Tesi: "Military operations, Aerial – American"

1

Laine, Howard David. "AWPD-1 : America's pre-World War II plan for bombing Germany /". Thesis, This resource online, 1991. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-11072008-063613/.

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2

Garner, Christian A. "Forgotten Legacies: The U.S. Glider Pilot Training Program and Lamesa Field, Texas, During World War II". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2016. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc849715/.

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Rapidly initiated at the national, regional, and local levels, the American glider pilot training program came about due to a perceived need after successful German operations at the outset of World War II. Although the national program successfully produced the required number of pilots to facilitate combat operations, numerous changes and improvisation came to characterize the program. Like other American military initiatives in the twentieth century, the War Department applied massive amounts of effort, dollars, and time to a program that proved to be short-lived in duration because it was quickly discarded when new technologies appeared. At the local level, the real loser was Lamesa, Texas. Bearing the brunt of these changes by military decision makers, the citizens of Lamesa saw their hard-fought efforts to secure an airfield fall quickly by the wayside in the wake of changing national defense priorities. As generations continue to pass and memories gradually fade, it is important to document and understand the relationship between this military platform that saw limited action and a small Texas town that had a similarly short period of significance to train the pilots who flew the aircraft.

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3

DeThomas, Scott V. "Aerial humanitarian operations delivering strategic effects /". CLICK HERE TO VIEW:, 2004. https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2004/ari/DeThomas.pdf.

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4

Howard, Stephen P. "Special Operations Forces and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Sooner or Later? /". Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Research Coordinator Office, 1998. http://www.au.af.mil/au/database/research/ay1995/saas/howardsp.htm.

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Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995.
Subject: An analysis of whether Special Operations Forces should use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to support intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications and re-supply capability deficiencies. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

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5

Butner, Joseph C. "Experimental analysis of integration of tactical unmanned aerial vehicles and Naval Special Warfare Operations Forces /". Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2002. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA409922&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

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6

Nagl, John A. "British and American army counterinsurgency learning during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.339868.

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7

Fridriksson, Fridrik. "Marine Corps operations in failing states". Quantico, VA : Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA490952.

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8

Warman, Steven A. "Transforming the American soldier educating the warrior-diplomat". Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2133.

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In this thesis, we examine the current levels of cultural understanding and irregular warfare being taught in U.S. Army conventional military schools. Given engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our view that the military needs a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction between American Soldiers and the local populations. Current analysis of the difficulties being reported suggests U.S. Army Soldiers are having trouble combating irregular warfare due to cultural misunderstandings and a lack of counterinsurgency training, thereby reflecting a likely educational gap in the U.S. Army's formal military educational training system. This thesis analyzes the current problems and difficulties Soldiers are reported to be having while attempting to combat irregular forces in non-western environments. We analyze the amount of training U.S. Army Soldiers receive in cultural understanding and irregular warfare in the military schools pipeline and conclude that there is a connection between problems Soldiers currently face and a lack of training for the conduct of operations in foreign countries. We propose a number of solutions to overcome these suspected gaps in education and suggested changes to the Army's professional education curriculum.

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9

Hudson, Jeff D. Warman Steven A. "Transforming the American soldier : educating the warrior-diplomat /". Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2005. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Jun%5FHudson.pdf.

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10

Calland, Brett M. "Marine close air support on the Pusan perimeter during the early months of the Korean War". Virtual Press, 2002. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/1246468.

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This thesis presents a qualitative analysis of the Marine experience in the Korean War with air power. Evidence suggests that Marine Close Air Support in the early months of the Korean War was superior to Navy and Air Force CAS. The Marine Corps collected interviews during the war, which support this conclusion. Interviews were taken with pilots, commanders, tactical air coordinators, forward air controllers, mechanics, infantrymen and other front line soldiers who experienced the CAS in the opening months of the war. Many factors contributed to this qualitative difference including; training, doctrine, control system, and type of planes used. This qualitative difference amounted to the superiority of Marine CAS in the opening months of the Korean War.
Department of History

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11

Muse, Robert C. "Advising foreign forces force structure implications of the indirect approach to irregular warfare /". Quantico, VA : Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA491120.

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12

Cheater, Julian C. "The war over Warrior : unmanned aerial vehicles and adaptive joint command and control /". Maxwell AFB, Ala. : School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&mode=user&action=downloadpaper&objectid=042cf9f2-33d9-4545-b101-f894b89842e0&rs=PublishedSearch.

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13

Parker, Matthew Austin Parrish T. Michael. "The Philippine Scouts and the practice of counter-insurgency in the Philippine-American War, 1899-1913". Waco, Tex. : Baylor University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2104/5214.

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14

Alfonso, Kristal L. M. "Femme fatale : an examination of the role of women in combat and the policy implications for future American military operations /". Maxwell AFB, Ala. : School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&mode=user&action=downloadpaper&objectid=9fa236b6-82fe-4be7-951f-1f172da0dcdf&rs=PublishedSearch.

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15

Melendez, Barbra Sue. "Versatility and applicability of dynamic help in army installation support modules". Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/24249.

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16

Butsky, Chris. "Cultural Factors and How They Shape Military Sustainment and Transition Operations in a Theater of War". University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1353030200.

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17

Denehan, Kieran T. "Victory by proxy? : American air power, the secret war in Laos, and the future of the Global War on Terrorism /". Maxwell AFB, Ala. : School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153&mode=user&action=downloadpaper&objectid=dd53c1a0-358d-4e44-9b7b-e54bd8d5f227&rs=PublishedSearch.

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18

Baumann, Andrea Barbara. "Clash of organisational cultures? : a comparative analysis of American and British approaches to the coordination of defence, diplomacy and development in stability operations, 2001-2010". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:80c8f9c6-fb4f-4c03-9f8f-26d89fcb8339.

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This thesis examines the challenge of coordinating civilian and military efforts within a so-called ‘whole-of-government’ approach to stability operations. The empirical analysis focuses on British and American attempts to implement an integrated civilian-military strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2010. Unlike many existing analyses, the thesis consciously avoids jumping to the search for solutions to fix the problem of coordination and instead offers a nuanced explanation of why it arises in the first instance. Empirical data was gathered through personal interviews with a wide range of civilian and military practitioners between 2007 and 2011. Together with the in-depth study of official documents released by, and on, the defence, diplomatic and development components of the British and American governments, they provide the basis for a fine-grained analysis of obstacles to interagency coordination. The thesis offers a framework for analysis that is grounded in organisation theory and distinguishes between material, bureaucratic and cultural dimensions of obstacles to interagency coordination. It identifies organisational cultures as a crucial force behind government agencies’ reluctance to participate and invest in an integrated approach. The empirical chapters cover interagency dynamics within the government bureaucracy and in operations on the ground, including the role of specialised coordination units and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the pursuit of coordination. The thesis concludes that stabilisation remains an inherently contested endeavour for all organisations involved and that the roles and expectations implied by contemporary templates for coordination clash with prevailing organisational identities and self-perceptions. These findings caution against the procedural and technocratic approach to interagency coordination that permeates the existing literature on the subject and many proposals for reform. While the thesis examines a specific empirical context, its conclusions have broader implications for civilian-military coordination and the quest for an integrated approach to security in the twenty-first century.

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19

Rable, Kyle K. ""One to the Head, Two to the Heart": The Failure of Psychological Warfare Doctrine and Understanding in The Vietnam War". Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1616336908093754.

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20

Taillon, Joseph Paul de Boucherville. "International co-operation in the use of elite military forces to counter terrorism : the British and American experience, with special reference to their respective experiences in the evolution of low-intensity operations". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1993. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2592/.

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This thesis examines the employment of elite military forces in low-intensity and counter-terrorist operations, and in particular, placing the principal emphasis on the aspect of international co-operation in the latter. The experiences of Great Britain and the United States in such operations are the main elements of the discussion, reflecting their heavy involvement in such operations. However, to analyze the experiences of those two countries out of context would be difficult and would distort the perceptions of the problems and desiderata as they evolved historically. Therefore, a survey of contemporary international terrorism, and the reaction to it, is also incorporated within the body of this paper. The British and American sections of the thesis begin by addressing their respective military experiences in the wider realm of low-intensity operations before dealing specifically with modern counter-terrorism. Equally necessary, for a balanced perspective, is the inclusion of the Israeli and West German experience in counter-terrorism; this is briefly addressed in two short case studies on Entebbe and Mogadishu. The main Anglo-American focus of the study gives primary importance to the development and doctrine for the employment of special forces, as well as an analysis of more recent low-intensity and counter-terrorism operations, such as the 1980 Iranian embassy siege in London and the failure that same year of the American hostage rescue attempt in Tehran. At this point this thesis attempts to identify and highlight those key aspects of co-operation at an international level which have, at least in part, been the sine qua non of successful counter-terrorist operations in the past and seem to be destined to remain so in the future. While it will be shown that international co-operation is essential in the areas of intelligence, exchanges and attachments between counter-terrorist forces, 'forward-basing' in relevant countries, as well as the acquisition of secure internal and external communications, it will also be argued, nonetheless, that the historical experience and state interest of different countries makes such co-operation more difficult than might appear at first sight. All of these, however, are impossible without the political will on the part of potential co-operating governments to undertake such initiatives. Particularly when one considers the very delicate nature of elite counter-terrorist force employment and the potential for embarrassment which is inherent in their activities and, therefore, cannot always be taken for granted. The findings of this study suggest that such co-operation can indeed provide significant advantages when low-intensity operations call for a response including 'the final option' - the employment of elite counter-terrorist forces. Also clear from this analysis is that the greatest progress in such international co-operation is likely to come from joint activities by countries having a similarly heightened sense of the threat which also implies that they share a common 'sociology' in their view of these historical developments.

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21

Bentley, Caitlin T. "Linking Communications: the Philippine Regional Section of the Allied Intelligence Bureau's Operations in the Occupied Islands,1942-1945". Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1449235520.

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22

Hunt, Andrew W. "Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resource (BEAR) Requirements Analysis Tool (BRAT)". Quantico, VA : Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA491134.

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23

Jahnke, Todd Eric. "By Air Power Alone: America's Strategic Air War in China, 1941-1945". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2001. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc2800/.

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During World War II, the Army Air Force waged three strategic air offensives in and from China against Japan. At first, the Flying Tigers and 10th Air Force constituted the whole of American aid to China, but the effort soon expanded. Supported by Chiang Kai-shek, Claire Chennault and his 14th Air Force waged an anti-shipping campaign, to which the Japanese Imperial Army responded with Operation Ichigo and against which Joseph Stilwell accurately warned. 20th Bomber Command used B-29s to wage Operation Matterhorn, failed, and later conducted PACAID missions. 14th Air Force then waged a counterproductive transportation campaign as The Pacific War, also known as the Greater East Asian War, ended. Events in the China-Burma-India and China Theaters provide lessons in logistics, targeting, training, and air-ground cooperation that are applicable in the post-Cold War era.

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24

Sambaluk, Nicholas Michael. "The Actions and Operational Thinking of Generals Stratemeyer and Partridge during the Korean War: Adjusting to Political Restrictions of Air Campaigns". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2008. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc6056/.

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Airpower played an important supporting role in the Korean War, and as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur pursued victory in the war and President Harry S Truman's objectives altered throughout the first year of the conflict, tension arose between the two men. One issue in these frictions was the restriction of airpower. Not only MacArthur, but also his admiring subordinate Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer commanding the Far East Air Forces, and Fifth Air Force commander Major General Earle E. Partridge opposed the restrictions which had been imposed on airmen from the outset of the conflict. Stratemeyer did so partly because of his loyalty to MacArthur, who wanted latitude in coping with the situation in the field and defeating the Communist enemy. Partridge did so because he thought they endangered his personnel and limited the effectiveness of airpower in the war. These commanders had a fundamentally different opinion from Washington regarding the likelihood of overt Soviet intervention in the war, and because they did not think the Korean War would become a world war, they were more willing than Washington to prosecute the war more aggressively. MacArthur's conflict ended with his removal in April 1951, and Stratemeyer (who suffered a heart attack weeks afterward) continued to advocate for forceful American foreign policy in Asia during his retirement. Partridge eventually earned four stars and long after the war likewise continued to disfavor the restrictions which had been put in place. Between oral history interviews in 1974 and 1978, however, Partridge reconsidered the issue of restrictions. He expressed that the Korean War had been a considerable challenge without a wider war, implying that restrictions had perhaps been important.

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25

Simpson, Patrick B. (Patrick Brent). "The History of the 389th Bombardment Group (H): a Study of the Use and Misuse of Strategic Bombers in the Second World War". Thesis, University of North Texas, 1994. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc278883/.

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This thesis describes and evaluates the successes and failures of the use of strategic bombers through the abilities of one heavy bombardment group, the 389th. It examines the different missions that determined the effectiveness of the Group. When employed in a strategic bombing role, the 389th contributed significantly to the destruction of the German war industries and transportation system. When used as a tactical bomber, a mission for which it had neither proper training nor equipment, the 389th was generally a failure.

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26

Jorge, Bernardo Wahl Gonçalves de Araújo [UNESP]. "As forças de operações especiais dos Estados Unidos e a intervenção no Afeganistão: um novo modo de guerra americano?" Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/96024.

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Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:48:06Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 jorge_bwga_me_mar.pdf: 806060 bytes, checksum: c3dbcac513f11151071767ea461e5ad7 (MD5)
A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da “transformação militar” que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um “novo” modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de “guerra ao terror”, as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas.
The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the “military transformation” that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a “new” american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of “global war on terror”, went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions.

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27

Tsukayama, John K. "By any means necessary : an interpretive phenomenological analysis study of post 9/11 American abusive violence in Iraq". Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4510.

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This study examines the phenomenon of abusive violence (AV) in the context of the American Post-9/11 Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency campaigns. Previous research into atrocities by states and their agents has largely come from examinations of totalitarian regimes with well-developed torture and assassination institutions. The mechanisms influencing willingness to do harm have been examined in experimental studies of obedience to authority and the influences of deindividuation, dehumanization, context and system. This study used Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to examine the lived experience of AV reported by fourteen American military and intelligence veterans. Participants were AV observers, objectors, or abusers. Subjects described why AV appeared sensible at the time, how methods of violence were selected, and what sense they made of their experiences after the fact. Accounts revealed the roles that frustration, fear, anger and mission pressure played to prompt acts of AV that ranged from the petty to heinous. Much of the AV was tied to a shift in mission view from macro strategic aims of CT and COIN to individual and small group survival. Routine hazing punishment soldiers received involving forced exercise and stress positions made similar acts inflicted on detainees unrecognizable as abusive. Overt and implied permissiveness from military superiors enabled AV extending to torture, and extra-judicial killings. Attempting to overcome feelings of vulnerability, powerlessness and rage, subjects enacted communal punishment through indiscriminate beatings and shooting. Participants committed AV to amuse themselves and humiliate their enemies; some killed detainees to force confessions from others, conceal misdeeds, and avoid routine paperwork. Participants realized that AV practices were unnecessary, counter-productive, and self-damaging. Several reduced or halted their AV as a result. The lived experience of AV left most respondents feeling guilt, shame, and inadequacy, whether they committed abuse or failed to stop it.

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28

Truxal, Luke. "Command Unity and the Air War against Germany". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2018. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1404524/.

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Abstract (sommario):

Starting in August 1942 the United States and United Kingdom started waging a strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Throughout the course of the 1942 and 1943 campaigns, American and British air forces struggled to gain the upper hand in the European air war. By November 1943 American and British defeats at the hands of the German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, had placed the air war in doubt. By February 1944, the air war had turned around in favor of the Allies. This dramatic turn of events has been explained by historians in a number of ways. The most popular narrative is that the introduction of the long range escort fighter, the P-51 "Mustang," turned the tide in the air war. Another narrative is that there was a change in the fighter tactics. Starting in January 1944, American fighters stopped defending the bombers and started aggressively pursuing German fighters. Yet, these analyses do not include a major command changes that took place from November to January 1944. After his appointment to command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower used his position centralize all of the major air commands in Europe under his control. By unifying the air commands, the Allies were able to better coordinate and concentrate their air against Germany. In February 1944 the Allies focused their air forces against the Luftwaffe ultimately wearing down German fighter strength. After finally removing a major obstacle impending the strategic air war against Germany, the Allies concentrated their air forces against transportation and oil targets. The destruction of these two major economic systems crippled Germany's ability to fight the Allies in 1944 and 1945. By changing the command structure, Eisenhower was able to use his air forces in successful coordinated strategic air offensives that the Allies had previously been incapable of accomplishing.

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29

Jorge, Bernardo Wahl Gonçalves de Araújo. "As Forças de Operações Especiais dos Estados Unidos e a intervenção no Afeganistão: um novo modo de guerra americano?" São Paulo : [s.n.], 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/96024.

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Orientador: Reginaldo Mattar Nasser
Banca: Oliveiros S. Ferreira
Banca: Shiguenoli Miyamoto
O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas"
Resumo: A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da "transformação militar" que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um "novo" modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de "guerra ao terror", as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas.
Abstract: The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the "military transformation" that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a "new" american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of "global war on terror", went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions.
Mestre

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30

Stables, Gordon Wilson. "The discourse of war in a time of peace : representations of American military operations in the 1990s". 2002. http://purl.galileo.usg.edu/uga%5Fetd/stables%5Fgordon%5Fw%5F200208%5Fphd.

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31

Sampson, Gary J., e 沙普瑞. "AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA’S ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL CAPABILITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC". Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41503853449482513091.

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碩士
國立中山大學
中國與亞太區域研究所
99
The post-Cold War world has created a number of important new challenges to the United States’ power projection capabilities. The worldwide network of bases and stations that enabled the U.S. to contain the Soviet Union have, in many cases, been made into liabilities. U.S. dependence on fixed, vulnerable ports and airfields for the buildup of combat power, as seen in the 1990-91 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War, have shown potential foes like China and Iran that it doesn’t pay to allow penalty-free access and freedom of action in maritime, air, and space commons. In the Western Pacific, China has pursued an anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, developing capabilities designed to deny U.S. freedom of movement in the region. This study examines U.S. perceptions of China’s growing A2/AD capabilities and their implications for U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific through the analysis of authoritative official and unofficial U.S. documents and studies. This work establishes a comprehensive, up-to-date picture of Chinese A2/AD capabilities through American eyes, updating previous comprehensive works in key areas such as the status of China’s anti-ship ballistic missile, conventional ballistic and cruise missile capabilities and their implications for key U.S. facilities in the region, and new technology and platforms like China’s first aircraft carrier and stealth aircraft. The thesis concludes that the U.S. has been slow in reacting to Chinese A2/AD developments and that it is unlikely that continued Chinese military modernization (including the refinement and development of additional A2/AD capabilities) will end in the near future. For the U.S., this means that development and implementation of a truly joint concept for counter-A2/AD operations, as well as the right mix of military capabilities to carry out such operations, cannot be delayed any longer.

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Hawkins, John Michael. "The Limits of Fire Support: American Finances and Firepower Restraint during the Vietnam War". Thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151185.

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Abstract (sommario):

Excessive unobserved firepower expenditures by Allied forces during the Vietnam War defied the traditional counterinsurgency principle that population protection should be valued more than destruction of the enemy. Many historians have pointed to this discontinuity in their arguments, but none have examined the available firepower records in detail. This study compiles and analyzes available, artillery-related U.S. and Allied archival records to test historical assertions about the balance between conventional and counterinsurgent military strategy as it changed over time. It finds that, between 1965 and 1970, the commanders of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Generals William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams, shared significant continuity of strategic and tactical thought. Both commanders tolerated U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Allied unobserved firepower at levels inappropriate for counterinsurgency and both reduced Army harassment and interdiction fire (H&I) as a response to increasing budgetary pressure. Before 1968, the Army expended nearly 40 percent of artillery ammunition as H&I – a form of unobserved fire that sought merely to hinder enemy movement and to lower enemy morale, rather than to inflict any appreciable enemy casualties. To save money, Westmoreland reduced H&I, or “interdiction” after a semantic name change in February 1968, to just over 29 percent of ammunition expended in July 1968, the first full month of Abrams’ command. Abrams likewise pursued dollar savings with his “Five-by-Five Plan” of August 1968 that reduced Army artillery interdiction expenditures to nearly ten percent of ammunition by January 1969. Yet Abrams allowed Army interdiction to stabilize near this level until early 1970, when recurring financial pressure prompted him to virtually eliminate the practice. Meanwhile, Marines fired H&I at historically high rates into the final months of 1970 and Australian “Harassing Fire” surpassed Army and Marine Corps totals during the same period. South Vietnamese artillery also fired high rates of H&I, but Filipino and Thai artillery eschewed H&I in quiet areas of operation and Republic of Korea [ROK] forces abandoned H&I in late 1968 as a direct response to MACV’s budgetary pressure. Financial pressure, rather than strategic change, drove MACV’s unobserved firepower reductions during the Vietnam War.

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Tesi sul tema "Military operations, Aerial – American"

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