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1
Kaplan Arık, Aslıhan. "Anayasa Değiştirme İktidarının Kötüye Kullanılmasını Önlemeye Yönelik Anayasa Değişikliği Usulünün Farklılaştırılması". International Journal of Social Sciences 7, n. 28 (9 maggio 2023): 280–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.52096/usbd.7.28.20.
Abstract (sommario):
Constitution-making powers impose limitations on their power to amend the constitution in the constitutional texts they prepare. These limits are intended to prevent the differentiation or abolition of the basic philosophy of the constitution and the constitutional order established by the power to make the constitution. These limits, which are brought in order to prevent the constitutional amendment powers from making changes other than their purpose, are realized by further protecting the principles and values that are given special value in the constitutions of some countries and that constitute the basic philosophy of the constitution. In other words, some provisions that constitute the basic principles and values of the constitution are subject to a different amendment procedure compared to other provisions of the constitution. This differentiation procedure includes additional conditions such as a qualified majority, a referendum, or the passage of a certain period of time in the amendment process. In this study, the differentiated constitutional amendment procedure and whether these procedures have an effect on the abuse of constitutional amendment power have been examined. Keywords: Constitutional amendment power, constitutional amendment procedure, differentiated constitutional amendment procedure, abuse of constitutional amendment power.
2
Lee, Hwanghee. "Stability and Changeability: Theoretical Considerations on the Process and the Way of Constitutional Amendment". Korean Constitutional Law Association 30, n. 1 (30 marzo 2024): 41–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.35901/kjcl.2024.30.1.41.
Abstract (sommario):
Societies are constantly changing, and legal systems are always organized in the context of those changes. Constitutions have a dual nature in the context of social change. On the one hand, it seeks to remain stable in the face of social change (stability). This helps maintain a normative and institutional core that should not be easily altered in response to social changes. On the other hand, it also aims to adapt to social changes (changeability). Constitutions themselves recognize the possibility of amendment and are open to various interpretations and applications. The two may seem contradictory, but both are essential to maintaining the normative power of a constitution.
In some cases, however, these attributes of a constitution may be unjustifiably or unnecessarily overemphasized. For example, an overemphasis on stability during a time when the constitution should be adapting to social change can cause it to fall behind. This can include legitimate amendments or laws that fail to meet the overly stringent requirements of the amendment process or are declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court. However, changeability can become problematic as well when it is unfairly exercised. This can occur when a constitution is misinterpreted or improperly amended.
This article examines these cases and proposes the dualization of the constitutional amendment process, eternal clauses, and the introduction of constitutional review on constitutional amendments as remedies for the problems. Although these measures are not perfect solutions, they will help preserve the rational core of constitutional stability and changeability while curbing the unwarranted exercise of each attribute.
Although there has been considerable debate about the current constitution, the issue of revising the constitutional amendment process has received less attention. However, to improve our constitution in the future, it is essential to pay attention to the amendment process. Revising the process for amending the constitution is a crucial task in constitutional revision.
3
Baranger, Denis. "The Language of Eternity: Judicial Review of the Amending Power in France (or the Absence Thereof)". Israel Law Review 44, n. 3 (2011): 389–428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700018112.
Abstract (sommario):
In several rulings from 1962, 1992, and 2003, the French Constitutional Court (Conseil constitutionnel) has denied jurisdiction over constitutional amendments. This article shows that this solution can only be understood in the light of the doctrinal background that provides its intellectual justification. While refusing to judicially review constitutional amendments, the Constitutional Court is in fact deeply involved in the ongoing process of altering the Constitution. Also, while the quasi-official doctrinal analysis insists on the absence of material limits to the amendment of the Constitution, and on the absence of any “supra-constitutional” rules, an analysis of the language used by the Court in these rulings offers reasons to diverge from this view. While the Court has refused to review constitutional amendments, it has done so in a way that comes very close to the language used by those courts that stated that such amendments were justiciable. Far from adhering to a mere policy of neutrality and self-restraint, the Constitutional Court speaks a “language of eternity” with a rich substantive content.
4
Kim, Jongcheol. "Significance and Limitations of the 1987 Constitution Amendment Movement: Why Do We Need Partial and Sequential Amendments?" Korean Constitutional Law Association 29, n. 3 (30 settembre 2023): 411–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.35901/kjcl.2023.29.3.411.
Abstract (sommario):
There is a need for a sequential and gradual process of constitutional reform, with targets that reflect the strong need for constitutional reform and the level of consensus at various levels.
It is also necessary to respond to the fact that the flawed political representation system has been an essential problem of the 1987 Constitution. That is, efforts should be made not only to emphasize representation in the constitutional revision process, but also to ensure sufficient participation of the people, who hold the authorship of the constitution, in accordance with the principle of sovereign people, which is the highest principle for the formation of national power structure. As a realistic alternative, it is necessary to actively embrace the civic and deliberative public debate system in the constitutional amendment process rather than the traditional method. This can be achieved to a certain extent through legislative reforms such as the Constitutional Amendment Procedure Act or the Referendum Act, rather than constitutional amendments.
In the end, we believe that sequential partial constitutional amendments, along with the democratic institutionalization of the constitutional amendment process, including the introduction of a deliberative public debate system, is a realistic alternative to inherit the achievements of the 1987 Constitution, improve its shortcomings, and build a new level of democratic republic.
5
Armia, Muhammad Siddiq, Zahlul Pasha Karim, Huwaida Tengku-Armia, Chairul Fahmi, Muhammad Syauqi Bin-Armia e Armiadi Musa. "Post Amendment of Judicial Review in Indonesia: Has Judicial Power Distributed Fairly?" Journal of Indonesian Legal Studies 7, n. 2 (21 dicembre 2022): 525–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/jils.v7i2.56335.
Abstract (sommario):
Distribution of power in Indonesian constitutional system not only occur amongst state organs but also within Indonesian judicial system. The Supreme Court and Constitutional Court share their power to review several regulations. The 1945 Constitution delivers power to review act against constitution for Constitutional Court and to review regulations below an act for the Supreme Court. However, this distribution of power is vulnerable to contradicting each other, with the possibility of having clash of judgment. There is no guarantee that the Supreme Court will fully obey the Constitutional Court judgment. So, the research question needs to be solved such as judicial Review pre-the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution process, and judicial Review Post the Amendment of the Constitution implement, that will be main points of research purposes. Furthermore, the main problem is the distribution power between Constitutional Court and Supreme Court, whether have distributed fairly or not. Another problem after amendment is about disagreement amongst judges. Before amendment, judges were forbidden to show their disagreement clearly in the verdict, but now allowed. This fact has led to public distrust. They have questioned the legitimacy of the verdict having disagreement, whether should be obeyed or be denied.
6
Dzidzoev, Ruslan Mukharbekovich. "The questions of organization of state power in new revision of the Constitution of the Russian Federation". Право и политика, n. 9 (settembre 2020): 156–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0706.2020.9.33640.
Abstract (sommario):
The subject of this research is the organization of state power in Russia in light of the amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation introduced in 2020 that require systematic scientific assessment. The object of this research is the legal acts that laid groundwork for the constitutional reform in Russia: Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of January 15, 2020, Law on Amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Opinion of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on correspondence of the amendment to the current Constitution of Russia. The author examines the content of the constitutional amendments, their reference with legal logic and requirements for the constitutional progress in Russia. The following conclusions were formulated: the significance and magnitude of the recent constitutional amendments allows speaking of the large-scale constitutional reform that adumbrates the new stage of constitutional evolution in Russia that results in the reform of state superstructure; constitutional amendments noticeably changes the configuration of state power with regards to ratio of the branches of power, checks and balances, objects and redistribution of the institutions of state power, which testifies to transition of the Russian Federation from semi-presidential (presidential-parliamentary) form of government towards presidential, characterized by dominant role of the President within the state system. The novelty of this research lies in analysis of the new constitutional provisions that describe the content of the Russian constitutional reform in the aspect of characteristics of the leading institutions of state power.
7
Bui, Ngoc Son. "Constitutional amendment in Laos". International Journal of Constitutional Law 17, n. 3 (luglio 2019): 756–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz067.
Abstract (sommario):
Abstract Laos, a socialist state in Southeast Asia, adopted an amended Constitution in 2015. This article investigates and explains this experience from the perspective of comparative constitutional amendment, supported by a qualitative empirical methodology: extensive formal interviews with several local constitutional amenders and informal conversations with a local lawyer and several legal scholars. It argues that Laos has introduced progressive constitutional amendments—notably, the redefinition of the position, structure, and functions of state institutions, including the imposition of term limits on executive power holders; strengthened commitment to a market economy; new commitments to human rights protection, judicial independence, and adversarial trials; and the creation of new institutions, namely, the local people’s councils, the state audit, and the election committee—to facilitate the improvement of its socialist constitutional system which in turn will promote the improvement of the material well-being of the living conditions of local people.
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Thiêm, Bùi Hải. "Pluralism Unleashed". Journal of Vietnamese Studies 9, n. 4 (2014): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/vs.2014.9.4.1.
Abstract (sommario):
The paper explores contestations playing out in constitutional debates around the 1992 constitutional amendments with a focal point in the exercise of discursive power and struggles for change. The paper discusses the significance of conflict in the constitutional reform process re-initiated in 2011. It demonstrates how the emphasis on stability and harmonious integration in initial constitutional amendment proposals has been compromised and renegotiated in the face of sustained criticisms of the constitution that draw on non-orthodox ideological foundations. The contestations that characterize constitutional reform discourse reveals how conflict is a significant driver of the changes presently underway in Vietnam.
9
Lee, Jae Hee. "Constitutional Amendment in the New Normal Era". European Constitutional Law Association 29 (31 agosto 2022): 323–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.21592/eucj.2022.39.323.
Abstract (sommario):
Under the health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the role of the state should be expanded. The state should not only guarantee the safety of individuals' lives from the risk of infection, but also help individuals to maintain their own lifestyle. Meanwhile, in order to prevent the spread of infection, the state has no choice but to restrict the freedom of assembly and association of individuals.
If there is a limit to appropriately responding to new social phenomena triggered by COVID-19 through the application of the existing legal system, constitutional amendment needs to be considered as the next step. Looking back on the history of constitutional revision of the Republic of Korea in the past, the constitution has been amended for the purpose of legitimizing power in the context of political change. The constitutional amendment have not been tried for the purpose of adapting to social change. However, it is time to consider the constitutional amendment according to the needs of the people. And in the age of new normal of COVID-19, we need to consider the constitutional amendment to actively accommodate these social changes.
However, it is true that it is practically difficult to amend the constitution through the constitutional amendment procedure stipulated in the current constitution. What made the constitutional amendment process difficult was to prevent the constitutional amendment from being misused by powered people. However, the democracy of the Republic of Korea has now stabilized to some extent, and society has changed significantly under the current constitution. Moreover, in the current crisis situation, constitutional amendment is requested. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the constitutional amendment procedure so that it is possible to amend the constitution if it is necessary to adapt to social change.
10
Nasution, Krisnadi. "INDONESIAN JUDICIAL POWER POST AMENDMENT". Mimbar Keadilan 13, n. 1 (24 gennaio 2020): 85–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.30996/mk.v13i1.2997.
Abstract (sommario):
Post the amendment of the Republic of Indonesia constitution, judicial authority in Indonesia underwent a fundamental change. The amendment was made based on the mandate contained in the 1945 Constitution post the amendment. Through normative juridical studies, an analysis of these changes will be carried out. The method of approach is based on statutory regulations and conceptually, as well as comprehensive. Post the amendment of the Republic of Indonesia Constitution, in the beginning, only the Supreme Court had power in the field of justice. Then developed with the formation of new institutions in the field of justice namely: the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Commission. Through these additions, it is expected that checks and balances will occur in the formation of laws and regulations and the implementation of judicial power.
11
Subiyanto, Achmad Edi. "Mendesain Kewenangan Kekuasaan Kehakiman Setelah Perubahan UUD 1945". Jurnal Konstitusi 9, n. 4 (20 maggio 2016): 661. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk944.
Abstract (sommario):
After the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of The Republic of Indonesia, The Judicial Power has become the most fundamentally power and also as a part of the axis of power which its function is to enforce justice. According to the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of The Republic of Indonesia, the judicial power in the structure of state power, is still placed at the power that is free from intervention or influence from other power in exercising its authority. In the structure of state power, after the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of The Republic of Indonesia, the judicial power shall be implemented by a Supreme Court and judicial bodies underneath it in the form of public courts, religious affairs courts, military tribunals, and state administrative courts, and by a Constitutional Court. The Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of The Republic of Indonesia, also spawned a new institution, beside Constitutional Court which its function is relating to judicial power, namely an independent Judicial Commission which shall possess the authority to propose candidates for appointment as justices of the Supreme Court and shall possess further authority to maintain and ensure the honour, dignity and behaviour of judges.
12
Stone, Adrienne. "Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Between Contradiction and Necessity". ICL Journal 12, n. 3 (27 novembre 2018): 357–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/icl-2018-0043.
Abstract (sommario):
Abstract In Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, Yaniv Roznai seeks to unscramble the apparent contradictions in the idea of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment. This argument is ambitious in its scope and its global comparative reach. Roznai does not limit himself to justifying explicit limitations placed on the power of amendment nor to limitations that go only to process. Rather, Roznai argues that amendment powers are always subject to limitations of substance and procedure and that these limitations may be implicit as well as explicit. In this short essay, I will argue that the form of argument deployed by Roznai cannot fully justify the doctrine of unamendability as Roznai elaborates upon it. It allows Roznai to establish that unamendability is a conceptual possibility but it does not follow, as he seeks to argue, that unamendability is a necessary consequence of constitutionalism.
13
DE CASTRO DOURADO CORDEIRO, WESLEY. "REFLEXÕES SOBRE O ASPECTO FORMAL DA EMENDA CONSTITUCIONAL Nº 106/2020 “ORÇAMENTO DE GUERRA". Revista Científica Semana Acadêmica 10, n. 228 (21 dicembre 2022): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.35265/2236-6717-228-12379.
Abstract (sommario):
The purpose of this article is to study the formal aspect of the Constitutional Amendment n. 106/2020 not analyzed by STF. Among the measures to fight Covid-19 Pandemic, the Constitutional Amendment n. 106/2020 was proclaimed. Through this rule, an extraordinary fiscal, financial and contracting regime was authorized. The normative species that was conveyed presents an intriguing feature: it is a constitutional amendment that does not amend anything. The Constitutional Amendment n. 106/2020 does not amend the Constitution itself, nor the Transitory Constitutional Provisions Act, and it acts as autonomous legislation. From this perspective and based on the doctrine of constitutional law, the text raises some hypotheses for such an option, generally and specifically, finally suggesting hypotheses of unconstitutionality, such as the abuse of Legislative Power.
14
Idiculla, Mathew. "Unpacking Local Self-Government: The Uncertain Power of Cities in the Indian Constitution". Verfassung in Recht und Übersee 53, n. 1 (2020): 30–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0506-7286-2020-1-30.
Abstract (sommario):
While cities are increasingly becoming powerful economic and political units, legal scholars have paid inadequate attention to the role of local governments in the constitutional division of powers. This paper examines the legal authority of city governments in India’s constitutional architecture and analyses the nature and extent of powers exercised by them. While globally city governments seldom derive their powers directly from the Constitution, in India the passage of the 74th Amendment has ensured that they have a definite space in its Constitution. Despite constitutional entrenchment, urban local governments in India find themselves powerless to administer some of the core municipal functions including urban planning. This paper seeks to analyse the reasons behind this contradiction. It argues that city governments continue to be weak because of the inherent limitations of the scope of the 74th Amendment as well as the way in which it is translated and implemented by the states. It examines the constitutional authority of urban local governments by analysing the key provisions of the 74th Amendment and its judicial interpretations. To understand how the constitutional reform has translated on the ground, this paper closely examines the role and functioning of the city government of Bangalore.
15
Mayieka Oira, Nickson. "Fundamental Constitutional Changes Without Participation of the Constituent Power". Italian Review of International and Comparative Law 3, n. 1 (5 maggio 2023): 215–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/27725650-03010015.
Abstract (sommario):
Abstract The book review analyzes the work of two renowned scholars who have highlighted how fundamental constitutional amendments could take place through interpretation of statutes by the judicial arm of government or through legislation without invoking the formal constitutional amendment processes. Such constitutional changes are fundamental and therefore transform the polity of a society without involving the constituent power. It is crystal clear from the authors that constitutional revolution is not so much about the process of change but about the significance of the changes made.
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Medvid, A. B. "Constitutional metamorphosis: analysis of amendment procedures to the Basic Law in the context of global transformations". Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence, n. 6 (27 dicembre 2023): 142–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2788-6018.2023.06.24.
Abstract (sommario):
The article is devoted to the study of constitutional metamorphoses in the context of global transformations, in particular the analysis of the procedures for introducing changes to the basic law in different countries of the world. Modifications in modern geopolitical, economic and socio-cultural conditions caused the need to revise and adapt constitutional norms in order to bring the latter to the requirements of modern challenges and realities.
Thescientific article examinesvarious approaches to the legal mechanism of amending constitutions in countries with various legal traditions and political systems. The author conducts a comparative analysis of such procedures, paying attention to legislative initiatives, the role of parliament, the participation of civil society and other aspects.
It has been shown that the key aspects of the modification of constitutions are the following issues: a) legitimacy of foundations and subjects that initiate the process of constitutional reform and have the authority to make changes to the constitution; b) the content of constitutional changes and the threshold at which amendments to the constitution introduce transformations into its principles and essence; c) characteristics of legal mechanisms and procedures (models) for amending constitutions, which, on the one hand, guarantee the legitimacy of updated constitutions, and on the other hand, serve as a legal barrier against "constitutional extremism”, that is, unfounded and dangerous for the individual, society and states by constitutional transformations.
It is emphasized that in the context of constitutional metamorphoses, the following forms of transformation of constitutions should be distinguished: a) amendments to basic laws; b) introduction of amendments to the constitutions; c) change of constitutions.
It has been established that constitutional metamorphoses in the context of global transformations indicate radical changes and transformations in the constitutional system of various countries or even at the world level, in particular: globalization of constitutional norms; expansion of the catalog of rights and freedoms; changes in the system of the power mechanism; ecological constitutional protection; constitutional innovation; global constitutional standards.
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Papastylianos, Christos. "The Cypriot Doctrine of Necessity and the Amendment of the Cypriot Constitution: The Revision of the Unamendable Amendment Rules of the Cypriot Constitution Through a Juridical Coup D’ État". ICL Journal 17, n. 3 (1 settembre 2023): 313–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/icl-2023-0035.
Abstract (sommario):
Abstract The constitutional design and the complete inability of the two ethnic communities who live in Cyprus (Greeks and Turks) to share the power according to the constitutional rules concluded soon after the independence to a constitutional crisis and consequently to the collapse of the system of governance that the Constitution provided, since the Turk-Cypriots withdraw from all their posts in key state institutions. The Supreme Court, in order to confront the issue that the part of the Constitution which set the system of governance became inoperative, implemented the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’, according to which the constitutional provisions that prescribe the bi-communal composition of all key institutions are suspended until the crisis comes to an end. The implementation of the Doctrine of Necessity did not leave intact the amendment formula of the Cypriot Constitution, which demands two separate majorities by 2/3rds of each community MPs for the conclusion of the process. However, such implementation of a judge-made standard to the amendment process raises crucial issues regarding the possibility of making clear-cut distinctions between constituent and constituted power, formal and informal constitutional change and about the legitimation of judges to revise through interpretation the amendment rules that the Constitution prescribes.
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Cho, Jae Hyun. "A Study on the Correlation between Changes in North Korea's Power Structure and Constitutional Amendments". Unification and North Korean Law Studies 29 (30 giugno 2023): 139–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.31999/sonkl.2023.29.139.
Abstract (sommario):
The Constitution of North Korea was enacted and promulgated on September 8, 1948 as the People's Democratic Constitution, and the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was newly adopted on December 27, 1972, including the 2019 Constitution, which did not guarantee basic human rights such as life, liberty, and property of all people, or operate as a norm to control and limit the supreme power of the state. From a legal normative perspective, North Korea's supreme authority exists beyond the constitution and is not bound by the law, and he has no real limits to the exercise of his constitutional powers. It can be said to be a state system in which the policies of the party and the state and the state's official governance system, such as the constitution, must coincide with the will of the leader, the sole leader. Likewise South Korean rulers in the past amended the Constitution with political intentions to prolong the regime, this paper attempted to examine what the political implications of the supreme power in North Korea's constitutional amendment there were, and find out what role the Constitution played in establishing the hereditary system leading to Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong Un. In addition, it was a question about the North Korea system, how it gave legitimacy to the power succession by using the constitutional normative power for the unique national hereditary succession by blood in the socialist system. For this purpose, in particular, this paper employed North Korea's 1992 constitutional amendment, Kim Jong-il's succession to power, Kim Il-sung's posthumous rule and 1998 constitution, and Kim Jong-il's posthumous Kim Il-sung--Kim Jong-il's constitution as the main subject of research. To understand the correlation between changes in the power structure of North Korea and the constitution, this paper tried to investigate first of all, what there are in the contents of the constitutional paving stone for the succession of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong Un, and find out Kim Jong-il's posthumous rule developed after Kim Il-sung's death and the intention of constitutionalization work for the deceased Kim Il-sung, and examine how the constitutional acceptance of the newly emerged state guidance guidelines was along with the hereditary succession of state power, and what intention there was in the constitutional reflection of the governing philosophy by deleting the previous highest state position and changing the new state position. It was because of the political intention shown in the amendment of the North Korea Constitution and the desire to approach the practical legal and normative environment of North Korea.
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Rishan, Idul, Sri Hastuti Puspitasari e Siti Ruhama Mardhatillah. "Amendment to Term of Office of Constitutional Court Judges in Indonesia: Reasons, Implications, and Improvement". Varia Justicia 18, n. 2 (29 novembre 2022): 141–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.31603/variajusticia.v18i2.7236.
Abstract (sommario):
After the amendment to the Constitutional Court Law, constitutional court judges would be dismissed honorably when they attain the age of 70 (seventy) years old. Problem arises, where the transitional provisions of the third amendment to the Constitutional Court Law are not applicable prospectively but retroactively. Hence, the implementation of the amendment to the term of office of constitutional court judges also brings an impact on the incumbent constitutional judges in the Constitutional Court. This study had three objectives. First, to identify the underlying reasons (ratio-legis) for the amendment to the term of office of constitutional court judges to the maximum age limit of 70 years. Second, to analyze the implications of arranging a maximum age limit of 70 years for the position of constitutional court judges. Third, to recommend alternative arrangements for the term of office of constitutional court judges in Indonesia. This was a legal doctrinal research with a qualitative analysis. The results showed that (1) the reasons for the amendment to the term of office of constitutional court judges are due to the open legal policy, globalization and efforts to build the pro-majoritarian power in the Constitutional Court. (2) This amendment brings implications, i.e., the distortion of judicial independence, conflicts of interest and a declined public trust. (3) Improvements can be made by revising the transitional provisions and trying other alternatives by arranging the term of office of the judges through the constitution.
20
Osavelyuk, A. M. "Reflections on a Secular State (in the Context of 2020 Amendments to the Constitution of Russia)". Actual Problems of Russian Law 15, n. 8 (30 agosto 2020): 32–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1994-1471.2020.117.8.032-042.
Abstract (sommario):
Based on the analysis of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the constitutions of foreign states and the current legislation, as well as domestic and foreign studies, the author argues that currently several kinds of secular States exist. They significantly differ from each other in the characteristics enshrined in their constitutions and legislation. Because of that, it is hard to talk about an indefinite classic secular State. Nevertheless, the author articulates the features that are characteristic of a large number of modern democratic secular States, and proposes the optimal model of the modern secular state. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of amendments made under the Law of the Russian Federation on the Amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of March 14, 2020, No 1-FKZ “On improvement of the regulation of certain issues of organization and functioning of public power” related to the secular State, especially amendments that formalize the attitude towards relations between the State and religious communities existing for centuries and developed in the territory of our Fatherland. The paper demonstrates special importance of interaction between prescriptions fixed in the constitutional provisions, constitutional legislation and moral principles enshrined in religious sources.
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Kim, Jeongsoo. "Constitutional perspectives on judicial reform and the direction of Constitutional amendment". Korean Constitutional Law Association 28, n. 4 (30 dicembre 2022): 657–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.35901/kjcl.2022.28.4.657.
Abstract (sommario):
Since the enactment of the current constitution, our society has undergone many changes, and there has been a considerable gap between the constitutional norms and the constitutional reality. Reflecting this reality, political parties including the National Assembly are constantly discussing constitutional amendments. It is necessary to secure the efficiency, stability, continuity, and accountability of the state by reforming the power structure, which is the main cause of the state confusion in the turbulent domestic and foreign environment. Therefore, the revised constitution should contain the design for the national stability, prosperity and sustainable development of the Republic of Korea in the future. In order for a successful constitutional amendment to take place, first of all, the active participation of the sovereign people and the securing of democracy through the public debate led by the National Assembly, which is the representative agency, should be given priority. In order to do this, it is necessary to accurately diagnose the problems of the current constitution, which has been claimed by various experts such as the National Assembly and civil society, and to consider the various interests surrounding the amendment of the constitution. The reason why the judicial reform, which has been tried several times by the active efforts of the political party and sometimes at the request of the judiciary, has ended without great achievement is that the people's expectation and desire for judicial reform, the direction of the reform that the political party thinks, The main reason is that the contents of the reform are different. In the end, in order for judicial reform to be a real reform that conforms to the essence of the judiciary, it must be a reform that is appropriate to the needs and standards of the sovereign people, and at the same time, the judiciary itself recognizes its necessity. Furthermore, while the human rights and fundamental rights of the people are protected and respected through fair and neutral trials under the constitution and laws, the ultimate direction and goal of the constitutional amendment should be to decide and enjoy their lives as freely and equally as possible.
22
Benvindo, Juliano Zaiden. "Resenha: Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Power (Oxford University Press, 2017), de Yaniv Roznai". Revista de Investigações Constitucionais 5, n. 3 (5 settembre 2018): 349. http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v5i3.60171.
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Martins, Ana. "Presidential Elements in Government The Portuguese Semi-Presidential System". European Constitutional Law Review 2, n. 1 (febbraio 2006): 81–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019606000812.
Abstract (sommario):
Influences of the Movimento das Forças Armadas, of earlier Portuguese and of foreign constitutions on Portuguese Constitution of 1976 — A semi-presidential system with originally four political powers: president, parliament, government and Revolutionary Council — Progressive ascendancy of the presidency in practice between 1976–1982 — Constitutional amendment of 1982: Revolutionary Council abrogated, parliamentary powers strengthened, presidential powers reduced — Presidential role in practice not declining, though depending on the political party power constellation — Influence of president as political moderator and institutional regulator at the lowest when political colours of president and parliamentary majority match — President not conducting, directly or indirectly, the country’s general policy.
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Khan, Iltaf, Bakhtiar Khan e Muhammad Tariq. "The 18th Constitutional Amendment and Its Impact on Pakistan’s Democracy". Global Foreign Policies Review V, n. I (30 marzo 2022): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gfpr.2022(v-i).01.
Abstract (sommario):
As a result of the 2008 general elections, a power transition from the military to the civilians took place in Pakistan. The Pakistan People's Party, after assuming the powers, under its legislative drive restored the 1973 constitution to its original shape. Under the landmark 18th constitutional amendment,federal parliamentary democracy was restored, which ensured autonomy for provinces after removing the concurrent list. It ensured the independence of the judiciary, transparency of the Election Commission of Pakistan, and made arrangements for a peaceful transfer of power under the neutral caretaker government.Through this amendment, provinces were empowered and allowed to legislate on various matters under their jurisdictions. More and more powers were devolved to enhance provincial autonomy and to enable them to unearth their own resources. The present paper examines the 18th amendment and its role in the establishment of a viable federal democratic system based on participatory governance.
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MZ, H. ISMAIL. "ANALISIS PERUBAHAN STRUKTUR LEMBAGA NEGARA DAN SISTIM PENYELENGGARAAN KEKUASAAN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA BERDASARKAN UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR 1945 SEBELUM DAN SESUDAH AMANDEMEN". GANEC SWARA 13, n. 2 (2 settembre 2019): 258. http://dx.doi.org/10.35327/gara.v13i2.90.
Abstract (sommario):
The amendment to the 1945 Constitution after the 1998 reform is based on the experience of the practice of state administration by the old and new order governments which are often referred to as authoritarian government systems, both overt and covert. The 1945 Constitution indeed gives enormous power to the President, both Sukarno and Suharto. Weaknesses contained in the 1945 Constitution that triggers the birth of the demands of the reformists to make amendments to the 1945 Constitution, especially concerning the power and term of office of the President. It is important to realize that after the 1945 Constitution is amended, it has very basic implications for the structure of the Republic of Indonesia. Before the amendment to the 1945 Constitution the existing state institutions are the People's Consultative Assembly, the President, the People's Representative Council, the Supreme Consultative Council, the Supreme Audit Board and the Supreme Court, whose titles are divided into two, namely the highest state institutions which are embedded in the People's Consultative Assembly, and the other is a high-level state institution. After changes or amendments to the 1945 Constitution from 1999 to 2002 have implications for changes in the structure of existing state institutions and the number becomes more than before the change. The state institutions after the change are explicitly mentioned in the nomenclature such as: the People's Consultative Assembly, the House of Representatives, the Regional Representative Council, the Regional People's Representative Council, the President and Vice President, the Minister (Specially the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense ) Governor, Regent, Mayor, Indonesian National Army, Republic of Indonesia National Police, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, Judicial Commission and Supreme Audit Board. While there are other state institutions whose nomenclature is not mentioned explicitly namely; Advisory Council, Election Commission and Central Bank. As a consequence of the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the constitutional system adopted has also changed. If before the change to the constitutional system adopted is the cameral union representative system, but after the change into the bicameral system, some even called it tri kameral
26
Daly, Eoin. "Translating Popular Sovereignty as Unfettered Constitutional Amendability". European Constitutional Law Review 15, n. 4 (dicembre 2019): 619–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019619000415.
Abstract (sommario):
Popular sovereignty translated as unfettered constitutional-amendment power – Weakness of constituent power as justification for unfettered amendability – Alternative concept of sovereignty as unaccountability of constituted power – Popular sovereignty as unaccountability of the referendum verdict – Sovereignty emerging at end-point, not inception of constitutional-amendment process
27
Taeva, N. E. "The Law of the Russian Federation on Amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation: Evolution of Legal Properties". Actual Problems of Russian Law 15, n. 8 (30 agosto 2020): 43–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1994-1471.2020.117.8.043-054.
Abstract (sommario):
The paper, on the basis of the analysis of legislation, the RF Constitutional Court jurisprudence, as well as practice of law-making on amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, describes the process of evolution of legal properties of the law under consideration. The paper investigates such legal properties of the Law of the Russian Federation on the Amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation as legal force, the subject of the legal regulation, the procedure for adoption and entry into force. The author believes that any change of these legal properties has an impact on the legal properties of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and primarily on its stability. The paper draws special attention to the Law of the Russian Federation on Amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation as of MArch 14, 2020, No. 1-FKZ “On improvement of regulation of certain issues of organization and functioning of public power.” According to the author, there was another transformation of the legal properties of the Law on Amendment. This transformation concerns the order of its entry into force. Provisions of the Law of the Russian Federation on Amendment to the Constitution adopted in 2020 contain both norms that amend the constitutional text and norms not intended for inclusion in the text of the Constitution of the Russian Federation that are technical and transitional in nature. In this regard, the author deals with the question whether the Law on Amendement itself may establish additional conditions for its entry into force other than those provided for by the federal legislation.
28
Orlović, Slobodan, e Nataša Rajić. "Changes in the constitutional position of the public prosecutor's office in the constitutional revision 2022". Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta, Novi Sad 57, n. 1 (2023): 137–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/zrpfns57-43269.
Abstract (sommario):
The paper critically analyzes the provisions of the amendments of the Constitution adopted in 2022, regarding the change of the position of the public prosecutor's office. The third initiative for the partial change of the Constitution was fruitful. The provisions which regulate the constitutional position of judiciary and prosecutor's office were changed, with the initial aim to create the independence guarantees of the judiciary, as well as the autonomy of the prosecutor's office. Certain steps that would go in the direction of achieving the given aim, can be recognized in the norms of the amendments. Those amendments have been also confirmed by the Venice Commission, which are considered as the key factor. However, the first impression created by the amendment provisions is that they are the result of a compromise and therefore partly inconsistent, between: the initiator of constitutional amendments (Government), representatives of the court's and the prosecutor's associations, other members of the working group, and, lastly, international community. Within that impression, the new position of the public prosecutor's office primarily indicates that the prosecutor's office rose to the rank which the judicial branch of power enjoys, by copying the provisions of the judiciary, with only a few differences.
29
Hassan, Muhammad, Amjad Hussain e Aas Muhammad. "Judicial Observations over the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment in Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal". Global Social Sciences Review VI, n. II (30 giugno 2021): 278–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2021(vi-ii).27.
Abstract (sommario):
The legal fraternity and some political parties around the country challenged the twenty-first constitutional amendment, enacted by the Parliament of Pakistan. The petitioners contended that the Legislature amended the basic features of the Pakistan Constitution beyond its scope of amending power and liable to be declared unconstitutional. However, some of the judges of the apex Court of Pakistan adopted the former judicial approach. They ruled that the apex court had no authority to annul any amendment when it became a formal part of 1973’sConstitution. The apex court further stated that the impugned amendment might be taken under consideration if it was found that the required constitutional procedure for amendment did not comply with it. This research aims to critically analyze observations of the apex court about examining the constitutional amendment on the yardstick of repugnancy with the basic features of the Constitution of Pakistan. For achieving the proposed objective, this study adopts a doctrinal research method. It carries out an in-depth analysis from the perspective of modern Constitutionalism, juristic literature, and judgments of the superior courts of various States to support the study.
30
Gaho, Ghulam Mustafa, Ahmad Hussain Shah Bukhari e Syed Anwar-ul-Mustafa Shah. "REVISITING THE 18TH AMENDMENT IN THE 1973 CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN: DEBATE OVER CENTRE-PROVINCE POWERS". Pakistan Journal of Social Research 04, n. 02 (30 giugno 2022): 384–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.52567/pjsr.v4i2.486.
Abstract (sommario):
This research article deals with the remarkable description of passing of 18th Amendment in the 1973 Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 2010, a move which was much awaited considered being the actual constitutional dream of the founder of the Nation Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the study talk about the different 102 constitutional articles amended in the process. Positive aspects of the 18thConstitutional Amendment have been given in detail followed by the opponent arguments given by those who are critical of this amendment. The research also delivers with the detailed debate on provincial autonomy followed by the apprehensions regarding the weak central government. The two opposite views are supported with solid arguments, whether the amendment brought greater role to the parliament and the Prime Minister or it was just to acquire unaccountable political power at the provincial level. In the end the conclusion sums up the debate. Key words: Constitution, Amendment, Legislation, Local Bodies, Judiciary, Provincial Autonomy, Senate
31
Andryan, Eddy Purnama, Suhaidi e Faisal Akbar Nasution. "The Shifting of the President Prerogative Powers in the Presidential System Post Amendment to the UUD 1945 in Indonesia". Journal of Law and Sustainable Development 11, n. 11 (29 novembre 2023): e1793. http://dx.doi.org/10.55908/sdgs.v11i11.1793.
Abstract (sommario):
Objective: To look for a shift in presidential power from the development of the constitution and constitutional practices in Indonesia. After the amendments to the 1945 Constitution were made, there was almost no authority the President could exercise alone without seeking approval or consideration from other institutions, except for the appointment of ministers. The research aims to determine the factors that cause the President's Prerogative Powers to be inconsistent with the ideal conception of the Indonesian constitutional system. Since the beginning of Indonesian independence, the constitution has placed the prerogative rights of the president very dominantly, now after very fundamental changes to the constitution it also has implications for shifting the prerogative power of the president. Method: The research used juridical-normative. The approaches used in this research are the Legislative Approach, Conceptual Approach, and Historical Approach. Results: In a presidential system, the president has absolute authority in appointing ministers, although in practice the president is also closely tied to supporting parties or other parties who have made political commitments to the president. In the 1945 Constitution after the amendment, there is no longer anything that is truly a prerogative power of the president that can be exercised without obtaining approval or consideration, especially from the People's Representative Council as the people's representative institution. Conclusion: Prerogative power also has an undemocratic and potentially dangerous tendency, so to increase public accountability, the use of prerogative power by the President must apply power by involving institutions as representatives of the people.
32
Eddyono, Luthfi Widagdo. "Independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in Norms and Practices". Constitutional Review 3, n. 1 (2 agosto 2017): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/consrev314.
Abstract (sommario):
Article 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution States after the third amendment, “the judicial power shall be independent in administering justice so as to uphold the law and equality.” The Indonesian Constitutional Court is one of the performers of the independent judicial power who plays a significant role in the enforcement of the constitution and the principle of the state based on the law by its authority and obligations as determined by the 1945 Constitution. This paper intends to study the Indonesian Constitutional Court to find out whether the Constitutional Court in exercising its constitutional authority can be independent. Also, this article will examine not just institutional independence but also judges independence to understand current issues related to the role of ethics and conduct of judges. The independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court supported by the 1945 Constitution after the amendments from 1999 until 2002, and further stipulated in Law. However, it can be said that this institution has ups and downs of public trust due to corruption cases conducted by constitutional justices. Also, in several political instances showed efforts of political institutions to limit the authority of the Constitutional Court. In its experiences, the Constitutional Court succeeded in convincing the parties through its decisions and strengthening institutional independence against the influence that tried to destabilize its institutions. The Council of Ethics of Constitutional Judges that maintains the values and behavior of judges also continuously works and efficient enough in overseeing the ethics and conduct of judges. The decision of the Ethics Council may also be accepted as a proportional decision.
33
Agustiwi, Asri. "DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTION IN 1945 AMENDMENTS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL IN INDONESIA". UNTAG Law Review 1, n. 2 (30 novembre 2017): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.36356/ulrev.v1i2.597.
Abstract (sommario):
<p>The constitution is often equated with the Constitution as the basic law is written. However, the Constitution of having understanding wider. The Constitution does not only include a written rule that constitution, but the unwritten rule, the basic rules are raised and maintained in the practice of statecraft or called by convention. The Constitution is the constitutional system in the form of written and unwritten rules set out together to govern a country. Where the nature and function of the constitution is there limitation of government power so that the implementation of power is not arbitrary. Thus, the rights of citizens are expected to be protected. 1945 was passed by the state constitution PPKI as Indonesia on August 18, 1945. In practice, the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia has been transformed into constitutional RIS (December 27th 1945- August 17, 1950), later transformed into a Provisional Constitution of 1950 (August 17th 1950s July 5th, 1959), until it became 1945 again but with amendments in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. An amendment to the 1945 Constitution because their demands strong 1945 changes of society. People feel that the charge 1945 times many are not appropriate.</p>
34
Han, Dong Hoon. "French Constitutional Court's control over French finance law". European Constitutional Law Association 41 (30 aprile 2023): 331–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.21592/eucj.2023.41.331.
Abstract (sommario):
The French Constitutional Court has reviewed most of the finance laws. The control of the French Constitutional Court can be divided into ⅰ) control under Article 40 of the French Constitution, ⅱ) control of legal regulations unrelated to the purpose of finance laws, ⅲ) control of discussion procedures in parliament, and ⅳ) control of the contents of finance laws. France's current finance laws should not just be an expression of the general will of the people, but also comply with the constitutional order prescribed by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of France. The attitude of the French Constitutional Court to control finance laws needs to be actively reviewed and accepted in discussions for the introduction of legislation- based budget system, especially in the specific design of the constitutional amendment. Therefore, in the case of introducing legislation-based budget system through constitutional amendment, the enactment of finance laws should not be discussed only in terms of the distribution of power between the parliament and the government, and the Constitutional Court's control over finance laws should also be guaranteed.
35
Fauzanto, Adi. "Rekonstruksi Rekrutmen Dan Pengawasan Eksternal Hakim Mahkamah Konstitusi Dengan Pendekatan Hukum Progresif". Jurnal Panorama Hukum 5, n. 1 (5 giugno 2020): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.21067/jph.v5i1.4285.
Abstract (sommario):
Indonesia is a country of law. Jimly Asshiddiqie formulated twelve main principles of modern rule of law, one of which was the existence of a free and impartial judiciary, and the existence of a constitutional justice mechanism. After amendments of the constitution of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, it has implications for the structure of more democratic state institutions. These changes give birth to the building of state relief from one another in an equal position with mutual control (checks and balances). Judicial Power is an independent power to administer justice to uphold law and justice. An independent judicial power or what is referred to as the principle of independence cannot be separated from the principle of checks and balances adopted by Indonesia to ensure that the institutions of authority and duties are balanced and the principles of the state are based on law and constitution. In Indonesia, the Constitutional Court judiciary was born on August 13, 2003, which was formed based on Law Number 24 of 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court. The history of the establishment of the Constitutional Court (MK) began with the adoption of the idea of a Constitutional Court in constitutional amendments. In the course of normative juridical arrangements regarding the Constitutional Court, there have been four amendments, namely (1) Law Number 24 of 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court; (2) Law Number 8 of 2011 concerning Amendment of Law Number 24 of 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court; and (3) Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2013 concerning Second Amendment to Law Number 24 of 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court which has been ratified into law with Law Number 4 of 2014 and has been cancelled by MK Decision Number 1-2 / PUU-XII / 2014. This is due to several problems faced by the Constitutional Court, namely Constitutional Court Judges who violated the code of ethics to commit corruption and bribery. Of course, there is a need for a comprehensive study relating to (1) Appointment of Constitutional Justices and Panel of Experts and (2) External Oversight of Constitutional Justices and the Ethics Board of Constitutional Justices. use the Progressive Legal Theory approach to get solutions to the problematics that occur, which explore the values contained in society. In its arrangement, the Expert Panel and External Oversight have been regulated in Perppu No. 1 of 2013 which has been stipulated as Law Number 4 of 2014, but in that Act, the Court considers that the Expert Panel and External Oversight Committee formed by the Judicial Commission is considered unconstitutional because there is no principle of checks and balances within the judicial authority. With the susceptibility of constitutional judges to take actions outside of authority and other factors that have implications for the declining level of the Constitutional Court's confidence in society. Therefore, the researcher here wants to reconstruct a Panel of Experts and External Supervisors who answer the previous problems. The purpose of the Reconstruction of Panel of Experts and External Oversight is to realize a law enforcement system that is free of corruption, collusion, nepotism.
36
Warjiyati, Sri, Kayode Muhammed Ibrahim, Safrin Salam e Umar Faruq. "Complaint Authority for Constitutional Complaint by Indonesia’s Constitutional Court". Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum dan Keadilan 10, n. 2 (24 agosto 2022): 303–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.29303/ius.v10i2.1070.
Abstract (sommario):
Constitutional Court will be able to provide protection for constitutional rights which will produce institutions that are able to provide answers to reforms. The presence of the Constitutional Court third amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which became the basis of Article 24C. The legitimacy of the Constitutional Court in a limited way is formulated, namely: to begin, to investigate legislation that violates the constitution, to adjudicate disputes over the power of state institutions vested with constitutional authority, and to adjudicate the dissolution of political parties and settlement, the four general election disputes. In the modern state administration discourse, it currently requires the Constitutional Court to expand the scope of its authority in relation to Constitutional Complaints or commonly referred to as Constitutional Complaints. The necessity of one of these powers can be seen in the number of state institutions that violate the constitutional rights of citizens through the actions of these institutions. However, the channel for this complaint still does not exist, only that currently exists in providing protection for the right of Constitutional Complaints to be protected through judicial review of the basic constitution as regulated in the constitution.
37
Das, Mamoni. "Panchayati Raj Institutions in India". Galore International Journal of Applied Sciences and Humanities 6, n. 2 (10 maggio 2022): 6–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.52403/gijash.20220402.
Abstract (sommario):
Panchayati Raj Institution (PRI) is a system of rural local self-government in India. Panchayati Raj is a system of governance in which gram panchayats are the basic units of administration. It has 3 levels: village, block and district. “Panchayat” literally means assembly (yat) of five (panch) and ‘Raj’ literally means governance or government. Mahatma Gandhi advocated Panchayati Raj a decentralized form of Government where each village is responsible for its own affairs, as the foundation of India’s political system. His term for such a vision was “Gram Swaraj”(Village Self-governance).The dream of 'Gram Swaraj' of our beloved father of nation, Mahatma Gandhi and motto of 'Power to People' are essence of true democracy. The task of capacity building of these large numbers of Panchayats is quite gigantic exercise. As per the assessment of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj even after 22 years of enactment of 73rd Constitutional (Amendment) Act and also after having three rounds of Panchayat elections in many States in India the empowerment of Panchayats have not taken place as envisioned in the 73rd Constitution (Amendment) Act in 1992.The 73rd Amendment to the Constitution in 1992 gave Constitutional status to the Panchayats as institutions of local self government and also for planning and implementing programmes for economic development and social justice. The Panchayati Raj System is not a new concept and therefore is considered as one of the best ways of governance of the rural India. However, the System of Panchayati Raj despite having derived their power and existence from the constitution of India. In this paper discuss Panchayati raj Structure, Evolution, 73rd Constitutional (Amendment) Act, Ministry of Panchayati Raj and Panchayati Raj System in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Keywords: Panchayati Raj, Constitution, Amendment and development
38
Torres-Artunduaga, Catalina, e Santiago García-Jaramillo. "Democratizing the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Puzzle of Amending the Judiciary Branch". ICL Journal 14, n. 1 (25 giugno 2020): 1–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/icl-2019-0024.
Abstract (sommario):
AbstractThe increasing interest of legal academia on the doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments and its growing enforcement by the judiciary in different jurisdictions has started to normalize a doctrine that was considered controversial and extraordinary. This paper seeks to cast some doubts on the use of this doctrine, especially when the Court that enforces it is the subject of the amendment itself. In the first section it will question the conceptual foundations of the doctrine by recourse to legal theory, focusing not only on the idea of constituent power, but also on those of the rule of law and accountability. In the second section, some comparative cases of unconstitutional constitutional amendments will be analyzed, focusing on those where the judiciary itself was the subject of the amendment. Finally, from a normative and conceptual standpoint, a dialogic approach to the application of the doctrine will be proposed, to mitigate the fact that Constitutional Courts can become an unaccountable accountability-holder.
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Arfan, Am'mar Abdullah, e Taufiqur Rohman. "State Institutional Format in the Constitution of 1945 After Amendment: Political and Legal Perspectives". HIKMATUNA: Journal for Integrative Islamic Studies 8, n. 2 (2 gennaio 2023): 196–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.28918/hikmatuna.v8i2.6155.
Abstract (sommario):
This research discusses the state institutional format in the Constitution of 1945 after the amendment. Since the Constitution 1945 had four changes from 1999 to 2022, so need to know what implications for all state institutions. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land in the Indonesian legal system, which was used as the basis for all social practice, nation, and state. This research used a normative approach in which the formation of the state is in accordance with its designation or not. The study of the content used normative juridical or doctrinal methods. This study found that the third and fourth amendments to the 1945 Constitution established three new institutions, namely the DPD, the Constitutional Court (MK) and the Judicial Commission, while the Supreme Consultative Council was abolished. With amendments to the 1945 Constitution, the MPR is no longer the highest institution. Likewise, changes in the constitutional system. These changes cover the government system (the President and Vice President as one leading institution), the representative system (MPR consisting of the DPR and DPD), and the justice system (MA and MK). The reformed format for organizing state institutions in the 1945 Constitution applies a system of enhancing power and the principle of checks and balances between state institutions, as in democratic countries.
40
Sumadi, Ahmad Fadlil. "Independensi Mahkamah Konstitusi". Jurnal Konstitusi 8, n. 5 (20 maggio 2016): 631. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk851.
Abstract (sommario):
Amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 (UUD 1945) define more clearly what is meant by judicial power and determine the perpetrators of judicial power. The judicial power as intended by the 1945 Constitution is the judicial power whereas the power needs to be guaranteed freedom (independency. Constitutional Court as one of the subjects of the judicial authorities in carrying out duties, functions, and authorities also uses the principle of independence and impartiality. The existence of the Constitutional Court as a subject of the judicial authorities which the authority determined in the 1945 Constitution, is necessary because amandment of 1945 Constitution have to led, among other things, the 1945 Constitution position as the supreme law of the state in which the authority of state agencies regulated.
41
Mbao, Melvin L. M. "Human rights and discrimination: Zambia's constitutional amendment, 1996". Journal of African Law 42, n. 1 (1998): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021855300010469.
Abstract (sommario):
In the leading South African case of The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, Ishmail Mohamed, J., (as he then was) with his characteristic eloquence observed that“all Constitutions seek to articulate, with differing degrees of intensity and detail, the shared aspirations of a nation; the values which bind its people, and which discipline its government and its national institutions, the basic premises upon which judicial, legislative and executive power is to be wielded; the Constitutional limits and the conditions upon which that power is to be exercised, the national ethos which defines and regulates that exercise, and the moral and ethical direction which the nation has identified for its future” (at para. 262).
42
Harjudin, Laode. "AMBIVALENSI KEKUASAAN PREROGATIF PRESIDEN PASCA AMANDEMEN KONSTITUSI". Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Indonesia 1, n. 1 (2 settembre 2020): 27–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/jisi.v1i1.17104.
Abstract (sommario):
Abstract. This study discusses the political process relating to the issue of presidential prerogative control with an emphasis on the views and interests of the actors involved in discussing the issue. This study explains two main questions, namely how the actualization of presidential prerogative powers in Indonesia's presidential system after the constitutional amendment and what is behind the ambivalence of the president's prerogative power formulation in Indonesia's presidential system after the constitutional amendment. This study finds that constitutional amendments related to the president's prerogatives show ambivalence that distorts the prerogative meaning itself and is not strict between limiting or actually expanding the president's power. This happens because of the tug-of-war between legislative and executive interests. Behind the issue of controlling the president's prerogative powers, there is the interest of legislative institutions to equalize power with the president. Instead, the executive seeks to maintain or extend the president’s prerogative power.Keywords: Prerogative Power; Presidential; Amendment of Constitutions.Abstrak. Studi ini membahas proses politik berkaitan dengan isu pengendalian prerogatif presiden dengan penekanan pada pandangan dan kepentingan para aktor yang terlibat dalam pembahasan isu tersebut. Studi in menjelaskan dua pertanyaan pokok: (1) Bagaimana aktualisasi kekuasaan prerogatif presiden dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia pasca amandemen konstitusi? (2) Apa yang melatarbelakangi ambivalensi rumusan kekuasaan prerogatif presiden dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia pasca amandemen konstitusi? Hasil studi inii menemukan bahwa amandemen konstitusi terkait dengan prerogatif presiden menampakkan ambivalensi yang mendistorsi makna prerogatif itu sendiri dan tidak tegas antara membatasi atau justru memperluas kekuasaan presiden. Hal ini terjadi karena adanya tarik menarik antara kepentingan legislatif dan eksekutif. Di balik isu pengendalian kekuasaan prerogatif presiden, ada kepentingan institusi legislatif untuk menyetarakan kekuasaan dengan presiden. Sebaliknya, pihak eksekutif berupaya untuk mempertahankan atau mempeluas kekuasaan prerogatif presiden.Kata Kunci: Kekuasaan Prerogatif; Presidensial; Amandemen Konstitusi.
43
Tsebelis, George. "Compromesso astorico: the role of the Senate after the Italian constitutional reform". Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 47, n. 1 (13 settembre 2016): 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2016.21.
Abstract (sommario):
The article examines the content of the constitutional amendments with respect to the Senate. While symmetric bicameralism would be abolished with respect to policymaking, it would be preserved and even exacerbated with respect to constitutional revisions. The consequences of the first would be a reduction of the number of institutional veto players, which would lead to the facilitation of policy change, and an increase in the power of the government (who is the agenda setter). The content of the new policies remains unknown, as are the economic consequences of the proposed changes. Constitutional revisions would become more difficult, because the ideological distance between the Chamber of Deputies and Senate would be likely to increase (because of the mode of selection of Senators), while article 138, which specifies the requirements for amendment to the constitution, would remain the same. As a result, the role of the Italian Constitutional Court would also likely increase.
44
Heard, Andrew, e Tim Swartz. "The Regional Veto Formula and Its Effects on Canada's Constitutional Amendment Process". Canadian Journal of Political Science 30, n. 2 (giugno 1997): 339–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900015468.
Abstract (sommario):
AbstractIn early 1996, Canada's federal government enacted a new constitutional amending process to provide provincial and regional vetoes over future amendments. This study compares the new process with the “7 and 50” formula found in the Constitution Act, 1982. Using the Banzhaf Index as well as separate measures for the power to prevent and the power to initiate amendments, the article examines the relative influence of the provinces under the two amending formulae. As well, it examines the relative voting power of each province's citizens in any future constitutional referendum. The results show that profound changes are produced by the regional veto amending formula, and the article discusses some remedies for the most negative effects.
45
Tusasirwe, Benson. "The Basic Structure Doctrine and Constitutional Restraint in Uganda: The “Age Limit” Case". Eastern Africa Law Review 46, n. 1 (30 giugno 2019): 29–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.56279/ealr.v46i1.2.
Abstract (sommario):
This Article discusses the scope and application of the Basic Structure Doctrine, against the background of the judgment of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Uganda in the case of Male Mabirizi Kiwanuka and Others v. Attorney General, wherein the two courts found that an amendment to the Constitution of Uganda removing the “age-limit” qualification to stand for president did not violate the Doctrine and was valid. It is argued that given Uganda’s political history the clause, which was designed to prevent the sitting president from taking advantage of his incumbency to perpetuate himself in power, was part of the basic structure of the Constitution. As it was, the impugned amendment removed the last measure against a life presidency, and is a recipe for instability. The court decisions were a missed opportunity to assert the power of the Judiciary as the foremost defender of constitutionalism and the rule of law. Keywords: Basic Structure, Constitution, Constitutionalism, amendment, age-limit, life-presidency.
46
Jakubiak, Łukasz. "Presidential politics of constitutional amendment in Francophone Africa: The case of Senegal". Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 61, n. 4 (14 febbraio 2022): 386–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/2052.2021.00280.
Abstract (sommario):
Abstract The paper is devoted to the role of the head of state in initiating and implementing constitutional reforms in Senegal. This country can legitimately be regarded as one of the few examples of a relatively successful democratization process in Africa, as evidenced, among other things, by the lack of military coups leading to the loss of power by civilian governments, as well as by two democratic transfers of power (in 2000–2001 and 2012), after which the main opposition parties gained the presidency and the majority of parliamentary seats. Both these fundamental political transformations generated important constitutional changes (for example, the adoption of the current Constitution of 2001, or the constitutional modifications of 2016 and 2019) that have influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, the position of the presidency in Senegalese systems of government. The author analyses their significance for the functioning of contemporary political institutions in the broader context set by the politics of constitutional amendment which was conducted by previous presidents of this country. The main goal of the paper is to examine to what extent the constitutional modifications introduced before and after the adoption of the 2001 Constitution were designed to contribute to the beginning or consolidation of pro-democratic trends, and to what extent they were created to strengthen the position of an incumbent president himself, leading to a political imbalance and regress in the democratization process. The author argues that the constitutional modifications adopted over the years have often gone in two opposite directions, influencing the efficiency and durability of Senegalese institutional structures.
47
Shairgojri, Aadil Ahmad, e Showkat Ahmad Dar. "Voices from India’s Borderlands against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA-2019) An Explanatory study". Journal of Image Processing and Intelligent Remote Sensing, n. 25 (1 agosto 2022): 8–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.55529/jipirs.25.8.18.
Abstract (sommario):
India is the largest populous democracy in the world, however there are many others? India has conducted itself as a responsible democracy ever since it gained its freedom. The world community has concurred on this as well. It has proven capable of adjusting to a variety of difficult situations. In order to revise India's Constitution, it is necessary to change the fundamental or ultimate law of the nation. Article 368 of Part XX (the Constitution's governing provision) governs constitutional amendments in India. With the help of this mechanism, the Indian Parliament's arbitrary power is constrained and the Indian Constitution is safeguarded. There are two different categories of modifications allowed under the Indian Constitution. A majority of all Indian states must ratify, as well as a special majority in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha (the lower house of Parliament). When the Indian Constitution was up for review again in October 2021, 105 amendments had been made. In 1950, the First Amendment to the US Constitution was ratified. The Constitution has undergone 104 amendments since that period. The Citizenship Amendment Bill, introduced in Lok Sabha, was an attempt to update the Citizenship Act of 1955. (CAA Bill 2019). A Joint Parliamentary Committee received it, and on January 7, 2019, it issued a report outlining its conclusions and suggestions. The Citizenship Amendment Bill was passed on January 8, 2019, and the 16th Lok Sabha was dissolved. Amit Shah, the minister of home affairs, reintroduced the bill in the 17th Lok Sabha on December 9, and it was approved on December 10 of that same year. Despite the Rajya Sabha voting to adopt the measure on December 11th, India has been quite critical of it due to its discriminatory nature among neighbouring nations. A bill of this sort is fiercely opposed by the populace. The paper aims to explain all of the bill's provisions and presents the arguments against it.
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Dar, Showkat Ahmad, e Aadil Ahmad Shairgojri. "Voices from India’s Borderlands against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA-2019) An Explanatory study". Journal of Language and Linguistics in Society, n. 21 (24 gennaio 2022): 18–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.55529/jlls.21.18.27.
Abstract (sommario):
India is the largest populous democracy in the world, however there are many others. India has conducted itself as a responsible democracy ever since it gained its freedom. The world community has concurred on this as well. It has proven capable of adjusting to a variety of difficult situations. In order to revise India's Constitution, it is necessary to change the fundamental or ultimate law of the nation. Article 368 of Part XX (the Constitution's governing provision) governs constitutional amendments in India. With the help of this mechanism, the Indian Parliament's arbitrary power is constrained and the Indian Constitution is safeguarded. There are two different categories of modifications allowed under the Indian Constitution. A majority of all Indian states must ratify, as well as a special majority in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha (the lower house of Parliament). When the Indian Constitution was up for review again in October 2021, 105 amendments had been made. In 1950, the First Amendment to the US Constitution was ratified. The Constitution has undergone 104 amendments since that period. The Citizenship Amendment Bill, introduced in Lok Sabha, was an attempt to update the Citizenship Act of 1955. (CAA Bill 2019). A Joint Parliamentary Committee received it, and on January 7, 2019, it issued a report outlining its conclusions and suggestions. The Citizenship Amendment Bill was passed on January 8, 2019, and the 16th Lok Sabha was dissolved. Amit Shah, the minister of home affairs, reintroduced the bill in the 17th Lok Sabha on December 9, and it was approved on December 10 of that same year. Despite the Rajya Sabha voting to adopt the measure on December 11th, India has been quite critical of it due to its discriminatory nature among neighbouring nations. A bill of this sort is fiercely opposed by the populace. The paper aims to explain all of the bill's provisions and presents the arguments
49
Shairgojri, Aadil Ahmad, e Showkat Ahmad Dar. "Voices from India’s Borderlands against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA-2019) An Explanatory study". Journal of Psychology and Political Science, n. 12 (27 novembre 2021): 24–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.55529/jpps.12.24.34.
Abstract (sommario):
India is the largest populous democracy in the world, however there are many others. India has conducted itself as a responsible democracy ever since it gained its freedom. The world community has concurred on this as well. It has proven capable of adjusting to a variety of difficult situations. In order to revise India's Constitution, it is necessary to change the fundamental or ultimate law of the nation. Article 368 of Part XX (the Constitution's governing provision) governs constitutional amendments in India. With the help of this mechanism, the Indian Parliament's arbitrary power is constrained and the Indian Constitution is safeguarded. There are two different categories of modifications allowed under the Indian Constitution. A majority of all Indian states must ratify, as well as a special majority in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha (the lower house of Parliament). When the Indian Constitution was up for review again in October 2021, 105 amendments had been made. In 1950, the First Amendment to the US Constitution was ratified. The Constitution has undergone 104 amendments since that period. The Citizenship Amendment Bill, introduced in Lok Sabha, was an attempt to update the Citizenship Act of 1955. (CAA Bill 2019). A Joint Parliamentary Committee received it, and on January 7, 2019, it issued a report outlining its conclusions and suggestions. The Citizenship Amendment Bill was passed on January 8, 2019, and the 16th Lok Sabha was dissolved. Amit Shah, the minister of home affairs, reintroduced the bill in the 17th Lok Sabha on December 9, and it was approved on December 10 of that same year. Despite the Rajya Sabha voting to adopt the measure on December 11th, India has been quite critical of it due to its discriminatory nature among neighbouring nations. A bill of this sort is fiercely opposed by the populace. The paper aims to explain all of the bill's provisions and presents the arguments against it.
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Abaeva, Elena A. "The Issue of the Legitimacy of Modern Constitutional Reform". Izvestiya of Saratov University. New Series. Series Economics. Management. Law 20, n. 4 (2020): 449–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1994-2540-2020-20-4-449-458.
Abstract (sommario):
Introduction. The reform of the Basic Law throughout the modern history of Russia has been determined by the political expediency of transforming the presidential power. Until the mid-2000s the constitutional inviolability supported by the authorities was aimed at preserving its political stability. Theoretical analysis. The Russian Federation has entered a new stage of constitutional development, due to the need for constitutionalization – giving a legitimate character to the prevailing presidential power. Any constitutional reform requires a theoretical understanding of its legitimacy, expediency, legality. Empirical analysis. The main factor in modern constitutional reform is the need for constitutionalization of presidential power. Results. The introduction of additional procedures for the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution testifies to the political will of the President of the Russian Federation to enlist the support of active participants in constitutional processes, thereby putting the ongoing constitutional reform in a legitimate and legal form.