Thèses sur le sujet « Ward, colin »

In this thesis, a coin from the Hannibalic occupation of Taras is analysed and discussed. The method applied in the analysis is Panofsky’s iconological method, and the theoretical framework has been derived from the research questions themselves in dialogue with modern numismatic research.  The focus of the discussion is on the relationship between the coin and its historical context. In the thesis, it is argued that the coin is a didrachm with heavily reduced weight, and that the weight reduction is a result of the financial difficulties caused by the Second Punic War.
Denna uppsats är en analys av ett mynt from Hannibals ockupation av Taras. Den metod som tillämpas i analysdelen är Panofskys ikonologiska metod. Det teoretiska ramverket har sin utgångspunkt i uppsatsens frågeställning, och har utarbetats i dialog med modern numismatisk forskning. Diskussionsdelen fokuserar på förhållandet mellan myntet och dess historiska kontext. I uppsatsen framförs argument för att myntet är en didrachm med kraftigt reducerad vikt, och att viktreduktionen är en följd av de finansiella svårigheter som orsakades av Andra puniska kriget.

This PhD thesis examines the status of ‘expert knowledge’ in the history of U.S. asymmetric, or ‘counterinsurgency’ (COIN), warfare during the last century. The historical rise of expert influence has so far been neglected in the study of wars within the field of International Relations and the thesis will give us an indication of the importance and utility of expert knowledge. With a specific focus on the campaigns in the Philippines (1899-1902), Vietnam (1954-75) and Iraq (2003-11), the central research question guiding the project is as follows: “What were the conditions for the evolution, the constitution and the use of ‘outside’ expert knowledge in U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns?” The thesis claims that military and academic ‘experts’ had a key role in framing and implementing the problem-sets and solutions to these conflicts. They have, in Iraq in particular, played an important part in developing the campaigns’ ex-post-facto justification of success. Within the framework of organisational knowledge production, this knowledge does not necessarily play an instrumental role for the military. Instead, it can also serve a merely symbolic function, demonstrating to the audience and stakeholders within the political environment that the organisation is willing to solve the problems the insurgents pose, but without any interest in long-term utilisation of the knowledge. This thesis argues that across time, from the beginning of the Philippine-American War in 1898 to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, ‘counterinsurgency’ has developed from a tactical and operational tool, used instrumentally to fight insurgencies, to a strategy or even ‘ideology’ in its own right. Whilst the methods or techniques of counterinsurgency remain basically the same, expert knowledge is increasingly used in modern – that is post-World War II – campaigns to support a politico-strategic narrative.

Syftet med denna analys är att främja COIN teorier (counter insurgency) som applicerats som en upprorsåtgärd under boerkrigen. Uppsatsens fokus kommer vara på vikten av dynamiken inom COIN teorierna. Begreppet omfattar åtgärder som vidtas av regeringen i en nation kring hanteringen av uppror. I denna analys kommer även viktiga aspekter av David Kilcullens syn på just teorierna inom COIN och dess användande i boerkrigen att granskas. Kilcullens teorier kring COIN fokuserar främst på den mänskliga säkerheten. Således är det möjligt att påstå att denna analys kommer främst att fokusera på de kritiska boerförhållanden som rått i Sydafrika. Processen utgår bland annat ifrån en kvalitativ textanalys av litteratur som beskriver skeendet. Teorin om kulturskillnader ger ett antal nyckelindikatorer samt källor som används i analysen av materialet. Resultatet visar att det taktiska beslutsfattandet under striderna främst baserades på nyttjande av COIN. Slutligen förs ett resonemang kring teorins taktiska handlande och nytta, samt huruvida analysen visar på gynnande eller destruktiva faktorer i vald taktik av upprorsbekämpning.
The purpose of this analysis is to promote the COIN theories  that were applied as a single insurgency operation during the Boer Wars. The essential dynamics of  COIN (counter insurgency) will be considered as the analysis also includes actions taken by a nation´s government to contain or suppress counterinsurgency. As well as key aspects of David Kilcullens analysis being specifically concentrated on the COIN theories and its use in the Anglo-Boer Wars, Kilcullens COIN theories also focuses on human security. This analysis will mainly focus on the critical Boer wars taking place in South Africa. It also contemplates the question of why modern COIN theory was considered an alternative in the Anglo-Boer Wars. The process is based on a qualitative textual analysis of relevant literature that vividly describes the action of the war. The theory of cultural differences provides a number of key indicators and sources used in the analysis of the material. The results show that the tactical decision-making used during the conflict was mainly based on COIN theories. Furthermore, a discussion of the operational theory and its usefulness will be presented in this analysis, and whether the analysis identifies a beneficial or destructive scene of chosen COIN tactics.

Le 12 septembre 2002, George Bush profitait d'un discours devant l'Assemblée Générale de l'ONU pour saisir le Conseil de Sécurité et exposer à la communauté internationale ses griefs à l'encontre de Saddam Hussein et de ses armes de destruction massive. Dictée par des impératifs électoraux, cette saisine de l'ONU s'était imposée à la Maison Blanche en raison de l'échec de la propagande néo-conservatrice à convaincre l'opinion publique de la nécessité d'une guerre en Iraq. Celle-ci devant donner corps au concept de « guerre contre le terrorisme » de la future campagne présidentielle, la Maison Blanche avait décidé de s'appuyer sur la crédibilité et la légitimité de l'ONU, pour relancer la propagande et travestir une guerre illégale en un acte de légitime défense, en tenant secret la décision de la guerre.La communauté internationale ne fut ni dupe ni complice de cette supercherie, mais le poids de la relation transatlantique interdit au Royaume-Uni de se désolidariser de l'Amérique et à la France d'user de son droit de veto contre ses alliés. Ces contradictions expliqueront la crise du Conseil de Sécurité de 2003, où, en désaccord, les gouvernants du bloc occidental s’affrontèrent sur la nécessité d’une seconde résolution autorisant la guerre. Cette crise ne fut sans conséquence, ni pour l'administration Bush, ni pour la communauté internationale, et encore moins pour l'ONU, puisqu'une fois enlisés en Iraq, les États-Unis obtiendront du Conseil de Sécurité plusieurs résolutions, sans reconsidérer leur unilatéralisme. Mise en porte à faux, l'Organisation internationale sera prise pour cible et son quartier général en Iraq détruit. Le chaos succédant à la guerre, l'administration néo-conservatrice sera finalement contrainte, sous la pression électorale, d'abandonner son unilatéralisme et de céder à l'ONU la résolution politique du conflit
On September 12, 2002, George Bush during a speech at the United Nations General Assembly seized the opportunity to submit the Security Council and expose to the International Community his worries concerning Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. Dictated by election requirements, referring to the United Nations was imposed on the White House because of failing neo-conservative propaganda convincing the public opinion of need for war in Iraq. This was supposed to give body to the upcoming presidential campaign’s concept of “war against terrorism”, the White House had decided to lean on the United Nations credibility and legitimacy to re-launch propaganda and disguise an illegal war into an act of self defence, by keeping the decision of war secret.The International Community was not fooled by or accomplice of this trick, but the weight of the trans-Atlantic relationship forbade the United Kingdom to set itself apart from the United States and for France to use its right to veto against its allies. These contradictions explain the 2003 Security Council crisis, where, by disagreeing the western governments faced one another on the necessity of a second resolution authorizing war.This crisis was not without consequences, for Bush’s administration or for the International Community and even so for the United Nations, since being stuck in Iraq, the United States obtained several resolutions from the Security Council without questioning their unilateralism. Being in an awkward position, the International Organisation was targeted and its headquarters in Iraq destroyed. In the chaos in the aftermath of the war, the neo-conservative administration was obliged, under electoral pressure, to give up its unilateral attitude, and let the Unieted Nations politically resolve the conflict

I uppsatsen som följer har jag använt mig av David Galulas COIN teori. Jag har sedan använt den teorin och analyserat kriget mellan Israel och Libanon 2006. Kriget blev känt som ett misslyckande ur israelisk synpunkt, då de inte lyckades att besegra Hezbollah eller stoppa deras raketskjutningar in i Israel. Detta trots att de har den mest högteknologiska armen i mellanöstern och hade luftoperativkontroll. I denna uppsats så har jag fört ett resonemang för att svara på frågeställningen: Går Galulas teorier att använda mot en organiserad motståndare som Hezbollah? Efter att ha skrivit denna uppsats så har jag inte kommit fram till ett absolut svar, men är personligen övertygad om att det går. I fallet Hezbollah är det väldigt problematiskt i och med att de var så väl förberedda på att det skulle bli krig. Det faktum att Israel dessutom hade skurit ner på sitt försvar och inte hade utbildat sina soldater och chefer inför denna typ av krig gjorde att de inte kunde strida på ett effektivt sätt. För att Israel skulle ha lyckats vinna, tror jag att en större markoperation hade varit nödvändig då Hezbollah var så väl förberedda. Detta är i linje med det första steget i Galulas COIN teori där man med truppnärvaro strävar efter att separera befolkningen från insurgenterna i detta fall Hezbollah.

In the essay that follows I have used David Galulas COIN theory. I have then used Galulas theory and analyzed the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006. The war from the Israeli point of view was a failure, as they failed to defeat Hezbollah and stop their rockets from firing into Israel. Despite the facts that the Israel had the most technologically advanced army in the Middle East and that they had air superiority in the area. In this essay I have discussed the following question: Are Galulas theories usable against an opponent like Hezbollah? After having written this essay, I have not beenable to conclude a definite answer, however I am convinced that it is possible. The reason for the Israeli failure was the fact that the Hezbollah were so well prepared for war. Whereas the Israeli forces were ill-prepared because of a substantial decrease in numbers compared to earlier years, and because the Israeli soldiers and officers were not trained for this type of war. In my opinion, the Israeli forces would have needed to focus much more on ground operations because the Hezbollah were so well prepared. This is exactly what stage one in Galulas COIN theory advises, where through military presence, separate the civilian population from the insurgents.

Ce mémoire se penche sur les raisons ayant mené à l’isolement du secrétaire d’État Colin Powell au sein du processus décisionnel de politique étrangère de l’administration de George W. Bush entre 2000 et 2004. Plus précisément, cette recherche mobilise le concept de dynamiques de groupes afin d’expliquer l’isolement de Powell dans le processus décisionnel ayant mené aux interventions en Afghanistan (2001) et en Irak (2003). Ce mémoire se veut une contribution à la littérature sur le processus décisionnel de politique étrangère ayant mené à ces deux interventions militaires. Cette littérature est abondante et témoigne d’un consensus au sujet de l’isolement de Powell au sein de cette administration. Toutefois, aucune contribution, à notre connaissance, ne s’était concentrée jusqu’ici à fournir une explication concernant cet isolement. Dans un premier temps, ce mémoire démontre que l’isolement de Powell ne peut être simplement attribué à la nature de la fonction qu’il occupait au sein de l’administration Bush. Par la description des dynamiques de groupes au sein du cabinet de guerre, il établit qu’une série d’indicateurs cognitifs et bureaucratiques permettent plutôt d’expliquer, du moins en partie, cet isolement. La présence d’un sous-groupe décisionnel déterminé utilisant des manœuvres bureaucratiques afin de marginaliser Powell, l’omniprésence de l’idéologie néoconservatrice et l’importante polarisation au sein du cabinet de guerre ainsi que la distribution inégales des ressources bureaucratiques sont des facteurs explicatifs développés dans ce mémoire.
Abstract: This master thesis focuses on the factors that led to the marginalization of the Secretary of State Colin Powell inside the foreign policy decision-making process of the George W. Bush administration (2000-2004). More precisely, this research uses the concept of small group dynamics to explain Powell’s isolation in the decision-making process that led to military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). This thesis is a contribution to the literature relating to the decision-making process that led to those military interventions. This literature is plenteous and testifies to the consensus about Powell’s marginalization inside this administration. So far, to our knowledge, no contribution has focused on providing an explanation for this marginalization. In the first place, this research reveals that Powell’s marginalization cannot be attributed to the function he occupied in the Bush administration. By describing the small group dynamics within the war cabinet, it establishes that a series of cognitive and bureaucratic indicators are more explanatory of this isolation. The presence of a determined subgroup using bureaucratic strategies to marginalize Powell, the omnipresence of neoconservative ideology that led to important polarization within the war cabinet, and the unequal distribution of bureaucratic resources are some explanatory factors developed in this research.

During the Peninsular War (1808-1814) the Spanish launched an unprecedented guerrilla insurgency that undermined Napoleon’s grip on that state. The advent of this novel and illegal “system” of warfare ushered in an era of military studies on the use of unconventional strategies in military campaigns – and changed the modern rules of war. A generation later during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), Henry Halleck and Winfield Scott used the knowledge from the Peninsular War to implement an innovative “conciliatory” counterinsurgency program directed at the Mexican people – which set the U.S. doctrinal standard informing an international consensus on the proper conduct for occupation. The Spanish war against the French influenced both belligerents in Mexico: the Mexicans tried to mount a guerrilla war modeled along Spanish lines, and the Americans adapted their tactics, rules, and laws of war between 1808 to 1848 to avoid the disastrous imperial overreach exemplified by the French in Spain.
Durante la Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1814), los españoles lanzaron una insurgencia guerrillera sin precedentes que socavó el control de Napoleón sobre ese estado. El advenimiento de este “sistema” de guerra novedoso e ilegal marcó el comienzo de una era de estudios militares sobre el uso de estrategias no convencionales en campañas militares, y cambió las reglas modernas de la guerra. Una generación más tarde, durante la Guerra México-Estadounidense (1846-1848), Henry Halleck y Winfield Scott utilizaron el conocimiento de la Guerra Peninsular para implementar un innovador programa de contrainsurgencia "conciliador" dirigido al pueblo mexicano, que estableció el estándar doctrinal de los Estados Unidos informando a un consenso internacional sobre la conducta adecuada para la ocupación. La guerra española contra los franceses influyó en ambos beligerantes en México: los mexicanos intentaron montar una guerra de guerrillas siguiendo el modelo español, y los estadounidenses adaptaron sus tácticas, reglas y leyes de guerra entre 1808 y 1848 para evitar la desastrosa extralimitación imperial ejemplificada por los franceses en españa.

This study examines how the Roman emperors c. AD. 260–295 attempt at maintaining their power-bases through legitimation of their claims to power, with reference to various potentially powerful groups of society, such as the military, the inhabitants of the provinces and the senate in Rome. The purpose has been to discern the development of ‘Roman imperial ideology’ in an age which has frequently been referred to as an ‘age of military anarchy.’ Focus is on how claims to power could be expressed through visual media. Of such media, mainly the coins struck for the emperors c. AD 260-295 have been studied. A close investigation has been made of the iconography of these coins. Furthermore, the ways in which coin-images are modified and combined with various legends are studied. An additional purpose of this investigation has been to provide a comment on the general potential of conveying visual imagery and messages on objects such as coins and medallions.

The study argues that novel, intricate and multi-layered images were created on the coins struck for the emperors c. AD 260-295. Furthermore, it is suggested that these coin-images were created to assume the function of larger-scale expressions of imperial authority, such as triumphal arches and imperial statues. This adaption of coinage was made because there was a need for intensified communication of imperial authority. This need arose due to the incessant warfare of the age, and a process of regionalization of the empire, which was connected to this warfare. The conclusion is that these coins provide an illustration of the development of the Roman empire in the second half of the third century. This was a development by which the city of Rome lost its importance in favour of regional capitals, and ultimately in favour of Constantinople.

This thesis examines the history of Commonwealth Government higher education policy in Australia between 1958 and 1997 and its impact on the development of two groups of academic librarians: the Association of Librarians in Colleges in Advanced Education (ALCAE) and the Committee of Australian University Librarians (CAUL). Although university librarians had met occasionally since the late 1920s, it was only in 1965 that a more formal organisation, known as CAUL, was established to facilitate the exchange of ideas and information. ALCAE was set up in 1969 and played an important role helping develop a special concept of library service peculiar to the newly formed College of Advanced Education (CAE) sector. As well as examining the impact of Commonwealth Government higher education policy on ALCAE and CAUL, the thesis also explores the influence of other factors on these two groups, including the range of personalities that comprised them, and their relationship with their parent institutions and with other professional groups and organisations. The study focuses on how higher education policy and these other external and internal factors shaped the functions, aspirations, and internal dynamics of these two groups and how this resulted in each group evolving differently. The author argues that, because of the greater attention given to the special educational role of libraries in the CAE curriculum, the group of college librarians had the opportunity to participate in, and have some influence on, Commonwealth Government statutory bodies responsible for the coordination of policy and the distribution of funding for the CAE sector. The link between ALCAE and formal policy-making processes resulted in a more dynamic group than CAUL, with the university librarians being discouraged by their Vice-Chancellors from having contact with university funding bodies because of the desire of the universities to maintain a greater level of control over their affairs and resist interference from government. The circumstances of each group underwent a reversal over time as ALCAE's effectiveness began to diminish as a result of changes to the CAE sector and as member interest was transferred to other groups and organisations. Conversely, CAUL gradually became a more active group during the 1980s and early 1990s as a result of changes to higher education, the efforts of some university librarians, and changes in membership. This study is based principally on primary source material, with the story of ALCAE and CAUL being told through the use of a combination of original documentation (including minutes of meetings and correspondence) and interviews with members of each group and other key figures.

This study examines the phenomenon of abusive violence (AV) in the context of the American Post-9/11 Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency campaigns. Previous research into atrocities by states and their agents has largely come from examinations of totalitarian regimes with well-developed torture and assassination institutions. The mechanisms influencing willingness to do harm have been examined in experimental studies of obedience to authority and the influences of deindividuation, dehumanization, context and system. This study used Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to examine the lived experience of AV reported by fourteen American military and intelligence veterans. Participants were AV observers, objectors, or abusers. Subjects described why AV appeared sensible at the time, how methods of violence were selected, and what sense they made of their experiences after the fact. Accounts revealed the roles that frustration, fear, anger and mission pressure played to prompt acts of AV that ranged from the petty to heinous. Much of the AV was tied to a shift in mission view from macro strategic aims of CT and COIN to individual and small group survival. Routine hazing punishment soldiers received involving forced exercise and stress positions made similar acts inflicted on detainees unrecognizable as abusive. Overt and implied permissiveness from military superiors enabled AV extending to torture, and extra-judicial killings. Attempting to overcome feelings of vulnerability, powerlessness and rage, subjects enacted communal punishment through indiscriminate beatings and shooting. Participants committed AV to amuse themselves and humiliate their enemies; some killed detainees to force confessions from others, conceal misdeeds, and avoid routine paperwork. Participants realized that AV practices were unnecessary, counter-productive, and self-damaging. Several reduced or halted their AV as a result. The lived experience of AV left most respondents feeling guilt, shame, and inadequacy, whether they committed abuse or failed to stop it.

This thesis reassesses the nature and importance of the Scottish Episcopal Church in Edinburgh and more widely. Based on a microstudy of one chapel community over a twenty-four year period, it addresses a series of questions of religion, identity, gender, culture and civic society in late Enlightenment Edinburgh, Scotland, and Britain, combining ecclesiastical, social and economic history. The study examines the congregation of Charlotte Episcopal Chapel, Rose Street, Edinburgh, from its foundation by English clergyman Daniel Sandford in 1794 to its move to the new Gothic chapel of St John's in 1818. Initially an independent chapel, Daniel Sandford's congregation joined the Scottish Episcopal Church in 1805 and the following year he was made Bishop of Edinburgh, although he contined to combine this role with that of rector to the chapel until his death in 1830. Methodologically, the thesis combines a detailed reassessment of Daniel Sandford's thought and ministry (Chapter Two) with a prosopographical study of 431 individuals connected with the congregation as officials or in the in the chapel registers (Chapter Three). Biography of the leader and prosopography of the community are brought to illuminate and enrich one another to understand the wealth and business networks of the congregation (Chapter Four) and their attitudes to politics, piety and gender (Chapter Five). The thesis argues that Daniel Sandford's Evangelical Episcopalianism was both original in Scotland, and one of the most successful in appealing to educated and influential members of Edinburgh society. The congregation, drawn largely from the newly-built West End of Edinburgh, were bourgeois and British in their composition. The core membership of privileged Scots, rooted in land and law, led, but were also challenged by and forced to adapt to a broad social spread who brought new wealth and influence into the West End through India and the consumer boom. The discussion opens up many avenues for further research including the connections between Scottish Episcopalianism and romanticism, the importance of India and social mobility within the consumer economy in the development of Edinburgh, and Scottish female intellectual culture and its engagement with religion and enlightenment. Understanding the role of enlightened, evangelical Episcopalianism, which is the contribution of this study, will form an important context for these enquiries.

There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years

博士
淡江大學
美洲研究所博士班
101
General Colin L. Powell (1937-present), a political superstar of the 1990s, has an extraordinary political and military career. He was promoted to the general rank in 1979 at the age of 41, and then in short order national security advisor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of state. He was not only the first African American to serve in each of the three important national security assignments, but also the only American in history to hold those three positions. Being propelled onto the national stage for his leading role in the overwhelming military success of Operation Desert Storm (1991), he has since then remained immensely popular among Americans due to his integrity, leadership, and the ability to transcend racial barriers. Few figures in the past quarter century have played a more prominent role in American foreign and defense policy than Colin Powell, who was deeply engaged in the most important foreign and defense policy debates, such as the uses of American force in the wake of Vietnam, the quest for America’s new role in the post Cold-War world, the interventions in Panama (1989), and the two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003). However, contrary to his popular image as a war hero, Powell was highly criticized by many top decision-makers, the presidents included, for his resistance to seeing military force as the primary foreign policy instrument in responding to crises. As a result, he was fundamentally marginalized or even isolated in the decision-making processes leading to the two Gulf Wars. Interestingly, his ultra-conservative military belief did not in any way diminish his chance in rising up the ladder of success, not at least until 2004 when George W. Bush asked him to resign as Secretary of State due to policy differences. By closely examining Powell’s military career and personal traits, as well as the evolution of military thinking since Vietnam, this dissertation seeks to unravel the myths surrounding this important, yet enigmatic figure, by analyzing what were the rationales behind Powell’s advocacy of military restraint and its linkage to his career. There are four major findings. 1. Race did play a role in Powell’s remarkable career and was major factor at numerous points in his rapid ascent. He was specifically selected and nurtured in the early 1970s to serve as evidence of the efforts by the US military to promote racial progress. In the 1990s, his image as a role model for minorities made him a sought-after figure by both the Republicans and the Democrats in order to exploit the race card to political advantage. However, his image as a political superstar obfuscated the fact that he was more a functionary figure than a strategic thinker. 2. Although Powell opposed the notion that military force should be the predominant foreign policy instrument, he closely monitored the president in times of foreign policy crises in which the use of force was considered. When the two Bushes decided to go for military options against Saddam Hussein, Powell quickly compromised, and was swayed to a pro-war stance, making himself useful by helping eliminate barriers to successful military operations. Powell’s anti-interventionist decision-making approach was based on sophisticated political calculations. It was wise for him to bank on the anti-war mentality after Vietnam and he played the role as a prudent and cautious military leader, a move which would bring him enormous popular support and, along with it, vast political capital. On the other hand, the last minute reversal on war against Hussein also saved him from antagonizing the president, the ultimate decision-maker. 3. Powell was famously known as “the reluctant warrior” because he rarely advocated military intervention as the first solution to foreign policy crises. His reluctance to the use of force grew out of the bitter lessons the US military taken from Vietnam, which include that the war power should not be monopolized by civilian leadership, that the US military power is limited, that military force should only be used as a last resort, and that the American support for US military involvement is finite. These lessons were formalized in “the Weinberger Criteria,” a list of conditions that sought to avoid another Vietnam-quagmire by strictly regulating the application of US military force. However, the lessons the military drew from Vietnam were overly generalized or even flawed, thus making the “Weinberger Criteria” inappropriate to be the guiding principle with regard to the use of force. Powell’s insistence on the “Weinberger Criteria” only made his military advice unacceptable to political leadership and marginalized his roles in the decision-making processes of the two Persian Gulf Crises. 4. Powell was politically neutral during his career, never revealing any strong ideology or political inclination, which made him easily acceptable to most Americans, both conservatives and liberals. However, this political neutrality became his major liability when the nation faced a real security crisis posed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. His archrivals in the George W Bush’s administration, the neoconservatives, though pursued a radical military approach that stood directly opposite to the prudent “Weinberger Criteria,” had, at least, strong convictions in American traditional political ideology and ideals. In a time of crisis when strong political leadership was required, President Bush determined to choose the neoconservatives over Powell to lead foreign policy, thus leading to the downfall of one of the greatest soldier-statesmen since Eisenhower, as well as the military conservatism he embodied.