Articoli di riviste sul tema "Deleuze (1925-1995)"

Propõe-se abordar Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) como filósofo trabalhador, operário dos conceitos. Afirma-se a filosofia como atividade produtiva no contexto capitalista, o que implica a militância do filósofo. Esta luta se faz pela análise da atividade filosófica, como meio de interferência nos processos de produção social, acompanhada pela clínica do trabalho filosófico, como desvio desenvolvido a partir das rupturas analíticas. Discute-se a composição do coletivo de trabalho e a sustentação do gênero de atividade em filosofia por Deleuze. A intercessão com a atividade docente se coloca como crucial. Apresentam-se situações concretas tratadas por Deleuze em sua filosofia: droga, literatura, loucura.

A partir dos escritos de Gilles Deleuze (1925 – 1995) e Félix Guattari (1930 – 1992), entou-se apresentar alguns deslocamentos entre a filosofia or eles proposta de maneira a pensarmos acerca de algumas práticas escolares. Antes mesmo da escolha destes autores, partiu-se da hipótese inicial de que houvesse, talvez um certo excesso de conhecimentos científicos no currículo em detrimento das artes e filosofias. Deste modo, buscou-se nestes autores uma base para enriquecer ainda mais nossa compreensão e tal qual, ampliarmos as discussões conceituais acerca das ciências, artes e filosofias. Através destes autores, percebeu-se que tais saberes em sua dimensão menor possuem caráter próprio e criador, coexistindo para fora de hierarquias. Com isto, acreditamos na possibilidade de conteúdos curriculares criadores que possam ensejar a produção contínua destas dimensões do pensamento e integrá-las ainda mais à atualidade. Para melhor explorar estas dimensões, tentou-se deslocar o conceito de rizoma e as múltiplas perspectivas que o envolvem, de maneira a rizomatizar, não apenas as ciências no currículo, mas em igual medida, as artes e as filosofias.

Este artículo interroga por la fina y precisa relación entre Arte y Política al interior del pensamiento del filósofo francés Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). Se intenta mostrar cómo Deleuze, en parte siguiendo el trabajo inacabado y juvenil de Nietzsche, quiere realizar una filosofía política desde una lógica de la sensación. Y no como los hegelianos o marxianos o marxistas, etc. que siempre han pensado lo político desde una lógica negativa de la dialéctica histórica. El plan de Deleuze, fundamentalmente en su última etapa, en su trabajo en torno al arte, en general, y, en especial, con la pintura versa desde una lógica de la sensación. Y es desde esta lógica dónde se da el lugar que expresa lo político.

O objetivo deste artigo é delimitar e restituir, de modo sistemático, os eixos argumentativos decisivos que permitem conceder um grau de coerência interna à célebre interpretação expressiva de Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) acerca da filosofia de Espinosa. Trata-se, inicialmente, de examinar o quanto a leitura deleuziana de Espinosa retrata um momento peculiar e único das relações que Deleuze, ao longo de pelo menos três décadas, estabeleceu com a história da filosofia. Em seguida, pretendemos demonstrar a partir de quais ordenamentos conceituais – construídos de maneira não-hierárquica, segundo Deleuze – a tese de uma necessidade prática intrínseca ao processo de constituição ontológica na Ética de Espinosa é sustentada dentro do viés de uma filosofia da diferença.

O presente artigo propõe uma leitura crítica do livro Escuro (2014), de Ana Luísa Amaral, a partir da perspetiva filosófica da noção de rizoma proposta por Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) e Pierre-Félix Guattari (1930-1992). Neste sentido, as multiplicidades cruzadas pela diferença do pensamento num jogo permanente e dicotómico presente em Escuro possibilitam a horizontalidade da poesia que se movimenta na força da delicadeza subterrânea do rizoma que se multiplica diferencialmente. Pela arquitetura corporalizada na multilinearidade de diferentes rotas de leitura, Escuro é perspetivado a partir da análise dicotómica e rizomática que enforma a rede conceptual deleuze-guattariana.

Pensar a utilização do cinema na sala de aula infere maiores reflexões sobre como aproveitar construtivamente esse instrumento sem deixar que ela caia na banalidade. Optamos pelo filósofo francês Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) e pelo diretor cinematográfico também francês Alain Resnais (1922) como mediadores do diálogo entre Educação e Cinema, por consideramos os conceitos desenvolvidos por ambos como pressupostos destacáveis para reflexões interdisciplinares por parte do professor consciente da importância das interfaces do conhecimento no desenvolvimento de suas aulas. Exporemos alguns conceitos desenvolvidos por Deleuze no tocante ao cinema pensante como produção filosófica, e aplicaremos a leitura de Deleuze, pautada pelo diálogo interdisciplinar entre educação, arte e filosofia, ao curta metragem Toda a Memória do Mundo (1956), de Alain Resnais, por entendermos essa obra como exemplo temático e estético para um trabalho com alunos em sala de aula.

Este texto busca visualizar configurações espaciais e temporais que subvertam estruturas lineares e dicotômicas através de formas de ocupação do espaço construídas na multiplicidade. Tal visualização incidirá a partir das obras do artista plástico Murits Escher (1898-1972) com aproximações de alguns conceitos trabalhados por Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). Considera-se que o encontro desses referenciais provindos da Arte e da Filosofia contribuem para a tessitura de percursos para a problematização de outros modos de subjetivação. A obra de Escher é um questionar sobre a realidade através dos seus próprios elementos configurados de formas surpreendentes e inconcebíveis, uma vez que desarticulam o estabelecido.

O artigo em questão almeja apresentar um breve panorama dos movimentos de difusão e apropriação do pensamento de Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) no campo das pesquisas em Educação, levando em consideração tanto sua obra individual quanto aquela escrita em parceria com Félix Guattari (1930-1992), contextualizando os distintos momentos do processo de recepção do pensamento desses autores e considerando unicamente as suas décadas iniciais (1980-2000). Para tanto, procedemos com a análise de um extenso arquivo bibliográfico compilado ao longo de nossa pesquisa de mestrado e doutorado, levando em consideração o início da recepção desses autores na década de 1980, integrando o grupo de teóricos ‘pós’ – pós-crítico, pós-estruturalista ou pós-modernos –, até a autonomização das pesquisas deleuzianas e/ou deleuzo-guattarianas na década de 2000, quando do surgimento de uma preocupação com questões de cunho metodológico no interior desses estudos. Defendemos não ser possível compreender o modo como se deu a recepção do pensamento deleuziano, guattariano e deleuzo-guattariano no campo educacional sem levarmos em consideração certos contextos maiores, como aquele instaurado com a crise do paradigma crítico na década de 1980, e entendemos que as pesquisas em educação que se filiam ao diapasão teórico da ‘Filosofia da diferença’ adquirem proeminência e autonomia apenas quando se recusam a combater o paradigma crítico e passam a construir ferramentas metodológicas próprias.

Este trabalho pretende analisar as manifestações do conceito de “dobra”, proposto por Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) em “Le pli: Leibniz et le Baroque” (1988), no pensamento barroco e pós-moderno e em suas aplicações no campo da arte e da arquitetura. Objetiva explicitar características convergentes nestes dois momentos, abordados tanto como períodos históricos e estilísticos, quanto pensamentos com essências sobreviventes. Discute sobre a complexidade, deslocamento, repetição, subjetividade e movimento em Francesco Borromini (1599-1667) e em Peter Eisenman (n. 1932) a partir da perspectiva trans-histórica de Aby Warburg (1866-1929).

El presente artículo explora la conexión entre dos modos de pensamiento que en apariencia se ven muy distintos, estos son, las filosofías del francés Gilles Deleuze (Paris 1925- Paris 1995) y del alemán Gottfried Leibniz (Leipzig 1646- Hannover 1716). En esta conexión de filosofías se repiensa la posibilidad misma del ejercicio filosófico en la actualidad; es posible que la filosofía se mueva radicalmente en el horizonte de lo barroco y es solamente desde allí donde se da la posibilidad y agenciamiento de la filosofía como disciplina y quehacer humano, en tanto creadora de conceptos, esto es, territorios desde los cuales podemos levantar nuestras formas de vida. Y para poder entender la filosofía como barroca y creadora de conceptos es necesario analizar desde el pensamiento de Deleuze dos categorías fundamentales: pliegue y concepto. Pues desde ellas podemos entender cómo el filósofo francés se siente un fiel heredero de lo más propia de la historia de la filosofía, esto es, la filosofía encarnada por Leibniz. Y desde esta filosofía alemana se dan las herramientas para seguir creando modos nuevos e intensos de estar en la realidad creativamente.

Este artigo nasce como fruto da pesquisa “Entre experiências e compreensões: cartografias da formação de professores”, pesquisa financiada pelo CNPq, realizada nos períodos de julho de 2012 a julho de 2013. Pretende-se aqui, refletir e dissertar sobre a formação de professores a partir da filosofia da diferença, mais especificamente à partir da filosofia produzida pelo filósofo francês Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). Busca-se assim, pensar a formação de professores e os processos educativos a partir de outros olhares, na tentativa de propor outros caminhos para a trajetória da educação. Não objetiva-se aqui, instituir verdades, mas, sobretudo, objetiva-se ampliar o olhar para as infinitas possibilidades do real.

En este trabajo se analizarán las nociones de “Espacio aliento” y “Espacio cualquiera” desarrolladas por el filósofo francés Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) en Cine I: La imagen-movimiento, Cine II: La imagen-tiempo y en sus lecciones de Cine dictadas en la Universidad de Vicennes entre 1982 y 1984. La hipótesis principal es que estos espacios tienen la característica de ser pro-nominales, puesto que las personas se desintegran en ellos, perdiendo si individualidad, luego de un proceso de absorción e interacción con la atmósfera del mismo. Esta desterritorialización sería análoga a aquella del paisaje pictórico, debido a lo cual un análisis de los espacios cualesquiera y espacios-aliento es pertinente para abordar la estética deleuziana.

A memória pode ser reavivada sob distintos vieses. Ao resgatarmos uma lembrança em forma de imagem, presentificamos esta recordação, gerando uma “imagem-lembrança”, de acordo com o conceito de Henri Bergson (1859-1941), resgatado por Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) em seu estudo intitulado Bergsonismo (1987). A lembrança presentificada se encontra fortemente presente na rememoração de eventos traumáticos, suscitando uma fixação da imagem aterradora, o que ocorre no conto de E. T. A. Hoffmann (1776-1822) O Homem da Areia (1816), no qual esta lembrança se converte em um fator fantasmagórico. O presente trabalho analisa, desse modo, a forma como o princípio bersgsoniano de “imagem-lembrança”, investigado a partir da publicação deleuziana, se manifesta no texto hoffmanniano, perpassando a problemática da fantasmagoria.

Este trabalho busca articular o estudo deleuziano acerca dos atos cinematográficos (quadro, decupagem e montagem) com o filme Limite (1931) realizado por Mario Peixoto (1908-1992). A partir de sequências selecionadas, analisaremos a forma como Peixoto dirigiu o filme que é considerado o melhor do cinema nacional. Tal aproximação, entre Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) e Mario Peixoto, tem como objetivo fornecer ao filme uma nomenclatura estética capaz de justificar o que faz de Limite “uma obra-prima desconhecida”, termo utilizado pelo crítico Georges Sadoul (1904-1967). Posto isto, é importante ressaltar que, a análise está balizada tanto pelo estudo deleuziana da relação entre cinema e filosofia, como pelos escritos deixados por Peixoto a fim de dialogar diretor e filósofo em torno de uma paixão em comum, o cinema.

ResumoA emergência das sociedades de controle trouxe um novo agenciamento que reformulou as formações sociais. O objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre as novas configurações das instituições a partir da intensificação da axiomática do capital e do surgimento do diagrama de controle. Realizamos uma revisão bibliográfica sobre a obra de Gilles Deleuze e de pensadores contemporâneos. Diferenciamos as instituições abstratas e as instituições concretas para nos referir ao complexo fenômeno das instituições. Discutimos a troca do código pela axiomática do capital enquanto mecanismo predominante de operação social. Esta substituição fez que as instituições tradicionais entrassem num processo de transição a uma nova forma social que denominamos de instituições imateriais. Ao mesmo tempo em que os códigos são descodificados, são reterritorializados a partir da axiomática do capital.Palavras-chave: Análise Institucional; Esquizoanálise; Psicologia Política; Deleuze, Gilles, 1925-1995. AbstractThe emergence of societies of control has brought a new type of assemblage that is reformulating social formations. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on new institutional configurations from the point of view of the intensification of the axiomatics of capital and the emergence of the diagram of control. Through a literature review on the work of Gilles Deleuze and other contemporary thinkers, we differentiate between abstract and concrete institutions to express to the complex phenomenon of institutions. We discuss the replacement of the code by the axiomatics of capital as the predominant mechanism of social operation. This substitution has required traditional institutions to embark on a transitional process towards a new social form which we call immaterial institutions. At the same time that codes are decoded, they are reterritorialized through the axiomatics of capital. Keywords: Institutional Analysis; Schizoanalysis; Political Psychology; Deleuze, Gilles.

In the approach that sustains this entire essay, besides my own trajectory as a researcher, the path moves away from the orthodox tradition, the more Kantian one, incorporating in Social Theory a philosophical line for a long time forgotten, by including figures such as Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), the founding father, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and many others. They would be the famous authors of vitalism, also known as philosophers of life (Lebensphilosophie), philosophers of process, or philosophers of affect. What are the implications when these figures invade the field of Social Theory, which characteristics can be found and, mainly, which advantages when compared with their more orthodox side and their insistent commitment to Kantian philosophy and its transcendental by-products (power, culture, ideology, discourse, etc)? Following this and other questions, six points will be considered as representative of what we call here an Object-Oriented Social Theory (O.O.S.T.).

Se trata de los fundamentos del caos en un sentido radical, y de su convergencia entre la indagación por la música y la pregunta por el carácter de la creación en el arte como un problema de la filosofía y no solamente de la estética. Y así, la cuestión del caos se hace transversal en la obra y concepto del filósofo francés Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). Es universo y virtualidad caótica, fuerzas de caos y obra de arte, otro orden y multiplicidad, fuerzas de caos como condición del pensar, función que revela la presencia de la ciencia, el arte, la política y la filosofía, considerando que toda la filosofía de Deleuze se construye atravesando un constante caos-cosmos, un caos compuesto y no preconcebido. Y me centraré en dos aspectos y reflexiones centrales, se trata de La creación territorializando en la propia tierra del caos, es decir, mirada como una creación de resistencia. Y un segundo aspecto que es La invención de la visibilidad,como una forma de liberar la vida. Una realidad asignificante, que se visibiliza desde el devenir y acontecer de la creación. En este sentido, el caos se confunde con un cosmos ilimitado en cuyo seno se formarían múltiples mundos y así considerar que estamos en medio del caos, o bien que el caos está en medio de nosotros y por lo mismo ese caos, como diría Deleuze, es un movimiento que nos dinamiza de manera activa en los procesos de creación y donde intentamos trazar planos en el caos con él, y no sobre él, para luego agenciar artistas que devienen readores.

This article starts with the presumption that Russian film director Andrei Tarkovsky (1932–1986) created a new conception of cinematic time. This impact on the theory of modern cinema was examined by philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) in his book Cinema 2: The Time-Image (in French: Cinéma 2, L’Image-Temps, 1985). The article asks the question: what were the conceptual and social circumstances for everyday time to be implemented in a specific movie? As an example, it takes the film Andrei Rubliov (director Andrei Tarkovsky, 1969), which underwent protracted critique and compulsory shortening. The article asks the question: what is the meaning and significance of the cuts made when passing from the first version of The Passion according to Andrei (in Russian: Strasti po Andreyu, director Tarkovsky, 1966) to the final Andrei Rubliov? What is the meaning of the cuts made to the scenes of violence and nudity? The research conclusions are: the impatience of the critics who demanded that the long scenes in The Passion according to Andrei be shortened speaks not about defects in the film, nor about the inability of Tarkovsky to calculate time, but rather about the inability of observers to grasp Tarkovky’s new conception of cinematic time. According to Deleuze, in his attempt to transfer into cinema the slow speed of everyday life, Tarkovsky created a feature of modern cinema, and made a turn from movement towards time; time in this particular movie is already made visible.

This paper is an investigation of “Techno-Orientalism” in postmodern Japanese and global cultural genres and subcultures since the 1980s. It concentrates on the representation of the diaspora from East Asia in the film Swallowtail Butterfly (1996), directed by Iwai Shunji (1963-). This film criticized the expansion of neoliberalism after the collapse of the “Bubble Economy” in the years 1986 to 1991 from the perspective of the diaspora, suggesting a path for the reconsideration of the connection between postmodernism and global capitalism in 1980s Japan. A postmodern genre formed in which urban space in Japan was represented as “Techno-Orientalist”, in works such as Blade Runner (1982) by Sir Ridley Scott (1937-), Akira (1988) by Otomo Katsuhiro (1954-), and Ghost in the Shell (1995) by Oshii Mamoru (1951-). Oriental “Techno Pop” music by Sakamoto Ryuichi (1952-) was also produced in the same context, and it is possible to discuss Iwai Shunji’s Swallowtail Butterfly in this context. The most important point of this movie is that Japanese actors played the roles of those who were part of the diaspora from East Asia, and they speak “Fake Chinese” and “Fake English.” This paper discusses these fake and creole languages through the prism of the theory of “Minor Literature” elaborated by Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Pierre-Félix Guattari (1930-1992).

Au delà des différences de terminologie et de background culturel, on essaye ici de montrer que le physicien quantique David Bohm (Wilkes-Barre 1917 – Londre 1992) et le philosophe poststructuraliste Gilles Deleuze (Paris 1925 – Paris 1995) ont visé un but de pensée commun: remplacer l’image classique (mécaniste) de la réalité, encore dominante à notre époque, par une métaphysique finalement en accord avec les concepts et les résultats de la relativité, de la mécanique quantique et de la biologie contemporaine. Pour cesdeux penseurs, le monde des choses bien individuées dans l’espace et le temps, et ordonnées selon des relations mécaniques de cause et d’effet, n’est rien d’autre que l’expression momentanée d’une “Totalité indivise en devenir” qui en constitue le véritable fondement ontologique. Par le moyen de cette nouvelle métaphysique, le monde de l’expérience quotidienne et de la science classique apparaît comme la manifestation explicite ou développée de l’ordre implicite que la totalité indivise contient virtuellement en elle à des niveaux d’enveloppementet d’imbrication toujours plus profonds. Le monde explicite (de la science classique et de l’expérience quotidienne) est le résultat d’un processus de répétition, ralentissement et stabilisation temporelle, déclenché par l’interaction de nos instruments de mesure – appareils techniques, organes sensoriels et moteurs, formes a priori et catégories de l’entendement – avec une totalité mouvante dont le sujet pensant et observant représente un reflet momentané et partial plutôt qu’un fragment solitaire et autonome. En critiquant l’image classique de la correspondance/adéquation entre l’être et la pensée, Bohm et Deleuze montrent enfin que la pensée qui veut saisir cette Totalité en devenirinteragit inévitablement avec elle, en la modifiant, en la recréant, en l’accomplissant dans une direction plutôt qu’une autre. La pensée ressemble ainsi à une danse qui essaye de s’harmoniser avec le flux universel qui l’engendre et l’emporte dans un seul mouvement avec la matière.

In this article, we seek to theorize the role of the kindergarten teacher as an agency mobiliser for sustainability through keeping the concept of the child in play, ultimately envisioning the child as a knowledgeable and connectable collective. This implies a non-dialectical politics of multiplicity ready to support and join a creative pluralism of educational organization and teacher roles for sustainability. Comprising friction zones between actual and virtual multiplicities that replace discursive productions of educational policies with enfoldedness, relations between bodies and becomings. This changes the power, position and function of language in and for agency and change. Not through making the child a constructivist change-agent through language but through opening up the possibilities for teachers to explore relations between language and matter, nature and culture and what might be produced collectively and individually. We go via the concepts of agencement expanding on the concept of agency, and conceptual personae directing the becoming of the kindergarten teacher. Both concepts informed by the transformational pragmatics of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992). The overarching contribution of this article is therefore political and pragmatic and concerns the constitution of subjectivity and transformative citizenships for sustainability in inter- and intra-generational perspectives.

* Doutora em Educação pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Professora do curso de Dança e do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Artes Cênicas (PPGAC) da Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (UFU).** Doutor em Educação pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Professor do curso de Filosofia, do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia (PPGFIL) e do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação (PPGED) da Universidade Federal de Uberlândia (UFU). O ano de 2015 marcou os vinte anos da morte de Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), a data foi celebrada com a realização de eventos promovidos pelos núcleos de pesquisa vinculados à filosofia de Deleuze, cuja obra comporta também os livros escritos em coautoria com Félix Guattari. O Dossiê Artes e Oficinas: incursões na filosofia de Deleuze-Guattari foi concebido no mesmo movimento de discussão do legado do pensamento deleuziano, cujo propósito ultrapassa o ensejo de uma simples homenagem e pretende intensificar as experimentações conceituais para vislumbrar, na criação artística, um disparador de encontros ético-político-estéticos, o que confere ao Dossiê uma abordagem transdisciplinar da filosofia de Deleuze - e também Guattari - com vias a favorecer as interfaces entre a filosofia e as artes, recuperando a junção dos afectos e dos perceptos, tal como foram apresentados pelos autores em muitas dos seus escritos, dentre os quais destacamos Qu'est-ce que la filosophie? (1991).O motivo dos artigos que compõem o presente Dossiê são as artes, considerando que essas manifestações são abordadas conforme dois eixos: das oficinas de criação e da lógica do sentido; ou seja, a poiética é considerada em sua autonomia na produção de experimentações do pensamento, por isso, não se trata de uma leitura estética, aliás, não é a intepretação das obras de arte que estão em discussão, mas, antes, a possibilidade das artes esgotarem as fixações de sentidos do mundo contemporâneo que instauram a crise nas mais variadas esferas da vida. Deleuze e Guattari vislumbram nas artes uma política menor, pertinente a mobilização dos afectos e dos perceptos graças as mobilizações engendradas pelos signos artísticos. Assim, apostamos na articulação da clínica, da crítica, das artes e da política, tendo em vista a abertura de novos espaços, contribuindo para o aparecimento de práticas de liberação dos fluxos que poderão fazer variar o pensamento.O que pode ser esperado das oficinas de criação em artes é a invenção de procedimentos diferentes que potencializem os corpos, mobilizando-os para encontrar nos blocos de perceptos e afectos da criação artística o arrancar "o percepto das percepções do objeto, [...], arrancar o afecto das afecções", provocando fluxos de desejo a abrirem a realidade a novos possíveis (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1991, p. 217). Os pensadores franceses oferecem uma rica abrangência com relação as artes e que acreditamos estar contemplada nos artigos do Dossiê, a saber, que a filosofia como criação de conceitos está conectada - ousamos dizer: acoplada - ao plano de imanência "que deve ser considerado pré-filosófico" (Ibidem, p. 57), porque a atividade conceitual vislumbra a apreensão de uma realidade não conceitual composta pelas criações artísticas, por isso, os pensadores concluíram afirmando que "o não-filosófico está talvez mais no coração da filosofia do que a própria filosofia".A aglutinação dos artigos, que apresentaremos a seguir, propõe a composição de zonas de vizinhança entre conceitos da filosofia em conexões com os perceptos e os afectos com relação as artes, não os confundindo com percepções e sentimentos. Ora, longe da ambição do dogmatismo filosófico, aqui a filosofia é tomada como conceito e devir, permitindo vislumbrar experimentações do pensamento, no encontro com o seu fora, ao entrar na composição de um plano de imanência, que poderá ser construído junto às criações artísticas. As escritas reunias neste Dossiê se processam em meio a produção de um pensar teórico-poiético a partir das artes e das oficinas, traçando divergências convergentes com a filosofia da diferença. [...]

Straipsnis skiriamas prancūzų aktoriaus, poeto, scenaristo, žiaurumo teatro idėjos autoriaus Antonino Artaud (1898–1948) idėjų pėdsakų šifravimui Gilles’io Deleuze’o (1925–1995) kino filosofijoje. Straipsnyje keliami klausimai: kuo Artaud idėjų traktuotė antrajame knygos „Kinas“ tome „Vaizdinys-laikas“ skiriasi nuo čia pat aptariamų rusų režisieriaus Sergejaus Eisensteino idėjų įtakos? Kaip modernaus kino filosofijoje veikia Deleuze’ui svarbi Artaud mintis apie pamatinę minties bejėgystę, įkūnytą pačioje mintyje? Ar iš Artaud pasiskolintas „kūno be organų“ konceptas išveda į kasdienį ir ceremonijų kūną, apie kurį rašo Deleuze’as kaip apie modernaus kino ženklą? Straipsnyje prieinama prie išvados, kad visgi galima išskirti dvi Deleuze’o iš Artaud perimtas kūno traktuotes: iki-šizofrenišką pozų ir gestų kūną, kuris sudaro pamatinę „žiaurumo teatro“ konceptualinę šerdį ir kuria remiasi Deleuze’as, rašydamas apie modernaus kino tapsmą, bei šizofrenišką „kūną be organų“, kuris turėjo įtakos Deleuze’o ir Guattari tyrimams. Pamatinė straipsnyje ginama tezė: tiriant teorines įtakas Deleuze’o modernaus kino filosofijai, neįmanoma apeiti ir nepastebėti Artaud.

[straipsnis ir santrauka lietuvių kalba; santrauka anglų kalba] Ar įmanoma, pasitelkus kino meno atvertas galimybes, ugdyti jautrumą vertybiniams apsisprendimams? Ar yra galimas kinas, kuris kreiptų žiūrovo nuostatas dvasinių vertybių link? Tikėtina, kad tai galbūt perteklinis reikalavimas meno žanrui, kuris arba nesiekia, arba nepajėgus realizuoti tokio pobūdžio užduočių. Gali būti, kad, netgi siekdamas įgyvendinti tokio lygmens užduotis, kinas yra nepajėgus savo priemonėmis jas atliepti. Straipsnis prasideda nuo provokuojančio klausimo: kodėl galima suabejoti „sakralaus meno“ galimybe? Religinio meno kaip kičinio oksimorono galimybę įžvelgia Tomas Sodeika, remdamasis neįmanomybės vaizduoti sacrum reprodukuojamuose vaizduose prielaida. Straipsnyje analizuojamas Gilles’io Deleuze’o (1925–1995) kino filosofijoje formuluojamas dvasinio pasirinkimo kino konceptas, keliant klausimą, ar jis negalėtų atverti lygiagrečios kičiniam religiniam kinui, bet visgi steigiančios religinės etikos vertybes refleksijos galimybės. Straipsnio autorė prieina prie išvados, kad Deleuze’as, pratęsdamas Søreno Kierkegaard’o įžvelgtą trijų dvasios lygmenų koncepciją ketvirtąja (laiko) ir penktąja (dvasios) dimensijomis, suranda dvasinio kino, lygiagretaus religiniam, kuris artimas revoliuciniam, apibrėžties galimybę. Tokio kino prielaidas Deleuze’as fokusuoja į prancūzų kino režisieriaus Roberto Bressono (1901–1999) kūrybą, tačiau straipsnio autorė jam priskirtų ir Ingmaro Bergmano (1918–2007), ir Andrejaus Tarkovskio (1932–1986), kaip, beje, ir šiame straipsnyje, ir Deleuze’o kino filosofijoje neminimo Krzystofo Kieslowskio (1941–1996) kūrybą. Tokio priskyrimo kriterijus būtų paties Deleuze’o siūloma Atverties kaip viseto, judančio tarp dviejų dimensijų (erdvinės ir laikinės), leidžiančio išvengti radikalaus materijos ir dvasios supriešinimo, paradigma. Bressono kinematografas straipsnyje pasitelkiamas kaip paties Deleuze’o išskirtas dvasinio kino vienas iš tipinių atvejų, atsispindintis ne tik Deleuze’o, bet ir Tarkovskio refleksijose. Pamatinė prielaida dvasinio kino steigčiai, autorės manymu, yra kaip būtina galimybė, Deleuze’o išskirta konkrečiame filme, iki galo neregima, bet galbūt fliuktuojanti anapus regimo lauko (hors-champ).

[Spinoza] sabe, sin embargo, que la muerte no es ni elinicio ni el final sino que, al contrario, se trata de pasara otro la propia vida.Gilles Deleuze Anna Ajmátova, la poeta, escribe: “Cuando muere un hombre / se trasforman sus retratos: / los ojos ven de otro modo, / se altera la sonrisa. / Lo descubrí al regresar del sepelio de un poeta, / luego, innumerables veces / mi intuición se ha confirmado” (35). En efecto, la muerte, de inmediato, lo transforma todo; al poner un punto final, esa vida adquiere, curiosamente, una nueva dimensión; cada gesto, cada mirada, cada palabra dicha y no dicha se resignifican. Es necesario entonces recrearlo, reescribirlo y rehacerlo todo. Cuando creíamos al muerto en un lugar fijo, su muerte sigue viviendo en nosotros. Lo que fue siendo durante su vida no deja de ser, sigue siendo, deviene a pasos lentos su propia muerte. No se muere de un momento a otro, quizás se continúe muriendo de por vida.

O trabalho busca tecer aproximações entre as operações estruturais e as dinâmicas epistemológicas do pensamento de Aby Warburg (1866-1929), Giorgio Agamben (1942-) e Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) a certa filosofia da diferença. Pretende refletir sobre a natureza comum da matriz conceitual dos três autores (dos quais destaco: “Pathosformel” e “Nachleben” em Warburg; “ponto de inflexão”, “diferença” e “repetição” em Deleuze, e “paradigma” e “analogia” em Agamben), operados principalmente por dinâmicas estruturais baseadas em dispositivos de diferença e repetição. Esta reflexão é motivada pela insurgente revisão epistemológica da historiografia contemporânea da arte e pelo poderio operacional possibilitado por esta estrutura ao lidar com as múltiplas complexidades das imagens.

Abstract Deleuze (1925–1995), in the early 1980s, adopts Peirce’s (1839–1914) semiotics in order to classify the signs that the images of the cinema display. Aiming at insufflating the Peircean principles with the movement that animates the images of cinema, he provides Peirce’s triadic logic with a new category – Zeroness – which stands for the semiotic movement of cinematic images. Deleuze’s new category has impacts on the main domains of Peirce’s philosophy. Accordingly, our inquiry will focus on the irradiation of Zeroness over the (a) system of categories, the (b) Peircean phenomenology (phaneroscopy), the (c) generative categorial role, the (d) semiotic effectiveness, the (e) doctrine of continuity, and the (f) logic of relatives. This article will show that for Deleuze nearly like more recent Peircean scholarship: (a) zeroth state holds a categorial status, (b) some phenomenon instantiates zeroth state, (c) zeroth state plays a generative role regarding Peirce's categories, (d) zeroth state as a phenomenological category is semiotically effective, (e) zeroth state and the doctrine of continuity, and (f) zeroth state is a “medad.” In order to assess these topics, we recover Deleuze’s advances on Peirce’s philosophy and confront them with the Peircean studies on the zeroth state. Finally, we will see that Deleuze, far from being a Peircean scholar, developed the importance of the zeroth state for Peirce’s semiotics in advance to the subsequent Peircean scholarship. Reciprocally, most of Deleuzian scholars understimate the importance of Peirce for Deleuze’s semiotics.

Queering Thought - Deleuze and the sexes to come. This article argues that queer theory in relation to Judith Butler is unable to account for the complexities of life's creation and immanent potential that exist prior to and in between the hierarchical representations of discourses, language and subjects. This article seeks an opening and understanding of thought as creation, not representation. Through the philosophy of french philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) thought is freed from its image and thereby activated in thinking. It is then possible to think and engage in life as becoming; life as consisting of virtual potentials, the alwaysnot-yet-actualised. The article proceeds by activating queer as a philosophical concept: ‘to queer' thus focusing on the ‘to do', not the ‘to be'; and analysing the queer-art-space Warehouse9 as a smooth space, where it is possible to encounter virtual sexes in concordance with sensible signs and aesthetic expressions.

: In the last decades, many studies on diagrams have endeavored to show how that kind of sign influences and is part of reasoning – not only mathematical and scientific reasoning but artistic reasoning as well. Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), for instance, depicts the role of the diagrams in the art of Francis Bacon. The American philosopher C.S. Peirce (1839-1914), on the other hand, develops such concept mainly in the context of scientific reasoning. Bearing that in mind, we will argue that in both cases, the philosophers did not present a thorough analysis of how the diagrams are or might be part of the artistic creation. In that sense, we intend to show how relevant their philosophies and more specifically their thoughts on diagrams can be to the understanding of arts and creativity

A escrita é sempre inacabada por estar sempre produzindo novas relações de multiplicidades e por ser detentora de um enunciado que fala por si. Ela é impessoal por ter a capacidade de criar artifícios para se conjugar novos enunciados, cujo centro não é o indivíduo, mas, todas as relações de agenciamentos que existem em torno dele e de outros agentes, relações homem e natureza, homem e tempo, homem e objeto. Essa é a ideia de desterritorialização da escrita definida pelos filósofos franceses Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) e Félix Guattari (1930-1992). O presente artigo tem como objetivo indagar em que medida a escrita literária pode ser compreendida como um caso de devir. Em cotejo à análise do conceito de devir e em como a literatura é atravessada por esse pensamento filosófico, iremos discutir a obra Moby Dick (1851) do escritor estadunidense Herman Melville (1819-1891), exemplo amplamente utilizado pelos próprios autores em livros como Mil Platôs – Devir-intenso, Devir-animal, Devir-imperceptível (2012) e Crítica e Clínica (2011). O artigo parte de uma investigação de cunho bibliográfico e se apoia no estruturalismo como recurso metodológico.

O presente artigo, pretende apresentar uma proposição sintética sobre os aspectos de um possível agenciamento filosófico-literário para o ensino de filosofia, por meio de expressões da arte. Para tanto, serão mostrados os resultados da prática de oficinas de “pictuleituras” (pinturas, literatura/leituras e pinturas) e de debates (leituras e conceitos) por meio de café filosófico a partir do contato dos estudantes da Educação Básica do Instituto Federal do Paraná, Campus de Umuarama-PR e do Colégio SESI de Francisco Beltrão-PR com a obra A Metamorfose (1997), de Franz Kafka (1883-1924). A partir da leitura da obra kafkaniana pretende-se elucidar também aspectos conceituais da filosofia de Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) e Felix Guattari (1930-1992) o que permitiu, mais facilmente, pensar uma possibilidade didática no ensino de Filosofia por meio de expressões da arte (cinema, literatura, artes visuais, música e teatro).

Partindo de uma perspectiva spinozista, tratada por Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) como uma etologia, na qual o corpo é definido pelos limiares mínimo e máximo de sua potência, buscamos entender como se fabricam corpos não-monogâmicos, em seu modo singular, o agenciamento indivíduo, e plural, o agenciamento ao qual chamamos de constelações íntimas. Por meio da cartografia, procedimento que traça um mapa dos afetos, analisamos a história de vida de Leci, mulher negra que devém não-monogâmica. Na presente análise destacam-se a resistência ao controle do próprio corpo, os embates com discursos raciais essencialistas e as dificuldades presentes nos processos de desterritorialização da monogamia. Salientam-se também as reterritorializações de sua constelação sob as práticas monogâmicas, sejam pelos conflitos que este modo de vida enfrenta no campo social, sejam pelos sentimentos que suscitam nos indivíduos que os praticam. Palavras-chave: Corpo. Identidade. Não-monogamia. Raça. Constelações íntimas.

19. yüzyıl sonu ve 20. yüzyıl başında hızla gelişen görüntüleme teknolojileri ve sinemaya ilişkin özgün düşünceler ortaya koyan ilk filozoflardan biri olan Bergson, belleğin niteliği ve “zaman”a ilişkin bakış açısı ile özgün bir felsefe ortaya koymuştur. Bergson zamanı, çizgisel ve ölçülebilir bir unsur olmaktan çıkarmaya çabalamıştır. Diğer taraftan sinemanın yeni ortaya çıkmakta olduğu bir dönemde eserlerini ortaya koyan Bergson’un sinema felsefesini de etkilediği görülmektedir. Bergson’un sinematografi eleştirisi, Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) başta olmak üzere pek çok düşünür ya da eleştirmen tarafından yeni bir sinema anlayışının çıkış noktası olarak kabul edilmiştir. Söz konusu ‘Bergsoncu sinema’ yaklaşımının en önemli unsurları ise, zaman, bellek ve benliktir. Yapay zekâ tartışmalarının eşliğinde, günümüzde benlik ve bellek ilişkisinin sıklıkla konu edildiği alanlardan biri de bilim-kurgu sinemasıdır. Distopik içeriğe sahip bir polisiye olan Blade Runner 2049 filmi ise Bergsoncu bir sinemanın mümkün olup olamayacağı sorusunun cevaplanması için elverişli bir içeriğe sahiptir. Nitekim Blade Runner 2049, özellikle başkahramanı K’nin “insan mı yoksa kopya mı” olduğu sorusunu, temelde bu sorunun anlamsızlığına işaret eden bir anlatı ile ele almaktadır. Çalışmamız, Blade Runner 2049 filmini Bergsoncu zaman, bellek ve benlik temaları eşliğinde analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Abstract The rhizome is like the poem. The growth power of nature and the possibilities of culture simultaneously and reciprocally. It stretches from biological cell and level of particles to our universal dreams and thoughts about and with life. The rhizome as poem is thus a picture and image of the importance of context and movement, production of constant importance for each/other. The picture breaks all patterns always and always creates new, as points and lines affectively collapsing into each/other for each/other. The rhizome as poem — and the consciousness about the preliminarity of processes across preliminary boundaries, opens up for translations and interpretations beyond known vocabularies and in unfinished channels. It possibilizes the realization of more - than - human concepts such as the dissolution of subjectivity turning my identity into a collective: I contain multitudes and sing myself.1 Knowledge creation and meaning making are thus connected with what situated knowledges makes possible and mobilize, and is about community, not isolated individuals; it is about productive connections and unexpected openings in which every concept is ‘trapped’ in experience. Informatically we are data subjects of an algorithmic nature. I oxymoronically and indirectly therefore ask how we can become materially identifiable subjects and what would it take to move from a mechanistic approach to education to a more machinic one? Further, are the abstractions one attempts to move from imitation to imagination abstract enough? I poem with the speculative process philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992) to think the future, theory and practice in Environmental Education other. Taking part in polysemantic ambiguity becomes attractive as condition to side with the child and it might turn into a strong source of energy for learning and change, trans-scientific collaboration and sustainability. The rhizome is my cosmic writing machine, research design and model.

‘Bitzer,’ said Thomas Gradgrind. ‘Your definition of a horse.’‘Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth.’ Thus (and much more) Bitzer.‘Now girl number twenty,’ said Mr. Gradgrind. ‘You know what a horse is.’— Charles Dickens, Hard Times (1854)Dickens’s famous pedant, Thomas Gradgrind, was not an anomaly. He is the pedagogical manifestation of the rise of quantification in modernism that was the necessary adjunct to massive urbanisation and industrialisation. His classroom caricatures the dominant epistemic modality of modern global democracies, our unwavering trust in numbers, “data”, and reproductive predictability. This brief quotation from Hard Times both presents and parodies the 19th century’s displacement of what were previously more commonly living and heterogeneous existential encounters with events and things. The world had not yet been made predictably repetitive through industrialisation, standardisation, law, and ubiquitous codes of construction. Theirs was much more a world of unique events and not the homogenised and orthodox iteration of standardised knowledge. Horses and, by extension, all entities and events gradually were displaced by their rote definitions: individuals of a so-called natural kind were reduced to identicals. Further, these mechanical standardisations were and still are underwritten by mapping them into a numerical and extensive characterisation. On top of standardised objects and procedures appeared assigned numerical equivalents which lent standardisation the seemingly apodictic certainty of deductive demonstrations. The algebraic becomes the socially enforced criterion for the previously more sensory, qualitative, and experiential encounters with becoming that were more likely in pre-industrial life. Here too, we see that the function of this reproductive protocol is not just notational but is the sine qua non for, in Althusser’s famous phrase, the manufacture of citizens as “subject subjects”, those concrete individuals who are educated to understand themselves ideologically in an imaginary relation with their real position in any society’s self-reproduction. Here, however, ideology performs that operation through that nominally least political of cognitive modes, the supposed friend of classical Marxism’s social science, the mathematical. The historical onset of this social and political reproductive hegemony, this uniform supplanting of time’s ineluctable differencing with the parasite of its associated model, can partial be found in the formation of metrics. Before the 19th century, the measures of space and time were local. Units of length and weight varied not just between nations but often by municipality. These parochial standards reflected indigenous traditions, actualities, personalities, and needs. This variation in measurement standards suggested that every exchange or judgment of kind and value relied upon the specificity of that instance. Every evaluation of an instance required perceptual acuity and not the banality of enumeration constituted by commodification and the accounting practices intrinsic to centralised governance. This variability in measure was complicated by similar variability in the currencies of the day. Thus, barter presented the participants with complexities and engagements of skills and discrete observation completely alien to the modern purchase of duplicate consumer objects with stable currencies. Almost nothing of life was iterative: every exchange was, more or less, an anomaly. However, in 1790, immediately following the French Revolution and as a central manifestation of its movement to rational democratisation, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand proposed a metrical system to the French National Assembly. The units of this metric system, based originally on observable features of nature, are now formally codified in all scientific practice by seven physical constants. Further, they are ubiquitous now in almost all public exchanges between individuals, corporations, and states. These units form a coherent and extensible structure whose elements and rules are subject to seemingly lossless symbolic exchange in a mathematic coherence aided by their conformity to decimal representation. From 1960, their basic contemporary form was established as the International System of Units (SI). Since then, all but three of the countries of the world (Myanmar, Liberia, and the United States), regardless of political organisation and individual history, have adopted these standards for commerce and general measurement. The uniformity and rational advantage of this system is easily demonstrable in just the absurd variation in the numeric bases of the Imperial / British system which uses base 16 for ounces/pounds, base 12 for inches/feet, base three for feet/yards, base 180 for degrees between freezing and cooling, 43,560 square feet per acre, eights for division of inches, etc. Even with its abiding antagonism to the French, Britain officially adopted the metric system as was required by its admission to the EU in 1973. The United States is the last great holdout in the public use of the metric system even though SI has long been the standard wanted by the federal government. At first, the move toward U.S. adoption was promising. Following France and rejecting England’s practice, America was founded on a decimal currency system in 1792. In 1793, Jefferson requested a copy of the standard kilogram from France in a first attempt to move to the metric system: however, the ship carrying the copy was captured by pirates. Indeed, The Metric Conversion Act of 1975 expressed a more serious national intention to adopt SI, but after some abortive efforts, the nation fell back into the more archaic measurements dominant since before its revolution. However, the central point remains that while the U.S. is unique in its public measurement standard among dominant powers, it is equally committed to the hegemonic application of a numerical rendition of events.The massive importance of this underlying uniformity is that it supplies the central global mechanism whereby the world’s chaotic variation is continuously parsed and supplanted into comparable, intelligible, and predictable units that understand individuating difference as anomaly. Difference, then, is understood in this method not as qualitative and intensive, which it necessarily is, but quantitative and extensive. Like Gradgrind’s “horse”, the living and unique thing is rendered through the Apollonian dream of standardisation and enumeration. While differencing is the only inherent quality of time’s chaotic flow, accounting and management requite iteration. To order the reproduction of modern society, the unique individuating differences that render an object as “this one”, what the Medieval logicians called haecceities, are only seen as “accidental” and “non-essential” deviations. This is not just odd but illogical since these very differences allow events to be individuated items so to appear as countable at all. As Leibniz’s principle, the indiscernibility of identicals, suggests, the application of the metrical same to different occasions is inherently paradoxical: if each unit were truly the same, there could only be one. As the etymology of “anomaly” suggests, it is that which is unexpected, irregular, out of line, or, going back to the Greek, nomos, at variance with the law. However, as the only “law” that always is at hand is the so-called “Second Law of Thermodynamics”, the inconsistently consistent roiling of entropy, the evident theoretical question might be, “how is anomaly possible when regularity itself is impossible?” The answer lies not in events “themselves” but exactly in the deductive valorisations projected by that most durable invention of the French Revolution adumbrated above, the metric system. This seemingly innocuous system has formed the reproductive and iterative bias of modern post-industrial perceptual homogenisation. Metrical modeling allows – indeed, requires – that one mistake the metrical changeling for the experiential event it replaces. Gilles Deleuze, that most powerful French metaphysician (1925-1995) offers some theories to understand the seminal production (not reproduction) of disparity that is intrinsic to time and to distinguish it from its homogenised representation. For him, and his sometime co-author, Felix Guattari, time’s “chaosmosis” is the host constantly parasitised by its symbolic model. This problem, however, of standardisation in the face of time’s originality, is obscured by its very ubiquity; we must first denaturalise the seemingly self-evident metrical concept of countable and uniform units.A central disagreement in ancient Greece was between the proponents of physis (often translated as “nature” but etymologically indicative of growth and becoming, process and not fixed form) and nomos (law or custom). This is one of the first ethical and so political debates in Western philosophy. For Heraclitus and other pre-Socratics, the emphatic character of nature was change, its differencing dynamism, its processual but not iterative character. In anticipation of Hume, Sophists disparaged nomos (νόμος) as simply the habituated application of synthetic law and custom to the fluidity of natural phenomena. The historical winners of this debate, Plato and the scientific attitudes of regularity and taxonomy characteristic of his best pupil, Aristotle, have dominated ever since, but not without opponents.In the modern era, anti-enlightenment figures such as Hamann, Herder, and the Schlegel brothers gave theoretical voice to romanticism’s repudiation of the paradoxical impulses of the democratic state for regulation and uniformity that Talleyrand’s “revolutionary” metrical proposal personified. They saw the correlationalism (as adumbrated by Meillassoux) between thought and thing based upon their hypothetical equitability as a betrayal of the dynamic physis that experience presented. Variable infinity might come either from the character of God or nature or, as famously in Spinoza’s Ethics, both (“deus sive natura”). In any case, the plenum of nature was never iterative. This rejection of metrical regularity finds its synoptic expression in Nietzsche. As a classicist, Nietzsche supplies the bridge between the pre-Socratics and the “post-structuralists”. His early mobilisation of the Apollonian, the dream of regularity embodied in the sun god, and the Dionysian, the drunken but inarticulate inexpression of the universe’s changing manifold, gives voice to a new resistance to the already dominate metrical system. His is a new spin of the mythic representatives of Nomos and physis. For him, this pair, however, are not – as they are often mischaracterised – in dialectical dialogue. To place them into the thesis / antithesis formulation would be to give them the very binary character that they cannot share and to, tacitly, place both under Apollo’s procedure of analysis. Their modalities are not antithetical but mutually exclusive. To represent the chaotic and non-iterative processes of becoming, of physis, under the rubric of a common metrics, nomos, is to mistake the parasite for the host. In its structural hubris, the ideological placebo of metrical knowing thinks it non-reductively captures the multiplicity it only interpellates. In short, the polyvalent, fluid, and inductive phenomena that empiricists try to render are, in their intrinsic character, unavailable to deductive method except, first, under the reductive equivalence (the Gradgrind pedagogy) of metrical modeling. This incompatibility of physis and nomos was made manifest by David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) just before the cooptation of the 18th century’s democratic revolutions by “representative” governments. There, Hume displays the Apollonian dream’s inability to accurately and non-reductively capture a phenomenon in the wild, free from the stringent requirements of synthetic reproduction. His argument in Book I is succinct.Now as we call every thing custom, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion, we may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present impression, is deriv'd solely from that origin. (Part 3, Section 8)There is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it; ... even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. (Part 3, Section 12)The rest of mankind ... are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. (Part 4, Section 6)In sum, then, nomos is nothing but habit, a Pavlovian response codified into a symbolic representation and, pragmatically, into a reproductive protocol specifically ordered to exclude anomaly, the inherent chaotic variation that is the hallmark of physis. The Apollonian dream that there can be an adequate metric of unrestricted natural phenomena in their full, open, turbulent, and manifold becoming is just that, a dream. Order, not chaos, is the anomaly. Of course, Kant felt he had overcome this unacceptable challenge to rational application to induction after Hume woke him from his “dogmatic slumber”. But what is perhaps one of the most important assertions of the critiques may be only an evasion of Hume’s radical empiricism: “there are only two ways we can account for the necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make experience possible. The former supposition does not hold of the categories (nor of pure sensible intuition) ... . There remains ... only the second—a system ... of the epigenesis of pure reason” (B167). Unless “necessary agreement” means the dictatorial and unrelenting insistence in a symbolic model of perception of the equivalence of concept and appearance, this assertion appears circular. This “reading” of Kant’s evasion of the very Humean crux, the necessary inequivalence of a metric or concept to the metered or defined, is manifest in Nietzsche.In his early “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (1873), Nietzsche suggests that there is no possible equivalence between a concept and its objects, or, to use Frege’s vocabulary, between sense or reference. We speak of a "snake" [see “horse” in Dickens]: this designation touches only upon its ability to twist itself and could therefore also fit a worm. What arbitrary differentiations! What one-sided preferences, first for this, then for that property of a thing! The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate expression; otherwise, there would not be so many languages. The "thing in itself" (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors.The literal is always already a reductive—as opposed to literature’s sometimes expansive agency—metaphorisation of events as “one of those” (a token of “its” type). The “necessary” equivalence in nomos is uncovered but demanded. The same is reproduced by the habitual projection of certain “essential qualities” at the expense of all those others residing in every experiential multiplicity. Only in this prison of nomos can anomaly appear: otherwise all experience would appear as it is, anomalous. With this paradoxical metaphor of the straight and equal, Nietzsche inverts the paradigm of scientific expression. He reveals as a repressive social and political obligation the symbolic assertion homology where actually none can be. Supposed equality and measurement all transpire within an Apollonian “dream within a dream”. The concept captures not the manifold of chaotic experience but supplies its placebo instead by an analytic tautology worthy of Gradgrind. The equivalence of event and definition is always nothing but a symbolic iteration. Such nominal equivalence is nothing more than shifting events into a symbolic frame where they can be commodified, owned, and controlled in pursuit of that tertiary equivalence which has become the primary repressive modality of modern societies: money. This article has attempted, with absurd rapidity, to hint why some ubiquitous concepts, which are generally considered self-evident and philosophically unassailable, are open not only to metaphysical, political, and ethical challenge, but are existentially unjustified. All this was done to defend the smaller thesis that the concept of anomaly is itself a reflection of a global misrepresentation of the chaos of becoming. This global substitution expresses a conservative model and measure of the world in the place of the world’s intrinsic heterogenesis, a misrepresentation convenient for those who control the representational powers of governance. In conclusion, let us look, again too briefly, at a philosopher who neither accepts this normative world picture of regularity nor surrenders to Nietzschean irony, Gilles Deleuze.Throughout his career, Deleuze uses the word “pure” with senses antithetical to so-called common sense and, even more, Kant. In its traditional concept, pure means an entity or substance whose essence is not mixed or adulterated with any other substance or material, uncontaminated by physical pollution, clean and immaculate. The pure is that which is itself itself. To insure intelligibility, that which is elemental, alphabetic, must be what it is itself and no other. This discrete character forms the necessary, if often tacit, precondition to any analysis and decomposition of beings into their delimited “parts” that are subject to measurement and measured disaggregation. Any entity available for structural decomposition, then, must be pictured as constituted exhaustively by extensive ones, measurable units, its metrically available components. Dualism having established as its primary axiomatic hypothesis the separability of extension and thought must now overcome that very separation with an adequacy, a one to one correspondence, between a supposedly neatly measurable world and ideological hegemony that presents itself as rational governance. Thus, what is needed is not only a purity of substance but a matching purity of reason, and it is this clarification of thought, then, which, as indicated above, is the central concern of Kant’s influential and grand opus, The Critique of Pure Reason.Deleuze heard a repressed alternative to the purity of the measured self-same and equivalent that, as he said about Plato, “rumbled” under the metaphysics of analysis. This was the dark tradition he teased out of the Stoics, Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Nicholas d’Autrecourt, Spinoza, Meinong, Bergson, Nietzsche, and McLuhan. This is not the purity of identity, A = A, of metrical uniformity and its shadow, anomaly. Rather than repressing, Deleuze revels in the perverse purity of differencing, difference constituted by becoming without the Apollonian imposition of normalcy or definitional identity. One cannot say “difference in itself” because its ontology, its genesis, is not that of anything itself but exactly the impossibility of such a manner of constitution: universal anomaly. No thing or idea can be iterative, separate, or discrete.In his Difference and Repetition, the idea of the purely same is undone: the Ding an sich is a paradox. While the dogmatic image of thought portrays the possibility of the purely self-same, Deleuze never does. His notions of individuation without individuals, of modulation without models, of simulacra without originals, always finds a reflection in his attitudes toward, not language as logical structure, but what necessarily forms the differential making of events, the heterogenesis of ontological symptoms. His theory has none of the categories of Pierce’s triadic construction: not the arbitrary of symbols, the “self-representation” of icons, or even the causal relation of indices. His “signs” are symptoms: the non-representational consequences of the forces that are concurrently producing them. Events, then, are the symptoms of the heterogenetic forces that produce, not reproduce them. To measure them is to export them into a representational modality that is ontologically inapplicable as they are not themselves themselves but the consequences of the ongoing differences of their genesis. Thus, the temperature associated with a fever is neither the body nor the disease.Every event, then, is a diaphora, the pure consequent of the multiplicity of the forces it cannot resemble, an original dynamic anomaly without standard. This term, diaphora, appears at the conclusion of that dialogue some consider Plato’s best, the Theaetetus. There we find perhaps the most important discussion of knowledge in Western metaphysics, which in its final moments attempts to understand how knowledge can be “True Judgement with an Account” (201d-210a). Following this idea leads to a theory, usually known as the “Dream of Socrates”, which posits two kinds of existents, complexes and simples, and proposes that “an account” means “an account of the complexes that analyses them into their simple components … the primary elements (prôta stoikheia)” of which we and everything else are composed (201e2). This—it will be noticed—suggests the ancient heritage of Kant’s own attempted purification of mereological (part/whole relations) nested elementals. He attempts the coordination of pure speculative reason to pure practical reason and, thus, attempts to supply the root of measurement and scientific regularity. However, as adumbrated by the Platonic dialogue, the attempted decompositions, speculative and pragmatic, lead to an impasse, an aporia, as the rational is based upon a correspondence and not the self-synthesis of the diaphorae by their own dynamic disequilibrium. Thus the dialogue ends inconclusively; Socrates rejects the solution, which is the problem itself, and leaves to meet his accusers and quaff his hemlock. The proposal in this article is that the diaphorae are all that exists in Deleuze’s world and indeed any world, including ours. Nor is this production decomposable into pure measured and defined elementals, as such decomposition is indeed exactly opposite what differential production is doing. For Deleuze, what exists is disparate conjunction. But in intensive conjunction the same cannot be the same except in so far as it differs. The diaphorae of events are irremediably asymmetric to their inputs: the actual does not resemble the virtual matrix that is its cause. Indeed, any recourse to those supposedly disaggregate inputs, the supposedly intelligible constituents of the measured image, will always but repeat the problematic of metrical representation at another remove. This is not, however, the traditional postmodern trap of infinite meta-shifting, as the diaphoric always is in each instance the very presentation that is sought. Heterogenesis can never be undone, but it can be affirmed. In a heterogenetic monism, what was the insoluble problem of correspondence in dualism is now its paradoxical solution: the problematic per se. What manifests in becoming is not, nor can be, an object or thought as separate or even separable, measured in units of the self-same. Dogmatic thought habitually translates intensity, the differential medium of chaosmosis, into the nominally same or similar so as to suit the Apollonian illusions of “correlational adequacy”. However, as the measured cannot be other than a calculation’s placebo, the correlation is but the shadow of a shadow. Every diaphora is an event born of an active conjunction of differential forces that give rise to this, their product, an interference pattern. Whatever we know and are is not the correlation of pure entities and thoughts subject to measured analysis but the confused and chaotic confluence of the specific, material, aleatory, differential, and unrepresentable forces under which we subsist not as ourselves but as the always changing product of our milieu. In short, only anomaly without a nominal becomes, and we should view any assertion that maps experience into the “objective” modality of the same, self-evident, and normal as a political prestidigitation motivated, not by “truth”, but by established political interest. ReferencesDella Volpe, Galvano. Logic as a Positive Science. London: NLB, 1980.Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia UP, 1994.———. The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester. New York: Columbia UP, 1990.Guenon, René. The Reign of Quantity. New York: Penguin, 1972.Hawley, K. "Identity and Indiscernibility." Mind 118 (2009): 101-9.Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 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