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1
Macknight, Vicki Sandra. "Teaching imagination." Connect to thesis, 2009. http://repository.unimelb.edu.au/10187/7035.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis is about the teaching imagination. By this term I refer to three things. First, the teaching imagination is how teachers define and practice imagination in their classrooms. Second, it is the imagination that teachers themselves use as they teach. And thirdly, it is the imagination I am taught to identify and enact for doing social science research.<br>The thesis is based upon participant-observation research conducted in grade four (and some composite grade three/four) classrooms in primary schools in Melbourne, a city in the Australian state of Victoria. The research took me to five schools of different types: independent (or fee-paying); government (or state); Steiner (or Waldorf); special (for low IQ students); and Catholic. These five classrooms provide a range, not a sample: they suggest some ways of doing imagination. I do not claim a necessary link between school type and practices of imagination. In addition I conducted semi-structured interviews with each classroom’s teacher and asked that children do two tasks (to draw and to write about ‘a time you used your imagination’).<br>From this research I write a thesis in two sections. In the first I work to re-imagine certain concepts central to studies of education and imagination. These include curriculum, classrooms, and ways of theorizing and defining imagination. In this section I develop a key theoretical idea: that the most recent Victorian curriculum is, and social science should be, governed by what I call a logic of realization. Key to this idea is that knowers must always be understood as participants in, not only observers of, the world.<br>In the second section I write accounts of five case studies, each learning from a different classroom teacher about one way to understand and practice imagination. We meet imagination as creative transformation; imagination as thinking into other perspectives; imagination as representation; imagination as the ability to relate oneself to the people and materials one is surrounded by; and imagination as making connections and separations in thought. In each of these chapters I work to re-enact that imagination in my own writing. Using the concept of the ‘relational teacher’, one who flexibly responds to changing student needs and interests, I suggest that some of these imaginations are more suitable to a logic of realization than others.
2
Andersson, Sofie. "Ignite Imagination." Thesis, KTH, Arkitektur, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-146205.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The intention with this project is to explore and open up the imagination, through investigating how text can be transformed into architecture. The outcome of the investigation during this project is a series of 9 architectural objects. The objects are independent from the text and could be thought of as ‘short-stories’.<br>Intentionen med detta examensarbete var att undersöka och öppna upp fantasin, genom att utforska hur text kan transformeras till arkitektur. Resultatet av detta utforskande projekt är en serie av 9 objekt. Objekten är oberoende av texten och kan ses som ’short-stories’ i sig själva.
3
Gilmour, Nathan P. "Visionary imagination." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2002. http://www.tren.com.
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Lin, Chien Heng. "What is imagination? : a study of young children's imagination." Thesis, Brunel University, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.439074.
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Nash, Hassan Khalid. "On Wings of Imagination: The Power of Imagination Politics." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1557478123922316.
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Anderson, Linda Viktoria. "Plato's political imagination." Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=99570.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Traditional interpretations of Plato see him either as an enemy of the imagination in his views of philosophic discussion, or as a purveyor of imaginative lies in his authoritarian and anti-democratic view of politics. Instead this thesis challenges both these interpretations by showing how the imagination is both philosophical and democratically political. In the Republic images and stories balance and enrich rational argumentation. I first analyze the imaginary aspects of Plato's ideal city. Secondly, I look more closely to the role of images in education and poetry by focusing on Plato's distinction between good and bad images. Thirdly, I discuss the role of images in relation to notions of the ideal and democracy. I propose that images are crucial in crafting and acquiring a vision of the ideal in speech. Finally, I end by stressing that philosophic discussion, and its use of images, not only contains democratic elements but that it also is more likely to thrive in a democratic space and context, marked by freedom of speech and pluralism.
7
Grant, James. "Criticism and imagination." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.539958.
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Davis, Jack Frank. "Belief and imagination." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2018. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10049327/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Two assumptions are often made about the nature of the cognitive attitudes that allow us to engage with fiction and in pretence: the uniformity and the non-doxastic assumptions. The uniformity assumption tells us that both of these activities involve the same cognitive attitudes. The non-doxastic assumption tells us that these cognitive attitudes are not beliefs, but belief-like states that we can call belief-like imaginings. I will challenge both of these assumptions in this thesis. In the case of the uniformity assumption, I will draw a distinction between voluntary and involuntary imaginative counterparts. I will argue that if a belief-like counterpart is involved in our engagement in pretence, it will be a voluntary counterpart, whereas an involuntary one will have to be associated with our engagement with fiction. Against the non-doxastic assumption, I will argue that we can explain our engagement with these activities by introducing beliefs with distinct contents. In the case of pretence, I will suggest that the relevant beliefs are of the form ‘[I believe] I PRETEND that “p”’. In the case of fiction, I will argue that the relevant beliefs are of the form ‘I believe p [in the fiction]’. This will lead to us challenging the non-doxastic assumption on the grounds that belief-like imaginings are unnecessary for explaining how we are able to engage with fiction and in pretence. I will also offer some arguments for why belief-like imaginings might be insufficient for explaining how we are able to engage with fiction and in pretence. In particular, I will argue that belief-like imaginings do not do enough to explain how we recognise when someone else is engaging in pretence, and that they struggle to make sense of why our representations related to fiction and pretence exhibit what Walton calls ‘clustering’.
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Ortiz-Hinojosa, Sofia. "What imagination teaches." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107091.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2016.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>An investigation of the imagination, as both a mental process and a capacity to acquire knowledge about the world and other minds. It is argued that imagination is a unique mental process, whose primary feature is the capacity to construct and manipulate sets of mental representations. This feature unifies the diverse activities we call imaginings into a single class. In addition, use of this capacity in a rule-based way, under the constraint of prior beliefs, can help us acquire knowledge of everyday facts. An examination is then made into the limitations of such a capacity. It is argued that imagination can aid in rational decision-making, even in cases which may involve substantial transformation of the agent. Finally, a case is made that we can improve our capacity to gain knowledge of the mental states of others by careful application of imagination.<br>by Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa.<br>Ph. D.
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Bell, Nicholas. "Reason And Imagination." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2134.
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Altorf, Marije. "Iris Murdoch and the art of imagination : imaginative philosophy as response to secularism." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2004. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1677/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This dissertation examines the work of the British philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch. A centre concern of this work is a question Murdoch poses more than once: ‘How can we make ourselves morally better?” This question is understood to initiate a form of philosophy which is critical of much of its tradition and its understanding of reasoning and argument. It also recognises its dependence on other disciplines. Murdoch develops this form of philosophy in reply to the cultural phenomenon of secularisation. In the absence of God, she attributes tasks to philosophy formerly performed by religion. Most importantly, she advocates a concept of transcendent reality in philosophical discourse. This reality is the Good. She finds that in order to do so, she has to reconsider philosophy’s central faculty of reason. Drawing on literary, philosophical and theological sources, Murdoch develops an understanding of reason and argument in which images, imagery and imagination are central. This study has three objectives. It first aims to present Murdoch as an imaginative philosopher by exploring the role of literature in her philosophical writing. In doing so, it challenges various presuppositions about philosophy, held by both philosophers and non-philosophers. Its second aims is to reconsider these assumptions in general terms. This part draws significantly on the work of Le Doeuff. In particular, it considers the presence of imagery in philosophy as well as philosophy’s assumed neutrality, which has arisen from its long affiliation with science. Thirdly, the thesis presents a reconsideration of the notion of imagination. This notion is often involved in the interdisciplinary debate between theology, philosophy and the arts. Murdoch’s notion of imagination challenges two important assumptions. By releasing imagination from the limited corner of art, it first challenges a strict distinction between literary and systematic writing. By introducing fantasy as the bad opposite of good imagination, it secondly critically assesses unconditional ‘praises of imagination’.
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Thompson, Michael. "Roots and Role of the Imagination in Kant: Imagination at the Core." [Tampa, Fla] : University of South Florida, 2009. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0002945.
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Frein, Mark. "Pedagogy of the imagination." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/nq25048.pdf.
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Miller, B. Darlene. "Playground for the imagination." Click here to access thesis, 2006. http://www.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/archive/spring2006/rebecca%5Fh%5Fsmith/smith%5Frebecca%5Fh%5F200601%5Fma.pdf.
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Thesis (M.F.A.)--Georgia Southern University, 2006.<br>"A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Fine Arts" ETD. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57).
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Hughes, Marnie Therese Elizabeth. "Historical imagination and education." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.339818.
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Marques, Hugo Gravato. "Architectures for Embodied Imagination." Thesis, University of Essex, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.520097.
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Dorsch, Stefan Fabian Helmut. "Imagination and the will." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2005. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1300296/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The principal aim of my thesis is to provide a unified theory of imagining, that is, a theory which aspires to capture the common nature of all central forms of imagining and to distinguish them from all paradigm instances of non-imaginative phenomena. The theory which I intend to put forward is a version of what I call the Agency Account of imagining and, accordingly, treats imaginings as mental actions of a certain kind. More precisely, it maintains that imaginings are mental actions that aim at the formation of episodic representations, the content of which is directly determined by what we want them to represent. My defence of this version of the Agency Account happens in two stages. On the one hand, I try to show that it is both extensionally adequate and explanatorily illuminating with respect to those mental states or projects which are clear instances of either imaginative or nonimaginative phenomena. And on the other hand, I seek to demonstrate that the most plausible alternative to the Agency Account - namely the Cognitive Account according to which it is distinctive of imaginings that they are non-cognitive phenomena and thus to be contrasted with perceptions, judgements, and so on - is bound to fail as a unified theory of imagining. The dissertation contains five main parts. In the first, I specify in more detail what a unified account of imagining has to achieve and, in particular, which phenomena it is supposed to capture. The second part presents the Cognitive Account, thereby focussing on Brian O'Shaughnessy's sophisticated version of it; while the third part is reserved for the evaluation and rejection of the Cognitive Account. In the fourth part, I develop my version of the Agency Account of imagining. And the fifth and last part is concerned with the accommodation of potential counterexamples to it.
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Tozer, Amanda J. A. "Celestina and dialogic imagination." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.272567.
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Jones, Nicholas. "Imagination, perception and belief." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.430531.
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Bruce, A. C. "Medieval theories of imagination." Thesis, University of York, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.372769.
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Parra, Alain. "Hypnose, attention et imagination." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017AIXM0450.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Afin de mieux comprendre les phénomènes hypnotiques décrits dans le domaine de la recherche expérimentale, nous avons réalisé un travail de synthèse sur les différents cadres théoriques de l’hypnose. A l’issue de travail de synthèses nous avons pu proposer une redéfinition et une modélisation, le Modèle I3, de ce que l’on appelle « hypnose » en pensant ces situations en termes de mécanismes psychologiques et cognitifs simples. Dans le but de tester notre modélisation, nous avons construit une série d’expérimentations autour de deux phénomènes hypnotiques dits « sensoriels » présents dans les échelles d’hypnotisabilité standards : « le bras lourd » et « l’hallucination du moustique ». Grâce à l’application d’une suggestion « engageant l’intéroception et l’imagination » (EII) issue de notre modélisation, il nous a été possible d’augmenter, largement au-dessus des résultats obtenus dans la littérature, l’hypnotisabilité de sujets non spécifiquement sélectionnés pour leurs habiletés hypnotiques, et cela sans entraînement, ni induction hypnotique préalable. Enfin, dans une dernière expérience, nous avons voulu appliquer notre modélisation à un phénomène hypnotique plus complexe et impliquant un processus automatique non contrôlable : l’annulation de l’effet Stroop. Notre suggestion EII permet de réduire l’effet Stroop sur des sujets non sélectionnés, mais ne semble pas suffisamment efficace pour produire des hallucinations visuelles assez puissantes ou assez prégnantes ayant un effet aussi massif que celui obtenu avec des sujets Hautement Hypnotisables. Les implications de notre travail sont discutées en dernière partie<br>In order to better understand the hypnotic phenomena described in the field of experimental research, we produced a synthesis on the different theories of hypnosis. This synthesis work allowed us to propose a redefinition and a modeling, the I3 Model, of what we call "hypnosis" by thinking these situations in terms of simple psychological and cognitive mechanisms.To test our modeling, we have built a series of experiments around two "sensory" hypnotic phenomena present in the standard hypnotizability scales: "arm immobilization" and "mosquito hallucination". Thanks to the application of a suggestion "engaging in interoception and imagination" (EII) resulting from our modeling, it has been possible to increase, largely above the results obtained in the literature, the hypnotisability of subjects not specifically selected for their hypnotic skills, without training or prior hypnotic induction.Finally, in a last experiment, we wanted to apply our modeling to a more complex hypnotic phenomenon involving an uncontrollable automatic process: the Stroop effect cancellation. Our EII suggestion makes it possible to reduce the Stroop effect on unselected subjects, but does not seem efficient enough to produce powerful visual hallucinations having such a massive effect as that obtained with High Hypnotisable subjects.The implications of our work are discussed in conclusion
22
Rafati, Tofan. "A Machine for Imagination." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/35729.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
<P>It began with the question, â What if the Modern Man was successful in his dominion over nature?â </P>
<P>By means of Architecture this thesis became a speculation and commentary on the human condition. But, more than that, this is a story that tells the evolution and outcome of a series of questions and inquiries into the relationship between Architecture, art and the mythopoetic-narrative realm. </P><br>Master of Architecture
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Rollins, Donna Lee. "Imagination makes things perfect /." Online version of thesis, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1850/11640.
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Matlak, Robert Paul. "Imagination and poetic witness." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2003. http://www.tren.com.
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Sheaffer, Lucas. "Damming the American Imagination." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2019. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/562228.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
English<br>Ph.D.<br>This work intervenes in the complex relationship between the large-scale management and exploitation of water in the United States and its impact on the bioregional literary imagination in the Tennessee Valley between 1933-1963. It shows through site-based environmental criticism and literary analysis that the “dam” becomes a material and symbolic place of convergence where one can examine the relationship between humans and their biospheres. As interdisciplinary rhetorical, literary, historical, archival and cultural analysis, this work engages writers such as David E. Lilienthal, William Bradford Huie, Robert Penn Warren, and Madison Jones in order to reveal the inherently conflicted realities of environmental conservation, individual identity, and displaced regional imaginations in American literature.<br>Temple University--Theses
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CORVALAN, ESPINOLA RODRIGO JAVIER. "Crisis of the imagination." Doctoral thesis, Università IUAV di Venezia, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11578/287416.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Crisis of the Imagination
In my imprecise memory is the memory of an interview with Helio Piñón and Albert Viaplana . I must confess that, everything that came from the imagination and the work table of these architects, called my attention a lot in my early days as a young professional architect, years in which the overwhelming current postmodern proposal monopolized all the attention of editorial publications in paper, when digital editions were not yet rated; It is also important to note that in Paraguay, in this general context, the situation was even poorer, since the paper editions were out of date and available (in my memory), only one “specialized” bookstore in architecture, urban planning and themes that revolved around these topics. I remember a couple of kiosks in the city center that randomly offered magazines specialized in Italian, French and American architecture, and we used the commutes of relatives and friends to have last minute publications.
Returning to the aforementioned interview, the architects Viaplana and Piñón responded to the interviewer about their creative processes with a fairly clear image: that of a tangle. One of them commented that projecting then consisted of an experience similar to that of untangling a thread (or several), at the beginning, impossible to present as a linear and ordered process from start to finish. They were referring to a rather uncomfortable task, full of anxiety and intuition; like trying to untie the thread by clicking from various points of the knot; a struggle of trial and error in which the path itself would indicate the course towards the solution, until reaching the disentanglement, or the project and its idea of solving the problem.
This image accompanied me in my memory often during all this time of reading and writing pages of this thesis, but the other way around completely, in the opposite direction: that of entangling threads, a sort of “Thread of Ariadna”.
I think that the idea of a tangle or knot should not be intimidating as a hypothesis, as long as the thesis can serve to untangle or understand how it has become entangled, a kind of problem and solution.
Internet is the new paradigm that I think entangles us today, revealing two generations. Namely Zygmunt Bauman , off / online generations. From another historical / geographical point of view, as a kind of dialectic.
The year 1989 is the point in time of the paradigm; although the internet had originated twenty years earlier, in 1969, in the military sphere, as an alternative to a form of communication during the Cold War. Decades will pass in which it will evolve in research centers and universities until, in 1989, Tim Berners-Lee presents software based on protocols that will allow information to be viewed, using hypertext as the only Universal Document Identifier.
A web of nets, a spider web in several planes that form a volume, perhaps a better image than a knot or tangle.
For more coincidences with the paradigm, in 1989 the wall that divided Germany, Europe, and the world left and right fell. Coincidentally, in Paraguay, that same year the longest military dictatorship in Latin America also fell, led by General Alfredo Stroessner , who, with a duration of 35 years, defined a before and after for all Paraguayans.
Surely the network of networks is a metaphor or a more rational definition, as mentioned, since it presents an order that can be quantified, even if it is infinite. Perhaps, at the end of this thesis, we will change our image, but, as long as it is a problem, a confusing and unclear concept, we will continue imagining it as a knot.
It is clear that there is a bewilderment on the issue of internet; On the one hand, it has greatly facilitated the communication system, the sciences and progress in all fields, but it is also true that the power it has is causing damage and disorder that surprises u
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Bates, Jennifer Ann. "The genesis and spirit of imagination (Hegel's theory of imagination between 1801-1807)." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ27875.pdf.
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Hardy, Annie. "The 'reality oriented' imagination : a philosophical examination of the imagination in 'mentalization' and 'neuropsychoanalysis'." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2018. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10052413/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis is concerned with the conceptualization of the imagination in contemporary psychoanalytic theory, focusing in particular on its connection with knowledge. I will propose that imaginative processes form the core of psychic ‘health’ by instantiating a state of mind in which the subject is genuinely open to ‘learning from experience’. At the centre of the investigation is a psychic process that I term the ‘reality oriented’ imagination: a form of conscious mental activity that facilitates an epistemological connection with both the internal and external worlds and renders the unobservable psychological experiences of others accessible. The concept of the ’reality oriented’ imagination significantly disrupts Freud’s portrayal of the imaginative processes as a form of wish-fulfilment in which the individual’s attention is drawn away from external reality and placed under the sway of the pleasure principle. Such differing presentations of the imagination across psychoanalytic models can arguably be understood by considering several major shifts in psychoanalytic theorizing since Freud’s time. I will propose that these changes can be characterised as an ‘epistemic turn’: a general movement in psychoanalysis towards framing the internal world as strategic rather than compensatory, and a corresponding understanding of psychopathological processes as a response to failures in understanding and prediction rather than instinctual conflict. Sound psychological functioning, according to such a picture, is characterised by a lack of rigid internal interpretive schemas: it is, paradoxically, the individual who does not need to ‘know’ who is most open to experience as it presents itself. This leads to a characterization of healthy conscious experience that resonates more with Winnicott’s ‘creativity’ than Freud’s ‘secondary process’: a form of engagement with internal and external reality that combines veridical perception with an affective sense of self and agency.
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Tandberg, Svein Erik. "Imagination, form, movement and sound /." Gothenburg : Univ. of Gothenburg, Academy of Music and Drama, Faculty of Fine, Applied and Performing Arts, 2008. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016990312&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Shimabukuro, Rika. "Invisible : the play of imagination." Thesis, Konstfack, Textil, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:konstfack:diva-3562.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
My master degree project is investigating how certain ideas from the traditional Japanese culture can be used within the field of interior design. The project has resulted in everyday objects - lamps and room dividers. In my opinion, these objects can very effectively be used to add life and poetry to space. I wanted to make objects for meditation and for keeping the balance of mind. Another ambition with the project has been to find ways to express immediate emotions through this specific media. For this reason I have turned to the technique of Japanese calligraphy1. This technique, which I have practiced for 15 years, is expressing ideas of crucial importance to my work – the philosophy of Zen2. The Japanese rock garden, Karesansui (“dry mountain water”), is another important part of my work. In simple words it represents the "empty and imperfect". Karesansui is the perfect manifestation of what I want to express about Japanese culture. The soul and logic, the very idea of my work – all of it can be found in the Karesansui. My work, like the Karesansui, is encouraging the viewer to take an active, creative part in the process: the imagination of the viewer is what makes it complete. My intention is, by using the Karesansui principle, to reveal what I think is the main idea of the Japanese culture. Apart from this, I also hope that my design will prove to meaningful and reasonable in its every day use.<br>Textil formgivning / Master 2009 Textile in the Expanded Field
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Coates, Corey Harper. "Empires of the historical imagination." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0003/NQ41127.pdf.
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Lam, Janneke. "Whose pain? childhood, trauma, imagination /." [Amsterdam] : Amsterdam : ASCA ; Universiteit van Amsterdam [Host], 2002. http://dare.uva.nl/document/66830.
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Oh, Jung Hyun. "Exegesis and imagination in preaching." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1988. http://www.tren.com.
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Denham, Alison Edwina. "Metaphor and the moral imagination." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.314928.
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Dickson, Barnabas W. "Practical reason: desires and imagination." Thesis, University of Sussex, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.564136.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis offers an account of certain aspects of practical reason. The chief aim is to develop our understanding of practical rationality by undermining some of the connections which are thought to exist between explicit criteria and codifiable rules on the one hand, and practical reason on the other. The thesis begins with a consideration of the question of what reasons for action are constituted from. It is argued that a necessary component of any practical reason is a desire of the person for whoa the reason is a reason (Part One). Equipped with this account of practical reasons two rationalistic prejudices are then attacked. The first of these is the claim that it must be possible to formulate explicit criteria of rational choice which set the standards of deliberation over a wide range of deliberative problems. It is argued that this claim is undermined by an examination of the actual circumstances in which deliberation takes place. On the positive side it is then contended that an understanding of deliberation requires consideration of the process of deliberation, and that this leads, in particular, to a recognition of the important role of imaginative thinking in solving deliberative problems (Part Two). The second prejudice that is attacked is the claim that a conception of how to act which determines the specific choices an agent makes must be codifiable. Against this, it it suggested that the idea that such conceptions can be determinate and yet not fully codifiable enables one to make better sense of certain aspects of deliberation. An argument demonstrating how it is possible for there to be such conceptions is than developed.
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Clune, Niamh. "Acquiring wisdom through the imagination." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.248092.
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Ninan, Dilip. "Imagination, content, and the self." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45621.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2008.<br>This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-113).<br>I begin with a discussion of two ways of imagining something: 'from the inside' and 'from the outside'. My interest in this topic is two-fold: First, I want to see what studying this topic can teach us about the nature of mental content -- in particular, about the content of de se and de re thoughts. Second, I want to formulate an account of this distinction which will help us understand the role these two types of imagining play in philosophical thought experiments about personal identity over time. The first three chapters of this dissertation focus on the first set of issues, issues of imagination and content. Chapter 4 extends and applies some of these insights to a puzzle about personal identity over time.<br>by Dilip Ninan.<br>Ph.D.
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Doggett, Tyler 1976. "Moral properties and moral imagination." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28836.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-73).<br>"Moral Realism" is about an argument against moral realism, why it is unsound, and what emerges from that. The argument is that if there were moral properties, they would be queerly related to non-moral properties and this is sufficient reason to think there are no moral properties. The argument is unsound for two reasons. The first emerges from consideration of sensational properties like being in pain or being in ecstasy-they bear the queer relation to non-sensational properties. The second emerges from consideration of vice properties like being an instance of greediness-they are not queerly related to non-moral properties. Analogies between moral and sensational properties are discussed. A disanalogy between the moral and sensational is important to "The Explanatory Gap" which discusses Levine's notion of an explanatory gap, relates it to the queer relation discussed in "Moral Realism," and criticizes one use to which it is put. The criticism emerges from consideration of the disanalogy between the moral and sensational: our moral imagination is considerably more limited than our sensational imagination. That there are limits to our moral imagination is interesting. "Imaginative Resistance" solves an old puzzle from Hume about the limits of our imaginative capacities, for example, the inability of some people (myself, for example) to imagine that baseless killing is morally permissible. Both the puzzle and solution illuminate the natures of imagination and possibility and the relation between them.<br>by Tyler Doggett.<br>Ph.D.
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Fay, Matthew Paul. "Enabling imagination through story alignment." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/71281.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2012.<br>This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.<br>Cataloged from student submitted PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-82).<br>Stories are an essential piece of human intelligence. They exist in countless forms and varieties seamlessly integrated into every facet of our lives. Stories fuel human understanding and our explanations of the world. Narrative acts as a Swiss army knife, simultaneously facilitating the transfer of knowledge, culture and beliefs while also powering our high level mental faculties. If we are to develop artificial intelligence with the cognitive capacities of humans, our systems must not only be able to understand stories but also to incorporate them into the thought process as humans do. In order to work towards the goal of computational story understanding, I developed a novel story comparison method. The techniques I present in this thesis enable efficient and effective story comparison through story alignment. My algorithms, implemented into the Genesis system, allow the comparison and combination of stories which is a step towards enabling imagination in artificial intelligence. This capability is made possible by reducing the runtime of a previously intractable computational problem to polynomial time. In the course of this research, these algorithms have been applied to a variety of story analysis problems. By comparing short, 10 sentence summaries of the Tet Offensive and the Yom Kippur War, the system predicts information omitted from both stories. In the analysis of a brief synopsis of Shakespeare's Macbeth, my algorithm is able to correctly match actors and events between two different variations of the tale by cutting down a search space of over 10³⁰ nodes to a mere 546 nodes. My techniques also demonstrate promise as a component of a larger video analysis system. The story alignment capabilities are used to fill in missing gaps in descriptions of videos, corresponding to missing video data, by comparing video feeds to an existing video corpus.<br>by Matthew Paul Fay.<br>S.M.
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Guerin, Robert Michael. "Imagination Bound: A Theoretical Imperative." UKnowledge, 2016. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/8.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Kant’s theory of productive imagination falls at the center of the critical project. This is evident in the 1781 Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant claims that the productive imagination is a “fundamental faculty of the human soul” and indispensable for the construction of experience. And yet, in the second edition of 1787 Kant seemingly demotes this imagination as a mere “effect of the understanding on sensibility” and all but withdraws its place from the Transcendental Deduction.
In his 1929 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger provided an explanation for the revisions between 1781 and 1787. Heidegger suggested that the Critique was supposed to be a foundation for Kant’s metaphysics of morals, which holds that practical reason is freely bound by a categorical imperative. Yet after 1781 Kant recognized that the Critique implicates the productive imagination as the “unknown root” of the faculties of understanding and sensibility. If the 1781 Critique reveals this imagination to be the source of theoretical rules and practical imperatives, then, according to Heidegger, Kant could not but “shrink back” from this shocking discovery. A faculty so intimately tied to sensibility, and hence contingency and particularity, is a poor progenitor of freedom and universal rules.
I think there is some truth to Heidegger’s explanation. But I also think there is something more important to draw from the revisions between 1781 and 1787. In this dissertation, I assume that something about the productive imagination did frighten Kant. But, pace Heidegger, I do not think that Kant shrank back from his initial position. Rather, I argue that the revisions clarify a theory that was implicit in 1781 but made explicit by 1787. If the imagination is a power for representation, which is at times a dream and at times a veridical experience, then the difference lies in the rule according to which the construction of the representation is bound. Furthermore, I argue that Kant’s revisions reveal a duty to bind the reproductive imagination according to a common concept, what Kant sometimes refers to as common sense. This is what I call the theoretical imperative.
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Laux, Henri. "Imagination et religion chez Spinoza." Paris 1, 1991. http://www.theses.fr/1991PA010576.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Il s'agit d'identifier le complexe des forces que produit la rencontre de l'imagination et de la religion, et de qualifier ainsi la puissance socio-historique de l'imagination. L'analyse de la prophetie, puis celle du miracle, montrent dans la revelation une ethique de l'integration sociale et dans le miracle l'essence theoricopratique du religieux en sa plus grande exteriorite. A ce point, ou les effets de desintegration apparaisent constitutifs de la religion, intervient dans sa logique le chapitre 7 du ttp : celui-ci ne constitue pas un traite autonome de technique exegetique, il enonce les regles qui rendent possible le passage de la religion d'exteriorite a la religion non encore philosophique mais liberee de ses pratiques d'asservissement ; il ecrit ainsi la methodologie d'une refondation de l'interindividualite. Apres avoir reconstruit le systeme ethique de l'imaginaire religieux a partir d'une selection d'affects, on montre donc comment grace au nouveau mode de lecture des ecritures, l'affranchissement de la servitude se realise de l'interieur meme de la religion, dans le rapport de l'individu au texte fondateur de ses croyances. Il en resulte une integration sociale reelle, ou differenciee. A la constitution de cette puissance les religions revelees participent tres diversement, le christ etant ici le modele le plus utile a l'affirmation ethique de l'individu. En conclusion : pour avoir montre les modalites de la lisibilite de la realite, spinoza est philosophe de l'historicite<br>It is a matter of identifying the complex of forces produced by the encounter between the imagination and religion, and thereby to characterize the socio-historical power of the imagination. The analysis of prophecy, and that of the mircale, manifest in revelation an ethic of social integration, and in the miracle the theorical-pratical essence of the religious in its greatest exteriority. At this point, when the effects of desintegration appear constitutive of religion, the logic of the chapter 7 of the itp intervenes : this chapter does not constitute an autonomous treaty of exegetical technique, it elaborates the rules which make possible the transition from an externalized religion to a religion not yet philosophical but freed from its enslaving practices ; thus it provides the methodology of a refoundation of interindividuality. After having reconstructed the ethical system of religion starting from a selection of affects, one demonstrates thus how, thanks to this new way of reading scripture, the delivrance from servitude is accomplished from within religion, in the relationship of the individual to the foundational text of his beliefs. The result is an actual, or differential, social integration. Revealed religions participate very diversely in the constitution of this power, christ being the most useful model for the ethical affirmation of the individual. In conclusion : for having shown the modalities of the readibility of reality, spinoza is a philosopher of historicity
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Ausperk, Ryan. "Phenomenology, Imagination, and Aesthetic Experience." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1398270498.
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Pallay, Karyn. "Reclaiming the Imagination through Science." VCU Scholars Compass, 2006. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd_retro/115.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis attempts to reclaim the imagination, defined by Ann Berthoff as the "name for the active mind," by looking at brain biology as it relates to teaching and learning. The section titled "Keeping Biology in Mind: The Brain as Speculative Instrument" demonstrates how biological naturalism, a philosophy developed by John Searle, validates the concept of an ontologically subjective "I" and hence the creation of course materials based on David Kolb's experiential-learning model. In addition, it discusses how biologist James Zull maps the actual structure of the brain onto Kolb's model. Adding to this bottom-up theory of learning that emphasizes brain biology and subjective experience, this thesis discusses how the mind, through mental force, works in a top-down fashion to change the brain, and suggests that students can learn to take control of their own learning by applying mental force. The section titled "Keeping Affect in Mind: The Biology of Intuition" presents the aspect of affect known as intuition and how it fits into the discussion. The main premise of this thesis is that we can employ concepts of the brain and learning in the composition classroom to facilitate the teaching and learning of writing. The last section titled "Keeping Composition in Mind: Theory into Practice" is devoted to this premise on a practical level.
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Gothrup, Thomas Ryan. "The Imagination and the Real." VCU Scholars Compass, 2009. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1756.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis challenges the sedentary nature of living vicariously through the television, whether it be watching sports or playing video games. Since the advent of professional sports spectators have become accustomed to stadiums stuffed with people cheering on their favorite teams. The television substitutes for this visceral experience and allows viewers to live surrogate lives without leaving the living room. Ultimately, I see this thesis as a social commentary on the impact of sports and media in our society. This project highlights the sociological implications of the loss of interpersonal contact perpetuated by media.
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Moore, Margaret Elizabeth. "Imagination and the Mind's Ear." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/106063.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Philosophy<br>Ph.D.<br>This dissertation provides an analysis of the phenomenon of musical imagery, or the internal 'hearing' of music. I uphold the view that musical imagery, as a kind of auditory imagery, is a kind of sensory or perceptual imagination, and cannot be incorporated into a propositional model of imagination. I further argue that musical imagery differs in important respects both from visual imagery and from other types of auditory imagery, such as inner speech. For this reason, this project makes a contribution to what would be a larger project (not necessarily carried out by a single researcher) of analyzing the sensory or perceptual imagination through careful comparative work in each sensory modality and their various combinations.
Chapter 1 provides the background on theories of imagination necessary in order to make this argument, and demonstrates the lack of attention currently paid to auditory imagination in general and musical imagination in particular. The analysis of musical imagery then proceeds from three points of view: phenomenological, conceptual or analytical, and empirical.
The goal of Chapter 2 is to describe our subjective experiences of musical imagery. While this description is a description of the phenomenological aspects of our experiences, it is not an example of work in phenomenology proper, as practiced by the followers of Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger. Rather, the method is necessarily first person, but appeals to the idea that musical imagery experiences occur along a spectrum of possible abilities. That is, while there is too much variation among reports of subjective musical imagery, it still makes sense to appeal to a kind of normal imaginative experience, and, as a result, the reliance on introspection does not result in hopeless idiosyncrasies.
Chapter 3 discusses four topics related to content of musical imagery. First, I address the question of what makes auditory imagination specifically auditory; second, I examine the relationship between auditory imagination and imagining hearing; third, I address questions about the ontology of sounds and the ontology of music in the context of my claims about auditory imagination; finally, I discuss whether the contents of musical imagery, as a type of auditory imagination, should be thought of as conceptual or nonconceptual.
Chapter 4 addresses the question of the ontology of the mental image, discussed both by Gilbert Ryle and by participants in the mental imagery debate in the field of psychology. Having demonstrated that scientific inquiry into the mechanisms of mental imagery does not involve commitment to ontologically problematic mental entities, I then survey empirical work in cognitive psychology and neuroscience that sheds light on the neural underpinnings of musical imagery. By way of conclusion, I discuss methodological issues regarding the integration of historical, empirical, conceptual, and phenomenological I use to develop a theory of musical imagery as sensory imagination.<br>Temple University--Theses
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Fredericks, Pamela R. "Music & the creative imagination /." Online version of thesis, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1850/12145.
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Beauclair, Alain. "John Dewey's ethics of imagination /." Connect to title online (ProQuest), 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1617305591&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=11238&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2008.<br>Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 215-222). Also available online in ProQuest, free to University of Oregon users.
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Tam, Francis Man-Kwan. "Embracing imagination in Chinese preaching." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2000. http://www.tren.com.
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Woodling, Casey. "Zombies and the active imagination." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2006. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0014741.
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Ichino, A. "Imagination in thought and action." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/280094.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In this thesis I ask what the role of imagination is in our representation of the world and interactions with it. A standard answer to this question is that imagination has no direct role: imagination’s proper function is rather to allow us to disengage from reality; its motivating power, if it has any, is basically limited to children’s pretence. I argue that this standard answer is mistaken: imagination’s role is much larger than that. I consider a number of cases – including cases of superstitious and religious actions, or so-called ‘expressive behaviours’ – where we are moved to act by representational states that are not sensitive to real-world evidence, nor integrated in our whole system of beliefs. I argue that at least some degree of sensitivity to evidence and inferential integration are necessary for a state to count as belief; hence the representational states that play the relevant motivating role in the cases I consider cannot be beliefs. I suggest that imagination is the best alternative candidate. This supports an account of imagination according to which its functional profile is the same of belief with respect to emotional and behavioural outputs, while it critically differs from belief with respect to cognitive inputs (and related normative constraints). Imaginings dispose us to act and react in the same ways in which belief do; but they are not (nor ought be) formed and maintained in response to real-world evidence as beliefs are (and ought to be).
On this view, many cognitions that are standardly classified as beliefs – like superstitious, ideological and religious ‘beliefs’ – turn out to be better understood as imaginings. Imagination does not just allow us to ‘escape’ from reality into fictional worlds, but plays a key, direct role in our representation of (and practical engagement with) reality.