Articles de revues : « We-intentionality »

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Giovagnoli, Raffaela. « Habits, We-Intentionality and Rituals ». Proceedings 47, n^o 1 (7 mai 2020) : 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2020047065.

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The notion of “habit” is at the center of a lively philosophical debate that shows how some ideas from classical thought are still plausible and useful to understand human behavior in ordinary life. Following Aristotle, we can intend habits through the process of “habits learning”, which is a central topic in neuroscience and neurobiology. We investigate the dimensions of habitual behavior and its extension to the social world.

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Giovagnoli, Raffaela. « Habits, We-Intentionality and Rituals ». Proceedings 47, n^o 1 (7 mai 2020) : 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings47010065.

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The notion of “habit” is at the center of a lively philosophical debate that shows how some ideas from classical thought are still plausible and useful to understand human behavior in ordinary life. Following Aristotle, we can intend habits through the process of “habits learning”, which is a central topic in neuroscience and neurobiology. We investigate the dimensions of habitual behavior and its extension to the social world.

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Zahavi, Dan. « We in Me or Me in We ? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood ». Journal of Social Ontology 7, n^o 1 (1 février 2021) : 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-0076.

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Abstract The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality.

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Arruda, Caroline T. « What We Can Intend : Recognition and Collective Intentionality ». Southern Journal of Philosophy 54, n^o 1 (mars 2016) : 5–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12162.

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Choi, Se Yeon, Goo Hyeok Chung et Jin Nam Choi. « Why are we having this innovation ? Employee attributions of innovation and implementation behavior ». Social Behavior and Personality : an international journal 47, n^o 7 (18 juillet 2019) : 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.8124.

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We used attribution theory to explain employee behavior toward innovation implementation. We focused on employee innovation attributions to organizational intentionality as employees' sensemaking of why their organization has adopted an innovation. We identified two types of employee attributions: to constructive intentionality and to deceptive intentionality. We collected data from 397 employees and 84 managers of Chinese and Korean organizations. Results showed that employee attribution to constructive intentionality enhanced innovation effectiveness by increasing active implementation and decreasing implementation avoidance. By contrast, employee attribution to deceptive intentionality diminished innovation effectiveness by increasing implementation avoidance. These findings enrich the innovation implementation literature by introducing the attribution-based perspective of sensemaking.

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Kiverstein, Julian, et Erik Rietveld. « Skilled we-intentionality : Situating joint action in the living environment ». Open Research Europe 1 (27 septembre 2021) : 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.13411.2.

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There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointly such as playing music in a band or dancing as a couple, and performing these same activities alone. This difference is sometimes captured by appealing to shared or joint intentions that allow individuals to coordinate what they do over space and time. In what follows we will use the terminology of we-intentionality to refer to what individuals do when they engage in group ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Our aim in this paper is to argue that we-intentionality is best understood in relation to a shared living environment in which acting individuals are situated. By the “living environment” we mean to refer to places and everyday situations in which humans act. These places and situations are simultaneously social, cultural, material and natural. We will use the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action the living environment furnishes. Affordances form and are maintained over time through the activities people repeatedly engage in the living environment. We will show how we-intentionality is best understood in relation to the affordances of the living environmentand by taking into account the skills people have to engage with these affordances. For this reason we coin the term ‘skilled we-intentionality’ to characterize the intentionality characteristic of group ways of acting, feeling and thinking.

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Bian, Xiaoying, Yifang Wang et Xiaolu Zhong. « Development of understanding of intentionality and moral judgments in preschoolers ». Social Behavior and Personality : an international journal 45, n^o 5 (6 juin 2017) : 859–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.6296.

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To explore the development of preschoolers' understanding of intentionality and moral judgments, we administered 3 tasks (classic intentionality, skill intentionality, and awareness intentionality) to 344 children aged between 3 and 6 years. The results showed that children's understanding of intentionality and moral judgments developed with increasing age. That is, the intentionality and moral judgments made by 3- to 5-year-olds were generally based on behavioral outcomes. In contrast, 6-year-old children started to make judgments by combining behavioral outcomes with intentionality conditions, which meant that they had started to consider different factors so as to analyze and judge the intentionality and morality of behaviors objectively. The developmental trajectory of intentionality and morality revealed by our study provides theoretical support for guiding children's intentionality and moral judgments.

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Nörnberg, Henning. « Elementary Affective Sharing ». Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018, n^o 1 (2018) : 129–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108080.

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This paper contributes to the current discussion on collective affective intentionality. Very often, affective sharing is regarded as a special feature ofamore general form of we-intentionality being already in place. In contrast to this view, the paper attempts to explicate a more elementary form of affective sharing that does not simply presuppose other forms of we-intentionality, but amounts to a primitive form of we-intentionality of its own. The account presented here draws on two conceptual tools from the broader phenomenological tradition: prereflective we-intentionality on the one hand and atmospheric perception on the other. The central claim is that some instances of affective we-consciousness mainly emerge on the level of unthematic, pre-reflective orientation within one’s environment. The first part of the paper gives an account of this claim, while second part places the account in the broader discussion on collective affective intentionality.

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Plotkin, H. C. (Henry C. ). « We-Intentionality : An Essential Element in Understanding Human Culture ? » Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46, n^o 2 (2003) : 283–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pbm.2003.0028.

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Kiverstein, Julian, et Erik Rietveld. « Skilled we-intentionality : Situating joint action in the living environment ». Open Research Europe 1 (21 mai 2021) : 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.13411.1.

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There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointly such as playing music in a band or dancing as a couple, and performing these same activities alone. This difference is sometimes captured by appealing to shared or joint intentions that allow individuals to coordinate what they do over space and time. In what follows we will use the terminology of we-intentionality to refer to what individuals do when they engage in group ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Our aim in this paper is to argue that we-intentionality is best understood in relation to a shared living environment in which acting individuals are situated. By the “living environment” we mean to refer to places and everyday situations in which humans act. These places and situations are simultaneously social, cultural, material and natural. We will use the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action the living environment furnishes. Affordances form and are maintained over time through the activities people repeatedly engage in the living environment. We will show how we-intentionality is best understood in relation to the affordances of the living environment.

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Bradley, Deborah. « Imagining Music Education in the “We-Mode” ». Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education 20, n^o 1 (février 2021) : 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.22176/act20.1.1.

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In this article, I explore the “we-mode,” a concept under investigation by social cognition researchers that emerged from John Searle’s concept of collective Intentionality. Wemode thinking captures the viewpoints of individuals engaged in social interactions and expands each individual’s potential for social understanding and action. This access to the knowledge and understandings of those with whom they collaborate creates shared knowledge and understandings that may lead to collective Intentionality or we-mode. The discussion begins with a look at how living and working in groups affects identity formation, using Paul Gilroy’s notion of planetary humanity as an example of we-mode thinking. As Searle explains, collective Intentionality emanates from the Background (similar to Bourdieu’s habitus), which thus allows for the possibility of collective Intentionality or we-mode thinking and action. The article concludes by querying the potential for developing we-mode thinking in music education within an anti-racism framework, followed by an introduction to the four articles published in this issue.

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Calabi, Clotilde, et Alberto Voltolini. « Should Pride of Place be Given to the Norms ? Intentionality and Normativity ». Facta Philosophica 7, n^o 1 (2005) : 85–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/10.3726/93519_85.

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Reasons motivate our intentions and thus our actions, justify our beliefs, ground our hopes and connect our feelings of shame and pride to our thoughts. Given that intentions, beliefs and emotions are intentional states, intentionality is strongly connected with normativity. Yet what is more precisely their relationship? Some philosophers, notably Brandom and McDowell, contend at places that intentionality is intrinsically normative. In this paper, we discuss Brandom and McDowell’s thesis and the arguments they provide for its defence. In contrast to what they hold, we argue that neither reference intentionality nor content intentionality are intrinsically normative, although at least content intentionality has normative implications. More precisely, we argue that neither species of intentionality are normative from a semantical viewpoint, because being in an intentional state is not being in a state that is semantically correct or incorrect. Nevertheless, being in a state endowed with content may be a reason for believing or acting. Thus, we argue that content intentionality has normative implications. More precisely, we argue that any content is such that, if it is the content of a state that is sensitive to reasons—as judging paradigmatically is—then it entitles the subject of that state to have further states or to act in certain ways.

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Vasylchenko, Andriy. « Intersubjective approach to intentionality and internal objects ». Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought) -, n^o 6 (16 janvier 2021) : 27–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/fd2020.06.027.

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Intentionality — the orientation of mental states to objects (things, properties, states of things, events) — has been considered a hallmark of the psyche since Brentano’s time. In this article, we consider the problem of intentionality from the second-person approach, or the standpoint of intersubjectivity. Our analysis shows that intentionality is intrinsically projective. The projective nature of intentionality is related to internal objects that play a crucial role in fixing the person’s subjective experience and serve as a fulcrum in the development of the person. The internal object can be treated as a set of properties and tropes. The logic of intentionality proposed by Graham Priest and the theory of primary (that is, belonging to the Freudian system «unconscious») psychological attitudes developed by Linda Brakel created the preconditions for seman- tical analysis of projective intentionality. In the article, we rely on the logic of projective intentionality that reorients the resources of modal logics and semantics of possible worlds to the investigation and formalization of primary thinking. Considering the problem of mental existence within the framework of the second-person approach, we show that Wittgenstein’s reasoning about the «beetle in a box» does not refute the thesis of the privacy of mental meanings. Finally, involving the possible world semantics, we develop a neo-Aristotelian approach to the ontology of mental objects.

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Becchio, Cristina, et Cesare Bertone. « Wittgenstein running : Neural mechanisms of collective intentionality and we-mode ». Consciousness and Cognition 13, n^o 1 (mars 2004) : 123–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2003.07.002.

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PLANT, ROBERT, et JEN REN. « A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MOTIVATION AND ENTREPRENEURIAL INTENTIONALITY : CHINESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ». Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 15, n^o 02 (juin 2010) : 187–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1084946710001506.

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In this paper, we compare the intentionality of students in graduate business programs in the United States and China toward becoming entrepreneurs. We utilize Amabile's Work Preference Inventory (WPI) to examine the motivational dimension of entrepreneurial intentionality and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) to compare the impact of gender and family history of self-employment on employment intentionality. Our results suggest there is a positive relationship with entrepreneurial intent in both the intrinsic challenge characteristic and extrinsic compensation characteristic. Results also suggest the intrinsic enjoyment characteristic and extrinsic outward characteristic are negatively correlated to self-employment. In addition, the study found that males in China exhibited a significantly greater intentionality toward self-employment than females did. We also found that entrepreneurial intentionality is stronger in the U.S. study group than in the China group for those with prior self-employment experience, as well as when they have a background that includes a family history of self-employment. However, when there is no family background of self-employment, the Chinese show greater intentionality to become self-employed than the group located in the United States.

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Kuhlmeier, Valerie A., et Susan A. J. Birch. « Steps toward categorizing motivation : Abilities, limitations, and conditional constraints ». Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, n^o 5 (octobre 2005) : 706–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05380125.

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Tomasello et al. have not characterized the motivation underlying shared intentionality, and we hope to encourage research on this topic by offering comparative paradigms and specific empirical questions. Although we agree that nonhuman primates differ greatly from us in terms of shared intentionality, we caution against concluding that they lack all aspects of it before other empirical tools have been exhausted. In addition, identifying the conditions in which humans spontaneously engage in shared intentionality, and the conditions in which we fail, will more fully characterize this ability.

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Soares, Maria Luísa Couto. « Notas sobre Referência e Intencionalidade : Frege e Husserl ». Phainomenon 20-21, n^o 1 (1 octobre 2010) : 25–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2010-0002.

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Abstract This paper aims to present an approach to Frege and Husserl’s theories of meaning in order to integrate meaning in the broader context of intentionality. Intentionality and reference are two notions with affinities, despite their pertaining to different but not separated areas. . . When comparing Frege and Husserl’s theories of meaning and intentionality we may provide a fruitful and enriching perspective: some problems and concepts of Husserl’s thought may be elucidated if confronted with those of Frege. On the other hand, Husserl’s theories of meaning and intentionality provide a broader and far-reaching scope to Frege’s ideas on meaning.. Husserl’s concept of intentionality provides a new perspective which allows to overcome some of the impasses of Frege’s theory of meaning.

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Leite Bastos, Cleverson, et Tomas Rodolfo Drunkenmolle. « Intentionality : A philosophical-cognitive approach to mental representations ». Revista de Filosofia Aurora 26, n^o 39 (28 avril 2014) : 819. http://dx.doi.org/10.7213/aurora.26.039.ao06.

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This article critically analyses the notion of intentionality from several philosophical cognitive points of view. The authors argue that the notion of mental representation in the wider sense and intentionality in the narrower sense remains elusive despite accommodated paradoxes, improved semantic precision and more sophisticated strategies in dealing with intentionality. We will argue that different approaches to intentionality appear to be coherent in their inferences. However, most of them become contradictory and mutually exclusive when juxtaposed and applied to borderline questions. While the explanatory value of both philosophy of mind as well as cognitive psychology should not be underestimated, we must note that not even hard-core neuroscience has been able to pin point what is going on in our minds, let alone come up with a clear cut explanation how it works or a definition of what thought really is. To date, however, intentionality is the best of all explanatory models regarding mental representations.

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Helm, Bennett W. « Emotions as Evaluative Feelings ». Emotion Review 1, n^o 3 (10 juin 2009) : 248–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1754073909103593.

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The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of the bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and coming to see emotions as a distinctive and irreducible class of mental states lying at the intersection of intentionality, phenomenology, and motivation.

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Gulick, Robert Van. « How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness ? » Philosophical Perspectives 9 (1995) : 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214222.

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Jensen, Jeppe Sinding. « How Institutions Work in Shared Intentionality and ‘We-Mode’ Social Cognition ». Topoi 35, n^o 1 (10 février 2015) : 301–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9306-7.

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Blomberg, Olle. « We-Experiences, Common Knowledge, and the Mode Approach to Collective Intentionality ». Journal of Social Philosophy 49, n^o 1 (mars 2018) : 183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josp.12221.

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Liu, Hao. « Intentional Directedness and Immanent Content ». International Philosophical Quarterly 60, n^o 1 (2020) : 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq202013144.

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This paper will investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle’s theory of perception and assess the accuracy of Brentano’s proposed location of intentionality in Aristotle. When introducing intentionality into contemporary philosophy, Brentano attributed it to Aristotle, whose theory of psychology he believed to reveal the characteristics of intentional inexistence. After setting up a working definition of intentionality that stresses such features as immanent content and intentional directedness, I will then clarify Aristotle’s theory of perception with regard to these two characteristics. I draw the conclusion that we can only find the roots of immanent content in Aristotle’s perceptual theory. For him, directedness moves from the sensible object to the sensitive soul, and thus it does not correspond to what contemporary philosophers define as intentional directedness.

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Summa, Michela. « On the Role of Attention and Ascription in the Formation of Intentions within Behavior ». Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018-2 : Modes of Intentionality. Phenomenological and Medieval Perspectives 2018, n^o 2 (2018) : 177–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108208.

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This article explores the roots of action in behavior. Departing from the standard understanding of action as ‘intentional behavior’, we argue that this view is often based on the underestimation of the intentional structures that are already operative within behavior. Distinguishing between a broader and a narrower meaning of intentionality, we then elaborate on the processes that lead from the diffuse and operative intentionality of behavior to the focused intentionality of action. In order to properly appreciate these processes, we show that a reassessment of the phenomenon of attention – which takes into consideration its double (passive and active) nature as well as its social embedment – is required. Finally, we discuss the interplay between the obtained reframing of the genesis of intentional actions with the phenomenon of social ascription

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Overgaard, Nicholas. « A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change ». Scientonomy : Journal for the Science of Science 1 (19 mai 2017) : 55–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/js.v1i0.28234.

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Although we accept that a scientific mosaic is a set of theories and methods accepted and employed by a scientific community, scientific community currently lacks a proper definition in scientonomy. In this paper, I will outline a basic taxonomy for the bearers of a mosaic, i.e. the social agents of scientific change. I begin by differentiating between accidental group and community through the respective absence and presence of a collective intentionality. I then identify two subtypes of community: the epistemic community that has a collective intentionality to know the world, and the non-epistemic community that does not have such a collective intentionality. I note that both epistemic and non-epistemic communities might bear mosaics, but that epistemic communities are the intended social agents of scientific change because their main collective intentionality is to know the world and, in effect, to change their mosaics. I conclude my paper by arguing we are not currently in a position to properly define scientific community per se because of the risk of confusing pseudoscientific communities with scientific communities. However, I propose that we can for now rely on the definition of epistemic community as the proper social agent of scientific change.Suggested Modifications[Sciento-2017-0012]: Accept the following taxonomy of group, accidental group, and community:Group ≡ two or more people who share any characteristic.Accidental group ≡ a group that does not have a collective intentionality.Community ≡ a group that has a collective intentionality. [Sciento-2017-0013]: Provided that the preceding modification [Sciento-2017-0012] is accepted, accept that communities can consist of other communities.[Sciento-2017-0014]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2017-0012] is accepted, accept the following definitions of epistemic community and non-epistemic community as subtypes of community:Epistemic community ≡ a community that has a collective intentionality to know the world.Non-epistemic community ≡ a community that does not have a collective intentionality to know the world.[Sciento-2017-0015]: Provideed that modification [Sciento-2017-0013] and [Sciento-2017-0014] are accepted, accept that a non-epistemic community can consist of epistemic communities.

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Martínez, Sergio F., et Alejandro Villanueva. « Musicality as material culture ». Adaptive Behavior 26, n^o 5 (25 septembre 2018) : 257–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712318793123.

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From an enactive perspective, one should be able to explain how perception and actions, constituted in patterns of interactions with the world, evolve into the capacities for social coordination and social understanding distinctive of human beings. Traditional accounts of our social understanding skills, focusing on the role of intentionality as the “aboutness” associated with the use of symbolic language, make this sort of explanation difficult to articulate. A satisfactory explanation should start with the recognition that intentionality is not a monolithic phenomenon and that more basic kinds of intentionality embodied in material culture have played a crucial role in allowing for the complexity of human social cognition. We argue for the importance of kinds of bottom-up intentionality, which arise from the world as it is experienced, dynamically structuring and directing our cognitive capacities toward possibilities of (joint) action. Musicality (our capacity for being musical) is a particularly rich kind of cultural expression, in which intentionality embodied in material culture can be studied and its significance for the structure of our deeply social cognition can be explored.

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Klaver, Irene. « Phenomenology on (the) Rocks ». Research in Phenomenology 31, n^o 1 (2001) : 173–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691640160048612.

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Abstract"Phenomenology on (the) Rocks" shows how an interest in the natural realm can be congruent with globalization if we conceive this globality in a vernacular way. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty first developed a tentative conceptual instrumentarium for this direction of thought. Through a broadening of traditional phenomenology as a philosophy of primordial constitution based upon intentionality of the subject, they began thinking in terms of co-constitution and operative intentionality. In the rest of the paper I mainly show how operant intentionality works in and through the way we take up - or are taken up by - that which seems the most indifferent and impervious to us, namely - the world of stones.

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Val Danilov, Igor, Araksia Svajyan et Sandra Mihailova. « Computerized Assessment of Cognitive Development in Neurotypical and Neurodivergent Children ». OBM Neurobiology 06, n^o 03 (28 septembre 2022) : 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2203137.

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This study aims to observe the differences in the shared intentionality magnitude in mother-child dyads with neurotypical (NT) children and neurodivergent (ND) children aged 3-6 years. The quality of shared intentionality in infancy is associated with cognitive development. Our results showed that ND children scored six times higher (on average) in quiz-test than NT children. Children with difficulties in interaction (ND children) are more likely to use shared intentionality in conversation than NT children. We believe that this knowledge can contribute to developing computerized assessment methods which can diagnose developmental disabilities in such children.

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Alicke, Mark, et David Rose. « Culpable control or moral concepts ? » Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, n^o 4 (août 2010) : 330–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10001664.

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AbstractKnobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe's side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.

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Chater, Nick, Hossam Zeitoun et Tigran Melkonyan. « The paradox of social interaction : Shared intentionality, we-reasoning, and virtual bargaining. » Psychological Review 129, n^o 3 (avril 2022) : 415–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rev0000343.

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Clotilde, Ubeda, Galante Mariana, Perinetti Andrea et Peltzer Raquel. « What do we understand by undetermined intention deaths ? Injuries patterns' intentionality identification ». Injury Prevention 18, Suppl 1 (octobre 2012) : A242.2—A242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/injuryprev-2012-040590w.60.

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Abdel Rahim Dahiyat, Emad. « Intelligent agents and intentionality : Should we begin to think outside the box ? » Computer Law & ; Security Review 22, n^o 6 (janvier 2006) : 472–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2006.09.001.

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Clark, Cory J., Christopher W. Bauman, Shanmukh V. Kamble et Eric D. Knowles. « Intentional Sin and Accidental Virtue ? Cultural Differences in Moral Systems Influence Perceived Intentionality ». Social Psychological and Personality Science 8, n^o 1 (21 septembre 2016) : 74–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550616663802.

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Indians and U.S. Americans view harmful actions as morally wrong, but Indians are more likely than U.S. Americans to perceive helping behaviors as moral imperatives. We utilize this cultural variability in moral belief systems to test whether and how moral considerations influence perceptions of intentionality (as suggested by theories of folk psychology). Four experiments found that Indians attribute more intentionality than U.S. Americans for helpful but not harmful (Studies 1–4) or neutral side effects (Studies 2 and 3). Also, cross-cultural differences in intentionality judgments for positive actions reflect stronger praise motives (Study 3), and stronger devotion to religious beliefs and practices among Hindus (Study 4). These results provide the first direct support for the claim that features of moral belief systems influence folk psychology, and further suggest that the influence is not inherently asymmetrical; motivation to either blame or praise can influence judgments of intentionality.

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Feilberg, Casper, Annelise Norlyk et Kurt Dauer Keller. « Studying the Intentionality of Human Being ». Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 49, n^o 2 (16 octobre 2018) : 214–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691624-12341347.

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Abstract Based upon a brief outline of existential-phenomenological ontology we present a theoretical and practical understanding of human being, which is suited for a methodologically reflected approach to qualitative research. We present the phenomenological distinction between three dimensions of corporeal intentionality (structural, generative and dialectic intentionality) that form elementary events and structures of meaning. Various aspects of human being are better scrutinized with these concepts of intentionality, such as the association of individual being or collective being (e.g. groups) with the less differentiated anonymity of human being. The aim of our framework is to support the qualitative researcher in grasping the experience of the human life in closer accord with how this being actually unfolds and is lived. Application of the presented framework is illuminated with empirical examples from educational, health and psychological contexts. Finally, we discuss the methodological implications that our approach has for qualitative investigations of human being.

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Lekic, Kristina. « Collective intentionality and autism : Against the exclusion of the “social misfits” ». Filozofija i drustvo 30, n^o 1 (2019) : 135–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1901135l.

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The paper aims to shed light on Searle?s notion of collective intentionality (CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of ?we-intentionality?. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle?s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle?s concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for individuals with autism.

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McClung, Jennifer Susan, Sarah Placì, Adrian Bangerter, Fabrice Clément et Redouan Bshary. « The language of cooperation : shared intentionality drives variation in helping as a function of group membership ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 284, n^o 1863 (20 septembre 2017) : 20171682. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1682.

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While we know that the degree to which humans are able to cooperate is unrivalled by other species, the variation humans actually display in their cooperative behaviour has yet to be fully explained. This may be because research based on experimental game-theoretical studies neglects fundamental aspects of human sociality and psychology, namely social interaction and language. Using a new optimal foraging game loosely modelled on the prisoner's dilemma, the egg hunt, we categorized players as either in-group or out-group to each other and studied their spontaneous language usage while they made interactive, potentially cooperative decisions. Both shared group membership and the possibility to talk led to increased cooperation and overall success in the hunt. Notably, analysis of players' conversations showed that in-group members engaged more in shared intentionality, the human ability to both mentally represent and then adopt another's goal, whereas out-group members discussed individual goals more. Females also helped more and displayed more shared intentionality in discussions than males. Crucially, we show that shared intentionality was the mechanism driving the increase in helping between in-group players over out-group players at a cost to themselves. By studying spontaneous language during social interactions and isolating shared intentionality as the mechanism underlying successful cooperation, the current results point to a probable psychological source of the variation in cooperation humans display.

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Hill, Jonathan, Lynne Murray, Vicki Leidecker et Helen Sharp. « The dynamics of threat, fear and intentionality in the conduct disorders : longitudinal findings in the children of women with post-natal depression ». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 363, n^o 1503 (mai 2008) : 2529–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0036.

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This paper considers how environmental threat may contribute to the child's use of avoidant strategies to regulate negative emotions, and how this may interact with high emotional reactivity to create vulnerability to conduct disorder symptoms. We report a study based on the hypothesis that interpreting others' behaviours in terms of their motives and emotions—using the intentional stance—promotes effective social action, but may lead to fear in threatful situations, and that inhibiting the intentional stance may reduce fear but promote conduct disorder symptoms. We assessed 5-year-olds' use of the intentional stance with an intentionality scale, contrasting high and low threat doll play scenarios. In a sample of 47 children of mothers with post-natal depression (PND) and 35 controls, children rated as securely attached with their mothers at the age of 18 months were better able to preserve the intentional stance than insecure children in high threat scenarios, but not in low threat scenarios. Girls had higher intentionality scores than boys across all scenarios. Only intentionality in the high threat scenario was associated with teacher-rated conduct disorder symptoms, and only in the children of women with PND. Intentionality mediated the associations between attachment security and gender and conduct disorder symptoms in the PND group.

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Gardner, Danielle M., et Ann Marie Ryan. « Does Intentionality Matter ? An Exploration of Discrimination With Ambiguous Intent ». Industrial and Organizational Psychology 10, n^o 1 (mars 2017) : 77–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/iop.2016.104.

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Although intentionality may be a valuable spectrum on which to categorically distinguish instances of discrimination, we consider whether or not differences on this construct actually reveal differing impacts for targets. Specifically, we wonder whether intentionality is very relevant to the experiences of targets of discrimination or whether the negative consequences stemming from the discriminatory interactions occur regardless of the perpetrator's intent. Further, we explore the potential consequences related to a target attempting to confront discrimination of ambiguous intent. Finally, we discuss discrimination of ambiguous intent from the perspective of the perpetrator, outlining theories related to intentional versus unintentional subtle discrimination.

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Gopnik, Alison. « How we know our minds : The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality ». Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, n^o 1 (mars 1993) : 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00028636.

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AbstractAs adults we believe that our knowledge of our own psychological states is substantially different from our knowledge of the psychological states of others: First-person knowledge comes directly from experience, but third-person knowledge involves inference. Developmental evidence suggests otherwise. Many 3-year-old children are consistently wrong in reporting some of their own immediately past psychological states and show similar difficulties reporting the psychological states of others. At about age 4 there is an important developmental shift to a representational model of the mind. This affects children's understanding of their own minds as well as the minds of others. Our sense that our perception of our own minds is direct may be analogous to many cases where expertise provides an illusion of direct perception. These empirical findings have important implications for debates about the foundations of cognitive science.

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Strang, Veronica. « Contributaries. From confusion to confluence in the matter of water and agency ». Archaeological Dialogues 21, n^o 2 (26 novembre 2014) : 165–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1380203814000191.

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I am happy to see that my essay has generated a lively discussion, and am most grateful to the respondents for their insightful contributions. Their comments express varying levels of agreement regarding the agency of things. Vernon Scarborough revisits anxieties about whether agency implies intentionality. Using the term ‘agency’ is indeed problematic if we assume that it entails sentience or intentionality (and I do not), but if we define it more precisely as a capacity to act (upon), it is possible to excise intentionality from the equation. This simultaneously allows us to acknowledge the agentive capacities of things without proposing or implying a form of faux animism. Anthropology has indeed drawn imaginatively on specifically cultural beliefs and knowledges, for example in composing more relational visions of human–other interactions than Western science tends to allow (see Strang 2006a), but this is not tantamount to assuming that things contain spiritual presence, or have ‘their own sense of agency’.

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Wiese, Wanja, et Karl J. Friston. « Examining the Continuity between Life and Mind : Is There a Continuity between Autopoietic Intentionality and Representationality ? » Philosophies 6, n^o 1 (21 février 2021) : 18. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies6010018.

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A weak version of the life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind (with a non-representational form of intentionality). The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds (with non-representational states) are also central to understanding non-basic minds (with representational states). We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: (i) there is a strong continuity between life and mind; (ii) all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; (iii) the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by the free energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds. In addition to this, we argue that the free energy principle also renders realism about computation and representation compatible with a strong life-mind continuity thesis (although the free energy principle does not entail computational and representational realism). In particular, we show how representationality proper can be grounded in ’as-if representationality’.

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Ruess, Miriam, Roland Thomaschke et Andrea Kiesel. « Intentional Binding for Unintended Effects ». Timing & ; Time Perception 8, n^o 3-4 (5 novembre 2020) : 341–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10005.

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We execute most of our movements in order to elicit an intended effect. This kind of intentionality is commonly assumed to drive a temporal illusion, referred to as Intentional Binding (IB): Stimuli intentionally elicited by one’s own action (i.e., effects) are perceived as temporally earlier compared to unintentionally occurring stimuli (not elicited by one’s own action). It is currently under debate whether intentionality is necessary for IB to occur, or whether causality might be sufficient for IB to occur. In the present study, we investigated the importance of an intention for the occurrence of IB. Employing a Libet Clock paradigm, we assessed IB for effects which participants were instructed to cause by their action (i.e., intended effect) as well as for effects participants were instructed not to cause by their action (i.e., unintended effect). Both effects, the intended as well as the unintended, were subject to IB, with a Bayesian analysis favoring no difference for both effect types. This implies that even an unintended effect is subject to IB and that, thus, causality instead of intentionality might be sufficient for IB.

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Takács, Ádám. « Intentionality and objectification : Husserl and Simmel on the cognitive and social conditions of experience ». Filozofija i drustvo 25, n^o 2 (2014) : 42–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1402042t.

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Husserl?s transcendental turn can be best regarded as a turn in his phenomenological models of intentionality. While in the Logical Investigations, he maintains a conception according to which intentionality is a structure of cognitive directedness in which objectification plays a formative role, in his later works the intentional relation is considered as a structure of consciousness founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority. This paper 42 argues that if Husserl had extended the scope of his early phenomenological research to the problems of object formation in the domain of historical and cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), the radical subjectively oriented transformation of his theory of intentionality would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. We also argue that in Simmel?s theory of historical cognition and culture one can detect the elements of a theory of intentionality that can account for what is missing in Husserl, namely the attention devoted to the specific constitution of social and cultural objects. It is precisely the objective mediation through exteriorization and symbolization deployed in social and cultural values, and in historical time that constitutes the specificity of these objects which also conditions subjective experiencing, rather than remains dependent on it.

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Gallotti, Mattia. « Collective Attitudes and the Anthropocentric View ». Journal of Social Ontology 2, n^o 1 (23 mars 2016) : 149–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0005.

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AbstractThe anthropocentric view holds that the social world is a projection of mental states and attitudes onto the real world. However, there is more to a society of individuals than their psychological make up. In The Ant Trap, Epstein hints at the possibility that collective intentionality can, and should, be discarded as a pillar of social ontology. In this commentary I argue that this claim is motivated by an outdated view of the nature and structure of collective attitudes. If we aim at a good theory of social ontology, we need a good theory of collective intentionality.

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Shirvani, Alireza, Rachelyn Farrell et Stephen Ware. « Combining Intentionality and Belief : Revisiting Believable Character Plans ». Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Interactive Digital Entertainment 14, n^o 1 (25 septembre 2018) : 222–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aiide.v14i1.13037.

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In this paper we present two studies supporting a plan-based model of narrative generation that reasons about both intentionality and belief. First we compare the believability of agent plans taken from the spaces of valid classical plans, intentional plans, and belief plans. We show that the plans that make the most sense to humans are those in the overlapping regions of the intentionality and belief spaces. Second, we validate the model’s approach to representing anticipation, where characters form plans that involve actions they expect other characters to take. Using a short interactive scenario we demonstrate that players not only find it believable when NPCs anticipate their actions, but sometimes actively anticipate the actions of NPCs in a way that is consistent with the model.

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Kazmi, Syed Zaheer Abbas, et András Nábrádi. « New venture creation – the influence of entrepreneurship education on students’ behavior (a literature – review based study) ». Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce 11, n^o 1-2 (30 juin 2017) : 147–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.19041/apstract/2017/1-2/18.

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Entrepreneurship brings economic growth and development through the process of venture creation. These new business enterprises have a very important and positive impact on employment generation, poverty alleviation, and socio-economic development. Entrepreneurship education influences the attitude and behavior of students to form intentions of self-employability. We have analyzed the literature to clearly understand the relationship between entrepreneurship education and intentionality and the underlying mechanisms through which entrepreneurship education impacts intentions to start new ventures. By utilizing the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and Social Cognitive Theory (SCT), we propose that entrepreneurship education increases students’ perceived entrepreneurial self-efficacy and perceived desirability for starting new ventures. Entrepreneurial self-efficacy and desirability in turn impact and increase students’ entrepreneurial intentions for creating new ventures. Entrepreneurship Education Programs (EEPs) focusing “Education for entrepreneurship” have more influence on intentionality through self-efficacy and desirability. Comparatively, EEPs concentrating on “Education about entrepreneurship” will have less impacts on the intentionality. The study has important theoretical and practical implications for researchers, academicians, policy makers and potential entrepreneurs – the students. JEL. Code: A2, L6

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Schmitz, Michael. « A History of Emerging Modes ? » Journal of Social Ontology 2, n^o 1 (23 mars 2016) : 87–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0054.

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AbstractIn this paper I first introduce Tomasello’s notion of thought and his account of its emergence and development through differentiation, arguing that it calls into question the theory bias of the philosophical tradition on thought as well as its frequent atomism. I then raise some worries that he may be overextending the concept of thought, arguing that we should recognize an area of intentionality intermediate between action and perception on the one hand and thought on the other. After that I argue that the co-operative nature of humans is reflected in the very structure of their intentionality and thought: in co-operative modes such as the mode of joint attention and action and the we-mode, they experience and represent others as co-subjects of joint relations to situations in the world rather than as mere objects. In conclusion, I briefly comment on what Tomasello refers to as one of two big open questions in the theory of collective intentionality, namely that of the irreducibility of jointness.

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Mills, Peta F., Bronson Harry, Catherine J. Stevens, Guenther Knoblich et Peter E. Keller. « Intentionality of a co-actor influences sensorimotor synchronisation with a virtual partner ». Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 72, n^o 6 (7 septembre 2018) : 1478–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1747021818796183.

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Interpersonal sensorimotor synchronisation requires individuals to anticipate and adapt to their partner’s movement timing. Research has demonstrated that the intentionality of a co-actor affects joint action planning, however, less is known about whether co-actor intentionality affects sensorimotor synchronisation. Explicit and implicit knowledge of a synchronisation partner’s intentionality may influence coordination by modulating temporal anticipation and adaptation processes. We used a computer-controlled virtual partner (VP) consisting of tempo-changing auditory pacing sequences to simulate either an intentional or unintentional synchronisation partner. The VP was programmed to respond to the participant with low or moderate degrees of error correction, simulating a slightly or moderately adaptive human, respectively. In addition, task instructions were manipulated so that participants were told they were synchronising with either another person or a computer. Results indicated that synchronisation performance improved with the more adaptive VP. In addition, there was an influence of the explicit partner instruction, but this was dependent upon the degree of VP adaptivity and was modulated by subjective preferences for either the human or the computer partner. Beliefs about the intentionality of a synchronisation partner may thus influence interpersonal sensorimotor synchronisation in a manner that is modulated by preferences for interacting with intentional agents.

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Giovanni, Luca De. « Husserl on Intentionality and Attention ». Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018-2 : Modes of Intentionality. Phenomenological and Medieval Perspectives 2018, n^o 2 (2018) : 81–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108203.

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This paper discusses the role of attention in the phenomenological analysis of intentional experience in light of the problem of the relation between consciousness, intentionality, and transcendental subjectivity. Are these concepts equivalent? Or should we rather say that there is more to intentionality (and subjectivity) than consciousness? Does subjectivity embrace an unconscious domain? And, if so, how does this unconscious, yet intentional, life of subjectivity operate and how is it related to consciousness? In order to answer these questions, the paper tracks the development of Husserl’s conception of attention from the Logical Investigations to genetic phenomenology, by focusing on his analyses of temporality in the Bernau Manuscripts, on the relation between activity and passivity in the Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis, and on the issue of the self-constitution of subjectivity

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Silva, José Filipe. « Intentionality in Medieval Augustinianism ». Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018-2 : Modes of Intentionality. Phenomenological and Medieval Perspectives 2018, n^o 2 (2018) : 25–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108200.

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Since Brentano, intentionality has become a key feature of debates within philosophy of mind and epistemology, expressing the directedness and the aboutness of mental acts. In recent decades, a wide range of studies has shown the historical background of this concept beyond the historical sources Brentano himself acknowledged. Augustine (354–430) has been prominently mentioned in some of these studies, the focus of which has mostly been on the aboutness aspect, that is to say on how this mental event is about a particular thing. I think there is yet another side to Augustine’s account of intentionality and this is the general undetermined directedness of the soul to the world, which results from its way of being in the body. Such an account commits Augustine to a certain account of perception, one which does not accept that we are causally acted upon by material things, but rather suggests that we are the agents, and causes, of our own cognitive acts. This is true not only of Augustine but also of many medieval authors within the tradition of Augustinian philosophy of perception. The focus of this article is how this position is elaborated in some thinkers of the Middle Ages, namely Henry of Ghent (1217–1293) and Peter John Olivi (1248–1298).

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