that were dead, more than 50% of those were southern/eastern red cedar. Most of those individuals that were observed with moderate or severe decline and greater than 50% dieback were southern/eastern red cedars. Although red bay (Persea borbonia) was identified as one of the “principal understory tree” species within Fort Matanzas National Monument’s maritime forests in 2004 (Zomlefer et al. 2004), tree-sized individuals were rarely detected on plots during this monitoring effort. This may be in part due to the detection of laurel wilt disease within St. Johns County in 2006 (USDA 2021). Based on the low detection...
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Boyle, M. Terrestrial vegetation monitoring at Ocmulgee Mounds National Historical Park: 2021 data summary. National Park Service, luglio 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.36967/2299748.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The Southeast Coast Network (SECN) conducts long-term terrestrial vegetation monitoring as part of the NPS Inventory and Monitoring Program. The vegetation community vital sign is one of the primary-tier resources identified by SECN park managers, and monitoring is conducted at 15 network parks (DeVivo et al. 2008). Monitoring plants and their associated communities over time allows for targeted understanding of ecosystems within the SECN geography, which provides managers information about the degree of change within their parks’ natural vegetation. 2021 marks the first year of conducting this monitoring effort at Ocmulgee Mounds National Historical Park (OCMU). Eight vegetation plots were established throughout the park in early May. Data collected in each plot included species richness across multiple spatial scales, species-specific cover and constancy, species-specific woody stem seedling/sapling counts and adult tree (greater than 10 centimeters [3.9 inches {in}]) diameter at breast height (DBH), overall tree health, landform, soil, observed disturbance, and woody biomass (i.e., fuel load) estimates. This report summarizes the baseline (year 1) terrestrial vegetation data collected at Ocmulgee Mounds National Historical Park in 2021. Data were stratified across two dominant broadly defined habitats within the park, Coastal Plain Alluvial Wetlands and Coastal Plain Upland Forests. Noteworthy findings include: 142 vascular plant taxa (species or lower) were observed across eight vegetation plots, including 15 species not previously documented within the park. The most frequently encountered species in each broadly defined habitat included: Coastal Plain Alluvial Wetlands: Chinese privet (Ligustrum sinense), Chinese tallow (Triadica sebifera), Japanese honeysuckle (Lonicera japonica), eastern poison ivy (Toxicodendron radicans var. radicans), and smallspike false nettle (Boehmeria cylindrica). Coastal Plain Upland Forests: sweetgum (Liquidambar styraciflua), muscadine (Muscadinia rotundifolia var. rotundifolia), winged elm (Ulmus alata), water oak (Quercus nigra), loblolly pine (Pinus taeda), yaupon (Ilex vomitoria), Japanese honeysuckle, American beautyberry (Callicarpa americana), ebony spleenwort (Asplenium platyneuron), and multiple species of woody vines. Eleven non-native species invasive (Category 1 or Category 2) by the Georgia Exotic Pest Plant Council (GA-EPPC 2023) were encountered within the park during this monitoring effort. Three of these species—Chinese privet, Chinese tallow, and Japanese honeysuckle—were among the most frequent and abundant of all species observed within Coastal Plain Alluvial Wetland plots. There were no observations of vascular plant species listed as rare and tracked by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (GADNR 2023) within these monitoring plots. Sweetgum, red maple (Acer rubrum), swamp tupelo (Nyssa biflora), and Chinese tallow were the most dominant species within the tree stratum of Coastal Plain Alluvial Wetland sites; water oak, loblolly pine, and sweetgum were the most dominant species of Coastal Plain Upland Forests. There were very few observable disturbances to natural and semi-natural vegetation communities documented during this monitoring effort, including very little to no impact of browsing by white-tailed deer, rooting by feral hogs, or presence of diseased or dying trees. The two most pronounced threats to native vegetation on the park are (1) the high prevalence of non-native, invasive plant species (particular within alluvial habitat, and (2) the altered hydrology of the park’s alluvial wetlands from conversion of large berms for vehicle and railroad traffic. Long-term monitoring data will aid in understanding how these threats over time impact the park’s forest communities.
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Gutiérrez Bayo, Jaime. International Case Studies of Smart Cities: Santander, Spain. Inter-American Development Bank, giugno 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0007969.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This case study is one of ten international case studies developed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), in association with the Korean Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS), for the cities of Anyang, Medellin, Namyangju, Orlando, Pangyo, Rio de Janeiro, Santander, Singapore, Songdo, and Tel Aviv. At the IDB, the Competitiveness and Innovation Division (CTI), the Fiscal and Municipal Management Division (FMM), and the Emerging and Sustainable Cities Initiative (ESCI) coordinated the study. This project was part of technical cooperation ME-T1254, financed by the Knowledge Partnership Korean Fund for Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Korea. At KRIHS, the National Infrastructure Research Division coordinated the project and the Global Development Partnership Center (GDPC) provided the funding. The case of Santander as an object of study in the field of smart cities and as an international reference is known for the widespread deployment of devices, which makes it unique in the world as a testing ground. This, coupled with the diversity of services that are integrating technology throughout, means that today, the city, through its council, the university, and the successful tenderers for municipal services, is participating in more than 15 international projects. The next step, already underway, will be the integration of all smart services (e.g., water supply, solid waste collection, street lighting, and public transportation) into a single smart platform that will allow them to interact with each other and represents a step toward efficiency and smart city management.
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Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of Latin American and Caribbean Public Debt Management Specialists: Río de Janeiro, March 17-19, 2005. Inter-American Development Bank, marzo 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0005992.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The First Annual Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Public Debt Management Specialists took place in Rio de Janeiro on March 17, 18 and 19, 2005. This Meeting was organized and funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (Infrastructure and Financial Markets Division of the Bank's Sustainable Development Department) and the Brazilian National Treasury. Senior officials from the Debt Management Offices (DMOs) and Central Banks of nineteen LAC countries, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Denmark participated in this meeting, as well as experts from the OECD, IMF, UNCTAD, The World Bank, and the Central American Monetary Council. Staff from different areas of the Inter-American Bank (Regional and Financial Departments) also attended the presentations and discussions during the meeting. The main objective of this meeting was the consolidation of the general framework to structure and guide the actions of such group of Latin American and Caribbean specialists. The group will foster an approach that will lead to continuous sharing of experiences across countries and privilege technical discussions involving a broad group of debt management analysts that deal with back, middle and front-office issues. The agenda also included the approval of the previously discussed Bylaws and the election of the first Steering Committee composed by: Brazil (President), Colombia (Vice president), Chile, Jamaica, Mexico and Panama. The role of Executive Secretary was designated to the Inter-American Development Bank. The proposal was enthusiastically supported by all the countries' representatives that pledged to immediately start working in the implementation of the group's objectives.