Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Great Britain. Foreign Office. Political Intelligence Department"

Introduction. This study is concerned with a problem of current interest, namely, the everyday political life of workers at the USSR Peoples’ Commissariat of Foreign Affairs during the Great Patriotic War. The novelty of the present study lies in the fact that the problem has been little investigated, while several documents are thereby introduced into general use for the first time. Materials and methods. The sources were the document complex in the Archive of Foreign Politics of the Russian Federation. The methodology is based on general scholar, special historical and source studies methods. Results. One of the components in the everyday political life of the Soviet diplomat Palgunov, who headed the Press Department in the Peoples’ Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, consisted of contacts with foreign correspondents who represented the mass media of the Allies, namely, Great Britain and the US. The correspondents were eager for getting the information concerning the war effort of the Soviet Union and the contributions into the defense of the country on the part of its citizens in the rear. However, this was hindered by the presence of strict political censorship in the USSR. The situation was aggravated by acute competition between British and American correspondents. Given these conditions, Palgunov acted as a kind of referee who was called upon to aid, both in obtaining information on the situation on the front and for help in the needs of their everyday life. Conclusions. The present author used the unpublished job diary of Palgunov for 1941–1942 to get a more accurate list of the British and American correspondents who were accredited in the USSR during that period of time. When combined with Palgunov’s memoirs, this source was used to present a true picture of how the Press Department was interacting with foreign correspondents. This author emphasized subjects such as the peculiarities in the activity of foreign correspondents in Moscow and Kuibyshev and in questions relating to the organization of their trips to the front zone. It has been found why they blamed Palgunov for bureaucracy and incompetence.

The aim of this article is to shed light on the phenomenon of «special relations» between the United States of America and Great Britain. Despite the fact that the topic gained considerable attention in the academic literature and the term «special relations» is applied to different states and regions, it is necessary to understand its origins. The purpose of the article is to investigate the phenomenon of American-British relations, to analyze the historical and political view of the problem, and to formulate the characteristics of the relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. Chronological limits are determined by the first mention of the term in 1946 and the presidential term of D.Trump, who managed the office in 2017–2021. Methodology of the article. Hypotheses were tested through historiographical analysis and the historical-comparative method were used to analyze published studies on the history of «special relations». The scientific novelty of the study consists in determining the peculiarities of relations between the United States and Great Britain during the tenure of Donald Trump. Therefore, the «special relationship» is a unique historically formed complex of interaction between the USA and Great Britain, which is manifested in various spheres of public life: political (to have an opportunity for better implementation of their own foreign policy), military (the USA and the United Kingdom have an unprecedented level of mutual trust and cooperation in the field of intelligence and nuclear programs), cultural (the historical memory of both nations makes American and British society sensitive to the problems of their «English-speaking neighbours»). We consider it necessary to highlight the following features of American-British relations:the long-term historical interaction that brought the two nations closer together and laid the foundation for relations between the United States and Great Britain; the common ideology of liberalism; cooperation provides an opportunity to better implement one’s own foreign policy; close relations between political figures of states; relations are characterized by periodic «approaching and distancing», which create new challenges for the allies. Each of these features is traced in the relations between the USA and Great Britain and during the administration of Donald Trump. Both states faced a number of challenges in international politics, due to the crisis state of the modern system of international relations. The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have demonstrated the ability to compromise in critical situations, that proves the uniqueness of such an alliance.

The article deals with the process of restoring diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Russia in the first third of the 18th century. England was the first country with which Russia established diplomatic relations 465 years ago. During this time, the countries have passed a difficult and thorny path of interaction. Often there were open military conflicts between them, and sometimes it simply came to the severance of diplomatic relations. One of these events occurred in the reign of Peter I on 14 December in 1720 year. Although diplomatic relations were interrupted, trade between the states continued to develop. The trade volume was reduced due to political tensions, which caused significant damage to the economy of England. In this regard, the British began to take active steps to establish diplomatic relations. The analysis of the correspondence between two British diplomats, T. Ward and C. Rondeau, and the Secretary of State of Great Britain, first undertaken in historical science, the author concludes that it was England that initiated the restoration of diplomatic relations, primarily to strengthen the position of the English merchants in Russia. The analysis of the ambassadors' dispatches gives valuable insights as to the strategy and tactics of the British Foreign Office in relation to Russia during the reign of Anna Ioannovna, as well as the motives that guided the diplomats involved in the preparatory process of establishing relations between the countries. The correspondence of the diplomats provides an opportunity to get acquainted with both their official and “secret” intelligence activities, which allows the author identify the true intentions of British diplomacy: to comprehensively study a potential rival which the British imagined Russia to be. It is also of great interest to learn more about how their mission went, what impressions they got from their visit to our country, what assessments they made about the top officials in the administration of the Russian Empire, as well as about the Russian people in general.

The article presents the origins and functioning of the Military Attaché Office in Berlin in the years 1928-1932 led by Lieutenant Colonel Witold Dzierżykraj-Morawski, who carried out the intelligence activities under the guise of a military diplomat. Within the scope of his operational activities, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski established contacts with other military attachés and gathered and transmitted information on the country of residence in order to identify its military potential as well as internal and external political situation in the Weimar Republic. In his work, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski did not conduct intelligence activity of a purely operational nature, however, he managed to obtain a wide range of contacts for intelligence work, in which he used the meetings with military attachés of foreign countries, people from various circles from German pacifists and the Union of Poles in Germany as well as the environments related to the armaments industry. From 1929 to 1932 he expanded his activity to include open sources, i.e. the official press and announcements of the Ministry of the Reichswehr that gave him knowledge about the dates of the next maneuvers and detailed information about their course, which he received in a wider range from Japanese or Spanish military attachés. Moreover, he obtained information about the cooperation between Germany and the USSR, which was to serve to devalue contacts between the military attaché of Great Britain and the German military authorities. One of such information was obtained in 1931 from the military attaché of Sweden through the Finnish military attaché office. In spite of quite secretive action, in November 1931 he was accused of espionage and was expelled in March 1932. He also gave a lecture at the Center for Higher Military Studies in Warsaw (February 1932) where he presented the possible directions of attack of the German Army and the entire doctrine of combat activity of the Reichswehr.

The Final Act of Congress of Vienna was signed on June 9, 1815. More accurately, because of Napoleon's escape and the consequent battle of Waterloo, the Vienna settlement was completed with the signature of the second Treaty of Paris on November 20s 1815. There is thus no doubt that last year marks the 170th anniversary of the settlement. There is equally no doubt that in many ways 1815 has come to seem very remote. There are no great historical arguments in progress about it, nor does it seem to attract any great interest from the students of international relations, unless their attention is actually drawn to it. So it may be as well to remember that the Vienna settlement has generated much more substantial debate at other times. Very soon after its making, it began to be said that the settlement represented a failed attempt to control, at worst, or suppress, at best, the two doctrines that were to be the political foundation of the 19th century: liberalism and nationalism. By the end of the century this attitude had intensified. In any case, the immense social and political changes which were moulding the modern state structure were beginning to create a new kind of international environment in which the ‘unspoken’ as well as deliberate assumptions of 1815 were less relevant. Approved or not, in practical terms, the settlement remained as a basis for the conduct of international politics until 1914, and thus was the obvious point of departure for discussion about the new settlement which would have to be made when the First World War ended. It is not surprising therefore to find that part of the British preparation for the Paris Peace Conference, which were made by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, was a study of the Congress of Vienna by C. K. Webster. It is a somewhat routine piece, and his treatment of the subject was much better based and wider ranging in his monumental study of British foreign policy under Lord Castlereagh. It contained, however, one conclusion which may have had an important effect on the way in which the 1919 settlement was arrived at. Webster said that it had been an error on the part of the allies to have permitted the French to be present at Vienna because of the successful attempt by Talleyrand to insert France into the discussions of the other great powers. It has of course been subsequently felt that one of the cardinal respects in which Vienna was more, sensible than Versailles was precisely in that the French were included and became in effect joint guarantors of the agreement. Whether anything fundamental would have been different had the same been done for the Weimar republic is open to question, but there can be no doubt that the circumstances at the time and afterwards would have been greatly easier had the agenda of post-war international politics not had to include the status of Germany as a first item.

Hong Kong has seen an upheaval in recent years. From the protests over the extradition law to the protests over the National Security Law, these protests are a response to the ever-encroaching hand of Beijing on political rights in Hong Kong. After the National Security Law was implemented, Hong Kong’s freedom was almost gone. One by one, pro-democracy protesters, opposition parliament members, and opposition media are being targeted and repressed. Despite the numerous protests and riots, the Hong Kong SAR government perseveres with little concession to the protesters. Why does the government of Hong Kong decided not to respect Hong Kong’s unique democratic system in China, arguably the system that has brought Hong Kong to one of the most prominent cities in the world for global interactions, and instead wish to turn it into another normal Chinese city? Why does the Hong Kong SAR government almost completely ignore the voice of the Hong Kong people? Using the framework developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith in The Dictator’s Handbook, I argue that the small size of Hong Kong’s governing coalition (i.e., the minimum amount of support required for the leader to stay in power) and the ease in which the Chief Executive of Hong Kong rewards her allies play a significant role in this democratic backsliding. Furthermore, while the Western World reacted in outrage over this undemocratic encroachment of Beijing on Hong Kong, I argue that their sanctions on Hong Kong leaders will not play a significant role as the Chief Executive of Hong Kong does not need their support. Keywords: Hong Kong; democracy; protests; governing coalition;sanctions REFERENCES Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides’s Trap? New York: Houghton Miflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2017. 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APAC. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china hongkong-security-usa-idUSKBN2412N9. Roantree, Anne Marie, Greg Torode, and James Pomfret. “Special Report: Hong Kong Leader Says She Would ‘Quit’ If She Could, Fears Her Ability to Resolve Crisis Now ‘Very Limited.’” Reuters, September 3, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong protests-carrielam-specialre-idUSKCN1VN1DU. Sanjaya, Trystanto. “Analyzing the ‘Democracy vs. Autocracy’ Advocacy of the Biden Administration in the Upcoming US-China Great Power Competition from the Perspective of National Interest .” Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 26, no. 4 (2023): 47–98. Subcommittee on Decision of the National People's Congress on Improving the Electoral System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Amended Annex I and Annex II to Basic Law, LC Paper No. CB(4)703/20-21(01) § (2021). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr20- 21/english/hc/sub_com/hs102/papers/hs10220210331cb4-703-1-e.pdf. 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As the 110th anniversary of the beginning of the excavations at Vinča is nearing, the question arises as to how much we really know about the role and motives of a number of British subjects who in various ways played decisive roles in the research and the international affirmation of this important Late Neolithic site. It is possible, on the basis of archives and personal correspondence of Miloje M. Vasić, to view the investigations of Vinča in the wider context of political and military relations, influencing the general situation in the Kingdom of The Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later Yugoslavia. John Lynton Myres was a professor at the universities in Oxford and Liverpool, the founder and editor of the Journal Man and the director of the British Archaeological School in Athens. During the World War I, between 1916 and 1919, he was an officer of the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve, first in the Navy Intelligence Service, and then in Military Control Office in Athens. The Browns, Alec and Catherine, also played an important role. Alec Brown, a left-oriented writer, translator and correspondent, arrived to Serbia as a Cambridge graduate, aiming at the post of an English language teacher in high schools. In the period from 1929 to 1931 he took part in the excavations at Vinča, taking this setting as the base for the plot of one of his books. His wife, Elsie Catherine Brown, whose life is very poorly documented, served in the British Embassy in Belgrade between the wars. Vasić dedicated the third volume of Prehistoric Vinča to her, for her devoted work in the British medical mission and the care she took of the Serbian soldiers near Thessalonica, but also for her part played in the establishment of the initial contact with Sir Charles Hyde. The life of Catherine Brown may be seen as one of the many exceptional stories about the noble British ladies, celebrated in Serbia for over a century. However, one should bear in mind that the events and characters (Myres, Hyde, the Browns) linked to the research in Vinča may be a part of a larger scene, and a consequence of other, equally important circumstances of a more direct involvement of Great Britain in the political situation in Yugoslavia between the wars. Myres, a man close to the scientific, intelligence and diplomatic circles, is the key person in the initial contact between Vasić and Catherine Brown. Since his first encounter with Vasić in 1918 in Athens, on the occasion of his return from France to Serbia, Myres himself or through Catherine Brown, worked to establish the collaboration and keep the contact with Vasić. It is possible that the Athens meeting, initiated by Myres, was a consequence not only of the scholarly interest, but also the growing British involvement in the Balkans. After the same line of reasoning, the arrival of Alec Brown in Belgrade cannot be understood solely as a consequence of the individual ambition of a young Slavic scholar, but as well as a part of the strategy of deepening the British influences over the region traditionally more inclined towards France, due to the political and cultural ties and military alliances. After the war, many Serbian linguists were posted as teachers of the language at the most prestigious British universities, such as Oxford and Cambridge, where Alec Brown earned his degree. His application to the post of English teacher in Serbia is closely preceded by the recommendation of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, British Foreign Secretary, to secure teaching English in the Yugoslav schools, and not only French, as it was previously the case. The collaboration between British and Serbian intellectuals was surely a very suitable context for the establishment of intimate contacts and spreading of cultural and political influences. As illustrated by the case of the Near East, archaeology and archaeologists are particularly useful in this respect. Their long sojourns and mobility in the field, command of the language, enabled them to gain the confidence of the locals, learn about the customs, and gain information, just like Myres the Blackbeard did, and more or less successfully Catherine and Alec Brown as well. Regardless of the real or clandestine motifs, in the case of the investigations of Vinča, this collaboration made possible the publication the four-volume work of Vasić – Prehistoric Vinča, exceptional in many respects, and the international recognition of Vinča as one of the most important Late Neolithic settlements in South-eastern Europe.

The emergence of diplomatic protocol service within the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Estonia (1918–40) is a subject that has hitherto not been researched. This is illustrated by the fact that even the complete list of chiefs of protocol (chef du protocole) of the MFA of Estonia has been missing until now. The strengthening of Estonia’s statehood by its international recognition, the accreditation of foreign envoys, and the first state visits brought about the need for a thorough understanding of all nuances of diplomatic protocol and ceremonial. Nevertheless, the office of a separate chief of protocol was created in the structure of the MFA of Estonia only according to the new Foreign Service Act, decreed by the Head of State Konstantin Päts on 13 March 1936; i.e. more than 18 years after the declaration of Estonia’s independence. Prior to 1936, the functions of protocol officers were usually fulfilled by the head of the MFA’s administrative or political department. This article focuses on three core issues: 1) who were the chiefs of protocol? 2) their functions and how diplomatic protocol was regulated in the MFA; 3) the reason why a separate office of the chief of protocol was not created earlier than 1936. The key source for this research is the MFA collection in the Estonian National Archives (RA, ERA.957). There are no clear sources regarding the functions of the chief of protocol before 1922. The field was most probably shaped and shared by several officials, including the head of the political department Hermann Karl Hellat (1872–1953) and William Tomingas (1895–1972), the junior private secretary of Foreign Minister Jaan Tõnisson (1868–1941?). Everything connected to international practices was probably influenced by the most experienced diplomats of the young state, namely the members of Estonia’s foreign delegation, which had already been created in 1917. Another major influence was Foreign Minister Jaan Poska (1866–1920), who as a former mayor of Tallinn, the former governor of the autonomous Governorate of Estonia, and the head of Estonia’s delegation at the peace talks with Soviet Russia, had extensive experience in protocol-related matters. Hans Johannes (Johan) Ernst Markus (1884–1969) can be deemed the first chief of protocol to be mentioned in the hitherto known sources of the MFA. According to an MFA report to the Estonian government from July of 1922, Markus was the head of the MFA’s Western political department and performed the duties of ‘master of ceremonies’ as well. In January of 1923, Markus was appointed head of the MFA’s administrative department. He remained in this office until April of 1927, coordinating the state visits of the President of Latvia Jānis Čakste (February of 1924), the Secretary General of the League of Nations Eric Drummond (February of 1924), and the President of Finland Lauri Kristian Relander (May of 1925), as well as the state visits of Estonia’s Head of State, the presentation of credentials, and day-to-day work regarding diplomatic privileges and immunities. Since the chief of protocol was responsible for organising ceremonies connected to the Head of State (Riigivanem), Markus could be considered not only as a coordinator of the MFA’s protocol matters, but as the chief of state protocol. Markus certainly did not work alone. He could rely on the administrative department and basically the whole MFA in fulfilling his functions, while also counting on the support of the aide-de-camp to the Head of State. Nevertheless, it was Markus who laid the ’cornerstone’ for the best practices that could be systematised and used by his successors. In April of 1927, the functions of the chief of protocol were taken over by Johan Leppik (1894–1965), the former Envoy to Poland and Romania, and Chargé d’Affaires in Czechoslovakia. In August of 1927, Leppik was appointed head of the MFA’s political department. According to the MFA’s working arrangement, Leppik retained the functions of chef du protocole in his new office starting from January of 1928. Since the grand, first-ever state visit of a monarch to Estonia, by King Gustaf V of Sweden in June of 1929, and the visit of the President of Poland Ignacy Mościcki in August of 1930 (which were preceded by the state visits of Estonia’s Head of State to those countries) required extensive preparations, Leppik could rely on the work of his subordinate, the head of the political bureau and deputy chief of protocol Elmar-Johann Kirotar (1899–1985). In June of 1931, Leppik was succeeded by the director of the bureau of law Artur Haman (Tuldava) (1897–1942) in his office as chief of protocol. Haman (Tuldava) put great effort into systematising existing practices related to protocol (incl. Presentation of credentials, and receptions) into a comprehensive compendium, which has been preserved to this day. The efficient work of Kirotar and Tuldava was probably noted by Estonia’s leadership, since once the separaate office of the chief of protocol had been created within the structure of the MFA, the position was filled first by Kirotar (1936–9) and then by Tuldava (1939–40). The quest for stability was most probably connected to the strong presidential power that shaped Estonia’s political life in the latter half of the 1930s. The personal influence of the head of state became more important in filling high-ranking positions in the state structure. According to the Foreign Service Act adopted by Parliament (Riigikogu) on 30 May 1930, departmental directors were appointed by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Service Act decreed by the Head of State on 13 March 1936 changed this procedure. According to the latter, departmental directors (incl. the chief of protocol) were appointed and dismissed by the Head of State (upon taking into consideration proposals from the Foreign Minister). There is no clear answer to the question of why there was no separate office of the chief of protocol in the 1920s, since these functions needed to be fulfilled anyway. This was most probably connected to budgetary restrictions i.e. the need to avoid all kinds of ’unnecessary’ expenses. In the 1930s, the director of the administrative department Jaan Mölder (1880–1942, in office 1935–6) and the head of the consular bureau August Koern (1900–89, in office 1936) also briefly fulfilled the functions of the chief of protocol. The latter was especially involved in systematising the rules and regulations of diplomatic practices. Like his predecessors and successors, he sent numerous inquiries to Estonia’s representations abroad to collect information on matters connected to privileges and immunities, decorations, preseance, organisation of state funerals, etc. According to sources at the Estonian National Archives, Estonia’s MFA collected information on international diplomatic practice everywhere that it was represented by its missions abroad. Already during the first years of Estonia’s independence, the MFA possessed the popular Guide to Diplomatic Practice by Sir Ernest Mason Satow (first issued in 1917) and several protocol-related compendiums from Finland, the United States of America, Great Britain, etc. It can be concluded that without a rich heritage of diplomatic practice of its own, Estonia was quickly able to successfully adapt to the international environment in matters of diplomatic protocol.

The secession from Russia, the declaration of independence, and the request to recognise the independent state of Lithuania were the three steps which had to be made by the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius) in order to bring Lithuania back into the international community after 120 years of occupation. The first two steps were made after all members of the Council of Lithuania signed the Statement of 11 December 1917, but it was not made public anywhere. Part I of the Statement was the Declaration of Independence, which declared the termination of all state ties which formerly bound the state to other nations and proclaimed the re-establishment of the independent state of Lithuania. Another step that ensued the secession and the declaration of independence had to be a request for the recognition of the independent state of Lithuania for it to become a full-fledged member of the international community. However, first and foremost, it had to be announced publicly. The article publishes the note handed over by the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) to the German envoy on 8 February 1918 and to the envoys of the Entente Powers and neutral states on 9 February 1918 and analyses its text and context. The text of the note in French is identical. The note includes the first request to recognise the independence of the Lithuanian state based on the modified text of Part I of the Statement of 11 December 1917 signed by the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius). The note dated 7 February 1918 was submitted to the German envoy in Bern and the note dated 9 February 1918 was handed over to the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Entente Powers (France, Great Britain, the USA, Italy) and neutral states (the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden) in Switzerland and the Swiss Political Department. Historiography includes no mention of the note delivered to Gisbert von Romberg, the German envoy in Bern, on 8 February 1918. The démarche made by Pranciškus Karevičius and Konstantinas Olšauskas at the same time, on 7–9 February 1918, to Gen. Erich Ludendorff and the German Chancellor Georg von Hertling in Berlin is not mentioned either. Both démarches, one by the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) in Bern and the other by the two Lithuanian priests in Berlin, were, in fact, coordinated. The reaction to the note and the evaluations of the démarches found in historiography are similar, but the fact that on 10 February 1918, in the aftermath of the said démarches, the Chancellery of the German Chancellor prepared the draft document on the recognition of Lithuania’s independence has not been known before. The aim of the research is to investigate the context and the text of the first request to recognise Lithuania’s independence expressed on 8–9 February 1918, to reveal the reaction towards it and the results achieved. The chronological boundaries of the research cover the period from the sitting of the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) of 25 January 1918, which put forward the idea to issue a memorandum with annexes, to 25 February 1918, when the German Military Administration completed the investigation into the circumstances of authorising the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) to represent Lithuanian affairs abroad. The research employed the logical-analytical method (the notional analysis of the content of the note and the information provided by the sources in German, French, Norwegian, English languages was conducted), synthesis (the new material of the sources was supplemented with the information circulating in historiography), comparison (the facts from Lithuanian, German and Norwegian archives and the Lithuanian, German and Swiss press were compared), comparative analysis (the texts of documents in different languages were compared), descriptive, inductive, and interpretive methods (the idea and meaning of the content of the sources was reconstructed with regard to the question wording). The research consists of three parts. The first part analyses the context of the origin of the note (25 January 1918–7 February 1918) and concludes that: (1) the uncoordinated efforts of the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne), the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius), and the Supreme Lithuanian Council in Russia to send Lithuanian delegates to the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk clearly demonstrated the equal rights of all three councils in representing the interests of the Lithuanian nation without any of them being more superior than the others; (2) the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) and the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius) sought to declare the independence of Lithuania and to obtain the recognition of Lithuania’s independence first from Germany and then from the Entente Powers and neutral states on the basis of the Statement of 11 December 1917; only the (non)presentation of the parts of the text in the documents of the notification of the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) and the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius) and the wording of different text parts differed; (3) to obtain as prompt recognition of Lithuania’s independence as possible, the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) and the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius) exerted pressure on the German Government in Berlin, and the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) did the same in the Swiss capital Bern; (4) the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) actively sought to participate in the formation of the Provisional Government of Lithuania and its work in taking up the posts of ministers and gradually taking over the competences in both foreign and domestic affairs from the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius) by reducing its functions to the function of approval only; the publication of Part I of the Statement of 11 December 1917 before the same was done by the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius) had to ensure that the leadership was in the hands of the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne). The second part of the study analyses the structure, content, and the essence of the note and the chronology of its submission. It is revealed that the introductory part of the note substantiates the powers exercised by the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) and its function. Its first part contains the first-ever publication of the modified text of Part I of the Statement of 11 December 1917 signed by the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius), i.e., the Declaration of Independence. The second part provides the justification for the declaration of independence; the third part specifies and describes the elements of Lithuania as a state; the fourth part repeats the Declaration on the Secession from Russia adopted by the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) on 25 December 1917. The fifth part expresses the request to recognise the independent state and justifies such a request, and the final part expresses respect for the Government of the foreign state to which the note is addressed. It was ascertained that the purpose of the text of the note was to obtain the recognition of Lithuania’s independence from the belligerent and neutral states, to accelerate the procrastinated recognition from Germany, to initiate the formation of the Provisional Government of Lithuania, and to create preconditions for re-orienting Lithuanian foreign policy from Germany towards the Entente Powers. The third part of the article addresses the reaction of Germany, the Entente Powers, and neutral states towards the note and the results of the démarche made by the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) in Bern and by the two Lithuanian priests in Berlin. It appeared that the German Foreign Office and the Military Administration believed that the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) sought to take over the competence of the Council of Lithuania (in Vilnius), to put Germany in front of a fait accompli or perhaps even abandon Part II of the Statement of the Council of Lithuania of 11 December 1917, and to change the Lithuanian foreign policy orientation towards the Entente Powers. The reaction of the German Military Administration and the German Chancellor towards the visit of Bishop Karevičius and prelate Olšauskas in Berlin was positive, helping to dot the i’s and cross the t’s in the history of Lithuania’s recognition. As a result, on 10 February 1918, the Chancellery of the German Chancellor drafted the document on the recognition of Lithuania’s independence. The investigation into the competence of the Lithuanian National Council (in Lausanne) by the German Foreign Office and the General Staff revealed the immense influence made by Juozas Gabrys and Friedrich von Ropp and the confidence in the information provided by them. On receipt of the note, the Entente Powers and the neutral states showed different, yet reserved, reactions: some refrained from any specific statements and did not reply (Switzerland, Norway), others limited themselves to the expression of their sympathies (France), or briefly informed that the final decisions would be made by the peace conference (Great Britain). To sum up the findings of the research, the text of the note and the context of its submission are significant for several essential aspects: (1) the foreign press, the diplomats of the Entente Powers and neutral states learnt about Part I of the Statement of the Council of Lithuania of 11 December 1917, i.e., the Declaration of Independence, which could not be published before; (2) the text of the note included all (published and unpublished) declarations by the Lithuanians in Lithuania and abroad about the secession from Russia, the declaration of independence, and the re-establishment of the Lithuanian state, which demonstrated the unanimous aim of all Lithuanians; (3) three steps were made by a single text: the secession from Russia was declared, the independence was proclaimed, and the request was expressed to recognise the Lithuanian state, bringing it back into the international community.

IntroductionFirmly located within the discourse of visible culture as the lofty preserve of art exhibitions and museum artefacts, the noun “curate” has gradually transformed into the verb “to curate”. Williams writes that “curate” has become a fashionable code word among the aesthetically minded to describe a creative activity. Designers no longer simply sell clothes; they “curate” merchandise. Chefs no longer only make food; they also “curate” meals. Chosen for their keen eye for a particular style or a precise shade, it is their knowledge of their craft, their reputation, and their sheer ability to choose among countless objects which make the creative process a creative activity in itself. Writing from within the framework of “curate” as a creative process, this article discusses how the state banquet for Queen Elizabeth II, hosted by Irish President Mary McAleese at Dublin Castle in May 2011, was carefully curated to represent Ireland’s diplomatic, cultural, and culinary identity. The paper will focus in particular on how the menu for the banquet was created and how the banquet’s brief, “Ireland on a Plate”, was fulfilled.History and BackgroundFood has been used by nations for centuries to display wealth, cement alliances, and impress foreign visitors. Since the feasts of the Numidian kings (circa 340 BC), culinary staging and presentation has belonged to “a long, multifaceted and multicultural history of diplomatic practices” (IEHCA 5). According to the works of Baughman, Young, and Albala, food has defined the social, cultural, and political position of a nation’s leaders throughout history.In early 2011, Ross Lewis, Chef Patron of Chapter One Restaurant in Dublin, was asked by the Irish Food Board, Bord Bía, if he would be available to create a menu for a high-profile banquet (Mahon 112). The name of the guest of honour was divulged several weeks later after vetting by the protocol and security divisions of the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Lewis was informed that the menu was for the state banquet to be hosted by President Mary McAleese at Dublin Castle in honour of Queen Elizabeth II’s visit to Ireland the following May.Hosting a formal banquet for a visiting head of state is a key feature in the statecraft of international and diplomatic relations. Food is the societal common denominator that links all human beings, regardless of culture (Pliner and Rozin 19). When world leaders publicly share a meal, that meal is laden with symbolism, illuminating each diner’s position “in social networks and social systems” (Sobal, Bove, and Rauschenbach 378). The public nature of the meal signifies status and symbolic kinship and that “guest and host are on par in terms of their personal or official attributes” (Morgan 149). While the field of academic scholarship on diplomatic dining might be young, there is little doubt of the value ascribed to the semiotics of diplomatic gastronomy in modern power structures (Morgan 150; De Vooght and Scholliers 12; Chapple-Sokol 162), for, as Firth explains, symbols are malleable and perfectly suited to exploitation by all parties (427).Political DiplomacyWhen Ireland gained independence in December 1921, it marked the end of eight centuries of British rule. The outbreak of “The Troubles” in 1969 in Northern Ireland upset the gradually improving environment of British–Irish relations, and it would be some time before a state visit became a possibility. Beginning with the peace process in the 1990s, the IRA ceasefire of 1994, and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, a state visit was firmly set in motion by the visit of Irish President Mary Robinson to Buckingham Palace in 1993, followed by the unofficial visit of the Prince of Wales to Ireland in 1995, and the visit of Irish President Mary McAleese to Buckingham Palace in 1999. An official invitation to Queen Elizabeth from President Mary McAleese in March 2011 was accepted, and the visit was scheduled for mid-May of the same year.The visit was a highly performative occasion, orchestrated and ordained in great detail, displaying all the necessary protocol associated with the state visit of one head of state to another: inspection of the military, a courtesy visit to the nation’s head of state on arrival, the laying of a wreath at the nation’s war memorial, and a state banquet.These aspects of protocol between Britain and Ireland were particularly symbolic. By inspecting the military on arrival, the existence of which is a key indicator of independence, Queen Elizabeth effectively demonstrated her recognition of Ireland’s national sovereignty. On making the customary courtesy call to the head of state, the Queen was received by President McAleese at her official residence Áras an Uachtaráin (The President’s House), which had formerly been the residence of the British monarch’s representative in Ireland (Robbins 66). The state banquet was held in Dublin Castle, once the headquarters of British rule where the Viceroy, the representative of Britain’s Court of St James, had maintained court (McDowell 1).Cultural DiplomacyThe state banquet provided an exceptional showcase of Irish culture and design and generated a level of preparation previously unseen among Dublin Castle staff, who described it as “the most stage managed state event” they had ever witnessed (Mahon 129).The castle was cleaned from top to bottom, and inventories were taken of the furniture and fittings. The Waterford Crystal chandeliers were painstakingly taken down, cleaned, and reassembled; the Killybegs carpets and rugs of Irish lamb’s wool were cleaned and repaired. A special edition Newbridge Silverware pen was commissioned for Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip to sign the newly ordered Irish leather-bound visitors’ book. A new set of state tableware was ordered for the President’s table. Irish manufacturers of household goods necessary for the guest rooms, such as towels and soaps, hand creams and body lotions, candle holders and scent diffusers, were sought. Members of Her Majesty’s staff conducted a “walk-through” several weeks in advance of the visit to ensure that the Queen’s wardrobe would not clash with the surroundings (Mahon 129–32).The promotion of Irish manufacture is a constant thread throughout history. Irish linen, writes Kane, enjoyed a reputation as far afield as the Netherlands and Italy in the 15th century, and archival documents from the Vaucluse attest to the purchase of Irish cloth in Avignon in 1432 (249–50). Support for Irish-made goods was raised in 1720 by Jonathan Swift, and by the 18th century, writes Foster, Dublin had become an important centre for luxury goods (44–51).It has been Irish government policy since the late 1940s to use Irish-manufactured goods for state entertaining, so the material culture of the banquet was distinctly Irish: Arklow Pottery plates, Newbridge Silverware cutlery, Waterford Crystal glassware, and Irish linen tablecloths. In order to decide upon the table setting for the banquet, four tables were laid in the King’s Bedroom in Dublin Castle. The Executive Chef responsible for the banquet menu, and certain key personnel, helped determine which setting would facilitate serving the food within the time schedule allowed (Mahon 128–29). The style of service would be service à la russe, so widespread in restaurants today as to seem unremarkable. Each plate is prepared in the kitchen by the chef and then served to each individual guest at table. In the mid-19th century, this style of service replaced service à la française, in which guests typically entered the dining room after the first course had been laid on the table and selected food from the choice of dishes displayed around them (Kaufman 126).The guest list was compiled by government and embassy officials on both sides and was a roll call of Irish and British life. At the President’s table, 10 guests would be served by a team of 10 staff in Dorchester livery. The remaining tables would each seat 12 guests, served by 12 liveried staff. The staff practiced for several days prior to the banquet to make sure that service would proceed smoothly within the time frame allowed. The team of waiters, each carrying a plate, would emerge from the kitchen in single file. They would then take up positions around the table, each waiter standing to the left of the guest they would serve. On receipt of a discreet signal, each plate would be laid in front of each guest at precisely the same moment, after which the waiters would then about foot and return to the kitchen in single file (Mahon 130).Post-prandial entertainment featured distinctive styles of performance and instruments associated with Irish traditional music. These included reels, hornpipes, and slipjigs, voice and harp, sean-nόs (old style) singing, and performances by established Irish artists on the fiddle, bouzouki, flute, and uilleann pipes (Office of Public Works).Culinary Diplomacy: Ireland on a PlateLewis was given the following brief: the menu had to be Irish, the main course must be beef, and the meal should represent the very best of Irish ingredients. There were no restrictions on menu design. There were no dietary requirements or specific requests from the Queen’s representatives, although Lewis was informed that shellfish is excluded de facto from Irish state banquets as a precautionary measure. The meal was to be four courses long and had to be served to 170 diners within exactly 1 hour and 10 minutes (Mahon 112). A small army of 16 chefs and 4 kitchen porters would prepare the food in the kitchen of Dublin Castle under tight security. The dishes would be served on state tableware by 40 waiters, 6 restaurant managers, a banqueting manager and a sommélier. Lewis would be at the helm of the operation as Executive Chef (Mahon 112–13).Lewis started by drawing up “a patchwork quilt” of the products he most wanted to use and built the menu around it. The choice of suppliers was based on experience but also on a supplier’s ability to deliver perfectly ripe goods in mid-May, a typically black spot in the Irish fruit and vegetable growing calendar as it sits between the end of one season and the beginning of another. Lewis consulted the Queen’s itinerary and the menus to be served so as to avoid repetitions. He had to discard his initial plan to feature lobster in the starter and rhubarb in the dessert—the former for the precautionary reasons mentioned above, and the latter because it featured on the Queen’s lunch menu on the day of the banquet (Mahon 112–13).Once the ingredients had been selected, the menu design focused on creating tastes, flavours and textures. Several draft menus were drawn up and myriad dishes were tasted and discussed in the kitchen of Lewis’s own restaurant. Various wines were paired and tasted with the different courses, the final choice being a Château Lynch-Bages 1998 red and a Château de Fieuzal 2005 white, both from French Bordeaux estates with an Irish connection (Kellaghan 3). Two months and two menu sittings later, the final menu was confirmed and signed off by state and embassy officials (Mahon 112–16).The StarterThe banquet’s starter featured organic Clare Island salmon cured in a sweet brine, laid on top of a salmon cream combining wild smoked salmon from the Burren and Cork’s Glenilen Farm crème fraîche, set over a lemon balm jelly from the Tannery Cookery School Gardens, Waterford. Garnished with horseradish cream, wild watercress, and chive flowers from Wicklow, the dish was finished with rapeseed oil from Kilkenny and a little sea salt from West Cork (Mahon 114). Main CourseA main course of Irish beef featured as the pièce de résistance of the menu. A rib of beef from Wexford’s Slaney Valley was provided by Kettyle Irish Foods in Fermanagh and served with ox cheek and tongue from Rathcoole, County Dublin. From along the eastern coastline came the ingredients for the traditional Irish dish of smoked champ: cabbage from Wicklow combined with potatoes and spring onions grown in Dublin. The new season’s broad beans and carrots were served with wild garlic leaf, which adorned the dish (Mahon 113). Cheese CourseThe cheese course was made up of Knockdrinna, a Tomme style goat’s milk cheese from Kilkenny; Milleens, a Munster style cow’s milk cheese produced in Cork; Cashel Blue, a cow’s milk blue cheese from Tipperary; and Glebe Brethan, a Comté style cheese from raw cow’s milk from Louth. Ditty’s Oatmeal Biscuits from Belfast accompanied the course.DessertLewis chose to feature Irish strawberries in the dessert. Pat Clarke guaranteed delivery of ripe strawberries on the day of the banquet. They married perfectly with cream and yoghurt from Glenilen Farm in Cork. The cream was set with Irish Carrageen moss, overlaid with strawberry jelly and sauce, and garnished with meringues made with Irish apple balsamic vinegar from Lusk in North Dublin, yoghurt mousse, and Irish soda bread tuiles made with wholemeal flour from the Mosse family mill in Kilkenny (Mahon 113).The following day, President McAleese telephoned Lewis, saying of the banquet “Ní hé go raibh sé go maith, ach go raibh sé míle uair níos fearr ná sin” (“It’s not that it was good but that it was a thousand times better”). The President observed that the menu was not only delicious but that it was “amazingly articulate in terms of the story that it told about Ireland and Irish food.” The Queen had particularly enjoyed the stuffed cabbage leaf of tongue, cheek and smoked colcannon (a traditional Irish dish of mashed potatoes with curly kale or green cabbage) and had noted the diverse selection of Irish ingredients from Irish artisans (Mahon 116). Irish CuisineWhen the topic of food is explored in Irish historiography, the focus tends to be on the consequences of the Great Famine (1845–49) which left the country “socially and emotionally scarred for well over a century” (Mac Con Iomaire and Gallagher 161). Some commentators consider the term “Irish cuisine” oxymoronic, according to Mac Con Iomaire and Maher (3). As Goldstein observes, Ireland has suffered twice—once from its food deprivation and second because these deprivations present an obstacle for the exploration of Irish foodways (xii). Writing about Italian, Irish, and Jewish migration to America, Diner states that the Irish did not have a food culture to speak of and that Irish writers “rarely included the details of food in describing daily life” (85). Mac Con Iomaire and Maher note that Diner’s methodology overlooks a centuries-long tradition of hospitality in Ireland such as that described by Simms (68) and shows an unfamiliarity with the wealth of food related sources in the Irish language, as highlighted by Mac Con Iomaire (“Exploring” 1–23).Recent scholarship on Ireland’s culinary past is unearthing a fascinating story of a much more nuanced culinary heritage than has been previously understood. This is clearly demonstrated in the research of Cullen, Cashman, Deleuze, Kellaghan, Kelly, Kennedy, Legg, Mac Con Iomaire, Mahon, O’Sullivan, Richman Kenneally, Sexton, and Stanley, Danaher, and Eogan.In 1996 Ireland was described by McKenna as having the most dynamic cuisine in any European country, a place where in the last decade “a vibrant almost unlikely style of cooking has emerged” (qtd. in Mac Con Iomaire “Jammet’s” 136). By 2014, there were nine restaurants in Dublin which had been awarded Michelin stars or Red Ms (Mac Con Iomaire “Jammet’s” 137). Ross Lewis, Chef Patron of Chapter One Restaurant, who would be chosen to create the menu for the state banquet for Queen Elizabeth II, has maintained a Michelin star since 2008 (Mac Con Iomaire, “Jammet’s” 138). Most recently the current strength of Irish gastronomy is globally apparent in Mark Moriarty’s award as San Pellegrino Young Chef 2015 (McQuillan). As Deleuze succinctly states: “Ireland has gone mad about food” (143).This article is part of a research project into Irish diplomatic dining, and the author is part of a research cluster into Ireland’s culinary heritage within the Dublin Institute of Technology. The aim of the research is to add to the growing body of scholarship on Irish gastronomic history and, ultimately, to contribute to the discourse on the existence of a national cuisine. If, as Zubaida says, “a nation’s cuisine is its court’s cuisine,” then it is time for Ireland to “research the feasts as well as the famines” (Mac Con Iomaire and Cashman 97).ConclusionThe Irish state banquet for Queen Elizabeth II in May 2011 was a highly orchestrated and formalised process. From the menu, material culture, entertainment, and level of consultation in the creative content, it is evident that the banquet was carefully curated to represent Ireland’s diplomatic, cultural, and culinary identity.The effects of the visit appear to have been felt in the years which have followed. Hennessy wrote in the Irish Times newspaper that Queen Elizabeth is privately said to regard her visit to Ireland as the most significant of the trips she has made during her 60-year reign. British Prime Minister David Cameron is noted to mention the visit before every Irish audience he encounters, and British Foreign Secretary William Hague has spoken in particular of the impact the state banquet in Dublin Castle made upon him. Hennessy points out that one of the most significant indicators of the peaceful relationship which exists between the two countries nowadays was the subsequent state visit by Irish President Michael D. Higgins to Britain in 2013. This was the first state visit to the United Kingdom by a President of Ireland and would have been unimaginable 25 years ago. The fact that the President and his wife stayed at Windsor Castle and that the attendant state banquet was held there instead of Buckingham Palace were both deemed to be marks of special favour and directly attributed to the success of Her Majesty’s 2011 visit to Ireland.As the research demonstrates, eating together unites rather than separates, gathers rather than divides, diffuses political tensions, and confirms alliances. It might be said then that the 2011 state banquet hosted by President Mary McAleese in honour of Queen Elizabeth II, curated by Ross Lewis, gives particular meaning to the axiom “to eat together is to eat in peace” (Taliano des Garets 160).AcknowledgementsSupervisors: Dr Máirtín Mac Con Iomaire (Dublin Institute of Technology) and Dr Michael Kennedy (Royal Irish Academy)Fáilte IrelandPhotos of the banquet dishes supplied and permission to reproduce them for this article kindly granted by Ross Lewis, Chef Patron, Chapter One Restaurant ‹http://www.chapteronerestaurant.com/›.Illustration ‘Ireland on a Plate’ © Jesse Campbell BrownRemerciementsThe author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.ReferencesAlbala, Ken. The Banquet: Dining in the Great Courts of Late Renaissance Europe. 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