Tesi sul tema "Bargaining process"

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2008.
"Department of Education Administration and Higher Education." Includes bibliographical references (p. 156-166). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009.
Title from electronic title page (viewed Jun. 26, 2009). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science." Discipline: Political Science; Department/School: Political Science.

The basic structures of collective bargaining in South Africa have evolved since industrialisation, through the Wiehahn-Commission era until the Farlam one and beyond, resulting in a number of legislative changes from 1924 to 2014. While dealing with collective bargaining, it is not possible to divorce the powerful history of mining from the South African story, from the diamond fields in Kimberley to the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886, where the mine employees’ focused on cheap, unskilled labour and migrant system in the 1900s to the tragic events at Marikana in 2012. In the advent of the industry revolution, employment relationships changed as competitive demands placed a great need for advancing economic developments which are often expressed through collective-bargaining. The objective of collective bargaining is to arrive at an agreement between the employer and employees to determine mutually beneficial terms and conditions of employment such agreement may prohibit unions to embark on an industrial action for as long as it is in place. Strikes became important during the Industrial Revolution, when many worked in factories and mines. Often when employees’ demands are not met, they resort to strike action. Strike action is when a number of employees stop rendering their service in protest to express their grievances. These strikes are usually led by labour unions to get better pay, working hours or working conditions during collective bargaining as a last resort. While trade union leadership fails to advance employees’ cause, employees resort to informal alternative structures to negotiate on their behalf. South Africans have a tradition of taking to the streets in protest when unhappy about issues and this tradition did not spring up during the apartheid era but has been around from as early as 1922 to date. Protests in South Africa today draw from past repertoires and at the same time push for new political practices and directions. Strikes are often used to: Pressure governments to change its policies like in the Rand Revolt; Strikes can destabilise the rule of a particular political party like a series of strikes by blacks in the 1970s and 1980s including the 1973 Durban dockworkers and the 1987 miners’ strikes; Strikes are often part of a broader social movement taking the form of a campaign of civil resistance like Treatment Action Campaign and community struggles such Abahlali Base Mjondolo. On the strike issues in South Africa, the researcher draws from the terrible incident that transpired in August 2012 at Lonmin Mine-Marikana and how it has affected the collective bargaining landscape in South Africa. The first real and significant labour unrest, the Witwatersrand miner strike rocked South Africa to the core in 1922 and in 2012, ninety years later the violent strike by the Rock Operational Drillers at Lonmin following the Marikana massacre and as such did not enjoy statutory protection under the LRA because was classified as wildcat strike. Normally, a wildcat strike constitutes a violation of a collective bargaining agreement in place and as such is not protected unless a union joins it and ratifies the protest. The union may, however, discipline its members for participating in a wildcat strike and impose fines. Among other things miners mainly demanded a wage increment of R12500 per month. The fight between AMCU and NUM for organisational rights also found its way into the equation. A strike wave, not only linked to the mining sector, made 2012 the most protest filled year since the end of apartheid, rolled out across South Africa, closing some industrial operations and crippling others. Commentators argue that the strike wave emerged from a landscape of extreme inequality and poverty, made intolerable by the additional financial burdens arising from the migrant labour system. These factors influenced the industrial action and institutions of collective bargaining comprising of both company and union structures and processes, were found wanting in their ability to address the root causes of the crisis. The post-Marikana strike wave made a mark in the workers struggle movement as it drew in thousands of workers to join AMCU and at the same time weakening NUM, the then majority union. The strike led to the rise and growth of AMCU which was seen by miners as the driver for change. The 2012 strike wave and the Marikana massacre not only changed the balance of forces on the ground against the NUM, but also generated divisions within COSATU. The divisions were between those who decided to remain deaf to the workers’ call for transformation and those who had already realised that a decisive turn in economic policy was needed to avoid a social, economic and political crisis. In the aftermath of the strike, a number community struggles increased as 2012 began and on the other side, a number of splinter groups from COSATU mushroomed which was hobbled by in fights. NUM’s collapse is indeed part of a series of recent failures for COSATU.

The problem investigated by this study was that of understanding types of behaviors exhibited by participants in negotiations processes and impact of behaviors on collective bargaining in Nigeria. The study's three purposes were to describe the nature and extent of interpersonal conflict that occurs in collective bargaining, to determine the consequences that stem from such conflict, and to suggest the behaviors and performances during the face-to-face negotiations that should exist to enhance labor-management relations in Nigerian public education. This study examined behavior in negotiations by using simulation, i.e., a quasiexperimental method. Four outcomes of negotiations--time required to reach agreement, terms of agreements, verbal behavior exhibited during negotiations, and satisfaction derived by negotiators in negotiations—were examined.

An evaluative research survey involving 694 faculty members with an academic appointment in Oregon's 4-year unionized institutions of higher education was undertaken to determine whether or not collective bargaining has supported faculty rights for participation in institutional governance. Four hypotheses were formulated to study the relationship between the independent variable of collective bargaining and the dependent variable of institutional governance, specific to: (1) professional interest, (2) economic interest, (3) educational policy, and (4) academic and personnel policy. Data received from 486 respondents' questionnaires were used for the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance to test the four hypotheses. The four hypotheses of the study were rejected. However, findings of the study suggest that the collective bargaining process is perceived by the respondents in all three unionized institutions as having (1) facilitated their participation in the formal structure and process for institutional decision making and (2) provided for just cause in dismissal and grievance decisions.

The purpose of this research was to study the effect of the conflict settlement process on the degree of expressed organizational commitment of employees in a collective bargaining setting. The research was done in a basic industry in northern Alabama. The instrument included the Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ) developed by Mowday, Porter, and Steers. Demographic variables measured were education, age, and sex. Main effects variables were tenure; union membership; and self-described experience with and feeling toward grievance/arbitration as a category 1 grievant, category 2 grievant, witness, and supervisor. Data were analyzed with hierarchical multiple regression. No statistically significant results were found. Limitations included the economic climate of the region and the industrial relations climate of the company.

The Arbitration Review Board existed in the bituminous coal industry from 1974 to 1981. Established during the 1974 contract negotiations between the Bituminous Coal Operators Association and the United Mine Workers of America, the ARB represented an effort to obtain consistency in arbitration decisions. The ARB operated as an industry appellate board designed to hear appeals of arbitration awards, and the decisions of the ARB were contractually mandated as industry precedents requiring arbitrator compliance. Although the parties terminated the ARB in 1981, they have continued to incorporate the precedent decisions in subsequent contracts. This study utilizes both a qualitative assessment and an empirical analysis of arbitration decisions to determine the impact of the ARB on the arbitration process in the coal industry. Structured interviews were conducted with former ARB members, arbitrators, management representatives, and union representatives to gather information with which to construct a complete historical perspective of the ARB's inception, operation, and termination. A total of 44 individuals were interviewed. The empirical assessment involved a content analysis of 300 arbitration decisions to determine the extent to which arbitrators have adhered to the ARB precedents. Conclusions of the research suggest that the ARB has had a profound impact on coal industry arbitration. Arbitrators increasingly adhered to ARB decisions during its existence, and have continued to exhibit a high degree of adherence following the ARB's termination. The difficulties encountered in implementing the ARB and the factors contributing to its termination are discussed.
Ph. D.

Esta tese explora as relações entre federalismo e partidos legislativos no sistema político brasileiro. Demonstra que os maiores partidos nacionais apresentam expressiva concentração regional de suas bancadas na Câmara dos Deputados, isto é, a maior parte de seus deputados federais provém de poucos estados. Em geral, de três a sete seções estaduais são suficientes para compor a maioria simples das maiores bancadas partidárias na Câmara dos Deputados. Conjuntamente, esses partidos somam entre 75% e 91% (em média 81%) do plenário da Câmara dos Deputados. PPB, PTB, PMDB, PSDB e PT são legendas cujos parlamentares estão altamente concentrados em poucos distritos das regiões estados do Sul e Sudeste, enquanto a representação do PFL se concentra no Sudeste. Como conseqüência, uma minoria (entre 25 e 30%) dos deputados é capaz de mobilizar, através da formação de maiorias no interior dos seus respectivos partidos, a maioria qualificada (60%) no plenário da Câmara dos Deputados. Esta maioria é suficiente para aprovar qualquer legislação. A concentração partidária em poucas seções estaduais se traduz na escolha dos líderes partidários, sendo que dois em cada três deles é oriundo das seções partidárias estaduais de alta concentração. A escolha da presidência da Mesa Diretora da Casa segue lógica similar, reforçando a relação entre composição regional dos grandes partidos nacionais e controle de postos-chave no sistema de representação política. Do mesmo modo, seções estaduais têm vantajosas condições de barganha, por intermédio de seus partidos, para indicar cargos ministeriais junto ao Executivo. Do governo Collor ao governo Lula, três em cada quatro ministros dos grandes partidos nacionais estudados tinha sua origem nos estados de alta concentração. Esta distribuição desproporcional dos cargos no interior dos partidos permite aos membros de poucas seções controlarem os principais cargos do processo decisório tanto no Legislativo quanto no Executivo. Estes resultados observados subvertem os resultados esperados por regras institucionais que visaram produzir um desenho federativo, que alavancasse a capacidade de vocalização dos estados do Norte, Nordeste e Centro-Oeste. A sobre-representação destes estados na Câmara dos Deputados (malapportionment), a conversão de territórios em Unidades Federadas (reforçando sua presença no Legislativo), a extensa gama de poderes do Senado brasileiro; a exigência de partidos nacionais, medidas originadas em 1946 e/ou reiteradas pelas constituições federais posteriores, parecem não ter sido suficientes para alterar os padrões de distribuição de poder entre os entes federados. O controle de postos-chave do processo decisório ainda parece garantir um papel protagônico às seções partidárias estaduais que, supostamente, estariam sub-representadas no sistema politico brasileiro.
This thesis explores the relationship between federalism and legislative parties in the Brazilian political system. It shows how the biggest national parties demonstrate expressive regional concentration of its delegation in the Chamber of Deputies, which means that the most part of the federal representants come from a few states. In general, from three to seven state sections are enough to compose the biggest parties delegations simple majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Putting them together, those parties add between 75% and 91% (average 81%) of the Chamber of Deputies. PPB, PTB, PMDB, PSDB e PT are parties whose representants are highly concentrated in a few districts from South and Southeast regions, while PFL`s representation is concentrated in Northeast. As a consequence, a minority (between 25% and 30%) of the representants is capable to mobilize, through majoritys formation inside their own parties, qualified majority (60%) of the plenary assembly in the Chamber of Deputies. This majority is enough to approve any legislation. Partisan concentration in a few state sections is translated in the choice of partys leaders, since two in three of them came from partys sections in states with high concentration. The President of the Chamber of Deputies choice follows similar logic what reinforces the relationship between regional composition of big national parties and key-jobs control in the political representation system. In the same way state sections have advantages conditions of bargaining, through their parties, to indicate ministerial jobs in the Executive. From Collor (1990-1992) to Lula`s (2003-2007) government three in every four ministers who belonged to big national parties are originated from high concentration states. This disproportional distribution of jobs inside the parties allows their members from few state sections have the control of the main jobs in the decision-making process in the Legislative and Executive. Those (real) results subvert (expected) institutional rules` results that draw a federative picture that evidenced the capacity of north, northeast and middle-west states. Super representation that states from these regions have in the Chamber of Deputies (malapportionment), the conversion of territories in federal unities (which reinforce these regions presence in the Federal Legislative), Brazilian Senates extended group of powers, national parties exigency, procedures originated in 1946 and/or reinforced by later constitutions, they seem to being insufficient to change distribution of powers pattern between federative states. Key-jobs control in the decision-making process still seems to guarantee a protagonist place to state party sections who are supposed sub represented in the Brazilian political system.

This thesis attempts to map out the negotiation strategies used by unskilled negotiators and among these, to identify those strategies which prevent such negotiators from achieving the most effective outcome. In highlighting such incorrect negotiating strategies, the thesis aims to steer academics away from using such strategies as part of their future teaching material on negotiation strategies. The theoretical aspect of this work describes the theory behind negotiating strategies and maps the features, styles and negotiation procedures which are used during negotiation. The practical part of the thesis interprets results gained from the research which was carried out. This research, which was conducted in the winter semester of the 2013/2014 academic year, involved the staging of bargaining games that were held over five separate sessions as part of the subject "Introductory training of social and management skills".

An exploration of the creation and use of farmers' commonly used "rules of thumb" is required to conceptualize farmers' decision making processes. While farmers face complex situations, particularly when subsistence is an issue, they do appear to use simple rules in their decision making. To date inadequate attention has been given to understanding their reasoning processes in creating the rules, so this study traces the origins of farmers' beliefs, and extracts the decisive and dynamic elements in their decision making systems to provide this understanding. The analysis was structured by using a model based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). Modifications included recognizing a bargaining process (BP) and other decision stimuli to represent socio-cultural influences and sources of perception, respectively. Two analyses based on the Personal Construct Theory (PCT) and the Ethnographic Decision Tree Modelling (EDTM) were also applied to help elaborate the farmers' cognitive process and actual decision criteria. The method involved interviews in two villages in Lamongan Regency in East Java Province of Indonesia, where the farmers adopted an improved paddy-prawn system ("pandu"). The results highlighted that farmers use rational strategies, and that socio-cultural factors influence decision making. This was represented by interactions between the farmers' perceptions, their bargaining effort, and various background factors. The TPB model revealed that the farmers' perceptions about the potential of "pandu", and the interaction with their "significant others", influenced their intention to adopt "pandu". The farmers appeared to prefer a steady income and familiar practices at the same time as obtaining new information, mainly from their peers. When "pandu" failed to show sufficiently profitable results, most farmers decided to ignore or discontinue "pandu". This became the biggest disincentive to a wide and sustainable adoption. However, the PCT analysis showed that part of this problem also stemmed from the farmers' lack of resources and knowledge. The farmers' restrictive conditions also led them to seek socio-cultural and practical support for their actions. This was highlighted by a bargaining process (BP) that integrated what the farmers had learned, and believed, into their adoption behaviour. The BP also captured the farmers' communication strategies when dealing with "pandu" as its adoption affected resource allocation within the family and required cooperation with neighbours. The PCT and EDTM analyses also confirmed how the BP accommodated different sets of decision criteria to form different adoption behaviours. Such a process indicated the importance of considering the adoption decision and the relevant changes resulting from the farmers' cognition. This provided a more dynamic and realistic description of the farmers' decision-making process than has previously been attempted. Overall, the results suggested that semi-commercial farmers need to know, and confirm, that a new technology is significantly superior to the existing system, and can provide a secure income. The introduction of a new technology should use a participatory approach allowing negotiation, conflict mitigation and the creation of consensus among the relevant parties. This can be supported through better access to knowledge, information and financing. A specific and well-targeted policy intervention may also be needed to accommodate the diversity in the farmers' ways of learning and making decisions. Ways to improve the current analytical approaches are also suggested.

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The scientific work aims to produce knowledge. This is not put into question. Although what is the purpose of that work, or if there is any purpose at all, is a question that must be made ex ante any task. The answer resounds: all knowledge must be turned to the instrument, technology in order to improve people's lives. In legal terms, this should be put in technical terms: improving justice, democracy, human dignity, certainty. However, these basic elements - justice, democracy, human dignity, certainty - have great fluidity, which does not allow them to extract a precise meaning. Same phenomenon occurs in the large themes: people, society, State, Law, State of Law, and Democracy. Witch shall be studied in Unitarian philosophical view of the world. Therefore it is necessary to introduce certain methodological warnings, and it explains the option for analyzing these institutes under the attributes of form and function, starting from abstractions up to very precise and contextualized content of those institutes; in order to propose solutions for fighting crime in a democratic way, especially organized crime. And therefore it is to be studied the possibilities of negotiation within the police investigation in Brazilian Criminal Procedural Law
O trabalho científico visa produzir conhecimento. Isso não se questiona. Mas a que se voltará este conhecimento, ou mesmo se possui alguma finalidade, é pergunta que se deve ser feita ex ante qualquer atividade. A resposta ressoa: todo conhecimento deve ser voltado a dar instrumento, tecnologia para melhorar a vida das pessoas. Em Direito, põe-se em termos técnicos: é assistir a justiça, a democracia, a dignidade humana, segurança. Contudo, estes elementos básicos --justiça, democracia, dignidade da pessoa humana, segurança-- possuem grande fluidez, que não permite extrair-lhes um significado preciso. Fenômeno que se verifica nos grandes temas: pessoa, sociedade, Estado, Direito, Estado de Direito, Democracia. Sempre tomando visão unitarista de mundo. Por isso, necessário introduzir advertências metodológicas, e a opção por analisar estes institutos sob sua forma e função, para chegar-se, de abstrações até conteúdos muito precisos e contextualizados. E ao fim propor solução para combate democrático à criminalidade atual, em especial a organizada. E assim estudar as possibilidades de negociação no inquérito policial, principal meio de investigação no Direito Processual Penal Brasileiro

An exploration of the creation and use of farmers' commonly used "rules of thumb" is required to conceptualize farmers' decision making processes. While farmers face complex situations, particularly when subsistence is an issue, they do appear to use simple rules in their decision making. To date inadequate attention has been given to understanding their reasoning processes in creating the rules, so this study traces the origins of farmers' beliefs, and extracts the decisive and dynamic elements in their decision making systems to provide this understanding. The analysis was structured by using a model based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). Modifications included recognizing a bargaining process (BP) and other decision stimuli to represent socio-cultural influences and sources of perception, respectively. Two analyses based on the Personal Construct Theory (PCT) and the Ethnographic Decision Tree Modelling (EDTM) were also applied to help elaborate the farmers' cognitive process and actual decision criteria. The method involved interviews in two villages in Lamongan Regency in East Java Province of Indonesia, where the farmers adopted an improved paddy-prawn system ("pandu"). The results highlighted that farmers use rational strategies, and that socio-cultural factors influence decision making. This was represented by interactions between the farmers' perceptions, their bargaining effort, and various background factors. The TPB model revealed that the farmers' perceptions about the potential of "pandu", and the interaction with their "significant others", influenced their intention to adopt "pandu". The farmers appeared to prefer a steady income and familiar practices at the same time as obtaining new information, mainly from their peers. When "pandu" failed to show sufficiently profitable results, most farmers decided to ignore or discontinue "pandu". This became the biggest disincentive to a wide and sustainable adoption. However, the PCT analysis showed that part of this problem also stemmed from the farmers' lack of resources and knowledge. The farmers' restrictive conditions also led them to seek socio-cultural and practical support for their actions. This was highlighted by a bargaining process (BP) that integrated what the farmers had learned, and believed, into their adoption behaviour. The BP also captured the farmers' communication strategies when dealing with "pandu" as its adoption affected resource allocation within the family and required cooperation with neighbours. The PCT and EDTM analyses also confirmed how the BP accommodated different sets of decision criteria to form different adoption behaviours. Such a process indicated the importance of considering the adoption decision and the relevant changes resulting from the farmers' cognition. This provided a more dynamic and realistic description of the farmers' decision-making process than has previously been attempted. Overall, the results suggested that semi-commercial farmers need to know, and confirm, that a new technology is significantly superior to the existing system, and can provide a secure income. The introduction of a new technology should use a participatory approach allowing negotiation, conflict mitigation and the creation of consensus among the relevant parties. This can be supported through better access to knowledge, information and financing. A specific and well-targeted policy intervention may also be needed to accommodate the diversity in the farmers' ways of learning and making decisions. Ways to improve the current analytical approaches are also suggested.

La presente tesi è un contributo allo studio delle implicazioni economiche delle intenzioni di fecondità e all’analisi degli aspetti economici legati ai processi decisionali riproduttivi. Precisamente la tesi, composta da tre capitoli indipendenti e basata su dati Italiani, si focalizza su donne, su individui che vivono in coppia e sulle coppie. In particolare lo studio mira a comprendere: i) l'interazione esistente tra il mercato del lavoro (con un focus particolare sul ruolo del settore occupazionale femminile) e le preferenze per la formazione della famiglia; ii) le influenze della ripartizione dei ruoli domestici all’interno della coppia sulle intenzioni riproduttive; iii) le determinanti (all’interno delle coppie) dell’accordo/disaccordo circa l'intenzione di diventare genitori una seconda volta, e -per coppie che registrano un disaccordo- iv) le determinanti che spingono una donna a contrastare l’intenzione positive del suo partner per un secondo figlio. La tesi utilizza il mixed-method design, una strategia basata sull’analisi quantitativa dei dati nonché sull’analisi approfondita di interviste: questo approccio consente di studiare l'argomento da diverse prospettive e -grazie ai due metodi di ricerca -quantitativo e qualitativo- di approfondire le conoscenze del fenomeno di interesse.
The thesis is a contribution to the study of the economic implications of fertility intentions and desires and of the economic aspects of the fertility decision making process. Precisely, it is based on three autonomous chapters and it aims at understanding: a) for women and for individuals within the couples the interplay between fertility and labour market preferences (with a particular focus on the role of women's sector of employment), and the influences that the (un)balanced division of domestic duties play on the intentions of becoming parents for another time in Italy; b) for couples living together the determinants of their (dis)agreement about the intention of becoming parents again; and c) for couples that disagree on future fertility plans, the determinants of female’s contrasting attitude towards her partners’ positive fertility intention. The dissertation uses a mixed-method design- a strategy based on survey data analysis as well as in-depth interviews analysis: this approach allows investigating the topic from different perspectives, by means of both quantitative and qualitative research methods in order to provide new insights into the phenomenon of interest.

The plots of Billy Budd and The Bonfire of the Vanities are organized entirely around a lawsuit. In The Pickwick Papers the trial is only a part, though an important one, of a series of related adventures in which the main characters of the novel participate. In the three novels there is a trial in which the accused is found guilty, although he is actually innocent. In The Posthumous Papers of the Club Pickwick, the author’s main purpose is to present the operation of the legal system, in which the modus operandi of unscrupulous lawyers, who rely only on cheating and deceiving methods, is atthe beginning of and determines the outcome of the lawsuit. In Billy Budd, an innocent is sentenced to death in order to preserve a supposed higher interest: the common good. In The Bonfire of the Vanities, political factors, personal interests, resentments and other worldly elements determine the outcome of the trial. In the three cases, the watchmaking mechanism that a lawsuit appears to be is completely overcome by factors outside it.
Las tramas de Billy Budd y La hoguera de las vanidades están organizadas íntegramente alrededor de un juicio. En Los papeles póstumos del Club Pickwick, el proceso es una parte importante de la obra, pero también existen aventuras relacionadas en las que participan los diversos personajes. En los tres juicios se juzga a un inocente. En Los papeles póstumos del Club Pickwick, el autor busca presentar el funcionamiento real del sistema legal, en el cual el modus operandi de abogados inescrupulosos, quienes emplean únicamente métodos tramposos y fraudulentos, determina el origen y el resultado del proceso. En Billy Budd, un inocente es condenado a muerte para preservar un supuesto interés mayor: el bien común. En La hoguera de las vanidades, factores políticos, intereses personales, resentimientos y otros elementos de carácter mundano determinan el resultado del proceso. En los tres casos, el mecanismo de relojería que parece ser el proceso es totalmente sobrepasado por factores externos al mismo.

The process of collective bargaining reforms in SpainThis article aims to analyze the main lines of development of the process of collective bargaining reforms in Spain. For this purpose, after of being described those characteristic elements of the Spanish model about this fundamental right, it highlight the principal legislative changes that involved the great labor reform of 1994, which have continued through the regulations issued between 2011 and 2012, generating a synergy that actually delimit a new right of collective bargaining.
El presente artículo tiene por finalidad analizar las principales líneas de desarrollo del proceso de reformas de la negociación colectiva en España. A dicho efecto, luego de describirse aquellos elementos característicos del modelo español respecto a este derecho fundamental, se resaltan los principales cambios legislativos que implicó la gran reforma laboral de 1994, los cuales han continuado a través de las normas emitidas entre 2011 y 2012, generándose una sinergia que en realidad delimita un nuevo derecho de la negociación colectiva.

Parler de négociation en matière pénale peut, de prime abord, semblerantinomique. Issue par tradition du modèle accusatoire de justice pénale, la logiqued’intégration du consensus dans le champ de la répression s’observe pourtant dans lesystème procédural à l’égard de procédures dont le fonctionnement est entièrementconditionné par l’aveu. Instrument au service de la répression des pratiquesanticoncurrentielles, du traitement du contentieux de masse ou de la lutte contre lacriminalité organisée, la négociation se présente aujourd’hui comme un processus dont lelégislateur ne peut plus faire l’économie. De ce constat est née la volonté d’appréhender lephénomène au moyen d’une définition qui permet d’une part, de mieux cerner l’articulationdes diverses modalités de la négociation avec les modes de réponse pénale traditionnels,d’autre part d’en apprécier les conséquences notamment au regard des principes directeursde la matière. Plaçant l’autorité de poursuite au rang d’acteur principal du système judiciaire,le processus de négociation nécessite l’élaboration d’un cadre juridique strict afin d’assurerla garantie des droits fondamentaux du justiciable. Si l’échange qui s’établit entre l’autoritéde poursuite et la personne mise en cause révèle l’existence d’un accord, l’étude dufonctionnement concret des procédures de négociation ne permet pas de conclure à laréalité d’un contrat. Illustration de la logique probatoire à l’oeuvre dans le système répressifnord-américain, le développement de la négociation doit s’inscrire dans le respect d’unéquilibre entre les impératifs d’efficacité et le respect des principes qui confèrent à la justicepénale française son identité
One can have reservations about the idea of negotiation in criminal law. Yet, theinitiative of reaching consensus in the field of repression – an initiative that derives from thetraditional adversarial model of criminal justice – can nevertheless be observed in theprocedural system with regard to procedures the implementation of which is entirelydetermined by the confession. The negotiation has been used to curb anti-competitivepractices, to handle class action lawsuits or to fight organized crime, and has definitelybecome a key process for lawmakers to consider. This observation has led to an examinationof this phenomenon through a definition which shall help to understand, on the one hand, thearticulation of the many forms of negotiation with the standard criminal procedure, and on theother, to appraise its consequences, especially those that are in conformity with the mainguiding principles of criminal justice. By placing the prosecution at the center of the justicesystem, plea-bargaining requires a strict legal framework to protect the basic rights of peoplesubject to trial. If discussions between the prosecution and the defendant have brought tolight some sort of agreement, the study of the inner workings of the bargaining procedureshas not exposed the existence of a contract. This dissertation aims to demonstrate that thecurrent development of plea-bargaining, a process which is illustrative of the probationaryrationale of the repressive North American criminal justice system, calls for some balancebetween the imperatives of efficiency and the respect of the distinctive characteristics of theFrench justice system

Lo scopo della nostra ricerca è di proporre un modello dell'intervento pubblico che differisce dall'approccio standard e di valutare le sue implicazioni in termini di benessere. Noi sosteniamo che in molte circostanze la regolamentazione risulta essere un processo di "give-and-take" pittosto che di "take-it-or-leave-it". Più precisamente, la nostra idea è che la politica regolamentatoria possa essere più generalmente modellizzata come il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, che normalmente implica la partecipazione attiva di ciascun agente coinvolto nell'interazione regolamentatoria. Nel Capitolo 1, seguendo l'intuizione di Spulberg, la regolamentazione è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione tra i gruppi di interesse dei consumatori e delle imprese, con l'agenzia nel ruolo di mediatore. La nostra analisi mostra che l'impresa regolamentata sfrutta il suo potere contrattuale per ottenere un sussidio, il quale è più elevato che con un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" di un meccanismo che massimizza il benessere sociale. L'eccessiva sussidiazione dell'impresa penalizza i consumatori ed implica una perdita di benessere sociale. Noi troviamo altresì che, con informazione asimmetrica sui costi, l'intervallo di tipi dell'impresa che partecipano in equilibrio all'interazione regolamentatoria può essere più grande con la politica negoziata che con la politica "take-it-or-leave-it". Vorremmo sottolineare che il Capitolo 1 è introduttivo e costituisce un passo preliminare per la nostra ricerca. Aldilà dei risultati analitici, il suo contributo è duplice. Innanzitutto, esso descrive le strutture basilari di una politica regolamentatoria negoziata e le sua implicazioni in termini di benessere. In secondo luogo, esso mostra che l'approccio basato sulla contrattazione rappresenta effettivamente un'estensione piuttosto che una negazione dell'approccio standard. In particolare, la contrattazione su una politica regolamentatoria può essere interpretata come un modello generale che include l'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" come caso limite, che si verifica quando l'impresa è privata di qualsiasi potere di contrattazione durante le negoziazioni. La discussione nel Capitolo 2 sviluppa la struttura precedente e considera un'agenzia che è delegata dal Congresso a rappresentare gli interessi dei consumatori nel precesso di contrattazione con l'impresa sulla politica regolamentatoria. L'esistenza di un'attività di negoaziazione tra l'agenzia e l'impresa è stata largamente ignorata dalla letteratura economica, con la principale eccezione rappresentata dai contributi di Scarpa. Comunque, Armstrong e Sappington, nella loro rassegna sui recenti sviluppi nella teoria della regolamentazione, hanno riconosciuto che la formulazione standard, la quale alloca tutto il potere di contrattazione al regolamentatore, è adottata per convenienza tecnica piuttosto che per realismo. Mentre l'agenzia è stata precedentemente raffigurata come un arbitro imparziale, nel Capitolo 2 supponiamo che essa rappresenti una parte contrattuale, la cui natura può essere benevolente od egoista. In questo contesto, noi studiamo la possibilità di collusione tra l'agenzia regolamentatoria e l'impresa regolamentata, un fenomeno che spesso si verifica in una relazione regolamentatoria. La contrattazione "a latere" tra i due partner colludenti è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione (eventualmente illegale)parallelo alla negoziazione sulla politica regolamentatoria. La nostra analisi mostra che i consumatori sono penalizzati dalla corruzione, in quanto essi interamente sussidiano il guadagno totale dalla collusione. Inoltre, il nostro modello suggerisce che un'agenzia più forte nel processo di contrattazione rende più desiderabile per il Congresso (cioè per i consumatori)consentire la collusione in equilibrio. Nei primi due capitoli, noi abbiamo considerato l'esistenza di solamente un mercato monopolistico. Il Capitolo 3, che ha beneficiato del contributo fondamentale di Carlo Scarpa, estende l'impianto precedente ed esamina la regolamentazione di due mercati interdipendenti quando i beni sono sostituti. Questo è il caso, per esempio, nelle industrie del gas naturale e dell'elettricità o delle ferrovie e autostrade. Noi ci focalizziamo sul progetto della struttura regolamentatoria. In particolare, noi intendiamo determinare se è meglio per il benessere dei consumatori avere un'autorità unica per entrambi i mercati o suddividere la giurisdizione regolamentatoria tra due differenti agenzie. Quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it", la nostra analisi mostra che due agenzie - ciascuna massimizzante il surplus totale nel suo proprio mercato - impongono prezzi che sono più bassi di quelli derivanti da centralizzazione regolamentatoria. Al contrario, quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, noi troviamo che un regolamentatore unico, che sequenzialmente contratta con entrambe le imprese, dà ai consumatori un livello di benesere più elevato, purchè il costo ombra dei fondi pubblici, attraverso i quali la produzione è sussidiata, sia sotto una certa soglia. Dunque, in presenza di negoziazioni, il nostro modello suggerisce che la centralizzazione dovrebbe essere la migliore struttura regolamentatoria per i consumatori nei paesi sviluppati, ove la raccolta fiscale non è troppo distorsiva. Se il costo ombra è sopra questa soglia, come spesso accade nei paesi in via di sviluppo, decentralizzare la struttura regolamentatoria risulta in un miglioramento del benessere sociale.
The aim of our research is to propose a pattern of government intervention which differs from the standard approach and to assess its welfare implications. We argue that in many circumstances regulation turns out to be a process of give-and-take rather than take-it-or-leave-it. More precisely, our idea is that the regulatory policy can be more generally modelled as the outcome of a bargaining process, which normally entails the active participation of each agent involved in the regulatory interaction. In Chapter 1, following Spulber’s intuition, regulation is modelled as a negotiation process between the consumers’ and firm’s interest groups, with the agency in the role of mediator. Our analysis shows that the regulated firm exploits its bargaining power to obtain a subsidy which is higher than under a take-it- or-leave-it offer of a total surplus maximizing mechanism. The oversubsidization of the firm penalizes consumers and entails a total surplus loss. We find also that, under asymmetric cost information, the range of the firm’s types participating in equilibrium in the regulatory interaction may be wider under the negotiated policy than under the take-it-or- leave-it policy. We would like to stress that Chapter 1 is introductory and constitutes a preliminary step for our research. On top of the specific analytical results, its contribution is twofold. First, it describes the basic features of a negotiated regulatory policy and its welfare implications. Second, it shows that the bargaining approach to regulation actually represents an extention rather than a negation of the standard approach. In particular, the bargaining over a regulatory policy may be interpreted as a general set-up which includes the take-it-or-leave- it offer as a limit case, that occurs when the firm is deprived of any bargaining power during negotiations. The discussion in Chapter 2 develops the previous framework and considers an agency which is delegated by Congress to represent consumers’ interests in the bargaining process with the firm over a regulatory policy. The existence of a negotiation activity between the agency and the firm has been by and large ignored by the economic literature, with the main exception represented by Scarpa’s contributions. However, Armstrong and Sappington, in their review on the recent developments in the theory of regulation, have recognized that the standard formulation, which allocates all the bargaining power to the regulator, has been adopted for technical convenience rather than for realism. While it has been previously depicted as an impartial arbitrator, the agency is assumed in Chapter 2 to represent a bargaining party, whose nature may be either benevolent or self-interested. In this setting, we study the potential for collusion between the regulatory agency and the regulated firm, a phenomenon which often occurs in a regulatory relationship. The side contracting between the two colluding partners is modelled as a (possibly illegal) negotiation process parallel to the bargaining over the regulatory policy. Our analysis shows that consumers are penalized by corruption, since they entirely subsidize the total stake in collusion. Furthermore, our model suggests that a stronger agency in the bargaining process makes it more desirable for Congress (i.e. for consumers) to allow collusion in equilibrium. In the first two chapters, we have considered the existence of just one monopolistic market. Chapter 3, which has benefited from the fundamental contribution of Carlo Scarpa, extends the previous setting and examines the regulation of two interdependent markets, whose goods are substitutes. This is the case, for instance, in the industries of natural gas and electricity or railroads and motorways. We focus on the design of the regulatory structure. In particular, we intend to determine whether it is better for consumers’ welfare to have a unique authority for both markets or to split the regulatory jurisdiction between two different agencies. When the regulatory policy is the outcome of a take-it-or-leave-it offer, our analysis shows that two agencies - each maximizing total surplus in its own market - set prices which are lower than those arising under regulatory centralization. On the contrary, when the regulatory policy is the outcome of a bargaining process, we find that a unique regulator, which sequentially bargains with both firms, gives consumers a higher welfare level, as long as the shadow cost of public funds, through which production is subsidized, is below a certain threshold. Hence, under negotiations our model suggests that centralization should be the best regulatory pattern for consumers in developed countries, where tax collection is not too distortionary. If the shadow cost is above that threshold, as it often happens in developing countries, decentralizing bargaining turns out to be consumers’ welfare improving.

This paper analyzes the employment policy of the current Peruvian government. We begin with some considerations on the economic and social context of the period 2011-2015 and specifically on the concept of precariousness in employment. Then we analyze the most important changes in labor and social security matters; finally, we will discuss some proposals for concrete measures regarding the search for solution of the problems addressed.
El presente trabajo se propone analizar la política laboral del actual Gobierno peruano. Empezaremos con algunas consideraciones sobre el contexto económico y social del período 2011-2015 y específicamente sobre el concepto de la precariedad en el empleo. Luego, analizaremos los cambios más importantes en materia laboral y previsional; finalmente, expondremos algunas propuestas como medidas concretas respecto a la búsqueda de solución de los problemas tratados.

Le thème de la protection pénale de l'accusé, connu des pénalistes, mérite aujourd'hui d'être renouvelé sous un angle essentiellement probatoire, au regard de l'évolution actuelle du procès pénal. Situés au confluent de l'innocence et de la culpabilité, les droits et garanties accordés à l'accusé, entendu dans son acception conventionnelle, doivent être analysés en considération des principes fondateurs que sont la présomption d'innocence et les droits de la défense. L'évolution continue de ces deux principes, dans un sens diamétralement opposé, rejaillit inévitablement sur l'intensité et les modalités de la protection dont bénéficie toute personne suspectée ou poursuivie dans le cadre d'une procédure pénale.La présente étude, volontairement limitée à la phase préparatoire du procès pénal, se propose d'appréhender, dans un souci pratique et technique, les différentes évolutions jurisprudentielles et législatives opérées en la matière. Y seront ainsi abordées les principales problématiques actuellement rencontrées en procédure pénale telles que la question du statut juridique du suspect ou encore l'effectivité du principe du contradictoire dans l'avant-procès pénal. S'il peut être tentant, au premier abord, de conclure à un renforcement indiscutable de la protection pénale accordée à l'accusé, il conviendra alors de reconsidérer cette question à l'aune de l'étude des limites procédurales attachées au procès pénal. Loin d'aborder ce thème dans une optique partisane, il sera question de modération dans les propos tenus. En effet, peut-être plus que sur toute autre question de procédure pénale, il est impératif de savoir raison garder
The theme of the criminal protection of the accused, well-known to criminal specialists, today deserves to be renewed under a probationary essentially angle, in the light of current developments in the criminal trial. Located at the confluence of innocence and guilt, the rights and guarantees granted to the accused understood in its conventional sense, must be analyzed in consideration of the founding principles of presumption of innocence and the rights of the defense. The continuing evolution of these two principles, in a sense diametrically opposite, inevitably reflects the intensity and the terms of the protection afforded any person suspected or prosecuted under criminal proceedings.This study deliberately limited to the pre-trial phase, proposes to understand, in a practical and technical problems, the various case law and legislative developments carried out in the field. Will thus addressed the key issues currently faced in criminal proceedings such as the question of the legal status of the suspect or the effectiveness of the adversarial principle in the preliminary criminal trial. While it may be tempting, at first, to conclude an indisputable strengthening the criminal protection afforded to the accused, then it will be necessary to reconsider this issue in terms of the study of procedural limitations attached to the criminal trial. Far from addressing this issue in a partisan way, it will be about moderation in the remarks. Indeed, perhaps more than any other issue of criminal procedure, it is imperative to keep a sense of proportion

Doutoramento em Matemática Aplicada à Economia e Gestão
This PhD thesis uses Dynamical Systems, Variational Calculus and Op- timal Control techniques to address three related problems in Mathematical Finance. We start by introducing an alternative characterization for martingale measures in discrete time financial markets models, relating the existence of such measures with a special family of optimization problems. We then move on to address two classical problems in mathematical finance, both connected through the incompleteness of the markets under consideration. We first consider a minimization problem as a model for the interaction between two agents trading a contingent claim in incomplete financial markets (in both discrete-time and continuous-time setups). The agents personal valuations for the contingent claim are assumed to depend on probability measures representing their beliefs concerning the future states of the world, and their goal is to achieve a common price for the contingent claim to be traded, while deviating as little as possible from their initial beliefs. We then prove a dynamic programming principle for a finite horizon optimal control problem for which the state variable dynamics are defined by a Markov- switching jump-diffusion stochastic differential equation. As an application of our results, we study a finite horizon consumption-investment problem in a Markov-switching jump-diffusion financial market.
Nesta Tese de Doutoramento usamos conceitos de Sistemas Dinâmicos, Cálculo Variacional e técnicas de Controlo para lidar com três problemas em Matemática Financeira. Começamos por uma caracterização alternativa das medidas martingale em modelos de mercados financeiros em tempo discreto, relacionando a existência de tal medida com uma família de problemas de optimização. Posteriormente, estudamos dois problemas clássicos em matemática financeira, relacionados pela incompletude dos mercados considerados. O primeiro é um problema de minimização que modela a interação entre dois agentes, que transacionam um derivado financeiro em mercados financeiros incompletos (quer em tempo discreto, quer em tempo contínuo). Assumimos que a avaliação que cada agente faz do derivado financeiro depende de medidas de probabilidade que representam as suas estimativas sobre a probabilidade de ocorrência de cada um dos futuros estados do mundo, e que o seu objetivo consiste em conseguir um preço comum para o derivado financeiro negociado, desviando-se o mínimo possível das suas estimativas iniciais. Finalmente, provamos um princípio de programação dinâmica para um problema de controlo óptimo em horizonte finito, no qual a dinâmica das variáveis de estado é definida por uma equação diferencial estocástica contendo termos de difusão, termos de saltos, sendo, adicionalmente, cada um destes termos modulado por uma cadeia de Markov. Como aplicação estudamos um problema de consumo-investimento em horizonte finito num mercado financeiro formado por activos cuja evolução com o tempo segue uma equação diferencial estocástica do tipo acima descrito.

碩士
靜宜大學
國際企業學系研究所
99
This study aims to investigate the process of buyers’ subsequent attitudes and subsequent actions and their relationships depended on the bargaining outcomes. Depth interviews were employed in order to explore the success, the failure, and the consequent actions in dyadic bargaining under the condition of one buyer and one seller. Ten international respondents were invited to be interviewed. Approximately one hour of each interview is taken, while English is the medium of the interviews. After the interviews, respondents were given five USD as an incentive. The results show that successful bargainers tended to be younger people and easterner, compared to unsuccessful bargainers who tended to be older people and westerner. When buying product in computer and vehicle category, it might provide higher chance in getting the discount, while buying product in garment category gave the partial tendency to win the bargain. Since garment seems to have fewer profit margins when compared to the other category like computer or vehicle, it thus is obligatory for the seller to avoid discounting this kind of product. During the interviews, author found that confident interviewees shared their successful bargaining experiences; whereas, interviewees with very calm and quiet attitude seemed to express about their unsuccessful bargaining stories. This research also provides insights of buyer as bargainer profoundly. It therefore helps the seller, especially in computer, garment, and vehicle industry, knows how to balance mutual-interest and maintain the strong relationship with customer.

碩士
國立中正大學
勞工所
97
Labor union is mechanism thru which labors express their voices and demands, Union also provides a platform by which Blue-collars and White-collars are able to bargain and address issues. By and large, union serves and leads labors to conduct necessary strikes and demonstrations if it is in need. Oftentimes, labors and management authorities see disputes and resist against each other when both sides firmly defend their battle grounds during the collective agreement making process. Once collective agreement is made, the Blue and White-collars will further finalize necessary documents required by labor laws and associate regulations. This is particularly significant in Taiwan’s current working environment due to inadequate domestic legal norms. The study suggests that issues between both sides may be addressed by using collective bargaining, co-determination, disputes, and the process of collective agreement making. This presentation concludes that, based on the case study, organizational disputes may turn out to be cooperative labor-management relations; co-determination may ascertain democratic environment within an organization; collective bargaining may lead to a collective agreement. Finally, this research paper proposes four points of assertion for labors, union, union leadership, employers, and to whom concerns in the related subjects showing as below: ．Labors should have demands on creating unions. ．Unions must operate independently and rationally to enhance their functions. ．Collective agreement is required to improve labor-management relations. ．Employers may set no bans to unions on co-determination participation to produce and shape a triple-win situation within an organization.

碩士
銘傳大學
企業管理學系碩士班
99
Uncertainty is one of the defining factors of failed supply chain management. Companies employ different control mechanisms to reduce the uncertainty in a cooperative relationship. This study considered the impact of different control mechanisms on process variability, supplier opportunism and supply flexibility, with supplier bargaining power as a moderating factor. Survey questionnaires were designed based on past research on related issues, and data were collected from the electronics and IT industries in Taiwan. The model was analyzed using Multi-Group Structural Equation Models. The Results show that supplier bargaining power has a significant moderating effect on control mechanisms’ effects on process variability, opportunism behavior, and supply flexibility. Some managerial suggestions are provided following the analysis.

The aim of the Master thesis Liberal intergovernmentalism: The role of small states in the European integration process is to test the applicability of the theory of Liberal intergovernmentalism to cases of small Member States of the European integration. Furthermore, the thesis aims to clarify the role of this states in the evolution of the European integrative cooperation. In order to reach the research objectives, the thesis uses case studies of Belgium and the Netherlands and it examines their motives and behaviour during the negotiation of treaties of the European primary legislation. The thesis is divided into chapters based on a chronological succession. Each chapter describes a time period before one of the treaties of the primary legislation, from the foundation of the European Economic Community until the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The chapters deal with the motivation of small states for new negotiations and their claims in concrete areas of diplomacy. These claims are further compared with results of the negotiations in the context of the significance of the arranged agenda. The final part of the thesis compares the negotiating power of small and large Member States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, taking into account the most significant issues of the agenda. The...

O presente estudo assenta no consenso na fase de Julgamento, em particular, no que concerne aos Acordos sobre a Sentença em Processo Penal. O mecanismo em causa reveste uma incontornável relevância prática, na medida em que se traduz numa maior eficácia, eficiência e celeridade processuais, o que só pode contribuir para a prossecução do favorecimento do processo. Em Portugal, partiu do Professor Figueiredo Dias (inspirado na prática jurisprudencial alemã e na subsequente alteração legislativa naquele ordenamento jurídico) o apelo à realização dos ditos acordos. Tendo os nossos Tribunais aderido e lançado mão dos Acordos sobre a Sentença em Processo Penal. A ideia de consenso prende-se com o facto do arguido confessar os factos que lhe vêm imputados na Acusação e, em contrapartida, o Tribunal estabelecer o limite máximo, abstratamente considerado, da pena na qual o mesmo poderá vir a incorrer. Sendo, necessariamente encurtado o momento previsto para a produção de prova. Daí se erguerem vozes no sentido que esta eficiência funcionalmente orientada pode colocar em causa a manutenção do Estado de Direito nos moldes que o conhecemos. Foi, exatamente, por não ser pacífico na doutrina nem na jurisprudência, que tendo o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça sido chamado a pronunciar-se, manifestou a sua oposição face aos Acordos sobre a Sentença, pelo menos, enquanto não se operar a alteração legislativa que lhes dê suporte literal. Perante esta posição assumida pelo aresto do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça e assumida também pela Procuradoria-Geral da República, cessou o recurso dos sujeitos processuais ao mecanismo dos Acordos sobre a Sentença. Sucede que, cada vez mais, parece fazer sentido revisitar o tema, analisar as suas vantagens e desvantagens e ponderar a sua aplicação prática, designadamente, alicerçada numa eventual alteração legislativa.
The present study is based on the consensus in the Judgment, in particular, regarding the Plea Bargaining in Criminal Procedure. The mechanism in question has an inescapable practical relevance in that it results in greater efficiency, efficiency and speed of procedure, which can only contribute to furthering the process. In Portugal, Professor Figueiredo Dias (based on German jurisprudence and subsequent legislative change) drew attention to the call for such agreements. Thus, our Courts have begun to use the Agreements on the Sentence in Criminal Procedure. The idea of consensus is that the accused confesses the facts that are imputed to him in the indictment and, on the other hand, the Court establishes the maximum limit, abstractly considered, of the sentence in which it may be incurred. The production of evidence is necessarily shortened. Hence, there are voices in the sense that this functionally oriented efficiency can put in question the maintenance of the rule of law in the ways that we know it. It was precisely because it was not settled in doctrine or in case-law that, since the Supreme Court of Justice had been called upon to rule, it had expressed its opposition to the Agreements on the Judgment, at least until the legislative amendment. Faced with this position assumed by the Supreme Court of Justice and also assumed by the Attorney General's Office, the appeal of the procedural subjects to the mechanism of the Settlement Agreements ceased. More and more it seems to make sense to revisit the subject, to analyze its advantages and disadvantages and to consider their practical application, in particular, based on a possible legislative change.

Neste trabalho procura-se perceber os fatores que estiveram na base dos resultados da negociação coletiva efetuada entre os sindicatos médicos e os dois últimos governos. A análise centra-se no processo de contratação coletiva, que deu origem a dois acordos coletivos de trabalho de conteúdos semelhantes que procuram harmonizar as regras sobre emprego e relações laborias dos médicos em funções públicas e dos médicos com contrato individual de trabalho do Serviço Nacional de Saúde. Partindo-se da identificação dos aspetos desreguladores do emprego no setor público da saúde, analisa-se as fases do processo, as posições dos atores sobre a negociação e sobre os desafios, os objetivos e as estratégias para os alcançar. Da análise efetuada, concluiu-se que os sindicatos médicos conseguiram negociar a re-regulação de várias matérias laborais alargando o universo da sua aplicação aos médicos das entidades públicas empresariais da saúde. Isto numa negociação com governos que resistiram partilhar o espaço da regulação das condisções de emprego com o ator sindical. Na base deste resultado está uma abordagem não ideológica às matérias alvo de negociação, além da adoção de uma posição consertada por parte dos sindicatos na mesa negocial e do recurso ao poder profissional dos médicos.
This study seeks to understand the factors that lead to results achieved through collective bargaining between medical labour unions and the last two governments. The analysis focuses on the process of collective agreement, which gave rise to two similar collective bargaining agreements, both of which seeked to harmonise the rules relating to the employment and labour relations of doctors in public service as well as doctors possessing individual labour contracts within the National Health Service. Based on the identification of deregulating aspects of employment in the public health sector, the analyses will focus on the different phases of the process, the actors’ positions in the negotiation and the challenges, objectives and strategies taken to achieve them. From this examination, it is revealed that the medical unions were able to negotiate the re-regulation of various labor issues, broadening the universe of their applications to medical public health enterprises through negotiations with governments that resisted sharing the regulation platform on labour conditions with union actors. On the basis of this result is a non-ideological approach to the issues subject to negotiation, and the adopting of a position fixed by the unions at the negotiating table as well as the use of the professional power possessed by physicians.