Letteratura scientifica selezionata sul tema "Australia-Indonesia foreign relations"

Talking about foreign policy relations of a country, it cannot be explained without adapting to the changes that occur in the growing environment or situation of both countries. Adjustments to the environment and the situation, especially the foreign policy are done in order to maintain the physical, economic, politic and social culture of the country in the midst of the real conditions of the situation occurred, like the history of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia). This is a study of the history of Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia since Whitlam government in 1972 until Hawke. The goal of the study is to explain how the foreign policy of the Australian Prime Ministers during their reigns. Although in reality in the course of its history, Australian and Indonesian diplomatic relations were full of intrigues, turmoil and conflicts, but it did not severe the relation of the two nations. Eventually, the conclusion of this study explicitly states that Australia and Indonesia still need each other in an attempt to establish political stability, economic and security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific peacefully.

As initially, Australia supported the integration of Timor Leste into the Republic of Indonesia, many events occurred which caused the relationship between Indonesia and Australia to be slightly disturbed. The changes that have taken place in Australia's relationship with Indonesia illustrate the real effects of Timor-Leste's independence. As a result of Australia's role in the East Timorese independence process, its relationship underwent many changes, especially in the political and military fields. The changes taking place in military relations are evident. First, the Agreement on Mutual Security (AMS) was released. Second, the joint training was cancelled, and the troops that used to work together became enemies. Eventually, Australian arms sales to Indonesia were stopped. Changes in the political and diplomatic sphere, including all political visits, were cancelled, and politicians within Australia and Indonesia publicly denounced others. Furthermore, cooperation within the global framework is limited, and the Ambassador's 'high alert' status is. Overall, Australia's relations with Indonesia became hostile. This study aims to determine how the influence of Australian foreign policy on Indonesia after the independence of Timor Leste. This research shows that the independence of Timor Leste and Australia's role in this process directly influenced government relations between Australia and Indonesia. Most Indonesians view the Australian government's actions and policies as separate from its relationship with Australian citizens. However, the relationship between people must still be considered when making policies about Indonesia because of widespread reactions to Australia's role in the East Timorese independence process.

As initially, Australia supported the integration of Timor Leste into the Republic of Indonesia, many events occurred which caused the relationship between Indonesia and Australia to be slightly disturbed. The changes that have taken place in Australia's relationship with Indonesia illustrate the real effects of Timor-Leste's independence. As a result of Australia's role in the East Timorese independence process, its relationship underwent many changes, especially in the political and military fields. The changes taking place in military relations are evident. The Agreement on Mutual Security (AMS) was released, the joint training was canceled, and the troops that used to work together became enemies. Eventually, Australian arms sales to Indonesia were stopped. Changes in the political and diplomatic sphere, including all political visits, were canceled, and politicians within Australia and Indonesia publicly denounced others. Furthermore, cooperation within the global framework is limited, and the Ambassador's 'high alert' status is. Overall, Australia's relations with Indonesia became hostile. This study aims to determine how the influence of Australian foreign policy on Indonesia after the independence of Timor Leste. This research shows that the independence of Timor Leste and Australia's role in this process directly influenced government relations between Australia and Indonesia. Most Indonesians view the Australian government's actions and policies as separate from its relationship with Australian citizens.

Indonesia misses Kevin Rudd's figure. The emergence and victory of Kevin Rudd in the 2007 Australian elections seemed to be a speck of light in the improvement of bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia at that time. He succeeded in turning Australia's foreign policy into a more humanist and Asia-centric direction. A thing that was previously very rare in the era of Prime Minister John Howard. Various policies were able to reconcile the romanticism of Garuda and the Kangaroo, which is the largest ruler in Southeast Asia and the Oceania Zone. This paper examines the dynamics of Kevin Rudd's victory in the 2007 Australian Election, as well as his golden legacy in fighting for harmonization of relations between Australia and Indonesia.

The southern states can be regarded as a developing country views of the average income is low, infrastructure that can be said is still relatively underdeveloped, and also the human development index which is less than the northern countries as the developed countries. Here the exception of Australia and New Zealand, despite being located in the southern part, but both countries have been classified into developed countries. Relation to humanitarian cooperation between Australia and Indonesia has been going on for a long time, and this partnership is experiencing bright and dim influenced by the political situation and international relations between the two countries. Leadership change affect the existing cooperation, because both countries still need each other in bilateral relations, although sometimes intervention. The purpose of this study was to see whether the assistance provided by Australia solely for humanitarian or any other purpose. In this article will use qualitative methods and results can be informed or to sharing for students, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and government who have been getting foreign aid from Australia in humanitarian issues, until now the Indonesian government still expect and rely on the Australian government about assistance or cooperation in humanitarian issues.

In its early documents related to Asianist orientation, Australia looked at engaging its immediate neighbourhood through institution such as ASEAN. ASEAN which was created to bring about synergies within the region and also engage important stakeholders as dialogue partners. Australia has been involved in Vietnam as part of its alliance obligations with US in 1970s and subsequently also. Australia has looked into ASEAN as a vehicle for cooperation, development and building better relations with Indonesia. The author argues that while Australia has aligned itself with the concept of the ASEAN way, there has not been any tectonic shift in the way Australia conducts its foreign policy. Even though Australia was one of the earliest dialogue partner in ASEAN, it has calibrated its policy depending on the national government priorities and the international interests of the country. The article also outlines the narrative from Australian perspective and situates ASEAN in the larger foreign policy discourse in Australia.

The plan to ratify the new Criminal Code in Indonesia is responded by Australia through issuing a travel advice policy in 2019. There has a concern that this policy will have an impact on the tourism sector in Indonesia, especially Bali, because the Australian tourists are recorded as dominating the visits. By using the concept of travel advice and foreign policy, this study aimed to analyze the travel advice policy issued by Australia from the perspective of International Relations and its impact on the tourism in Bali. This study used qualitative descriptive method and the primary data collection was done through interviews with the hoteliers in Bali and Australian tourists visiting Bali. From the perspective of International Relations, it is found that Australia’s travel advice is a foreign policy that has a purpose based on Australia’s national interests. This policy has no impact on Australian tourist visits because it is not a binding policy. The Australian tourists' have their own opinion about Bali and the decisions to visit affected by the clarity information from targeted state or destination.

The main objective of this research is to analyze the effect of depreciation and real exchange rate appreciation on Indonesia's tourism trade balance bilaterally against Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore. Such analysis on bilateral relations have never been studied for developing markets countries, namely Indonesia. This study uses a linear ARDL approach and a nonlinear ARDL approach with the dependent variable on the tourism trade balance and the real exchange rate as independent variables. Income, foreign direct investment (FDI), and natural disasters as control variables. The empirical results show that Chinese and Japanese tourists respond positively to the depreciation in the real currency rate of exchange, thereby increasing Indonesia's tourism trade balance. Nonlinear ARDL shows that the relation concerning the real rate of exchange plus the balance of trade is non-symmetrical with respect to China and Japan, while Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore are symmetrical. These results suggest that the government should formulate policies to increase tourist visits from China and Japan. Further empirical results also found a J-curve pattern in Indonesia-China and Indonesia-Japan.

Since 2008, the number of asylum seekers and refugees trying to reach Australia from Indonesia by boat has increased. With many of them hailing from conflict-ridden countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Sri Lanka, most entered Indonesia with short-term tourist visas or fraudulent papers or no documents at all. It is widely known that a significant number of these ‘irregular’ migrants pay various types of brokers (often labelled, accurately or otherwise, ‘human smugglers’) at least at one stage – either to enter the country or to escape it. As a non-signatory to the UN Refugee Convention, Indonesia does not permit local integration. While a substantial part of these migrants are detained in the 13 immigration detention centres scattered around the archipelago, many roam freely, looking for opportunities for onward migration. Due to the restrictive border protection arrangements between Australia and Indonesia and a number of bilateral intelligence measures for deterring ‘unwanted’ migrants, human smugglers have been gradually forced to adapt strategies, routes and prices. According to much of the available data, most human smugglers are not Indonesians but foreigners who have been lingering in Indonesia for many years. This article demonstrates, moreover, that these foreigners depend upon local contacts to successfully carry out their risky business. Most often, the Indonesian counterparts are solely facilitators or handymen, but in a number of cases Indonesian authorities have also been involved in this highly lucrative business.

This paper will discuss how the cooperative relationship between Indonesia and Australia through AusAID resulted in various assistance programs in the education sector during the Joko Widodo era from 2014 to 2019, in which this research will look at the effectiveness of the cooperation. Indonesia has pressing problems in the education sector. This is due to the declining quality of education in Indonesia and the alarming dropout rate. Therefore, it is necessary to take steps to improve the quality of education in Indonesia, one of which is through cooperation with Australia. Bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia have existed for a long time so cooperation in the education sector between the two countries is considered to be beneficial. Indonesia has various policies in the education sector such as 9-year compulsory education and character education development. Meanwhile, Australia has a foreign policy in the field of education that focuses on assistance in improving the quality of education and direct assistance. The cooperation between Indonesia and Australia in the field of education can be seen in the implementation of programs such as the Education Partnership, Technical Assistance for Education System Strengthening, ProDEP, and Innovation for Indonesia's School Children. The cooperation program resulted in various achievements, such as the availability of educational infrastructure and facilities, improving the quality of educators and educational services, improving the curriculum for effective learning methods, as well as the accessibility of education quality in achieving gender equality and being disability-friendly. Researchers see that educational cooperation between Indonesia and Australia from 2014 to 2019 was effective in helping to overcome various educational issues in Indonesia.

[Truncated abstract] This thesis focuses on human rights in Australia’s foreign policy from 1991 to 2004 taking East Timor and Papua as case studies. It encompasses the Paul Keating years (1991 to 1996) as well as John Howard’s three consecutive terms as Prime Minister (from 1996 to 2004). As a consequence of events unfolding in this period of time, the thesis does not consider Australian foreign policy towards East Timor beyond the 1999 referendum that resulted in the separation of East Timor from Indonesia and focuses on Papua until 2004. The primary empirical aim of this thesis is to compare and contrast the two administrations’ approaches and responses to human rights abuses in East Timor and Papua. Drawing upon a variety of theoretical concepts in human rights and foreign policy, this thesis shows that incorporating a concern for human rights in the foreign policy making process is problematic because the promotion of human rights often comes into conflict with other foreign policy objectives . . . The two case studies on human rights abuses in East Timor and Papua reflect the tensions between concepts of realism and idealism in Australian foreign policy. However, the situation of East Timor shows that public pressure is required to balance the disparity of national interest and human rights. The role of public pressure has been largely absent in debates on human rights and foreign policy. While this study focuses on East Timor and Papua as case studies, the discussion of the findings has far reaching implications for Australian foreign policy and international relations, especially concerning the scholarly debate over the place of human rights in foreign policy.

For over two decades the issue of East Timor's right to self-determination has been a ‘prickly’ issue in Australian foreign policy. The invasion by Indonesian forces in 1975 was expected, as Australian policy-makers had been well informed of the events leading up to the punitive action being taken. Indeed, prior discussions involving the future of the territory were held between the Australian Prime Minister and the Indonesian President in 1974. In response to the events unfolding in the territory the Australian Labor Government at the time was presented with two policy options for dealing with the issue. The Department of Defence recommended the recognition of an independent East Timor; whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs proposed that Australia disengage itself as far as possible from the issue. The decision had ramifications for future policy considerations especially with changes in government. With the Department of Foreign Affairs option being the prevailing policy what were the essential ingredients that give explanation for the government's choice? It is important to note the existence of the continuity and cyclical nature of attitudes by Labor governments toward Indonesia before and after the invasion. To do so requires an analysis of the influence ‘Doc’ Evatt had in shaping any possible Labor tradition in foreign policy articulation. The support given by Evatt for the decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) gave rise to the development of a special relationship-so defined. Evidence of the effect Evatt had on future Labor governments may be found in the opinions of Gough Whitlam. In 1975 when he was Prime Minister, Whitlam felt the East Timor issue was merely the finalisation of Indonesia's decolonisation honouring Evatt's long held anti-colonialist tradition existing in the Australian Labor Party. The early predisposition toward Indonesia's cohesiveness surfaced again in the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of later years. It did not vary a great deal with changes in government The on-going commitment to preserving and strengthening the bilateral relationship meant Indonesia's territorial integrity became the focus of the Australian political elites’ regional foreign policy determinations. The actions taken by policy-makers served to promote the desire for a stable region ahead of independence claims of the East Timorese. From a realist perspective, the security dilemma for Australian policy-makers was how to best promote regional order and stability in the South East Asian region. The desire for regional cohesiveness and stability continues to drive Australian political elites to promote policies that gives a priority to the territorial integrity of regional states. Indonesia, in spite of its diversity, was only ever thought of as a cohesive unitary state and changes to its construct have rarely been countenanced. Australia's political elite justifications for this stance vacillate between strategic and economic considerations, ideological (anti-colonialism) to one of being a pragmatic response to international politics. The political elite argues the projection of power into the region is in Australia’s national interest. The policies from one government to the next necessarily see the national interest as being an apparent fixed feature of foreign policy. The persistent fear of invasion from the north traditionally motivated Australia's political elite to adopt a strategic realist policy that sought to ‘shore up’ the stability, strength and unity of Indonesia. The national interest was deemed to be at risk if support for East Timorese independence was given. The national interest though can involve more than just the security issue, and the political elite when dealing with East Timor assumed that they were acting in the common good. Questions that need to be addressed include determining what is the national interest in this context? What is the effect of a government invoking the national interest in debates over issues in foreign policy? And, who should participate in the debate? In an effort to answer these questions an analysis of how the ex-foreign affairs mandarin Richard Woolcott defines the national interest becomes crucial. Clearly, conflict in East Timor did have implications for the national interest. The invasion of East Timor by Indonesia had the potential to damage the relationship, but equally communist successes in 1975 in Indo-China raised Australia's regional security concerns. During the Cold War, the linking of communism to nationalism was driving the decision-making processes of the Australian policy-makers striving to come to grips with the strategic realities of a changing region. Because of this, did the constraints of world politics dominated by Cold War realities combined with domestic political disruption have anything to do with Australia's response? Certainly, Australia itself was experiencing a constitutional crisis in late 1975. The Senate had blocked supply and the Labor Government did not have the funds to govern. The Governor-General by dismissing the Labor Government finally resolved the impasse. What were the reactions of the two men charged with the responsibility of forming the caretaker government toward Indonesia's military action? And, could the crisis have prevented the Australian government from making a different response to the invasion? Importantly, and in terms of economic security, did the knowledge of oil and gas deposits thought to exist in the Timor Sea influence Australia's foreign policy? The search for oil and gas requires a stable political environment in which to operate. Therefore for exploration to continue in the Timor Sea Australia must have had a preferred political option and thoughts of with whom they preferred to negotiate. What was the extent of each government's cooperation and intervention in the oil and gas industry and could any involvement have influenced the Australian political elites’ attitude toward the prospect of an independent East Timor? Australia's subsequent de jure recognition that East Timor was part of Indonesia paved the way for the Timor Gap (Zone of Cooperation) Treaty signing in 1989. The signing underpinned Australia's acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The outcome of the analysis of the issues that shaped Australia's foreign policy toward East Timor showed that the political elite became locked into an integration model, which was defended by successive governments. Moreover, they formed an almost reflexive defence of Indonesia both at the domestic and international level.

This thesis analyses the relationship between Australia and Indonesia between 1986-1996 and particularly focuses on cooperation in the areas of politics, economics and defence. It is argued that the relationship between Australia and Indonesia has become stronger due to the mutual interests of the two countries.
Thesis (M.A.) -- University of Adelaide, Dept. of Politics, 1997

Australia’s relationship with Indonesia has been a topic in diplomatic, academic, defence and intelligence circles in Australia for over fifty years. Australian diplomacy towards Indonesia in the period from the attempted coup in October 1965 until the fall of the Liberal – Country Party coalition in 1972, remains relatively overlooked by Australian researchers. There is virtually no research of this period drawn from Australian archival sources. This thesis seeks to rectify this gap in our knowledge. The study suggests that Australian diplomacy towards Indonesia from 1965 to 1972 was dominated by a fear which contradicted Australian intelligence and defence assessments of Indonesia’s threat potential to Australia. This study will examine how this fear contributed to, and was also reinforced by, a lack of a clear working definition of what constituted ‘security’ in an Australian context. It bred a sense of insecurity and vulnerability by which Australian policy makers departed from a course of rationality. This is reflected in Australian relations with the New Order Government which were dominated by strategic concerns. Although Australia desired an informal closeness to the New Order Government, Jakarta’s increasing repression exposed Australia to international and domestic opprobrium with regard to the more salient abuses of the New Order Government.
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Australia’s relationship with Indonesia has been a topic in diplomatic, academic, defence and intelligence circles in Australia for over fifty years. Australian diplomacy towards Indonesia in the period from the attempted coup in October 1965 until the fall of the Liberal – Country Party coalition in 1972, remains relatively overlooked by Australian researchers. There is virtually no research of this period drawn from Australian archival sources. This thesis seeks to rectify this gap in our knowledge. The study suggests that Australian diplomacy towards Indonesia from 1965 to 1972 was dominated by a fear which contradicted Australian intelligence and defence assessments of Indonesia’s threat potential to Australia. This study will examine how this fear contributed to, and was also reinforced by, a lack of a clear working definition of what constituted ‘security’ in an Australian context. It bred a sense of insecurity and vulnerability by which Australian policy makers departed from a course of rationality. This is reflected in Australian relations with the New Order Government which were dominated by strategic concerns. Although Australia desired an informal closeness to the New Order Government, Jakarta’s increasing repression exposed Australia to international and domestic opprobrium with regard to the more salient abuses of the New Order Government.

Between 1950 and 1965, foreign aid played a crucial role within the Indonesian economy. With the Cold War as a backdrop, this aid came from both Western and Eastern blocs with the intention of drawing Indonesia into their spheres of influence. The aid also played a crucial role in the development of architecture in the archipelago. A major endeavour within this period was the construction of buildings and venues for the Fourth Asian Games to be held in Jakarta in 1962 which involved a new stadium, an international-standard hotel and a large by-pass road around part of the city. Financial and technical aid from the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States was obtained to realise these projects. All the while, the Asian Games, along with the modern structures constructed for the event, provided Indonesia an opportunity to advance its own agenda, which was to construct a sense of self-confidence and national pride and to situate itself as a leader among decolonised nations. Nevertheless, foreign financial and technical aid played an important role in the realisation of these projects. The availability of foreign aid was intrinsically tied to President Ahmad Sukarno’s ability to play the interests of all sides. This paper examines plans and preparations for the Fourth Asian Games as a case of engagement between the two Cold War blocs with Indonesia in the middle. By focusing on the key building projects for the Games, the paper reveals the role of foreign aid in the development of architecture in Indonesia during a critical period in its post-war and post-independence formation. This development took place through the interaction of different interests—those of the Western Bloc, the Eastern Bloc, and Indonesia—in the midst of the Cold War and decolonisation period. A glimpse into the interaction may suggest a case of competition. However, examination of the three projects indicates that it was a case of multipolar collaboration instead.