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Articles de revues sur le sujet "World War, 1939-1945 – Diplomatic history – Germany"
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Siegel, Mona, et Kirsten Harjes. « Disarming Hatred : History Education, National Memories, and Franco-German Reconciliation from World War I to the Cold War ». History of Education Quarterly 52, no 3 (août 2012) : 370–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5959.2012.00404.x.
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On May 4, 2006, French and German cultural ministers announced the publication of Histoire/Geschichte, the world's first secondary school history textbook produced jointly by two countries. Authored by a team of French and German historians and published simultaneously in both languages, the book's release drew considerable public attention. French and German heads-of-state readily pointed to the joint history textbook as a shining example of the close and positive relations between their two countries, while their governments heralded the book for “symbolically sealing Franco-German reconciliation.” Beyond European shores, East Asian commentators in particular have taken note of Franco-German textbook collaboration, citing it as a possible model for how to work through their own region's often antagonistic past. Diplomatic praise is not mere hyperbole. From the Franco-Prussian War (1870) through World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945), France and Germany were widely perceived to be “hereditary enemies.” The publication of Histoire/Geschichte embodies one of the most crucial developments in modern international relations: the emergence of France and Germany as the “linchpin” of the New Europe.
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Roberts, Geoffrey. « Stalin, the Pact with Nazi Germany, and the Origins of Postwar Soviet Diplomatic Historiography ». Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no 4 (octobre 2002) : 93–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/15203970260209527.
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Recently released files from the collection (fond) of Josif Stalin's papers in the former Central Party Archive in Moscow have shed new light on the development of postwar S viet diplomatic historiography, particularly in relation to Stalin's personal role in framing the official rationale and justification for the Nazis viet pact of 1939–1941. This episode gave rise to a policy of archivebased publications in the mid 1950s and pr vided the foundation for later Soviet (and posts viet) treatments of the diplomatic history of the Second World War and other topics.
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Borisov, A. Y. « Diplomatic History of the Great Patriotic War and the New World Order ». MGIMO Review of International Relations, no 3(42) (28 juin 2015) : 9–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-3-42-9-20.
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From ancient times, war was called "the creator of all things". And winners created the postwar world order. The article reveals the backstage, the diplomatic history of the Great Patriotic War, which make the picture of the main events of the war, that culminated in victory May 1945 in the capital of the defeated Third Reich, complete. The decisive role of the Soviet Union and its armed forces in the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies was the strong foundation on which to build the strategy and tactics of Soviet diplomacy during the war. It was implemented in the course of negotiations with the Western Allies - the United States and Britain, led by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. World history teaches, large and small wars have been fought on Earth for centuries for specific political interests. In this context, the Second World War has been a shining example not only to curb the aggressor states, the liberation of peoples from the Nazi tyranny, but also an attempt by the victor to organize a new, better postwar world order to guarantee a durable and lasting peace based on the cooperation of the allied states. But the allies in the war did not become allies in the organization of the postwar world. Their collaboration briefly survived the end of hostilities and was overshadowed start turning to the Cold War. It was largely due to the US desire to realize their material advantages to the detriment of the Soviet Union after the war and build a system that would be a one-sided expression of the interests of Washington. Americans, especially after the death of President Roosevelt, and during his successor Truman understood international cooperation as an assertion of its global leadership while ignoring the interests of the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the war.
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Grottanelli, Cristiano. « Fruitful Death : Mircea Eliade and Ernst Jünger on Human Sacrifice, 1937–1945 ». Numen 52, no 1 (2005) : 116–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568527053083449.
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AbstractMircea Eliade, the writer and historian of religions, and Ernst Jünger, the hero of the Great War, novelist, and essayist, met in the 1950s and co-edited twelve issues of the periodical Antaios. Before they met and cooperated, however, and while the German writer knew about Eliade from their common friend, Carl Schmitt, they both dealt with the subject of human sacrifice. Eliade began to do so in the thirties, and his interest in that theme was at least in part an aspect of his political activism on behalf of the Legion of the Archangel Michael, or the Iron Guard, the nationalistic and anti-Semitic movement lead by Corneliu Codreanu. Sacrificial ideology was a central aspect of the Legion's political theories, as well as of the practice of its members. After the Iron Guard was outlawed by its allies, and many of its members had been killed, and while the Romanian regime of Marshal Ion Antonescu was still fighting alongside the National Socialist regime in the Second World War, Eliade turned to other aspects of sacrificial ideology. In 1939 he wrote the play Iphigenia, celebrating Agamemnon's daughter as a willing victim whose death made the Greek conquest of Troy possible; and as a member of the regime's diplomatic service in Lisbon he published a book in Portuguese on Romanian virtues (1943), in which he presented what he called Two Myths of Romanian Spirituality, extolling his nation's readiness to die through the description of the sacrificial traditions of Master Manole and of the Ewe Lamb (Mioritza). Jünger's attitude to sacrifice ran along lines that were less traditional: possibly already while serving as a Wehrmacht officer, in his pamphlet Der Friede, the German writer attributed sacrificial status to all the victims of the Second World War, soldiers, workmen, and unknowing innocents, and saw their death as the ransom of a peace "without victory or defeat." In this article, the sacrificial ideologies of the two intellectuals are compared in order to reflect upon the complex interplay between traditional religious themes, more or less freely re-interpreted and transformed, political power, and violent conflict, in an age of warfare marked by fascisms and by the terrible massacre some refer to by the name of an ancient Greek sacrificial practice.
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Pavlenko, Valerii, et Oleksandr Komarenko. « HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF : THE INABILITY OF THE FORCES OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY AROUND THE WORLD TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF A PLANETARY WAR IN THE 2ND HALF OF THE 1930S ». European Historical Studies, no 21 (2022) : 82–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2022.21.6.
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In this paper the international political situation, which was established in Europe and in the world in the latter half of the 30s of the 20th century, is investigated. The authors draw a comparison between the 20s and 30s of the 20th century, pointing out that the 30s brought a series of military conflicts, as well as say that the fear of a new great war has been appeared throughout the world. Attention is drawn to the inactivity of the League of Nations, which failed to ensure a collective security policy between 1936 and 1938. Special attention has been drawn to the appeasement policy and the role of Great Britain and France in this policy, who did not want to bring the situation to military confrontation. It is pointed out that by the mid-1930s Germany went on the offensive and set itself the goal of achieving supremacy in Europe. Special attention is drawn to the reaction of Western countries to Hitler’s aggressive policy, as well as the actions of the Soviet Union and the policy carried out by Moscow on the eve of World War II are assessed. It is stated that in 1938-1939 the world policy increasingly focused on particular regions, where the conflict number and intensity were increasing sharply. The role of the Munich Conference in September 1938 and the fact that the initiative in international affairs was completely transferred to A. Hitler upon the signing of the agreement are determined. The policy of Great Britain and France after the Munich Conspiracy is analysed; it is explained why London and Paris thought primarily about personal security. A special place in this paper is given to the explanation of why the existing international system could no longer ensure the world order and why war becomes inevitable. The authors come to the conclusion that although Hitler managed to win the diplomatic struggle on the eve of World War II, but he did not finally become a triumphant.
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BRYDAN, DAVID. « Axis Internationalism : Spanish Health Experts and the Nazi ‘New Europe’, 1939–1945 ». Contemporary European History 25, no 2 (12 avril 2016) : 291–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777316000084.
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AbstractMany of the forms and practices of interwar internationalism were recreated under the auspices of the Nazi ‘New Europe’. This article will examine these forms of ‘Axis internationalism’ by looking at Spanish health experts' involvement with Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Despite the ambiguous relationship between the Franco regime and the Axis powers, a wide range of Spanish health experts formed close ties with colleagues from Nazi Germany and across Axis and occupied Europe. Many of those involved were relatively conservative figures who also worked with liberal international health organisations in the pre- and post-war eras. Despite their political differences, their opposing attitudes towards eugenics and the tensions caused by German hegemony, Spanish experts were able to rationalise their involvement with Nazi Germany as a mutually-beneficial continuation of pre-war international health cooperation amongst countries united by a shared commitment to modern, ‘totalitarian’ forms of public health. Despite the hostility of Nazi Germany and its European collaborators to both liberal and left-wing forms of internationalism, this phenomenon suggests that the ‘New Europe’ deserves to be studied as part of the wider history of internationalism in general and of international health in particular.
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BRODIE, THOMAS. « German Society at War, 1939–45 ». Contemporary European History 27, no 3 (23 juillet 2018) : 500–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777318000255.
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The actions, attitudes and experiences of German society between 1939 and 1945 played a crucial role in ensuring that the Second World War was not only ‘the most immense and costly ever fought’ but also a conflict which uniquely resembled the ideal type of a ‘total war’. The Nazi regime mobilised German society on an unprecedented scale: over 18 million men served in the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, and compulsoryVolkssturmduty, initiated as Allied forces approached Germany's borders in September 1944, embraced further millions of the young and middle-aged. The German war effort, above all in occupied Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, claimed the lives of millions of Jewish and gentile civilians and served explicitly genocidal ends. In this most ‘total’ of conflicts, the sheer scale of the Third Reich's ultimate defeat stands out, even in comparison with that of Imperial Japan, which surrendered to the Allies prior to an invasion of its Home Islands. When the war in Europe ended on 8 May 1945 Allied forces had occupied almost all of Germany, with its state and economic structures lying in ruins. Some 4.8 million German soldiers and 300,000 Waffen SS troops lost their lives during the Second World War, including 40 per cent of German men born in 1920. According to recent estimates Allied bombing claimed approximately 350,000 to 380,000 victims and inflicted untold damage on the urban fabric of towns and cities across the Reich. As Nicholas Stargardt notes, this was truly ‘a German war like no other’.
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KOSTRZEWA-ZORBAS, Grzegorz. « GERMAN REPARATIONS TO POLAND FOR WORLD WAR II ON GLOBAL BACKGROUND ». National Security Studies 14, no 2 (19 décembre 2018) : 183–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.37055/sbn/132131.
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No other country in the world suffered a greater measurable and verifiable loss of human and material resources than Poland during World War II in 1939-1945. According to the first approximation, the value of human and material losses inflicted to Poland by Nazi Germany amounts to 6.495 trillion US dollars of 2018.However, Poland never received war reparations from Germany. The article is a preliminary survey of the complex issue – conducted in an interdisciplinary way combining elements of legal, economic, and political analysis, because the topic belongs to the wide and multidisciplinary field of national and international security. Refuted in the article is an internationally popular myth that communist Poland unilaterally renounced German war reparations in 1953. Then the article discusses the global background of the topic in the 20th and 21st centuries – in particular, the case of Greece whose reparations claims Germany rejects like the Polish claims, and major cases of reparations actually paid: by Germany for World War I, by Germany to Israel and Jewish organizations for the Holocaust, by Japan for World War II – at 966 billion US dollars of 2018, the largest reparations ever – and by and Iraq for the Gulf War. The article concludes with a discussion of necessary further research with advanced methodology of several sciences, and of a possible litigation before the International Court of Justice – or a diplomatic solution to the problem of war reparations.
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SPÄTH, JENS. « The Unifying Element ? European Socialism and Anti-Fascism, 1939–1945 ». Contemporary European History 25, no 4 (14 octobre 2016) : 687–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777316000400.
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Far too often studies in contemporary history have concentrated on national stories. By contrast, this article analyses wartime discourses about and practices against fascism in France, Germany and Italy in a comparative and – as far as possible – transnational perspective. By looking at individual biographies some general aspects of socialist anti-fascism, as well as similarities and differences within anti-fascism, shall be identified and start to fill the gap which Jacques Droz left in 1985 when he ended hisHistoire de l'antifascisme en Europewith the outbreak of the Second World War. To visualise the transnational dimension of socialist anti-fascism both in discourse and practice different categories shall be considered. These include historical analyses and projects for the post-war order in letters, newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets and books, acts of solidarity like mutual aid networks set up by groups and institutions and forms of collaboration in resistance movements.
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Lotchin, Roger W. « A Research Report ». Southern California Quarterly 97, no 4 (2015) : 399–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ucpsocal.2015.97.4.399.
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Public opinion polls taken between 1939 and 1945 questioned Americans’ attitudes toward Japan and Germany and toward the people of Japan and Japanese Americans. The polls’ quantified responses provide previously overlooked data that should be taken into account by scholars of Japanese American and World War II history.
Thèses sur le sujet "World War, 1939-1945 – Diplomatic history – Germany"
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Booth, Donald 1971. « An analysis of communications between opponents to Hitler in Germany and the British Government during the "Phoney War" (September 1939-May 1940) ». Thesis, McGill University, 1994. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=22564.
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It is the objective of this thesis to examine contacts between the British government and German opponents to Hitler during the "Phoney War" (September 1939-May 1940). Throughout this nine month period opponents to Nazism within Germany sought both material and moral support from the British government for an overthrow of the National Socialist regime. This work analyzes the channels through which communication between the German opposition and the British government were established and the nature of the discussions which took place. The work also examines the British reaction to the German overtures.
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Bingel, Karen J. (Karen Jane). « Ernst von Weizsäcker's diplomacy and counterdiplomacy from "Munich" to the outbreak of the Second World War ». Thesis, McGill University, 1986. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=65474.
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Poupart, Ronald. « Les réactions des pays de l'axe face au pacte germano-russe de 1939 / ». Thesis, McGill University, 1986. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=61274.
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This thesis is concerned with the diplomatic reaction of the Axis Countries, Italy, Japan, Spain and Hungary, to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. The immediate origins of the Pact were studied in order to put into context the individual responses of the various countries, known as the Axis Powers. Each of these countries was confronted with a dramatic change in the European situation and each had to adjust its relations with Germany in accordance with its own interests and expectations for the question of war or peace in Europe.With the exception of Hungary, all were opposed to the Pact because it seemed to run contrary to their national interests and promised to upset the Balance of Power on the European, and indeed, the Asian continent. The thesis thus illustrates the special character of Hitler's diplomacy, in the last year of peace before the Second World War, which did not consider the interests of his partners when concluding his arrangements with the Soviet Union.
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Doubler, Michael D. « Closing with the enemy : American combined arms operations in the war against Germany, 1944-1945 / ». The Ohio State University, 1991. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/26692664.html.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1991.Advisor: Allan R. Millett, Dept. of History. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.
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Bernheim, Robert B. « The Commissar Order and the Seventeenth German Army : from genesis to implementation, 30 March 1941-31 January 1942 ». Thesis, McGill University, 2004. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=85128.
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An essential and critical component of the orders German front-line formations received in the ideological war against the Soviet Union was the Commissar Order of 6 June 1941. This order, issued by the High Command of the Armed Forces prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, required that front-line military formations, as well as SS and police units attached to the Army, immediately execute Soviet political commissars among prisoners of war. Soviet political commissars were attached to the Red Army at virtually every operational level, and were viewed by both Hitler and the High Command as the foremost leaders of the resistance against the Nazis because of their commitment to Bolshevik ideology. According to the Commissar Order, "Commissars will not be treated as soldiers. The protection afforded by international law to prisoners of war will not apply in their case. After they have been segregated they will be liquidated."While there is no paucity of information on the existence and intent of the Commissar Order, this directive has only been investigated by scholars as a portion of a much greater ideological portrait, or subsumed in the larger context of overall Nazi criminal activities during "Operation Barbarossa."
Examining the extent to which front-line divisions carried out the charge to shoot all grades of political commissars is necessary if we are to understand the role and depth of involvement by front-line troops of the Wehrmacht in a murderous program of extermination during the German attack and occupation of the Soviet Union. Such an examination has simply not taken place to-date. My dissertation seeks to address this issue. The result is both a narrative on the genesis of the Commissar Order and its attendant decrees and agreements between the Army leadership and the SS ( SD) and Security Police, and a quantitative analysis of how many commissars were reported captured and shot by the front-line forces of the 17th Army over a seven month period.
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Scott, James Christian. « Germany, Great Britain and the Rashid Ali al-Kilani Revolt of Spring 1941 ». PDXScholar, 1995. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/5025.
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There are few events in the history of humankind which have been more compelling than the Second World War (1939-1945). Unfortunately, most of what transpired during this period of history stands obscured by events such as D-Day, Kursk, and Midway, all happenings which popular history has been more than happy to dwell upon. This study' s intent is to, with the use of primary materials, analyze one of the more "obscured" happenings of the Second World War, the Rashid Ali al-Kilani Revolt of April and May 1941. Central to this work is an assessment of the policy responses of both Great Britain and Germany to the Baghdadbased revolt. It also seeks to answer the following question: why did Great Britain approach the coup with great urgency, while Germany, for the most part, paid it very little attention? In the case of Great Britain, its traditional power position in the Middle East, and possession of both the Suez Canal and extensive oil stocks, was challenged by Axis activity in north Africa, the Balkans and Crete. The Iraqi coup simply exacerbated the British problem. London's fears were valid and its successful response reflected as much. For Germany and its leader Adolf Hitler, ideological concerns took precedence over a Middle Eastern campaign. A Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, an event which, by design, would destroy Slavism, Bolshevism, and much of world Jewry, plus gain greater Germany "living space," was primary to Hitler's thinking in the spring of 1941. Furthermore, the Fuehrer's desire for an Anglo-German "understanding" seems to have influenced his attitude in regards to the coup. Conclusions are also drawn that the policy paths chosen by each European player during the coup were met with dissension. In Great Britain's case, Middle Eastern Commander-in-Chief Archibald Wavell felt that aggressive British action in Iraq might antagonize Arab nationalism. For Germany, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was a major advocate of an antiBritish strategy and corresponding Nazi activity in Iraq. The Rashid Ali coup represented the last opportunity for Ribbentrop, prior to "Barbarossa," to expose the great vulnerability of the British Empire. From this, proffered is the theory that Ribbentrop, through an exploitation of the Iraq coup, was perhaps attempting to dissuade Hitler from an invasion of the Soviet Union.
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Veal, Stephen Ariel. « The collapse of the German army in the East in the summer of 1944 (Volume 1) ». PDXScholar, 1991. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/4301.
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The collapse of the German Army in the East in the Summer of 1944 is analyzed and determined to be the result of the following specific factors: German intelligence failures; German defensive doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed in the West; Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive doctrine and tactics. The collapse of Army Group Center, the destruction of the XIII Army Corps, and the collapse of Army Group South Ukraine in Romania during the Summer of 1944 are examined in detail. The significance of the collapse of the German Army in the East is compared to events occurring on the Anglo-American fronts and the German losses on both theaters of military operations are compared. The Soviet contributions to the defeat of the German Army during the Summer of 1944 are examined and the views of Soviet historiography and American historiography compared.
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Veal, Stephen Ariel. « The collapse of the German army in the East in the summer of 1944 (Volume 2) ». PDXScholar, 1991. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/4302.
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The collapse of the German Army in the East in the Summer of 1944 is analyzed and determined to be the result of the following specific factors: German intelligence failures; German defensive doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed in the West; Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive doctrine and tactics. The collapse of Army Group Center, the destruction of the XIII Army Corps, and the collapse of Army Group South Ukraine in Romania during the Summer of 1944 are examined in detail. The significance of the collapse of the German Army in the East is compared to events occurring on the Anglo-American fronts and the German losses on both theaters of military operations are compared. The Soviet contributions to the defeat of the German Army during the Summer of 1944 are examined and the views of Soviet historiography and American historiography compared.
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Truxal, Luke. « Command Unity and the Air War against Germany ». Thesis, University of North Texas, 2018. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1404524/.
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Starting in August 1942 the United States and United Kingdom started waging a strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Throughout the course of the 1942 and 1943 campaigns, American and British air forces struggled to gain the upper hand in the European air war. By November 1943 American and British defeats at the hands of the German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, had placed the air war in doubt. By February 1944, the air war had turned around in favor of the Allies. This dramatic turn of events has been explained by historians in a number of ways. The most popular narrative is that the introduction of the long range escort fighter, the P-51 "Mustang," turned the tide in the air war. Another narrative is that there was a change in the fighter tactics. Starting in January 1944, American fighters stopped defending the bombers and started aggressively pursuing German fighters. Yet, these analyses do not include a major command changes that took place from November to January 1944. After his appointment to command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower used his position centralize all of the major air commands in Europe under his control. By unifying the air commands, the Allies were able to better coordinate and concentrate their air against Germany. In February 1944 the Allies focused their air forces against the Luftwaffe ultimately wearing down German fighter strength. After finally removing a major obstacle impending the strategic air war against Germany, the Allies concentrated their air forces against transportation and oil targets. The destruction of these two major economic systems crippled Germany's ability to fight the Allies in 1944 and 1945. By changing the command structure, Eisenhower was able to use his air forces in successful coordinated strategic air offensives that the Allies had previously been incapable of accomplishing.
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Watt, Mary R. « The 'stunned' and the 'stymied' : The P.O.W. experience in the history of the 2/11th Infantry Battalion, 1939-1945 ». Thesis, Edith Cowan University, Research Online, Perth, Western Australia, 1996. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/966.
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Stimulated by a pronouncement of Joan Beaumont that prisoners of war are a neglected subject of historical inquiry this thesis undertakes an empirical and analytical study concerning this topic. Within the context of the prisoner of war experience in the history of the 2/11th Infantry Battalion during the Second World War, it puts a case for including non-operational strands of warfare in the body of Australian official military history. To facilitate this contention the study attempts to show the reasons for which historians might study the scope and range of the prisoner of war experience. Apart from describing the context and aims of the study, the paper utilizes Abraham Maslow's theory of a hierarchy of needs to highlight the plight of prisoners of war. Amongst the issues explored are themes of capture, incarceration and recovery. Suggestions are made to extend the base of volunteer soldiers curriculum in favour of a greater understanding of the prisoner of war and an awareness that rank has its privileges. In addition to the Official Records from the Australian War Memorial, evidence for the study has been drawn mainly from the archive of the 2/11th Infantry Battalion, Army Museum of Western Australia, catalogued by the writer as a graduate student, December 1992, and military literature that were readily available in Perth. At every opportunity the men are allowed to speak for themselves thus numerous and often lengthy quotations are included.
Livres sur le sujet "World War, 1939-1945 – Diplomatic history – Germany"
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Sympathy for the devil : Neutral Europe and Nazi Germany in World War II. New York : New York University Press, 2001.
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Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan : The hollow diplomatic alliance. New Brunswick (N.J.) : AldineTransaction, 2011.
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Bernd, Wegner, et Germany Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, dir. From Peace to War : Germany, Soviet Russia, and the world, 1939-1941. Providence : Berghahn Books, 1997.
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Santamaria, Yves. 1939, le pacte germano-soviétique. Bruxelles : Editions Complexe, 1998.
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Diplomatic ramifications of unrestricted submarine warfare, 1939-1941. New York : Greenwood Press, 1990.
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Maria, Roger. De l'accord de Munich au Pacte germano-soviétique du 23 août 1939. Paris : Harmattan, 1995.
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Fleischhauer, Ingeborg. Pakt : Gitler, Stalin i init͡siativa germanskoĭ diplomatii 1938-1939. Moskva : Progress, 1991.
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Littlefield, Frank C. Germany and Yugoslavia, 1933-1941 : The German conquest of Yugoslavia. Boulder : East European Monographs, 1988.
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Di︠u︡kov, Aleksandr. "Pakt Molotova-Ribbentropa" v voprosakh i otvetakh. Moskva : Istoricheskai︠a︡ pami︠a︡tʹ, 2009.
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Roosevelt confronts Hitler : America's entry into World War II. DeKalb, Ill : Northern Illinois University Press, 1987.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "World War, 1939-1945 – Diplomatic history – Germany"
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Polonsky, Antony. « War and Genocide 1939–1945 ». Dans Jews in Poland and Russia : A Short History, 308–79. Liverpool University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/liverpool/9781906764395.003.0010.
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This chapter explores how the outbreak of the Second World War initiated a new and tragic period in the history of the Jews of north-eastern Europe. The Polish defeat by Nazi Germany in the unequal campaign that began in September of 1939 led to a new partition of the country by Germany and the Soviet Union. Though Hitler had been relatively slow to put the more extreme aspects of Nazi antisemitism into practice, by the time the war broke out, the Nazi regime was set in its deep-seated hatred of the Jews. Following the brutal violence of Kristallnacht on November 9–10, 1938, when up to a hundred Jews were murdered in Germany and Austria and over 400 synagogues burnt down, Hitler, disconcerted by the domestic and foreign unease which this provoked, decided to entrust policy on the Jews to the ideologues of the SS. They were determined at this stage to enforce a ‘total separation’ between Jews and Germans, but wanted to do so in an ‘orderly and disciplined’ manner, perhaps by compelling most Jews to emigrate. The Nazis did not act immediately on the genocidal threat of ‘the annihilation of the Jews as a race in Europe’, but during the first months of the war, a dual process took place: the barbarization of Nazi policy generally and a hardening of policy towards Jews.