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Libri sul tema "Belief"

Autore: Grafiati

Pubblicato: 4 giugno 2021

Ultima modifica: 30 luglio 2024

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1

Vattimo, Gianni. Belief. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1999.

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2

Collins, Francis S. Belief. New York: HarperCollins, 2010.

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3

Johnson, Stephanie. Belief. London: Vintage, 2001.

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4

Jaszczolt, Katarzyna. Expressions of belief and belief ascription. [Lodz: University of Lodz], 1995.

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5

Luetz, Johannes M., e Patrick D. Nunn, a cura di. Beyond Belief. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67602-5.

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6

Kellenberger, James. Religious Belief. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74170-9.

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7

Fermé, Eduardo, e Sven Ove Hansson. Belief Change. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60535-7.

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8

Dubois, Didier, e Henri Prade, a cura di. Belief Change. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5054-5.

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9

O'Brien, Dellanna. Beyond belief! Birmingham, Ala: Woman's Missionary Union, 2000.

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10

Ṭaḥāwī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. Islamic belief. Leicester: UK Islamic Academy, 1995.

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11

Liggins, Ray. Utter belief. Kegworth: R. Liggins, 1997.

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12

Kearny, Mary Ann. Beyond belief. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall Regents, 1988.

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13

ek, Slavoj Z. iz. On belief. London: Routledge, 2001.

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14

1963-, Hillard Todd, a cura di. Belief matters. Eugene, Or: Harvest House Publishers, 2009.

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15

Hesse, Hermann. My belief. London: Grafton, 1989.

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16

Eco, Umberto, e Carlo Maria Martini. Belief or Non-Belief? Burns & Oates, 2006.

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17

Zimmerman, Aaron Z. Belief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.001.0001.

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Have you ever called yourself a “pragmatist”? Have you ever wondered what that means? The author traces the origins of pragmatism to a theory of belief defended by the nineteenth-century Scottish philosopher Alexander Bain, and defends it in light of contemporary cognitive neuroscience, social psychology, and evolutionary biology. Pragmatists define our beliefs in terms of information poised to guide our more attentive, controlled actions. The author describes the consequences of this definition for the reader’s thinking on the relation between psychology and philosophy, the mind and brain, the nature of delusion, faith, pretence, racism, and more. He employs research on animal cognition to argue against the propositional attitude analysis of belief now popular among Anglo-American philosophers, offers pragmatic diagnoses of Capgras syndrome and various forms of racial cognition, and defends William James’s famous doctrine of the “will to believe.” We have some wiggle room to believe what we want. Indeed, the adoption of a theory of belief is an instance of this very phenomenon.

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18

Bivins, Jason C. Belief. A cura di Michael Stausberg e Steven Engler. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198729570.013.35.

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Belief is a central shaping category in the study of religion. Owing to its continued scrutiny, belief is both an analytic device and a conceptual prism through which to assess changes in the study of religion. While it is difficult to write about ‘belief’ outside the category’s well-known critical interrogation, engagement with the complexities of lived religion shows ineluctably how belief takes numerous and multivalent shapes that point beyond such critiques. This chapter first describes some of the complexities of ‘belief’ as a concept in the study of religion, and it briefly considers three examples—New Age, Hindu, and Christian—to illustrate some of these complexities in context. A review of discussions in the history of the discipline highlights both the core of recent critiques that a focus on belief has obscured practice and recent possibilities for reassessing ‘belief.’ The chapter concludes by assessing recent related developments.

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19

Radcliffe, Elizabeth S. Belief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199573295.003.0004.

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Hume’s characterization of belief is crucial in the debate over whether beliefs could be motives. Hume seemed to doubt his account of belief in the Treatise, made corrections to it in the Appendix, and developed the corrected view in the first Enquiry. At least three readings of Hume’s portrayal of belief are viable contenders: (1) as a vivacious idea; (2) as a sentiment (which could motivate); and (3) as a disposition to behavioral manifestations. However, Hume did not intend to identify belief with a sentiment, but with an idea having a distinctive sentimental aspect. Hume’s notion of belief as a vivacious idea is not undermined by his hesitations, and ideas are not intrinsically motivating states. This discussion also considers to what degree the recent manner of distinguishing beliefs and desires in terms of “direction of fit” is rooted in Hume’s theory and replies to criticisms that imply Hume was confused about reason’s objects.

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20

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. Belief. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199682706.003.0008.

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This chapter develops and defends a relevant-alternatives contextualist semantics for belief ascriptions, similar to that proposed in the book for knowledge ascriptions. The view is a metasemantic generalization from Roger Clarke's infallibilist approach to belief. The result explains the sense in which belief is a kind of full commitment, consistent with humans' possession of many beliefs. It is also, in the context of the book's broader approach to knowledge, able to explain and predict the sense in which there is a knowledge norm of belief.

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21

Byrne, Alex. Belief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198821618.003.0005.

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This chapter attempts to solve the puzzle of transparency for belief. The notion of an epistemic rule is introduced, and the proposed solution is that knowledge of one’s beliefs may be (and typically is) obtained by following the epistemic rule: BEL If p, believe that you believe that p. This is an inferential theory of knowledge of what we believe; it can be extended to an inferential theory of knowledge of what we know. The theory is also economical and detectivist, and is argued to give a satisfactory explanation of both privileged and peculiar access. The chapter concludes by examining a variety of objections.

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22

Price, H H. Belief. Routledge, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315830452.

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23

Belief. London: Duckworth Overlook, 2005.

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24

Belief. Boston: Roberts, 1985.

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25

Belief. London: BBC, 2005.

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26

Donaghue, Anthony. Belief;. Lulu Press, Inc., 2017.

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27

Parker, Chris. Belief. Bloodhound Books, 2021.

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28

Encylopedia, Cambridge Junior. Belief. University of Cambridge ESOL Examinations, 2000.

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29

Warner, Dave, e Marlion Pickett. Belief. Simon & Schuster Australia, 2020.

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30

H, Price H. Belief. Routledge, 2015.

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31

Garbini, Nicholas. Belief. Elysium Productions, 2022.

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32

Belief. Pacific Pr Pub Assn, 2003.

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33

Bakewell, Joan. Belief. Continuum Intl Pub Group, 2005.

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34

Bilunka, Stephen. Belief. AuthorHouse, 2004.

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35

Horrocks. Belief. Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1991.

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36

Price, H H, H. H. Belief. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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37

Parker, Chris. Belief. Bloodhound Books, 2021.

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38

Bakewell, Joan. Belief. Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, 2005.

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39

Regan, Robert Rj. Belief. Forest City Publications, 2022.

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40

Bakewell, Joan. Belief. Overlook Hardcover, 2006.

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41

Vattimo, Gianni. Belief. Stanford University Press, 1999.

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42

Garbini, Nicholas. Belief. Elysium Productions, 2022.

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43

Belief. Mawenzi House, 2016.

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44

Skaggs, Jon. Belief. Blurb, 2015.

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45

Belief. London: Duckworth Overlook, 2006.

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46

Belief. Urbane Publications, 2017.

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47

Belief. Auckland, N.Z: Vintage, 2000.

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48

Kriegel, Uriah. Belief-That and Belief-In. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0008.

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Abstract (sommario):

Let propositionalism be the thesis that all mental attitudes are propositional. Anti-propositionalists have focused on trying to resist reductive analyses of apparently non-propositional attitudes, such as fearing a dog and loving a spouse, into propositional form. This chapter explores the anti-propositionalist’s prospects for going on the offensive, trying to show that some apparently propositional attitudes, notably belief and judgment, can be given a reductive analysis in terms of non-propositional attitudes. Although the notion that belief is a non-propositional attitude may seem ludicrous at first, it has been given an admirable defense by Franz Brentano, a defense which this chapter expounds and deepens.

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49

Belief Matters (Beyond Belief Campaign). Tyndale House Publishers, 2003.

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50

Belief Matters (Beyond Belief Campaign). Tyndale House Publishers, 2003.

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