Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Committee to Prepare the New Police Bill"

Summary The Civil Service Act, passed in 1918, had never been substantially modified for the 43 years following its adoption. In 1957 however the Government asked the Civil Service Commission to review personnel procedure in the Government Service and to prepare a report. The report produced was entitled Personnal Administration in the Public Service. The following article is an analysis of Bill C-71, which resulted from the Commission's report and from the work of a Special Committee of the House established in 1961.

On January 1, 2021, the autonomous police system was implemented in Korea, and local autonomy was implemented in the field of security following general administration and education administration. In terms of decentralization, it was expected that the essential purpose of local autonomy would be realized by providing customized policing services based on the characteristics of the region and the will of the residents, and the democracy, decentralization and resident orientation of police activities would be strengthened. In the second half of 2020, the unified autonomous police model bill was completely revised and enacted through a sudden policy change in the dualized autonomous police model, which was previously discussed, and the institutional basis was established with the leading role of the National Police Agency in the situation of lack of preparation period. In the meantime, the term of the first autonomous police commissioners, who have played a pivotal role in the settlement and development of the autonomous police system, has expired and is now preparing for the formation of a new second autonomous police committee. At this point, it is expected that it will provide implications for the stable development of the autonomous police system as well as the preparation of the second autonomous police committee to clarify the current status of the autonomous police system and legal and institutional problems and to present concrete suggestions for future improvement directions. In organizing this paper, I basically referred to various literature materials such as publication data, research papers and media reports of the National Police Agency and the municipal autonomous police committee. In order to grasp the reality of the operation of the system and to find out the effective improvement direction of the legal system, I also listened to the vivid opinions and suggestions for improvement through direct interviews with some autonomous police committee members and police related NGOs such as autonomous crime prevention groups. Since the implementation of the autonomous police system, mutual cooperation between the city and provincial offices and the city and provincial police agencies has worked closely in the autonomous police affairs by securing the linkage between local administration and security administration centered on the autonomous police committees in cities and provinces across the country. Various policing policies have been established and implemented to reflect the will and participation of residents in the police administration and to provide policing services suitable for local specificity. The responsibility of the heads of local governments for local security has been increased by cities and provinces across the country, and the budget for projects needed to carry out local police affairs has also been increased. However, despite many developments and achievements, there has been a constant need to supplement the essential limitations of the current autonomous police system, low awareness of the autonomous police, and the promotion of mutual cooperation with the autonomous police committee and the national police. More in-depth discussions are needed in that the introduction of the dualization model of the autonomous police and the financial burden of the state are related to the maintenance of security at the national level and the allocation of the national budget. It is hoped that the police system development committee under the Prime Minister's Office will make systematic and careful decisions based on national consensus and careful financial analysis and diagnosis so that the total amount of national security will not be damaged in the rapidly changing domestic and overseas security environment.

The autonomous police system is based on the premise that the quality of life of the residents can be improved by the police system for the residents, by the residents, and for the residents. Fundamental questions have been raised as to whether Korea's autonomous police system is being operated for the residents, but on the other hand, the current autonomous police system has been implemented after discussion and review of the autonomous police system for a considerable period of time. The autonomous police system is a system that pursues values contrary to the national police system, placing importance on democracy and procedurality rather than efficiency. The autonomous police system is an essential element in the decision-making process of residents aiming for grassroots democracy, and Korea's autonomous police system does not utilize the purpose of the autonomous police system in that it is implemented by determining the model and operation method centrally. In order to operate the autonomous police system, a blueprint to transfer much of the police power to local governments should have been presented, but due to the inefficiency of decentralized systems, confrontation between the two Koreas, and familiarity with the implementation of the national police system, a centralized national police system was maintained, and a formal police organization with limited responsibilities and authority was established in local governments and only some police duties closely related to residents' lives was carried out as an office manager. Despite various problems, the autonomous police system has become an irreversible trend of the times, and although it is insufficient, discussions continue as it contributes to improving the quality of life of residents by improving the problems. The Yoon Suk Yeol government, which was launched in May 2022, launched the “Police System Development Committee” under the Prime Minister in September of the same year and said that it would pilot the dual autonomous police system in Jeju, Sejong, Gangwon and Jeonbuk, but discussions were underway until February 2023 and have been suspended. Given that time is needed to overhaul legislation, implement new models, and improve complementary points, it is not easy to keep its pledge to fully implement the dual autonomous police system by 2026. There are both negative criticisms of the autonomous police system, which has been implemented from 2021 to 2024, as well as positive evaluations of the process of developing the autonomous police system as a transitional period. It is difficult to say that the “double-level” model, in which autonomous police organizations are operated separately from national police, immediately carries out practical autonomous police administration, but it can take on the shape of an autonomous police rather than a unified model. A form of incorporating the national police system centered on the autonomous police system was considered a hard landing plan, and a form of incorporating the autonomous police system centered on the national police system was suggested as a soft landing plan. As a hard landing plan, the full transfer of national police authority to local governments and the introduction of an election system for the chairman of the municipal and provincial autonomous police committees or police officers were proposed. As a soft landing plan, a bill should be enacted or revised to allow the dualization model to operate more efficiently, which should include organizational and operational aspects. The main contents will require the transfer of organization, manpower, and budget to local governments, and accordingly, organizations that can perform autonomous police affairs, such as the autonomous police committee and the autonomous police headquarters, should be reorganized.

Apart from previous partial codifications and system-laws, the first civil code in Hungary was promulgated in 1959. After the beginning of transition in 1989, despite the great number of amendments to the existing Civil code, to issue of recodification of civil law in Hungary became inevitable. This process began in 1998 when the Government appointed a committee with most renowned Hungarian legal scholars as members, which had the task to prepare a draft version of a new civil code. The committee has worked devotedly on the text of the draft for nearly a decade. In 2003 it published the so-called Concept and Syllabus of the new civil code in order to enable the public to get knowledge of the planned subject matter of the draft and, what is even more important, enable it to contribute to the quality of the draft by expressing critical remarks and suggestions. The committee, having taken into account the opinion of the public, continued its work on the draft and published the first full text of the draft in 2006. 2007 marked a turning point in the codification procedure when, to general astonishment, the Ministry of Justice took over the task of drafting a civil code, by which the drafting committee's mandate on the preparation of the new civil code ceased to exist, before it even could have had a chance to process the remarks the public had had on the 2006 draft. The Ministry published its first version of the draft in 2007, and a second one in 2008. In the same year, the committee, whose mandate has ceased to exist in 2007, published its, by then unofficial, version of the draft in order to make the achievements of its nearly decade-long work available to public in authentic form. The Ministry's second draft was adopted in 2008 by the Government and submitted to the Parliament as a bill to be enacted. The Parliament, after it had been in legislative procedure for a year or so, finally adopted the new Civil code of Hungary, though with a very slim majority. However, the President, using his constitutional powers, denied promulgating it, just as the subsequently enacted Law on the Implementation and Entering into Force of the new Civil Code. The President, who is, by the way, one of the most prominent civil law scholars in Hungary, expressed his deepest doubts in respect of the enactment of the new Civil code, both in terms of its substantial flaws and the manner in which the legislative draft and bill have been prepared. Using his right to suspensive veto he could not bring to naught the new Civil code, but he succeeded in postponing its promulgation and entry into force. The aim of this paper is to block in the tempestuous, decade-long work on the text of the new Civil code and its content in short, with special regard to the reasons for which the President denied to promulgate it.

Fiji's National Government has committed to using Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) to protect its marine environment. As Fiji is in the process of reforming its marine law, now is an opportune time to develop statutory mechanisms for establishing and regulating MPAs. This article considers the regulation of MPAs in Fiji's coastal waters—where the intersection of statutory and customary law poses particular challenges. ‘Customary MPAs’ already exist in Fiji's coastal environments, taking the form of tabu areas and ‘Locally Managed Marine Areas’ (LMMAs). Both of these are important mechanisms that any new statutory framework should incorporate and strengthen. In 2010, the draft Inshore Fisheries Decree (draft Inshore Decree) was prepared. Although the draft Inshore Decree appears to have stalled, it may yet be progressed to a final bill. Alternatively, some of the measures in it may be incorporated into another law. This article assesses one mechanism in the draft Inshore Decree that could be used to formalize customary MPAs—Community Fisheries Management and Development Plans (CFMDPs). It finds that CFMDPs demonstrate a number of strengths, in particular by supporting legal recognition of existing marine management measures. However, there are also weaknesses. Nevertheless, with refinement CFMDPs may be a useful tool for regulating Fiji's coastal MPAs.

Legal analysis of bills aimed at improving the mechanism of application of life imprisonment in Ukraine, namely: “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts Implementing Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights” № 4048 and “On Amendments to the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses, the Criminal Code of Ukraine and the Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine on the execution of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights” № 4049 is provided in the article. It is determined that the mechanism of parole in the form of life imprisonment proposed by these bills consists of two stages: the first stage is the replacement of life imprisonment with a milder punishment under the rules of the new version of Article 82 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine; the second stage is conditional early release from serving a sentence in the form of imprisonment, which is assigned to a convict in order to replace life sentence with a milder punishment (imprisonment) under the rules of a new version of Article 81 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The legal positions of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration with the European Union, the Main Scientific and Expert Department of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the expert assessment of the Council of Europe are analyzed. The generalized legal analysis of bills 4048, 4049 gave an opportunity to reveal their progressive provisions, as well as shortcomings. Progressive provisions of the bills include: convicts’ drawing up their personal plan for reintegration into society, a temporary restriction on re-applying for the replacement of life sentence with imprisonment for a definite term or a request for a parole. The shortcomings of the bills include: unjustifiably short minimum sentence that a convict must serve in order to be released from life sentence; lack of a mechanism for determining the risk assessment of those sentenced to life imprisonment; lack of legislation to provide for probation in the process of replacing life sentence with a milder sentence and parole in terms of risk assessment, reintegration plan and monitoring compliance with court obligations; lack of criteria for determining the risk of re-offending; implementation of administrative supervision by police bodies over persons released on parole; lack of clear content of the reintegration plan; providing conclusions of the administration of a penal institution on convict’s preparing for release. Key words: bill 4048, bill 4049, life sentence, parole, European standards, implementation.

On the basis of national security and territorial integrity, can the state regulate the use of land and buildings around important defense facilities or on border islands? In response, on June 16, 2021, Japan promulgated ‘Important Land Survey Regulation Act.’ In enacting the Important Land Survey Regulation Act, the Japanese government suggested land acquisition in a specific area by foreign capital as a basis for legislation. Due to the cases of land acquisition in a water source, defense facilities, or border islands, anxiety among Japanese residents and the people is growing. As a background of legislation, the Important Land Survey Regulation Act refers to ‘concerned’ foreign capital and state. It is primarily considering Korea and China as regulatory targets. The Important Land Survey Regulation Act is a regulation law based on the maintenance of the base of national life, maritime sovereignty, and national security. In the future, I think the Important Land Survey Regulation Act will have a direct or indirect effect on Korea. From a national security perspective, laws that regulate direct investment in corporate purchases also exist in the United States and Japan. However, regulations on real estate transactions have recently been introduced from the perspective of national security. In the United States, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) enacted in August 2018 is a representative law. Real estate transactions are being conducted as a subject of review by the US Foreign Investment Committee (CFIUS). From a national security perspective, Japan is reviewing the case of the United States, which regulates the sale of real estate. However, problems with the bill were pointed out in the process of enacting the Important Land Survey Regulation Act. The issue of unconstitutionality of the Important Land Survey Regulation Act was also raised. In this study, I reviewed the issues and the contents of the law in the legislative process of the Japanese National Assembly : the purpose of legislation and the existence of legislative facts, the subject of regulation and delegation of legislation, forest and water sources, enforcement decree and delegation legislation, resident movement regulation, designation of special zones, and pre-reporting system, etc. The following matters were reviewed on the issue of unconstitutionality inherent in the Important Land Survey Regulation Act : legislative purposes and the absence of legislative facts, violation of the principles of parliamentary legislation, principle of criminal justice, recommendations and orders and criminal penalties, land use investigation and personal information, privacy rights, freedom of thought and conscience, self-denial rights, property rights and compensation systems, etc. The Important Land Survey Regulation Act, like FIRRMA in the United States, is based on national security, Japan primarily aims to protect Japan’s Self-Defense Forces facilities and U.S. military facilities. To this end, ownership and use, and transactions of land and buildings in a specific area are regulated. Second, however, it is a law to prepare for border disputes or maritime disputes between Japan and China, Japan and Russia, Korea and Japan. From the perspective of borders, territories, and maritime sovereignty, the Republic of Korea needs to establish new border protection measures for uninhabited islands and islands.

Hong Kong has seen an upheaval in recent years. From the protests over the extradition law to the protests over the National Security Law, these protests are a response to the ever-encroaching hand of Beijing on political rights in Hong Kong. After the National Security Law was implemented, Hong Kong’s freedom was almost gone. One by one, pro-democracy protesters, opposition parliament members, and opposition media are being targeted and repressed. Despite the numerous protests and riots, the Hong Kong SAR government perseveres with little concession to the protesters. Why does the government of Hong Kong decided not to respect Hong Kong’s unique democratic system in China, arguably the system that has brought Hong Kong to one of the most prominent cities in the world for global interactions, and instead wish to turn it into another normal Chinese city? Why does the Hong Kong SAR government almost completely ignore the voice of the Hong Kong people? Using the framework developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith in The Dictator’s Handbook, I argue that the small size of Hong Kong’s governing coalition (i.e., the minimum amount of support required for the leader to stay in power) and the ease in which the Chief Executive of Hong Kong rewards her allies play a significant role in this democratic backsliding. Furthermore, while the Western World reacted in outrage over this undemocratic encroachment of Beijing on Hong Kong, I argue that their sanctions on Hong Kong leaders will not play a significant role as the Chief Executive of Hong Kong does not need their support. Keywords: Hong Kong; democracy; protests; governing coalition;sanctions REFERENCES Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides’s Trap? New York: Houghton Miflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2017. 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Abstract SYNTHESIS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM FOR RESEARCH IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY Introduction At the beginning of the development of the social sciences there was a considerable vogue for comparative research. A long period of empirical studies and almost total preoccupation with methodological problems followed. Once again, however, psychology, political science, sociology, and above all anthropology, have taken up the thread of this tradition, and the bibliography in these fields is becoming ever more abundant. The study of deviance, of various manifestations of criminality, and of social reaction against crime are, however, noticeably missing in the picture, even though there is nothing in the nature of criminology which precludes the development of comparative research. To many research workers in criminology, the time seemed ripe to take up the comparative tradition once again. Two imperatives were considered : the generalization of norms of deviance which are tied to the standard of living set by industrial civilization, thus putting the problem of criminality in a global light ; and, second, the development and standardization of methods of studying these phenomena, drawing on the experience of allied disciplines. The response of the participants in this Symposium and the results of their discussions were not unexpected. A consensus was arrived as to the problems it was thought important to study, and agreement was reached about the strategies of research to be undertaken. Priorities, however, were not established since too much depends on the availability of research teams, funds, etc. But the broad, overall look at the main problems in comparative criminology will, hopefully, open a new chapter in the history of crimino-logical research and in our continuing search for knowledge of man and society. The brief resume which follows should give the reader an idea of the extent of the problems tackled. The detailed proceedings of the Symposium will be published at a later date, in mimeographed form. Sectors of research proposed In a sense, this Symposium was prepared by all the participants. The organizers had requested that each person invited prepare a memorandum setting out the problems in comparative criminology which he considered to be most important. The compilation of their replies, reported to the plenary session at the opening of the Symposium, produced the following results : Summary of suggestions for research activities Note : In all that follows, it should be understood that all of these topics should be studied in a cross-cultural or international context. 1) Definitions and concepts : a) Social vs legal concept of deviance ; b) Distinction between political and criminal crimes ; c) The law : a moral imperative or a simple norm ; d) The concepts used in penal law : how adequate ? e.g. personality of criminal ; e) Who are the sinners in different cultures and at different times. 2) Procedures : a) Working concepts of criminal law and procedure ; b) Differentiating between factors relating to the liability-finding process and the sentencing process ; c) Behavioural manifestations of the administration of criminal justice ; d) Judicial decisions as related to the personality of the judges and of the accused ; e) Sentencing in the cross-national context (2 proposals) ; f) In developing countries, the gap between development of the legal apparatus and social behaviour ; g) Determination of liability ; h) The problem of definition and handling of dangerous offenders ; i) Decision-making by the sentencing judges, etc. (2 proposals) ; ;) Medical vs penal committals ; k) Law-enforcement, policing. 3) Personnel : a) Professionalization in career patterns ; b) Criteria for personnel selection ; c) Greater use of female personnel. 4) Causation. Situations related to criminality : a) How international relations and other external factors affect crime ; 6) Hierarchy of causes of crime ; c) Migrants. Minorities in general ; d) Relation to socio-economic development in different countries ; e) A biological approach to criminal subcultures, constitutional types, twin studies, etc. ; f) Cultural and social approach : norms of moral judgment, ideals presented to the young, etc. ; g) Effect of social change : crime in developing countries, etc. (6 proposals) ; h) Effects of mass media, rapid dissemination of patterns of deviant behaviour (2 proposals). 5) Varieties of crime and criminals : a) Traffic in drugs ; b) Prison riots ; c) Violence particularly in youth (7 proposals) ; d) Dangerousness ; e) Relation to the rights of man (including rights of deviants); f) Female crime (2 proposals) ; g) Prostitution ; i) The mentally ill offender ; ;) Cultural variations in types of crime ; k) Organized crime ; /) Use of firearms ; m) Gambling ; n) Victims and victimology. 6) Treatment : evaluation : a) Social re-adaptation of offenders ; b) Statistical research on corrections, with possible computerization of data ; c) Comparisons between prisons and other closed environments ; d) Extra-legal consequences of deprivation of liberty ; e) Rehabilitation in developing countries ; f ) Criteria for evaluation of programs of correction ; g) Biochemical treatment (2 proposals) ; i) Differential treatment of different types of offense. Evaluation ; /) Prisons as agencies of treatment ; k) Effects of different degrees of restriction of liberty ; /) Environments of correctional institutions ; m) Study of prison societies ; n) Crime as related to the total social system. 7) Research methodology : a) Publication of what is known regarding methodology ; b) Methods of research ; c) Culturally-comparable vs culturally-contrasting situations ; d) Development of a new clearer terminology to facilitate communication ; e) Actual social validity of the penal law. 8) Statistics : epidemiology : a) Need for comparable international statistics ; standardized criteria (3 proposals) ; b) Difficulties. Criminologists must collect the data themselves. 9) Training of research workers : Recruiting and training of « com-paratists ». 10) Machinery : Committee of co-ordination. Discussions The discussions at the Symposium were based on these suggestions, the main concentration falling on problems of manifestations of violence in the world today, the phenomenon of student contestation, and on human rights and the corresponding responsibilities attached thereto. Although the participants did not come to definite conclusions as to the respective merits of the problems submitted for consideration, they did discuss the conditions under which comparative studies of these problems should be approached, the techniques appropriate to obtaining valid results, and the limitations on this type or work. Four workshops were established and studied the various problems. The first tackled the problems of the definition of the criteria of « danger » represented by different type of criminals ; the problem of discovering whether the value system which underlies the Human Rights Declaration corresponds to the value system of today's youth; the problem of the treatment of criminals ; of female criminality ; and, finally, of violence in the form of individual and group manifestations. The second workshop devoted its main consideration to the revolt of youth and to organized crime, also proposing that an international instrument bank of documentation and information be established. The third workshop considered problems of theory : how the police and the public view the criminal ; the opportunity of making trans-cultural comparisons on such subjects as arrest, prison, etc. ; and the role of the media of information in the construction of value systems. The fourth workshop blazed a trail in the matter of methodology appropriate to research in comparative criminology. The period of discussions which followed the report of the four workshops gave rise to a confrontation between two schools of thought within the group of specialists. The question arose as to whether the problem of student contestation falls within the scope of the science of criminology. Several experts expressed the opinion that criminologists ought not to concern themselves with a question which really belongs in the realm of political science. On the other hand, the majority of the participants appeared to feel that the phenomenon of student contestation did indeed belong in the framework of criminological research. One of the experts in particular took it upon himself to be the spokesman of this school of thought. There are those, he said, who feel that criminology should confine itself and its research to known criminality, to hold-ups, rape, etc. However, one should not forget that penal law rests on political foundations, the legality of power, a certain moral consensus of the population. Today, it is exactly this « legitimate » authority that is being contested. Is it not to be expected, therefore, that criminology should show interest in all sociological phenomena which have legal and criminal implications ? Contestation and violence have consequences for the political foundations of penal law, and therefore are fit subjects for the research of the criminologist. International Centre {or Comparative Criminology The First International Symposium for Research in Comparative Criminology situated itself and its discussions within the framework and in the perspectives opened by the founding of the International Centre for Comparative Criminology. The Centre is sponsored jointly by the University of Montreal and the International Society for Criminology, with headquarters at the University of Montreal. As one of the participants emphasized, criminologists need a place to retreat from the daily struggle, to meditate, to seek out and propose instruments of research valid for the study of problems common to several societies. Viewing the facts as scientists, we are looking for operational concepts. Theoreticians and research workers will rough out the material and, hopefully, this will inspire conferences and symposiums of practitioners, jurists, sociologists, penologists, and other specialists. Above all, it will give common access to international experience, something which is lacking at present both at the level of documentation and of action. A bank of instruments of method- ology in the field of comparative criminology does not exist at the present time. The Centre will undertake to compile and analyse research methods used in scientific surveys, and it will establish such an instrument bank. It will also gather and analyse information pertaining to legislative reforms now in progress or being contemplated in the field of criminal justice. Through the use of computers, the Centre will be able to put these two projects into effect and make the results easily accessible to research workers, and to all those concerned in this field. The participants at the Symposium were given a view of the extent of the problems envisaged for research by the future Centre. It is hoped that this initiative will be of concrete use to research workers, private organizations, public services and governments at many levels, and in many countries.

The paper is a continuation of the previous analyses of penal policy pursued by Polish courts. The directions and shape of penal policy are the resultant of many different elements. Analysed in the present paper is the impact on that policy of changes in: penal law; detected crime; and some characteristics of the population of convicted persons. The 1980s abounded in far-reaching changes of penal legislation. In the years 1980-1981, the tremendous “Solidarity” movement failed to bring about a penal law reform despite the fact that its representatives started intensive work toward that aim, preparing and stimulating others to prepare drafts of such reform. The imposition of martial law secured continued power to the communists; its social costs, however, were extremely high. An item on the bill society were forced to pay was the inclusion into penal law of many elements typical of the law of war which aggravated criminal responsibility. Thus (1) the competence of military courts was extended to various categories of civilians; (2) the application of special modes of procedure was introduced or extended, including the single-instance summary proceedings; (3) many statutory penalties were aggravated; (4) many different categories of acts were penalized which had not been punishable before, including in particular pursuit of trade union activities and organization of strikes and protests; (5) internment was introduced as an administrative form of preventive deprivation of liberty. The abrogation of martial law resulted in removal of most but not all of the above aggravations. A new tide of severe provisions came with the acts of May 1985 which in fact created a new “martial law” in penal law. It consisted in: (1) extension of applicability of the existing and introduction of new “simplified” modes of procedure which involved limitation of the defendant’s right to defence; (2) aggravation of the statutory penalties for many acts; (3) vast extension of the application of additional penalties; (4) limitation of the applicability of suspended sentences; (5) exclusion of conditional release of multiple recidivists; (6) extension of the conditions of withdrawal of parole. Therefore, penal policy was shifted twice towards aggravation in the 1980s, the first such shift was made in 1982 and continued with reduced force throughout 1983, and the second one taking place in the years 1985‒1988. Departure from the over-punitive penal law of People’s Republic of Poland started in 1989 with the emergence of the new political order which created the initial conditions for the building of the Third Republic. In 1989, just the first steps were made, followed by few farther in the years 1990‒1991, towards changing the contens of penal law and reforming the most glaring effects of its abuse. Such steps met with immense difficulties. The attachment to former penal law proved strong: to penal law with indefinite statutory features of situences, with severe penalties which could be accumulated and imposed in the conditions of far-reaching limitation of the right to defence or even by default. According to an opinion often expressed in official statements, penal policy was to be determined first and foremost by the state of crime. The extent and trends of crime in general and of the separate offences were to “force” the authorities accordingly to shape penal policy. The incessantly growing threat to public order and citizens’ safety, and to social property in particular, was to justify the need for aggravated and accumulated penalties. Also penal lawyers who noticed the direct relationship between crime and punishment tended ‒ and still tend today for that matter ‒ to suppose that an identical relationship can be found between crime as a mass phenomenon and punishment as a proces of distribution of condemnations through the imposition of penalties by courts. Yet whatever the relations between punishment ‒ its severity in particular ‒ and crime, they are in fact very weak indeed. This is shown by facts: crime comparable as to extent and gravity meets with most different punishment in different countries. A growth in crime sometimes leaves penal policy unchanged, and at other times results in its aggravation or mitigation; similar are the effects of a decrease in crime. Poland is a good example here: in the 1970s, detected crime was on the decrease but penal policy gained in strictness; in the 1980s, crime went up and the aggravation of penal policy continued. In the first of those decades, the decrease in crime was said to have resulted from the particular shape of penal policy pursued then; in the next one, the need forstrict penal policy was argued to follow from the growth in crime. Never mentioned, instead, was a trend of crime which would actually justify a mitigation of penal policy. As we know, the extent and also largely the structure of detected crime, that is of crime recorded by the police, is the resultant of many different organizational, legal, and often also political factors. The real extent and structure of crime can hardly be seen through that screen, and its picture is often distorted. In the former “socialist” states, the extent of crime was a political issue: generally speaking, it shaped the way the authorities expected it to shape. During the 1970s and even in 1980, the number of detected offences ‒ those confirmed in preparatory proceedings ‒ was 320‒350 thousand a year. Starting from 1981, it went up rapidly to 540 thousand in 1984. For the next few years, it was falsely kept at a similar or even somewhat lower level which was to manifest the effectiveness of the drastic statutes of May 1985. Early in the 1990s, the situation was changed radically: the extent of detected crime was no longer perceived as a political issue regulated as the authorities requested. In the years 1990‒1992, the number of detected offences became stabilized at 860‒880 thousand a year. It is believed to have actually gone up, and it no doubt did go up in the economy-related spheres: the real number of offences against foreign currency and customs regulations, tax offences, frauds, embezzlements etc. was indeed greater. III. The above-mentioned growth in the number of detected offences was hardly reflected in the numer of persons found guilty in criminal proceedings. There were about 200 thousand such persons a year, and the numer only went down in years when amnesty laws were passed. Penal legislation provides for different penalties for the separate offences. Therefore, in order to appraise the enhanced or reduced severity of penal policy, it is important to investigate any possible changes in the proportions of those offences throughout the 1980s. In the years 1980‒1991, convictions for crimes (where the statutory penalty is deprivation of liberty for at least 3 years) regularly amounted to 3‒4%, and those for the more serious offences (statutory pelalty of at least 1 or 2 years imprisonment) – to 19‒31%. In the early half of the 1980s, there was a shift towalds a greater proportion of convictions for the less serious offences. The opposite trend could be noticed in the latter half of the decade. Generally speaking, the bulk of convicted persons were guilty of less and less serious offences during the discussed decade, the proportion of convictions for serious crimes remaining rather stable in that period. This trend could be noticed under the statutes of May 1985 which shows how unrelated they were to the real situation in the sphere of crime, and how much they depended on other factors such as e.g. the ruling elites’ desire to have their revenge on society for the events of 1980-1981. The situation changed in the years 1989‒1991 when the proportion of persons convicted for the more serious offences started to go up rapidly. This sole element considered – that is, the structure of crime – were penal policy stable throughout the years l980‒1988, there should have been more and more sentences to penalties not involving deprivation of liberty, and the length of inprisonment should have been reduced. In the years 1989‒1991, instead, a greater number of longer immediate prison sentences could be expected. The most severe, of all penalties provided for by Polish law is capitol puishment. In the years 1981‒1982, there were 3‒4 valid sentences to that pe- nalty a year, the number going up to a dozen or so in the years 1984‒1986. The common courts imposed death penalty for homicide only. Since 1988, not a single valid sentence to death has been imposed by those courts (though it was imposed by invalid sentences in isolated cases). This de facts abolition can be hoped to persist, especially as the new draft penal code does not provide for capital punishment. The death penalty has first of all a symbolic sense; it is difficult to say why the authorities insisted on rejecting all the postulates for its abolition. Instead, the basic instrument that determines the punitiveness of the Polish penal system is unconditional deprivation of liberty. Penal policy of the 1970s had few good points; one of them was a limitation of the use of that penalty, noticeable at the end of the decade. This trend was further intensified in 1981 when 19% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate imprisonment. Under martial law and in the period of its suspension, there was a slight shift away from that policy (2l‒22%). It was finally abandoned in the years 1984‒1986: in 1986, 30% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate inprisonment. In 1988, the policy-makers came back to their senses, and re-orientation of penal policy was started: sentenced to immediate imprisonment were 21% of those found guilty. This proportion went further down to 18% in 1989, but then proceeded to rise again in the years 1990‒1991 (19‒20%). The above-mentioned change in the structure of crime in those years considered, this fact cannot possibly be seen as evidencing the aggravation of penal policy. The imposition of unconditional deprivation of liberty evolved in a way that is worth mentioning here. In the latter half of the 1970s, the number of sentences to that penalty became stabilized at 190-200 per 100 thousand of adults, a great improvement compared to the early half of that decade (228‒273 per 100 thousand of adults). In the 1980s, the number of unconditional prison sentences went further down to about 150 per 100 thousand of adults, barring the period of validity of the acts of May 1985 when it again exceeded 200. Thus on the whole, the range of imposition of immediate impressonment was further reduced – a most satisfactory development. As regards the length of that penalty, that is the term to be spent in prison, there has been little improvement. Prison terms of under 1 year, considered short in Poland, still constitute a mere 8‒13% of all sentences to unconditional deprivation of liberty. Thus nearly 180 persons per 100 thousand of adults in the years of validity of the statuts of May 1985, and about 130-140 in the other years were sentenced to prison terms of at least one year, the number only going down to somewhat less than 100 in the years when amnesty laws were passed. Instead, the incidence of sentences to long prison terms of at least 3 years remained relatively stable: sentenced to that penalty were 30‒40 persons per 100 thousand of adults. The length of sentences can also be considered from a different angle, i.e. that of the average length of the discussed penalty. In the years 1980‒1991 the average length of unconditional prison term was practically unchanged and amounted to 24‒25 months (barring the year 1985 when it nearly reached 27 months). Therefore, the following trend emerped: the imposition of immediate imprisonment is gradually limited but its average length remains at a practically unchanged level. It is an extremely high level at that, the fact considered that the bulk of offences for which the Polish offenders were convicted involved the lower statutory penalty of 6 months deprivation of liberty at most. Of the greatest importance among the reactions to an offence which do not involve deprivation of liberty in Poland is the penalty of conditional deprivation of liberty. Its incidence went up rapidly under martial law (from 29% in 1980 to 37% in 1982) and remained at a high level for the next few years. It is only recently that the proportion of such sentences has been reduced to its original level. There is a great variety of shapes this particular penalty can assume: it can be combined with fine, supervision, and various duties imposed on the person sentenced to that penalty, and also with additional penalties and payment to the injured person or for a public purpose. In the years 1980‒1984, it was very often combined with fine (7l‒78% of cases). This proportion went down in the next years (to 55‒60%) which was however accompanied by an unusual growth in the imposition of additional penalties, such as in particular confiscation of property and forfeiture of things, and also of payment to the injured personor for a public purpose. In the years 1989‒1991, that is after abrogation of the states of May 1985, the proportion of cases where fine was imposed together with conditional deprivation of liberty again went up to two thirds of all cases of imposition of that penalty. (The amount of fines will be discussed further on). The penalty of limitation of liberty, introduced by tle 1969 penal code, had some problems fighting its way into the practice of criminal justice. In the latter half of the 1970s, though, its proportion among the bulk of penal measures became stabilized at 12‒14%. The same trend could be noticed in the years 1980‒1981. The aggravation of criminal responsibility under martial law resulted in reduction of sentences to that penalty (to as low a level as 7% in 1984). Instead, the next aggravation introduced by the statutes of May 1985 led to a growth in both the number and proportion of sentences to limitation of liberty. Surprising as it may seem at first sight this development can be explained by the fact that by force of the provisions adopted in 1985, that penalty could be imposed in proceedings by penal order, i.e. in the absence of the defendant. His objection to the decision admittedly rendered the order invalid, but he was not protected by the ban on reformatio in peius. In the years 1989–1991 the proportion of limitation of liberty in the bulk of penal measures imposed went down to the extent of rendering that penalty unimportant. In 1989, it was imposed on 7.4% of those found guilty; in 1990 – on 3.5%; and in l991 – on a mere 2.7%. In the 1990s, the relative incidence of imposition of the separate forms of that penalty started to change rapidly. Deduction from the remmeration for work was imposed on 53% of persons sentenced to limitation of liberty in 1989, on 38% in 1990, and on 21% in 1991. Unpaid supervised work came to the foreground (34, 56, and 78% respectively) while referral of the convicted person to work practically disappeared (l3, 6 and, 1% respectively). Fine as a self-standing penalty has never been extensively imposed in Poland as opposed to the situation in many other penal systems, the West European ones in particular. Late in ten 1970s, the proportion of fines became stabilized at 11–13% and remained unchanged throughout the early half of the 1980s. It then proceeded to go up a little in the years 1986–1988 (15–16%), and stopped at 13–15% in the years 1989–1991. The proportion of fines can be expected to grow in the future, mainly at the sacrifice of conditional deprivation of liberty combined with fine. As important as the length of a prison term is the amount of a fine imposed. The repressiveness of fines can be appraised through reference to the average monthly wages in socialized economy. Compared to them, the average fines under the 1969 code evolved significantly. The use of fines was intensified in two parallel ways. First, their imposition together with deprivation of liberty grew more and more frequent (up to 69% of all persons sentenced to a prison term in 1980). Second, the amount of fine was raised (to 2.5 times the monthly wages in 1980). Important changes in this respect took place in the 1980s. In the early half of the decade, the accumulation of fines with deprivation of liberty was further extended (to 75% of prison terms in 1984). On the other hand, the relative amount of fines went down (to about 1,5 times the monthly wages in socialized economy). This situation changed radically with the introduction of the statues of May 1985 which involved a drastic raise in the amount of fines (in the years 1986–1987, to about 4 times the average monthly wages in the case of fines as additional penalties combined with deprivation of liberty, and to 2.5 times – in the case of self-standing fines). A next far-reaching change took place in the years 1989–1991. The relative amount of fine went down to about 0.5 time the monthly wages – a considerable reduction of repressiveness, even the general impoverishment of society considered. One of the penal measures introduced by the 1969 penal code is conditional discontinuance of criminal proceedings. It can be applied to first offenders guilty of the less serious acts whose guilt is self-evident. The measure was appllied by the public prosecutor in nearly 90% of cases, and by the court in about l0% of cases only. Like unconditional deprivation of liberty, conditional discontinuance of proceedings can be seen as a specific gauge of aggravation or mitigation of penal policy. With growing severity of that policy, the proportion of persons sentenced to unconditional prison terms goes up, and that of conditionally discontinued proceedings goes down. Is penal policy mitigated, the above proportions are reversed. In the years 1981, 1988, and 1989–1991, proceedings were conditionally discontinued in 24–30% of cases where the suspect was found guilty. Under the special martial law legislation, the proportion was 19–20%, and under the acts of May 1985 – 16–19%. The remaining penal measures, that is additional penalty imposed as the main one, application of educational or corrective measures to persons aged 17 and guilty of misdemeanours, and renouncement of carrying out of the sentence, were used extremely seldom in spite of the considerable possibility of their application (the first two in particular). In the days when those in charge of criminal justice aimed at aggravation of responsibility, there was little room for its mitigation with the use of such measures. The years l980–1988 were characterized first and foremost by a tendency to aggravate penalties. After a short break in 1981, that tendency continued until 1989 when the first changes coul be noticed. In both cases, the period of reorientation of penal policy was too short to yield any farther-reaching changes. In the structure of penal measures, the aggravation of responsibility was expressed mainly in the growing proportion of sentendes to immediate imprisonment and the limited use of conditional discontinuance of proceedings and limitation of liberty when no special procedural provisions incited the use of those measures. The penal policy pursued in the years 1989-1991 was deeply rooted in the practices of people’s Republic of Poland; to be more exact, the trends of that period still today if in a mitigated form. The 1989–1991 mitigation took place on different planes: the legal one, through removal of the specially punitive and glaringly unjust provisions, on the plane of application of law through many small mitigations of penalties which add to a significant whole, and also through a radical reform of prison policy. But the actual mitigation does not go beyond the achievements of “Solidarity” of 1981. As a result, too many and too long sentences of immediate imprisonment are still imposed, and penal measures (imprisonment and fine in particular) are too often accumulated. Briefly speaking, Poland still has the style of punishming shaped after the penal code in force and its interpretation made in the 1970s. A radical abolition of this style and mitigatin of penalties still remains to be done, although the first steps have already been made by now (the virtual abolition of the death penalty and reduction of the amount of fines).