Articoli di riviste: "Moral rights"

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Trumble, Steve. "Moral rights". Clinical Teacher 10, n. 6 (12 novembre 2013): 422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tct.12138.

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Schaller, Walter E. "Kant on Right and Moral Rights". Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, n. 2 (giugno 2000): 321–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00903.x.

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Pasternak, Avia. "From Corporate Moral Agency to Corporate Moral Rights". Law & Ethics of Human Rights 11, n. 1 (8 maggio 2017): 135–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2017-0003.

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Abstract Recent literature suggests that organizational entities, such as states and business corporations, can qualify as moral agents. Does it follow that, as members of our moral community, group agents are entitled to moral protections? This article explores the connection between groups’ moral agency and moral rights. I argue that corporate moral agency does not, in itself, ground a group’s claim for moral protections. Nevertheless, a group agent can be entitled to derivative moral rights protections, which attach to the group itself but are grounded in the interests of individuals, such as the group’s members. Furthermore, the agential status of a group helps to identify which rights can attach to it, given its moral agency. One such moral agency related right is a right not to be morally subverted. This right generates a duty for the group agent’s members to ensure that its decision-making process incorporates sound moral reasoning. The final part of the article applies these conclusions to recent debates on the rights of states. I argue that, as moral agents, states have a moral right not to be morally subverted. It follows that citizens have a pro tanto duty, directed at their state, not to engage in political activities that would subvert its moral powers.

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f, f. "The Interrelationship of Moral Education and Human Rights: How are moral education and human rights related?" Korea Association for Public Value 6 (31 dicembre 2023): 18–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.53581/jopv.2023.6.1.18.

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Purpose: ‘Moral Education’ is a major field in the study of education, characterized as a systematic process that provides a structure of meaningful activities for engaging young individuals to help them acquire a set of beliefs that guide their intentions and attitudes towards others and their environment / society in terms of outlook and morality. It focuses on the prevalent norms, values, and virtues which prompt individuals to reflect and act according to their axiological responsibilities. ‘Human Rights’ are those inherent moral claims of all human beings without which they cannot live as human beings. After the formation of the UN in 1945 and the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10th December 1948, they revolved around the ideas of Freedom, Equality, Justice, Human Dignity, Inalienability, Indivisibility, and Universality. Now they hold prime consideration in Education as well. This study explores the interrelationship of Moral Education and Human Rights in Pakistan to facilitate scholars, activists, and educationists to identify the areas of their common interests and collaborate more meaningfully. Method: A qualitative study employing a systematic review, survey, and some structured interviews was undertaken in order to find some common parameters from which it may be tentatively concluded that Moral Education and Human Rights are interdependent. Results: The results largely indicate that the study will provide a strong foundation to make meaningful changes in the domain of Moral Values Education, with particular emphasis on the context of Human Rights and training educators to be the most important “vehicle” for impact. Conclusion: The study establishes the significance of Moral Education and its efficacy in institutions highlighting the interdependence of Moral Values Education and Human Rights. It also presents some state-of-the-art implementation measures to secure lifelong learning possibilities using integrative approaches to foster knowledge and competencies related to ethics and values education.

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Kashfi Butt, Kashfi Butt. "The Interrelationship of Moral Education and Human Rights: How are moral education and human rights related?" Korea Association for Public Value 6 (30 giugno 2024): 19–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.53581/jopv.2023.6.1.19.

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Purpose: ‘Moral Education’ is a major field in the study of education, characterized as a systematic process that provides a structure of meaningful activities for engaging young individuals to help them acquire a set of beliefs that guide their intentions and attitudes towards others and their environment / society in terms of outlook and morality. It focuses on the prevalent norms, values, and virtues which prompt individuals to reflect and act according to their axiological responsibilities. ‘Human Rights’ are those inherent moral claims of all human beings without which they cannot live as human beings. After the formation of the UN in 1945 and the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10th December 1948, they revolved around the ideas of Freedom, Equality, Justice, Human Dignity, Inalienability, Indivisibility, and Universality. Now they hold prime consideration in Education as well. This study explores the interrelationship of Moral Education and Human Rights in Pakistan to facilitate scholars, activists, and educationists to identify the areas of their common interests and collaborate more meaningfully. Method: A qualitative study employing a systematic review, survey, and some structured interviews was undertaken in order to find some common parameters from which it may be tentatively concluded that Moral Education and Human Rights are interdependent. Results: The results largely indicate that the study will provide a strong foundation to make meaningful changes in the domain of Moral Values Education, with particular emphasis on the context of Human Rights and training educators to be the most important “vehicle” for impact. Conclusion: The study establishes the significance of Moral Education and its efficacy in institutions highlighting the interdependence of Moral Values Education and Human Rights. It also presents some state-of-the-art implementation measures to secure lifelong learning possibilities using integrative approaches to foster knowledge and competencies related to ethics and values education.

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Karmakar, Mahuya Roy. "Understanding Rights: Moral, Natural and Legal". Paripex - Indian Journal Of Research 3, n. 1 (15 gennaio 2012): 185–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/22501991/jan2014/57.

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Yu, Peter K. "Moral Rights 2.0". 2013 Fall Intellectual Property Symposium Articles 1, n. 4 (marzo 2014): 873–900. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/lr.v1.i4.3.

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When the protection of moral rights is brought up in the United States, commentators have always emphasized the differences between continental Europe and the United States.2 Cases that have been widely used as textbook illustrations include Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe3 and Turner Entertainment Co. v. Huston.4 While the Anglo-American copyright regime and the French author’s right (droit d’auteur) regime were quite similar in the eighteenth century, 5 the protection of moral rights did not attain formal international recognition until 1928.6 The gap between the U.S. and French systems has also grown considerably since the enactment of the 1909 U.S. Copyright Act.

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Lewis, Andrew R. "The Transformation of the Christian Right’s Moral Politics". Forum 17, n. 1 (24 aprile 2019): 25–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2019-0001.

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Abstract For at least the past four decades, the Christian Right’s political advocacy has epitomized morality politics in the US. In recent years, however, the Christian Right has transformed how it approaches various moral and cultural issues, appealing to the language and process of political rights. This reframing of cultural concerns has coincided with the declining cultural status of conservative Christianity. This article analyzes three issue areas—abortion, free speech, and religious freedom—documenting how conservative Christianity has altered its approach to public politics, coming to embrace individual rights language and arguments over and above common morality. The article also analyzes the whether this growing rights talk has contributed to extending support to the rights of others, finding mixed results. As conservative Christians have embraced the rights commitment for themselves, there has been a corresponding growth of political tolerance for others. At the same time, there remain prominent challenges to supporting pluralistic politics. While questions about the commitment to pluralism remain, the evolution of the Christian Right’s cultural style of politics has important implications, as the last vestige of communitarian politics routinely engages politics using the language of liberalism. Moral politics are now routinely rights politics.

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Puspasari, Anastasia Theresia. "Tinjauan Konsep Hak Eksklusif dalam Hak Cipta Berdasarkan Teori Hegel". Dialogia Iuridica 13, n. 2 (28 aprile 2022): 140–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.28932/di.v13i2.4577.

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Copyright is a protection in a form of an exclusive right which is attached with the creator, including moral rights which are possessed by the creator for the embodiment for their personality in the creation. The referred moral rights are recognized in the international treaties, specifically in Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement, which put forward the moral rights as a copyright protection. The protection of moral rights evolved from the Continental Europe countries, which recognizes author’s rights. The principle of moral rights could be analyzed with Hegel’s theory from the writing in his book entitled “Philosophy of Rights”, postulating the principle of how a person could claim his right of property possessions. In accordance with Hegel’s theory, this research will be focused on the scope of copyright as an exclusive right, which will also analyze the copyright law of Indonesia regulated in Law Number 28/2014. The copyright protection regarding moral rights in Law Number 28/2014 principally regulates the right given to the creator to signify their identities in their creation or to claim for their creation which adheres with their personalities. Moral rights are also given to performers in the form of related rights, as a right for the performers to claim the performance of the creation.

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Shook, John R. "Is Moral Enhancement a Right, or a Threat to Rights?" Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (ottobre 2018): 209–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135824611800036x.

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AbstractEnhancements for morality could become technologically practical at the expense of becoming unethical and uncivil. A mode of moral enhancement intensifying a person's imposition of conformity upon others, labeled here as “moral righteousness”, is particularly problematic. Moral energies contrary to expansions of civil rights and liberties can drown out reasoned justifications for equality and freedom, delaying social progress. The technological capacity of moral righteousness in the hands of a majority could impose puritanical conformities and override some rights and liberties. Fortunately, there cannot be a human right or a civil right to access righteous moral enhancement, and governments would be prudent to forbid such technology for moral righteousness. From an enlarged perspective, less righteousness could lead to a more just society. Going further, if a neurological intervention for moral righteousness could be invented, so too could moral de-enhancement, here labeled as “moral toleration”. Perhaps moral toleration deserves as much commendation as so-called moral enhancement. Justice with less delay can be justice enhanced.

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Child, J. W., A. I. Melden e L. W. Sumner. "Rights in Moral Lives." Philosophical Quarterly 40, n. 158 (gennaio 1990): 112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219974.

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Rasekh, Mohammad, Maedeh Taskhiri, Alireza Eskandari e Faezeh Ameri. "The Moral and Rights". Journal of Law Research 22, n. 87 (1 novembre 2019): 19–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.29252/lawresearch.22.87.19.

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Dryden, Jean. "Moral Rights and Archives". Journal of Archival Organization 15, n. 1-2 (3 aprile 2018): 78–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15332748.2018.1563745.

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Montague, Phillip. "Specification and Moral Rights". Law and Philosophy 34, n. 3 (15 novembre 2014): 241–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-014-9222-9.

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Mohammed, E. A. C. "Moral rights and mortal rights in Canada". Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 4, n. 4 (1 aprile 2009): 261–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpp004.

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Jones, Peter. "Moral Rights, Human Rights and Social Recognition". Political Studies 61, n. 2 (8 ottobre 2012): 267–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00988.x.

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Cruft, Rowan. "Human Rights Law Without Natural Moral Rights". Ethics & International Affairs 29, n. 2 (2015): 223–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0892679415000088.

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In this latest work by one of our leading political and legal philosophers, Allen Buchanan outlines a novel framework for assessing the system of international human rights law—the system that he takes to be the heart of modern human rights practice. Buchanan does not offer a full justification for the current system, but rather aims “to make a strong prima facie case that the existing system as a whole has what it takes to warrant our support of it on moral grounds, even if some aspects of it are defective and should be the object of serious efforts at improvement” (p. 173).

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Suka Asih K.Tus, Desyanti. "HAK EKONOMI DAN HAK MORAL KARYA CIPTA POTRET DI SOSIAL MEDIA". VYAVAHARA DUTA 14, n. 1 (19 settembre 2019): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.25078/vd.v14i1.1099.

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<p>Copyright is an exclusive right which contains economic rights and moral rights. Portrait is part of a protected creation. In a portrait that is distributed offline or online through social media, namely economic rights and moral rights that must be presented and adhered to by users. Copyright infragement that still occur for portraits on social media are related to violations of economic and moral rights. The use of portraits on social media without permission for commercial purposes is a form of violation of economic rights. While the form of violations of moral rights over portraits is not to include the creator or source of portraits used in social media. The regulation and protection of economic and moral rights of portraits on social media are regulated in the Copyright Law. Economic rights are stipulated in Article 12 to Article 15. Moral rights are stipulated in Article 5 to Article 7.</p>

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Chapman, Robert L. "Immigration and Environment: Settling the Moral Boundaries". Environmental Values 9, n. 2 (maggio 2000): 189–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/096327190000900205.

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Large populations fuelled by immigration have damaging effects on natural environments. Utilitarian approaches to immigration (whether restrictive or permissive) are inadequate, since they fail to draw the appropriate boundaries between people, as are standard rights approaches buttressed by sovereignty concerns because they fail to include critical environmental concerns within their pantheon of rights. A right to a healthy environment is a basic/subsistence right to be enjoyed by everyone, resident and immigrant alike. Current political-economic arrangements reinforced by familiar ethical positions that support property rights and preference satisfaction favours (privileged) residents while directly or indirectly denying basic rights to potential immigrants and should be abandoned and a basic rights procedure adopted.

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Vashchynets, Ivan. "Certain issues of the relationship between intellectual property rights and human rights in international legal aspects". Law Review of Kyiv University of Law, n. 1 (5 maggio 2021): 213–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.36695/2219-5521.1.2021.41.

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The article discusses the relationship between intellectual property rights and human rights in the context of international treaties,in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.Based on the relevant articles of these documents provided for the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral andmaterial interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author as well as on the specific featuresof human rights, the nature of intellectual rights and their intersection with human rights are analysed.The article devotes considerable attention to various international bodies’ views on the question at hand. In one of the most importantdocuments on the issue, General Comment No. 17, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contrasts humanrights with intellectual property rights. It is noted that the former are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements belonging toindividuals, and the latter are generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else. At the sametime, the UN Committee interpreted the author’s moral rights of attribution and integrity of his work to form part of the moral interestsreferred to in human rights law.The Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights Farida Shaheed generally concurred with the position of the Committee.However, she stressed the importance of looking beyond moral rights already recognized in copyright regimes to discern additional orstronger moral interests from a human rights standpoint so as to prevent the moral interests of authors from being under-protected. TheSpecial Rapporteur acknowledges that the moral rights of inventors and scientific discoverers are also protected as human rights.In respect to material interests, a limited number of property rights of authors can be recognized as human rights. As both the UNCommittee and the Special Rapporteur agreed, the material interests of authors are linked to an adequate standard of living which canbe achieved through one-time payments or by vesting an author, for a limited period of time, with the exclusive right to exploit his scientific,literary or artistic production.Hence, considering the provisions of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights, the creator’s moral rights of attribution and integrity of his work as well as his resale right and right to remunerationcan be considered as human rights.

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Gaus, Gerald F. "Green's Rights Recognition Thesis and Moral Internalism". British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7, n. 1 (febbraio 2005): 5–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2005.00163.x.

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T. H. Green claimed that ‘rights are made by recognition. There is no right but thinking makes it so’. This ‘rights recognition thesis’ is widely rejected. I argue in this article that, so far from being an idiosyncratic doctrine of 19th-century British Idealism, the rights recognition thesis implies a compelling conception of rights, and one that, surprisingly, is more in tune with contemporary meta-ethics than are many contemporary rights theories. Green's moral theory, I argue, is a form of the widely embraced doctrine of ‘moral internalism’. Such internalism, conjoined with a generally embraced analysis of rights, leads to some version of the rights recognition thesis.

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Hanfling, Oswald. "Rights and Human Rights". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 58 (marzo 2006): 57–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100009310.

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The concept of rights, as has often been noted, became prominent at a particular time in our history. It is associated especially with seventeenth and eighteenth century political ideas about the rights of individuals versus those of governments, and with such notable events as the American Declaration of Independence. It was at this time, too, that debates about rights of property and liberty became prominent. What was the role of this concept in earlier times? Has it always existed? Does it have a permanent place in our moral thinking? According to H.L.A. Hart,the concept of a right, legal or moral, is not to be found in the work of the Greek philosophers, and certainly there is no noun or noun phrase in Plato or Aristotle which is the equivalent of our expression ‘a right’, as distinct from ‘right action’ or ‘the right thing to do’.

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Perry, Michael J. "FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AS RELIGIOUS AND MORAL FREEDOM". Journal of Law and Religion 29, n. 1 (3 gennaio 2014): 124–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2013.1.

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AbstractIn another essay being published contemporaneously with this one, I have explained that as the concept “human right” is understood both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in all the various international human rights treaties that have followed in the Universal Declaration's wake, a right is a human right if the rationale for establishing and protecting the right—for example, as a treaty-based right—is, in part, that conduct that violates the right violates the imperative, articulated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration, to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.” Each of the human rights articulated in the Universal Declaration and/or in one or more international human rights treaties—for example, the right, articulated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration and elsewhere, not to be subjected to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”—is a specification of what, in conjunction with other considerations, the imperative—which functions in the morality of human rights as the normative ground of human rights—is thought to forbid (or to require). A particular specification is controversial if and to the extent the supporting claim—a claim to the effect that the “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative forbids (or requires)X—is controversial. My aim in this essay is to elaborate and defend a particular specification: the right, internationally recognized as a human right, to freedom of conscience—to freedom, that is, to live one's life in accord with the deliverances of one's conscience.

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Wellman, Christopher Heath. "PROCEDURAL RIGHTS". Legal Theory 20, n. 4 (dicembre 2014): 286–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325215000051.

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ABSTRACTIn this essay, I argue that absent special circumstances, there are no moral, judicial procedural rights. I divide this essay into four main sections. First, I argue that there is no general moral right against double jeopardy. Next, I explain why punishing a criminal without first establishing her guilt via a fair trial does not necessarily violate her rights. In the third section, I respond to a number of possible objections. And finally, I consider the implications of my arguments for the human right to due process.

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Biggar, Nigel. "IMPRUDENT JURISPRUDENCE? HUMAN RIGHTS AND MORAL CONTINGENCY". Journal of Law and Religion 30, n. 3 (10 settembre 2015): 391–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2015.23.

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AbstractOliver O'Donovan is mistaken to think that subjective rights are irredeemably bound up with Hobbesian individualism, but correct to criticize their abstraction from deliberation about a wider range of moral considerations. As Grotius's thinking shows, the existence of a natural, moral right against physical harm depends on the contingent presence or absence of morally significant circumstances. There is, however, an important distinction between natural moral rights outside a particular, effective legal system and positive rights granted by such a system. Positive rights are less contingent and more stable, because society thinks it prudent to bear the social costs of that stability. Take, for example, the positive right against torture. This is not based simply on the intrinsic evil of what is done to the tortured. It is based partly on the intrinsic evil of the sadistic motive of the torturer. However, this motive obtains only in some cases, not others. Let us distinguish the latter as cases of “aggressive interrogation.” There might be instances of such interrogation that are conscientious and morally justified, all considerations of social cost and risk apart. There is, therefore, no natural moral right against it. Nonetheless, its general legal prohibition under a positive right against torture is justified by the prudential judgment that any possible momentary advantages to national security are outweighed by the high risk of social and institutional corruption and its political costs. That said, extraordinary circumstances might still justify—morally—the rare violation of the positive, legal right.

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Willard, L. Duane. "Needs and Rights". Dialogue 26, n. 1 (1987): 43–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300042281.

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It is not difficult to sympathize with the strong impulse among philosophers to attempt to explain, justify, and even define moral concepts in factual terms. For without some kind of grounding in the facts of human nature, we may be quite perplexed concerning what relevance moral concepts have to our actual decisions, actions, and social relationships. Put another way, without grounding moral concepts in facts we may be quite puzzled as to the connections between principles and practice, between the ideal and the actual. The history of ethical theory contains several serious efforts by various philosophers to provide factual grounding for moral concepts, efforts which we cannot here take up.

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Thompson, C. Bradley. "ON DECLARING THE LAWS AND RIGHTS OF NATURE". Social Philosophy and Policy 29, n. 2 (luglio 2012): 104–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052512000015.

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AbstractThis article examines the moral theory of the American Revolutionary and Founding periods by focusing on two key concepts of that doctrine: the moral laws and the moral rights of nature. In particular, the article will examine several important questions from the perspective of America’s Revolutionary generation: What are the moral laws and rights of nature? What is the difference between a law and a right of nature, and how are the laws and rights of nature related to each other? Are nature’s moral laws and rights descriptive, prescriptive, or both? What are the attributes and sanctions of nature’s laws and rights, and how are they promulgated? What is the source of nature’s laws and rights? And finally, how did America’s founding fathers use the laws and rights of nature to establish their political institutions? In order to answer these questions, the article focuses on the core text universally recognized as the symbol of America’s revolutionary mind and moral theory: the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration’s deepest philosophic meaning is herein illuminated by also examining the broader, extant literature of the period.

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Agarwal, Nikhil, e Vinayak Ojha. "Moral Rights: International Framework and Indian Approach". Christ University Law Journal 6, n. 1 (1 gennaio 2017): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.12728/culj.10.1.

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In the wake of increasing globalization and technical advancements in the digital field, the dissemination of creative work has become easier than ever. However, this development has come with its own set of challenges, particularly for Intellectual Property Law, as most of online transfer of information is unregulated. Digitalization has lead to the imminent need for standardized and stringent protection of an author‟s work. While this protection is mainly conceived as commercial right of the author on his work, there is another fundamental element to it, which is equally important and cannot be neglected, i.e., moral rights. These rights include right of attribution and integrity and are so inextricably related, that they stay with the author, even after transfer of economic rights on the work. In order to ensure effective globalized protection, there is a requirement for minimum standards of protection in all domestic laws, as was provided in the TRIPS agreement. This paper analyzes the Moral Rights regime as envisaged by the TRIPS agreement, and the monoist and dualist approaches that have been adopted by different countries. It also analyzes the evolution of moral rights in India.

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Karanikic-Miric, Marija. "Objectivization of moral damage". Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, n. 152 (2015): 487–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn1552487k.

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Moral (non-patrimonial) damage in Serbian law includes physical and psychological pain and suffering, and fear of sufficient duration and intensity. This is a purely subjective concept of moral damage: the mere infringement of non-patrimonial rights, or violation of personal goods as objects of these rights, does not constitute moral damage, unless they caused the plaintiff?s physical or psychological pain, or fear, and disturbed his or her mental equilibrium. Objectivization of moral damage is a change in this paradigm, towards the understanding of moral damage as an abstract infringement of a non-patrimonial right of the injured party, irrespective of any pain or fear caused by such infringement. Moral damage exists if personal (non-patrimonial) right, or personal good, or legally protected personal interest is violated, even if the injured party did not suffer any pain or fear due to this violation. Since 2005, Croatian legislator has abandoned the long-standing subjective concept of non-patrimonial damage, and reconceptualized it as an abstract violation of personal rights, including personal rights of legal entities. The Commission appointed to draft the new Civil Code of Serbia considers several modes of either partial or complete objectivization of the concept of moral damage in the prospective codification. In this paper the author examines the reasons for such change, and offers arguments in support of the idea that Serbian legislator should decide on a mixed conception of non-patrimonial damage, that is, to adhere to the existing concept of non-patrimonial damage, but also to allow for a violation of non-patrimonial goods or legally protected interests to be recognized as a type of moral damage, regardless of any psychological suffering coming out of such infringement.

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Copp, David. "Consequentialist Rights: L. W. Sumner's The Moral Foundation of Rights". Dialogue 28, n. 1 (1989): 131–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221730001564x.

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It is commonplace to criticize utilitarianism on the ground that it does not take moral rights seriously; that it cannot account for the rights we have, and for their role in constraining our pursuit of the overall good. Wayne Sumner does not directly address this criticism in The Moral Foundation of Rights. Instead he attempts to show that consequentialism can defeat nihilism about rights: the view that there are no moral rights at all.

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Taylor, Paul W. "Inherent Value and Moral Rights". Monist 70, n. 1 (1987): 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist198770113.

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Stone, Christopher D. "Legal Rights and Moral Pluralism". Environmental Ethics 9, n. 3 (1987): 281–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics1987936.

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BORTOLOTTI, Lisa. "Moral Rights and Human Culture". Ethical Perspectives 13, n. 4 (1 dicembre 2006): 603–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/ep.13.4.2018711.

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NEWMAN, Dwight G. "Collectivities as Moral Rights-Holder". Ethische Perspectieven 14, n. 4 (1 dicembre 2004): 439. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/epn.14.4.516921.

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Sterba, James P., e L. W. Sumner. "The Moral Foundation of Rights." Noûs 26, n. 2 (giugno 1992): 246. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215740.

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FEINBERG, JOEL. "In Defence of Moral Rights". Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 12, n. 2 (1992): 149–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/12.2.149.

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37

Hasenclever, Andreas. "Human Rights by Moral Intervention". International Studies Review 7, n. 1 (marzo 2005): 63–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2005.00458.x.

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38

Harris, George W. "MORAL CODES AND LEGAL RIGHTS". Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, n. 1 (marzo 1986): 47–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb00436.x.

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39

Bird, Robert C. "Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation". American Business Law Journal 46, n. 3 (settembre 2009): 407–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-1714.2009.01082.x.

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40

Zysset, Alain. "Human rights: moral or political?" Jurisprudence 10, n. 2 (18 febbraio 2019): 281–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2019.1575617.

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41

Adeney, Elizabeth. "Australia’s experience of moral rights". Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 14, n. 4 (5 febbraio 2019): 312–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpz001.

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42

McConnell, Terrance. "Gratitude, Rights, and Moral Standouts". Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20, n. 2 (5 ottobre 2016): 279–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9761-2.

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43

Ozar, David T. "Do corporations have moral rights?" Journal of Business Ethics 4, n. 4 (agosto 1985): 277–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00381769.

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44

Garner, Richard. "The Moral Foundation of Rights". Teaching Philosophy 12, n. 3 (1989): 305–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil198912383.

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45

Zuber, Joseph. "Do Artists have Moral Rights?" Journal of Arts Management and Law 21, n. 4 (dicembre 1991): 284–307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07335113.1991.9943146.

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46

Zuber, Joseph. "Do Artists have Moral Rights?" Journal of Arts Management and Law 21, n. 4 (1 dicembre 1992): 284–307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07335113.1992.9943146.

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47

Masiyakurima, Patrick. "The Trouble with Moral Rights". Modern Law Review 68, n. 3 (maggio 2005): 411–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2005.00544.x.

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48

Vorster, J. M. "Human Rights and Moral Conflicts". Ecumenical Review 54, n. 4 (ottobre 2002): 458–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-6623.2002.tb00166.x.

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49

Montague, Phillip. "Human Embryos and Moral Rights". Journal of Social Philosophy 46, n. 4 (dicembre 2015): 502–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josp.12132.

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50

Jones, Charles. "Human rights and moral cosmopolitanism". Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13, n. 1 (marzo 2010): 115–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230903326299.

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