Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Israel Aircraft Industry"

This paper presents a selected aspect of design activity devoted to optimising HALE and MALE UAVs. The project is taking place at Warsaw University of Technology under the V Framework of European Union in the CAPECON project. This paper deals with wing airfoil selection, defining of the configuration layout and power unit integration. A brief overview of wing sections developed in some design centres (mainly in Israel Aircraft Industry and in Northrop Grumman) is included. Aircraft layout depends on the mission and sensor selection and is discussed using the examples of PW‐103 and PW‐114. Engine suspension and integration with aircraft is included in the analysis because if it is not properly analysed, it can lead to an excessive vibration and fatigue of the whole aircraft structure.

Titanium alloys sheets have many attractions for the aerospace industry owing to their high strength, low density, heat resistance and other useful properties. Many of the sheet metal structures in airframes have complex shapes and compound curvatures with intricate details. Superplastic forming (SPF), a most recent advancement in titanium sheet forming technology, exploits the excellent characteristic of >1000% elongation potential for the fabrication of complex configurations not achievable by conventional methods. SPF technology can also reduce manufacturing cost by shortening the preparation time, eliminating the need for extensive welding or other joining methods and by reducing the number of manufacturing steps. Consequently, high profit margins may be achieved in serial aircraft production. This paper outlines the research at Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) of SPF technology and its application in producing complex-shape Ti sheet parts for the new IAI commercial aircrafts, models “G-150” and “G-200”. Examples of both actual and experimental parts are given, together with details of the manufacturing parameters employed. An economical analysis is also included.

The experience of armed conflicts that do not cease on our planet confirms the increasing role of unmanned aerial vehicles in today's wars. The article analyzes the state and prospects of the unmanned aircraft vehicles production in the world, and highlights some problematic aspects regarding the provision of own unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV) development and samples testing of Ukrainian and foreign UAV production in modern conditions. It is shown that the largest producers of military UAVs in the world during the last decade were the USA, Israel, the Republic of Turkey, China, and Iran. A significant part of the European NATO member states, having their own development of unmanned aircraft vehicles and sufficient capacity for their production, prefer the purchase and acceptance into service samples of UAV, mainly of American or Israeli production, which have proven themselves well during armed conflicts in the Middle East. Considering the urgent need of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for UAVs in 2014, Ukraine also followed the path of NATO countries and initially concluded contracts for the supply of foreign-made unmanned aerial vehicles. The beginning of the war with the russian federation also gave a significant impetus to the development of private defense companies in Ukraine. In 2014-2015, an entire industry of unmanned aircraft production was born, and Ukraine became the world's largest testing ground for advanced military technologies. Information about the UAVs used by the Ukrainian military is different, since the Armed Forces receive both officially accepted and adopted UAVs samples, as well as UAVs samples that are transferred by volunteer organizations and often do not have official records (especially those UAVs that are not originally intended for military use). The changes to the regulatory documents that govern the procedures for acceptance into service and acceptance of samples of weapons and military equipment are aimed at ensuring the urgent needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for these samples, but they create a number of problems. In the context of providing the Armed Forces with unmanned aircraft vehicles, this is an aggravation of the problems of regulatory and methodological support for the development and testing of UAV samples and the low level of readiness of UAV samples provided by their developers (manufacturers) for testing or proposed for operation under a simplified approval procedure. According to the authors, one of the ways to increase the defense capability of Ukraine is to increase the development and testing efficiency of weapons and military equipment that will be put into operation and armed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Therefore, it is necessary to stimulate the developers (manufacturers) of UAVs to strictly comply with the current regulatory documentation on the development of UAVs and to improve the quality of preparation of UAVs samples for testing; to study the experience of NATO countries, as well as in terms of requirements for the specialists training in the combat use of UAV; to promote the implementation of NATO standards in Ukraine in order to expand the opportunities for the participation of UAV in joint operations in NATO member countries and in Ukraine.

The article examines Hungary’s modernization of Armed Forces and expansion of the capabilities of the country’s defence-industrial complex (DIC). Using the neorealistic paradigm, the author analyzes the main directions in which the Hungarian army and the MIC developed during the leadership of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The 10-year development program of the Hungarian Defence Forces – Zrínyi – involves a significant increase in their capabilities by 2026. Official plans to expand and modernize the DIC include the target to make the Hungarian state one of the leaders of the defense industry in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by 2030. The main partners in this area are going to be companies not only from the member states of the European Union (Germany, France and the Czech Republic), but also from Turkey and Israel. Reforming the army and increasing the technological level of the DIC are primarily aimed at strengthening the country’s economy and protecting the state borders and Hungarian citizens both in Hungary itself and in Ukraine, in Transcarpathia. At the same time, the Prime Minister V. Orbán is confident that NATO’s actions can only be aimed at self-defense. This is related to the refusal of the Hungarian authorities to supply weapons to Kiev. However, Hungary is not only strengthening mechanized troops (German Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, Turkish Gidrán armored personnel carriers), the country’s Air Force (Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen aircraft) and Air Defense (Norwegian–American NASAMS anti-aircraft missile complex), but also, reflecting on the experience of the conflict in Ukraine, returns to the use of artillery, considers the possibility of producing drones and more ammunition on its territory, and also wants to increase the offensive potential of its Armed Forces thanks to modern multiple rocket launchers like HIMARS. Despite the fact that Hungary, according to V. Orbán, is on the side of the ‘peace party’, in the future, as part of NATO in the CEE region, there will be a modernized army with a proper defence-industrial complex, ready for a ‘new generation’ conflict. The Hungarian political opposition in turn advocates for military assistance to Ukraine and curtailing relations with Russia, while being actively encouraged by the United States.

The preservation of U.S. aeronautical leadership is an economic and military necessity, but it is by no means assured. The rise of Airbus, Ariane, and Embraer has been lightning fast; tomorrow could see the development of Japan's FSC or Israel's Lavi. Our competitors are well organized and often enjoy the support of their governments. Our capabilities are no longer unique; thus our future work is clearly defined for us.The key to continued U.S. preeminence in aerospace is to be found in the further research, development, and application of a group of revolutionary technologies in the areas of propulsion, numerical and symbolic computation, laminar flow modeling, and advanced materials and structures. Exploitation of the emerging technologies in these areas by industry, government, and universities will significantly impact the performance and cost of future aerospace vehicles and systems. Materials science and engineering, particularly the discipline of nondestructive evaluation, will play a major role in making such continued aerospace leadership a reality.From the use of plastic and glass radomes in the first jet engine demonstrators to the composite parts of today's most advanced aircraft, the need to ensure reliable materials has always been critical. Advanced materials and structural concepts offer the opportunity for significant airframe improvements on all types of aircraft. Indeed tomorrow's aerospace structures, such as the National Aerospace Plane, the Space Station, as well as the ATF and SDI-related items will employ a myriad of exotic materials that must be extremely reliable and highly producible.

In the 1980s and 1990s, South Africa was considered a global leader in the development of unmanned aircraft largely because of the Seeker, a drone created by the state-controlled armaments industry during apartheid. This article examines how military power, state-enforced racial hierarchies, and global exchange are made visible and obscured through the drone’s unmanned system. It advances the concept of drone infrastructure, which updates theories of the drone that focus on optics and verticality. Drone infrastructure studies the web of relations organized by aircraft systems and articulates how the interplay of visibility and invisibility affectively and materially structures drone systems. The study starts with the ‘invisible’ transfer of drone technology that led to the Seeker, pointing to a shared genealogy of warfare linking South Africa, Israel, and the United States, as well as the ‘secret’ use of the Seeker in the South African Border Wars. It then turns to how, in the post-apartheid era, the Seeker was refashioned as a technology of national protection and democratic advance, a ‘visible’ symbol of the new state. Contemporary efforts to use drone aircraft in South Africa for wildlife conservation in the 2010s aim to overwrite these earlier uses, describing the air platform as international aid. Yet, the Seeker’s militarized infrastructure continues to shape drone use and the logics of white supremacy persist in the networks of relations organized by contemporary drone use in South Africa.

The Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program is much bigger than the two ambitious high speed helicopters that Bell and Sikorsky will now get more than $1 billion to build. At least five other major moving pieces must come together on time to turn the final aircraft, whoever makes it, into a working weapon: - a new Improved Turbine Engine built by GE; - helicopter-launched mini-drones called Air Launched Effects (ALE); - a new Long-Range Precision Munition (LRPM), with the Israeli Spike-NLOS as the initial version; - an Integrated Missile Launcher (IML) to launch both the missile and the drones; - and the underlying electronic framework of standards and interfaces to plug it all together, the Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA). *Recently, FARA has added a 20mm Gatling Gun being developed by The Advanced Rotorcraft Armament and Protection System (ARAPS) program team at the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Center (CCDC) Armaments Center The Army is "not just focused on the air vehicle, but focused on the weapon system," said Brig. Gen. Walter Rugen, Future Vertical Lift director at Army Futures Command, in a call this morning with reporters. [1] While some have questioned the viability of fielding the FARA in ten years, e.g. by 2028, others have offered reasons on why the plan for a next-gen recon aircraft needs to be accelerated. Who knows how much money will be available to the Army for sustaining its aviation fleet as budget walls close in over the next several years? Trilliondollar deficits have a way of impinging on defense budgets. What is proposed, though, is that the Army compress its development schedule for a new armed recon rotorcraft so that our soldiers begin to be better equipped against the likes of Russia and China somewhere around 2025, rather than after 2030. A whole lot can happen in ten years. We don't need another Army development program to be overtaken by events. (2) However, since the FARA will likely be in service for a half-century or more, it makes sense to conduct rigorous analysis up front to ensure that what is fielded has the capabilities to provide the most value for the warfighter and the taxpayer. Prior to spending billions of dollars and decades producing the FARA aircraft, it is prudent to spend the time to determine what the right solutions should be. Many projects fail when the initial requirements are not well thought out and the ramifications are not clearly understood. To solve the tension between these conflicting desires, designers need to iterate the design sensitivities with operational analysis to show the pros and cons of each attribute, alone and in concert, but ultimately the Army must prioritize its requirements and potentially make hard trade-off decisions.(3) The major objective of this paper is provide a methodology for the necessary understanding of the push and pull of technology readiness and application through trade studies and operational analysis early to avoid disappointments and to minimize FARA slippages and cost increases. This will be accomplished by reviewing Lessons Learned from the AHIP/OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and the LHX/RAH-66 Comanche development programs. While the authors were directly involved in these programs as Army Aviation engineers, managers and senior executives, the major emphasis for this paper will be to address how the government-industry teams brought these programs successfully through initial development. Fortunately, for the AHIP/OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Development Program there are excellent documentation of the government-industry team participation in References 4 and 5. While the authors strongly endorse the lessons learned in these documents, they will have a few of their own. For the LHX/RAH66 Comanche Development Program there is considerably less documentation; however, the authors will provide Army and their lessons learned. It is hoped that this paper and the referenced documents will be read, and the lessons learned by both government and industry involved in the FARA development program.