Tesi sul tema "Constitutional law – history"
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1
Aroney, Nicholas Theodore 1966. "The Federal Commonwealth of Australia : a study in the formation of its constitution". Monash University, Faculty of Law, 2001. http://arrow.monash.edu.au/hdl/1959.1/8864.
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2
Joseph, Rosara. "The war prerogative : history, reform and constitutional design". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9b7c6ac7-6c0e-4a84-ac01-bd11732d0ef8.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis studies the evolution of the war prerogative in England from 1600-2010. It traces the historical theory and practice of the war prerogative and proposes reform of the constitutional arrangements for its exercise. It addresses three key questions. First, what have writers on political and constitutional theory said about the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, and, in particular, what justifications have been advanced for those arrangements? Secondly, in practice, has the executive in fact possessed sole and exclusive powers over war and the deployment of force, or have Parliament and the courts had a role to play in their exercise and scrutiny? Thirdly, are there better ways to organise our constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, to enable a more substantive role for Parliament (particularly the House of Commons) in its exercise and scrutiny? On the first question, I show that orthodox theoretical and political discourses have continuously asserted the executive’s exclusive power over war, but the justifications advanced for that arrangement have changed over time. Those changes reflect the varying influence of different political theories at different times. On the second question, I find that, contrary to orthodox theoretical and political discourses, Parliament has played an active and substantive role in the exercise and scrutiny of the war prerogative. The courts have refused to intervene in the exercise of the war prerogative, but have been more ready to intervene in cases involving the exercise of powers incidental to the war prerogative. On the third question, I argue that reform of the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative is necessary and desirable. I recommend the use of ‘institutional mechanisms’, which are small-scale rules and institutional arrangements, within existing institutions, which aim to promote certain normative goals. In particular, I propose a statute which would impose conditions on the executive’s exercise of its war prerogative. I argue that these proposals show that, through careful institutional design, democratic values, national security and operational efficiency can each be reconciled and promoted.
3
Thompson, Bankole. "The constitutional history and law of Sierra Leone (1961-1995) /". Lanham (Md.) : University Press of America, 1997. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb389022691.
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4
Preibusch, Sophie Charlotte. "Verfassungsentwicklungen im Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen 1871-1918 : Integration durch Verfassungsrecht? /". Berlin : BWV, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016543635&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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5
Bose, Feler. "Evolutionary impulses in law". Fairfax, VA : George Mason University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1920/2986.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Thesis (Ph. D.)--George Mason University, 2007.Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Jan. 17, 2008). Thesis directors: Charles K. Rowley, Duncan Black. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics. Vita: p. 206. Includes bibliographical references (p. 201-203). Also available in print.
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Schmidt, Christian Hermann. "Vorrang der Verfassung und konstitutionelle Monarchie eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Problem der Normenhierarchie in den deutschen Staatsordnungen im frühen und mittleren 19. Jahrhundert (1818-1866) /". Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2000. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/45716296.html.
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Saccone, Giuseppe Mario. "The role of A Dialogue in Hobbes's conception of law and legal history". Thesis, University of Exeter, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240761.
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8
Staggers, Elijah T. "Dred Scott v. Sandford| The African-American Self-Identity Through Constitutional Hermeneutics". Thesis, Georgetown University, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10104386.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, Chief Justice Roger Taney spoke for the majority of the United States Supreme Court to declare that Blacks were not constituent members of the American political sovereignty, but rather they were “beings of an inferior order, altogether unfit to associate with the white race” and they “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” Through engaging in a critical inquiry of constitutional hermeneutics, Blacks looked to the Constitution to deduce their collective identity. However, when they looked in the constitutional mirror, they saw a broken reflection. By evaluating the existential dichotomy of the African-American self-identity revealed in the responses to the Dred Scott decision, this research argues that the African-American self-identity was broken by the Supreme Court’s declaration that they were neither citizens nor people under the Constitution; however, in the face of the Dred Scott decision, the African-American self-identity used the very document which denied their right to exist, to galvanize a unique identity capturing their oppression, and the hope to realize their deprived liberty.
9
De, Thy Ludovic. "L’écriture des lois constitutionnelles de 1875 : La fondation de l’ordre constitutionnel de la IIIe République". Thesis, Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017UBFCF004/document.
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10
Versteeg, Mila. "Words of liberty : the origins and evolution of constitutional ideas". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.669950.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
It has become almost universal practice for countries to adopt written constitutions that include a bill of rights. Yet we know little about the origins and evolution of the practice of constitution-writing on a global scale. Are bills of rights defining statements of the nation’s character and identity? Or are they more standardized documents that are similar across countries, and vary only at the margins? Are substantive constitutional features rooted in the society for which they are written, or are they borrowed from elsewhere? What are the origins of the world’s “words of liberty”? This thesis presents the first-ever systematic substantive exploration of the world’s written constitutions. It introduces a new database, based on the coding of the constitutions of 188 countries, for the period 1946-2006. With this data, it explores the historical trajectory of the world’s written constitutions and offers explanations for their substantive content. This thesis's most important finding is that constitutions are inherently “transnational” documents. As it turns out, substantive constitutional choices are remarkably unrelated to local needs and values. Constitutions do not express identity or national character. Instead, the most important predictor of whether any particular country adopts any particular constitutional provision is whether other countries previously did the same thing. Constitutions do not tell stories of the nation’s history, but rather tell stories of transnational interactions and international politics. As a result, constitutions have become at least partly standardized documents that vary along a small number of underlying dimensions. But this thesis also shows that not all constitutions are the same, and that there exists no evidence of a global constitutional convergence. Instead, the world’s constitutions divide in a limited number of constitutional families. This thesis is not currently available in ORA.
11
Swithinbank, Hannah J. "Talking politics : constructing the res publica after Caesar's assassination /". St Andrews, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/910.
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Kwon, Chan Doo. "Reassessing Korean legal culture and the rule of law : legal history, constitutional review and negotiations". Phd thesis, Faculty of Law, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/5994.
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Stephens, Otis H. Jr, John M. II Scheb e Colin Glennon. "American Constitutional Law, Volume I and II: Civil Rights and Liberties". Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University, 2015. http://amzn.com/1285736923.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Volumes I and II, combines cases, decisions, and authorial commentary to maximize your learning and understanding in this course. These comprehensive volumes cover the entire range of topics in constitutional law. Volume I examines the institutional aspects of constitutional law; Volume II deals with civil rights and liberties. Each of the chapters includes an introductory essay providing the legal, historical, political, and cultural context of Supreme Court jurisprudence in a particular area of constitutional interpretation. Each chapter also contains several boxed features (labeled "Case in Point" and "Sidebar") to provide additional perspective and context for the set of edited decisions from the United States Supreme Court cases that follow. In selecting, editing, and updating the materials, the authors emphasize recent trends in major areas of constitutional interpretation, as well as many landmark decisions, some of which retain importance as precedents while others illustrate the transient nature of constitutional interpretation. Because the book provides a good balance of decisions and authorial commentary, this text appeals to instructors of law as well as instructors of political science.https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1021/thumbnail.jpg
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Sempill, Julian Andrei. "Making law about power". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a5ffd843-dbad-44c5-b963-bca59da66f6a.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the inhabitants of some parts of Europe and the North American colonies were confronted with proto-state institutional arrangements. In certain cases, they responded ambivalently. That ambivalence is at the heart of what I will call the 'limited government tradition'. The tradition's adherents thought that long historical experience, not to mention the events of their own times, provided ample evidence of the corrupting effects of power on those who wield it. Power-holders, left to their own devices, are likely to succumb to the temptations of power by exercising it arbitrarily. Where they are able to do so comprehensively and systematically, the upshot is tyranny. How, then, to ensure that state power is constituted in a manner that is inhospitable to tyranny? The tradition envisaged a range of measures, including a distinctive vision of 'the Rule of Law'. The Rule of Law would both define and enforce certain limits on state power. This study argues that the tradition's hostility to political absolutism is based on moral foundations which apply with equal force to economic power. The tradition ought to examine the modern constitution of economic power to determine whether it is hospitable to arbitrariness and tyranny. If such an examination is undertaken, we learn that modern economic power poses the kind of moral dangers that the tradition's Rule of Law project is designed to combat. However, the tradition assumes that it need not treat economic power as even a potential target of the Rule of Law. I will call that assumption the 'Consensus'. This study's first major aim is to explain the origins and stubbornness of the Consensus. Its second major aim is to persuade readers that the Consensus is mistaken: the tradition must regard economic power as, at least, a potential target of the Rule of Law.
15
Harms, Katharina. "Verfassungsrecht in Umbruchsituationen /". Baden-Baden : Nomos, 1999. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=015248436&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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16
Knecht, Ingo. "Der Reichsdeputationshauptschluss vom 25. Februar 1803 Rechtmässigkeit, Rechtswirksamkeit und verfassungsgeschichtliche Bedeutung /". Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2007. http://books.google.com/books?id=IoqbAAAAMAAJ.
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Drake, Thomas. "Eyewitness to History in Devolution of Democracy and Constitutional Rights Following 9/11". Thesis, Walden University, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10284227.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Many researchers and political experts have commented on the disenfranchisement of the citizenry caused by irresponsible use of power by the government that potentially violates the 4th Amendment rights of millions of people through secret mass surveillance programs. Disclosures of this abuse of power are presumably protected by the 1st Amendment, though when constitutional protections are not followed by the government, the result can be prosecution and imprisonment of whistleblowers. Using a critical autoethnographic approach, the purpose of this study was to examine the devolution of democratic governance and constitutional rights in the United States since 9/11. Using the phenomena of my signature indictment (the first whistleblower since Daniel Ellsberg was charged under the Espionage Act) and prosecution by the U.S. government, data were collected through interviews with experts associated with this unique circumstance. These data, including my own recollections of the event, were inductively coded and subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. The findings revealed that the use of national security as the primary grounds to suppress democracy and the voices of whistleblowers speaking truth to, and about, power increased authoritarian tendencies in government. These tendencies gave rise to extra-legal autocratic behavior and sovereign state control over the institutions of democratic governance. Positive social change can only take place in a society that has robust governance and social structures that strengthen democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and do not inhibit or suppress them.
18
Fargeaud, Benjamin. "La doctrine constitutionnelle sous la IVe République : Naissance d'une nouvelle génération de constitutionnalistes". Thesis, Paris 2, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA020054.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
En 1945, la période de la Libération devait également être un moment de rénovation pour le droit constitutionnel. Au moment même où la France se dotait d’une nouvelle Constitution, une nouvelle génération de constitutionnalistes accède au devant de la scène. A la génération des « disciples », qui elle-même avait succédé à la génération des fondateurs, succède celle que Marcel Prélot avait baptisée la « troisième génération de constitutionnalistes » et qui devait être la génération des « novateurs ». La rénovation du droit constitutionnel s’avéra toutefois un programme difficile à mettre en œuvre. La IVe République, malgré l’adoption d’une Constitution nouvelle, est rapidement revenue aux pratiques et usages de la IIIe République antérieure, décevant ainsi les espoirs de la doctrine constitutionnelle et les tentatives de façonner un droit constitutionnel propre au nouveau régime. Constatant l’échec du droit constitutionnel à encadrer la vie parlementaire, les constitutionnalistes ont alors délaissé le terrain de la technique constitutionnelle et se sont tournés vers la science politique afin de refonder leur discipline. Si cette voie politiste a permis à la « jeune école de droit public » d’aborder des champs de recherches nouveaux, tels que les partis politiques ou l’histoire des idées politiques, elle l’a toutefois détournée du terrain de la technique constitutionnelle sur lequel allait finalement se jouer la révision constitutionnelle de 1958, qui a consacré la Constitution de la Ve RépubliqueIn 1945, the Liberation era was supposed to be a time when constitutional law would be renovated. At the very moment where France was adopting a new Constitution, a new generation of constitutional law Professors emerged. From the « disciple » generation which succeeded to « the founders » generation itself, the « Third generation of constitutional law Professors », as Marcel Prélot named them, emerged. It was meant to be the « creative » generation. But renewing constitutional law was not an easy task. Notwithstanding the adoption of a new Constitution, the IVth Republic rapidly came back to the uses and habits of the IIIrd Republic. It therefore disappointed the hopes of the constitutional legal doctrine and its attempts to reshape a specific constitutional law suiting the new regime. Taking note of the failure of constitutional law to frame the parliamentary daily life, constitutional law Professors reoriented their efforts to renew their academic discipline in a way that would get closer to political sciences. This new orientation allowed the « Third generation » to tackle new fields of research, such as political parties or the history of political ideas, but diverted them from a more technical approach. However, it was on the latter that the constitutional revision of 1958 that set out the Constitution of the Vth Republic settled
19
O'Byrne, Nicole Colleen. "The answer to the 'Natural Resources Question' : a historical analysis of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements". Thesis, McGill University, 2005. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=99147.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Seventy-five years ago the provincial governments of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta signed a series of Natural Resources Transfer Agreements (NRTAs) with the federal government. These agreements provided the answer to a contentious debate known as the 'Natural Resources Question'. Before the NRTAs, the three prairie provinces did not have control over their public domain lands and did not share equal constitutional status with the other Canadian provinces. In the early 1920s, Prime Minister King recognized the validity of the provincial arguments for constitutional equality and no longer wanted the federal government to be responsible for the administration of provincial natural resources. By this time, the policy ambitions which had previously justified the retention of the natural resources had been fulfilled. Thus, the constitutional rights arguments presented by the prairie provinces found a receptive audience when the control of the lands and resources were no longer a federal priority.
20
Dlamini, Lomakhosi G. "Socio-economic and political constraints on constitutional reform in Swaziland". University of the Western Cape, 2005. http://etd.uwc.ac.za/index.php?module=etd&action=viewtitle&id=gen8Srv25Nme4_4327_1197279930.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This study looked at socio-economic and political constraints on constitutional reform in Swaziland, an independent state with a fully autonomous government that falls under the Monarch who is Head of State. Swaziland maintains strong economic and trading links with South Africa and also maintains such ties with other states, especially in the Southern African Development Community region. Up untill 1973, the country's constitution was Westminister based. This was evoked and replaced with a system designed to facilitate the practice of both western and traditional styles of government. This system incorporated the system known as Tinkhundla and provides for the people to elect candidates to be their parliamentary representatives for specific constituencies.
21
Callum, Douglas R. "Soviet society and law : the history of the legal campaign to enforce the constitutional duty to work". Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1995. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6553/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In both the 1936 and 1977 USSR Constitutions conscientious labour in socially useful activity was decreed to be a "duty and matter of honour" for every Soviet citizen. This study examines the various approaches adopted by successive Soviet leaderships in their determined efforts to reinforce that ethos. It focuses, in particular, on the so-called "anti-parasite" laws dating back to 1957, when as a part of Khrushchev's attempt to revive popular justice, several smaller republics experimented with enactments that permitted peer justice institutions in the form of amorphous social assemblies to exile "parasites" via a procedure which bypassed the existing court system. Special attention is devoted to the criticism lodged against the laws (during their adoption and spread to the other union republics in 1961) by members of the legal profession, who complained that the wide punitive given to the extra-judicial bodies and the attitudes and behaviour encouraged in them would erode the respect for "socialist legality" which they had been charged with enhancing in the minds of the mass public. Although as a result of such criticism, the Khrushchev regime modified the peer justice institutions in the early 1960's, and even though his populism was absorbed by or subordinated to the normative sector of social control in Brezhnev's legal policy, the study highlights the fact that complaints of abuses and inconsistencies in anti-parasite proceedings continued to be levelled against the prosecution process. This, it is contended, was due in large part to the extreme vagueness of the notion of social parasitism itself, although the lack of a precise and consistent definition of this peculiar offence (and of the key elements which were deemed to constitute it) was actually seen as necessary and even desirable since it allowed the authorities to use the anti-parasite legislation as a weapon of suppression against a broad spectrum of socially, politically, and economically inconvenient groups within Soviet society.
22
Guttenberg, Karl-Theodor zu. "Verfassung und Verfassungsvertrag : konstitutionelle Entwicklungsstufen in den USA und der EU /". Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2009. http://d-nb.info/992131669/04.
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Lunau, Ralf. "Auf der Schwelle dieser Demokratie : Normentstehung und Normbestand der Verfassung des Landes Thüringen vom 20. Dezember 1946 /". Stuttgart [u.a.] : Boorberg, 2003. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/368930297.pdf.
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Lainé, Julien. "Empirisme et conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Lille 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LIL20014.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l’empirisme et du conceptualisme interroge la possibilité pour la doctrine, d’induire de la jurisprudence des catégories plus générales et abstraites, facilitant la connaissance d’une discipline essentiellement jurisprudentielle. L’idée de confronter cette problématique au droit constitutionnel est d’abord liée aux mutations de la discipline depuis la création du Conseil constitutionnel en 1958. Précisément, le développement de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle pouvait laisser présumer une facette empirique en droit constitutionnel, susceptible d’interroger la nécessité pour la doctrine, de procéder a posteriori à une mise en ordre synthétique des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel. En réalité, l’alternance entre l’empirisme et le conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel dépasse le seul rapport de la doctrine et la jurisprudence. La présente étude s’efforce alors de saisir dans tous les stades de la discipline, et quelles que soient les sources, le travail de systématisation du droit. Néanmoins, il ne s’agit pas de se contenter de suivre, conformément à une démarche chronologique, l’évolution de la pensée en droit constitutionnel, mais de procéder à l’identification de périodes. Le conceptualisme ancien, hérité des premiers manuels de droit constitutionnel à la fin du XIXe siècle, a permis d’élaborer les grands principes du droit constitutionnel français. Partant, l’évolution des méthodes doctrinales tout au long du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle, en lien avec l’évolution du droit lui-même, soumet ces principes à des démarches plus empiriques. Il s’agit d’abord, d’un premier courant doctrinal apparu à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qualifié dans le cadre de la présente étude de « empirisme politique », puis, aux alentours des années 1970, d’un second courant, défendant un « empirisme juridique ». Enfin et cette dernière période demeure en cours, le développement de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, caractérisée par son empirisme, ouvre la voie à un « empirisme jurisprudentiel », dont les enjeux sont plus largement abordés dans la présente étudeThe issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods. The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after World War II and is described as “political empiricism” in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970’s and advocates a “legal empiricism”. Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for “case law empiricism”, widely discussed in this analysis
25
Baird, Rory S. "An in Depth Look at Gonzales V. Raich: The History of Medical Marijuana and the Commerce Clause". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/125.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The Supreme Court case, Gonzales v. Raich (2005), ruled medical marijuana use, authorized by the State of California, was subject to federal prosecution and regulation under the interstate commerce clause.
26
Gren, Marie. "De la suprématie législative à la suprématie constitutionnelle : étude comparée d'un changement de paradigme en France : en Israël et au Royaume-Uni". Thesis, Paris 1, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA01D061.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Le système juridique repose sur un paradigme constitutionnel. La dialectique entre la doctrine, le constituant et le juge renforce le consensus dominant qui constitue ce paradigme. La puissance de ces convictions partagées implique que le passage d'un paradigme à un autre se fait par le biais d'un processus révolutionnaire. Lorsque survient une crise, une rupture révolutionnaire peut bouleverser l'ordre constitutionnel établi. Si cette révolution réussi un nouveau modèle paradigmatique, accepté par la majorité des acteurs juridiques, se substitue à l'ancien. L'analyse détaillée d'un tel processus de substitution de paradigme en droit constitutionnel a rarement été faite. L'étude comparée du passage du paradigme de la suprématie législative à celui de la suprématie constitutionnelle, en France, en Israël et au Royaume-Uni en est une excellente illustration. Dans ces trois pays, la crise du paradigme de la suprématie législative a conduit les juges à adopter des décisions révolutionnaires qui renversent ces systèmes initialement construits sur le modèle de la toute-puissance parlementaire. La décision Liberté d'association du Conseil constitutionnel, l'arrêt Mizrahi Bank de la Cour suprême israélienne et l'arrêt Factortame de la Chambre des Lords forment le point de départ du processus révolutionnaire qui a conduit à l'établissement du nouveau paradigme de la suprématie constitutionnelle. L'acceptation de ces décisions juridictionnelles par les constitutionnalistes et parfois leur validation par le constituant, a contribué à la mise en place du nouveau consensus, qui repose sur la garantie de normes constitutionnelles par les jugesThe legal system relies on a constitutional paradigm. Dialectics between legal scholars, Parliament vested with constituent power and judges reinforces the consensus underpinning the paradigm. Given the compelling strength of these shared beliefs, a revolutionary process is necessary to overtum the system. At a time of crisis questioning the paradigm, a revolution can subvert the constitutional order if it is approved by the majority of legal actors, and particularly constitutional scholars. A detailed analysis of such a process in constitutional law has rarely been made. A perceptive study of such a phenomenon can be made by comparing the change of paradigm from legal to constitutional supremacy in France, Israel and the United Kingdom. In these three legal orders, the crisis of legislative supremacy lead judges to make revolutionary decisions, striking down a system based on the omnipotence of Parliament. The Constitutional Council Freedom of Association decision, the Israeli Supreme Court Mizrahi Bank case and the House of Lords Factortame case were a revolutionary move towards constitutional supremacy. The creation of a new paradigm, relying on the protection of constitutional norms by judges has then been favored by its acceptance by constitutional experts and sometimes even by Parliament
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Bujadoux, Jean-Félix de. "Rationalisation du parlementarisme en France (XIXe-XXIe siècles)". Thesis, Paris 2, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA020028.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Le concept de la rationalisation du parlementarisme a été dégagé par Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch en 1928 à partir de son étude des Constitutions adoptées dans les nouveaux pays européens issus du Traité de Versailles. Il renvoie à une démarche de codification écrite des pratiques et des usages régissant les rapports entre le pouvoir exécutif et les assemblées dans un régime parlementaire, afin de les aménager selon une finalité déterminée.En France, à l’instar d’autres pays européens durant la même période, cette démarche a été poursuivie par les constituants en 1946, puis en 1958. Toutefois, l’idée de rationaliser le parlementarisme en fonction d’une représentation donnée du régime parlementaire a dans notre pays des origines bien antérieures, remontant même au XIXe siècle, à la généralisation du recours à cette technique après la Première, puis la Seconde Guerre mondiale au sein des démocraties parlementaires européennes. En outre, les approches de l’idée de rationalisation, au travers des différents corpus forgés par les acteurs politiques et les publicistes, apparaissent plus denses et nombreuses dans le débat constitutionnel français au point que l’on puisse évoquer des rationalisations du parlementarisme en France et distinguer, dans une classification générale, trois catégories – camérale, gouvernementale et arbitrale – de rationalisation du parlementarisme. Ces trois catégories ont pu être mises en œuvre, alternativement ou cumulativement, en France à la fin de la IIIe, puis sous les IVe et Ve République avec des effets contrastés sur le fonctionnement des institutions. Aujourd’hui, la rationalisation du parlementarisme demeure un des piliers structurants du régime parlementaire françaisThe concept of the rationalization of parliamentarism was cleared by Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch in 1928 from his study of the Constitutions adopted in the new European countries from the Treaty of Versailles. It refers to a process of written codification of the practices and usages governing the relationship between the executive power and the assemblies in a parliamentary system, in order to adapt them to a specific purpose.In France, like other European countries during the same period, this process was pursued by the constituents in 1946 and again in 1958. However, the idea of rationalizing parliamentarism according to a given representation of the regime in our country, our parliamentary origins go back much as far back as the nineteenth century to the widespread use of this technique after the First and Second World Wars in European parliamentary democracies.In addition, the approaches of the idea of rationalization, through the different corpora forged by the political actors and the publicists, appear more dense and numerous in the French constitutional debate to the point that one can evoke rationalizations of parliamentarism in France. and distinguish, in a general classification, three categories - cameral, governmental and arbitral - of rationalization of parliamentarism. These three categories could be implemented, alternately or cumulatively, in France at the end of the third, then under the Fourth and Fifth Republic with contrasting effects on the functioning of institutions. Today, the rationalization of parliamentarism remains one of the structuring pillars of the French parliamentary system
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Garrison, Gary Lee. "FEDERALISM, ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES". Miami University / OhioLINK, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami1115304485.
Testo completo
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Monroe, Theresa. "An analysis of canonical aspects of the constitutional history of the Society of the Sacred Heart". Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1989. http://www.tren.com.
Testo completo
30
Manouguian, Aïda. "La juridictionnalisation du droit constitutionnel français : etude d'un phénomène doctrinal". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Lyon, 2021. https://buadistant.univ-angers.fr/login?url=https://bibliotheque.lefebvre-dalloz.fr/secure/isbn/9782247218790.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Le droit constitutionnel français témoigne, à l’époque contemporaine, d’une évolution majeure tenant à l’emprise du juge constitutionnel et de sa jurisprudence sur la discipline. Depuis l’avènement de la justice constitutionnelle sous la Ve République, la question du contrôle juridictionnel de constitutionnalité des lois s’est à tel point diffusée dans les discours doctrinaux qu’il ne paraît plus possible d’envisager le droit constitutionnel sans son juge. Qu’il soit loué ou décrié, nul ne nie l’importance de ce phénomène doctrinal. Après plus d’un demi-siècle de juridictionnalisation du droit constitutionnel, cette recherche a pour ambition de mesurer les conséquences de cette mutation dans la pensée constitutionnelle. Le phénomène doctrinal de juridictionnalisation, qui puise ses racines dans la pensée antimoderne des parlementaires de l’Ancienne France bien davantage que dans le constitutionnalisme moderne, se manifeste à l’époque contemporaine comme une remise en cause de la présentation classique des institutions autant que des sources du droit constitutionnel. Son identification, qui passe par la déconstruction d’un certain nombre de présupposés portant préjudice à sa compréhension, permet alors d’en analyser les effets sur la discipline. De ce point de vue, les bouleversements se révèlent considérables et perturbent tant le statut épistémologique de la discipline que les fondements de l’exercice du pouvoir. Cristallisant, voire aggravant l’ensemble des controverses doctrinales, le juge constitutionnel apparaît ainsi comme l’objet privilégié d’une réflexion générale sur les représentations du droit constitutionnelIn contemporary times, French constitutional law bears witness to a major development due to the influence of the constitutional judge and of his case law, over the discipline. Since the advent of constitutional justice under the Fifth Republic, the question of judicial review has spread to such an extent in scientific debates that it no longer seems possible to consider constitutional law without its judge. Whether praised or criticized, no one denies the importance of this scientific phenomenon. After more than half a century of juridictionalization of constitutional law, this research aims to measure the consequences of this change in constitutional thought.The scientific phenomenon of juridictionalization, which has roots in the anti-modern thinking of the Old Regime parliamentarians – much more than in modern constitutionalism – manifests itself in contemporary times as a questioning of the classic presentation of institutions as much as of sources of constitutional law. Its identification, which goes through the deconstruction of a certain number of assumptions detrimental to its understanding, makes it possible to analyze their effects on the discipline. From this point of view, the upheavals are proving to be considerable and disturb both the epistemological status of the discipline and the foundations of the exercise of power. Crystallizing, even aggravating all the scientific controversies, the constitutional judge thus appears as the privileged object of a general research on the representations of constitutional law
31
Petersen, Megan A. "Rights We Are Bound to Disrespect: John Locke, Dred Scott, and the American Social Contract". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/585.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This article traces different forms of the same present throughout several eras in American political and social history. I focus on two texts, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, and Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, in order to examine slavery as a legal institution in the United States, and, in particular, the constitutionality of slavery. Rather than a massive contradiction, the Dred Scott decision is just another iteration of American political and racial philosophy as it was 100, even 200 years earlier. Taney’s opinion is a reflection of what the Lockean social contract came to look like in a racially hierarchized, colonial society. The Dred Scott decision paints one of the most accurate pictures of American political thought but is always written off as nothing but bad law. A close examination of race and social contract theory as they influenced the American Constitution gives insight into more productive ways to talk about race today.
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Lainé, Julien. "Empirisme et conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel". Thesis, Lille 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LIL20014/document.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l’empirisme et du conceptualisme interroge la possibilité pour la doctrine, d’induire de la jurisprudence des catégories plus générales et abstraites, facilitant la connaissance d’une discipline essentiellement jurisprudentielle. L’idée de confronter cette problématique au droit constitutionnel est d’abord liée aux mutations de la discipline depuis la création du Conseil constitutionnel en 1958. Précisément, le développement de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle pouvait laisser présumer une facette empirique en droit constitutionnel, susceptible d’interroger la nécessité pour la doctrine, de procéder a posteriori à une mise en ordre synthétique des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel. En réalité, l’alternance entre l’empirisme et le conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel dépasse le seul rapport de la doctrine et la jurisprudence. La présente étude s’efforce alors de saisir dans tous les stades de la discipline, et quelles que soient les sources, le travail de systématisation du droit. Néanmoins, il ne s’agit pas de se contenter de suivre, conformément à une démarche chronologique, l’évolution de la pensée en droit constitutionnel, mais de procéder à l’identification de périodes. Le conceptualisme ancien, hérité des premiers manuels de droit constitutionnel à la fin du XIXe siècle, a permis d’élaborer les grands principes du droit constitutionnel français. Partant, l’évolution des méthodes doctrinales tout au long du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle, en lien avec l’évolution du droit lui-même, soumet ces principes à des démarches plus empiriques. Il s’agit d’abord, d’un premier courant doctrinal apparu à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qualifié dans le cadre de la présente étude de « empirisme politique », puis, aux alentours des années 1970, d’un second courant, défendant un « empirisme juridique ». Enfin et cette dernière période demeure en cours, le développement de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, caractérisée par son empirisme, ouvre la voie à un « empirisme jurisprudentiel », dont les enjeux sont plus largement abordés dans la présente étudeThe issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods.The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after Word War II and is described as “political empiricism” in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970’s and advocates a “legal empiricism”. Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for “case law empiricism”, widely discussed in this analysis
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Ogundele, Ayodeji O. "The United States Supreme Court's Volitional Agendas, 1801-1993: Historical Claims versus Empirical Findings". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2000. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc2458/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
In this study, I examined the Supreme Court's agenda from 1801 to 1993 to determine the composition and dynamics of the issues that have dominated the business of the Court. Specifically, I set out to test empirically Robert G. McCloskey's (now standard) characterization of the Supreme Court's history, which sees it as dominated by nationalism/federalism issues before the Civil War, by economic issues just after the War through the 1930s, and by civil rights and liberties since the 1930s. The question that drove my investigation was "Is McCloskey's interpretation, which appears to be based on the great cases of Supreme Court history, an accurate description of the agenda represented in the Supreme Court's total body of reported decisions?"
To test McCloskey's historical theses I employed concepts adapted from Richard Pacelle's (1991) important work on the agenda of post-Roosevelt Court and used the methods of classical historical analysis and of interrupted time-series analysis. Data for my research came from existing datasets and from my own collection (I coded the manifest content of thousands of Supreme Court's decisions from 1887 back to 1801). The most important finding from my analyses is that McCloskey not withstanding, the pre-Civil War Supreme Court's agenda was clearly dominated by economic issues of various sorts, not by nationalism/federalism as previously believed. Another key finding is that partisanship had a pronounced impact on the Court's attention to this category of issueseven in the periods when the Supreme Court had very little control of its docket. These results suggest that Supreme Court scholars should reassess or rethink their previous notion of the Court's pre-Civil War agendathe now well-established view that nation-state issues dominated the business of the Court in its formative yearsand the idea (often expressed implicitly) that the Court's mandatory jurisdiction suppressed attitudinal factors on the Court in the earlier eras.
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Trabut, Robin. "Le constitutionnalisme libéral (1814-1877)". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Toulon, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023TOUL0157.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Si l’expression n’est que très peu utilisée par les constitutionnalistes, l’idée d’un constitutionnalisme libéral imprègne, de fait, leurs raisonnements. Assez fréquemment d’ailleurs, la théorie de constitutionnalisme libéral se confond avec celle de parlementarisme, sur lequel des travaux importants existent déjà. Mais si l’on veut construire une histoire scientifique du constitutionnalisme, il faut cerner la notion de constitutionnalisme libéral. Le droit positif se trouve ainsi éclairé par l’histoire. Cette étude permet, tout en dégageant la théorie de constitutionnalisme libéral, d’apporter un éclairage juridique original sur nos institutionsAlthough the term is only rarely used by constitutionalists, the idea of a liberal constitutionalism does indeed permeate their reasoning. Moreover, the theory of liberal constitutionalism is confused with that of parliamentarianism, on which important works already exist. But if we want to build a scientific history of constitutionalism, we must define the notion of liberal constitutionalism. Positive law is thus clarified by history. This study makes it possible to shed an original legal light on our institutions, while at the same time defining the liberal constitutionalism’s theory
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Gren, Marie. "De la suprématie législative à la suprématie constitutionnelle : étude comparée d'un changement de paradigme en France : en Israël et au Royaume-Uni". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 1, 2017. https://buadistant.univ-angers.fr/login?url=https://bibliotheque.lefebvre-dalloz.fr/secure/isbn/9782247191703.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Le système juridique repose sur un paradigme constitutionnel. La dialectique entre la doctrine, le constituant et le juge renforce le consensus dominant qui constitue ce paradigme. La puissance de ces convictions partagées implique que le passage d'un paradigme à un autre se fait par le biais d'un processus révolutionnaire. Lorsque survient une crise, une rupture révolutionnaire peut bouleverser l'ordre constitutionnel établi. Si cette révolution réussi un nouveau modèle paradigmatique, accepté par la majorité des acteurs juridiques, se substitue à l'ancien. L'analyse détaillée d'un tel processus de substitution de paradigme en droit constitutionnel a rarement été faite. L'étude comparée du passage du paradigme de la suprématie législative à celui de la suprématie constitutionnelle, en France, en Israël et au Royaume-Uni en est une excellente illustration. Dans ces trois pays, la crise du paradigme de la suprématie législative a conduit les juges à adopter des décisions révolutionnaires qui renversent ces systèmes initialement construits sur le modèle de la toute-puissance parlementaire. La décision Liberté d'association du Conseil constitutionnel, l'arrêt Mizrahi Bank de la Cour suprême israélienne et l'arrêt Factortame de la Chambre des Lords forment le point de départ du processus révolutionnaire qui a conduit à l'établissement du nouveau paradigme de la suprématie constitutionnelle. L'acceptation de ces décisions juridictionnelles par les constitutionnalistes et parfois leur validation par le constituant, a contribué à la mise en place du nouveau consensus, qui repose sur la garantie de normes constitutionnelles par les jugesThe legal system relies on a constitutional paradigm. Dialectics between legal scholars, Parliament vested with constituent power and judges reinforces the consensus underpinning the paradigm. Given the compelling strength of these shared beliefs, a revolutionary process is necessary to overtum the system. At a time of crisis questioning the paradigm, a revolution can subvert the constitutional order if it is approved by the majority of legal actors, and particularly constitutional scholars. A detailed analysis of such a process in constitutional law has rarely been made. A perceptive study of such a phenomenon can be made by comparing the change of paradigm from legal to constitutional supremacy in France, Israel and the United Kingdom. In these three legal orders, the crisis of legislative supremacy lead judges to make revolutionary decisions, striking down a system based on the omnipotence of Parliament. The Constitutional Council Freedom of Association decision, the Israeli Supreme Court Mizrahi Bank case and the House of Lords Factortame case were a revolutionary move towards constitutional supremacy. The creation of a new paradigm, relying on the protection of constitutional norms by judges has then been favored by its acceptance by constitutional experts and sometimes even by Parliament
36
Dafel, Michael. "The constitutional rebuilding of the South African private law : a choice between judicial and legislative law-making". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/285563.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
A tension arises whenever the South African private law fails to meet constitutional right norms. To remedy a deficiency, two law-making options are available. The first is for the judiciary to develop or change private law principles and rules in order to provide protection for the implicated constitutional norm. The second is for the judiciary to enforce an obligation upon Parliament to enact legislation to amend or replace existing private law rights and obligations so as to safeguard the norm against interference from a private individual or entity. The former is the more conventional option, but, in recent years, the law reports record an increasing reliance on the legislative duty to protect constitutional right norms in private legal relationships. The thesis investigates the extent to which the latter phenomenon - which will be described as a 'pivot towards legislative remedies' - exists, and the circumstances in which the courts pivot towards legislative remedies rather than developing private law of their own accord. The thesis finds that legislative schemes that give effect to constitutional rights are likely to contain an array of benefits that are absent from or reduced in the judicial law-making process. The judicial pivot towards legislative remedies is thus a strategy to enhance the process through which conflicting rights are resolved, as it allows for the constitutional rebuilding of private law in a way that the judiciary is unable to do on its own. Importantly, however, theories of judicial deference do not explain the pivot. On the contrary, the courts have exercised a strict level of control over the legislative law-making pathway. Through either statutory interpretation or the review of legislation, the courts require legislation to contain the essentials of the judicial law-making framework. From this perspective, the judicial law-making process produces the floor of the rebuilding project and the legislative law-making process enhances that framework.
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Spencer, Daniela. "The Confrontation Clause: Maryland v. Craig and the Judicial Philosophies of Scalia and O'Connor". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/434.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis looks at the Confrontation Clause from the Sixth Amendment in light of the decision made in Maryland v. Craig. It examines the opinions of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, and determines if their judicial philosophies were consistent with their opinion. It does so by examining the history of the Confrontation Clause from ancient history to the present, and by enumerating the judicial philosophies of O'Connor and Scalia. In conclusion, while O'Connor's majority opinion is consistent with her pragmatic philosophy, Scalia's dissent is not consistent with his originalist views.
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Hashemi, S. Ahmad. "The question of freedom within the horizon of the Iranian Constitutional Movement (1906-1921)". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:74388230-d9c6-4c17-850b-bdbceaa0848b.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The present DPhil research attempts to develop an appropriate method for the historiography of ideas by taking into consideration cultural, linguistic and socio-political limitations and obstacles to free thinking in a predominantly closed society like Qajar Iran. By applying such a method the study then investigates the history of the idea of freedom in Iran during one of the most important periods in the evolution of this concept. The research method is grounded in a hermeneutical interpretation of Collingwood's logic of question and answer. It also employs MacCallum's meta-theoretical frame of analysis which states that freedom is always of something (an agent or agents), from something (conditions), to do something (actions). Using this methodological framework, the research shows how most locutions about freedom uttered in the last century of the Qajar period were formed within the horizon of the question of decline and were somehow related to remedy such situations. It then explores how late Qajar interpretations of the three variables of freedom manifest themselves in the socio-political life of early 20th century Iran. During the first constitutional period (August 1906-June 1908), the major concern of the first majlis was to establish the rule of law. In legislating the constitution and its supplement, the majority of the majlis believed that the main obstacle to freedom was arbitrary rule. Therefore, they endeavoured to restrain the government’s illegal and arbitrary interferences in the people's freedom. However, they did not develop a rational criterion for identifying legitimate and justifiable legal interferences. During the second constitutional period (July 1909– February 1921), the main concern of the second majlis was to restrain chaos and to strengthen the central government in order to put an end to domestic insecurity and foreign threats. To rectify such a situation, the majlis empowered the government to interfere even in the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. As a result, the situation began to turn from chaos towards arbitrary rule. The research also argues that in most of their interpretations of the aim of freedom, constitutionalists considered an action permissible only if it was compatible with public interest as well as the material and spiritual progress of individuals and society. Theoretically, the aim of freedom could not have been the doing of an action that harmed another person or violated his/her freedom. Furthermore, 'the right to be wrong,' even if it harmed no one, was never defended. Nonetheless, in practice, freedom turned into chaos and licence in both the first and in the second constitutional periods. Finally, this study investigates how the Iranian pioneers of the freedom-seeking movement responded to the question of the eligibility of the agent of freedom, and the question of the equality of agents in having freedom. Iranian society was taking its first steps in experiencing the rule of law and had a long way to go to rectify its discriminatory culture and to establish equal rights. In such conditions, accepting a set of equal fundamental rights for all Iranians should be considered a great achievement for the constitutional movement.
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Ghodoosi, Farshad. "Iran and the Constitutionalism: History and Evolution and the Impact on International Relations". FIU Digital Commons, 2018. https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/3720.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
The sweeping changes in the Middle East, so-called the “Arab Spring”, necessitate revisiting constitutionalism in the region. This task entails a fresh look at the idea of rule of law and constitutionalism amongst the people of the Middle East. One of the widely misconceived and yet understudied constitutional movements in the Middle East belongs to Iran. A new perspective on the trajectory of constitutionalism in Iran would better equip us to comprehend rule of law in the Middle East. From the 1905 Constitutional movement to the 1979 Revolution, Iran has undergone major changes. Each transformation created a rupture with the preceding order fostering a fresh look at rule of law in Iran. The current studies have mainly concentrated on the political and social aspects of these groundbreaking events. The legal aspect of each of event has remained largely unnoticed and under-researched.
It is important to fill the gap by focusing on the role of constitutions, despite its shortcomings, and international commitments of states using Iran as an example. The objective is to bring to the fore the role constitutionalism plays in incentivizing states to enter into international commitments and to comply with their international commitments. More than before, the mutual relationship between constitutionalism and international relations is intertwined because of two main developments: a. for better or worse, international relations have become increasingly judicialized, meaning all aspects of inter-state interactions are now subject to some normative regimes; b. more than ever, states feel the need to structure their domestic and inter-state relationship by resorting to a normative structure which is best materialized in constitutions.
Using Iran as an example, this dissertation aims to fulfill the following: First, it is critical to understand whether a state is a constitutional state and whether its domestic power relations are subject to any checks and balances (broadly speaking). By reviewing Iran’s recent history through this lens, the dissertation shows that Iranian’s legal culture presents (a version of) constitutionalism.
Second, it is critical to understand whether constitutionalism leads to any differences in the international behavior of such a state. Based on its constitutionalism, Iran’s international behavior has been premised on legalistic and juridical grounds.
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Arlettaz, Jordane, Attila Badó, Kitti Bakos-Kovács, Szilvia Bató, János Bóka, Laureline Congnard, Erzsébet Csatlós et al. "Internationale Konferenz zum zehnjährigen Bestehen des Instituts für Rechtsvergleichung der Universität Szeged = Conférence internationale au 10ème anniversaire de l‘Institut de droit comparé de l‘Université de Szeged". Universität Potsdam, 2014. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2014/7203/.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Die Konferenz „International Conference for the 10th Anniversary of the Institute of Comparative Law” hat am 24. Mai 2013 in Szeged stattgefunden. Im Rahmen der viersprachigen Konferenz haben mehr als dreißig Teilnehmer ihre Forschungsergebnisse präsentiert.
Der Essay von Zoltán Péteri blickt auf die Disziplin aus der Perspektive der Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Katalin Kelemen und Balázs Fekete gehen in ihrem Aufsatz der Frage nach, welchen Weg die Versuche der Klassifikation der Rechtssysteme von Osteuropa in der späten Phase der Umbrüche der 1980/90er Jahren genommen haben. Die historische Betrachtungsweise mit Bezug auf Rechtsgeschichte und Rechtsvergleichung spiegelt sich auch in anderen Essays wider, vor allem in den Aufsätzen von Szilvia Bató, Magdolna Gedeon und Béla Szabó P. sowie auch in den Aufsätzen von Péter Mezei und Tünde Szűcs. Attila Badó analysiert die Rechtsvergleichung aus der Sicht des Rechts, der Soziologie und der Politikwissenschaft anhand von Untersuchungen über das Sanktionsystem der Richter in den USA. Diese politikwissenschaftliche Seite wird auch in den Aufsätzen über die aktuellen Fragen der europäischen Integration von Carine Guemar und Laureline Congnard betont. Eine Reihe von Aufsätzen behandeln die konventionelle normative Komparatistik auf dem Gebiet des Verfassungsrechts (Jordane Arlettaz und Péter Kruzslicz), Gesellschaftsrechts (Kitti Bakos-Kovács), Urheberrechts (Dóra Hajdú) und Steuerrechts (Judit Jacsó). Daneben bilden eine weitere Gruppe die Aufsätze von János Bóka und Erzsébet Csatlós, die die Verwendung der vergleichenden Methode in der Praxis der Rechtsprechung untersuchen.
Die Rechtsvergleichung ist eine sich dynamisch entwickelnde Disziplin. Die Konferenz und dieser Band dienen nicht nur der Würdigung der bisherigen Arbeit des Instituts für Rechtsvergleichung, sondern zeigen gleichzeitig neue Ziele auf. Die wichtigsten Grundsätze bleiben aber fest verankert auch in einem sich stets verändernden rechtlichen und geistigen Umfeld. Das Motto des Instituts lautet „instruere et docere omnes qui edoceri desiderant“ – „alle lehren, die lernen wollen.“ Auch in den folgenden Jahrzehnten werden uns der Wille des Lernens und Lehrens, die Freiheit der Forschung sowie die Übertragung und Weiterentwicklung der ungarischen wie globalen Rechtskultur leiten.
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Lajoinie, Tamara. "Le référent historique dans le contentieux constitutionnel comparé". Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016AIXM1063.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
L’histoire a toujours occupé une place singulière au sein des sciences sociales mais qu’en est il de sa place dans le contentieux constitutionnel comparé des démocraties occidentales ? Le présent travail de recherche tendra ainsi à démontrer que la référence à l’histoire est bel et bien présente et qu’elle revêt un impact décisif sur les solutions constitutionnelles effectivement retenues pas le juge comme sur la substance même des droits et libertés fondamentaux. Il apparaîtra, en effet, que l’histoire, jaillissant dans le contentieux constitutionnel sous la forme d’un référent juridique type pouvant faire l’objet d’une systématisation au sein du droit comparé, contribue, par le truchement du juge constitutionnel à l’établissement comme au fonctionnement de l’État de droit contemporain. De la même manière, la symbolique particulière des évènements historiques qui seront mobilisés, c’est à dire leur charge positive ou négative pour l’État de droit, va nourrir la volonté juridictionnelle du juge d’assurer la rupture avec un fait historique tragique ou à l’inverse de conforter un héritage historique glorieux. Juge qui, en dernier analyse, pourra être conduit, conformément au rôle social nouveau que lui confère les démocraties constitutionnelles contemporaines, selon une utilisation soutenue du référent historique, à réparer directement ou plus indirectement les préjudices nés de l’histoire comme à renforcer ou à limiter le sens des droits et libertés fondamentaux devenus historiquement circonstanciésHistory has always occupied a singular place within the realm of Social Sciences and the question of its functions in comparative judicial review deserves to be raised. This research intends to demonstrate that the historical argument has a decisive impact on constitutional decisions as well as on the substance of fundamental rights and freedoms. History, being systematized in comparative law, through the form of a standard legal argument, contributes, via constitutional review, to the establishment as well to the operation of the rule oflaw, today. The immediate legal logic of such historical impregnation will be analysed through the work of the judge in the motivation of its decisions. In the same perspective, the singular meaning of historical events and their positive or negative impact, feeds judicial interpretation, either breaking away from a tragic historical event or consolidating a glorious historicalheritage. The judge, in accordance with his new social function recognized in western democracies, is lead to repare directly or indirectly, the damages resulting from historical events as well as to strenghten or limitate the scope of fundamental rights, which appear today, historically situated
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Picard, Kelly. "La responsabilité de l'État du fait du préjudice historique : réflexion sur la possible reconnaissance d'un dommage constitutionnel". Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017AIXM0531.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Des faits historiques peuvent-ils, plusieurs décennies après leur survenance, générer une situation préjudiciable au point d’en faire découler une forme de responsabilité juridique spécifique ? Cette étude se situe au carrefour de la justice constitutionnelle et de la justice transitionnelle, entendue comme l’ensemble des mécanismes permettant de rendre la justice à la suite de périodes de grande violence, par l’identification des responsabilités, l’octroi de réparations et la manifestation de la vérité. Cette thèse considère que la défaillance de la justice rendue consécutivement à une situation de violences extrêmes et bien souvent massives est susceptible de générer un « préjudice historique ». Elle démontre la nécessité de consacrer une responsabilité juridique et juridictionnelle résultant du préjudice historique. Néanmoins, le caractère anormal des situations de violence extrême génère des préjudices « extraordinaires » qui imposent une réponse dépassant la mise en œuvre des mécanismes juridiques habituels. La réflexion est donc menée sur la possible existence d’un « dommage constitutionnel » en tant que fondement potentiel de la responsabilité du fait du préjudice historique. Dès lors, cette thèse se veut une réflexion plus générale sur l’impuissance du droit en dehors de ses mécanismes traditionnels et sur la nécessité de dépasser ses limites et de développer de nouveaux moyens permettant d’appréhender une réalité sociale dont il reste encore trop éloignéCan historical facts, several decades after their occurrence, lead to the recognition of an injurious situation, giving rise to a specific form of legal accountability? This doctoral study is set up at the crossroads of constitutional and transitional justice. These latter can be defined as the set of mechanisms seeking to achieve justice after times of massive violence including responsibility, reparations and the recognition of truth. This doctoral study asserts that the failure of justice in the aftermath of extreme violence and mass crimes is likely to generate a specific “historical wrong”. It reveals the necessity to recognize a legal and judicial accountability resulting from an historical wrong. However, the exceptional nature of extreme violence acts generates “extra-ordinary” prejudices, creating a need for the implementation of specific mechanisms beyond the ordinary ones. This thesis will therefore explore the notion of “constitutional damage” as a potential basis to the accountability resulting from historical wrong. Thus, this dissertation exposes a larger issue on the helplessness of the law outside its traditional ordinary mechanisms and on the need to go beyond its limits. It also seeks means to answer and deal with a social reality from which the law would otherwise remain distanced
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Spagnolo, Benjamin James. "Kelsen and Raz on the continuity of legal systems : applying the accounts in an Australian context". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a9025e33-e70e-49e9-994f-52f8daa311fd.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This thesis has three objectives. Its primary objective is to examine, and critically evaluate, the theoretical accounts offered by Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz to explain the temporal continuity and discontinuity of legal systems. In particular, it evaluates the explanatory power of those accounts by combining an abstract analysis of the accounts in principle and an evaluation based on systematically applying them to one concrete, historically circumstanced instance: the legal systems of British derivation in Australia between 1788 and 2001. The thesis thus tests each account’s factual fit: how adequately it corresponds to, accords with, and persuasively makes sense of, the facts – including complex social facts, attitudes and normative standards – for which it purports to offer an account. Second, the thesis aims to demonstrate, more generally, the utility of applying theoretical accounts to a particular historical instance to complement abstract analysis. Third, the thesis aims to advance the understanding of the evolution of Australian legal systems between 1788 and 2001. These three objectives are achieved through the critical exposition and reconstruction of the accounts, their development and enrichment where refinement is appropriate, their application to the specific context of Australia and their evaluation, individually and in comparison.
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Churches, Steven C. "An historical survey of the presumption in the common law that general statutes do not bind the Crown /". Title page, contents and abstract only, 1988. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phc562.pdf.
Testo completo
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Batchelor, Bronwyn Le Ann. "Constitutional damages for the infringement of a social assistance right in South Africa are monetary damages in the form of interest a just and equitable remedy for breach of a social assistance right". Thesis, University of Fort Hare, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10353/388.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
This dissertation will explore the revolutionary progression in the provision of monetary damages and the availability thereof due to the change in South Africa’s legal system from Parliamentary sovereignty to Constitutional supremacy after the enactment of the final Constitution in 19961. The Constitution of South Africa brought with it the concepts of justification and accountability as the Bill of Rights enshrines fundamental rights and the remedies for the infringement of same. The available remedies for the infringement of a fundamental right flow from two sources, being either from the development of the common law remedies in line with the Bill of Rights or alternatively from Section 38 of the Constitution, which provides for a remedy which provides ‘appropriate’ relief. The question that will be raised in this dissertation is, ‘does appropriate relief include an award of delictual damages?’ or a question related thereto ‘is an award of monetary damages an appropriate remedy?’ The motivation for this dissertation arises from the plethora of case law, especially in the Eastern Cape, that has come to the fore in the last sixteen years, highlighting the injustice of cancellations of social assistance grants and the non-payment of such in South Africa’s social security system, as well as the precedent that was set by our Constitutional Court and Supreme Court in remedying that injustice. The central case to this dissertation is that of Kate v Member of Executive Council for Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 SECLD; Member of Executive Council, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA), which is generally regarded as having paved the way for the granting of monetary damages for the infringement of an individual’s constitutional right as same require legal protection. Firstly the past approach to damages will be explored in relation to South Africa’s common law, being the Roman-Dutch law. The common law Aquilian action is the focal point of this dissertation in relation to the common law in that the granting of damages for the infringement of an individual’s social assistance right (being a specific constitutional right framed within the 1996 Constitution) results in pure patrimonial loss which in our common law system was remedied by the actio legis Aquilae. In delict, an award of damages is the primary remedy, aimed at affording compensation in respect of the legal right or interest infringed. After the common law system of damages has been explored, this dissertation will then examine the changes that have developed therefrom, and largely shaped by the current state of disorganization in the National Department of Welfare coupled with the all encompassing power of the final Constitution. The final Constitution provides the power, in section 38 of the 1996 Constitution, for the court to award a monetary remedy for the breach of a constitutional right. The question, however, is “does the award of monetary damages not merely throw money at the problem, whereas the purpose of a constitutional remedy is to vindicate guaranteed rights and prevent or deter future violations?” The battle for domination between the common law approach and the constitutional approach to damages is witnessed as the two systems eventually amalgamate to form an essentially new remedy, unique to South Africa. South Africa’s new system is aligned with the Constitution as the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and underpins the awarding of all damages and, especially, the awarding of constitutional damages. For the sake of completeness, alternatives to monetary damages will also be canvassed in this dissertation. It is hoped that the reader will, in the end, realize that the final Constitution is the supreme law of the land and as such dictates the manner and form in which damages are provided. If such provision is not in alignment with the Constitution, it will be declared invalid. The flexibility of our common law is put to the test, yet it is found to be adaptable to the ever-developing boni mores of society exemplified in the embracing constitutional principles and the production of this new remedy. The courts develop the common law under section 39(2) of the Constitution in order to keep the common law in step with the evolution of our society and the ever changing nature of bonos mores.National Research Foundation
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Schmitz-Thursam, Trevor Charles. "The Tumult of Amboise and the Importance of Historical Memory in Sixteenth-Century France". PDXScholar, 1994. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/4789.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Humanist legal scholarship was the catalyst to historical revolution that took place in sixteenth-century France. French philologists succeeded in demonstrating the cultural distinctiveness of France from a heretofore assumed classical heritage shared with ancient Rome. As a result, scholars sought to retrace the historical origins of France in the non-Roman Gauls and Franks. Their intensive study of the laws, customs and institutions that developed in France, as distinct from ancient Rome, transformed the understanding of the national past. Following the introduction of the principles of historical anachronism and cultural relativism, the sixteenth century witnessed a transformation of traditional perceptions of historical time. It was during this period when the historical myths, legends and traditions that comprised the cultural fabric of French society were called into question, were transformed, and emerged as new myths that spoke more directly to the crises of the French Religious Wars. The purpose of this study is to attach greater significance to the Tumult of Amboise of 1560 than has previously been afforded in the scholarship of this period. The Tumult of Amboise provide not only the impetus for the civil wars that were waged in France for nearly half a century, but also served as the catalyst for an first expression of Protestant resistance theory that was to change the face of political discourse in this period. The debate centered around the Tumult of Amboise set the stage for constitutional theories regarding the laws of succession and the role of the Estates-General that were dominate political discourse in the latter half of the sixteenth century. As political polemicists increasingly sought to reconstruct an image of the mythical French past, in order to demonstrate the ancientness of the French constitution, the historical fiction that developed around these efforts became a functioning political ideology that should be viewed as one of the first concerted expressions of French nationalism. In this regard, the recreation of the national past took on a patriotic dimension heretofore absent from traditional, chroniclesty led medieval histories and, in time, developed into a uniquely Gallican mythology that stood defiantly as a rival to the cultural heterodoxy of Rome. Further, the purpose of this study is to demonstrate the developmental nature of political discourse in this period. As the civil wars progressed, doctrines of constitutionalism and limited monarchy began to be laced with more abstract theories regarding the nature of political obligation and the responsibility of the ruler to his subjects. Employing a comparative analysis of discourse from the 1560's to the succession of Henri IV, it will be shown that the transformation of political propaganda was direct! y dependent on the historical memory of the participants, who engaged in an effort to frame the political and religious crises within the context of their perceptions of the past.
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Vlachogiannis, Apostolos. "Les juges de la Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis et la notion de constitution vivante". Thesis, Paris 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA020019.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Les juges de la Cour Suprême des États-Unis et la notion de constitution vivante.Une constitution écrite peut-elle évoluer au cours du temps et s’adapter aux besoins et aux valeurs évolutives de la société, sans pour autant être révisée formellement ? Et si oui, qu’en est-il du texte constitutionnel ? Devant ces interrogations, la notion de constitution vivante vise à résoudre le paradoxe du changement matériel de la Constitution sans modification du texte. Elle est sans aucun doute un topos – qui ne manque pas de susciter des critiques,notamment celle de la théorie dite « originaliste » - de la pensée constitutionnelle américaine, un concept mobilisé, en l’occurrence, pour justifier la cause de la réforme juridique et sociale. Elle a été développée,durant le XXe siècle, principalement par des juges de la Cour Suprême américaine qui ont fourni une approche stimulante et fertile de la nature de la Constitution. La notion de constitution vivante exprime donc une conception évolutive de la Loi suprême, qui saurait, par sa flexibilité et sa fonctionnalité,s’adapter au changement de circonstances. Dans ce cadre, elle a été instrumentalisée afin de surmonter la rigidité de la procédure de révision formelle prescrite par l’article V de la Constitution. Cette notion est dès lors porteuse de la tension entre la permanence du texte et l’évolution du droit constitutionnel positif. Pour justifier ce décalage entre la forme et le fond, les juges défenseurs de la constitution vivante ont toujours traité le texte comme un « document vivant », qui doit être lu à la lumière des valeurs évolutives et des idéaux partagés par le peuple américainThe Justices of the United States Supreme Court and the notion of the livingConstitutionCan a written constitution evolve over time and adapt itself to the changingneeds and values of society, without being formally amended? If yes, thenwhat about the text? The notion of the living constitution tries to solve theparadox of constitutional change without modification of the text. It is acommon place notion – though subject to fierce criticism, notably byoriginalism - of U.S. constitutional thought, a concept invoked on manydifferent occasions in order to promote constitutional and social change. It hasbeen primarily elaborated by certain Justices of the Supreme Court of theUnited States during the 20th century, who have offered a stimulatingapproach of the nature of the U.S. Constitution. From their point of view, thenotion of the living constitution is based on the idea that the Constitutionevolves over time adapting itself to the ever changing circumstances. It thusleads to a theory of interpretation which treats the constitutional provisionsthat allocate powers or guarantee individual rights as flexible and vital.Furthermore, the notion of the living constitution has been used as a means ofovercoming the barrier of the amendment procedure as prescribed by Article Vof the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, it is marked by the tension between thepermanence of the text and the evolution of constitutional law. In order tojustify this evolution, the Justices who defend the notion of the livingConstitution, have always treated the text as a living document, which mustbe read in light of the aspirations and the high ideals of the American people
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Pasquiet-Briand, Tanguy. "La réception de la Constitution anglaise en France au XIXème siècle. Une étude du droit politique français". Thesis, Paris 2, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA020028.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Le modèle réformiste de la Constitution de l’Angleterre a intellectuellement dominé la France du XIXe siècle. Synthèse des aspirations françaises visant la stabilité politique, cette représentation mêle un historicisme de l’accomplissement libéral du gouvernement représentatif et une adhésion à la légitimation coutumière de l’innovation. Elle procède d’un jeu de projections contradictoires sur la Constitution anglaise. D’une part, les libéraux romantiques identifient dans ses institutions, les conditions propres à préserver l’individu des abus du pouvoir et à permettre le développement de la démocratie. D’autre part, les traditionalistes perçoivent dans la continuité historique de l’Angleterre, les bienfaits structurants de la hiérarchie sociale et de la liberté aristocratique. Plus particulièrement, les Doctrinaires décèlent, dans la morphologie civilisationnelle de l’Angleterre, une société déployant la liberté dans l’ordre. C’est dans le parlementarisme, produit historique de l’évolution institutionnelle anglaise, que la doctrine politique finit par identifier le régime politique susceptible de clore les tensions révolutionnaires françaises. Pensé comme une matrice libératrice des énergies individuelles et conservatrice de l’ordre politique et social, il dépossède le chef de l’Etat de son pouvoir personnel, dans la mesure où il le rend irresponsable. En outre, il consacre le règne de l’opinion publique par la prédominance de la chambre élective et par la reconnaissance de la responsabilité politique des ministres. Enfin, il encadre l’action politique par les usages historiques hérités de la monarchie représentative. Fondé sur un projet politique, le parlementarisme français donne corps à une philosophie prudentielle du droit constitutionnel. Celle-ci conçoit la constitution comme un cadre institutionnel au sein duquel l’agir politique doit pouvoir adapter la société à son stade de développement historique. Le laconisme des Lois constitutionnelles de la Troisième République témoigne de l’enracinement de ce réformisme constitutionnel. Plus qu’un compromis politique de circonstances, il cristallise en effet une politique constitutionnelle libérale et conservatrice. Ce travail entend montrer qu’elle résulte de la modélisation française de la Constitution anglaise au XIXe siècleThe reformist model of the English Constitution was intellectually predominant in nineteenth century France. As a synthesis of French yearnings for political stability, this representation historicises the liberal achievement of representative government and endorses the legitimacy of innovation through custom. It results from contradictory visualisations of the English Constitution. On the one hand, romantic liberals identify in its institutions the necessary elements to protect individuals from abuses of power and to allow the development of democracy. On the other hand, traditionalists perceive in England’s historical continuity the structuring benefits of social hierarchy and aristocratic freedom. More particularly, French Doctrinaires see through the morphology of the English civilization a society that secures freedom within order. French thinkers recognise in parliamentarism, as a product of England’s institutional evolution, the political regime capable of putting an end to French revolutionary tensions. As a mould that both liberates the energies of individuals and protects the political and social order, it renders the Head of State irresponsible and thus strips him of personal powers. Furthermore, it establishes the reign of public opinion through the superiority of the elected chamber and the recognition of government responsibility. Finally, it disciplines political action through the historical practices inherited from representative monarchy. Based on a political project, parliamentary government in France gives substance to a prudential philosophy of constitutional law. This philosophy views the constitution as an institutional framework within which political action must be able to adapt society to its historical phase of development. The laconism of the constitutional laws of the Third Republic reflects this constitutional reformism. Rather than a circumstantial political compromise, it crystallizes a liberal and conservative constitutional policy. The present study aims to show that it is the result of how the English Constitution has been modeled in France during the nineteenth century
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Roynier, Céline. "Le problème de la liberté dans le constitutionnalisme britannique". Thesis, Paris 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA020090.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Le relatif échec que fut le Human Rights Act 1998 et les condamnations régulières du Royaume-Uni par la CEDH peuvent être considérés comme les symptômes, parmi d’autres, d’un problème de la liberté dans le constitutionnalisme britannique. Comment expliquer que cet Etat, membre fondateur du Conseil de l’Europe, résiste si fortement à l’application de cette déclaration de droits qu’est la Convention Européenne de Sauvegarde des droits de l’Homme et des libertés fondamentales ? Nous proposons dans ce travail une solution appuyée sur une étude de la culture classique de la common law, c'est-à-dire, essentiellement mais pas seulement, de la grande doctrine parlementaire anglaise du dix-septième siècle. Il nous semble en effet que cette doctrine a fixé la conception anglaise de la liberté et l’a définitivement envisagée comme devant relever de la common law. Nous suggérons que c’est par une redéfinition permanente de la common law que la liberté a été pensée en droit public anglais et que ce travail de redéfinition est encore à l’oeuvre aujourd’hui. Tout d’abord le problème de la liberté – qui s’est aussi posé en France et en Amérique par exemple – a pris une forme particulière en Angleterre : plutôt que de penser la source de légitimité du pouvoir, les juristes anglais ont réfléchi à ce que pouvait être les « marques » d’un droit acceptable pour tous. Cette réflexion a engendré des vagues de politisation du droit mais elle a rendu l’apparition d’un peuple sujet de droit beaucoup plus difficile. La première vague de politisation fait de la common law, le droit de la communauté, c'est-à-dire le droit commun à tous (Partie 1). La seconde vague de politisation de la common law correspond à un approfondissement de la première et fait de la common law un droit de la liberté en articulant le langage de la common law à l’individu par le biais d’une morale constitutionnelle (Partie 2)Many are the signs revealing a certain difficulty with liberty or freedom in british constitutionalism. The relative failure of the Human Rights Act 1998 in terms of efficiency , the never-ending debate about the enactment of a british declaration of rights and the numerous sanctions taken by the ECHR against the UK, can be considered as symptoms of this problem. How, then, is it possible to explain the overwhelming role of the UK in the adoption of the ECHR in the 1950’s and this resistance of the UK towards the European Convention ? Our aim, in this work, is to provide an explanation which would be based on the study of the early modern common law tradition that is mainly (but not exclusively) the parliamentary Doctrine of the Seventeenth Century. We think that this doctrine or discourse established the english conception of liberty and considered this latter as originating in the common law. We suggest that liberty was and is thought as a permanent redefinition of the law itself (the common law) and that this idea gave birth to Public Law exactly at the same time. First of all, the above-mentioned problem of liberty – which appeared in America and France as well – arose in a particular way in England. Rather than focusing on power and its legitimacy, english state lawyers concentrated their work on the marks of a law which could be acceptable for all. This reflexion led to successive waves of politisation of the law itself but did not enable the apparition of a people which would be the source of both law and power. The first wave of politisation established that common law was the law common to all (Part 1). The second wave deepened the first one and enabled the common law to be « the law of liberty » by linking the language of the common law with the individual, through constitutional morality (Part 2)
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Millman, Eric. "Substantive Due Process and the Politicization of the Supreme Court". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2018. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1905.
Testo completoAbstract (sommario):
Substantive due process is one of the most cherished and elusive doctrines in American constitutional jurisprudence. The understanding that the Constitution of the United States protects not only specifically enumerated rights, but also broad concepts such as “liberty,” “property,” and “privacy,” forms the foundation for some of the Supreme Court’s most impactful—and controversial—decisions.
This thesis explores the constitutional merits and politicizing history of natural rights jurisprudence from its application in Dred Scott v. Sandford to its recent evocation in Obergefell v. Hodges. Indeed, from slavery to same-same sex marriage, substantive due process has played a pivotal role in shaping our nation’s laws and destiny: But was it ever intended to?
This paper first examines the legal arguments in favor of substantive due process to determine whether the judiciary was designed to be the “bulwark” of natural as well as clearly scribed law. Then, employing a novel framework to measuring judicial politicization, the thesis tracks the doctrine’s application throughout its most prominent case studies. Often arriving at nuanced conclusions, we observe that the truth is more often painted in some gradation of grey than in black or white.