Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Investments (Foreign), Africa: Congo (French)"

In the autumn and winter of 1954 Commissioner John Allan, the second-incommand of the Salvation Army, visited Africa and travelled through those countries where The Salvation Army was then established: Kenya, Rhodesia, South Africa, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo. During his visit he met tribal and national leaders including, on 11 November 1954 in the Gold Coast, Kwame Nkrumah in his Presidential Office, where Commissioner Allan “asked God to guide Nkrumah as he controls the destiny of his people”.When an account of the tour was written up for publication in 1955, the article began as follows:Nowadays Africa is a continent where something dramatic is always happening. One part or another is constantly in the public eye. Here and there a new order is in course of being established and, as one competent authority has stated, tomorrow's headlines are certain to come out of the Dark Continent.

ABSTRACTAgainst the background of conflict in the Great Lakes Region, the UK and France promised, at their 1998 Saint-Malo summit, to set aside rivalries and cooperate on Africa. In subsequent Anglo-French gatherings, they singled out the DRC and pledged to work together there to promote peace and tackle poverty. This article asks whether this coordination took place and whether it involved a ‘deconflictualisation’ of approaches, ‘coincidental’ cooperation, or ‘sustained and reciprocal’ collaboration. It looks for evidence of institutionalisation of UK-French ties and policy cooperation in the fields of peacebuilding and poverty reduction. It then identifies the pressures for, and barriers to, collaboration, focusing particularly on the role of interests, foreign policy norms, institutional factors and resource constraints. It concludes by setting out the wider implications of UK-French cooperation and the limited prospects of closer future collaboration.

The Coronavirus Global Pandemic Now Poses Additional Peril To The Already Burdened Healthcare Systems With Inadequate Funding In Africa. This Paper Attempts To Present The Funding Patterns For Healthcare In Nigeria, Congo, Tanzania, Egypt, And South Africa. It Also Explored Investor Opportunities For Lowering OOPs And Increasing Investor Profits. Data Were Drawn From The WHO, The World Bank, And World Charts Databases. Government Health Expenditure Was Far Below What Individuals And Families Pay From Out-Of-Pocket Payments (OOPs) For Healthcare Services Except In South Africa, Where OOP Accounts For Only 8%. Contrary To Popular Notion, Donation Funds Or Foreign Aid For Healthcare Accounts For A Lower Percentage Of Total Healthcare Expenditure In The Countries Under Consideration. Households Mostly Bore The Healthcare Expenditure Burden (Nigeria’s OOPs Of 77%, Congo- 48%, And Egypt- 60%). Averagely, Nigeria And Congo Only Spent About 3% Of Their National Budget On Healthcare. In Comparison, Tanzania And Egypt Spent An Average Of 4% And 5% (South Africa-8%) Between 2010 And 2017, Reflecting Low-Risk Protection For Households. Specific Aspects For Investments Through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) Reviewed In This Paper Should Include Designing Innovative Financing Models Focusing On Risk Pooling Mechanisms To Help Bridge The Funding Gap, Local Production, And Manufacture Of Pharmaceuticals And Healthcare Equipment At This Time, Instead Of Importation. Investors Can, Therefore, Take Advantage Of The Various Initiatives Outlined In This Paper To Achieve Better Health Outcomes In Africa.

Purpose – The generation is witnessing the greatest demographic transition and Africa is at the heart of it. There is mounting concern over corresponding rising unemployment and depleting per capita income. The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues from a long-run perspective by assessing the relationships between population growth and a plethora of investment dynamics: public, private, foreign and domestic investments. Design/methodology/approach – Vector autoregressive models in the perspectives of vector error correction and short-run Granger causality are used. Findings – In the long-run population growth will: first, decrease foreign and public investments in Ivory Coast; second, increase public and private investments in Swaziland; three, deplete public investment but augment domestic investment in Zambia; fourth diminish private investment and improve domestic investment in the Congo Republic and Sudan, respectively. Practical implications – Mainstream positive linkage of population growth to investment growth in the long-term should be treated with extreme caution. Policy orientation should not be blanket, but contingent on country-specific trends and tailored differently across countries. The findings stress the need for the creation of a conducive investment climate (and ease of doing business) for private and foreign investments. Family planning and birth control policies could also be considered in countries with little future investment avenues. Originality/value – The objective of this study is to provide policy makers with some insights on how future investment opportunities could help manage rising population growth and corresponding unemployment.

The relationship between money demand and specific macroeconomic predictors has been explained by a number of money demand theories. Panel structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) and generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) techniques were deployed to analyze the data on money demand with lag adjustment in relation to inflation uncertainty, interest rate variations, household consumption, and exchange rate depreciation in Africa. The study which covers 30 African nations discovered a two way relationship between money demand and price level variation. While higher prices would increase demand for money, the same demand also influences changes in a nation’s price level, such that in the long run, inflation would result from more money held by economic units. With a standard deviation of 5.51, Guinea had the most erratic money demand, followed by Sierra Leone at 5.29. A variance of inflation uncertainty ranged from 9.45 percent to an extremely high proportion for Congo. Exchange rate devaluation is found to be considerably impactful in determining money demand. Results show that as more of the units of the local currency is used to exchange a unit of foreign currency such as the dollar, local economic units are discouraged to increase demand for money in local money and thus hold fewer local currencies while investing in foreign exchange investments

Abstract: The economists agree that actually the African economies did take off. A further growth, however, needs investments. Attracting these investments is precisely one of the purposes of the African Union with her 54 Member States and of - in a geographically more limited area - the OHADA, the organization for the harmonization of business law in mainly French-speaking Africa. The originality of the OHADA consists in the adoption of uniform Acts, which apply in all 17 Member States. It is only fair to say that through these uniform statutes the influence of France and that of the French juridical culture are perpetuated in Africa. In this paper, the OHADA legislation is described, more specifically from the perspective of one of the Member States, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo, the former Belgian colony. An overview of the uniform Acts relating to the following commercial contracts is given: sale, arbitration agreement, carriage of goods by land, lease for professional purposes, lease of the management of a business, agency and brokerage, pledge, surety, and other guarantees. The uniform Acts modernize the outdated law of the Member States. Some of the introduced innovations are the Trade and Personal Property Credit Register and the Trustee for the guarantees. The French law as it stands in our days (including e.g. the trust-like device of the "fiducie") serves as a model, but so does the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles. The latter is not faithfully followed, though. For instance, the remedy of the anticipatory breach (provided for in the CISG) did disappear out of the revised uniform Act relating to the general commercial law. The unilateral avoidance for breach of contract (provided for in the UNIDROIT Principles), on the other hand, is only by exception allowed and the exceptional circumstances are not defined. The creditor must normally thus apply to the court for an order resolving the contract. The non-commercial special contracts continue to be regulated by the national law of each Member State. This can produce odd effects, so is the ownership of the goods sold transferred to the buyer at the very moment of the agreement of the contracting parties according to the Congolese Civil Code, while the ownership of the goods sold in Congo by commercial contract takes place at the moment of the delivery since the joining of the OHADA. In the present state of affairs, the general law of contracts (as opposed to the OHADA special rules for the different nominate contracts) remains also part of the national law of the Member States. Obviously, this has to change by all means, if one wants the harmonization of the commercial contracts. This article deals therefore also with a text that should become the cornerstone of the OHADA legislation, i.e., the preliminary draft on general contract law. It follows as close as possible the UNIDROIT Principles and there are good reasons for this, as explained by the draughts man professor M. Fontaine. Unfortunately, this draft is momentarily blocked off backstage by some lawyers steeped in the myth of the French legal culture. It may indeed seem hard to imagine, for instance, that the causa disappears! But then also does the consideration in the UNIDROIT Principles.

BackgroundInsufficient funding is hindering the achievement of malaria elimination targets in Africa, despite the pressing need for increased investment in malaria control. While Western donors attribute their inaction to financial constraints, the global health community has limited knowledge of China’s expanding role in malaria prevention. This knowledge gap arises from the fact that China does not consistently report its foreign development assistance activities to established aid transparency initiatives. Our work focuses on identifying Chinese-funded malaria control projects throughout Africa and linking them to official data on malaria prevalence. By doing so, we aim to shed light on China’s contributions to malaria control efforts, analysing their investments and assessing their impact. This would provide valuable insights into the development of effective financing mechanisms for future malaria control in Africa.MethodsOur research used AidData’ s recently released Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset V.2.0 providing comprehensive coverage of all official sector Chinese development financing across Africa, from which we identify 224 Chinese-funded malaria projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) committed between 2002 and 2017. We conducted an analysis of the spending patterns by year, country and regions within Africa and compared it with data on population-adjusted malaria prevalence, sourced from the Malaria Atlas Project.ResultsChinese-financed malaria projects Africa mainly focused on three areas: the provision of medical supplies (72.32%), the construction of basic health infrastructure (17.86%) and the deployment of anti-malaria experts (3.57%). Moreover, nearly 39% of the initiatives were concentrated in just four countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda and Liberia. Additionally, China’s development financing amount showed a weak negative correlation (−0.2393) with population-weighted malaria prevalence. We concluded that the extent and direction of China’s support are not adequately tailored to address malaria challenges in different countries.ConclusionWith China’s increasing engagement in global health, it is anticipated that malaria control will continue to be a prominent priority on its development assistance agenda. This is attributed to China’s vast expertise in malaria elimination, coupled with its substantial contribution as a major producer of malaria diagnostics and treatments.

The article is devoted to Biden Administration Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa during the first half of 2022. This policy is carried out in accordance with a keynote speech “The United States and Africa: Building a 21st Century Partnership” made by Secretary of State Antony Blinken on November 17, 2021 in Abuja, Nigeria. The Secretary identified five spheres of common interest and cooperation – global health, the climate crisis, more stable and inclusive economy, defense of democracy, peace and security. The United States acknowledge a growing role of Africa in the world affairs and use all means at their disposal to preserve and strengthen their positions on the continent. The US “right” to be a global leader remains indisputable. The main enemies, as everywhere, are “authoritarian” China and Russia. The author reviews the US positions and activities in regard to conflict situations in Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. The meetings and contacts are traced between A. Blinken, his deputies and assistants and African leaders – Chairpersons of African Union and AU Commission, presidents of Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Malawi, Somalia, Zambia, prime minister of Cote d’Ivoire, foreign ministers of South Africa, Kenia, Nigeria and other countries. The trips of two American delegations are described. One, led by Deputy Secretary of State W. Sherman to South Africa, Angola and Togo (May). The other – “the Department of State economic diplomacy delegation” to Nigeria, Kenia, South Africa and Namibia (February). Some statistics on US – Sub-Saharan Africa trade and investments are provided. The official position concerning the tasks facing Africom is cited. In connection with the events in Ukraine, the United States launched in Africa a frenzied slanderous campaign against Russia. Despite brutal American pressure, about half of the African states refused to vote for the anti-Russian resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (26 out of 54). The African Union Chairperson M. Sall characterized the position of Africa as “very heterogeneous” and insisted on the cancellation of sanctions. His meeting with V. Putin in Sochi on June 3 showed that the African Union is interested in cooperation with Russia and has no intention to quarrel with it. The author analyses in detail “the Congressional Budget Justification” letter which presents the State Department requests of funds for the US policy in Africa in 2023 Financial Year (1 October 2022 – 30 September 2023). Now principle changes in regard to the size of expenditures or vectors of activities are planned.

In the second part of the article three topics are reviewed. The US secretary of state visit to Senegal (November 20, 2021). Senegal was of particular interest to the United States as a member of French speaking community of African countries and a 2022 chairmen of the African Union. A. Blinken was received by President M. Sall. A comprehensive discussion with Foreign minister Aissata Sall was devoted to the cooperation in five areas of “common interests - global health, the climate crisis, inclusive economic growth, democracy, peace and security”. During the visit the Senegal government and four American companies signed a Memorandum of $1 billion investments into infrastructural projects of the country. The remarks made by the secretary during his stay in Africa provide the materials for the assessment of the US position on four acute conflict situations on the continent. Proposed schemes of settlement: Ethiopia - end of hostilities between the Federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, dialogue and negotiated political agreement; Somalia - the conclusion of parliament formation and presidential elections; Sudan and Mali - transit from military regimes to democratic civilian led governments. The author cites factual aspects of Africa participation in the virtual global “Summit for democracy” initiated by President Biden (December 8-10, 2021). The Summit was conceived as a step toward the establishment of the US-led global alliance against China and Russia under the cover of democracy protection from “authoritarianism”. Out of 54 African states only 17 were invited. Surprisingly Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt were left out.

In the second part of the article three topics are reviewed. The US secretary of state visit to Senegal (November 20, 2021). Senegal was of particular interest to the United States as a member of French speaking community of African countries and a 2022 chairmen of the African Union. A. Blinken was received by President M. Sall. A comprehensive discussion with Foreign minister Aissata Sall was devoted to the cooperation in five areas of “common interests - global health, the climate crisis, inclusive economic growth, democracy, peace and security”. During the visit the Senegal government and four American companies signed a Memorandum of $1 billion investments into infrastructural projects of the country. The remarks made by the secretary during his stay in Africa provide the materials for the assessment of the US position on four acute conflict situations on the continent. Proposed schemes of settlement: Ethiopia - end of hostilities between the Federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, dialogue and negotiated political agreement; Somalia - the conclusion of parliament formation and presidential elections; Sudan and Mali - transit from military regimes to democratic civilian led governments. The author cites factual aspects of Africa participation in the virtual global “Summit for democracy” initiated by President Biden (December 8-10, 2021). The Summit was conceived as a step toward the establishment of the US-led global alliance against China and Russia under the cover of democracy protection from “authoritarianism”. Out of 54 African states only 17 were invited. Surprisingly Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt were left out.

Abstract The Ivory Coast borders Liberia and Guinea in the west, Mali and Burkina Faso in the north, Ghana in the east, and the North Atlantic Ocean in the south. The country has two main topographical zones: the savannah in the north and the forest zone in the south. According to the latest census (1998), the population is 15 million inhabitants, of which 78 per cent are located in the forest zone of the south. The population is mostly Muslim (39 per cent) or Christian (30 per cent). Although Yamoussoukro is the formal capital, Abidjan is the commercial and administrative centre of the country, with 3 million inhabitants. Other important cities are Bouaké, Korhogo, Daloa, Gagnoa, and San Pedro. The Ivory Coast was a French colony from 1893 to 1960, when it became La République de Côte d’Ivoire. The country is among the world’s largest producers and exporters of coffee and cocoa and by maintaining close ties with France and encouraging foreign investments, the Ivory Coast has developed into one of the most prosperous states in sub-Saharan Africa. However, since the death of the nation’s founder Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, the country has faced increasingly severe ethno-political problems, which have resulted in a division of the country into a government-held south and a rebel-held north.

Abstract As China has recently become the largest foreign investor in Africa, the question arises: how do NGOs respond to China's new-found prominence? The chapter examines advocacy practices regarding Chinese mining investments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It shows that the classic “boomerang model” of transnational advocacy does not fit the case, especially considering closed action opportunities within China. That said, Congolese NGOs tend to challenge Chinese mining action within the DRC, partly through transcalar efforts, while international NGOs pursue advocacy “through the supply chain” associated with Chinese mining operations. Hence, while there is no transnational activism that directly targets company headquarters or the public in China, other advocacy practices still challenge Chinese, Western, and other Southern mining company practices. For advocacy research, the chapter illustrates the power of domestic networks within the Global South and the continued relevance of Northern-based NGOs, including for cases involving Chinese mining investments.