Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Bureau Renseignement"
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Articoli di riviste sul tema "Bureau Renseignement"
Bat, Jean-Pierre. "Le 2 e bureau en Afrique équatoriale française". Revue Historique des Armées 273, n. 4 (1 dicembre 2013): 95–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rha.273.0095.
Testo completoLahaie, Olivier. "Face à l’Allemagne vaincue, les services de renseignement français (novembre 1918-avril 1919)". Revue Historique des Armées 251, n. 2 (1 aprile 2008): 61–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rha.251.0061.
Testo completoBourlet, Michaël. "Des normaliens dans les services de renseignement du ministère de la guerre (1914-1918)". Revue Historique des Armées 247, n. 2 (1 aprile 2007): 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rha.247.0031.
Testo completoAan De Wiel, Jérôme. "Le deuxième bureau et les républicains irlandais, 1900-1904 : contacts, invasion et déception". Revue Historique des Armées 253, n. 4 (1 dicembre 2008): 74–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rha.253.0074.
Testo completoAlbertelli, Sébastien. "Les services secrets de la France Libre : le Bureau Central de Renseignement et d'Action (BCRA), 1940-1944". Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains 242, n. 2 (2011): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/gmcc.242.0007.
Testo completoNeysmith, Sheila M. "Bureau de la Statistique du Québec 1986, Les personnes âgées au Québec, Québec: Les Publications du Québec". Canadian Journal on Aging / La Revue canadienne du vieillissement 6, n. 4 (1987): 339–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0714980800007650.
Testo completoSassòli, Marco. "Le Bureau national de renseignements en faveur des victimes des conflits armés". Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 69, n. 763 (febbraio 1987): 6–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0035336100090894.
Testo completoChabord, Marie-Thérèse. "Le Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action de la France libre (BCRA)." Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains 212, n. 4 (2003): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/gmcc.212.0105.
Testo completoDenton, M., J. Ploeg, J. Tindale, B. Hutchison, K. Brazil, N. Akhtar-Danesh, M. Quinlan, J. Lillie, J. Millen Plenderleith e L. Boos. "Where Would You Turn for Help? Older Adults' Awareness of Community Support Services". Canadian Journal on Aging / La Revue canadienne du vieillissement 27, n. 4 (2008): 359–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cja.27.4.359.
Testo completoVeyssière, Laurent. "Les archives du bureau de centralisation des renseignements du Commandement supérieur du Havre (1915-1919)". Revue Historique des Armées 221, n. 4 (2000): 111–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rharm.2000.4989.
Testo completoTesi sul tema "Bureau Renseignement"
Lahaie, Olivier. "Renseignements et services de renseignements en France pendant la guerre de 1914-1918 : 2ème bureau et 5ème bureau de l'Etat Major de l'Armée. ; 2ème bureau du G.Q.G. (section de renseignement, section de centralisation des renseignements) : évolutions et adaptations". Paris 4, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006PA040032.
Testo completoOn August, 1914, the French Intelligence Services knew German war plans, but intelligence specialists went against Joffre's scepticism. With the beginning of Trench Warfare, the French High Commander wished to inquire about enemy casualties, but also economic and political situation or morale in Germany. New techniques helped to control information gathered by Human Intelligence. The Secret Service imposed Telegraphic then Postal control, initiated an allied cooperation dealing with Intelligence Warfare. On 1915, new spying methods appeared, including use of planes to shake off enemy defences. Cooperation with Belgian and British Intelligence Services created preference conditions for spying. The Great War, which was a Total War, developed new kind of services dealing with Economic Intelligence. Propaganda and Psychological Warfare were developed as well, both on frontline and inside Germany. Counter-Intelligence was strengthened too, but the mutiny crisis of 1917 showed the danger of it when used against Brothers of Arms. At the end of World War I, implication of some officers belonging to the Secret Service in high treason trials tarnished their reputation. French Intelligence gathered many independent and rival services, but working all together to facilitate military victory on Germany and its Allies. Two distinct but complementary branches coexisted in France: one created by the “Etat-Major de l'Armée”, and the other by the “Grand Quartier General”. Among the three French High Commanders, Pétain was remarkable by the clever use of intelligence he made, in order to spare soldiers' blood. Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, Foch used it as well to lay Ludendorff low. From 1914 to 1918, French Intelligence proved its high capacity to innovate. W. W. I created favourable conditions to experiment new techniques, which were used after 1918 to develop the future “Special Services” of W. W. II. Thanks to a skilful mixing of consideration and improvisation, but also with the wish of gathering clever and firm individualities, French Secret Services really contributed to defeat Imperial Germany
Mennessier, Anne-Laurence Chevillotte Sylvie. "Analyse et réorganisation di bureau accueil-renseignement de la BU sciences de l'Université de Franche-Comté". [S.l.] : [s.n.], 2001. http://www.enssib.fr/bibliotheque/documents/ppp/mennessier.pdf.
Testo completoAlbertelli, Sébastien. "Les services secrets de la France Libre : le Bureau central de renseignement et d'action (BCRA), 1940-1944". Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006IEPP0037.
Testo completoFrom 1940 to 1944, the Bureau Central de Renseignement et d’Action (BCRA) was the link between the Free French – in London and Algiers – and those who, in France, committed themselves in the resistance against the occupying forces. This service of a new type was created and managed by André Dewavrin (Passy). Throughout the war, an important and successful part of its activities has been to collaborate with the Intelligence Service to create intelligence networks. In 1941, it started to collaborate with the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in order to create a Secret Army under the orders of general de Gaulle as well as to conceive and to implement destruction plans so that the reaction of the enemy would be delayed when the allied landing happens. After June 1942, the BCRA was also in charge of implementing the political missions that the Commissariat National à l’Intérieur was working out. A service with so wide functions was subject to covetousness and criticisms. It was accused by de Gaulle’s enemies to be a powerful instrument that served the political ambitions of the Free French leader. It is a fact that de Gaulle has always been anxious to keep his control on the BCRA, consequently on action in France. This service served his will to assert French sovereignty towards the Allies and to assert the state authority towards the leaders of resistance organisations in France. Among de Gaulle’s followers, some accused the BCRA to turn into a law under itself. It is a fact that the activities of this service were so important for the success of de Gaulle’s political plans that its leaders could secure themselves an important position in the gaullist state
Bourlet, Michaël. "Les officiers français des 2e et 5e bureaux de l’état-major de l’armée (août 1919-juin 1919)". Thesis, Paris 4, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA040172.
Testo completoAt the beginning of the 20th century, the “2e bureau” embodied military intelligence at the headquarters of the War Office in Paris. Between August 1914 and June 1919, 366 officers served in this secret administration of the War Office. Through individual files and with the aim of relating the history of services known as special services, this thesis is made up of three main lines: first, an institutional study, then a prosopographic study and finally a biographical dictionary. In less than four years, the intelligence plan set up at the EMA (État-major de l’armée) opened to new fields (economy, politics, diplomacy, inter-allied cooperation). This development went through deep structural reforms. In order to bring its activities to a successful conclusion, the “2e bureau” increased personnel and recruitment, which applied to reserve officers in particular. The intellectual and economic elites of the Nation would then occupy a place of choice in this organisation. Once the war was over, the “2e bureau” was back in charge of purely military matters
Bourlet, Michaël. "Les officiers français des 2e et 5e bureaux de l’état-major de l’armée (août 1919-juin 1919)". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 4, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA040172.
Testo completoAt the beginning of the 20th century, the “2e bureau” embodied military intelligence at the headquarters of the War Office in Paris. Between August 1914 and June 1919, 366 officers served in this secret administration of the War Office. Through individual files and with the aim of relating the history of services known as special services, this thesis is made up of three main lines: first, an institutional study, then a prosopographic study and finally a biographical dictionary. In less than four years, the intelligence plan set up at the EMA (État-major de l’armée) opened to new fields (economy, politics, diplomacy, inter-allied cooperation). This development went through deep structural reforms. In order to bring its activities to a successful conclusion, the “2e bureau” increased personnel and recruitment, which applied to reserve officers in particular. The intellectual and economic elites of the Nation would then occupy a place of choice in this organisation. Once the war was over, the “2e bureau” was back in charge of purely military matters
Jarry, Maud. "La France, les Français et les armes de représailles allemandes V1-V2, 1943-1945". Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008IEPP0012.
Testo completoThe A4 / V2 rocket and the Fi 103 / V1 flying bomb were developed at the end of 1942, at the time when the Allies began defeating the Axis Powers and when the RAF began to bombard Germany cities. These raids fed a desire for revenge against England, which these weapons made possible. From 1943 to 1945, because of the choice of the target and the range of the rockets, France and the French found themselves caught in the middle of the battle that the Germans and the Allies fought over the implementing of the V weapons. The French helped each side. They helped the Germans, whether under constraint or as volunteers, economically, socially and militarily, to build their launch ramps and to produce their weapons. On the other hand, other French fought on the side of the Allies to make the German plan fail. The French Resistance, in the front lines, informed secret services based in London, including the BCRA, providing information concerning the sites and the description of the arms. The sites were then bombarded by the RAF, which was supported by the USAAF and the FAFL. Although these attacks slowed the use of the V weapons, they also destroyed the surrounding countryside. After the D-Day, the Germans succeeded in firing their rockets. The French bases were then even more intensively bombed until the allied troops captured them at the end of the summer. Their inspection, carried out sometimes with French interested by this new technology, as well as the discovery of the rockets themselves, provided the technical basis of modern rocket science, which in turn led to the exploration of outer space
Van, Roy Patrick. "Essays on the economics of banking and the prudential regulation of banks". Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210882.
Testo completoThe first chapter is introductory and reviews the motivation for regulating banks and credit rating agencies while providing a detailed overview of the thesis.
The second chapter uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze how banks from six G10 countries adjusted their capital to assets ratios and risk-weighted assets to assets ratio between 1988 and 1995, i.e. just after passage of the 1988 Basel Accord. The results suggest that regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards had little effect on both ratios for weakly capitalized banks, except in the US. In addition, the relation between the capital to assets ratios and the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio appears to depend not only on the level of capitalization of banks, but also on the countries or groups of countries considered.
The third chapter provides Monte Carlo estimates of the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks must hold for their corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures both under Basel I and the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II. In the latter case, Monte Carlo estimates are presented for different combinations of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) that banks may choose to risk weight their exposures. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different ECAIs leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, these differences never exceed, on average, 10% of EMU banks’ capital requirements for corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures. Second, the standardized approach to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk weight their exposures. Third, the minimum capital requirements for the corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures of EMU banks will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the standardized approach to credit risk is limited.
The fourth and final chapter analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings, I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information.
Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
Libri sul tema "Bureau Renseignement"
E. d'Orsonnens & Cie. Bureau de renseignement, 34, rue St. Gabriel, Montréal: Dans une grande ville comme Montréal ... de parvenir à la connaissance exacte des mauvais débiteurs .. [S.l: s.n., 1985.
Cerca il testo completoChame, Énora. Quand s'avance l'ombre: Mission à haut risque en Syrie. Paris]: Mareuil éditions, 2022.
Cerca il testo completoAgency, British Columbia Mercantile. The British Columbia Mercantile Agency reference book, Victoria, B.C. Victoria, B.C: Banfield & Jewell Presses, 1996.
Cerca il testo completoGaudreau, Claudette. Lire-rédiger au bureau, 3: Manuel d'apprentissage : demande de renseignements, lettre de commande, accusé de réception, lettre de réclamation, lettre de recouvrement, circulaire. [Quebec]: Publications PPMEP-LAVAL, 1988.
Cerca il testo completoPerrier, Guy. Le colonel Passy et les services secrets de la France libre. Paris: Hachette littératures, 1999.
Cerca il testo completoDroitière, Guy de La. Londres à tout prix: Voyage de guerre d'un bon jeune homme, 1940-1945. [Le Coudray-Macouard, France]: Cheminements, 2008.
Cerca il testo completoDroitière, Guy de La. Londres à tout prix: Voyage de guerre d'un bon jeune homme, 1940-1945. [Le Coudray-Macouard, France]: Cheminements, 2008.
Cerca il testo completoAnn, Blackman, a cura di. The spy next door: The extraordinary secret life of Robert Philip Hanssen, the most damaging FBI agent in U.S. history. Boston: Little, Brown, 2002.
Cerca il testo completoPassy. Mémoires du chef des services secrets de la France libre. Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 2000.
Cerca il testo completoKlimenko, V. G. Novye zapiski kontrrazvedchika: FBR protiv rossiĭskikh spet︠s︡sluzhb : uspekhi i neudachi. Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenii︠a︡, 2021.
Cerca il testo completoCapitoli di libri sul tema "Bureau Renseignement"
Mafart, Jean. "Deuxième bureau". In Dictionnaire du renseignement, 253–57. Perrin, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/perri.mouto.2018.01.0253.
Testo completoZarrandikoetxea, Aitxuri. "Bureau réservé". In Dictionnaire du renseignement, 118–20. Perrin, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/perri.mouto.2018.01.0118.
Testo completoAlbertelli, Sébastien. "Une Résistance londonienne ? L’étude du Bureau Central de Renseignement et d’Action". In Chercheurs en Résistance, 25–35. Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/books.pur.49013.
Testo completoLahaie, Lieutenant-Colonel Olivier. "La coopération européenne en temps de guerre : l’exemple du Bureau interallié de renseignements (septembre 1915)". In Les Européens et la guerre, 31–58. Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/books.psorbonne.92290.
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