Tesi sul tema "Corporate dividend policy"
Cita una fonte nei formati APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard e in molti altri stili
Vedi i top-50 saggi (tesi di laurea o di dottorato) per l'attività di ricerca sul tema "Corporate dividend policy".
Accanto a ogni fonte nell'elenco di riferimenti c'è un pulsante "Aggiungi alla bibliografia". Premilo e genereremo automaticamente la citazione bibliografica dell'opera scelta nello stile citazionale di cui hai bisogno: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver ecc.
Puoi anche scaricare il testo completo della pubblicazione scientifica nel formato .pdf e leggere online l'abstract (il sommario) dell'opera se è presente nei metadati.
Vedi le tesi di molte aree scientifiche e compila una bibliografia corretta.
Verma, Savita. "Ownership structure and corporate dividend policy". Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/31375.
Testo completoBusiness, Sauder School of
Graduate
Al-Malkawi, Husam-Aladin Nizar Y., University of Western Sydney, College of Law and Business e School of Economics and Finance. "Dividend policy of publicly quoted companies in emerging markets : the case of Jordan". THESIS_CLAB_EFI_Al-Malkawi_H.xml, 2005. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/819.
Testo completoDoctor of Philosophy (Finance)
Farinha, Jorge Bento Ribeiro Barbosa. "Dividend policy, corporate governance and managerial entrenchment". Thesis, Lancaster University, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.310531.
Testo completoGaliakhmetova, Ramilya <1985>. "Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking". Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2013. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/5657/.
Testo completoLawrence, Stephen Caleb. "Essays in empirical corporate finance". Thesis, Boston College, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/591.
Testo completoChapter one of this dissertation provides new evidence on the existence of dividend clienteles for institutional investors. We directly examine individual institutions' preferences for dividend paying stocks based on the characteristics of stocks held in their portfolio. Many institutions follow persistent investment styles, maintaining relatively high or low dividend yield portfolios over time. Institutions which hold portfolios of higher yielding stocks are significantly more likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase or sell their stock in response to a decrease. For a subset of institutions, we directly observe the proportion of their portfolio managed on behalf of taxable clients. Consistent with tax-induced dividend clienteles, institutions with more taxable clients are less likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase. Finally, we show that stock price reactions to announcements of dividend increases are related to characteristics of the institutions holding the stock. Our results suggest that tax status, as well as other factors are important in explaining observed clientele behavior. Chapter two explores the determinants of heterogeneity in institutional investor portfolio preferences and the relationship between institutions and the clients they serve. I find that the characteristics of an institution's clients and the characteristics of the institution itself are both important determinants of portfolio preferences and trading behavior. Specifically, I find that institutions traditionally subject to prudent investor laws are more likely to invest in high quality stocks, although, institutions sub-managing money for pension funds are less prudent than pension managers themselves. In addition, I find that institutions with taxable clients are likely to avoid unnecessary dividend taxation and turn over their portfolios less frequently. More generally, institutions exhibit systematic shifts in their exposure to common risk factors that may be explained in part by the levels and changes in client composition. While evidence for a causal link between client shifts and institutional preferences is limited to mutual funds, contemporaneous changes in clients and portfolio characteristics suggest that the dynamics of institutional investment are closely related to the nature of the clients served
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2007
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
Silva, Domingos Luis Correia da. "Corporate control and financial policy : an empirical investigation of dividend policy in Germany". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.389744.
Testo completoPan, Lee-Hsien. "Two essays on dividend policy, managerial compensation, and corporate governance". Related electronic resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2009. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.
Testo completoTruong, Thanh, e thanh truong@rmit edu au. "Corporate Ownership, Equity Agency Costs and Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis". RMIT University. Economics, Finance and Marketing, 2008. http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/adt/public/adt-VIT20080528.094747.
Testo completoPan, Carrie H. "Two essays in corporate finance". Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1186166338.
Testo completoYensu, Joseph. "Capital structure, corporate cash holding and dividend policy in African countries". Thesis, University of Southampton, 2014. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/367755/.
Testo completoCharbti, Sana. "Dividend policy, irrationality approaches and behavioral corporate finance : theory and evidence". Thesis, Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020UBFCG003.
Testo completoBehavioural corporate finance is an area that has attracted a lot of interest from financial economists, psychologists and neuroscientists over the past decade. This research falls within the scope of behavioural corporate finance, which proves to be an new and promising field of research. The question of dividends, although recurrent, continues to occupy an axiological position in recent research in Finance. Since 2015, France has been considered as one of the most generous countries in terms of dividend distribution in the European Union (EU). At this level, it is a question of research aimed at delimiting the real contours of the determinants of the decision and the amount of the dividend distributed. In concrete terms, the objective of this work is to study certain exogenous factors likely to explain the dividend distribution policy, on the one hand, and to assess their impact on the payment decision and the distribution rate through the investor sentiment and behavioural biases of French executives, on the other hand. In terms of objectives, this thesis has sought to provide some answers to the questions of the importance of sectoral sentiment in the decision to pay dividends, which is the subject of the first chapter (the Catering theory). The results show that the investor sentiment does not have a significant impact on the decision to distribute dividends in the French case (Ferris et al. (2009); La Porta et al. (2000). Contrary to Anouar and Aubert (2017), our results highlight a positive and significant impact of the investor sentiment on the probability of dividend payment in the industrial sector. Such a result shows that companies in the industrial sector are able to meet investors' needs based on their demand for dividend distribution. Regression analysis confirms that sectoral sentiment is an appropriate indicator to test the Catering theory (Baker and Wurgler 2004a). The second chapter analyses the impact of managerial overconfidence on dividend distribution policy. By using a sample of French companies, we show that the excess confidence of managers plays a decisive role in explaining the dividend policy of French companies. Over-confidence of CEO has a positive effect on the dividend payout. The third chapter examines the implications of governance in terms of accountability and rationalization of decisions and its effects on the moderation of the impulses of agents' irrationality. Our main results concerning this analysis (quantile regression) show that the coefficients of the managers' overconfidence index are positive and significant, respectively, in the quantile of 30%, 50%, 60% and 80% dividend distribution. The over-confidence of French executives is reflected by an increase in dividend payments. However, the sentiment index is non-significant for different dividend distribution quantile
Kinkki, Seppo. "Essays on minority protection and dividend policy /". Helsinki : Helsinki School of Economics, 2008. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/560343396.pdf.
Testo completoAl-Najjar, Basil. "Modelling capital structure, dividend policy, and corporate governance : evidence from Jordanian data". Thesis, University of the West of England, Bristol, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.445110.
Testo completoAl, Ghazali Abdullah. "The economic and behavioural factors affecting corporate dividend policy : theory and evidence". Thesis, University of Bath, 2015. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.665388.
Testo completoYu, Bing. "Agency Costs of Stakeholders and Corporate Finance". Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1258316541.
Testo completoZagonel, Timóteo. "Política de dividendos, tributação e governança corporativa no Brasil". reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/72819.
Testo completoThis paper investigates the influence of taxes and corporate governance on dividend policy of Brazilian public companies in the years 1986 to 2011, using panel data Probit and Tobit estimation. There are several tax law changes particularly in Brazil within the period analyzed, creating a good opportunity to study dividend policy. Empirical results suggests that (a) when Earnings Per Share increased, the percentage of profits distributed in the form of dividends was higher in periods in which there was no incidence of taxation and lower when there was incidence of taxation; (b) state owned companies paid less dividends than private companies; (c) companies that paid dividends also paid Interest On Equity Capital; (d) companies under corporate governance best practices tend to pay more dividends.
Nnadi, M. A. "The effect of mergers and acquisitions on the dividend policy of banks". Thesis, Coventry University, 2010. http://curve.coventry.ac.uk/open/items/b15ce6f3-a85e-2042-c896-97b558445b23/1.
Testo completoBasuki, Hardo. "The impact of the 1997 abolition of the tax credit on dividends in the UK and corporate dividend policy". Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.424251.
Testo completoLue, Alexander W. "Fire the caterer : a test of catering theory for corporate dividend payout policy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66442.
Testo completoCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [37]).
We propose that the catering theory of dividends will not hold when tested with an extended sample period, different formulations of the dividend premium, and subsets of our sample divided by industry. The catering theory implies that managers cater to irrational and timevarying investor demand for dividends. This demand can be proxied by a dividend premium, a comparison of the market-to-book ratio of payers versus non-payers. The dividend premium that the catering model is based on suffers from a very arbitrary derivation. We find that coefficients for the regression of catering using an extended sample period and different derivations of the dividend premium give results with smaller economic and statistical significance. Furthermore, tests of our sample by industry show that the dividend premium, supposedly a market-wide measure that affects all firms, has different effects on various industries. Though the catering theory finds significance given a particular methodology, further analysis shows that the model is based on spurious correlation, and not true causation.
by Alexander W. Lue.
M.Eng.
Ding, Xiaoming. "Capital structure and dividend policy issues in corporate finance : evidence from UK firms". Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.633084.
Testo completoJohansson, Jakob, e Hallberg Martin. "Does Corporate Liquidity Affect Dividend Policy? : A Quantitative Study on Public European Firms". Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-184863.
Testo completoHop, K. G. "Corporate payout policy: a study on multinationality and legal origin". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-377174.
Testo completoWu, Yulin. "The impacts of credit default swaps on debt pricing, corporate investment and dividend policy". Thesis, University of Bath, 2018. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.767580.
Testo completoDundeberg, Mirjam. "Does vote differention affect dividend payout policy? : A study on swedish listed firms". Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Economics, Finance and Statistics, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-16118.
Testo completoZhang, Haiyan. "Corporate governance and dividend policy : a comparison of Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and in the mainland /". View abstract or full-text, 2005. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?ACCT%202005%20ZHANG.
Testo completoHuang, Shih-Yun. "Real investment and dividend policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model : corporate finance at an aggregate level through DSGE models". Thesis, University of Bradford, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/5440.
Testo completoAlharbi, Abdulrahman. "Dividend Policy in a Frontier Market and Sector Equity Traded Funds in the United States". ScholarWorks@UNO, 2017. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/2371.
Testo completoMutenheri, Enard. "The determinants of corporate financial policy in Zimbabwe : empirical evidence from company panel data". Thesis, Loughborough University, 2003. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/7578.
Testo completote, Velde Rob. "The Influence of Corporate Governance Quality and Growth Opportunities on Firms’ Payout Policy". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-377179.
Testo completoБерезіна, О. Ю. "Дивідендна політика акціонерного банку в системі факторів якості корпоративного управління". Thesis, Українська академія банківської справи Національного банку України, 2008. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/61586.
Testo completoRajaiya, Harshit. "Three Essays in Corporate and Entrepreneurial Finance:". Thesis, Boston College, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:108781.
Testo completoMy dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I analyze the impact of firms' innovation success on their corporate financial policies. I hypothesize that innovation success reduces the information asymmetry facing firms and, through the information channel, affects their capital structure and dividend policies. I measure innovation success using the quantity and quality of patents. I show that firms with higher innovation success face lower information asymmetry, measured using analyst coverage, dispersion, and forecast error. Further, I show that firms with higher innovation success have lower leverage ratios; have a greater propensity to issue equity rather than debt; and have lower dividend payout ratios. I establish causality using instrumental variable analyses with patent examiner leniency as an instrument for patent grants. In the second chapter, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur, Xuan Tian, and Qianqian Yu, we analyze the impact of trademarks in entrepreneurial firms' success. We hypothesize that trademarks play two economically important roles for entrepreneurial firms: a “protective” role, leading to better product market performance; and an “informational” role, signaling higher firm quality to investors. We develop testable hypotheses based on the above two roles of trademarks, relating the trademarks held by private firms to the characteristics of venture capital (VC) investment in them, their probability of successful exit, their valuations at their initial public offering (IPO) and in the immediate secondary market; institutional investor IPO participation; post-IPO information asymmetry; and post-IPO operating performance. We test these hypotheses using a large and unique dataset of trademarks held by VC-backed private firms. We establish causality using an instrumental variable (IV) analysis using trademark examiner leniency as the instrument. For private firms, we find that the number of trademarks held by the firm is positively related to the total amount invested by VCs and negatively related to the extent of staging by VCs. We show that the number of trademarks held by a firm increases its probability of successful exit (IPOs or acquisitions). Further, for the subsample of VC-backed firms going public, we show that the number of trademarks held by the firm leads to higher IPO and immediate secondary market firm valuations; greater IPO participation by institutional investors; a lower extent of information asymmetry in the equity market post-IPO; and better post-IPO operating performance. In the third chapter, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur and Jinfei Sheng, we develop testable hypotheses and empirically analyze the effects of outside investors having access to soft information such as online employee ratings from the Glassdoor website on firms' financing and investment policies. We find that higher online employee ratings are associated with larger equity issue announcement effects; a greater propensity to have positive announcement effects and to issue equity rather than debt to raise external financing; higher investment expenditures; greater equity issue participation by institutional investors; and better long-run post-issue operating performance. We establish causality using a difference-in-differences methodology relying on the staggered adoption of anti-SLAPP laws across U.S. states
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
"Corporate dividend policy". Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5887126.
Testo completoThesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-64).
ABSTRACT --- p.ii
ACKNOWLEGEMENTS --- p.iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.v
LIST OF TABLES --- p.vii
CHAPTER
Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1
Chapter 1.1 --- Dividends Come in Many Forms --- p.2
Chapter 1.2 --- How Do Companies Decide on Dividend Payments ? --- p.3
Chapter 1.3 --- Limitation on Dividend Payments --- p.3
Chapter 1.4 --- The Analytical Approach --- p.5
Chapter II. --- EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.7
Chapter 2.1 --- Lintner's Model --- p.7
Chapter 2.1.1 --- Stability of Dividend Rate --- p.8
Chapter 2.1.2 --- Stockholders ' Needs and Expectations --- p.9
Chapter 2.1.3 --- Earnings --- p.10
Chapter 2.1.4 --- Principal Considerations in Dividend Decisions --- p.10
Chapter 2.1.5 --- Partial Adjustment Model --- p.11
Chapter 2.2 --- Fama and Babiak's Empirical Analysis on Dividend Policy --- p.13
Chapter 2.3 --- Empirical Results for the Hong Kong Market --- p.15
Chapter 2.4 --- Miller and Modigliani's Model --- p.17
Chapter 2.4.1 --- No Agency Cost --- p.17
Chapter 2.4.2 --- No Tax --- p.17
Chapter 2.4.3 --- Full Information --- p.18
Chapter 2.4.4 --- No Transformation Cost --- p.18
Chapter 2.4.5 --- Independent Investment and Financing Decisions --- p.18
Chapter 2.4.6 --- Summary of M & M Theory [1961] --- p.18
Chapter 2.4.7 --- Other Considerations --- p.20
Chapter 2.5 --- The Information Contents of Dividends --- p.20
Chapter III. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.22
Chapter 3.1 --- Cash Dividend Policy for Hong Kong Market --- p.22
Chapter 3.2 --- Stock Dividends and Stock Splits --- p.23
Chapter 3.3 --- Cash Dividend Payment Practices --- p.25
Chapter 3.3.1 --- A Preliminary Test on Dividends and Distributed Lags --- p.26
Chapter 3.3.2 --- Initial Tests of Lintner's Model --- p.26
Chapter 3.3.3 --- Tests of the Lag Structure . --- p.27
Chapter IV. --- FINDINGS --- p.28
Chapter 4.1 --- Cash Dividend Policy for Hong Kong Market --- p.28
Chapter 4.1.1 --- Background Information --- p.28
Chapter 4.1.2 --- Principal Considerations in Dividend Decisions --- p.30
Chapter 4.1.3 --- Other Influences on Dividend Decisions --- p.31
Chapter 4.1.4 --- Earnings --- p.33
Chapter 4.1.5 --- Regularity of Payment --- p.36
Chapter 4.1.6 --- Availability of Cash --- p.37
Chapter 4.1.7 --- Stability of Rate and Dividend Growth --- p.39
Chapter 4.1.8 --- Stockholders' Needs and Expectations --- p.40
Chapter 4.2 --- Stock Dividends and Stock Splits . . . --- p.41
Chapter 4.2.1 --- Reasons for Stock Dividends --- p.41
Chapter 4.2.2 --- Reasons for Stock Splits . . --- p.43
Chapter 4.3 --- Cash Dividend Payment Practices --- p.44
Chapter 4.3.1 --- A Preliminary Test on Dividends and Distributed Lags --- p.44
Chapter 4.3.2 --- Initial Tests of Lintner's Model --- p.48
Chapter 4.3.3 --- Tests of the Lag Structure . --- p.51
Chapter V. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.54
APPENDIX --- p.56
BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.62
Hung, Hsiang-Shih. "Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy". 2004. http://www.cetd.com.tw/ec/thesisdetail.aspx?etdun=U0001-2007200411130000.
Testo completoHung, Hsiang-Shih, e 洪翔詩. "Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/60436432776121469019.
Testo completo國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
92
This paper tests two models of dividends in Taiwan during the period of 2000-2002. And the empirical results in Taiwan support the expropriation hypothesis which argues that dividends signal the severity of the conflict between controlling and small shareholder. That is firms with weak corporate governance are associated with fewer cash dividend paying. However, the expropriation phenomenon is not such obvious gauged by deviations from control rights to cash flow rights. But if we replace deviations from control rights to cash flow rights with deviations from the percentage of board seats controlling shareholders occupy to cash flow rights, the expropriation by not paying dividends to shareholders becomes significant. This variable is proven to be more representative of conflicting interests between minority and majority shareholders in our regressions and proves controlling shareholders will exert their power in the board of directors to affect corporate dividend policy.
劉錦如. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/847gcu.
Testo completo國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
105
Based on the data of listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) over the period from 2005 to 2015, this master thesis examines the linkage between firm’s engagement in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and corporate dividend policy that is proxied by cash (stock) dividend amount, cash (stock) dividend payout ratio and cash (stock) dividend payout variability. Existing studied has mentioned that CSR has benefit as well as cost on economic consequence of firm, while corporate payout policy involved meeting stockholder’s demanding for return and investment expenditure in the future, firm with enough corporate resource tends to payout its cash. Thus, CSR may affect firm’s payout policy through its effect on enhancing or destroying the value of a firm. Empirical result shows that firms with superior performance on CSR tend to pay more dividends than low-CSR-performance firms. This is consistent with the existing literature that socially responsible firms may use the dividend policy to manage the agency problem from overinvesting on CSR. The evidence also shows that firm with better performance on CSR has more stable on dividend payout, means that socially responsible firm tends to adjust dividends slower than socially irresponsible firms. Better performance on stakeholder’s management and greater dividend payout to stockholder means win-win situation could be achieved.
Hou, Wen-Lin, e 侯玟伶. "Investor Sentiment and Corporate Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84301330267676360729.
Testo completo國立東華大學
公司理財碩士學位學程
97
The research analyzes the impact of investor sentiment on dividend policy. The recent literature applied the view of cartering theory, liquidity and idiosyncratic risk of stock to explain why the low “propensity to pay dividends” in American. But they can explain the limited part. We think that investor sentiment can explain how managers do the dividend policy well. The research not only examine how investor sentiment affect dividend policy, but considering whether firms that are likely to be more affected by shifts in investor sentiment-newer, smaller, more volatile, unprofitable, with extreme growth potential firms- its dividend policy affected by investor sentiment will be more apparent. The results suggest that the impact of investor sentiment on dividend policy is statistically significant from zero, when the investor sentiment is low, firms are more likely to pay dividends, and firms are newer, smaller, more volatile, unprofitable, with extreme growth potential, its dividend policy affected by nvestor sentiment is more apparent. We also find that firms are likely to be more affected by shifts in investor sentiment, the stock market reaction to their dividend changes more depends on investor sentiment. Furthermore, we find that firms are likely to be more affected by shifts in investor sentiment, its managers do learn from the firm’s own considering investor sentiment experience. If considered the investor sentiment had the great market reaction in last time, will enhance managers do consider the investor sentiment again.
TUNG, YU-SHAN, e 董玉珊. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8qkz3d.
Testo completo國立高雄應用科技大學
財富與稅務管理系碩士在職專班
104
ABSTRACT This thesis examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and dividend policy. Using the survey data made by Comrnon Wealth Magazine during 2007-2014 as the sample of CSR performance. This research also follows Chan et al. (2004) to use five matching-control firms based on market capitalization and book-to-market ratio and consists of 1,224 observations in the study. The empirical results suggest a positive relationship between CSR performance and dividend payout, indicating the firms control the phenomenon of overinvestment in CSR through higher dividend payout. Moreover, the firms with high CSR score or high governance score are also associated with high dividend payout. Furthermore, socially irresponsible firms adjust dividends quicker than socially responsible firms, dividend policy is less stable in low CSR firms than in high CSR firms.
Wu, Yi-Chen, e 吳羿蓁. "Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout Policy". Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xjpnjm.
Testo completo國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
106
This paper investigates the relationship between abnormal corporate governance and dividend policy by using the sample of Taiwan’s public firms. Based on the agency theory proposed by La Porta et al. (2000), we consider two controversial hypotheses: the outcome and substitute hypotheses to discuss whether Taiwan’s dividend policy is used to solve agency problem. Different from the traditional corporate governance, we create an “abnormal corporate governance index” by controlling the characteristics of CEOs and firms and see how it affects dividend policy. Our empirical findings show that abnormal corporate governance is negatively correlated to cash dividend policy, which means that our results are consistent with “substitute model”. It can be seen that Taiwan’s dividend policy is more relevant to investment opportunities. The firms with better corporate governance often have lower agency cost and managers tend to use retained earnings to gain more benefit; thus, they will have less dividend payout but more investment opportunities. On the contrary, the firms with worse corporate governance, managers tend to pay dividends to relieve shareholders’ concerns of expropriation.
Wang, Li-Ting, e 王麗亭. "Corporate Governance, Dividend Policy, Accrual Quality and Corporate Value". Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/58524647062609744550.
Testo completo輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
94
The thesis examines the relationship among corporate governance structure, cash dividend policy, accrual quality and firm value. The sample consists of observations selected from listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan from 1998 to 2004. The empirical results are summarized as follows. 1.As the cash flow rights held by the controlling shareholder increases, both the likelihood of cash dividends payment and the level of cash dividends will get higher. Moreover, the accrual quality will get better. The finding shows that when the ownership of the controlling shareholder gets higher, the incentive effect will dominant, and thus the interest of the controlling shareholder will be more congruent with minor shareholders, in turn it helps for improving the accrual quality of financial statements. 2.If the proportion of seats of the board of directors controlled by the controlling shareholder increases, then the likelihood of cash dividends payment and the level of cash dividends are lower. Further, the accrual quality will get worse. The finding shows that when the board of directors is high affiliated with the controlling shareholder, the entrenchment effect will dominant, and thus the controlling shareholder will exploit minor shareholders’ interests and impair the accrual quality of financial statements. 3.The predicted excess cash dividends arising from corporate governance structure incrementally decrease the cost of equity capital after controlling other variables. In addition, the effect of cash dividends on the firms with worse accrual quality will get stronger. Besides, the predicted excess accrual quality arising from corporate governance structure is negatively correlated with cost of debt. Furthermore, for the firms paying no cash dividends, the predicted excess accrual quality arising from corporate governance structure incrementally decreases the cost of equity capital. 4.For firms with excess cash dividends or accrual quality arising from corporate governance structure, they will have better performance in the future. The finding shows that as firms with better corporate governance mechanisms (they are proxy by the cash flow rights held by the controlling shareholder is higher or the board of directors is not high affiliated with the controlling shareholder) signal positive future operating performance. Overall, our evidences support the views that better corporate governance structure can strengthen cash dividend policy and improve accrual quality, and the predicted excess cash dividends or accrual quality arising from corporate governance structure can be the monitoring role in mitigating the agency problems effectively and thus reduce the cost of capital. In addition, cash dividends and accrual quality are effective signal about future performance of firms. They can be regarded as tools to communicate with stakeholders, and further, to mitigate asymmetric information and agency conflicts.
HUANG, MEI-FANG, e 黃玫芳. "Top Managers’ Characteristics and Corporate Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67913893628437820960.
Testo completo大葉大學
企業管理學系碩士班
104
This study investigates whether top managers’ characteristics affect corporate dividend policies. The sample firms include publicly listed firms in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange from 2010 to 2014. We use three variables as proxies of top managers’ characteristics, including whether the top managers’ professional background is related to accounting and finance, whether the top managers get a master or PhD degree, and their seniority in the top management position. Also we use dummy of whether the firms pay dividends and dividend yields as proxies of corporate dividend policies. The empirical results indicate that the higher the top managers’ seniority, the more likely the firms pay the dividends. However, top managers with accounting or financial professional background tend to have low dividend yield. This paper also finds that firm size and profitability have positive impacts on corporate dividend policies.
Wang, Chia Han, e 王家菡. "Relationships between Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/28217864796514386319.
Testo completo長庚大學
企業管理研究所
100
In the past literatures, the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy can be concluded to outcome or substitution models, and we use six dividend policies to investigate the relationship between the corporate governance and dividend policies for the firms in Taiwan from 1996 to 2006. We use panel data model to test which dividend policy is more explainable. Besides, in the past researches, they do not study the cross-section and time-series data at the same time, but we consider not only the cross-section data but also the time-series data. From the empirical results, we have the conclusions as follows: First of all, although the empirical results show that the results of control rights to cash-flow rights are not significant under the six deviation policies, they all support the substitution model. This means firms would pay more dividends while the interest between minority and majority contains more conflicting. Secondly, cash dividends payout is the most significant, because it could reflect actual situation of growth of company. Finally, Stock dividend multiply price is more significant to explain the relationship between corporate governance and dividends policy.
Chen, Szu-Yuan, e 陳思源. "Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Cash Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05876084801438823861.
Testo completo國立東華大學
公司理財碩士學位學程
97
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the structure of executives’ compensation and the corporate governances affects cash dividend policy based on the data from listed companies in Taiwan stock exchange market during 2004 to 2007. Family controlled firms display different governance culture and monitoring mechanism than non-family controlled firms, so this study further investigates the difference between them. The empirical results we document are below: (1)Executive compensation is associated with higher dividend payouts. This result indicate better aligning the interests of management and shareholders, could result in a higher level of dividend payouts. (2)Blockholders’ ownership concentration is associated with higher dividend payouts. (3)Higher active institutional investors’ ownership results in higher dividend payouts. (4)Independent board membership affects higher dividend payouts. Higher Independent board members could improve board’s monitoring mechanism and result in higher dividend payouts to protect minority shareholders’ interest. (5)In the family controlled firms, higher blockholders’ ownership, active institutional investors and independent board membership could result in higher dividend payouts. (6)Executive compensation and managerial stock ownership are associated with higher dividend payouts, in the non-family controlled firms. These results indicate that firms apply managerial incentives to relieve agency problems when making dividend policy decision.
Yeh, Ying-Chao, e 葉穎超. "The Influence of Dividend Policy on Corporate Growth". Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/77031391282198310924.
Testo completo國立中山大學
企業管理學系研究所
101
In the past, most of domestic scholars research the relation between dividend policy and corporate growth, they all regard corporate growth as one of company''s characteristics and the explanation parameter of the influence of company''s dividend policy. However when company chooses to retain earnings or pay dividends, its purpose is nothing more than hopes to regard retained earnings as reinvestment fund in the future, or hopes to convey the company operating information. Therefore, this study investigated the influence of dividend policy on corporate growth through empirical evidence and from the point of use retained earnings. In addition this study also investigated industry and laws factors which whether change the influence of dividend policy on corporate growth. The empirical results yield the following finding: 1. Cash dividend had significant negative relationships with growth opportunities and realized growth; Stock dividend and total dividend had significant positive relationships with growth opportunities and realized growth. 2. Industry factor would change the influence of cash dividend and total dividend on growth opportunities, but does not change the influence of stock dividend on growth opportunities. 3. Tax integration factor would change the influence of stock dividend and total dividend on growth opportunities and realized growth, but does not change the influence of cash dividend on t growth opportunities and realized growth.
Tsou, Sheng-wei, e 鄒聲偉. "Corporate Dividend Policy of MNCs and Domestic Firms". Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/26202057719244703708.
Testo completo逢甲大學
國際貿易所
100
The dividend policy of company is always a subject which is worth to explore. Past literature about dividend policy is too much, but there is none to explore the relationship between internationalization and dividend policy. That’s the purpose of this research. This research follows the model of Denis and Osobov, uses five different international variables to explore whether the internationalization of firms will affect the propensity of dividend payment and dividend payout ratio or not. The results are as follows: 1. It’s true that the internationalization of firms would affect the propensity of dividend payment. 2. The internationalization of firms would affect the payout ratio too, but there is no evidence robust to support. 3. Taiwan’s MNCs dividend payment would be affect by internationalization, neither do DCs. 4. It’s not so identical that there is a nonlinear relationship between the internationalization of firms and dividend payment, and there is a nonlinear relationship between the internationalization of firms and dividend payout ratio, and it is also not identical. However, we can understand that the internationalization of firms would affect dividend policy, and this result can be a good example for all the pubic firms in Taiwan. Key Word: Dividend policy, Internationalization
Chen, Guan-Conng, e 陳冠璁. "Non-Controlling Director Influence on Corporate Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/26663300293730324569.
Testo completo中國文化大學
會計學系
103
The electoral system of board has been a major factor affecting corporate governance. But in these years many companies often use the electoral system to control the member of board, so let the situation of long time long-serving chairman and one maker board happenes. Therefore, at 2011 for solve this malpractice. Government modify Company Law Section 198 from the block vote to only can use cumulative voting. Its goal is expected non-controlling interest can be join to the board, and let the board seats become flowing. Then that companies produce more good decisions and become flourish. Dividend policy is one of the major decisions in financial activities, and Rozeff (1982) considered the dividend policy can reduce agency costs and can solve the problem of payment of cash dividends. This study was to investigate the non-controlling interest of directors for corporate dividend policy implications. And expect can made contribution to the corporate governance. The results show that: the more seat of non-controlling interest in the board let cash dividend payment become higher. It’s mean that non-controlling interest is really prefer cash dividends. And the reason is the non-controlling interest are chosen by non-controlling interest shareholders or independent directors. Because the request of outside shareholders is cash dividends (Gordon, 1962; Rozeff, 1982). The independent directors rests with specialized knowledge and experience are preference for cash dividends, too(張雅琳,2004;趙苑婷,2011). Because the cash dividend policy can improve the value of the company, and can have a great help for raise funds. So the independent directors also prefer cash dividend policy.
Kuo, Yu-Chen, e 郭宇晨. "Impacts of Corporate Social Responsibility on Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/h276t6.
Testo completo國立臺灣科技大學
企業管理系
107
Corporate actions in social and environmental responsibility are developing due to global changes. In addition to engaging in charitable activities and reducing environmental impact, the way companies are promoting sustainable development is also extremely important. Most of the previous research has focused on value creation associated with high levels of corporate social responsibility (CSR) involvement. However, this trend has now begun to focus on studying and explaining the impact of CSR participation on wealth distribution. The motivation and purpose of this research are to investigate the impact of Taiwan's CSR on dividend policy. Based on agency theory and signaling theory, using 2,942 annual observations of listed companies from 2013 to 2017 collected by the TEJ Taiwan Economic News as well as 8 CSR Dimension scores to evaluate the company's CSR, the study employed the Least Squares Regression to analyze and showed that companies with a high level of CSR will pay higher dividends. This result also showed that CSR companies are not only responsible for society in the process of creating wealth, but also in the distribution of wealth creation.
"Essays in Corporate Policy". Doctoral diss., 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.30057.
Testo completoDissertation/Thesis
Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2015
Su, Ching-Yi, e 蘇靜怡. "Effects of country and corporate governance on dividend policy". Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/r43xws.
Testo completo國立東華大學
企業管理學系
96
The objective of this study is to investigate the effects of country and corporate governances on dividend policy. Moreover, the thesis studies that growth opportunity affects the relationship between governance and dividend policy. Therefore, the effects of country and corporate governances on dividend policy also are discussed, when considered company and country growth opportunity. Besides, we also have the interests in that country governance whether is more important to the dividend policy, and which growth opportunity is more important to the dividend policy. According to the study of La Porta et al. (2000), there are two agency models of dividends. One is outcome model and another is substitute model. We apply the data from United States and Chinese stock markets to analyze above issues. From the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy, we found that the Chinese firms’ dividend policy consists with the substitute model and the United States firms’ dividend policy more tends to the outcome model. From the effect of country governance on dividend policy, the regression result shows that it was not apparent consisted with the substitute model. In additional, we consider the company growth opportunity on the effect of corporate governance to dividend policy. The result shows that the Chinese firms consist with the outcome model, but the United States firms are not. The substitute model is considered if country growth opportunity is included into the model. It means that considering the country growth opportunity, the dividend payout of Chinese firms is greater than United States firms. Finally, the empirical result found corporate governance is more important than country governance, and company growth opportunity is more significant regarding to dividend policy.
Yu, shan-hwa, e 余姍樺. "The Review of Dividend Policy in Taiwan Corporate Law". Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/10569839250889145719.
Testo completo中原大學
財經法律研究所
96
Dividend policy can show the company’s profit and going and a perfect dividend policy can even draw money from capital market easily. However managers have the discretion over the free cash flow of the company. It will incur agency costs of free cash flow because managers might invest it at below the cost of capital or waste it on organization inefficiencies. So in order to reduce agency costs between shareholders and managers dividend policy still is the best solution. But in Taiwan Corporate Law, managers can make the dividend policy and submit the resolutions on the surplus earning distribution to general meeting of shareholders for its ratification (Company Act § 230). If a company pays dividends and bonuses in violation of the provisions of the preceding article, creditors of the company may request rescission and may also claim for compensation for loss or damage resulted there-from. (Company Act § 233). From the studying of the Company Act, shareholders and creditors have claims over the dividend policy made by managers. But the question is the regulations of the Company Act can effectively encourage managers to make a perfect dividend policy and reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. Otherwise in this thesis I will also compare the EU’s Second Directive (77/91/EEC) with USA legislation and figure out which legislation is adaptable to Taiwan corporate law. By the rising of the hostile takeover, managers can use their discretions over dividend policy as defensive tactics to serve their own interests. This behavior not only increases the conflict of interests but also decrease the value of companies. So in hostile takeover we should rethink the allocation of powers between shareholders and directors to maximize the corporate value.
Chuang, Ya-Cheng, e 莊雅程. "The Influence of Corporate Governance Quality on Dividend Policy". Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41912585354111802432.
Testo completo國立中正大學
企業管理研究所
100
The purpose of this study is to verify whether the quality of corporate governance affects the release of the company's dividend policy or not. Samples were selected from the Taiwan listed companies in manufacturing industry during the year of 2005 to 2010 and 5,422 samples were obtained. In this study, we also take the data from the Taiwan Corporate Governance Association and use Corporate Governance Quality Score (Gov-Score) to identify the quality of corporate governance. The variables of dividend policy include dividend yield, the cash dividends / total asset ratio, and the cash dividends / after-tax net profit margin. Ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression analyses were adopted to explore the correlation between the quality of corporate governance and dividend policy. The empirical results show that: 1.Corporate governance quality has significant impact on the cash dividend yield. 2.Corporate governance quality has significant impact on the ratio of dividend to total assets. 3.Corporate governance quality has significant impact on whether cash dividend was delivered.