Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Yugoslavia – Foreign relations – Europe, Western »

Traditionally the phenomenon of the European integration towards South East Europe is regarded starting from the XXI century. The explanation for such a periodization are resolution of the open conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and implementation of the complex EU strategy for the region. Starting point of the majority of researches is the year of 2003 when the EU Agenda for the Western Balkans was started in Thessaloniki. The topic of EEC-Yugoslavia relations, SFRY having been first socialist country to institutionalize its trade and economic relations with Brussels, are unfairly ignored in domestic and foreign scientific literature. It is regarded solely as a chronological period of trade agreements. Nevertheless, this issue is of fundamental importance for understanding the current neighborhood of the European Union. The main thesis the author proves is that in the 1960s and 1980s as it is the case nowadays, the main imperative of Brussels' policy towards the Balkans was to prevent Moscow from increasing its influence. This led to the formation of a very specific format of relations with Belgrade and was one of the reasons why the economic crisis in Yugoslavia became extreme and its economy irreformable. In addition, at a later and structurally much more complicated stage of relations between the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the European Union the specificity and main components of relations of the Cold War period did not fundamentally change. As for the policy of so-called containment of the external actors one could see that besides Moscow, we can speak about similar attitude of the EU towards China. It makes it possible to consider the EU policy towards the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the paradigm of neoclassical realism, rather than in the paradigm of traditional liberal European integration approaches which allows us to unite neorealists elements with the specifics of internal processes, including the modernization of institutes, relations between society and state, types of political leadership.

The article reflects on the issue of the foreign policy strategy of modern Russia in the Balkans region. One of the most significant aspects of this problem is the difference in views between Russia and the West. Authors show how different interpretations of the events in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s predetermined the sense of mutual suspicion and mistrust which spread to other regions such as the post-Soviet space. Exploring differences between the Russian and the Western (Euro-Atlantic) views on the current matters, authors draw attention to fundamental differences in terminology: while the Western narrative promotes more narrow geographical and political definitions (such as the Western Balkan Six), traditional Russian experts are more inclined to wider or integral definitions such as “the Balkans” and “Central and Southeast Europe”. Meanwhile none of these terms are applicable for analysis of the current trends such as the growing transit role of the Balkans region and its embedding in the European regional security architecture. Therefore, a new definition is needed to overcome the differences in vision and better understand significant recent developments in the region. Conceptualizing major foreign policy events in Central and Southeast Europe during the last three decades (the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s), authors demonstrate the significance of differences in tools and methods between the Soviet Union and the modern Russia. Permanent need for adaptation to changing political and security context led to inconsistence in Russian Balkan policy in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Russia was able to preserve an integral vision of the region and even to elaborate new transregional constructive projects, which in right political circumstances may promote stability and become beneficial for both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.

At the request of the editorial board of the journal Slavic World in the Third Millennium, the eldest researcher of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Leonid Ianovich Gibianskii (born 1936), recounts his life. Leonid Ianovich graduated from the Department of Southern and Western Slavs of the History Faculty of Moscow State University in 1960 and began working at the Institute in 1966, when he commenced a graduate course there. He is the prominent specialist in the history of Yugoslavia and in the problems of international relations in contemporary Central and South-Eastern Europe. The principal lines of his investigations included the history of Yugoslavia during and after World War II, the history of the formation of communist regimes in Central and South-Eastern Europe, the organization of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and the study of foreign relations and the politics of the great powers in the region in the 1940s and 50s. Leonid Ianovich was one of the first Russian historians to elaborate the problem of the formation of the Soviet bloc, the history of the Cominform, and the conflict between Stalin and Tito using archive materials which became accessible to researchers from the end of 1980s. Gibianski is the author of several hundred academic works, which have been published in many countries all over the world, as well as the organiser of and a participant in a number of international projects and conferences on the Cold War. Leonid Ianovich describes his childhood, his studies at the Department of Southern and Western Slavs of the History Faculty of Moscow State University, and his work at the Institute of Slavic Studies.

The article analyses the content of doctrinal documents on the development of post-socialist states in a special sub-region in Southeast Europe – the post-Yugoslav space. The author examines the concepts of foreign policy, national security and defence. Based on the consideration of internal political development of the post-Yugoslav states separately, the evolution of relations between them within the special subregion and the process of international relations in general, three stages can be distinguished in the development of relations between Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Euro-Atlantic and European structures: 1991–1999, 1999–2014 and from 2014 to the present. During these years, a new national-state agenda was formed in each of the aforementioned countries, which at different stages reflected national versions of liberalism, conservatism, social democracy, which resonated in doctrinal documents – strategies for national security, foreign policy and defense. After constitutions were adopted in the 1990 s, and the first versions of doctrinal documents aimed at NATO and EU accession in the 2000 s, the post-Yugoslav states joined NATO and to a lesser extent the EU in 2000–2013.Thus, the intra-regional configuration of the Western Balkans has gradually changed and will probably continue to change, the conceptual vision of the worldview, political-ideological and practical dimensions in these countries has been transformed and will continue to be transformed – namely, the attitude to Europeanisation, to overcoming conflicts and conflictogenic factors. The aforementioned strategic documents make it possible to answer the question of the essence, forms and methods of foreign policy of post-Yugoslav states in the situation in the region, Europe and the world after February 24, 2022.

In contrast to the previous optimistic forecasts of the ruling elite in the late USSR and in the new Russia about how our country's relations with the West will develop positively after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist system in Eastern Europe, Russia's successful entry into the Western community; after the triumphalist sentiments in the West itself regarding the "collapse of communism", the after the victory in the cold war and the role of Russia, which has lost its role as a superpower, subordinate to the interests of the Western community, the real reality of international relations turned out to be completely different. At the turn of the century, as a result of NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia, the approach of troops and weapons of this bloc to our borders, open support in the West for separatist movements and wars on the territory of the Russian Federation, the process of disillusionment with previous illusions began. It sharply intensified after Vladimir Putin's Munich speech in 2007, Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and especially the conflict in Ukraine and the reunification of Crimea, which actually led to the beginning of a new cold war. Gradually, the ruling elites of Russia and the West began to realize that the decisive reason for the former "cold war" of 1946-1989 was not so much the notorious "communism" in the USSR and in Eastern European countries, but above all the fundamental civilizational and geopolitical differences between the West and Russia, dating back centuries, stable Russophobic sentiments of public opinion in the West. As the experience of history and modernity shows, Russia's successful domestic and international position is possible only if it preserves and strengthens the status of a great Eurasian power based on a sovereign domestic and foreign policy, a successful socio-economic course approved by the people and a wise state ideology.

The article deals with the European aspects of the US foreign policy in the 2nd half of the 20th century. It also includes studies of the transatlantic relations of the described period and the exploration of an American influence on European integration processes. It is determined that the United States has demonstrated itself as a partner of the Western governments in the post-war reconstruction and further creation of an area of US security and prosperity. At the same time, it is noted that the American presidents have differently shaped their administrations’ policies towards Europe. The greatest supporter of the European integration processes was President Eisenhower. Among other things, the US President believed that Europe would become a key ally of the United States, thus, he considered the union of Sweden, Greece, Spain and Yugoslavia as a solid foundation for building a “United States of Europe”. After Eisenhower administration, European affairs, to a lesser extent, were taken up by such Presidents as Johnson, Carter, Reagan and Clinton. Showing no personal interest, Kennedy, Nixon and Bush-Sr. were forced to support the transatlantic dialogue, understanding the inevitability of European integration and the need for the United States to cooperate with the new consolidated actor. The United States aimed to strengthen its position in the European space, moving to that purpose by using NATO mechanisms and applying the policies of American protectionism against the communist threat. The main competitor of the United States for strengthening national positions in Europe was France led by General de Gaulle, who believed that the affairs of Europe should be resolved by European governments without the American intervention. However, NATO continued to serve as a springboard for the U.S. involvement in European affairs. At the end of the 20th century, through the close links between the EU and NATO, the USA received new allies from Central and Eastern European countries. It is concluded that after the end of World War II, Europe needed an assistance that the United States willingly provided in exchange for the ability to participate in European issues, solving and partly controlling the integration processes. The study found that, despite the varying degree of the American interest in transatlantic affairs, Europe has consistently been remaining a zone of national interest for the United States.

Recognition of regional features, outlining of the contours of regions, tendency to regionalize ethnic, economic, cultural and state-administrative space, and strengthening the ideology of regionalism in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is Serbia and Montenegro, appear as a practical and political but also as a theoretical problem which includes and combines several scientific disciplines. The phenomenon of regionalism is not contradictory although it is primarily expressed through the numerous conflicts of interests rivalry and antagonisms of political subjects. The problematic side of the phenomenon of regionalism includes the result of an extremely negative and existentially tragic experience of the several years-long disintegration of the complex Yugoslav state. During the partition and disintegration of the second Yugoslavia, there also happened the disintegration of the Serbian ethnic area Growth, support and instigation of regional tendencies occurred in the historical circumstances of secession and did not stop in the post-secession period. Particularization and segmentation of political area, as well as the disintegration of the former state, did not occur in accordance with the norms of internal and international law. Legality was late and was achieved within the transformation of power reflected in the changed territorial policy of the dominant alliance of great powers. The entire past decade was characterized by an extraordinary metamorphosis of political space. Secession trend had the territorial features which included the change of borders and had been long in the focus of the global geopolitical attention. Territories were divided and made smaller. Intensive territorial dynamics within the external silhouette of the de-stated SFR of Yugoslavia resulted in the creation of several state and quasi-state political formations. Former republics became semi-sovereign states. Dispersed and displaced Serbian ethnos was configured in the three territories: in the Republic of Serbia - from which Kosovo and Metohia were amputated and placed under the UN protectorate - in the entire Republic of Montenegro and in the Republic Srpska, located in one part of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demopolitical result of the geopolitical destruction of the Serbian ethnos was a great movement of the Serbian population from the west to the east, and its concentration in the territory of the Republic of Serbia this implied that the Serbs were expelled from their millennia-long abodes in Croatia, parts of Bosnia and from Kosmet. The geo-economic result of the same process was the devastation of the national economic strength west of the Drina and in the southern province. Economic regression occurred also in the national parent-land state. Balkan re-arrangement of the spheres of interest in the post-bipolar period was in 1995. fixed by the interest arrangement of the great powers known under the name Dayton Peace Agreement. Redistribution of the territories from the destroyed state occurred in the post-communist period with the expansion of west-civilization structures to the European east Westernization of the eastern part of Europe, or entire Europe as the other pole of the global West, could be characterized as a dual mega-regionality. Namely, the west is composed of Europe and America; on the other side, there is the global East or its hybrid variation Eurasia. With the disappearance of their common state and its framework, south Slavs found themselves in the seemingly independent, and actually client states. Western delimitation of the south Slavic area moved from the Yugoslav borders towards a wider Balkan demarcation. One could say that the revitalized notion of the Balkans became a new, in many aspects obligatory framework for regional thinking. The Balkan macroregion is further determined by the intentions to expand the European Union. One of the Euro-centric concepts, which is being experimentally employed precisely in the Balkans, is the establishment of the so-called Europe of regions in the peripheral areas. On the other hand, even though the process of the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation appears to be irreversible, the superordinate Euro-American factor does not give up the possibility of the mezzo-regional initiatives, cooperations, associations and integrations. This "middle" level of dealing with the specificities of the Yugoslav region is related to the states and nations from the former Yugoslavia, or the so-called West Balkans. Naturally, it is not the tendency to revive the silhouette of the previous state, but certainly there is a noticeable intention to achieve a regional linking of the related, now semi-sovereign territories which sometimes belonged to the same state framework. The fourth level deals with microregionalism, that is the relation between the different areas in the newly-created states. It is interesting that the regionalist discourse is mostly cherished exactly in the ethno-heterogeneous Serbian area, although other Yugoslav states also have or had regional tradition and mixed population, like, for example, Slovenia and Croatia Nevertheless, these former Yugo-republics are structured as mono-national states, so the regional policy and ideology of regionalism are still not in the first plane. Regionalism within the newly-formed states could be supplemented with the micron level implying specific sub-regionalism of the highest degree, within the larger regions in the same state. This could be illustrated with Backa, Banat and Srem inside Vojvodina, understood as the northern Serbian region, or Kosovo and Metohia in the south of Serbia, in the province with the same name. In the part of Serbia outside the provinces, similar things could be said for Belgrade with its surroundings, Macva, Podrinje, Sumadija, Raska District etc. Thus, when it comes to the present FR of Yugoslavia, all five levels of regional dynamics have a principled, but insufficiently studied significance. Mega-regional level is related to the mark denoting the global belonging to the West. Macroregional level deals with the European loyalty, that is inclusion of the FR of Yugoslavia into the continental European trends. This trans-continental and continental direction of inclusion implies a historical teleology of the relative eastern belonging to the absolute West, that is Euro-America, and the entrance into the full structure of the European Union. All the mentioned problems of recognition and characterization of the regional phenomenology in the political topography of the world are motivated by the tendency to achieve as clear as possible spatial-temporal national and state orientation The direction is related to the so-called safety dilemma of the nation and the country faced with the change of size and essence of one's own state, with the different geopolitical position and redefined foreign-policy priorities. It is also the case of the changed alliance policy, and the innovated strategy of integration into the old and new global and regional political structures. On the basis of the indicated components of geopolitical context, one could say that the phenomenon of regions and their cognate correlates {regionally regionalization and regionalism) should not be understood exclusively through the legal categories of international law and the so-called constitutional solutions, that is administrative division of the state territory. Actually in the analysis of regions and regionalism in Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia it is necessary first to discuss the pre-normative or meta-le-gal factors in the creation of the regional issue within the national and state issue, which have the form of the unsolved political problem. Meta-legality is located within the domain of the international relations and geopolitic. Meta-legal or pre-normative factors of the formation or recognition of regions and regionalisms deal with the possibility of the political constitution of the Serbian, that is Serbian / Montenegrin (still Yugoslav) society. Since the unique state area was destroyed in the four-year secession wars and there occurred significant demopolitical changes, war migrations, forceful displacements and expulsion of the population - the ethnic character of many areas was also drastically changed. At the same time, the post-secession existence of the FR of Yugoslavia could be also viewed through the optics of the state residuum. The remaining Serbia or Serbia (temporarily) without Kosovo is certainly not an equivalent for the Serbian ethnic space, nor for the entire Serbian lands. It is not even the FR of Yugoslavia, as a dual con federation of the Serbian / Montenegrin nation. Geopolitical reduction of the SFR of Yugoslavia to a residual creation of the FR of Yugoslavia was not deduced from the legality sui generis, but resulted from a conflict, the defeat of integralism and the victory of separatism, as well as from a new triumphal configuration of power. The impulse implying the statism of the collective rights from the former complex federal necessarily-multinational level was transferred to a lower mononational level. Therefore, the regionalist ideology in the post-secession reality of the residual state almost inevitably, as a tendency, nears the separatory particularism. Even the lost national state and the state entirety are openly denied within the requests for the territorization of the collective rights of various minorities. Naturally these requests do not carry the primary features of the development of democracy. On the contrary, in the majority of cases this implies the rise of parish and tribal consciousness prone to narrow-minded separation. Thus the post-secession requests for the regionalization are often just a slight rhetorical mask for real separatism. For example, they are expressed through the pseudo-national separation of Vojvodina from Serbia, as well as Montenegro from Serbia, or through the establishment of state-like entities in the territorial tissue of Serbia Alleged arguments are found in the unfinished disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia on the one hand, and in the prevention of the creation of the so-called Greater Serbia, even within the diminished Serbia That way, even in the post-secession, reduced Serbia one could easily recognize the tendencies of federalization and confederalization, even the amputation of its remaining state space. Additional arguments for the crawling secession and prolonged territorial destruction are found in the ideology of globalization and world trends of relativizing territorial integrity and state sovereignty. On the other hand, the idea about the principled insignificance of borders in Europe without borders, as well as Europe of regions, is emphasized. Thus, it is obvious that the new state and regional delimitations and demarcations are in contradiction with the vision of the trans-statal and trans-national integrity of the European continent. In Serbia itself, me problem of the restructuring of regions is determined by the inherited and unchanged triple division of its territory into the central part and two autonomous provinces in the north and south. Thus every idea for regionalization (expert, party, leader's, NGO and the like) faces the inherited, too narrow constitutional framework and easily slides to the federalization or confederalization of the Republic, and in extreme cases to the independence and sovereignty of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other minorities. Roughly put, the tendencies for territorial separation from the Republic of Serbia still exist in several neuralgic and unstable areas or regions. In Vojvodina, the presented tendencies have the character of a meaningless internal - Serbian autonomy, autonomism, latent separatism. Authentic Serbian autonomy lost its original character long ago and deteriorated into an internal national re-statism. On the other hand, in the furthest south of Serbia, in Kosmet, the UN protectorate is established, but the region is actually occupied and thus the status of the Province is "frozen". In the three municipalities in the south of Serbia, with the relative Albanian majority, Albanian separatism smolders within the platform of the so-called east Kosovo. In the Raska region (Sandzak) there are also strong tendencies for separateness on the religious-ecclesiastical, so-called Bosniac platform, with religious solidarity, and ethnic and territorial unity of all Bosniacs. In the meta-legal or pre-normative situation - which most often denotes political and geopolitical context implying interests, power and force - the inclinations for territorial design are faced with the conflicting ideology of regionalism. Therefore, the constitutional-legal solutions of the former, present and future regions, generated within the self-created legality which does not respect meta-legal, political and geopolitical impulses regardless of how aestheticized and "humanized" they may be - at the end face the practical impossibility of realization.

With the end of the Cold War, many observers expected that international conflict would be less likely to occur and easier to manage. Given the successful resolution of the Gulf War and the European Community's (EC) efforts to develop a common foreign policy, observers expected international cooperation to manage the few conflicts that might break out. Instead, the disintegration of Yugoslavia contradicted these expectations. Rather than developing a common foreign policy, European states were divided over how to deal with Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Germany pushed for relatively quick recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, whereas other members of the EC wanted to go slower. Some observers expected Russia to fall in line with the West because of its need for investment and trade, but instead it supported Serbia. It is puzzling that Europe failed to cooperate regardless of whether greater international cooperation could have managed this conflict. How can we make sense of the international relations of Yugoslavia's demise? Since secession is not a new phenomenon, we should study previous secessionist conflicts to determine if they share certain dynamics, and we should consider applying to Yugoslavia the arguments developed to understand such conflicts.

This dissertation examines the emergence of norms and the process through which these influence state behaviour. State identity conceptualized in ethnic or civic terms, shapes state preferences concerning the recognition of new states. Hence, the ethnic or civic identity of Germany, France, Greece and Italy influenced their policy on recognition of the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, FYROM (Macedonia) and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the examination of these policies indicates that these preferences were tempered by security concerns and perceptions of threat. Hence, although this thesis supports the constructivist claim on the power of principles such as identity, it also incorporates the realist claims on the significance of geopolitics in foreign policy. Consequently, it does not claim the supremacy of one theory over another instead it attempts to provide a better framework for understanding the sources of foreign policy.

When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, the Western Powers (Britain, the USA, France) were taking action to counter a perceived Soviet threat. This included the policy of liberating Eastern Europe from Communist domination. Tito's expulsion was misinterpreted by the Western Powers: assuming that Tito had initiated it, the Western Powers hoped for similar "defections" by other Communis regimes. The sowing of discord between the Satellite leaders (including Mao) and Stalin became a new facet of the Liberation policy. Yugoslavia was treated as show-case to demonstrate to Satellite leaders that they could obtain aid from the West if they ceased to support Stalin. In the case of the European Satellite leaders, this policy was a miscalculation: they had no intention of breaking with Stalin and the alternative of obtaining help from the Western Powers had little credibility in view of their anti-Communist propaganda and subversive secret operations. The Americans for other reasons failed to encourage existing emancipatory trends among the Chinese Communist leaders. British recognition of Mao's regime was not enough to draw Mao away from Stalin. Yugoslavia's other role was strategic and it gained particular importance for the West in the context of increased defensive measures after the outbreak of the Korean War. The Western Powers gave Yugoslavia arms and economic aid to strengthen her as a shield for the defence of NATO territory. Yet Yugoslavia was discouraged from committing herself to the West by Western reluctance to give away NATO information. Italo- Yugoslav defence co-ordination would have been necessary but was made impossible by disagreements about Trieste, also involving the Western Powers. The Trieste crisis of late 1953 set back Western-Yugoslav relations significantly, perhaps irretrievably. The ephemeral Balkan defence pact of 1954 between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey was no substitute, and with the waning of the Soviet threat for Yugoslavia after Stalin's death in 1953 Tito became less interested in defence-cooperation with the Western Powers.

This paper surveys U.S. foreign policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the American administration reacted to the Soviet Union's interventions in Afghanistan and Poland and to its planned gas pipeline to Western Europe. Chapter I outlines the origins of the pipeline project; Chapters II and III describe U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviets during the Carter and Reagan administrations. Chapter IV focuses on the economic sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union by the United States and their failure to block or delay the pipeline, and Chapter V stresses the inability of economic sanctions-- in this and other instances--to achieve political ends.

Defence date: 3 July 1998
Examining Board: Prof. Fulvio Attinà (University of Catania); Prof. Knud Erik Jørgensen (University of Aaarhus); Prof. Roger Morgan (Supervisor); Prof. Jan Zielonka (European University Institute)
First made available online 04 July 2017
On June 26, 1991, after some 46 years without a war in Europe, violent conflict erupted in the territory of what used to be the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It took more than four years of atrocities before a peace agreement was finally negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995. This book provides a detailed analysis of the response of Western Europe to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The account pays particular attention to the behaviour of the major Member States of the European Community (later Union), such as France, Britain, and Germany, in two crucial moments of debate and decision-making: the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and the debate on the desirability and form of a possible military intervention in the warring country. By combining three theoretical approaches to the study of international politics - neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism - Lucarelli provides a theoretically informed analysis of the main forces behind Western Europe's response to the Yugoslav wars. Conclusions are drawn on the major characteristics of Western Europe's management of the conflict, the interplay of international and domestic factors behind the behaviour of Western European states, the relative explanatory power of each of the three theoretical perspectives and their common research tradition, and the perspective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The book's reconstruction and evaluation of conflict management in ex-Yugoslavia, its attention to the influence of the European integration process on the foreign policy of its Member States, and its use and assessment of International Relations theoretical tools, should make it of topical interest for a wide range of scholars interested in both international and European political affairs.

Defence date: 14 July 2017
Examining Board: Prof Federico Romero, European University Institute (Supervisor); Prof Pavel Kolář, European University Institute; Prof Josip Glaurdić, University of Luxembourg; Prof Tvrtko Jakovina, University of Zagreb
This thesis examines the origins and evolution of Yugoslav policy towards Western European integration from the early 1950s until the signing of the first Yugoslav–EEC Trade Agreement in 1970. It examines the emerging role of Western Europe in the Yugoslav foreign and internal politics within the larger context of the Cold War and development of European integration. Increased trade relations with the EEC and the domestic introduction of the 1965 Economic Reform proved vital in persuading Belgrade to become the first socialist country to establish diplomatic and trade relations with the Community in 1968. The thesis argues that these relations became of increasing relevance to the economic and, ultimately, political stability of Yugoslavia. Besides the basic foreign (trade) policy concepts towards the EEC, this study focuses on the perceptions of the Western European integration process among the political elite by addressing the following research questions: How did Yugoslav policymakers react to the Western European integration process? What impact did the success of the EEC have on Yugoslav foreign policy and internal differences among the political elite? In what way did the League of Communists of Yugoslavia rationalize their cooperation with the EEC? What did it mean for the internal coherence of the LCY and for Yugoslavia’s pronounced cooperation with the developing countries? The overarching question is how and why already in the 1960s the EEC became such an important external factor, crucial for the economic development and stability of Yugoslavia. By analysing the complex interaction between the external factors and internal dynamics of Yugoslavia and their impact on Belgrade´s policy towards the EEC, this study provides an explanation of the underlying long-term structural problems of the economy that determined the Yugoslav diplomatic and economic responses to the creation and evolution of the EEC until the breakup of the country.
Chapter ‘Conclusion' of the PhD thesis draws upon an earlier version published as an article 'A troubled relationship : Yugoslavia and the European economic community in détente' (2014) in the journal ‘European review of history’

Defence date: 3 July 1991
Examining board: Dr. Willy de Clerq, President of the Committee for External Economic Relations of the European Parliament, Minister of State ; Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, University of Cologne, Director of the Froschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (Bonn) ; Dr. Horst G. Krenzler, Director General for External Relations, Commission of the European Communities ; Prof. Dr. roger Morgan (supervisor) European University Institute ; Prof. Dr. Jürgen Schwarze (co-supervisor) European University Institute ; Dr. William Wallace, Senior Research Fellow in European Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford University

Defence date: 9 November 2010
Examining Board: Prof. Antonella Romano (EUI), Supervisor Prof. Anthony Molho (EUI) Prof. Stephen L. Dyson (University at Buffalo, The State University of New York) Prof. Salvatore Settis (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa)
First made available online on 14 January 2013.
The focus of this investigation lies on the dynamic of national interests versus international collaboration among the so-called foreign academies in Rome during the immediate post-war period in Italy. This is a study of individual, local and national representation and mentalities, as well as of national scholarly institutions. The study covers the period 1935-1953, and concerns scholarly interaction at five foreign academies in Rome - the Swedish Institute in Rome (SIR), the British School at Rome (BSR), the American Academy in Rome (AAR), the École française de Rome (EFR) and the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut Rom (DAIR) - all representing national academic structures and scholarly paradigms in relation to the study of antiquity and perceptions of common classical heritage and tradition. The investigation attempts to illuminate and contextualise the foreign academies in Rome, and has been inspired by the conspicuous general lack of assessment of the foreign academies beyond national ‘hagiographical’ histories, and by a need for self-reflective evaluation of the academies in historical context.

This chapter examines the evolution of European approaches to the Middle East. Realism would downplay the relevance of institutions such as the European Union and the limits to cooperation. Yet medium powers such as Europe can shape outcomes in international relations and there are Middle Eastern states that have looked to Europe to supply this balancing effect. The chapter discusses four discernible phases in the story of European involvement in the Middle East in the last hundred years. The first is the era of European imperialism in the Middle East; the second coincides with the Cold War, which witnessed the rivalry between the Western powers for commercial gain; the third period saw the EU member states set about devising a common foreign and security policy toward their neighbours in the Mediterranean; and the fourth covers the Arab Spring and the refugee crisis.

This chapter examines how the world was divided into two opposing blocs, East and West, during the period 1945–8. It begins with a discussion of the Marshall Plan, focusing on its implementation and its Cold War consequences, and the Western economic system. It then considers the Soviet Union’s takeover of Eastern and Central Europe, with emphasis on the split between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. It also looks at the struggle for influence in East Asia and concludes with an assessment of the division of Germany. The chapter suggests that the Berlin crisis was in many ways a symbolic crisis in a city which came to epitomize Cold War tensions until 1989; the crisis has also been regarded as an important cause of the militarization of the Cold War and the formation of NATO.

This chapter examines how the world was divided into two opposing blocs, East and West, during the period 1945–1948. It begins with a discussion of the Marshall Plan, focusing on its implementation and its Cold War consequences, and the Western economic system. It then considers the Soviet Union’s takeover of Eastern and Central Europe, with emphasis on the split between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. It also looks at the struggle for influence in East Asia and concludes with an assessment of the division of Germany. The chapter suggests that the Berlin crisis was in many ways a symbolic crisis in a city which came to epitomize Cold War tensions until 1989; the crisis has also been regarded as an important cause of the militarization of the Cold War and the formation of NATO.

The breakup of Yugoslavia is a turning point in international relations with consequences far beyond the region. The US intervention in the former Yugoslavia reestablishes American leadership in Europe. It revitalizes and reforms NATO and the EU and creates new relationships with the UN. The international effort in the former Yugoslavia creates seven new nations oriented toward Western values. Importantly, the US engagement creates an opportunity to replace ethnic conflict with democracy in the Balkans. While the US should remain engaged, success depends on the commitment of local leaders to change.

The aim of the research is to explore the development of trade relations between the Visegrád countries and their major Western European partners since accession to the European Union. The topic is currently an important one, as the Visegrád region is highly dependent on Western European countries, especially in the area of foreign trade. The research analyzed how the 2008-2009 global economic crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in Europe affected these trade relationships, i.e. did it cause significant changes in levels of relationship and/or trends. To answer this question, this paper used a time-series analysis method called Interrupted Time Series Analysis. As a result, statistically significant changes in the level and trend of foreign trade relations between the Visegrád countries and their Western European partners were detected. Finally, a more detailed breakdown of product groups also revealed which product groups are most responsible for slowing down the growth of trade relations.

After the dispersion of the Soviet Union, the European Union embarked upon an intense relationship with the Central and Eastern European Countries. The transition into capital market and democratization of these countries had been supported by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1989 before the collapse of the Soviet Union System. The European Agreements were signed between the EU and Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on December 16th, 1991. 10 Central and Eastern Europe Countries became the members of the EU on May 1st, 2004. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU on January 1st, 2007, the number of the EU member countries reached up to 27, and finally extending to 28 with the membership of Croatia to the EU on July 1st, 2013. Removing the Western Balkan States, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina from the scope of external relations, the EU included these countries in the enlargement process in 2005.The European Commission has determined 2014 enlargement policy priorities as dealing with the fundamentals on preferential basis. In this context, the developments in the Balkans will be closely monitored within the scope of a new approach giving priority to the superiority of law. The enlargement process of the EU towards the Balkans and whether or not the Western Balkan States will join the Union will be analyzed.

The UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign policy describes Russia as ‘the most acute direct threat to [the UK’s] security’ in the 2020s. Relations did not get this bad overnight: the trend has been negative for nearly two decades. The bilateral political relationship is now broken. Russian policymakers regard the UK as hostile, but also as weaker than Russia: a junior partner of the US and less important than Germany within Europe. The consensus among Russian observers is that Brexit has reduced the UK’s international influence, to Russia’s benefit. The history of UK–Russia relations offers four lessons. First, because the two lack shared values and interests, their relationship is fragile and volatile. Second, adversarial relations are the historical norm. Third, each party exaggerates its importance on the world stage. Fourth, external trends beyond the UK’s control regularly buffet the relationship. These wider trends include the weakening of the Western-centric international order; the rise of populism and opposition to economic globalization; and the global spread of authoritarian forms of governance. A coherent Russia strategy should focus on the protection of UK territory, citizens and institutions; security in the Euro-Atlantic space; international issues such as non-proliferation; economic relations; and people-to-people contacts. The UK should pursue its objectives with the tools of state power, through soft power instruments and through its international partnerships. Despite Brexit, the EU remains an essential security partner for the UK. In advancing its Russia-related interests, the UK should have four operational priorities: rebuilding domestic resilience; concentrating resources on the Euro-Atlantic space; being a trusted ally and partner; and augmenting its soft power. UK decision-makers should be guided by four propositions. In the first place, policy must be based on clear, hard-headed thinking about Russia. Secondly, an adversarial relationship is not in itself contrary to UK interests. Next, Brexit makes it harder for the UK and the EU to deal with Russia. And finally, an effective Russia policy demands a realistic assessment of UK power and influence. The UK is not a ‘pocket superpower’. It is an important but middling power in relative decline. After Brexit, it needs to repair its external reputation and maximize its utility to allies and partners, starting with its European neighbours.