Tesi sul tema "Intentionalism"
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1
Hager, Steven Christopher. "An Incompatibility between Intentionalism and Multiple Authorship in Film". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2009. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/57.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The multiple authorship view for film is the claim that multiple authors exist for almost any given film. This view is a recent development in opposition to the longstanding single authorship view which holds that there is only one author for every film, usually the director. One of the most often-cited reasons in support of the multiple authorship claim is that multiple authorship views more successfully explain the following fact about filmmaking better than single authorship views: filmmakers’ intentions sometimes conflict with each other during the production of a film. However, since multiple authorship views cannot adequately explain how a single filmic utterance can result from conflicting intentions, I want to argue that the single authorship view should be reinstated in those special cases where two or more agents are involved in the production of a filmic utterance and where the intentions of those agents are incompatible.
2
Grewal, Siddhant. "Intentionalism as metacriticism : a reassessment of the intentional fallacy". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88752/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In 1946, Monroe C. Beardsley and W. K. Wimsatt published an article, “The Intentional Fallacy,” which objected to the critical practice of treating claims about an artist as claims about her work. Thus was inaugurated what today is known as the intentionalism debate. I begin by offering a certain conception of the debate—not quite a novel conception, for it corresponds more or less to what Beardsley and Wimsatt took themselves to be doing, but one which, in recent decades, has increasingly been supplanted by something very different. I argue for the priority of this original conception, which is concerned primarily with the language and norms of criticism, over the more recent conceptions which focus on analyses of meaning. I then propose a view which defends the artist’s relevance against the objections of Beardsley and Wimsatt, so understood. The interest of my view lies in its circumvention of what many have (incorrectly) thought essential to the position to which Beardsley and Wimsatt were objecting.
3
Hoyer, Steven. "Intention and interpretation". Thesis, McGill University, 1993. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=68104.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis is in two chapters. Chapter one is about intentions. Literary theorists have, by and large, dismissed their relevance to interpretation, so it will be useful to consider what exactly is being ignored. Therefore, I devote chapter one to a clarification of the nature and role(s) of intention within the interlocking network of basic propositional attitudes. I argue that intentions incorporate both a functional and a representational dimension, triggering actional mechanisms and structuring the process of practical reasoning.Chapter two is about interpretation. I open the chapter with an examination of extreme conventionalist theses, arguing that their success depends on an unjustifiably strict demarcation between intentionality and textuality. Appropriating aspects of Donald Davidson's work in the philosophy of language, I argue for the recognition of linguistic communication as a form of intentional action. I then defend this thesis against more moderate conventionalist theories to offer a viable approach to the interpretation of literary works.
4
Shallcross, Wendy L. "Enhanced attention to "motionese" do infants prefer infant-directed to adult-directed action? /". Click here for download, 2006. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/villanova/fullcit?p1434312.
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5
Fehross, Anson. "Against intentionalism: a reappraisal of artefactual metaphysics, with an eye to weaponry". Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/12460.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
It is commonplace to talk of weapons being ‘misused’ in certain contexts. We might say that whenever a policeman uses a Taser on a struggling suspect to force compliance that he has ‘misused’ his weapon. This might be justified by reference to the intention of a designer, who wished the Taser to be a purely defensive weapon. What is of note is that such a claim is predicated on the acceptance on a prior metaphysical outlook: that in order to determine the nature of a weapon, or any artefact whatsoever, we must turn to the intentions of the designer. This is emblematic of intentionalism, the metaphysical outlook that artefact kinds are determined by reference to the intention of the designer. Intentionalism represents the default view within contemporary analytic philosophers of technology. I intend to provide an account that undermines this view, supplanting it with what I term the optimality account. Under this account we ought to define artefacts by reference to their capacity to function well as tokens of a particular artefact type. This thesis has two main goals. The first is to provide a persuasive account of why we should reject the claim that artefacts are defined by their designer’s intentions. In so doing, weaponry will be utilised as both a focus and a case study of why such an account is grossly inadequate to the data before us. Second, the account given here will provide a positive account of artefact metaphysics that will link the nature of weapons to their capacity to be optimal as means of harming others.
6
Bordini, D. "THE TRANSPARENCIES AND THE OPACITIES OF EXPERIENCE. INTENTIONALISM, PHENOMENAL CHARACTER, AND MOODS". Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/236976.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
According to Intentionalism, what it’s like to undergo a conscious experience (i.e. its phenomenal character) is nothing over and above what that experience represents (i.e. its intentional content). This view is usually thought to be directly and strongly supported by introspective evidence and, in particular, by the following introspective datum, the so-called transparency of experience: in introspection one is not aware of the intrinsic qualities of one’s experience, but the only features one is directly aware of appear as properties of mind-independent, external objects of the world. (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995, 2000) This suggests that all that there is about our conscious experience is nothing over and above its intentional content.
In this dissertation, I focus on and address the issue of the transparency of experience and its relations with Intentionalism. More precisely, I consider why and how transparency exactly supports Intentionalism, what is the scope of transparency, what exactly is its strength, and what are the consequences on Intentionalism in case transparency fails. In particular, I argue for these two interconnected claims: (1) experience is not transparent in the sense required by Intentionalism; (2) introspection does not support Intentionalism but, on the contrary, offers strong reasons against it.
In order to develop my argument, I consider the case study of moods, namely, affective states like anxiety, depression, elation, grumpiness, gloominess, irritation, etc.
The discussion on moods provides the following two main results. (i) At least some moods–– e.g., undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation––are genuinely undirected, as long as they are not other-presenting experiences. This is not dependent on some deficiency/inability of the introspector, but it is a fact about their phenomenal character: it is constitutively part of what it’s like to be in those moods. (ii) The fact that those experiences are not other-presenting leads to conclude that they are also fully opaque experiences (i.e. entirely non-transparent experiences). Indeed, as I argue, one minimal condition for transparency is being other-presenting.
These two results have important consequences both on Intentionalism and on transparency. For what concerns the consequences on Intentionalism, the opacity of undirected moods is not only a mere lack of evidence in support of Intentionalism; rather, it constitutes a source of evidence against it. That undirected moods are opaque, indeed, means that their phenomenal character, as it is revealed in introspection, is such that it cannot be identified with intentional content. So, I argue, if one considers transparency as a strong evidence in support of the claim that phenomenal character is intentional content, then, and for the same reasons, one should also accept that opacity is strong evidence against that claim. Thus, Intentionalism as a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character is to be rejected because the opacity of undirected moods offers introspective direct and strong evidence against it.
On the other hand, as for transparency, with Kind’s (2003) distinction between strong and weak transparency at hand, I argue that transparency should not be rejected altogether, but rather revised in its strength and thereby understood in terms of weak transparency, where this means the following: although difficult, it is still not impossible to be introspectively aware of the qualities of the experience. Thus, I claim, experience is not strongly transparent (i.e. the way the intentionalist would like it to be) but weakly transparent. Hence, my twofold conclusion: (1) experience is not transparent in the (strong) sense required by Intentionalism; (2) introspection does not support Intentionalism but, on the contrary, offers strong evidence against it. Although these results suggest a rejection of Intentionalism, my final suggestion is that this is to be done in a constructive way. So, in the very final paragraphs I offer some general considerations on how to make sense of an alternative view that keeps the best of the intentionalist proposal and, at the same time, drops what is wrong with it.
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Arborelius, Jon. "Den implicite författaren : En diskussion kring begreppet "implicit författare", med en exemplifierande analys av Karl Ove Knausgårds roman Min kamp". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Litteraturvetenskapliga institutionen, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-242763.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Uppsatsen undersöker och diskuterar begreppet "implicit författare" med utgångspunkt i en hypotetisk-intentionalistisk tolkningsmodell för skönlitterära texter. Uppsatsens syfte är att fördjupa och precisera begreppet "implicit författare", samt att visa hur begreppet kan vara behjälpligt vid en analys av ett skönlitterärt verk. Uppsatsen avslutas med en exemplifierande analys av inledningen till Karl Ove Knausgårds roman Min kamp.
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Söderberg, Vendela. "”Hur blir man medborgare, om man ingenting vet om livet runt omkring? Först när man själv har hamnat i fällan, får man omsider kunskap.” : En komparativ och kvalitativ textanalys om Gulags framställning i skolböcker 1970-2010". Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Historia, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-45767.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
”Min farfar pratade inte om det han var med om i Stalins Gulagläger om man inte pressade honom.” Detta skriver historikern Anton Weiss-Wendt om sin farfar, Helmut Weiss, som förlorade 20 år av sitt liv i Gulag. Den här historien och fler därtill, kände världen inte till. Sovjetunionens sönderfall inträffade år 1991 och censuren upphävdes. Tidigare hemligstämplade dokument av politiska makthavare offentliggjordes och allmänheten i väst fick kunskap om Gulaglägren i första hand tack vare nobelpristagaren Aleksandr Solzjenitsyns böcker. Genom en komparativ och kvalitativ textanalys av sex skolböcker från olika decennier och en granskning av styrdokument kommer jag i den här uppsatsen att undersöka hur historiedidaktik och officiella riktlinjer har påverkat läroböckernas innehåll. Detta med Gulag framställning i skolböcker i Sverige som det centrala forskningsområdet.
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Weiss, Jeremy. "A Feeling Theory of Feelings". The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1462182103.
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Hussin, Nora Anniesha Binte. "Interaction from an activity theoretical perspective comparing learner discourse of language face-to-face, in chat and in audio conferencing in second language learning /". Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B41758146.
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Hussin, Nora Anniesha Binte. "Interaction from an activity theoretical perspective: comparing learner discourse of language face-to-face, inchat and in audio conferencing in second language learning". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B41758146.
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Almäng, Jan. "Intentionality and intersubjectivity /". Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2077/4563.
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Ammereller, Erich. "Wittgenstein on intentionality". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.295494.
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John, James R. 1975. "Consciousness and intentionality". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28838.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004.Includes bibliographical references (p. 174-180).
(cont.) having perceptual experiences, subjects can be--and usually are--directly aware of material objects.
This dissertation is about phenomenal consciousness, its relation to intentionality, and the relation of both to issues in the philosophy of perception. My principal aim is (1) to defend an account of what it is for a perceptual experience to be phenomenally conscious and (2) to develop, within the terms set forth by this account, a particular theory of perceptual phenomenal consciousness. Given the way these matters are usually understood, it probably is not obvious why I distinguish two philosophical tasks here. One might ask: "Isn't defending an account of what it is for a perceptual experience to be phenomenally conscious the same thing as developing a particular theory of perceptual phenomenal consciousness?" I argue that it is not. In addition to my principal aim, I have three subsidiary aims. First, to shed some light on what it means for a perceptual experience to be an intentional mental event, one with representational content. Many philosophers regard the notion of perceptual intentionality as utterly unproblematic. Though I accept that experiences almost always have content, I subject this claim to more scrutiny than is usual. Second, to go some way towards better understanding the relationship between perceptual phenomenal consciousness and perceptual intentionality. In particular, I examine recent attempts to explain the former in terms of the latter. My conclusion is that there can be no such explanation. Finally, to show that, by improving our understanding of perceptual phenomenal consciousness, perceptual intentionality, and the relation between them, we can make headway on some very difficult problems in the philosophy of perception. I am especially interested in defending direct realism, the view that, in
by James R. John.
Ph.D.
15
NGUYEN, THANH BINH. "Sens, situation, intentionalite". Paris 4, 1988. http://www.theses.fr/1988PA040049.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Cette these tente de repondre a deux questions; d'une part, "comment le sens peut-il etre source de contraintes situationnelles"; d'autre part, "comment le locuteur pretend-il amener le destinataire a remplir les conditions de satisfaction de son acte illocutoire?". A la premiere question - que l'on fera porter d'abord sur la structure logique du sens, ensuite, sur la relation entre interlocuteurs - on repondra, respec- tivement, en termes intentionnels, et en faisant intervenir la double notion de pri- se en charge et d'engagement. Le premier chapitre, qui traite de cette question, a- borde egalement celles de l'arriere-plan et de la representation, de l'intention de communication, et de la consistance semantique et intentionnelle. En reponse a la se- conde question, abordee dans le second chapitre, sera proposee la notion de transfor- mation situationnelle: le seul moyen dont dispose l pour amener d a realiser les con- ditions de satisfaction de son acte consiste a lui fournir les informations necessai- res a la construction d'un contexte de comprehension et d'evaluation. De ce fait, l'enon- ciation aura pour effet de transformer le contexte mental de d, laquelle transforma- tion devra permettre la construction eventuelle des contextes pertinents. Le troi- sieme chapitre tente de donner un ancrage linguistique a certaines de ces transfor- mations en les reliant a certains types d'expressions dont la fonction serait de vehiculer des instructions destinees a aider le processus de comprehension dans la construction des contextes mentionnes'how can meaning be the source of contextual constraints', and 'how does the speaker purport to get the hearer to fulfill the conditions of satisfaction of his speech act'are the two questions 1 address myself to. The first question is susceptible of two types of answer: in intentional terms, when construed as a question about the logical structure of meaning; in terms of the double notion of endorsement commitment, when taken to bear on the relation between s and h. Chapter one, which deals with this question, also takes up such related issues as'background and representation', communicative intention' and' semantic versus intentional consistency'. The second question 1 answer in chapter two in terms of contextual transformations: in the absence of guaranteed means s could avail herself of to get h to do what is expected from him, all s can do is provide h with the means to understand and evaluate the content of her intention; or rather, to construct the relevant contexts of comprehsion and evaluation. Accordingly, s's utterance will trigger a series of transformations of h's mental context, which transformationsform the necessary prerequisite for those further contextual transformations. Chapter three is concerned with the extent to which those various modifications of the context are anchored in meaning. Its main focus is on those expressions which can be said to carry the relevant instructions intended for the comprehension process
16
Allen, Benjamin T. "Searle on Intentionality". Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1218134470.
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Reznick, J. Steven. "Inferring infant intentionality". Saarbrücken VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2007. http://d-nb.info/988902613/04.
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Gentile, Michele. "Intentionality, Modularity and Time". Doctoral thesis, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/401825.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
L'abast d'aquesta tesi és el de proporcionar una explicació del temps psicològic que s'adhereix al concepte de modularitat de les funcions cognitives com va ser formulada per Fodor. Aquest compte té per objecte demostrar que el nostre "sentit" de temps (i la capacitat relacionada amb la gestió d'informació en temps) és el resultat cognitiu d'una sèrie de processos que es duen a terme per dos components de processament independents i neutralment aïllables que són part de la porció de l'arquitectura mental, dedicat als sistemes modulars. Intento demostrar que aquests subsistemes poden estar al seu torn es fa referència com a mòduls, ja que cada un té la possibilitat d'especialitzar en el processament temporal. Dins d'aquesta funcionals delimitacions arquitectura entre aquests diferents mètodes de processament s'organitzen d'acord amb els principis que tenen el seu fonament en la tesi de la modularitat de Fodor. Utilitzant la referència de "mòdul" per a la noció de ‘specious present’ meu argument procedeix a organitzar el processament temporal en una jerarquia, amb la finalitat de representar la informació de temps des de les primeres etapes de la percepció a etapes superiors de la cognició. Si aquesta hipòtesi és correcta, podria oferir pautes útils per explorar capacitat de sincronització en els éssers humans, i proporcionar un marc creïble per a la futura investigació dels mecanismes psicològics i neuronals de processament temporal.El alcance de esta tesis es el de proporcionar una explicación del tiempo psicológico que se adhiere al concepto de modularidad de las funciones cognitivas como fue formulada por Fodor. Esta cuenta tiene por objeto demostrar que nuestro "sentido" de tiempo (y la capacidad relacionada con la gestión de información en tiempo) es el resultado cognitivo de una serie de procesos que se llevan a cabo por dos componentes de procesamiento independientes y neutralmente aislables que son parte de la porción de la arquitectura mental, dedicado a los sistemas modulares. Trato de demostrar que estos subsistemas pueden estar a su vez se hace referencia como módulos, ya que cada uno tiene la posibilidad de especializarse en el tiempo de procesamiento. Dentro de esta funcionales delimitaciones arquitectura entre estos diferentes métodos de procesamiento se organizan de acuerdo a los principios que tienen su fundamento en la tesis de la modularidad de Fodor. Utilizando la referencia de "módulo" para la noción de ‘specious present’ mi argumento procede a organizar el procesamiento temporal en una jerarquía, con el fin de representar la información de tiempo desde las primeras etapas de la percepción a etapas superiores de la cognición. Si esta hipótesis es correcta, podría ofrecer pautas útiles para explorar capacidad de sincronización en los seres humanos, y proporcionar un marco creíble para la futura investigación de los mecanismos psicológicos y neuronales de procesamiento temporal.
The scope of this thesis is to provide an explanation of psychological time which adheres to the concept of modularity of cognitive functions as formulated by Fodor. This account seeks to demonstrate that our ‘sense’ of time (and the related ability to manage time information) is the cognitive result of a series of processes carried out by two independent and neutrally isolable processing components which are part of the portion of mental architecture dedicated to modular systems. I try to demonstrate that these sub-systems can themselves be referred to as modules, as each has the potential to specialize in time processing. Within this functional architecture delimitations between these different processing methods are organised according to principles which have their basis in Fodor's modularity thesis. Using the reference of 'module' for the notion of specious present my argument proceeds to arrange time processing into a hierarchy, in order to represent time information from the early stages of perception to higher stages of cognition. If such a hypothesis is correct, it could offer useful guidelines for exploring timing ability in humans, and provide a plausible framework for future investigation of the psychological and neuronal mechanisms of time processing.
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Tennenbaum, Christopher D. "Intentionality in Artificial Intelligence". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/269.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This paper addresses the question of whether Artificial Intelligence can have intentionality. This question is part of a larger discussion of whether or not Artificial Intelligence can ever be 'conscious'. Ultimately, I come to the conclusion that while we can see how intentionality can be transferred, it has yet to be shown that intentionality can be created within Artificial Intelligence. To begin, I define intentionality. I then discuss the Turing Test (Alan Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" and the Chinese Room (John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs"). I conclude by expressing my own opinions and where I believe Artificial Intelligence will be in the near future.
20
Towse, Marcus John. "Intentionality, morality and humanity". Thesis, University of York, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.258731.
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Parildar, Sümeyye. "Intentionality in Mullā Ṣadrā". Thesis, University of Exeter, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/16006.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The present study reconstructs psychological, linguistic and ontological aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy in the light of Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Brentano used intentionality as a psychological term to denote the ‘mental’ as opposed to the ‘natural’. Later, with Meinong, intentionality took an ontological commitment to assenting that ‘there are things that do not exist’. The chapters that discuss Ṣadrā’s philosophy reflect the two aspects with an investigation for the production process of intentional objects and an investigation of the status of these objects in ontology. The main aim of the research is to give an internalist and monist account for the nature of intentionality demonstrating an alternative approach to the concepts of existence and the soul. Ontologically, there is only one reality (existence) and nothing is left outside it. Accordingly, intentional objects are mental beings that are at a lower level of existence (wujūd ẓillī). The principles behind the monist ontology are: first, the gradational ontology (tashkīk) that all things are determined beings (mutamayyiz) and they are manifestations of a single reality at different levels of intensity (mutashakkik), and, second, the simplicity principle (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa) in which existence is a simple reality that comprehends all beings whilst being the principle of multiplicity at the same time. Accordingly intentional objects are a level of existence, and share same reality. Epistemologically, all knowledge processes including external senses are regarded as internal processes in which the causal effect of the extra-mental object is reduced to being an accidental preparatory tool and faculties for the soul. Perception is always completed with the touch of imagination and the real object of perception is internally created. The soul is not the receiver of forms, but is the active agent. Moreover, the soul undergoes substantial change as the objects are being produced. The soul is then not a container of forms. It is rather the case that the forms themselves construct the soul. The last point is that knowledge is a mode of existence. This mode of being (knowledge) indeed is the very existence of the human soul. In this explanation, the soul is neither material nor immaterial per se: the soul starts her journey as a material substance and becomes more delicate and immaterial through her journey. The soul’s journey is made possible with the preparatory role of the processes of perception. Intentionality is soul’s action of creating mental forms. The products are identical to soul since soul and knowledge are identical. Consequently, intentional objects are dependent on the soul in their presence and creation.
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Myles, Robert. "Chaucer's intentionalist realism and the Friar's Tale". Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=39339.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
John R. Searle asks the following fundamental question at the beginning of Speech Acts: "What is the difference between saying something and meaning it and saying it without meaning it?" This dissertation demonstrates that Chaucer is interested in this same question and that his answer to it is essentially "modern." I show in a number of Chaucer's works, but primarily through a reading of the Friar's Tale, that Chaucer understands the intentional structure of all signs, based on the paradigm of language; that is, that signs are always simultaneously mind-related and world-related, that they possess what is called today a "three-level semantics." This semantics is at the heart of the dynamic play in Chaucer's poetry, and through it he is able to portray his characters psychologically. This being so, with Chaucer as an exemplar, this dissertation calls into question the widespread belief in a "medieval mentality" that is essentially "other" than a "modern mentality."To support this argument in the context of medieval thought, I explain that Chaucer could have such a "modern" understanding of the psychological import of language by describing certain of the common, shared presuppositions and characteristics of medieval Judeo-Christian metaphysics: its thesis of intentionality, its personalism and existentialism, and its semiological nature.
The present study is of importance to Chaucerian studies in general because I argue that heretofore Chaucer's understanding of language has been inadequately, incorrectly, and confusedly described in terms of medieval nominalism and realism. Consequently, Chaucer has been seen as a nominalist thinker, a realist thinker or a combination of both. This dissertation lays these particular "Chaucers" to rest. I argue that Chaucer may be described as an "intentionalist realist," but the "realist" of this description is not identical with the "realism" of the scholastic debates on the nature of the universals.
This dissertation further suggests that the semantics which Chaucer consciously considers and exploits in his works on the level of language, speech and other human-directed signs may serve as a paradigm of a general Chaucerian "semantics" in an extended sense: Chaucer's understanding of a structure of meaning or logos of all reality. On an individual human level this translates into a structure whereby a medieval Christian may judge if a person, including his or her own self, is relating properly, or improperly, to other individuals, to other created things, and to God.
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O'Callaghan, Richard. "The pure intentionalist theory of perceptual experience". Thesis, University of Ulster, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.267827.
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Follon, Derek. "Synthesis from numbers to intentionality". Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/4600.
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Farias, De Souza Filho Sergio. "Naturalising intentionality : a teleological approach". Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2018. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/naturalising-intentionality(b8e0d9e3-e085-4247-abe6-f5422208b9cd).html.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis develops a teleological theory of mental representation to naturalise intentionality. Teleosemantics explains mental representation in terms of biological functions. The thesis addresses a number of foundational problems that threats the viability of teleosemantics. The first chapter, “The metaphysics of mental representation”, develops a basic conception of mental representation that is designed to satisfy certain intuitive requirements (misrepresentation and original intentionality) and methodological requirements (explanatory power and ontological parsimony). The second chapter, “Naturalising intentionality”, defends the thesis that mental representation is naturalistically reducible and in particular that it should be explained teleosemantically. After that, it addresses some of Tyler Burge’s objections to reductionist naturalism in general and teleosemantics in particular. The third chapter, “The minimal conditions for intentionality: the problem of demarcation”, considers the problem of demarcating the limits of intentionality and the objection that teleosemantics and other naturalist theories are too liberal. It adopts the method of reflective equilibrium to develop minimal conditions for intentionality based on mutual adjustments between intuitive and explanatory constraints. Finally, it rejects alternative proposals for demarcating intentionality in terms of causal independence or constancy mechanisms. The fourth chapter, “The minimal conditions for intentionality: the dual proposal”, develops a specific solution to the problem of demarcation – the dual proposal for the minimal conditions for intentionality. The fifth chapter, “The content problem: in defence of producer-based teleosemantics”, defends a producer-based version of teleosemantics and proposes solutions for functional indeterminacy problems facing teleosemantics.
26
Brandt, Stefan Geoffrey Heinrich. "Wittgenstein and Sellars on intentionality". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0d9c1102-17bf-493b-a1a0-aa983d277717.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The aim of the thesis is to explore Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Wilfrid Sellars’s views on intentionality. In the first chapter I discuss the account of intentionality and meaning the early Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus. I present his idea that sentences are pictures of states of affairs with which they share a ‘logical form’ and to which they stand in an internal ‘pictorial relationship’. I argue that Wittgenstein thought of this relationship as established by acts of thought consisting in the operation of mental signs corresponding to the signs of public languages. In the second and third chapters I discuss the later Wittgenstein’s criticism of ideas at the heart of the Tractarian account of intentionality, as well as his explanations of the phenomena that motivated it. In the second chapter I examine his rejection of the idea that thinking consists in the operation of mental signs and his criticism of the idea that meaning and understanding are mental processes accompanying the use of language. In the third chapter I turn to Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea that representations stand in an internal ‘pictorial relation’ to objects in the natural order that are their meaning. I illuminate his later views by discussing Sellars’s non-relational account of meaning, in particular his claim that specifications of meaning do not relate expressions to items that are their meaning, but rather specify their rule-governed role in language. I conclude with a discussion of the later Wittgenstein’s account of the relationship between intentional phenomena and the objects at which they are directed. In the final fourth chapter I provide a detailed discussion of Sellars’s account of thinking. I conclude with some criticisms of Sellars’s views.
27
Bell, Jordan. "The relationship between consciousness and intentionality". Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2013. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/818.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Within the Philosophy of Mind two features of our mental life have been acknowledged as the most perplexing - consciousness, the phenomenal "what it is likeness" of our mental states, and intentionality, the aboutness or directedness of our mental states. As such, it has become commonplace to develop theories about these phenomena which seek to explain them naturalistically, that is, without resort to magic or miracles. Traditionally this has been done by analyzing consciousness and intentionality apart from one another. However, in more recent years the tide has turned. In contemporary theories these phenomena are typically analyzed in terms of the other. This results in two competing views: Representationalism, which seeks to ground consciousness in intentionality, and Phenomenalism, which seeks to ground intentionality in consciousness. David Chalmers has proposed an alternative view to these which takes consciousness and intentionality as essentially interdependent, neither more fundamental than the other. This thesis explores the motivations for Representationalism and Phenomenalism, outlines their extraneous commitments, and analyzes their merits - as well as assessing whether Chalmers' view is a defensible middle ground. This involves an analysis of the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism, phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, and the nature of mental content. I argue that the view which Chalmers advocates is the best supported. Yet, I argue, it could benefit by adopting a thoroughgoing externalism of mental content.B.A.
Bachelors
Arts and Humanities
Philosophy
28
McDonald, Paul John. "An intentionalist analysis of selected works of Edmond Holmes". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.612099.
Testo completo
29
McWeeny, Jennifer. "Knowing emotions : emotional intentionality and epistemological sense /". view abstract or download file of text, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3201692.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-273). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
30
De, Silva M. B. "The demands of content : action, experience, intentionality". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.598452.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In this essay I examine what I call the transcendental approach to perceptual experience, which has come to prominence in the philosophy of mind in the last decade under the heading of disjunctivism and related doctrines. The basic premise of this approach is that making sense of empirical thought places substantive constraints on our conception of experience. I focus my efforts on elaborating and defending two claims made by John McDowell, the philosopher most closely associated with the transcendental approach. (1) The intelligibility of empirical judgement (belief) depends essentially on our conception of ourselves as free and rational agents; in particular, judgement formation is responsibly free action. Considered as such, (2) judgement’s intelligibility requires that a subject’s perceptual experience provide him with justificatory reasons, or evidence, for his empirical judgements. I develop an account of perceptual justification and knowledge around these two claims that eschews many of the more contentious elements of McDowell’s own perceptual epistemology. I give an account in chapter 1 of the fundamentals of intentional content, and of empirical content in particular. In chapter 2, I argue at length for the following propositions, upon which the intelligibility of empirical judgement depends: (a) the judgement that p is correct only if p (that is, only if p is true); and (b) the process or mechanism of empirical-judgement formation – a subject’s deliberative faculty for making up his mind about what to believe about the empirical world – must be causally guided or constrained, in the most basic type of case (observational judgement), by its empirical subject matter. In chapter 3, I construct a detailed argument for theses (1) and (2). In the final chapter I begin by rebutting some influential philosophers’ objections to the sort of view of experience’s relation to belief developed in chapter 3. I conclude by offering an account of perceptual justification and knowledge, one that diverges in critical respects from McDowell’s own view while accommodating the transcendentalists’ claim that our picture of perceptual experience must answer to the theoretical demands imposed by an intelligible conception of empirical thoughts.
31
Anderson, Blake M. "The logic-desire-belief structure of intentionality". Virtual Press, 2007. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/1365171.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Intentionality is the concept of how mental states and their content relate to each other. Although intentionality was re-introduced to philosophy by the psychologist Franz Brentano, psychology has not empirically researched the concept. The present study reviews the history of intentionality, as it relates to psychology, and argues that people recognize their own and other people's intentionality through a logic-desire-belief structure. The logic-desire-belief structure was tested by having participants in an experiment read situations containing the structure and an intentional state. The results demonstrate that people are sensitive to the logic-desire-belief structure, and the structure may allow people to recognize intentionality.Department of Psychological Science
32
Freedman, David Emmanuel. "The intentionality, causality and metaphysics of naming". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e45f5865-b9a9-46a1-b8b7-a26eb4ae58fa.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis delineates the boundaries of theories of naming, placing particular emphasis on the demarcation of the semantic function of referring expressions from the pragmatics of referential usage. The need for such emphasis derives from frequent confusions in work on singular reference where pragmatic phenomena are used to refute semantic theories and vice versa. Part One of the thesis examines various conceptions of the semantic function of names. Frege's notion of 'Sinn' is shown to be incoherent as are its reincarnations by modern, neo-Fregean commentators: a more modest role for sense is suggested. Kripke's intuitions about scope-insensitivity in modal contexts are amplified and criticised. An investigation of singular thought yields a discussion of Evans 1 views and the removal of the apparent impasse that substitutevity failure causes for Millian theories. Part Two of the thesis concentrates on the mechanism of namereference, which works by connecting a contemporary use of a name via a causal umbilicus to some (or no) supposed referent. A number of anomalies are examined, from which the notion of a name-using practice and an elucidation of the criteria in virtue of which we judge a term to be a name are developed. In Part Three of the thesis the artificial super imposition of logical structure onto natural language is explored. The argument hinges on a plausible generalization of Donnellan's referentialattributive distinction. From this there emerges a picture of the complex network of intentions that surround the referring process. The role of definite descriptions in grounding the use of names is explained. Both the semantic and pragmatic pictures of name-reference are applied to the perennial puzzles of substitutivity failure and existential statements. The results underline the fact that a great deal of work needs to be done by those who subscribe to the growing orthodoxy of Millian theories, but that this is work in pragmatic areas that are too often ignored by those studying 'pure' semantics.
33
Kirkby, David James. "On judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar". Thesis, Durham University, 2013. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9451/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis explores conceptions of judgement which have been central to various philosophical and scientific traditions. Beginning with Hume, I situate his conception of judgement within his overarching constructivist program, his science of man. Defending Hume from criticism regarding the naturalistic credentials of this program, I argue that Hume’s science of man, along with the conception of judgement which is integral to it, is appropriately understood as a forerunner to contemporary cognitive science. Despite this, I contend that Hume’s conception of judgement prompts a problem regarding the intentionality of judgement – a problem which he does not adequately address. In the second part of my thesis I show how the intentionality problem which Hume grapples with is also crucial, constituting a point of departure, for Kant’s transcendental undertaking. Following Kant’s reasoning, I illustrate how an original concern with this intentionality issue leads Kant to a distinct conception of judgement, according to which concepts only exist in the context of a judgement. Having arrived at Kant’s conception of a judgement, the remainder of the thesis is devoted to the issue of judgement forms. Kant’s postulation of these forms is closely related to his conception of judgement, and I seek to establish both how these forms ought to be understood and how they might be derived. In relation to this latter issue, I suggest that there may a role for contemporary work in Generative Grammar. Specifically, I suggest that it may be viable to understand the forms of judgement as grammatical in nature, thereby securing an interdisciplinary connection between a philosophy of judgement and the empirical investigation of grammar.
34
Feng, Qianli. "Modeling Action Intentionality in Humans and Machines". The Ohio State University, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1616769653536292.
Testo completo
35
Faulkner, Philip Bernard. "Three essays on rationality, intentionality and economic agency". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2003. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/244841.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The central theme of this dissertation is the contribution that the theory of human ontology developed by the philosopher John Searle can make to economics. Searle's account of the cognitive functioning associated with rational behaviour provides a framework within which to analyse the role of conscious and non-conscious factors in rational behaviour; the nature and functioning of discursive and tacit knowledge; and the distinction between intentional and non-intentional states. Using this framework, each of the three essays which make up the core of this dissertation examines aspects of the conception of economic agency associated with a different field in economics; critical realism, behavioural finance and mainstream microeconomics. The first essay, which looks at the critical realist conception of the human actor in Tony Lawson 's Economics and Reality, argues that Lawson leaves undeveloped the notion of tacit knowledge, failing to explain important differences between knowledge that functions by virtue of conscious reflection and that which functions tacitly. From a Searlean perspective the key omission is argued to be the technical notion of intentionality, upon which Searle develops an account of tacit knowledge. I show how this notion of intentionality evades my criticism of Lawson. The second essay examines the conception of agency associated with behavioural finance from the perspective of the human ontology proposed by Searle. The principle theme of the essay is that each of the psychological traits that behavioural finance draws on, namely prospect theory, judgmental heuristics and mental accounting, involves the interplay of both conscious and non-conscious factors. Consequently the agent of behavioural finance is a construction that is readily intelligible in Searlean terms. I argue that this finding leads to a conception of the rationality of the agent encountered in the behavioural finance literature that is quite different from the way in which it is commonly presented. The mainstream microeconomic conception of the human actor is the focus of the final essay, in which it is argued that the treatment of human knowledge on this approach neglects a number of important factors in economic behaviour. The first half of the essay uses a simple Cournot duopoly game under conditions of complete and incomplete information in order to highlight the usual assumptions about actors ' knowledge in mainstream models. On the basis of these findings the second half of the essay then considers three aspects of human agency that these models neglect: non-probabilistic forms of uncertainty and ignorance, the subjectivity of knowledge and the role of tacit knowledge.
36
Gallotti, Mattia Luca. "Naturally we : a philosophical study of collective intentionality". Thesis, University of Exeter, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10036/2997.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to ‘share’ the mental states of others and to form collective intentional states. Collective intentionality has been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of its reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related, and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In this thesis I set out a theory of the naturalization of collective intentionality that draws a line between naturalizability arguments and theories of collective intentionality naturalized. The former provide reasons for believing in the naturalness of collective intentional states based on our commonsense understanding of them; the latter offer responses to the ontological question about the existence and identity of collective as distinct from individual intentionality. This model is naturalistic because it holds that the only way to establish the place of mental entities in the order of things is through the theory and practice of science. After reviewing naturalizability arguments in philosophy, I consider an influential research program in the cognitive sciences. On the account that I present, the irreducibility of collective intentionality can be derived from a theory of human development in scientific psychology dealing with phenomena of sociality like communication, recently refined by Michael Tomasello.
37
Vick, Erik. "IMPLEMENTING LEXICAL AND CREATIVE INTENTIONALITY IN SYNTHETIC PERSONALITY". Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2005. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/3252.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Creating engaging, interactive, and immersive synthetic characters is a difficult task and evaluating the success of a synthetic character is often even more difficult. The later problem is solved by extending Turing's Imitation Game thusly: computational construct should be evaluated based on the criteria of how well the character can mimic a human. In order to accomplish a successful evaluation of the proposed metric, synthetic characters must be consistently believable and capable of role-appropriate emotional expression. The author believes traditional synthetic characters must be improved to meet this goal. For a synthetic character to be believable, human users must be able to perceive a link between the mental state of the character and its behaviors. That is to say, synthetic characters must possess intentionality. In addition to intentionality, the mental state of the character must be human-like in order to provide an adequate frame of reference for the human users' internal simulations, to wit, the character's mental state must be comprised of a synthetic model of personality, of personality dynamics, and of cognition, each of which must be psychologically valid and of sufficient fidelity for the type of character represented. The author proposes that synthetic characters possessing these three models are more accurately described as synthetic personalities. The author proposes and implements computational models of personality, personality dynamics, and cognition in order to evaluate the psychological veracity of these models and computational equivalence between the models and the implementation as a first step in the process of creating believable synthetic personalities.Ph.D.
Other
Arts and Sciences
Modeling and Simulation
38
Teixeira, J. F. "Motion, evolution and content : An essay on intentionality". Thesis, University of Essex, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.380554.
Testo completo
39
Davis, Paul B. "Turing-completeness as medium : art, computers and intentionality". Thesis, University of the Arts London, 2018. http://ualresearchonline.arts.ac.uk/13523/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This PhD is a practice-based study of how the computer functions in art practice, which takes on the notion of a fine art computing “medium”. Current research, while sometimes referencing the computer as a potential art medium, mostly defines it non-explicitly as a type of “hybrid” media device or some sort of “multimedia” machine. These terms leave the existence of a specific computing medium in art practice undefined and have historically led the analysis of artworks that employ computers to rely on critical frameworks that were either developed for earlier physical media, or have no structural similarities to computers. Such approaches can fail to examine unique ontological issues that arise - especially at a structural level - when using a computer to produce art. To achieve a formal description of a hitherto loosely defined (or non-defined) art medium, the research employs a range of critical and theoretical material from fields outside art practice, chiefly among them Alan Turing’s definition of a "a(utomatic)-machine", (nowadays called a “Turing machine”) from his 1936 paper "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem". Turing described a machine which can “simulate” any other computing machine including all modern computers. His machine is here used to propose a ‘Turing-complete medium’ of art, of which every computer is a computationally equivalent member. Using this perspective/definition, the research undertook an investigation of a ‘Turing-complete medium’ by developing creative practice in the form of individual works that explored specific aspects of computing systems. The research then engaged in a written analysis of the practice, again employing the concept of a ‘Turing-complete medium’, working towards the development of medium-specific critique of any art made with any computer. In foregrounding the nature and functions of computing machines, the research explores how these elements can be made intrinsic to our interpretations of computer-based art while also being aware of the limitations of medium-specific critique as exposed within the modernist tradition.
40
Heflin, Ashley Shew. "What Dolphins Want: Animal Intentionality and Tool-Use". Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/31748.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In this thesis, I argue that at least some animals have the sort of intentionality philosophers traditionally have only ascribed to humans. I argue for this through the examination of tool-use among New Caledonian crows and Bottlenose dolphins. New Caledonian crows demonstrate advanced tool-manufacture and standardization, while Bottlenose dolphins use social learning to a much greater degree than other animals. These two case studies fit nicely with many of the non-linguistic accounts of intentionality employed by philosophers.
This thesis is aimed at showing that our basic philosophical concept of intentionality leaves room for intentional behavior on the part of non-human animals. Descriptions of human behavior are often contrasted with that of â lowerâ animals. Many have taken rationality as the characteristic that separates us from animals, and our notions about the superiority of humans have been passed down through theology and philosophy. From Plato onward, philosophers have created divisions that put humanity in a special position relative to all other creatures. Neglecting a careful analysis of animal behavior in making these divisions does a disservice not only to the animals themselves, but also to humans. This thesis is an attempt to start pulling a thread of the discussion about the specialness of humans out for examination. Specifically, I examine the case of intentionality in the framework of the tool-related behaviors of crows and dolphins.
Master of Arts
41
Jones, Jennifer Marie. "Evaluating Intentionality| A Psychometric Rubric for Statements of Purpose". Thesis, Grand Canyon University, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3587568.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Nearly one-half of doctoral students will never finish their program of study. This statistic is alarming. There is a need for an additional method to assess applicants, aside from prior academic success, in order to best identify those that will not only perform well in courses, but also have the psychosocial skills to persist to degree attainment. The purpose of this study was to evaluate an intentionality rubric which was found to have evidence of initial construct validity. Intentionality is a multivariate construct comprised of five domains: motivation, beliefs, goal-setting, goal-seeking, and self-efficacy. Such domains have been found to be important for pursuit of long-term goals. Doctoral students require high intentionality as there is not only coursework to complete, but dissertation research as well. Students need both the academic potential to complete the coursework and intentionality to maintain the journey. Doctoral students and faculty from a university in the Southwest participated in this study. With the rubric evaluated, tests were done of prompts to confirm that intentionality could be elicited in writing samples. The study found evidence of initial construct validity and confirmed that intentionality could be elicited from prompts. A recommendation for incorporating intentionality writing and evaluation into curriculum was offered with suggestions that additional research be conducted on the relationship between intentionality and success.
Key Words: Intentionality; attrition, university admission, goal setting; goal seeking, statement of purpose, self-efficacy, purpose, projective writing, psychosocial evaluation
42
SENRA, ANDRE VINICIUS DIAS. "THE NOTION OF INTENTIONALITY IN HUSSERL S PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS". PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2006. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=9772@1.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIORA fenomenologia husserliana, com o intuito de oferecer um fundamento filosófico para o conhecimento em geral, procura evitar, ao mesmo tempo, tanto o psicologismo quanto o logicismo. Embora a investigação fenomenológica pretenda esclarecer a relação cognoscitiva a partir da clarificação lógica do sentido, no entanto, seu propósito não trata a atividade filosófica como uma analítica da linguagem, mas infere que a Filosofia deve ter, propriamente, método, questões e objetos independentes de quaisquer outros saberes racionais. De acordo com a perspectiva fenomenológica, a superação do psicologismo não se refere somente à afirmação de que o acesso à objetividade dependa do reconhecimento da esfera ideal como sendo independente da sensibilidade. Husserl entendeu que o problema era que a base de argumentação cognitiva mantinha seu foco, até então no objeto transcendente, do mesmo modo, e analogamente, que a apreensão intuitiva desse objeto só podia ser efetuada pelo sujeito empírico. O fato de a objetividade pertencer a uma esfera independente, em referência aos aspectos sensíveis, torna imprescindível uma teoria da subjetividade pura, para que seja possível, de modo correto, efetuar a correspondência significativa que a relação de conhecimento exige. Se a experiência sensível do eu (sujeito psicológico) não for neutralizada, não é possível justificar coerentemente o ato noético em relação à objetividade e, por conseguinte, não pode haver fundamentação, precisamente porque o conhecer não se encontra livre do contato com a transcendência.
Husserlian Phenomenology as the aim to offer philosophical foundation for the general knowledge, seeks to avoid, at the same time, both psychologism and logicism. Although the Phenomenological inquiry intends to clear the cognoscitive relationship from logic clarification of sense, however, its purpose does not deal with the philosophical activity as an analytical one from linguistics, but it infers that philosophy must properly own its method, questions and objects, independently from any other rational knowledge/wisdoms. As to the Phenomenological view, the overcoming of psychologism is not related only to the affirmation that the access to the objectivity relies on the recognizing of the ideal sphere as being independent from sensibility. Husserl understood that the problem was that the basis for cognitive arguing had so far maintained its focus, on the transcendent object in the same way, and analogically that the intuitive apprehension from this object could only be made by the empirical subject. The fact that the objectivity belongs to an independent sphere, in reference to sensible aspects a theory of pure subjectivity becomes indispensable, in order to be possible, in a correct way, to make the significant correspondence that knowledge relation requires. If the I that experiences sensibly is not neutralized, it is not possible to coherently justify the noetic apprehension of objectivity as pure possibility and hence there may not be foundational, precisely because the knower is not found free from contact with transcendence.
43
Halloran, John. "The activity space : analyzing intentionality in open cooperative work". Thesis, University of Sussex, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.324182.
Testo completo
44
Eizak, Shiri Farhad. "Planning intentionality and its implications for project planned time". Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/planning-intentionality-and-its-implications-for-project-planned-time(db4669e5-68be-4426-9bc4-73f71f7361b4).html.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Within the construction industry, proximity of actual to scheduled completion time is a primary performance measure, and deviations from planned schedules remain a popular concern in the field of construction management. Prevailing research assumes that delays arise either from flawed execution of the plan or from failure to plan effectively. Thus, solutions suggested include improving execution and developing ever more sophisticated planning techniques. In spite of these efforts, accuracy in scheduling construction projects has shown little or no improvement, and clients continue to incur the significant costs associated with the failure to more accurately plan. Eschewing this traditional techno-rational view, the current research turned to critical management studies for solutions and investigated planning intentionality, the intentional and unintentional roles planners play in project delays. Thus, it sought to explore the following with respect to the project planner role: optimism bias, where a planner unintentionally mitigates negative information in decision-making; strategic misrepresentation, where a planner intentionally mitigates negative information; and group dynamics in time estimation. The latter is relevant because a team rather than an individual typically embodies the planner function within a construction project. To perform this research, two mixed-methods studies, preceded by a pilot study, and seven interviews with project planners were conducted. The first mixed-methods study investigated how intended and unintended actions of participants affected underestimation of time during task performance; and the second investigated the creation of collective intentionality, the transmutation of individual preferences into a group consensus in time estimation. Results of the first mixed-methods study identified the key situational variables differentiating intended and unintended actions of planners and indicated how these can influence the quality of time estimation. Results of the second study showed that group performance in time estimation was inferior to that of individuals and that group member interaction appeared detrimental to good decision-making. Reasons found were sense of power, commitment, confidence level, cultural diversity, conflicts, and groupthink. The findings were compared and contrasted with those obtained from interviews with project planners to enhance the scope of the study.
45
Ysidron, Dominic Walter. "Intentionality and Perceived Injustice: Repeated Exposure to Acute Pain". Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1593076281483829.
Testo completo
46
Di, Nucci Ezio. "Mind out of action : the intentionality of automatic actions". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/2587.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of intentional action can't explain the whole of agency. Causalist accounts such as Davidson's and Bratman's, according to which an action can be intentional only if it is caused by a particular mental state of the agent, don't work for every kind of action. So-called automatic actions, effortless performances over which the agent doesn't deliberate, and to which she doesn't need to pay attention, constitute exceptions to the causalist framework, or so I argue in this thesis. Not all actions are the result of a mental struggle, painful hesitation, or the weighting of evidence. Through practice, many performances become second nature. Think of familiar cases such as one's morning routines and habits: turning on the radio, brushing your teeth. Think of the highly skilled performances involved in sport and music: Jarrett's improvised piano playing, the footballer's touch. Think of agents' spontaneous reactions to their environment: ducking a blow, smiling. Psychological research has long acknowledged the distinctiveness and importance of automatic actions, while philosophy has so far explained them together with the rest of agency. Intuition tells us that automatic actions are intentional actions of ours all the same (I have run a survey which shows that this intuition is widely shared): not only our own autonomous deeds for which we are held responsible, but also necessary components in the execution and satisfaction of our general plans and goals. But do standard causal accounts deliver on the intentionality of automatic actions? I think not. Because, in automatic cases, standard appeals to intentions, beliefs, desires, and psychological states in general ring hollow. We just act: we don't think, either consciously or unconsciously. On the reductive side, Davidson's view can't but appeal to, at best, unconscious psychological states, the presence and causal role of which is, I argue, inferred from the needs of a theory, rather than from evidence in the world. On the non-reductive side, Bratman agrees, with his refutation of the Simple View, that we can't just attach an intention to every action that we want to explain. But Bratman’s own Single Phenomenon View, appealing to the mysterious notion of 'motivational potential', merely acknowledges the need for refinement without actually providing one. So I propose my own account of intentional action, the 'guidance view', according to which automatic actions are intentional: differently from Davidson and Bratman, who only offer necessary conditions in order to avoid the problem of causal deviance, I offer a full-blown account: E's phi-ing is intentional if and only If phi-ing is under E's guidance. This account resembles one developed by Frankfurt, with the crucial difference that Frankfurt – taking 'acting with an intention' and 'acting intentionally' to be synonymous – thinks that guidance is sufficient only for some movement being an action, but not for some movement being an intentional action. I argue that, on the other hand, Frankfurt's concept of guidance can be developed so that it is sufficient for intentional action too. In Chapter One I present and defend my definition of ‘automatic action’. In Chapter Two I show that such understanding of automatic actions finds confirmation in empirical psychology. In Chapter Three I show that Davidson's reductive account of intentional action does not work for automatic actions. In Chapter Four I show that the two most influential non-reductive accounts of intentional action, the Simple View and Bratman's Single Phenomenon View, don't work either. And in Chapter Five I put forward and defend my positive thesis, the 'guidance view'. Also, in the Appendix I present the findings of my survey on the intentionality of automatic actions.
47
Tao, Ruoting. "Understanding object-directed intentionality in Capuchin monkeys and humans". Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9304.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Understanding intentionality, i.e. coding the object directedness of agents towards objects, is a fundamental component of Theory of Mind abilities. Yet it is unclear how it is perceived and coded in different species. In this thesis, we present a series of comparative studies to explore human adults' and Capuchin monkeys' ability to infer intentional objects from actions. First we studied whether capuchin monkeys and adult humans infer a potential object from observing an object-directed action. With no direct information about the goal-object, neither species inferred the object from the action. However, when the object was revealed, the monkeys retrospectively encoded the directedness of the object-directed action; unexpectedly, in an adapted version of the task adult humans did not show a similar ability. We then adapted another paradigm, originally designed by Kovács et al (2010), to examine whether the two species implicitly register the intentional relation between an agent and an object. We manipulated an animated agent and the participants' belief about a ball's presence behind a hiding screen. We found no evidence showing that humans or monkeys coded object-directedness or belief. More importantly, we failed to replicate the original results from Kovács et al's study, and through a series of follow up studies, we questioned their conclusions regarding implicit ToM understanding. We suggested that, instead of implicit ToM, results like Kovacs et al's might be interpreted as driven by “sub-mentalizing” processes, as suggested by Heyes (2014). We conclude that so called ‘implicit ToM' may be based upon the computation of intentional relations between perceived agents and objects. But, these computations might present limitations, and some results attributed to implicit ToM may in fact reflect “sub-mentalizing” processes.
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Cheeseman, Mark Raymond. "History, intentionality, and meaning Jesus' understanding of His death /". Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2002. http://www.tren.com.
Testo completo
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Turner, Sudan A. "Intrinsically semantic concepts and the intentionality of propositional attitudes /". Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5721.
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Riempp, Roland. "Intentionales Beobachtungslernen von Bewegungs- und Handlungsabläufen mit interaktivem Video". Tübingen : UI-Druck, 2000. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=963184911.
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