Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Deleuze, Gilles (1925-1995 ; philosophe) – Et le cinéma"

Au delà des différences de terminologie et de background culturel, on essaye ici de montrer que le physicien quantique David Bohm (Wilkes-Barre 1917 – Londre 1992) et le philosophe poststructuraliste Gilles Deleuze (Paris 1925 – Paris 1995) ont visé un but de pensée commun: remplacer l’image classique (mécaniste) de la réalité, encore dominante à notre époque, par une métaphysique finalement en accord avec les concepts et les résultats de la relativité, de la mécanique quantique et de la biologie contemporaine. Pour cesdeux penseurs, le monde des choses bien individuées dans l’espace et le temps, et ordonnées selon des relations mécaniques de cause et d’effet, n’est rien d’autre que l’expression momentanée d’une “Totalité indivise en devenir” qui en constitue le véritable fondement ontologique. Par le moyen de cette nouvelle métaphysique, le monde de l’expérience quotidienne et de la science classique apparaît comme la manifestation explicite ou développée de l’ordre implicite que la totalité indivise contient virtuellement en elle à des niveaux d’enveloppementet d’imbrication toujours plus profonds. Le monde explicite (de la science classique et de l’expérience quotidienne) est le résultat d’un processus de répétition, ralentissement et stabilisation temporelle, déclenché par l’interaction de nos instruments de mesure – appareils techniques, organes sensoriels et moteurs, formes a priori et catégories de l’entendement – avec une totalité mouvante dont le sujet pensant et observant représente un reflet momentané et partial plutôt qu’un fragment solitaire et autonome. En critiquant l’image classique de la correspondance/adéquation entre l’être et la pensée, Bohm et Deleuze montrent enfin que la pensée qui veut saisir cette Totalité en devenirinteragit inévitablement avec elle, en la modifiant, en la recréant, en l’accomplissant dans une direction plutôt qu’une autre. La pensée ressemble ainsi à une danse qui essaye de s’harmoniser avec le flux universel qui l’engendre et l’emporte dans un seul mouvement avec la matière.

Curating content is a key part of a social media user’s profile—and recent reports reveal an upward trend in the curating of video, image, and text based content (Meeker). Through “engagement”—in other words, posting content, liking, sharing, or commenting on another’s content—that content becomes part of the user’s profile and contributes to their “activity.” A user’s understanding of another user in the network depends on curation, on what another user posts and their engagement with the content. It is worth while studying content curation in terms of meaning, which involves clarifying how a user makes themselves meaningful depending on what they curate and their engagement with the curated content, and also how other users gain meaning from someone else’s curatorial work, determining how they position themselves in relation to others. This essay analyses the structure of meaning underpinning an individual’s act of curating content in social media, each time they publish content (“post”) or republish content (like, share, and/or comment) on their social media homepage. C.S. Peirce’s semiotics is the method for clarifying this structure. Based on an application of Peirce’s tripartite structure of semiosis, it becomes clear that curated content is a sign representative of the user who posted the content, the poster, and that, with the range of ways this representation takes place, it is possible to begin a classification of social media signs. Background: Meaning, Self-Documentation, Semiotics The study of meaning is a growing field in the research of social media. Lomborg makes a case for the importance of studying meaning due to social media’s “constant flux” and evolution as an object of study. In this context, structures of meaning are a stabilising component that provides “the key to explaining continuity and change in social media over time” (Lomborg 1). In her study of social media, Langlois defines meaning broadly as something we create and find. “Finding meaning” and “making sense” of the world, people, and objects involves the whole gamut of decoding meaning and applying social and cultural ideas as well as a more Deleuzian pedagogy of “real thinking” which involves creating new concepts (Deleuze Difference; Dillet). An analysis of the structure of meaning underpinning content curation extends existing research on self-documentation online, self-presentation, and personal media assemblages/personal media archives (see Doster; Good; Orkibi; Storsul). As noted by Langlois, “There has been a massive popularisation of self-documentation” (114) and it involves more than publishing reflections on blogging and microblogging platforms. It involves forms that focus on “self-presence” and “self-actualisation,” including sharing pictures, videos, and memes, writing comments, and “the use of buttons such as the Facebook ‘Like’ button” (117). Recent research discusses how Facebook profiles use the platform to collate content in a manner similar to that of diaries and scrapbooks. Good explains how social media users today and users in the print era use “tokens” to communicate taste and build cultural capital. An “interest token” is content that is shared: in the print era these are mainly clippings and in social media these are “digital articles” such as links to video clips as well as liking friends’ posts (568). Crucial to the content in both eras is the latent presence of the user. For example, in Victorian Britain contributors to confession books would hint at their desires through textual quotations. Good describes much the same structure of meaning underlying a user’s publishing of content on Facebook: “Tokens, when analysed as part of a broader media assemblage in a Facebook page or scrapbook page, can essentially speak volumes about a user’s cultural aspirations, dispositions and desires for social distinction” (568). Doster also reiterates this point about how digital technology enables users to associate themselves with digital content in order to represent themselves in complex ways. The structure of meaning analysed in this essay is found in the very phenomena identified above: when a user, by publishing content or republishing another’s content, is using their profile to curate content which is interpreted by other users to say something about them. As noted, current social media research discusses how, on platforms such as Facebook, users collate content as an important strategy of self-documentation and self-presentation. Other research examines in detail the conditions influencing the production of meaning (Langlois), identifying the software algorithms described by Chowdhry that decide what content social media users see on the platform, influencing what they curate in the first place—for example, when a user republishes, by liking, sharing, and/or commenting on, another friend’s post, a social organisation’s post, or even an advertisement. This paper, however, analyses the structure of meaning specifically. Peirce’s semiotics is a conceptual framework that explains how this structure of meaning works. Semiotics has a fruitful history of explaining in detail the problem of meaning. Chuang and Huang are clear about the benefit of Peircian semiotics as a conceptual framework for systematically presenting and processing an object of analysis (341); Metro-Roland is also adamant about the value of Peirce’s theory for offering a “robust heuristic tool” (272); and Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema 2: The Time-Image famously praises Peirce’s Sign as an alternative to Ferdinand de Saussure’s more restrictive schema in semiology (Dawkins). Semiotics clarifies how an individual act of content curation is a triadic Sign (Representamen, Object, Interpretant). This triadic structure explains how posters are represented by content, and, in turn, how the content is interpreted to be representative of them. Following from semiotics, this paper seeks to “identify signs and describe their functioning” (Culler viii) and beyond its scope is an analysis of the conditions under which the Sign is produced. The Sign, According to C.S. Peirce Peirce’s semiotic, a branch of philosophy, is triadic. He proposes that we can think “only in terms of three”, and, from these “modes of valency,” and based also on his critique of Kant (Deledalle), he claims three phenomenological categories of being: Firstness and the state of possibility; Secondness and the state of existential relations; and Thirdness and the state of certainty, reasoning, and general rules. In relation to these three modes of being he claims that the way we make sense of the world—a process he names semiosis—also has three constituents. The three constituents of semiosis inform the three core elements of Peirce’s triadic Sign. There is the Sign itself, which Peirce calls the Representamen or Sign; there is the Object the Sign represents; and there is the resulting thought that follows, called the Interpretant (CP 1.541). (References to Peirce’s work are based on the customary practice of citing his collected works: CP, Collected Papers, with volume and page numbers.) Given that semiotics is triadic, Peirce defines three kinds of Representamen, three kinds of Object, and three kinds of Interpretant. For the sake of simplification this paper focuses on Peirce’s Object and Interpretant. They are briefly explained below and noted schematically in the appendix. In terms of Peirce’s Object, there are three kinds of Sign–Object relation. From the category of Thirdness, a Sign represents its Object according to an imagined idea. Peirce describes this relation with the Symbol. From the category of Secondness, a Sign represents its Object by being physically linked to its Object, and in this case it represents an actual object. Peirce describes this relation with the Index. From the category of Firstness, a Sign represents its Object based on qualitative resemblance, and in this case it represents a possible object. Peirce describes this relation with the Icon. In his explication of Peirce, Deledalle reminds us that “Nothing in itself is icon, index or Symbol” (20), meaning, for example, that what is an index in one semiosis could be a symbol in another. Deledalle discusses a symptom as a Sign of an illness, which is the Object, and an example is a symptom such as a person’s shivering. He writes: “If this symptom is referred to in a lecture on medicine as always characterising a certain illness, the symptom is a symbol. If the doctor encounters it while he is examining a patient, the symptom is the index of the illness” (19–20). Expanding Deledalle’s discussion, if the symptom were represented in a graphic of a shivering man, the symptom is an icon. Consider the three ways a Sign is interpreted. From Thirdness, the Sign is associated with the Object based on a conceptual connection imagined by the interpreter. This is an arbitrary connection based on convention. This kind of interpretation is called an Argument. In Secondness, Sign and Object are interpreted to form a physical pair and the interpreting mind simply remarks on this connection. “The Index asserts nothing,” writes Peirce, “it only says ‘There!’” (CP 3.361). This kind of Interpretant is called a Dicent. In Firstness, the qualities of the Sign are interpreted to resemble a possible Object, and those qualities “excite analogous sensations in the mind for which it is a likeness” (CP 2.299). This kind of Interpretant is called a Rhema. The three kinds of Representamen, three kinds of Sign–Object relation and three kinds of Interpretant together create 10 principal classes of Sign. It is worth noting that Peirce originally envisaged five categories of being, which would produce further classes of Signs; moreover, in his cinema books Deleuze develops an even more expansive taxonomy of Signs from Peirce’s theoretical framework, and this is based on his subdivision of Peirce’s categories. Crucial is how semiosis depends upon “the set of knowledge and beliefs that will be brought to bear” (Metro-Rowland 274), or what Peirce calls collateral experience. Comedian Jerry Seinfeld’s first appearance on The Tonight Show explains the importance of collateral experience for meaningfulness (Goldenberg). Seinfeld says he loves a particular sign he saw on the freeway—which is unique to New York—that reads “Left turn OK.” When pronouncing the text on the sign he intentionally adds a pause, so it sounds more like, “Left turn... Okay.” Seinfeld explains that the structure of the text adds a more personal and human tone than is typical of street signs (a tone Seinfeld makes perfectly obvious through his exaggerated pronunciation), and the use of the colloquial and friendly “okay” also contributes to this personal touch. Seinfeld explains how a driver can’t help but to interpret the sign as being more like a piece of advice they could take or leave. Similar, he says, would be signs like “U-turn: enjoy it” and “Right turn: why not?” Seinfeld is making clear that the humour of the example lies with the fact that a driver’s initial response to such as sign is to take it as an instruction; in other words, the driver’s collateral experience tells them that the object of the sign is an instruction. Towards a Classification of Social Media Signs It is fair to say that how one is perceived online is influenced by the content they curate. For example, Storsul cites the following comment from a teenager: “On Facebook, you judge each other’s lives. That’s what you do. I look at pictures, how they are, and I look at interests if we share some interests. If you visit my profile you can find out everything about me” (24). In her discussion of interest tokens, Good makes clear how content online means more than what the content itself is about—it’s also used to portray a person’s cultural aspirations, social capital, and even sexual desire. Similarly, Barash et al. identifies the importance to a user’s social media post of their image projected, noting how these are typically characterised according to scales such as cool–uncool, entertaining–boring, and uplifting–depressing (209). Peirce’s tripartite structure of the Sign is a useful tool for comprehending the relationship between users and content. Consider the following hypothetical example, indicative of a typical example of curated content: a poster publishing on Facebook their holiday photos, together with a brief introductory comment. Using Peirce, this is an individual act of semiosis that can be analysed according to the following general structure: the Sign is made up of the images and the poster’s text; the Object is the poster herself; and the Interpretant is the resulting thought(s) of another user looking at this Sign. The curated content is a Sign of the poster no matter what, and that is because the poster has published this content themselves and it is literally attributed to them, through their name and profile image. But of course the meaningfulness created from this structure also depends on the user’s collateral experience of the poster. The poster of curated content is always present as the Object of the Sign and, insofar as this presence is based on their publication (and/or republication) of content to the platform, the Sign–Object relation is principally indexical. However, and as will become apparent below, there is scope in the structure of meaning for this physical “presence” of the poster to appear otherwise. The poster’s indexical presence is ostensibly more complex as they can also be absently present—for example, if they post without commenting, or simply “Listen to…” or share content. More complex still is how a share involves a different kind of presence to posting and “liking.” It is reasonable to say that each kind of presence has a different effect on the meaningfulness of the Sign. Also, consider the effect of the poster’s comment, should they choose to leave one. Based on Peirce’s phenomenology, a poster could write a comment that makes some conceptual claim (Thirdness); or that simply points to the content, similar to the function of a demonstrative pronoun (Secondness); or that is designed to excite sensations in the mind (Firstness)—for example, poetic text in the manner of a haiku. Analysing another hypothetical example will help clarify the semiotic mixes potential to content curation. Imagine a close-up image of a steak, posted in Facebook. Accompanying the image is the linguistic text “Lunch with the work crew.” The Sign is the image plus the text; the Object is the poster (in this case, “Clinton”); and the Interpretant is the idea created in the mind of the user, scrolling the feed of content on their home page, who perceives this Sign. The most obvious and salient way this Sign works is as a statement of actual fact; that is, the comment states an activity and, in terms of its relation to the image, only has a “pointing” function and provides information about its Object of actual fact only. From Peirce, this class of Sign is (IV), a Dicent Indexical Sinsign. There is also the potential, however, for this particular Sign to motivate a more conceptual or generalised interpretation of the poster. The use of slang in the text would resonate with a certain group and result in a more generalised interpretation of Clinton—for example, “Just smashed this steak after some fun runners down south.” In this text, a certain group would understand “runners” as waves at the beach, and therefore this Sign is representative of its Object as a surfer, and, more complex still, perhaps as a privileged surfer since Clinton clearly enjoys surfing on a weekday—in other words, he’s not a “weekend warrior.” From Peirce, this class of Sign is (X), an Argument Symbolic Legisign. But another user may interpret this Sign in a slightly less complex way, equally valid and important. Perhaps they don’t “get” the surfing slang in Clinton’s comment, but they understand a surfing reference has been made nonetheless. In this case a user might interpret the Sign in the following way: “He’s making some comment about surfing, but I don’t understand it.” From Peirce, this class of Sign is (VII), a Dicent Indexical Legisign. But what if Clinton simply posted this image of the steak with no text? In this case the user interpreting the Sign is directed to the Object (“Clinton”: the profile that posted the content), but the Sign does not describe anything about the Object. Instead, “The sign deals with possible evidence that some relations have been connected, and thus indicates some previous state of affairs” (Chuang and Huang 347). From Peirce, this class of Sign is (III), a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. As a final example (which by no means concludes the analysis of this Sign), what if Clinton posted this image by way of a like only? The effect of the like is to determine the poster as less “present” than they would be had they only posted the content, or shared it, or left a comment on it. Despite the fact that the like still shows the poster as curator—and, ostensibly, publisher—of the content, determining their indexical presence, the like also allows for an iconic Sign–Object relation. As was mentioned earlier, “Nothing in itself is icon, index or symbol” (Deledalle 20). Given the poster’s iconic representation by the Sign, the poster is interpreted as a possible Object. What happens is that the qualities of the content would be interpreted to resemble some possibility of a person/Object. The user has a vague sense of somebody, but that somebody is present more as a pattern, diagram, or scheme. From Peirce, this class of Sign is (II), a Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. Conclusion This paper aims to identify and describe the structure of meaning underlying the proposition, “We are what we curate online.” Using Peirce’s tripartite Sign, it is clear that the content a user curates is representative of them; in terms of the different ways users engage with content, it is possible to begin to classify curated content into different kinds of Signs. What needs to be emphasised, and what becomes apparent from the preliminary classification undertaken here, is that another user’s interpretation of these Signs—and any Signs, for that matter—depends on the knowledge they bring to semiosis. Finally, while this paper has chosen deliberately to engage with the structure of meaning underpinning an individual act of curation and has made inroads into a classification of Signs produced from this structure, further semiotic research could take into consideration the conditions under which the Signs are created, in terms of software’s role influencing the creation of Signs and a user’s collateral knowledge. Appendix Given the breadth of Peirce’s work and the multiple and often varied definitions of his concepts, it is reasonable to consult a respected secondary synthesis of Peirce’s semiotic. The following tables are from Deledalle (19). Table 1: The Three Trichotomies of Signs 1 2 3 Representamen Object Interpretant Qualisign Icon Rhema Sinsign Index Dicisign Legisign Symbol Argument Table 2: The 10 Classes of Sign “All expressions such as R1, O2, I3, should be read according to Peirce in the following way: a Representamen ‘which is’ a First, an Object ‘which is’ a Second, an Interpretant ‘which is’ a Third (8.353)” (Deledalle 19). R O I I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X R1 R2 R2 R2 R3 R3 R3 R3 R3 R3 O1 O1 O2 02 01 02 02 03 03 03 I1 I1 I1 I2 I1 I1 I2 I1 I2 I3 Rhematic Iconic Qualisign Rhematic Iconic Sinsign Rhematic Indexical Sinsign Dicent Indexical Sinsign Rhematic Iconic Legisign Rhematic Indexical Legisign Dicent Indexical Legisign Rhematic Symbolic Legisign Dicent Symbolic Legisign Argument Symbolic Legisign References Barash, Vladamir, Nicolas Ducheneaut, Ellen Isaacs, and Victoria Bellotti. “Faceplant: Impression (Mis)management in Facebook Status Updates.” Proceedings of the Fourth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media. May 2015 ‹http://www.aaai.org/›. Chowdhry, Amit. “Facebook Changes Newsfeed Algorithm to Prioritise Content from Friends Over Pages.” Forbes 23 Mar. 2015. 18 June 2015 ‹http://www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/2015/04/23/facebook-changes-news-feed-algorithm-to-prioritize-content-from-friends-over-pages/›. Chuang, Tyng-Ruey, and Andrea Wei-Ching Huang. “Social Tagging, Online Communication, and Peircian Semiotics: A Conceptual Framework.” Journal of Information Science 35.3 (2009): 340–357. Culler, Jonathan. The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction. London: Routledge, 1981. Dawkins, Roger. “The Problem of a Material Element in the Sign: Deleuze, Metz, Peirce.” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. 8.3 (2003): 155–67. Dillet, Benoit. “What Is Called Thinking?: When Deleuze Walks along Heideggerian Paths.” Deleuze Studies 7.2 (2013): 250–74. Deledalle, Gerard. Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana, 2000. Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. 1985. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989. ———. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. NY: Columbia UP, 1995. Doster, Leigh. “Millenial Teens Design and Redesign Themselves in Online Social Networks.” Journal of Consumer Behaviour 12 (2013): 267–79. Goldenberg, Max. Once Upon a Time Seinfeld Was a Little Boy. 19 Mar. 2007. Web video. 5 Apr. 2015 ‹https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYJxcFaRpMU›. Good, Katie Day. “From Scrapbook to Facebook: A History of Personal Media Assemblages and Archives.” New Media & Society 15.4 (2012): 559–73. Langlois, Ganaele. Meaning in the Age of Social Media. NY: Palgrave, 2014. Lomborg, Stine. “'Meaning' in Social Media.” Social Media + Society 1.1 (Apr.–June 2015): 1–2. Meeker, Mary. “Internet Trends 2015 – Code Conference.” 2015. 10 Jun. 2015 ‹http://www.slideshare.net/kleinerperkins/internet-trends-v1›. Metro-Rowland, Michelle. “Interpreting Meaning: An Application of Peircian Semiotics to Tourism.” Tourism Geographies: An International Journal of Tourism Space, Place and Environment 11.2 (2009): 270–79. Orkibi, Eithan. “‘New Politics,’ New Media – New Political Language? A Rhetorical Perspective on Candidates’ Self-Presentation in Electronic Campaigns in the 2013 Israel Elections.” Israeli Affairs 21.2 (2015): 277–92. Peirce, Charles Sanders. Collected Papers. Eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Vols. 1–6. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1932. Storsul, Tanja. “Deliberation or Self-Presentation: Young People, Politics and Social Media.” Nordicom Review 35.2 (2014): 17–28.

Le problème que cette thèse se propose d’aborder est celui d’un décalage entre la philosophie du cinéma de Gilles Deleuze et la condition de l’image cinématographique contemporaine, qui, depuis l’analyse de Deleuze, a été radicalement modifiée par le numérique. Mon argument principal est qu’une relation productive entre cette philosophie et les cultures contemporaines de l’écran est en effet possible et potentiellement très utile, à condition que nous puissions relire et étendre certains concepts-clés de la pensée deleuzienne. Dans ce contexte, à partir d'un concept utilisé dans Cinéma II : l’image-temps (1985), je soutiens que les images numériques peuvent engendrer des relations uniques avec un « dehors » - une présence non articulée au-delà du cadre, qui sert à fonder et à problématiser la pensée. Le « dehors » - développé à partir de la philosophie littéraire de Maurice Blanchot - constitue une condition génétique de la pensée, selon laquelle le penseur est confronté à ce qui est fondamentalement impensé, un terrain inconnu auquel la pensée doit répondre par des solutions novatrices et créatives. Je soutiens que ce modèle de pensée nous éloigne des habitudes et des orthodoxies, nous obligeant à nous ouvrir radicalement à la contingence et au changement - un mouvement à la mesure, de ce que je qualifierais, d’orientation politique fondamentale de la philosophie de Deleuze
The problem this thesis intends to address is that of a certain disconnect between the cinematic philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and the condition of the contemporary moving-image, which, in the years since Deleuze wrote on film, has been radically altered by its transformation into digital format(s). It is my central contention that a productive relationship between this philosophy and contemporary screen cultures is indeed possible, and potentially of great value, provided we can reread and extend certain key Deleuzian concepts.Pursuant to this goal, drawing on a concept deployed throughout Deleuze’s Cinema II: The Time-Image (1985), I argue that digital images can engender certain unique relations with an “outside” –an unarticulated presence beyond the frame, which serves to unground and problematise thought. The “outside” –developed from the literary philosophy of Maurice Blanchot– constitutes a genetic condition of thought, which sees the thinker confronted with that which is fundamentally un-thought, an unrecognisable terrain to which she must respond with creative, novel solutions. This model of thought, I argue, impels us away from habitudes and orthodoxies, forcing us to become radically open to contingency and change –a movement commensurate with what I will claim is the fundamental political orientation of Deleuze’s philosophy

Dans cette thèse située aux frontières de la philosophie, de l'esthétique et de la théorie du cinéma, nous revenons sur une notion-de de l’œuvre deleuzienne : « I'image de la pensée », qui désigne l'ensemble des présupposés subjectifs, non fondés philosophiquement, à partir desquels la philosophie désigne ce que signifie penser. Nous cherchons en particulier à mettre au jour les rapports qui lient l'image de la pensée au concept d'image et à l'image cinématographique, dans une approche critique. C'est ainsi que pour Deleuze, la pensée du cinéma contribue à la naissance d'une nouvelle image de la pensée qui réévalue notamment les rapports entre matière et pensée. Dans cette perspective, nous avons étudié comment l'image cinématographique contredit le schéma hylémorphique aristotélicien et offre une place de choix à la notion de plasmaticité, qui, à son tour permet de dégager une fonction métaphysique du cinéma à travers ce que nous avons appelé la « matière-monde».

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’étudier le cinéma américain indépendant du point de vue de la différence qu’il instaure avec le cinéma hollywoodien, comme une ligne de fuite qui le déterritorialise tout en créant pour lui-même des formes nouvelles d’expression et de contenu. Cela suppose de considérer ses rapports avec le cinéma hollywoodien comme rapports entre deux plans d’immanence surgis au même niveau d’individuation à l’intérieur d’un plan d’immanence plus large, celui du cinéma nord-américain. Et, en même temps, il suppose de considérer la différence entre ces sous-plans dans ce qu’elle implique pour une pensée en cinéma, à savoir en blocs d’images-mouvement et d’images-durée, qui se trouve en face des tensions particulières qui caractérisent la société américaine. Dans cet esprit, la distinction principale qu’il faut considérer est celle qui passe entre : d’une part, le cinéma hollywoodien et ses différentes façons (genres, récit organico-actif) de « sauver » la différence, en la représentant ; et de la représenter en la rapportant aux exigences d’une seule grande forme en affinité directe avec ce que je définis comme rêve de continuité et de cohérence de la société américaine ; et, d’autre part, le cinéma indépendant et ses différentes façons de témoigner d’un fond rebelle qui déterritorialise le sens prédéterminé vers lequel les actions et les situations du cinéma hollywoodien convergent. Ce qui se trouve au-delà ou en-deçà de la représentation organique-hollywoodienne et que le cinéma indépendant arrache à cette dernière est un espace de distribution errante, intensive, entre forces et rapports de forces
The objective of this thesis is to study the American independent cinema from the point of view of the difference which it founds with the Hollywood cinema, as a line of flight which deteritorialises the latter, while creating for itself new forms of expression and content. That supposes to consider its relation with the Hollywood cinema as one between two plans of immanence emerged on the same level of individuation inside a broader plan of immanence, that of the North-American cinema. And, at the same time, it supposes to consider the difference between these under-plans in what it implies for a cinema-thought, namely a thought in terms of blocks of movement-images and time-images, facing the particular tensions which characterize the American society. Within this framework, the principal distinction that should be considered is that which passes between: on the one hand, the Hollywood cinema and its various ways (genres, organico-active régime) “of saving” the difference, by representing it; and of representing it by bringing it back to the requirements of only one great form in direct affinity with what I define as a dream of continuity and of coherence of American society; and, on the other hand, the independent cinema and its various ways of testifying to a rebellious core which deteritorialises the predetermined direction towards which the actions and the situations of the Hollywood cinema converge. What is beyond or below Hollywood organic representation and that the independent cinema tears off from the latter is a space of wandering and intensive distribution between forces of power and forces of resistance

Cette thèse étudie les représentations littéraires et filmiques des évolutions sociétales dues à l’introduction des réseaux et de la flexibilité dans nos modes de vie contemporains. Mon approche s’attache à décrire la façon dont le rhizome Deleuzien peut être conçu comme un concept qui problématise la représentation de cette évolution. En effet, le rhizome est un concept qui définit l’espace discursif comme un lieu de connections et d’interconnections, donc comme un réseau. Pour Deleuze et Guattari, cette manière d’identifier le discours participe à une critique des catégories qui organisent le savoir et permet de mettre en évidence le caractère centripète et non-linéaire des structures qui régissent la création de sens, ce qui me permet de m’attacher à la description de nouvelles formes de représentations, de communication et de signification qui trouvent leur particularité dans leur nature polymorphe et leurs mutations constantes.Cet état de chose permet d’ouvrir le potentiel de créativité des arts et des agents d’innovations économiques et sociales. Néanmoins au XXIème siècle, le capitalisme fonctionne de plus en plus comme un rhizome, c’est à dire comme une structure polymorphe et en mutation constante, ce qui oblige donc de plus en plus les individus à s’adapter en permanence pour appartenir à ce nouveau monde flexible. Cette adaptation perpétuelle crée un malaise mis en évidence par le concept d’« insupportable flexibilité de l’être » (nommé de cette façon par l’auteure de cette thèse en hommage à Milan Kundera). Cette thèse analyse la manière dont cette flexibilité forcée de la société est représentée en cinéma et en littérature dans le travail de Jean-Echenoz, Jean-Philippe Toussaint, Michel Houellebecq, Marie Redonnet et Eric Chevillard, et dans les films de Leos Carax, Laurent Cantet, Nicolas Klotz, Noémie Lvovsky, Jean-Marc Moutout et Cédric Klapisch
This dissertation studies representations – in contemporary French and Francophone literary fiction and feature films – of the developing condition associated with global markets and networking technology; a condition that the word “flexibility” aptly summarizes. My approach to this issue draws on the “rhizome” concept proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari – that is, on the idea of a discursive space in which everything is connected and which therefore functions like a network. As the Deleuze and Guattari critique of categorization highlighted the non-linear and non-centrifugal nature of the structures governing the creation of meaning, it can also help us study new forms of representation, communication and signification which are by essence both polymorphic and in constant mutation. This state of affairs supposedly gives more room to creativity and innovation; it can be argued, nevertheless, that in the 21st century, capitalism itself behaves more and more like a rhizome, that is to say an ever-changing and polymorphic structure, which forces human beings to constantly adapt in order to fit into this world, thereby becoming more flexible. We have only begun to take stock of this ongoing process of enforced flexibility, and of the suffering that may result from it for the ever-adapting humanity that we have become. My dissertation calls this anguish or unease courtesy of Milan Kundera – “the unbearable flexibility of being.” This research aims at studying this anguish in French Contemporary Literature and Films in works of literature by Jean Echenoz, Jean-Philippe Toussaint, Michel Houellebecq, Marie Redonnet and Eric Chevillard and in films by directors such as Leos Carax, Laurent Cantet, Nicolas Klotz, Noémie Lvovsky, Jean-Marc Moutout and Cédric Klapisch

En quel sens les livres que Deleuze a écrits sur le cinéma sont-ils des livres de philosophie ? Dans une démarche généalogique, notre travail montre comment Deleuze « capture » de façons différentes les œuvres de quatre philosophes – Kant, Bergson, Peirce, Spinoza – afin de lui permettre d’avancer dans sa propre philosophie. A partir d’une rencontre avec le cinéma dans son ensemble, Deleuze prolonge sa réflexion sur l’empirisme transcendantal, reconsidère la question de l’image et des signes, revisite secrètement l’éthique de Spinoza afin de nous proposer une nouvelle éthique, qui ne répond plus à la question « Que peut un corps ? » mais à sa généralisation « Que peut une image ? ». Suivant la figure d’un spinozisme post-kantien que nous identifions chez Deleuze, le temps comme affect de soi par soi chez Kant équivaut aux auto-affections du second genre de connaissance chez Spinoza : le temps devient le lieu où se déploie la vie spirituelle dans l’attribut de la pensée. A la fois genèse de la sensibilité, cosmogonie, sémiotique et éthique, L’Image-mouvement et L’Image-temps construisent une génétique des puissances de l’image dont les œuvres singulières des cinéastes sont à la fois les jalons et les pierres de touche : la rencontre avec ces œuvres permet à la philosophie de Deleuze de subir l’épreuve du réel et de la faire bifurquer au gré des rencontres avec les pensées des cinéastes. Deleuze se sert du cinéma, qui devient la vérification expérimentale de sa philosophie, cependant que le cinéma « capture » Deleuze, et l’amène à tracer des cheminements de pensée inédits. Dans cette parade amoureuse, Deleuze est la guêpe, le cinéma l’orchidée
To what extent are the books written by Deleuze about cinéma philosophy books ? Following a genealogical reasoning, our study shows how Deleuze “captures” in different ways the works of four philosophers – Kant, Bergson, Peirce, Spinoza – in order to get ahead in his own philosophy. From his encounter with cinema as a whole, Deleuze continues his reflection about transcendental empiricism, reconsidering the issue of image ands signs and secretly revisiting Spinoza’s ethics to offer a new system of ethics which no longer answers the question “What can a body live ?” but its generalization “what can an image live ?” Following the figure of a post-kantian spinozism that we have identified in Deleuze’s work, time as an affect of the self by the self in Kant’s philosophy can be equated with the self-affections of the second kind of knowledge in Spinoza’s work : time becomes the place where spiritual life can spread in the attribute of thought. Being at the same time a genesis of sensitivity, a cosmogony, semiotics and ethics, The Movement-image and The Time-image constitute a system of genetics of image powers of which film-makers singular creations are both the landmarks and the touchstones : Deleuze’s encounter with these movies allows his philosophy to undergo the test of the real and to make it change its course each time he meets a film-maker’s thinking. Deleuze uses cinema which becomes the experimental checking of his philosophy where as cinema “captures” Deleuze and leads him to open up new ways of thinking. In this mating display, Deleuze is the wasp and cinema is the orchid

Notre thèse propose une vision d’ensemble de l’oeuvre d’Hong Sang-soo, à partir du postulat qu’ilexiste une affinité particulière entre les images de cinéma et la pensée. Ce postulat s’accorde au projet d’Hong Sang-sooqui cherche par ses films à modifier les habitudes de penser et à lutter contre les illusions.Nous organisons notre parcours autour du problème de la « croyance », qui renvoie chez Gilles Deleuze à lapossibilité pour l’homme de se relier au monde après une rupture de l’unité, et nous permet d’articuler l’analyse desimages, une approche philosophique et l’existence des personnages. En étudiant la construction des récits et à l’usage decertains procédés formels comme la répétition ou des effets de dédoublement, notre travail met en évidence la façondont l’oeuvre produit l’image d’un monde discontinu et des conceptions de la mort, du temps, de l’identité, du possibleet de la réalité propres à Hong Sang-soo. Une dramaturgie souterraine émerge de nos analyses : un conflit d’ « imagesde pensée », une tension entre continuité et discontinuité qui se joue à la fois à l’intérieur des films, dans l’existence despersonnages, et entre les films et un spectateur.En construisant une lecture cohérente du cinéma d’Hong Sang-soo, nous voulons souligner sa dimension critique. Alors que la critique le réduit trop souvent au thème des relations sentimentales, nous montrons que tout ce qui se jouesur le terrain sentimental implique un enjeu mental. Nous voulons également souligner le fait que le cinéma d’HongSang-soo, à partir d’une perte des croyances traditionnelles, porte en lui une issue positive, la mise en jeu de nouvellescapacités et l’affirmation de nouvelles valeurs (la différence contre la ressemblance, l’instant contre le prolongement, lanouveauté contre la reproduction, etc.), et fait lui-même appel à une perspective évaluatrice
Our thesis proposes a comprehensive view of Hong Sang-soo’s work, from the assumption that thereis a special affinity between cinema images and thought. This assumption agrees with Hong Sang-soo’s project, whichis to modify habits of thoughts and to struggle against illusions through movies.We build our run around the problem of « belief », which refer according to Gilles Deleuze to the possibility forman to connect himself again to the world after a breaking of unity, and allows us to articulate image analysis,philosophical approach and the characters existences. By studying narrative structures and the use of some formalprocesses such as repetition or undoubling effects, we highlight the production of a discontinuous world by the imagesand conceptions of death, time, identity, possible and reality that are specific to Hong Sang-soo. An hidden plot emergesfrom our analysis : a conflict between « images of thought », a tension between continuity and discontinuity that takesplace both inside movies, within the characters existences, and between movies and a spectator.By building a coherent lecture of Hong Sang-soo’s cinema, we want to emphasize his critical implications. Whencritical reception too often confines him to the topic of sentimental relationships, we show that everything that takesplace on the sentimental field involves a mental stake. We also mean to underline that Hong Sang-soo’s cinema, fromthe loss of traditional beliefs, bears within himself a positive outcome, bringing into play new capacities and anaffirmation of new values (difference againt resemblance, instant against prolongation, novelty against reproduction,etc.), and appeals to an evaluative perspective

"Deleuze affirme que les deux ouvrages qu'il consacre au cinéma - L'Image-mouvement (1983) et L'Image-temps (1985) - "sont des livres de philosophie". Partant de cette déclaration, il s'agissait de replacer l'essai sur l'art des images animées au sein de l'économie générale de l'oeuvre deleuzienne. L'hypothèse centrale a consisté à poser l'importance de la "doctrines des facultés" que l'auteur met en place dès Différence et répétition (1968), dans une confrontation avec la philosophie critique de Kant. La délicate question du passage de l'image-mouvement à l'image-temps a notamment été abordée au regard de cette hypothèse, une attention particulière ayant été portée au "cinéma de voyant" qui apparaît dans l'intervalle des deux volumes, et qui renvoie formellement aux exigences de cette doctrine des facultés. Celle-ci a également permis d'approfondir les modalités de la disjonction du visuel et de la parole que Deleuze explore dans le cinéma contemporain. "
Deleuze asserts that is two books on cinema - The Movement-Image (1983) and The Time-Image (1985) are "philosophy books". This statement is the starting point of our analysis which tries to replace this essay onmoving images within the general process and work of Deleuze. The main assumption is to insist on the importance of the "doctrine of the faculties" the author analyses since 1968 first with Difference and Repetition in a confrontation with Kant's critical philosophy. The awkward question underlining the link between the "movement-image" and the "time-image" is adressed through this assumption with a specific focus on the idea of "sighted cinema" developped by Deleuze in the interspace of the two volumes, and which formally refers to the particularities of this "doctrine of the faculties". This same doctrine mainly enables to go into the modalities of the disjunction among the visual and the word, which are investigated by Deleuze through contemporary cinema

Notre travail de thèse a pour but de dégager le caractère essentiel de l’image dans la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze. Il est vrai qu’il est le premier philosophe à considérer le mouvement des images comme la base de la pensée. Il a en effet écrit plusieurs livres au sujet de l’image. Pour lui, elle ressemble au mouvement de la pensée et des idées et, à ce titre, elle est un moyen d’expression et une manière d’exister, de sorte qu’elle est substantielle pour exprimer la philosophie. L’image permet à la pensée de devenir un processus permettant de faciliter le raisonnement du penseur, de comprendre son acte, désirer la vie et former le sensible. C’est pourquoi Deleuze ne limite pas sa théorie de l’image à l’image cinématographique, mais l’étend à toutes les images de la pensée. Cette dimension longtemps négligée, commence à intéresser davantage la recherche sur la philosophie de Deleuze. En effet, l’image permet d’inventer le monde actuel et virtuel de la pensée, ainsi que le monde possible et réel de l’existence, de sorte qu’elle en même temps politique, ontologique et existentielle. L’image nous invite à entrer dans est une nouvelle sensibilité et une nouvelle composition des rapports de pensées. L’éthique de l’image considère les idées comme un tout qui s’étend et se différencie, qui s’accélère en mouvement et se ralentit en repos. Elle donne leur unité ultime et absolue aux activités esthétiques singulières. C’est ainsi que l’éthique de l’image crée une nouvelle image qui est esthétique, stylistique et transcendantale par hétérogénéité, discontinuité et insensibilité. Le style de l’image esthétique précise cette nouvelle image comme une nouvelle forme de la pensée et la définit par des éléments constitutifs, des expressions et des contenus
Our thesis work aims to identify the essential character of the image in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. It is true that he is the first philosopher to consider the movement of images as the basis of thought. He has indeed written several books about the image. To him, it resembles the movement of thought and ideas and, as such, it is a means of expression and a way of existing, so it is substantial in expressing philosophy. The image allows thought to become a process to facilitate the thinker's reasoning, to understand his act, to desire life and to form the sensible. This is why Deleuze does not limit his theory of the image to the image of cinema, but extends it to all images of thought. This long neglected dimension is beginning to interest more in research on the philosophy of Deleuze. Indeed, the image makes it possible to invent the actual and virtual world of thought, and the possible and real world of existence, so that it is political, ontological and existential. The image invites us to enter into a new sensitivity and a new composition of the relationships of thoughts. The ethics of the image consists of a totality of ideas which expands and differs into everything, which accelerates in movement and slows down in rest. It constitutes its ultimate and absolute unity in a singular way of aesthetic activities. This is how the ethics of image creates a new image that is aesthetic, stylistic and transcendent in its heterogeneities, discontinuities, insensibility. The aesthetic style image specifies this new image as a new form of thought and defines it by constituent elements, expressions and contents

Les deux ouvrages consacrés au cinéma, l’Image-mouvement et l’Image-temps de Deleuze, constituent un texte philosophique complexe qui, d’un côté « problématise » le cinéma en tant que régime spécifique de l’image, et d’un autre « met en scène » la confrontation du cinéma et de la pensée philosophique. Mais cette problématisation et la mise en scène révèlent la rupture formant la confrontation « politique » entre le cinéma et la philosophie, et constituant notre problématique principale. Nous abordons ce problème par trois paradoxes de sa théorie (qui constituent trois des aspects essentiels du montage), à savoir la représentation, l’obtusité et la politique, en analysant les manières différentes de monter
The two works devoted to the cinema, Movement-Image and Time-Image of Deleuze, constitute a philosophical text complexes which, on a side "problématise" the cinema as a specific mode of the image, and another "met en scene" the confrontation of the cinema and the philosophical thought. But this problematization and the mise en scene reveal the rupture forming "political" confrontation between the cinema and the philosophy, and constituting our principal problems. We approach this problem by three paradoxes of his theory (which constitute three of the essential aspects of montage), namely the representation, the obtusity and the politic, by analyzing the different manners of montage

Ce travail parie sur la possibilité de reposer les problèmes éducatifs de Rous-seau à la lumière de certains concepts de la philosophie française contempo-raine. Ainsi, en partant des analyses de Foucault, l’on ne peut manquer d’être frappé par la figure du gouverneur dans Émile ou de l’éducation qui apparaît, stricto sensu, comme la condition de l’émergence de la vérité de la nature, de la vérité de ce qui convient aux hommes, de la vérité de ce que doit être leur éducation. Mais en quel sens peut-on dire que, dans l’Émile, l’éducation est une manifestation de la vérité ? Le problème de la vérité et du pouvoir est an-cien. Michel Foucault le qualifie de lieu commun depuis la pensée politique du XVIIe siècle. Dans ses cours au Collège de France publiés en 2012 sous le titre Le gouvernement des vivants, il s’est efforcé « d’élaborer la notion de gouvernement par la vérité » en étudiant notamment la tragédie d’Œdipe qui lui permet de poser le problème de la conjonction entre le pouvoir et le savoir, entre le gouvernement et la vérité que l’on sait. Le problème du gouvernement de l’enfance peut également être éclairé par le concept deleuzien de devenir. Le devenir a quelque chose à nous dire sur l’enfance, sur l’émancipation de l’individu et sur le projet d’une éducation tout au long de sa vie
This work is attempt to discuss Rousseau's problematisation of education, using concepts drawn from contem-porary French philosophy. However, if one examines the relation between Foucault and Emile by em-ploying the concept of alèthurgie, one cannot but be struck by the figure of the governor in Emile, who appears in the text to be the guarantor and the condition for the emergence of an idea of truth within the narrative- a truth which is natural, which governs the activities of men, and which is deeply in-volved in the process of education. In his 2012 lectures at the College de France, published under the title ‘The government of the living,’ Michel Fou-cault strove "to develop the concept of government by the truth" through an analysis of the power relations within Oedipus. In particular, Foucault ana-lysed the relation between truth, knowledge, and the exercise of governmen-tal power. In this work, I examine the relation between Foucault’s analysis and Emile Rousseau’s novel Emile. The relation between them may seem paradoxical: after all, Foucault is concerned with truth, and Emile is a work of fiction. The government of childhood can also be illuminated by the Deleuzian concept of Becoming. The Becoming does have something to tell us about childhood, the emancipation of the individual, and about education as a life-long project