Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Foreign economic policy"

Since gained its independence in 1991, energy management has become the most important factor in the development of Kazakhstan’s economic and foreign policy. This is due to the presence of widespread deposits of natural energy resources in the bowels of Kazakhstan. This forms the energy security and essential basis for the economic independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The study, first of all, looks at Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and the links between foreign policy and energy sources. In particular, attention is paid to the role of oil in shaping Kazakhstan’s foreign policy as an active participant in the highly competitive energy resources market. The energy potential of Kazakhstan, the entry of Kazakh oil into the world market and the obstacles created by Russia for Kazakhstan in this process are investigated next. Other problems in the region are analyzed, including border issues with neighboring countries, as well as the impact of energy demand in China on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. In this regard, the main focus of the study is the analysis of Kazakhstan’s energy resources rich in oil reserves, and the analysis of the multilateral energy policy of the Astana Government since independence and has been gained since.

Political scientists researching economic foreign policy have generally taken one of two analytic approaches. The first is based on realpolitik, the traditional application of “high” politics to the “low” politics of economics. This approach considers economics subordinate to politics. The concept of the national interest dominates; the pursuit of power—what enables the state to achieve its goals of security, welfare, and other societal values—is seen to underlie most actions. The study of foreign economic policy is thus an analysis of the distribution of power among states within the international system. By understanding a state's sources of strength and areas of vulnerability in relation to other states, the analyst will better understand the creation of foreign policy. Hans Morgenthau notes that while states may sometimes pursue economic policies for their own sake (in which case they should take little interest in their success), the more important economic policies they will favor are instruments of political power.Stephen Krasner views the state as an autonomously motivated actor, able to guide policy in pursuit of state priorities while resisting interest groups and ideologies. According to this “power theory”, the state tries to increase its economic competitiveness, ensure security of material needs, and promote its broad foreign-policy objectives. Economic policy is for the most part subordinate to and best explained by state priorities and prerogatives. Robert Tucker, Klaus Knorr, Robert Gilpin and others have also adopted this framework.

Regionally, Kuwait has a unique foreign policy that is characterized by neutrality. This study investigates Kuwait’s foreign policy towards regional issues in the Middle East in the period from 2003 to 2014. The study investigates the role of two tools of foreign policy: economics and mediation. The study investigates the role and implications of both economics and economic development assistance in activating foreign policy in Kuwait. It determines social, political, cultural and economic implications of economic development assistance in implementing and activating foreign policy in Kuwait. The study discusses some mechanisms of activating the economic foreign policy in Kuwait such as interdependence, soft power and national interests. It investigates mediation as one of foreign policy activation tools. The study suggests some ways for improving the efficiency of economic development assistance in implementing and activating foreign policy.

The aim of this paper is to assess how far the German foreign policy follows the principles of the theory of geo-economy. The paper has the following structure. First, the theory of geo-economy will be presented. Second, the characteristics of three debates relating to the German foreign policy will be pointed out. Third, German policy during the Euro crisis will be analysed. Fourth, the development of the relations between Germany and the new powers will be assessed. This paper supports the thesis that geo-economic strategy is beneficial for Germany.

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Bachelors
Arts and Sciences
Political Science

While openness enables countries to keep pace with the most advanced state-of-the-art knowledge, technology transfers among innovators in different countries facilitate the motivation of research and development and the spread of new knowledge and skills. Rapid technological innovations also motivate trade and international capital flows and speed up the integration process of the world economy. The thesis concentrates on two areas within these ongoing investigations; namely Trade Policy and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), within the wider discussions of the newly developed models in the theory of Economic Growth, styled "endogenous growth theory" Based on the models of new growth theory, namely Romer (1987,1990, 1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 4,6, and 7), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1992, Chapter 4 and 11), this thesis first focuses on the mechanism through which trade restrictions affect the welfare of a developing country. In Chapter 2, the comparison of the welfare effects of two of the most commonly used trade policies, tariff and voluntary export restriction (VER) is presented. It shows counter-intuitively that a VER may be superior to a tariff. Second, this thesis focuses on the mechanism illustrating the interaction of imitation, FDI, and economic growth rate of a developing country. Chapter 3 constructs a model which detects the interrelationships between FDI, innovation, imitation and the long-run growth rate. One of the major findings is that governmental policies to promote local technology activities do not necessarily improve the relative condition of labour in the policy-active country. Finally, in Chapter 4, this thesis also examines the empirical evidences of the effect of FDI upon the growth of a developing country's economy based on a recent growth model. The Taiwanese economy (1953-1995) is used as an empirical case study. The results show that FDI did play an important role in the manufacturing industry of Taiwan.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006.
Thesis Advisor(s): Lyman Miller. "June 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p.37-39). Also available in print.

The present article focuses on the role of APEC in the consolidation of Peruvian Foreign Economic policy. It analyzes if this Forum has represented some type of influence and in what way it has become evident. This study shows that APEC, with the leadership of the United States, has exerted a relevant external influence, first, channeling the liberalization principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and then, through the deepening of its own agenda that institutionalized a bilateral and multilateral opening strategy after the Asian crisis.
El presente artículo se centra en el rol ejercido por APEC en el proceso de consolidación de la Política Exterior Económica Peruana (PEEP). En tal sentido, analiza si este Foro ha representado algún tipo de influencia y de qué manera se ha hecho evidente. Este estudio demuestra que APEC, vinculado al liderazgo de los Estados Unidos, ha ejercido una influencia externa relevante, primero, canalizando los principios de liberalización de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), y luego, a través de la profundización de una agenda propia que institucionalizó una estrategia bilateral y multilateral de apertura tras la crisis asiática.

This paper analyzes the liberalization of Venezuela's foreign direct investment (FDI) laws. In the past, Venezuela placed tough restrictions upon the entry and operation of foreign investment. These restrictions were made possible as long as petroleum prices remained high and the country had access to cheap international bank loans. The debt crisis in the 1980s, a drop in commodity prices, and a decrease in international bank loans once again made FDI an attractive source of foreign capital. In order to attract greater FDI inflows, Venezuela began to liberalize its foreign investment laws in the mid-1980s. Despite these changes, FDI inflows into Venezuela have been erratic. This paper then discusses some of the adjustments Venezuela will have to make in order to attract greater foreign investment inflows, and ends with an examination of how the country can maximize FDI's contribution to its economic development.

International trade is defined the exchange of goods, services, and capital among various countries and regions. Also the potential of imports and exports account for an important part of growth. On the other hand, total value of international trade in goods and services shows the countries’ integration into the world economy. In this paper we focused on to analyze the effects on imports and make inferences for Eurasian Countries. In this paper we aim to examine the relationship between imports and macro-economic indicators in 6 Eurasian economies. To analyze the relationship, we used panel data regression analysis. Data obtained from World Bank. The panel data covers 1996-2012 periods and 6 countries which named Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. We predicted pooled, fixed effects and random effects panel data models using the Stata and analyzed them. The dependent variable is defined the imports in our model. It has been found that gross domestic savings, foreign direct investments and, and exports are statistically significant for this countries. The results found in this paper show that gross domestic savings has negative effects on imports. On the other hand, for this 6 countries foreign direct investments (inflow) and exports have positive effects on imports as we expected. It shows us the economic positions of Eurasian countries still depend on Russian Federation. Also, these findings have important policy implications for Eurasian Countries. Our interpretation of these findings is that, integration to world economy has generally positive effects on foreign direct investments for this countries.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the works of Russian researchers, which studied the foreign policy of the Russian Empire / USSR in Barga. The author examines works on Russian foreign policy in the first half of the 20th century, including publications written during this period. The article analyzed in detail the publications of contemporary Russian historians on this issue.

This paper is a review of the progress of the Vietnam socio-economic and development plans, and an assessment of the extent to which Vietnam is putting in place the critical social and economic development structures that will enable it to reach the status of “developed nation” in the time set (2020) by its national strategic plan. The research will identify and review trade patterns, trade policy and the effect of foreign aid on Vietnam’s plan to transform its economy and society from developing to a developed nation status. The overriding question stands as “is” Vietnam effectively moving towards developed nation status soon”? The review is conducted by collecting and analyzing data on foreign trade, foreign aid, business and general economic growth, development and social wellbeing. It identifies and appraises the trade patterns, trade effects, socio-economic policies and the effect of foreign aid on the economic growth and the progress of the country towards becoming a developed nation state. Vietnam has experienced significant progress to date based on conventional developed nation criteria. However, there is an ongoing need for continued assertive governmental application of geo-economic and geopolitical policies focusing on sustainable, comprehensive, and vital social, cultural and economic growth.

In this paper, we try to discuss how the Siberian part of the Russian territory can present advantages and disadvantages for Russian foreign policy. Situated in the center of the Eurasian geography, Siberia offers many economic opportunities and energy reserves as well as a strategic value for Russia, whose population and interests are mostly concentrated in the western provinces. Long considered as an isolated continent for exile for political dissidents, Siberia has become nowadays a center of the economic strategies of the Russian administration, in relation with its foreign policy perspectives. As an energy source for natural gas and oil and transit corridor toward China and Kazakhstan, Siberia is now supported through governmental policies of restructuration and labour migration. This new perspective can lead to a new policy of regionalism in connection with foreign policy interests. For the federal center, there is an unavoidable correlation between the domestic and foreign policy stakes with Siberia’s integration in world and regional politics.

The global crisis which started in September 2008 adversely affected many global economies and also Kyrgyzstan economy. Kyrgyzstan economy which declined and experienced a severe recession in 2009 due to the crisis started recovering from the adverse effects of the crisis after 2010. What lie beneath this positive development is increased foreign exchange revenues abroad and vigor experienced in construction industry and industrial production. The recovery experienced in economies of Russia and neighbor Kazakhstan resulted in increased exports and thus increased revenues in foreign currencies obtained from foreign countries. The political disturbances experienced in Bishkek in April 2011 and ethnic conflicts experienced in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2011, created an adverse effect on the economy. The crisis resulted in degradation of investment environment, adversely influenced the foreign investments and increased the current account deficit. These developments adversely influenced the banking sector too. The government attempted to diminish effects of the crisis through financial incentives. The budget deficit emerged as a result of crisis was attempted to be closed through support secured from International Monetary Fund (IMF). IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank lent great support to invigorating Kyrgyzstan economy after events of April and July. According to IMF, if political instability goes on in Kyrgyzstan in medium and long term, economic problems shall continue. Uncertainties in banking sector are amongst the main factors which increase the economic risks. Recovery of Kyrgyzstan economy is dependent on medium term financial policy measures to be applied to the economy and balancing the foreign trade.

Today’s China presents fundamental challenges to the democracies of Europe and North America. Perspectives on China will continue to differ due to geography, economic exposure, perceptions, historical trajectories as well as foreign policy approaches. But there has been significant convergence among transatlantic partners. Today, areas of agreement are substantial and offer a solid basis for cooperation. What is needed is a pragmatic approach identifying joint action where possible and managing differences where necessary. This report proposes a transatlantic agenda aimed at achieving quick wins, with recommendations organized by seven issue areas.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

The article reveals the features of the state mechanism for regulating labor migration in the Jewish Autonomous Region. It is noted that labor migration is an integral part of the economic development of the region. The purpose of the study is the peculiarities of solving the problems of optimizing the mechanisms for regulating labor migration in the Jewish Autonomous Region (JAO). The practical significance of the study is underscored by the growing resource requirements of the Jewish Autonomous Region. The importance of attracting labor migrants from the widest list of countries, to increase the exchange of experience and improve interethnic relations, the organization of programs to increase the flow of willing workers and promising employers, is highlighted. The scientific novelty of the research is in the designation of the latest methods and state programs aimed at improving the efficiency of the labor migration management mechanism. Every year, the number of migrants illegally staying on the territory of Russia is growing, and the authorities of the Russian Federation are trying to improve the methods of control of foreign citizens entering the country, which makes it easier, but at the same time more effective, to exercise control over migrants and distribute it in. areas such as the patent system, employee-to-employer linkage and simplified taxation.

The UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign policy describes Russia as ‘the most acute direct threat to [the UK’s] security’ in the 2020s. Relations did not get this bad overnight: the trend has been negative for nearly two decades. The bilateral political relationship is now broken. Russian policymakers regard the UK as hostile, but also as weaker than Russia: a junior partner of the US and less important than Germany within Europe. The consensus among Russian observers is that Brexit has reduced the UK’s international influence, to Russia’s benefit. The history of UK–Russia relations offers four lessons. First, because the two lack shared values and interests, their relationship is fragile and volatile. Second, adversarial relations are the historical norm. Third, each party exaggerates its importance on the world stage. Fourth, external trends beyond the UK’s control regularly buffet the relationship. These wider trends include the weakening of the Western-centric international order; the rise of populism and opposition to economic globalization; and the global spread of authoritarian forms of governance. A coherent Russia strategy should focus on the protection of UK territory, citizens and institutions; security in the Euro-Atlantic space; international issues such as non-proliferation; economic relations; and people-to-people contacts. The UK should pursue its objectives with the tools of state power, through soft power instruments and through its international partnerships. Despite Brexit, the EU remains an essential security partner for the UK. In advancing its Russia-related interests, the UK should have four operational priorities: rebuilding domestic resilience; concentrating resources on the Euro-Atlantic space; being a trusted ally and partner; and augmenting its soft power. UK decision-makers should be guided by four propositions. In the first place, policy must be based on clear, hard-headed thinking about Russia. Secondly, an adversarial relationship is not in itself contrary to UK interests. Next, Brexit makes it harder for the UK and the EU to deal with Russia. And finally, an effective Russia policy demands a realistic assessment of UK power and influence. The UK is not a ‘pocket superpower’. It is an important but middling power in relative decline. After Brexit, it needs to repair its external reputation and maximize its utility to allies and partners, starting with its European neighbours.

This rapid review focuses on Global Health Diplomacy and defines it as a method of interaction between the different stakeholders of the public health sector in a bid to promote representation, cooperation, promotion of the right to health and improvement of health systems for vulnerable populations on a global scale. It is the link between health and international relations. GHD has various actors including states, intergovernmental organizations, private companies, public-private partnerships and non-governmental organizations. Foreign policies can be integrated into national health in various ways i.e., designing institutions to govern practices regarding health diplomacy (i.e., health and foreign affairs ministries), creating and promoting norms and ideas that support foreign policy integration and promoting policies that deal with specific issues affecting the different actors in the GHD arena to encourage states to integrate them into their national health strategies. GHD is classified into core diplomacy – where there are bilateral and multilateral negotiations which may lead to binding agreements, multistakeholder diplomacy – where there are multilateral and bilateral negotiations which do not lead to binding agreements and informal diplomacy – which are interactions between other actors in the public health sector i.e., NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations. The US National Security Strategy of 2010 highlighted the matters to be considered while drafting a health strategy as: the prevalence of the disease, the potential of the state to treat the disease and the value of affected areas. The UK Government Strategy found the drivers of health strategies to be self-interest (protecting security and economic interests of the state), enhancing the UK’s reputation, and focusing on global health to help others. The report views health diplomacy as a field which requires expertise from different disciplines, especially in the field of foreign policy and public health. The lack of diplomatic expertise and health expertise have been cited as barriers to integrating health into foreign policies. States and other actors should collaborate to promote the right to health globally.

This Briefing Note responds to key challenges articulated by Foreign, Commonwealth & Development (FCDO) staff in monitoring how, and the extent to which, programming, policy and humanitarian interventions in crisis contexts support inclusion. It provides an overview of how to monitor inclusion, focusing on ongoing monitoring during the implementation of interventions. However, there is some crossover with evaluation and learning processes, especially in complex crisis contexts. The information provided is relevant to people working within and across a range of sectors that seek to address the diverse needs that emerge during crises, including social protection; climate resilience and food security; health; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); education; livelihoods; infrastructure and economic growth; mental health and psychosocial support; protection; and governance or peacebuilding initiatives.

As a means to reduce discrimination and promote the economic empowerment of women, there is a growing understanding that tax policy, tax administration and tax research need to be gender transformative. Recognising this need, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) is reshaping and building its approach to tax and gender programming. K4D’s Tax and Gender Learning Journey brought together tax and gender teams to identify other tax and gender stakeholders and collaboratively craft a future approach to tax and gender for FCDO and partners. Initial exploration of the early impact from activities that have taken place amongst partner organisations in Pakistan suggests K4D’s inputs have the potential to bolster intended social reforms across the country’s revenue and other government departments.

The issue of flooding in Nigerian cities is relatively poorly documented, despite the significant economic damage and the loss of life it results in each year. The lack of a consistent set of data for informing policy and programming is a well-recognised challenge. Recognising the value of access to a reliable evidence base, colleagues at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Nigeria office collaborated with the K4D team in drafting a desk review that outlined a deeper understanding of the impact, risk factors and associated management and mitigation factors to urban flooding in Nigeria. Evidence indicates that the report has proved a successful instrument in both providing a foundation for evidence-based action, as well as serving as a tool in which to engage and inspire a wide range of stakeholders.

This report describes the effects of climate change for Finland from the view of comprehensive security. The report examines both direct and indirect climate security risks as well as transition risks related to climate change mitigation. The report is based on previous research and expert interviews. Direct security risks refer to the immediate risks caused by the changing nature of natural hazards. These include the risks to critical infrastructure and energy systems, the logistics system, health and food security. Indirect security risks relate to the potential economic, political and geopolitical impacts of climate change. Climate change can affect global migration, increase conflict risk, and cause social tensions and inequality. Transition risks are related to economic and technological changes in energy transition, as well as political and geopolitical tensions and social problems caused by climate change mitigation policies. Reducing the use of fossil fuels can result in domestic and foreign policy tensions and economic pressure especially in locations dependent on fossil fuels. Political tension can also increase the risks associated with hybrid and information warfare. The security effects of climate change affect all sectors of society and the Finnish comprehensive security model should be utilized in preparing for them. In the short run, the most substantial arising climate change related security risks in Finland are likely to occur through indirect or transition risks. Finland, similar to other wealthy countries, has better technological, economic and institutional conditions to deal with the problems and risks posed by climate change than many other countries. However, this requires political will and focus on risk reduction and management.