Articles de revues sur le sujet « Yugoslavia – Foreign relations – Europe »

The main purpose of this article is to present the most important conditions and variables characterizing the role of the Middle East in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy strategy in the 1970s, based on available literature and documentation. I also intend to analyze the conditions that contributed to intensifying Yugoslavia’s position in the region and led to a decrease in Yugoslavia’s importance in the Middle East in the second half of the decade. Firstly, I will describe Yugoslavia’s relations with the countries of the Middle East in 1970–1973, especially with Egypt, where Gamal Abdel Nasser, after his death, was succeeded by the country’s Vice President, Anwar Al-Sadat. It will also be important to shed light on the Yugoslav Government’s stance regarding the Middle East conflict from the point of view of the situation in Europe. Next, I will present the significance of the Yom Kippur War for Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and its implications for Belgrade’s relations with Cairo and Tel-Aviv. Moreover, it will be extremely important to explain why Yugoslavia’s importance in the Middle East gradually diminished as of the middle of the decade. In addition, I will address the issue of Yugoslav President Josip Broz-Tito’s position toward the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the fading of Yugoslavia’s interest in the region following Tito’s death and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the summary, I want to note that the period under analysis in Yugoslav-Middle Eastern relations was decisive for the country’s foreign policy and its internal situation, as Yugoslavia never again played a significant role in the Arab world.

With the end of the Cold War, many observers expected that international conflict would be less likely to occur and easier to manage. Given the successful resolution of the Gulf War and the European Community's (EC) efforts to develop a common foreign policy, observers expected international cooperation to manage the few conflicts that might break out. Instead, the disintegration of Yugoslavia contradicted these expectations. Rather than developing a common foreign policy, European states were divided over how to deal with Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Germany pushed for relatively quick recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, whereas other members of the EC wanted to go slower. Some observers expected Russia to fall in line with the West because of its need for investment and trade, but instead it supported Serbia. It is puzzling that Europe failed to cooperate regardless of whether greater international cooperation could have managed this conflict. How can we make sense of the international relations of Yugoslavia's demise? Since secession is not a new phenomenon, we should study previous secessionist conflicts to determine if they share certain dynamics, and we should consider applying to Yugoslavia the arguments developed to understand such conflicts.

Popular music is one of the cultural phenomena that has been most shared among the peoples inhabiting the territory of the former Yugoslavia; indeed, considering the persistence of a common popular music culture there even after the break up of the Yugoslav federation in 1991, there is perhaps little in cultural life that unites them more. It was in the 1950s that a Yugoslav popular music culture emerged through the development of local festivals, radio programs and a recording industry, at a time when popular music was also referred to as “dance,” “entertainment” or “light” music, and when jazz, pop and, by the end of the decade, rock and roll were the styles of it that were being listened to in Yugoslavia and around the world. However, the development of a Yugoslav popular music culture at this time was rooted not only in international cultural trends but was also shaped by the domestic and foreign policies that were pursued by the ruling Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), which was renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1952. Through its cultural, economic and foreign policies, the party sought to define Yugoslavia's position in Cold War international relations, develop a sense of Yugoslav identity among its multinational citizenry, and reconstruct and modernize a country that had suffered some of the greatest losses in Europe in the Second World War—and which had, just before it, been one of the Continent's least developed states, not only economically but also in terms of cultural infrastructure. In the cultural sphere, investments were needed immediately after the war to redress the facts that Yugoslavia had high rates of illiteracy and low rates of radio ownership by European standards, that cultural activities beyond folklore remained the purview of a small urban elite, and that it lacked musical artists, schools and instruments—with great disparities in all of these measures existing between its more developed northern areas (Slovenia, Croatia and northern Serbia) and the poorer south (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and southern Serbia). For example, with regards to radio ownership, in 1946 the number of individuals per radio ranged from 40 in Slovenia, 48 in Croatia and 91 in Serbia to 137 in Macedonia, 288 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 702 in Montenegro, with the average for all of Yugoslavia being 78.

The article is devoted to the times when the foreign policy of the USSR in relation to socialist countries changed, and the “Gorbachev Doctrine” appeared in perestroika. M. S. Gorbachev was actively engaged in foreign policy issues, lying his particular attention to Europe. The author tries to fi nd an answer to the question: to what extent was he interested in the Balkans? To answer this question, the author refers to one of the signifi cant events of that time - M. S. Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1988. It was then when the foundations of the country's Balkan policy were laid, which manifested itself in the 1990s. The visit gave Mikhail Gorbachev an opportunity to get to know Yugoslavia better, to get a better idea of the life of the peoples of this country, to feel the love of the Yugoslavs for Russia and the Russian people. As Gorbachev's close party comrades supposed, it was during the years of perestroika that a full understanding was reached between the leadership of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The contents of the conversations, and the fi nal documents gave the Yugoslav side the assurance that mutual understanding reached will in case of possible difficulties allow it to be provided with Soviet help and support. It is this kind of assistance that Yugoslavia would need in two years, when the country began to fall apart, when Slovenia and Croatia decided to leave the Federation on their own and received full support from Germany and the United States. But Moscow refused to help.

Traditionally the phenomenon of the European integration towards South East Europe is regarded starting from the XXI century. The explanation for such a periodization are resolution of the open conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and implementation of the complex EU strategy for the region. Starting point of the majority of researches is the year of 2003 when the EU Agenda for the Western Balkans was started in Thessaloniki. The topic of EEC-Yugoslavia relations, SFRY having been first socialist country to institutionalize its trade and economic relations with Brussels, are unfairly ignored in domestic and foreign scientific literature. It is regarded solely as a chronological period of trade agreements. Nevertheless, this issue is of fundamental importance for understanding the current neighborhood of the European Union. The main thesis the author proves is that in the 1960s and 1980s as it is the case nowadays, the main imperative of Brussels' policy towards the Balkans was to prevent Moscow from increasing its influence. This led to the formation of a very specific format of relations with Belgrade and was one of the reasons why the economic crisis in Yugoslavia became extreme and its economy irreformable. In addition, at a later and structurally much more complicated stage of relations between the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the European Union the specificity and main components of relations of the Cold War period did not fundamentally change. As for the policy of so-called containment of the external actors one could see that besides Moscow, we can speak about similar attitude of the EU towards China. It makes it possible to consider the EU policy towards the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the paradigm of neoclassical realism, rather than in the paradigm of traditional liberal European integration approaches which allows us to unite neorealists elements with the specifics of internal processes, including the modernization of institutes, relations between society and state, types of political leadership.

Zogu has resolutely defended the freedom and independence of his country. Zogu consolidated diplomatic relations with neighboring countries and the political strategy followed by him brought not only economic stability, but also protection of the territory. Seen from that prespective, the purpose of this paper is to show that the policy pursued by King Zog, influenced the establishment of peace in the country and protected the entire Balkans by not further complicating the situation and neutralizing the greedy interests and intentions of Yugoslavia for the territory of Albania, especially St. Naum. In 1924 King Zog had also a possed Yugoslavia’s intervention and intrigues. Throughout his policy, he aimed to achieve Balkan’s peace, because Zogu understanding very well that this would bring peace to Albania as well. The foreign policy led by Zog, deprived neighboring countries of any wishing conflicts. Thus the peace in Europe would have been in jeopardy as a result of threatening Balkans’s peace. Received: 7 July 2021 / Accepted: 30 August 2021 / Published: 5 September 2021

Yugoslavia, once an advanced country in market reforms, was one of the least transformed countries in Eastern Europe in the nineties. Such a situation was caused by the civil war, policy of the Milosevic?s regime and international sanctions. The resistance of the ruling conservative forces made it impossible to establish an adequate reform policy. Thus, the transition stopped short halfway. The situation has radically changed only since the autumn of 2000, after Milosevic?s downfall, when after the gradual lifting of international isolation, economic and political reforms were given a new stimulus, and the country could start the process of European integration. This article is an attempt to give an overview of the transition of the Yugoslav economy in the last ten years or so. The growth rate of Yugoslavia?s GDP is compared not only with that of its neighbouring countries, i.e. other former socialist countries of South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania) but also with that of other transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Commonwealth of Independent States. A particular attention is given to the role of research and development (R&D) in Yugoslavia in the nineties as compared to Croatia, Slovenia, and the United States. The structural changes in the Yugoslav economy during the past decade are analysed together with property relations as well as the issues concerning small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). At the sectoral level, it is the performance of manufacturing and agriculture that is separately explored. In relation to this, wage formation and relative wage levels in Yugoslavia?s manufacturing are viewed regarding the country?s international competitiveness and wider characteristics of globalising world economy. In analysing the role of external sources in the Yugoslav economy, the problems of foreign trade, external indebtedness, and attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) are emphasized together with the economic assistance rendered to the FRY by the European Union. Regarding the important indicator of openness, i.e. the share of exports and imports in GDP, a comparison is made between Yugoslavia, on one hand, and Croatia, Slovenia, the European Union, and the United States, on the other. The economic policy of Milosevic?s regime is contrasted with that of the new democratic government that came to power after the events in October 2000. Stabilisation, liberalisation, privatisation, and institutional reform are considered giving particular attention to the experience of the member republics of the Yugoslav federation: Serbia and Montenegro. The author comes to the following conclusions: in transition countries stabilisation, liberalisation, and privatisation cannot be successful without carrying out a comprehensive, deep reform of the system of political institutions that along with creation of conditions for establishment of democracy and its strengthening also enables building of a modern and efficient market economy. This complicated and often contradictory process could come across serious obstacles if the old state and party nomenclature in power retains the command economy without planning, and under demagogical, nationalistic, and populist slogans gets involved in wars even taking the risks of being put under international isolation. However, such an outdated economic system characterised by autarchy can only temporarily exist and hinder the unravelling of market reforms in the epoch of globalisation.

Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 288 pp., $35.00, ISBN 0-8133-2096-8. Eric D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 230 pp., $17.95, ISBN 0-271-01958-1. Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 246 pp., $40, ISBN 0-271-01629-9. Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Monographs, 1996), 436 pp., £35.00, ISBN 0-19-829200-7. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, trans. Sabrina Petra Ramet (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 279 pp., £16.99, ISBN 0-415-18596-3. Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 2nd edn (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 2000), 243 pp., £42.50, ISBN 0-312-23084-2. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 354 pp., $30.00, ISBN 0-8133-2559-5. Richard H. Ullman, ed., The World and Yugoslavia's Wars (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 230 pp., $18.95, ISBN 0-87609-191-5. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 536 pp., $16.95, ISBN 0-8157-9513-0.

The current relations of the Republic of Serbia with the People?s Republic of China (hereinafter: Serbia and China) are conditioned by many political, economic, legal and social factors. The mentioned factors point to the existence of asymmetry in many aspects which, however, is not an issue that implies that the two parties can not develop good and friendly relations. In the historical and international legal sense, the relations of the two countries are characterized by the continuity of diplomatic relations established on January 2, 1955, between the then Federal People's Republic Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China. Serbia as the successor state of SFR Yugoslavia continues to treat China as one of its most important partners in international relations, which is manifested through the foreign policy course, according to which China is one of the main ?pillars? of Serbia's foreign policy alongside the European Union, Russia and the United States. The mere reference to the main ?pillars? in Serbia's foreign policy orientation indicates that China is a key player in world politics and a great power with which Serbia needs to build relations of a ?comprehensive strategic partnership?. It is not surprising, therefore, that the deepening of the Serbian-Chinese relations on a bilateral and multilateral level (especially within the UN, regional international organizations and political forums such as the 16 + 1 mechanism between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) contributed to better strategic positioning of Serbia in modern international relations.

The intractable war in Yugoslavia, the breakup of Czechslovakia, the nationalist rumblings in Hungary and Romania, and manifestations of imperial and nationalist longings in Russian politics signify nationalism's enduring potency in Central and Eastern Europe. While some foreign observers worried about this potency, the new elites largely believed that liberalism in power could overcome those forces. Liberal democracy's triumph supposedly meant the end of History,inter alia,aggressive nationalism in Eastern Europe. They believed that these national liberation movements had cooperative, mutually supportive relationships that would flower after Communism ended. Nationalist discords were due to Eastern Europe's previous historical post-1914 nightmares, but the new post-1989 states would have amicable relations with their neighbors. Ostensibly, nationalism, once freed from Soviet repression, would bring an end to Soviet rule and usher in a new ‘springtime of nations.'

At the request of the editorial board of the journal Slavic World in the Third Millennium, the eldest researcher of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Leonid Ianovich Gibianskii (born 1936), recounts his life. Leonid Ianovich graduated from the Department of Southern and Western Slavs of the History Faculty of Moscow State University in 1960 and began working at the Institute in 1966, when he commenced a graduate course there. He is the prominent specialist in the history of Yugoslavia and in the problems of international relations in contemporary Central and South-Eastern Europe. The principal lines of his investigations included the history of Yugoslavia during and after World War II, the history of the formation of communist regimes in Central and South-Eastern Europe, the organization of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and the study of foreign relations and the politics of the great powers in the region in the 1940s and 50s. Leonid Ianovich was one of the first Russian historians to elaborate the problem of the formation of the Soviet bloc, the history of the Cominform, and the conflict between Stalin and Tito using archive materials which became accessible to researchers from the end of 1980s. Gibianski is the author of several hundred academic works, which have been published in many countries all over the world, as well as the organiser of and a participant in a number of international projects and conferences on the Cold War. Leonid Ianovich describes his childhood, his studies at the Department of Southern and Western Slavs of the History Faculty of Moscow State University, and his work at the Institute of Slavic Studies.

The article reflects on the issue of the foreign policy strategy of modern Russia in the Balkans region. One of the most significant aspects of this problem is the difference in views between Russia and the West. Authors show how different interpretations of the events in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s predetermined the sense of mutual suspicion and mistrust which spread to other regions such as the post-Soviet space. Exploring differences between the Russian and the Western (Euro-Atlantic) views on the current matters, authors draw attention to fundamental differences in terminology: while the Western narrative promotes more narrow geographical and political definitions (such as the Western Balkan Six), traditional Russian experts are more inclined to wider or integral definitions such as “the Balkans” and “Central and Southeast Europe”. Meanwhile none of these terms are applicable for analysis of the current trends such as the growing transit role of the Balkans region and its embedding in the European regional security architecture. Therefore, a new definition is needed to overcome the differences in vision and better understand significant recent developments in the region. Conceptualizing major foreign policy events in Central and Southeast Europe during the last three decades (the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s), authors demonstrate the significance of differences in tools and methods between the Soviet Union and the modern Russia. Permanent need for adaptation to changing political and security context led to inconsistence in Russian Balkan policy in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Russia was able to preserve an integral vision of the region and even to elaborate new transregional constructive projects, which in right political circumstances may promote stability and become beneficial for both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.

The article analyses the content of doctrinal documents on the development of post-socialist states in a special sub-region in Southeast Europe – the post-Yugoslav space. The author examines the concepts of foreign policy, national security and defence. Based on the consideration of internal political development of the post-Yugoslav states separately, the evolution of relations between them within the special subregion and the process of international relations in general, three stages can be distinguished in the development of relations between Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Euro-Atlantic and European structures: 1991–1999, 1999–2014 and from 2014 to the present. During these years, a new national-state agenda was formed in each of the aforementioned countries, which at different stages reflected national versions of liberalism, conservatism, social democracy, which resonated in doctrinal documents – strategies for national security, foreign policy and defense. After constitutions were adopted in the 1990 s, and the first versions of doctrinal documents aimed at NATO and EU accession in the 2000 s, the post-Yugoslav states joined NATO and to a lesser extent the EU in 2000–2013.Thus, the intra-regional configuration of the Western Balkans has gradually changed and will probably continue to change, the conceptual vision of the worldview, political-ideological and practical dimensions in these countries has been transformed and will continue to be transformed – namely, the attitude to Europeanisation, to overcoming conflicts and conflictogenic factors. The aforementioned strategic documents make it possible to answer the question of the essence, forms and methods of foreign policy of post-Yugoslav states in the situation in the region, Europe and the world after February 24, 2022.

AbstractThere has always been a plurality of trends within Islam, to which Sufism also belonged. Within the Ottoman Empire, mystical groups remained among the uncentralized forms of Islam until the end of the 19 th century and the creation of an association of the dervish orders, which, however, provided only a very partial structure for them. In 20 th -century Balkans, the Bektashis, one of the major Sufi orders present in the region, secured an official and institutionalized structure in Albania from the beginning of the 1920s. After the collapse of the Communist regimes in Albania and Yugoslavia, which had put strong obstacles against the free development of religion (especially in Albania where it was banned in 1967), a Bektashi organization was reestablished in Tirana. The paper discusses the main normative features of this organization, called Komuniteti Bektashian. Kryegjyshata Botërore Bektashiane (“Bektashi Community. World Bektashi Grandfather”). Special reference is given to the changing power relations within the community caused by this novel structure (its members being often linked to other Albanian or foreign actors—Albanian politicians, Iranian Shi'i networks, Turkish Alevi networks, etc.). The article also examines the complex and disputed relationship of the Bektashi organization with the official Islamic religious institutions, its international, or rather pan-Albanian, dimension, and also its inner functioning which is not as centralized as it is supposed to be.

The article is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Croatia in close connection with its domestic policy. The author examines the balance of political forces in the country on the eve, during and after the presidential elections in 2019/2020, as well as the elections to Sabor (parliament) in July 2020. He describes in detail the situation in the party that won the elections to Sabor, - the Croatian Democratic Union, - and the internal party struggle between representatives of the centrist and right-wing nationalist groups. Largely thanks to the current leader and prime minister of Croatia A. Plenković, it ended in 2020 with the victory of the centrists. At the same time, the presidential elections in December 2019 - January 2020 were won by the candidate of the left-center - Social Democrat Z. Milanović, who defeated the CDU representative K. Grabar-Kitarović, who held this post. The author believes that in Croatia, as a result of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019/2020, a situation has developed in which the president and the prime minister, representatives of the left and the right centers respectively, can, through joint efforts, pursuing their own political goals, update Croatia’s domestic and foreign policy, including in the Balkan / South-Eastern Europe region. The previous policy of Croatia, according to the author, was unsuccessful. The previous leadership of Croatia, using as a basis the ideology of nationalism and fearing that Croatia would be historically associated with Yugoslavia and the Balkans, pursued a policy of self-isolation in the very region in which Croatia could play an important role. The balance of power formed in Croatia in 2020 makes it possible to intensify Croatia’s policy in the region, on the basis of a possible normalization of relations with the Serbian community of the country as well as through the process of improving relations with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without this transformation, the final stabilization in the Balkans / South-Eastern Europe region is impossible.

In the Spring of 1927 a major European crisis was developing in the Balkans It concerned the rivalry between Mussolini?s Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes over Albania in which, though a small and backward country, both Rome and Belgrade claimed to have legitimate political and security interests. At the time, the Italo-Yugoslav crisis was seen by many observers as containing the potential of turning into a war the Italian government in particular insisting that Belgrade was engaged in military preparations in order to launch an invasion of Albania. An important factor that made the Italo-Yugoslav rivalry over Albania possible in the first place was the country?s perennial political instability. Thus the crisis attracted considerable attention in Europe. Given the fact that France and Italy experienced strained relations, and that the Weimar Germany had only recently returned to the mainstream of the affairs of Europe following the treaties of Locarno, it was Great Britain that emerged as the chief player in attempts to defuse the emergency. Historians have paid relatively little attention to this, by now largely forgotten, episode in the diplomatic history of interwar Europe. The existing literature, however mistakenly tends to interpret the efforts of Great Britain as favoring the Italian claims in Albania. This article, which makes extensive use of primary sources from the Foreign Office, demonstrates that Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain and all his relevant officials handled the crisis in an even-handed manner throughout and that, at times, if London exhibited any sympathy and understanding at all for either side, it was towards Belgrade rather than Rome.

The article deals with the European aspects of the US foreign policy in the 2nd half of the 20th century. It also includes studies of the transatlantic relations of the described period and the exploration of an American influence on European integration processes. It is determined that the United States has demonstrated itself as a partner of the Western governments in the post-war reconstruction and further creation of an area of US security and prosperity. At the same time, it is noted that the American presidents have differently shaped their administrations’ policies towards Europe. The greatest supporter of the European integration processes was President Eisenhower. Among other things, the US President believed that Europe would become a key ally of the United States, thus, he considered the union of Sweden, Greece, Spain and Yugoslavia as a solid foundation for building a “United States of Europe”. After Eisenhower administration, European affairs, to a lesser extent, were taken up by such Presidents as Johnson, Carter, Reagan and Clinton. Showing no personal interest, Kennedy, Nixon and Bush-Sr. were forced to support the transatlantic dialogue, understanding the inevitability of European integration and the need for the United States to cooperate with the new consolidated actor. The United States aimed to strengthen its position in the European space, moving to that purpose by using NATO mechanisms and applying the policies of American protectionism against the communist threat. The main competitor of the United States for strengthening national positions in Europe was France led by General de Gaulle, who believed that the affairs of Europe should be resolved by European governments without the American intervention. However, NATO continued to serve as a springboard for the U.S. involvement in European affairs. At the end of the 20th century, through the close links between the EU and NATO, the USA received new allies from Central and Eastern European countries. It is concluded that after the end of World War II, Europe needed an assistance that the United States willingly provided in exchange for the ability to participate in European issues, solving and partly controlling the integration processes. The study found that, despite the varying degree of the American interest in transatlantic affairs, Europe has consistently been remaining a zone of national interest for the United States.

Recognition of regional features, outlining of the contours of regions, tendency to regionalize ethnic, economic, cultural and state-administrative space, and strengthening the ideology of regionalism in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is Serbia and Montenegro, appear as a practical and political but also as a theoretical problem which includes and combines several scientific disciplines. The phenomenon of regionalism is not contradictory although it is primarily expressed through the numerous conflicts of interests rivalry and antagonisms of political subjects. The problematic side of the phenomenon of regionalism includes the result of an extremely negative and existentially tragic experience of the several years-long disintegration of the complex Yugoslav state. During the partition and disintegration of the second Yugoslavia, there also happened the disintegration of the Serbian ethnic area Growth, support and instigation of regional tendencies occurred in the historical circumstances of secession and did not stop in the post-secession period. Particularization and segmentation of political area, as well as the disintegration of the former state, did not occur in accordance with the norms of internal and international law. Legality was late and was achieved within the transformation of power reflected in the changed territorial policy of the dominant alliance of great powers. The entire past decade was characterized by an extraordinary metamorphosis of political space. Secession trend had the territorial features which included the change of borders and had been long in the focus of the global geopolitical attention. Territories were divided and made smaller. Intensive territorial dynamics within the external silhouette of the de-stated SFR of Yugoslavia resulted in the creation of several state and quasi-state political formations. Former republics became semi-sovereign states. Dispersed and displaced Serbian ethnos was configured in the three territories: in the Republic of Serbia - from which Kosovo and Metohia were amputated and placed under the UN protectorate - in the entire Republic of Montenegro and in the Republic Srpska, located in one part of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demopolitical result of the geopolitical destruction of the Serbian ethnos was a great movement of the Serbian population from the west to the east, and its concentration in the territory of the Republic of Serbia this implied that the Serbs were expelled from their millennia-long abodes in Croatia, parts of Bosnia and from Kosmet. The geo-economic result of the same process was the devastation of the national economic strength west of the Drina and in the southern province. Economic regression occurred also in the national parent-land state. Balkan re-arrangement of the spheres of interest in the post-bipolar period was in 1995. fixed by the interest arrangement of the great powers known under the name Dayton Peace Agreement. Redistribution of the territories from the destroyed state occurred in the post-communist period with the expansion of west-civilization structures to the European east Westernization of the eastern part of Europe, or entire Europe as the other pole of the global West, could be characterized as a dual mega-regionality. Namely, the west is composed of Europe and America; on the other side, there is the global East or its hybrid variation Eurasia. With the disappearance of their common state and its framework, south Slavs found themselves in the seemingly independent, and actually client states. Western delimitation of the south Slavic area moved from the Yugoslav borders towards a wider Balkan demarcation. One could say that the revitalized notion of the Balkans became a new, in many aspects obligatory framework for regional thinking. The Balkan macroregion is further determined by the intentions to expand the European Union. One of the Euro-centric concepts, which is being experimentally employed precisely in the Balkans, is the establishment of the so-called Europe of regions in the peripheral areas. On the other hand, even though the process of the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation appears to be irreversible, the superordinate Euro-American factor does not give up the possibility of the mezzo-regional initiatives, cooperations, associations and integrations. This "middle" level of dealing with the specificities of the Yugoslav region is related to the states and nations from the former Yugoslavia, or the so-called West Balkans. Naturally, it is not the tendency to revive the silhouette of the previous state, but certainly there is a noticeable intention to achieve a regional linking of the related, now semi-sovereign territories which sometimes belonged to the same state framework. The fourth level deals with microregionalism, that is the relation between the different areas in the newly-created states. It is interesting that the regionalist discourse is mostly cherished exactly in the ethno-heterogeneous Serbian area, although other Yugoslav states also have or had regional tradition and mixed population, like, for example, Slovenia and Croatia Nevertheless, these former Yugo-republics are structured as mono-national states, so the regional policy and ideology of regionalism are still not in the first plane. Regionalism within the newly-formed states could be supplemented with the micron level implying specific sub-regionalism of the highest degree, within the larger regions in the same state. This could be illustrated with Backa, Banat and Srem inside Vojvodina, understood as the northern Serbian region, or Kosovo and Metohia in the south of Serbia, in the province with the same name. In the part of Serbia outside the provinces, similar things could be said for Belgrade with its surroundings, Macva, Podrinje, Sumadija, Raska District etc. Thus, when it comes to the present FR of Yugoslavia, all five levels of regional dynamics have a principled, but insufficiently studied significance. Mega-regional level is related to the mark denoting the global belonging to the West. Macroregional level deals with the European loyalty, that is inclusion of the FR of Yugoslavia into the continental European trends. This trans-continental and continental direction of inclusion implies a historical teleology of the relative eastern belonging to the absolute West, that is Euro-America, and the entrance into the full structure of the European Union. All the mentioned problems of recognition and characterization of the regional phenomenology in the political topography of the world are motivated by the tendency to achieve as clear as possible spatial-temporal national and state orientation The direction is related to the so-called safety dilemma of the nation and the country faced with the change of size and essence of one's own state, with the different geopolitical position and redefined foreign-policy priorities. It is also the case of the changed alliance policy, and the innovated strategy of integration into the old and new global and regional political structures. On the basis of the indicated components of geopolitical context, one could say that the phenomenon of regions and their cognate correlates {regionally regionalization and regionalism) should not be understood exclusively through the legal categories of international law and the so-called constitutional solutions, that is administrative division of the state territory. Actually in the analysis of regions and regionalism in Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia it is necessary first to discuss the pre-normative or meta-le-gal factors in the creation of the regional issue within the national and state issue, which have the form of the unsolved political problem. Meta-legality is located within the domain of the international relations and geopolitic. Meta-legal or pre-normative factors of the formation or recognition of regions and regionalisms deal with the possibility of the political constitution of the Serbian, that is Serbian / Montenegrin (still Yugoslav) society. Since the unique state area was destroyed in the four-year secession wars and there occurred significant demopolitical changes, war migrations, forceful displacements and expulsion of the population - the ethnic character of many areas was also drastically changed. At the same time, the post-secession existence of the FR of Yugoslavia could be also viewed through the optics of the state residuum. The remaining Serbia or Serbia (temporarily) without Kosovo is certainly not an equivalent for the Serbian ethnic space, nor for the entire Serbian lands. It is not even the FR of Yugoslavia, as a dual con federation of the Serbian / Montenegrin nation. Geopolitical reduction of the SFR of Yugoslavia to a residual creation of the FR of Yugoslavia was not deduced from the legality sui generis, but resulted from a conflict, the defeat of integralism and the victory of separatism, as well as from a new triumphal configuration of power. The impulse implying the statism of the collective rights from the former complex federal necessarily-multinational level was transferred to a lower mononational level. Therefore, the regionalist ideology in the post-secession reality of the residual state almost inevitably, as a tendency, nears the separatory particularism. Even the lost national state and the state entirety are openly denied within the requests for the territorization of the collective rights of various minorities. Naturally these requests do not carry the primary features of the development of democracy. On the contrary, in the majority of cases this implies the rise of parish and tribal consciousness prone to narrow-minded separation. Thus the post-secession requests for the regionalization are often just a slight rhetorical mask for real separatism. For example, they are expressed through the pseudo-national separation of Vojvodina from Serbia, as well as Montenegro from Serbia, or through the establishment of state-like entities in the territorial tissue of Serbia Alleged arguments are found in the unfinished disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia on the one hand, and in the prevention of the creation of the so-called Greater Serbia, even within the diminished Serbia That way, even in the post-secession, reduced Serbia one could easily recognize the tendencies of federalization and confederalization, even the amputation of its remaining state space. Additional arguments for the crawling secession and prolonged territorial destruction are found in the ideology of globalization and world trends of relativizing territorial integrity and state sovereignty. On the other hand, the idea about the principled insignificance of borders in Europe without borders, as well as Europe of regions, is emphasized. Thus, it is obvious that the new state and regional delimitations and demarcations are in contradiction with the vision of the trans-statal and trans-national integrity of the European continent. In Serbia itself, me problem of the restructuring of regions is determined by the inherited and unchanged triple division of its territory into the central part and two autonomous provinces in the north and south. Thus every idea for regionalization (expert, party, leader's, NGO and the like) faces the inherited, too narrow constitutional framework and easily slides to the federalization or confederalization of the Republic, and in extreme cases to the independence and sovereignty of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other minorities. Roughly put, the tendencies for territorial separation from the Republic of Serbia still exist in several neuralgic and unstable areas or regions. In Vojvodina, the presented tendencies have the character of a meaningless internal - Serbian autonomy, autonomism, latent separatism. Authentic Serbian autonomy lost its original character long ago and deteriorated into an internal national re-statism. On the other hand, in the furthest south of Serbia, in Kosmet, the UN protectorate is established, but the region is actually occupied and thus the status of the Province is "frozen". In the three municipalities in the south of Serbia, with the relative Albanian majority, Albanian separatism smolders within the platform of the so-called east Kosovo. In the Raska region (Sandzak) there are also strong tendencies for separateness on the religious-ecclesiastical, so-called Bosniac platform, with religious solidarity, and ethnic and territorial unity of all Bosniacs. In the meta-legal or pre-normative situation - which most often denotes political and geopolitical context implying interests, power and force - the inclinations for territorial design are faced with the conflicting ideology of regionalism. Therefore, the constitutional-legal solutions of the former, present and future regions, generated within the self-created legality which does not respect meta-legal, political and geopolitical impulses regardless of how aestheticized and "humanized" they may be - at the end face the practical impossibility of realization.

In contrast to the previous optimistic forecasts of the ruling elite in the late USSR and in the new Russia about how our country's relations with the West will develop positively after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist system in Eastern Europe, Russia's successful entry into the Western community; after the triumphalist sentiments in the West itself regarding the "collapse of communism", the after the victory in the cold war and the role of Russia, which has lost its role as a superpower, subordinate to the interests of the Western community, the real reality of international relations turned out to be completely different. At the turn of the century, as a result of NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia, the approach of troops and weapons of this bloc to our borders, open support in the West for separatist movements and wars on the territory of the Russian Federation, the process of disillusionment with previous illusions began. It sharply intensified after Vladimir Putin's Munich speech in 2007, Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and especially the conflict in Ukraine and the reunification of Crimea, which actually led to the beginning of a new cold war. Gradually, the ruling elites of Russia and the West began to realize that the decisive reason for the former "cold war" of 1946-1989 was not so much the notorious "communism" in the USSR and in Eastern European countries, but above all the fundamental civilizational and geopolitical differences between the West and Russia, dating back centuries, stable Russophobic sentiments of public opinion in the West. As the experience of history and modernity shows, Russia's successful domestic and international position is possible only if it preserves and strengthens the status of a great Eurasian power based on a sovereign domestic and foreign policy, a successful socio-economic course approved by the people and a wise state ideology.

The analysis concerned indicates that the publication activity deployed by he Islamic Comunity has obtained the remarquable results. They had begun rather modestly and cautiously, under permanent consultations with various state and ideological commissions, to print basic religious literature, caracterised by the oldfashioned subjects and poor graphic presentation. Making use of all the liberal phases of social development of the period conerned, the management of the Islamic Community kept gradually getting out of the control in the publication fi eld of activity. The institutional shaping up of the Nonaligned Nations Movement had controbuted thereto, as well as the changed foreign policy orientation of the country and good relations Yugoslavia had established with the majority of Islamic countries. The personnel educated at the best Islamic Universities, had begun promoting new standards in that fi eld upon their return to the country, characterised by setting deeper Islamic foundations to all the subjects under study, by eff orts to study the actual problems in an inter-disciplinary way, as well as by the modern marketing access thereto, all of the same having for a goal the books to reach the end user – the ordinary believers. Following up this new strategy, the Islamic Comminity within the FRY, becomes marked by the end of this period. by publication of a larger number of the good quality books, which developed, thanks to the renowned authors, the way of presentation of their material, their actuality and modern graphic design, into the irreplaceable material for all the interested to get acquainted with the up-to-date achievements of the Islamic theology and with the attitude of the Islamic scientists concerning various actual problems or the history of this great religion. After having successfully overcome the opposition from the offi cial state authorities and solved certain organisational and proff essional problems, the holy Islamic book of Koran, was translated into the Srbo-Croatian language. Upon publication of the fi rst edition thereof, all state interefrence had ceased, due to the then adopted attitude than the Islamic believers were entitled to their own copy thereof and the Islamic Community, in its capacity of their representative, was entitled to organise both the printing and distribution of the Koran. Translation of the Koran into the Albanian language meant the achievement of a strategic goal in addition to the religious and cultural one, because in such a way the second largest group of the Islamic believers in Europe, had got the possibility to get acquainted with the basic and binding principles of their faith in their mother tongue. A large number of various newspapers and magasines have been started thanks to the great eff orts deployed by all the Islamic Community structures. In time, the editorial offi ces and journalists they employed, had acquaired the necessary experience, and thanks to the decisions and subsidiaries from the Republican offi cials and to the activities of the members of the Ulema (Islamic religious institution) at the fi eld, all these newspapers and magasines achieved a high number of copies according to the criteria of that period. By their devoted work within the Djemat (Religious Committee), the immams had succeeded to attain the goals, previously by the supreme bodies within the Islamic Community in Yugoslavia, i.e. that every Muslem house should prosess a copy of an Islamic newspaper. By way of making them reading only this sort of the press, edited by the persons under direct control and infl uence of the top people from the religious institutions, the conditions had been created to estrange the Islamic believers in a very large measure, from the multinational and multi-religious environment in which they lived.

As the 110th anniversary of the beginning of the excavations at Vinča is nearing, the question arises as to how much we really know about the role and motives of a number of British subjects who in various ways played decisive roles in the research and the international affirmation of this important Late Neolithic site. It is possible, on the basis of archives and personal correspondence of Miloje M. Vasić, to view the investigations of Vinča in the wider context of political and military relations, influencing the general situation in the Kingdom of The Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later Yugoslavia. John Lynton Myres was a professor at the universities in Oxford and Liverpool, the founder and editor of the Journal Man and the director of the British Archaeological School in Athens. During the World War I, between 1916 and 1919, he was an officer of the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve, first in the Navy Intelligence Service, and then in Military Control Office in Athens. The Browns, Alec and Catherine, also played an important role. Alec Brown, a left-oriented writer, translator and correspondent, arrived to Serbia as a Cambridge graduate, aiming at the post of an English language teacher in high schools. In the period from 1929 to 1931 he took part in the excavations at Vinča, taking this setting as the base for the plot of one of his books. His wife, Elsie Catherine Brown, whose life is very poorly documented, served in the British Embassy in Belgrade between the wars. Vasić dedicated the third volume of Prehistoric Vinča to her, for her devoted work in the British medical mission and the care she took of the Serbian soldiers near Thessalonica, but also for her part played in the establishment of the initial contact with Sir Charles Hyde. The life of Catherine Brown may be seen as one of the many exceptional stories about the noble British ladies, celebrated in Serbia for over a century. However, one should bear in mind that the events and characters (Myres, Hyde, the Browns) linked to the research in Vinča may be a part of a larger scene, and a consequence of other, equally important circumstances of a more direct involvement of Great Britain in the political situation in Yugoslavia between the wars. Myres, a man close to the scientific, intelligence and diplomatic circles, is the key person in the initial contact between Vasić and Catherine Brown. Since his first encounter with Vasić in 1918 in Athens, on the occasion of his return from France to Serbia, Myres himself or through Catherine Brown, worked to establish the collaboration and keep the contact with Vasić. It is possible that the Athens meeting, initiated by Myres, was a consequence not only of the scholarly interest, but also the growing British involvement in the Balkans. After the same line of reasoning, the arrival of Alec Brown in Belgrade cannot be understood solely as a consequence of the individual ambition of a young Slavic scholar, but as well as a part of the strategy of deepening the British influences over the region traditionally more inclined towards France, due to the political and cultural ties and military alliances. After the war, many Serbian linguists were posted as teachers of the language at the most prestigious British universities, such as Oxford and Cambridge, where Alec Brown earned his degree. His application to the post of English teacher in Serbia is closely preceded by the recommendation of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, British Foreign Secretary, to secure teaching English in the Yugoslav schools, and not only French, as it was previously the case. The collaboration between British and Serbian intellectuals was surely a very suitable context for the establishment of intimate contacts and spreading of cultural and political influences. As illustrated by the case of the Near East, archaeology and archaeologists are particularly useful in this respect. Their long sojourns and mobility in the field, command of the language, enabled them to gain the confidence of the locals, learn about the customs, and gain information, just like Myres the Blackbeard did, and more or less successfully Catherine and Alec Brown as well. Regardless of the real or clandestine motifs, in the case of the investigations of Vinča, this collaboration made possible the publication the four-volume work of Vasić – Prehistoric Vinča, exceptional in many respects, and the international recognition of Vinča as one of the most important Late Neolithic settlements in South-eastern Europe.

This paper will analyze France’s attempted foreign policy strategy in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe during the 1960s, beginning with the various positions of de Gaulle’s France and Tito’s Yugoslavia and the numerous similarities in how the two countries’ diplomacy functioned. In both countries, the course of foreign policy was determined according to the authoritarian characteristics of their systems and of their central figure–the president. Both countries were also interested in transcending the Cold War division of Europe, and they based their strategies on attempts to marginalize the United States and pacify the Soviet regime. De Gaulle’s attempt at a détente, which Yugoslavia was very sympathetic toward and had also committed itself to similar goals, failed due to unrealistic illusions of overcoming this bipolarity by forging a middle way between the two opposing Cold War blocs. Faced with an overestimation of their own influence, along with the Warsaw Pact’s aggression toward Czechoslovakia, Moscow’s complete lack of interest in pacification, and the US’s unwillingness to withdraw, end of de Gaulle’s attempts at détente, in which Yugoslavia would play an important role, came to an end. Nevertheless, similar European and global policy goals brought France and Yugoslavia closer together, and this established the principles on which a cooling down period in the mid-1970s became possible.

Yugoslav-Italian relations between two world wars, besides the diplomatic-political, also had a very significant economic aspect. Italy was one of the most important foreign trade partners of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and this paper will explore the trade exchange between the two countries, especially the import of materials necessary for the textile industry, which substantially contributed to the positive balance of trade. Beside a quantitative analysis of statistical data regarding foreign trade, the paper also looks at the impact of political and economic events on the trade relations between the two countries, as well as the relation between the industrialization of Yugoslavia and changes in foreign trade.

This study aims to explore Hungarian–Yugoslav diplomatic relations in the first phase of the disintegration of the second Yugoslav state through relevant documents from the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and accounts from the contemporary Hungarian press. The study mainly focuses on relations between the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Except for Serbia, diplomatic relations between Hungary and the other Yugoslav republics were not taken into consideration due to length constraints. The study also examines Budapest’s diplomatic activities with the great powers regarding the Yugoslav question. The documents used this study can be found in XIX-J-1-j records at the Department of Political Government and Party Authorities of the Hungarian National Archives after 1945 (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára 1945 utáni Politikai Kormányszervek és Pártiratok Főosztálya, MNL OL).

From 1960 forward, Yugoslavia based its independent foreign policy on three “special relationships”, balancing its accommodation with the Soviet Union by close relations with the United States and the new Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Paying special attention to the roles of Yugoslavia’s Foreign Ministry and the US State Department as well as President Tito, this article addresses three crucial periods in which the intersection of Yugoslavia’s relations with the US, the USSR and the NAM prompted a decisive turn in its foreign policy. In 1961–63, Tito’s support for the NAM damaged its US relations to Soviet benefit. But in 1967–71, NAM indifference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia turned Tito back toward the US, as advocated by his Foreign Ministry. And in 1976-79, Soviet and Bulgarian efforts to coopt the NAM through Cuba’s Presidency prompted a successful rebuff led by Yugoslavia and appreciated in Washington. After 1979, however, Belgrade’s post Tito reliance on economic relations with the NAM members had unintended and damaging domestic consequences, obstructing the Slovenian and Croatian commitment to West European trade while also dividing Bosnian Muslims from Bosnian Serbs.

The purpose of this article is to identify the principal security challenges in South Eastern Europe. The mix of challenges has changed radically since the end of the Cold War and the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in favour of non-military threats. The era of wars of religion, ideology and redrawing of state borders in the Western Balkans seems to be over. The tranquillity in the region, imposed from the outside has been buttressed by two international protectorates. The suppression of armed violence did not add up to long-term stability as the underbrush of nationalism, in- tolerance and inter-communal hatred still survives in the Balkans. The potential for interethnic conflicts and for further fragmentation in the former Yugoslavia has not yet been fully exhausted in spite of much improved interstate relations. Prominent among the non-military threats to security are organized crime, corruption, natural and ecological disasters, climate change and weak energy security. The inclusion of the entire South Eastern Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures offers the best promise. There are thus good reasons for moderately optimistic expectation that the South Eastern Europe will eventually become a region of democracy, prosperity and stability.

Yugoslavia's socialism was always a special case when compared with other states in the eastern part of Europe, and so was its religious policy. In the 1960s, Yugoslavia adopted a rather liberal stance towards its religious communities. The state interfered less in the internal affairs of the churches than it did in most states in the Warsaw Pact. Even Croat Cardinal Franjo Kuharić, who was otherwise very critical towards Tito's Yugoslavia, had to admit in 1987,The Pope freely appoints bishops, without the intervention of the government. The church is free in its inner administration: there is no numerus clausus, neither for priests nor for the order's candidates. The bishops appoint and transfer priests without hindrance, without government interference. Bishops, priests and believers are free to gather in church rooms and don't have to apply for special permits. The orders can exist and function, although within the frames of law. The freedom of motion in- and outside the country is not hampered, though it may happen that-in our conviction, without justification-priests' passports are taken away. The freedom of the religious press is also one of the positive facts.

Abstract Although Albania emerged from the Second World War as an appendage of Yugoslavia, the Albanian Communist regime soon turned against Yugoslavia and forged an alliance with the Soviet Union. However, after the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev launched a campaign of de-Stalinization, Albania’s alliance with the USSR steadily eroded and collapsed altogether by the early 1960s. The PRC under Mao Zedong emerged as the new patron for the only Stalinist regime left in Europe. This article draws on recently declassified archival materials to reassess how and why Albanian Communist leaders shifted from one alliance to another. Both ideological and security considerations shaped the decision-making process. The article sheds light not only on Albania’s Cold War history but also on the history of Eastern Europe and the Soviet bloc.

In this article, I examine foreign investment in the socialist enterprise in the former Yugoslavia based on the case study of Kolektor in the context of the liberalized communist social and economic order. Foreign investments were allowed in the form of joint ventures. I present these investments from the viewpoint of economic reforms, the concept of socialist enterprise, and the concept of economic development, which enabled foreign investments and shaped regulation and the structure of foreign investments in Yugoslavia. The history of the case of Kolektor began at a time when Slovenia still belonged to the former Yugoslavia, which was arguably a liberalized type of communist economic system. This was during the Cold War, when both Europe and the rest of the world were divided essentially along the lines of the communist east and the capitalist west. The Kolektor Company was established in 1963 as a state socialist enterprise for the manufacture of the rotary electrical switches known as commutators. From the outset, the company tried to establish international cooperation to acquire modern technology. In 1968, it reached an agreement with the West German Company Kautt & Bux, which at the time was the technological and market leader in the production of commutators. Kautt & Bux invested in Kolektor and became an owner of 49 percent of the company. The investment proved very profitable for both partners. The Slovenian side got access to modern technology and expertise, and the German side got additional production facilities, skilled workers, and low-cost production, which increased its competitiveness on international markets.

The Balkan crisis is the result of a series of conflicts in various areas of political, economic and social life in the former Yugoslavia. Relations between the former republics show the complex character of European security. Without a sustainable development of the whole region, it is impossible to guarantee security throughout the European continent. Europe was shaken by the bloody events that marked the break-up of Yugoslavia. No one could have imagined that such violent military clashes could take place in a European country, 50 years after the end of World War II, and that hundreds of thousands of people would seek refuge throughout Europe. It was clear from the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia that the war would continue for many years and if the international community did not intervene the result would be many casualties. The United Nations, the European Union and the OSCE tried to prevent military conflicts between the nations of the former Yugoslavia, but they failed. National elites pursued a policy aimed at creating nation-states and had outside support from influential forces. To achieve this goal they were willing to pay any price. The collapse of the former Yugoslavia, in fact, meant the end of the process that had defined the development of Western Europe since the beginning of the 20th century, in the time between the two world wars. It was the beginning of nation-states. The Balkans had lagged behind in its transformation for many reasons and unlike Western and Central Europe, the Balkan states found themselves in a different wave of historical development, accompanied by conflict and chaos. The collapse of socialism had an impact on this situation, causing new economic and political conflicts. From this point of view, all the efforts of the European and international communities, aimed at controlling the situation after the break-up of Yugoslavia, had no chance of success.

During the last two decades, discourses over the transition process shifted toward a theoretical diversity and a deeper understanding of ‘how modernity was reworked in postsocialist context’. It was widely argued that changing social relations were shaped not only by norms and institutions of Neoliberal capitalism, but also by established networks, institutional and regulatory structures and actors that/who gave diverse responses to the profound and thorough transformation of the society. This paper aims at understanding how geopolitical discourses over the Balkan and its place in the ‘new Europe’ shaped social relations and produced daily practices nested into those webs, through the perception and interpretations of post-socialist transformation by Hungarian migrants who left the war-hit Yugoslavia.

The intra-party conflict in Yugoslavia in 1966 resulted in a fundamental shift in the attitude of the Yugoslav leadership toward the Albanian national minority, which was also reflected in the country?s foreign policy orientation. The normalization of relations with Albania was set as one of the objectives of Yugoslav foreign policy. Yugoslavia stopped responding to the anti-Yugoslav statements of Albanian officials and launched a series of cooperation initiatives with Albania. The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija was assigned a special role in the normalization of relations with Tirana and, with the consent of Belgrade, an exchange of publications, visits of cultural-artistic associations and contacts between the cultural institutions of Kosovo and Metohija and Albania ensued. This policy resulted in the establishment of direct cultural, economic and political ties between the governments of Albania and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, into which the Yugoslav political leadership no longer had any insight.

Yugoslavia was destroyed through the concerted effort of domestic forces of the seceding republics and foreign factors, embodied by the entirety of the Western world. Although the USA undoubtedly supported the West, in the early stages of the process, they favored the preservation of Yugoslavia. The country with the leading role in the destruction of Yugoslavia was Germany. The causes of the disappearance of Yugoslavia from the political map of Europe and the world were numerous: economic, social, political, geopolitical, etc. In this article we focus on the military component, that is, the role of the Yugoslav People's Army in the destruction process. We consider various factors which brought to the situation in which the YPA proved itself utterly unsuccessful and ineffective in defending itself from destruction from the inside. We also look at the opportunities with which the YPA was presented, which it failed to seize. These choices lead the country and its citizens into a bloody civil war with countless victims and great destruction. The YPA itself was finally pilloried for its ultimately disastrous attempts to protect the state from aggressive forces within.

This article is devoted to the relationship between interwar Ukrainian political emigrants and local authorities in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). A comparative analysis of the attitude of the Yugoslav authorities towards Russian and Ukrainian emigrants was conducted. The Russophilia of Yugoslav authorities, who viewed the Ukrainian question through the lense of the Russian emigrants, was described. The idea of Pan-Slavism had been spreading in the Balkans for a long time, which facilitated the legitimization of friendly relations between the southern Slavs (primarily Serbs) and Russians, whom Serbs considered as protectors from the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Yugoslavia sided with the anti-Bolshevik White Movement, an ally of the Entente, which had a positive impact on the situation of Russian emigrants. The young state was in need of professionals with a good command of foreign languages and European culture. Many emigrants met those requirements. Therefore, in the early 1920s, several thousands of emigrants worked in the public service. The reigning Karadjordjević dynasty had marital ties with the Romanov dynasty. A former Russian diplomat was among advisers to the king and the head of government. The immigration from the former Russian Empire was addressed by the Royal Court as well as several ministries and central government institutions. Direct support to the immigrants was provided by the State Commission for Assistance to Russian Refugees. Yugoslavia was a center of political and religious immigration for Russians and a provincial center for Ukrainian emigration. It is concluded that the Yugoslav authorities did not distinguish Ukrainians from Russian emigrants, therefore, any specific policy towards them was not carried out. The degree of interaction of Ukrainian emigrants with local authorities in Yugoslavia varied geographically (Slovenia and Croatia, on the one hand, and Serbia and Macedonia, on the other) and in time (in the first half of the 1920s and from the mid-1920s until the beginning of World War II). Keywords: authorities, emigration, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslavia.

There is a gap between the academic discourse’s acknowledgement of the importance of the question of diverging values in the relations between Russia and the European Union (EU), especially in the light of recent human rights cases, and the ongoing tendency of recent analyses of EU-Russia human rights relations to focus on rationalist cost-benefit accounts which leave out value interpretation issues. I seek to fill this gap by genealogically analyzing the origin of different human rights understandings of Europe and Russia and their constitution of the scope of foreign policy action. The results point to a high divergence of the meaning of human rights between the European Union and Russia as well as a high relevance of this divergence for both parties’ foreign action and identity formation.

The fragmentation of Yugoslavia has wrought extensive political and social change in the Balkans and Europe more generally. After the collapse of communism and the breakup of Yugoslavia, many Balkan countries have transformed their political systems. European states have attempted to engage and manage this breakup on an individual and collective basis. The involvement of the international community, and above all of EU countries adjacent to the Balkans, has greatly influenced processes of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in the region.

Bilateral relations between the Republic of Turkey and the individual successor states of former Yugoslavia differ, after thirty years since its dissolution, in form and in substance. While just after the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Turkey managed to establish and sustain cordial ties with such countries as, for instance, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, relations with Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro) remained tense and the two countries perceived themselves, in the best case, as traditional opponents. The basic aim of this paper is to analyse the bilateral relations of these two states and Turkish foreign policy towards Serbia, a country currently perceived as a ‘neighbour,’ despite the fact that they do not share common border. The paper argues that rapprochement of two countries, so clearly visible in several dimensions after 2002, marks a new phase in Turkey’s general foreign policy. The paper will trace the thirty-year evolution of bilateral contacts while arguing that the current positive relations have their source also in the domestic arena, both of Turkey and Serbia, which is willing to increase influence in the Western Balkans and institutionalise her international position. Thus, the two states for the first time share similar foreign policy goals. The whole analysis is theoretically anchored in the behavioural approach of the ‘middle power‘ paradigm. An author-applied qualitative content analysis is the main research technique. The main sources are official documents, selected monographs, academic articles, and analytical reports.