Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Decedents' estates – taxation"

LL.M. (Tax Law)
Capital Gains Tax (“CGT”) was introduced with effect from 1 October 2001 by the insertion of section 26A and an Eighth Schedule into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 5 of 2001. Paragraph 40(1) of the Eight Schedule provides that a deceased person must, with certain exceptions, be treated as having disposed of his assets to his estate for proceeds equal to the market value of those assets as at the date of death. Paragraph 40(1A) of the Eight Schedule provides that if an asset of a deceased person is treated as having been disposed of under paragraph 40(1) and is transferred directly to the estate of the deceased person, the estate must be treated as having acquired the asset at a cost equal to its market value as at the date of death for base-cost purposes, and if the asset is transferred directly to an heir or legatee, the heir or legatee must be treated as having acquired the asset at a cost equal to its market value as at the date of death for base-cost purposes. The capital gain will be the difference between the market value of a taxable asset of the deceased on the date of his death and its base cost to him, which is included in his final income tax assessment and which will have to be settled out of the estate‟s assets. There are many arguments in favour of the discontinuance of the levying of CGT at the death of a taxpayer in South Africa, which arguments become evident when comparing the South African CGT provisions regarding the levying of CGT at death with tax jurisdictions such as Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Botswana and Nigeria. Canada for example abolished their inheritance tax in 1972 which in that particular situation justifies the levying of CGT at death. If CGT will continue to be levied at the death of a taxpayer it is suggested that a carry-over approach in terms of which the heir inherits the asset at its acquisition cost and the CGT liability is deferred until the heir actually disposes of the asset should be followed. This approach is currently followed in Australia, Botswana and Nigeria. The holder of an inherited bare dominium will suffer at the hands of a CGT anomaly where the deceased created a limited interest, for example a usufruct over a fixed property bequeathed by him to the bare dominium holder. The anomaly that transpires is that the limited interest created by the deceased will result in an artificial drop in the base cost of the fixed property so bequeathed and there will be no adjustment to the base cost when the bare dominium holder succeeds to full ownership of the fixed property, for example when the usufructuary passes away, meaning that the same capital gain will be taxed twice. It is submitted that legislative amendments are required to provide for an increase in the base cost applicable to the bare dominium holder when the usufructuary eventually passes away. Alternatively the SARS‟s current practice in this respect should be altered to avoid the unbearable situation where a capital gain may be taxed at 2 separate instances. At least two anomalies exist when dealing with capital losses in the deceased‟s final period of assessment and in the winding up of the deceased‟s estate. Firstly a capital loss may not be carried forward from the deceased‟s final assessment to his deceased estate to be set off against capital gains that may be realised in the winding up of the estate. Secondly a capital loss incurred on the sale of a capital asset during the winding up of a deceased estate cannot be carried over from the deceased estate to the heirs of the deceased and will thus remain unutilised. It is suggested that the method followed in Canada in respect of capital losses that occurred in the year of a taxpayer‟s death should be followed in South Africa, ie that such capital loss may be carried back three years in order to reduce any taxable capital gains that occurred in those years or that the capital losses may be utilised to reduce other income of the taxpayer in his final return. It is further suggested that this method should also be followed in respect of unutilised capital losses that occurred in the winding up of the estate, alternatively the capital losses so realised must be carried over to the heirs of the deceased.

This chapter addresses the laws of the State of New York (including its transfer tax laws) and the federal taxation of gratuitous transfers. Many of the New York laws are codified in the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) and the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA). The chapter begins with discussing the amendment, revocation, and revival of wills. It argues that a will must be in writing, signed at the end by the testator/trix and signed by two witnesses who also write their addresses. Any material written after the testator/trix’s signature is not valid. This chapter then displays the order of intestate succession wherein the deceased leaves no valid will. It also reviews the freedom of testation under the State of New York laws, highlighting that the surviving spouse of a decedent is entitled to an elective share from the estate equal to the greater of one-third of the net estate. Ultimately, the chapter considers a provision by which a spouse or children can claim maintenance from a deceased’s estate.