Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Utilitarian reasoning »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Utilitarian reasoning"
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AGAR, NICHOLAS. « Moral Bioenhancement and the Utilitarian Catastrophe ». Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24, no 1 (4 décembre 2014) : 37–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180114000280.
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Abstract:This article challenges recent calls for moral bioenhancement—the use of biomedical means, including pharmacological and genetic methods, to increase the moral value of our actions or characters. It responds to those who take a practical interest in moral bioenhancement. I argue that moral bioenhancement is unlikely to be a good response to the extinction threats of climate change and weapons of mass destruction. Rather than alleviating those problems, it is likely to aggravate them. We should expect biomedical means to generate piecemeal enhancements of human morality. These predictably strengthen some contributors to moral judgment while leaving others comparatively unaffected. This unbalanced enhancement differs from the manner of improvement that typically results from sustained reflection. It is likely to make its subjects worse rather than better at moral reasoning.
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Thomas, Bradley C., Katie E. Croft et Daniel Tranel. « Harming Kin to Save Strangers : Further Evidence for Abnormally Utilitarian Moral Judgments after Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage ». Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23, no 9 (septembre 2011) : 2186–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2010.21591.
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The ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) has been implicated as a critical neural substrate mediating the influence of emotion on moral reasoning. It has been shown that the vmPFC is especially important for making moral judgments about “high-conflict” moral dilemmas involving direct personal actions, that is, scenarios that pit compelling utilitarian considerations of aggregate welfare against the highly emotionally aversive act of directly causing harm to others [Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911, 2007]. The current study was designed to elucidate further the role of the vmPFC in high-conflict moral judgments, including those that involve indirect personal actions, such as indirectly causing harm to one's kin to save a group of strangers. We found that patients with vmPFC lesions were more likely than brain-damaged and healthy comparison participants to endorse utilitarian outcomes on high-conflict dilemmas regardless of whether the dilemmas (1) entailed direct versus indirect personal harms and (2) were presented from the Self versus Other perspective. In addition, all groups were more likely to endorse utilitarian outcomes in the Other perspective as compared with the Self perspective. These results provide important extensions of previous work, and the findings align with the proposal that the vmPFC is critical for reasoning about moral dilemmas in which anticipating the social-emotional consequences of an action (e.g., guilt or remorse) is crucial for normal moral judgments [Greene, J. D. Why are VMPFC patients more utilitarian?: A dual-process theory of moral judgment explains. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 322–323, 2007; Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908–911, 2007].
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Chirove, Munyaradzi, David Mogari et Ogbonnaya Ugorji. « Students’ mathematics-related belief systems and their strategies for solving non-routine mathematical problems ». Waikato Journal of Education 27, no 3 (9 décembre 2022) : 101–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.15663/wje.v27i3.822.
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This study explored students’ mathematics-related beliefs and the relationship between the beliefs and their strategies for solving non-routine mathematical problems. The study was guided by Daskalogianni and Simpson’s 2001 belief systems categories and strategies for non-routine mathematical problems. The participants were 625 grade 11 students from five high schools in Tshwane North District, Gauteng province of South Africa. Data were collected using a mathematics beliefs questionnaire, a mathematics problem-solving test and interview. Quantitative and qualitative research techniques were used for data analysis. It was found that the students held all the three belief systems (utilitarian, systematic and exploratory) at different degrees of intensity and the belief systems and strategies for problem-solving had a weak positive linear relationship, and there were no statistically significant differences among mean scores of the students holding systematic, exploratory and utilitarian beliefs. They apply unsystematic guess, check and revise; systematic guess, check and revise; systematic listing; looking for patterns; consider a simple case; modelling; logical reasoning; no logical reasoning; trial-and-error and use a formula in solving non-routine mathematical problems. Furthermore, it was found that the systematic belief system could explain the students’ behaviour in problem-solving more than the exploratory and utilitarian belief systems.
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Lavoie, Jennifer, Pooja Megha Nagar et Victoria Talwar. « From Kantian to Machiavellian deceivers : Development of children’s reasoning and self-reported use of secrets and lies ». Childhood 24, no 2 (16 octobre 2016) : 197–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0907568216671179.
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This article examines developmental differences in children’s reasoning about secrecy and lying as well as their use of these behaviors in two studies. Study 1 explored children’s ( N = 66, 8–15 years) reasoning about the circumstances in which secrecy and lying are acceptable. Study 2 analyzed children’s ( N = 50, 8–15 years) actual reported daily frequency of secrets and lies in relation to maladaptive behavior problems. Overall, findings suggest that children’s motivations for secrecy and lying become more nuanced, and seemingly utilitarian, with age, and that children’s use of concealment may be an adaptive tool that facilitates social relationships.
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Jaquet, François, et Florian Cova. « Beyond moral dilemmas : The role of reasoning in five categories of utilitarian judgment ». Cognition 209 (avril 2021) : 104572. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104572.
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Serafimova, Silviya. « Moral Challenges for Bauer’s Project of a Two-level Utilitarian AMA ». Balkan Journal of Philosophy 14, no 2 (2022) : 115–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/bjp202214215.
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The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate why AI researchers’ attempts at developing projects of moral machines are a cause for concern regarding the way in which such machines can reach a certain level of morality. By comparing and contrasting Howard and Muntean’s model of a virtuous Artificial Autonomous Moral Agent (AAMA) (2017) and Bauer’s model of a two-level utilitarian Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) (2020), I draw the conclusion that both models raise, although in a different manner, some crucial issues. The latter are recognized as deriving from the complex relationships between human cognition and moral reasoning, as refracted through the lens of the idea of moral AI. In this context, special attention is paid to the complications which are triggered by the analogical thinking regarding the processes of replication of human morality in the field of machine ethics.
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Dobrijevic, Aleksandar. « "Critique of intuitive reason" ». Filozofija i drustvo, no 26 (2005) : 179–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid0526179d.
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The author displays and reexamines Hare?s "two-level theory" of normative moral thinking ("intuitive" level and "critical" level), including goals that are intended by its establishing. Given Hare?s holism, the met ethical level, considered as fundamental or the "third" level, has notable effect on process of normative reasoning, especially if it is taken as one of the determinant of the critical moral thin king. Central part of the analysis is examination of utilitarian character of the theory.
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Huang, Karen, Joshua D. Greene et Max Bazerman. « Veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good ». Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 116, no 48 (12 novembre 2019) : 23989–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1910125116.
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The “veil of ignorance” is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision making by denying decision makers access to potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here, we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning in a more focused way to specific moral dilemmas, all of which involve a tension between the greater good and competing moral concerns. Across 7 experiments (n = 6,261), 4 preregistered, we find that veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good. Participants first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning about a specific dilemma, asking themselves what they would want if they did not know who among those affected they would be. Participants then responded to a more conventional version of the same dilemma with a moral judgment, a policy preference, or an economic choice. Participants who first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning subsequently made more utilitarian choices in response to a classic philosophical dilemma, a medical dilemma, a real donation decision between a more vs. less effective charity, and a policy decision concerning the social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. These effects depend on the impartial thinking induced by veil-of-ignorance reasoning and cannot be explained by anchoring, probabilistic reasoning, or generic perspective taking. These studies indicate that veil-of-ignorance reasoning may be a useful tool for decision makers who wish to make more impartial and/or socially beneficial choices.
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Acevedo-Triana, César A., Juan Francisco Muñoz Olano et Pablo Reyes. « Differences on Utilitarian and Moral Decision Between Male and Female ». Pensamiento Psicológico 17, no 1 (23 mars 2019) : 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/javerianacali.ppsi17-1.dumd.
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Objective. Moral judgments are based on decisions that take into account the representation of norms and law, values, functionality and situations themselves. Morality has been studied with “hypothetic moral dilemmas”, in order to identify the type of outcome and the process behind moral reasoning. But judgments by themselves are not enough to establish differences in the type of resolution or the relationship with other cognitive processes. The present paper aimed to compare performance in tasks of utility maximization, cognitive control, and moral judgments, taking into account sex and other sociodemographic variables. Method. Seventy-three university students participated (50 women, 20 men and 3 with unreported gender, the average age was 19.53 years (SD = 1.68 years). The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was used to identify behaviors of utility maximization. In addition, we used the switch costs and the web application of moral machine tasks. Results. A difference between variables of the IGT, but no differences in the switch costs task were found. Conclusion. Regarding moral judgment, males gave more value to respect norms than females. Some variables of the IGT task support outcomes related to differences between sexes. Results are congruent with differences shown in existing literature.
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Martin, Rose, Petko Kusev, Joseph Teal, Victoria Baranova et Bruce Rigal. « Moral Decision Making : From Bentham to Veil of Ignorance via Perspective Taking Accessibility ». Behavioral Sciences 11, no 5 (1 mai 2021) : 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bs11050066.
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Making morally sensitive decisions and evaluations pervade many human everyday activities. Philosophers, economists, psychologists and behavioural scientists researching such decision-making typically explore the principles, processes and predictors that constitute human moral decision-making. Crucially, very little research has explored the theoretical and methodological development (supported by empirical evidence) of utilitarian theories of moral decision-making. Accordingly, in this critical review article, we invite the reader on a moral journey from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism to the veil of ignorance reasoning, via a recent theoretical proposal emphasising utilitarian moral behaviour—perspective-taking accessibility (PT accessibility). PT accessibility research revealed that providing participants with access to all situational perspectives in moral scenarios, eliminates (previously reported in the literature) inconsistency between their moral judgements and choices. Moreover, in contrast to any previous theoretical and methodological accounts, moral scenarios/tasks with full PT accessibility provide the participants with unbiased even odds (neither risk averse nor risk seeking) and impartiality. We conclude that the proposed by Martin et al. PT Accessibility (a new type of veil of ignorance with even odds that do not trigger self-interest, risk related preferences or decision biases) is necessary in order to measure humans’ prosocial utilitarian behaviour and promote its societal benefits.
Thèses sur le sujet "Utilitarian reasoning"
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Kuo, Chi-Ting, et 郭紀廷. « The study of college students’ moral reasoning on utilitarian v. justice dilemmas and exploration of its correlates ». Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/60442342944260221509.
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碩士國立臺南大學
教育學系測驗統計碩博士班
104
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the psychometric characteristics of utilitarian v. justice scale, and assess the current status of the moral reasoning of students on utilitarian and justice dilemmas based on daily life scenarios. In addition, the consistency of moral judgments made from different standpoints including impartial and situated conditions will also be evaluated. Furthermore, the effect of different background variables on the scores of utilitarian v. justice scale will also be explored. The principle of utilitarianism is to maximize the collective utility so that the differences between benefits and costs are optimized. By contrast, the principle of justice emphasizes that the basic rights of individuals should be protected even in face of tremendous majority utility. The empirical data revealed that college students in general tend to be more utilitarian-oriented in terms of overall performance on the utilitarian v. justice scale. Whether subjects will make utilitarian or justice response may depend on the scale and amount of utility and the nature of basic rights involved in the dilemmas. Subjects tended to make more justice-oriented response when they are in the impartial or objective condition. In contrast, subjects tended to make more utilitarian-oriented response when they are situated in the standpoint of decision makers. Gender, education, partisan orientation, and engagement in civil activities were the important background variables which are significantly correlated with the scores on the utilitarian v. justice scale.
Livres sur le sujet "Utilitarian reasoning"
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van Prooijen, Jan-Willem. Reason or Intuition ? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190609979.003.0003.
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This chapter pits the motives described in Chapter 2 against each other. If people pursue punishment, are they mainly driven by utilitarian or retributive motives? The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that retributive motives trump utilitarian motives. Sometimes people do use rational reasoning when punishing, but while emotion tends to increase punishment, reason tends to decrease punishment. At the same time, the chapter takes issue with authors who have positioned behavioral control as a “happy byproduct” of moral punishment. In the evolutionary history of our species, we evolved a moral punishment instinct because it was adaptive in controlling the behavior of selfish group members. Put differently, the power to control behavior is the very reason why humans evolved a punishment instinct as part of their intuitive moral psychology.
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Hellman, Samuel. Medical Ethics and Learning. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780190650551.003.0002.
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Randomized clinical trials have become the preferred method of medical learning, but the author believes that they are often in conflict with an appropriate doctor-patient relationship. The physician’s primary obligation is to the individual patient rather than patients in general. Medical knowledge, by being gained by inductive reasoning, is always conditional and subject to being disproved. Medicine must be practiced with awareness of this uncertainty; while learned for patients as a group, it must be modified for the particular patient. From Tuskegee and Willowbrook to the Helsinki Declaration, medical ethics continues to evolve to favor individual rights rather than utilitarian benefit, and this trend should and will continue.
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Besson, Samantha. Human Rights in Relation. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198795957.003.0002.
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Human rights must sometimes be restricted to further social interests or the rights of others. Yet, we like to think that human rights are not reducible to interests like security and cannot be weighed and balanced against them. This position holds a middle ground between Kantian absolutism and prioritization of rights and utilitarian consequentialism and weighing and balancing of rights. It reflects the sheer theoretical difficulty of accounting for moral trade-offs that are not quantitative. This ambivalence is also echoed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): restrictions to human rights are usually hard to justify or even excluded in some cases. This chapter proposes an interpretation that comes close to a form of qualitative balancing of human rights by reference to their egalitarian dimension. It also accounts for seemingly contradictory elements in the ECtHR’s reasoning: the ‘proportionality’ test and the reference to ‘absolute’ rights.
Chapitres de livres sur le sujet "Utilitarian reasoning"
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Präntare, Fredrik, Mattias Tiger, David Bergström, Herman Appelgren et Fredrik Heintz. « Towards Utilitarian Combinatorial Assignment with Deep Neural Networks and Heuristic Algorithms ». Dans Trustworthy AI - Integrating Learning, Optimization and Reasoning, 104–11. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73959-1_10.
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Francis, John G., et Leslie P. Francis. « Fairness in the Use of Information About Carriers of Resistant Infections ». Dans Ethics and Drug Resistance : Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health, 243–56. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27874-8_15.
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Abstract One standard menu of approaches to the prevalence of anti-microbial resistance diseases is to enhance surveillance, fund research to develop new antimicrobials, and educate providers and patients to reduce unnecessary antimicrobial use. The primarily utilitarian reasoning behind this menu is unstable, however, if it fails to take fairness into account. This chapter develops an account of the fair uses of information gained in public health surveillance. We begin by sketching information needs and gaps in surveillance. We then demonstrate how analysis of information uses is incomplete if viewed from the perspectives of likely vectors of disease who may be subjects of fear and stigma and likely victims who may be coerced into isolation or quarantine. Next, we consider aspects of fairness in the use of information in non-ideal circumstances: inclusive participation in decisions about information use, resource plans for those needing services, and assurances of reciprocal support. Fairness in information use recognizes the ineluctable twinning of victims and vectors in the face of serious pandemic disease.
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Beveridge, Craig. « Utilitarian History ». Dans Recovering Scottish History, 97–114. Edinburgh University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474491464.003.0005.
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Burton’s scepticism is identified both on early historical sources and on more recent ‘conjectural’ and antiquarian approaches to Scottish history. Allied to an insistence that history be founded on credible facts and inductive reasoning, his approach to events themselves is shown to reflect an admiration for practical thought and actions. This valorisation of ‘practicality’ is traced in a number of instances, particularly in his treatment of political history. The chapter concludes by examining the formative influences shaping these veins of scepticism and practicalism in his work. It is proposed that these relate to Burton’s significant literary endeavours in promoting the work of David Hume and Jeremy Bentham to the Victorian Age as the central modern exponents of utilitarianism; as well as his close relationship with contemporary social reformers, particularly Edwin Chadwick, at a point when they were seeking to move beyond utilitarian theory to champion practical reform.
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Bobek, Michal. « Comparative Reasoning by Courts : Some Classical Points Revisited ». Dans Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199680382.003.0014.
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The chapter revisits four of the objections commonly raised against the judicial use of comparative inspiration: legitimacy, methodology, purpose, and predictability. It deals, first, with the question of legitimacy for judicial ‘travels abroad’. Secondly, the traditional challenges formulated in relation to the alleged lack of methodology for judicial comparisons, their selectivity, and utilitarian character, are critically discussed. It is suggested, thirdly, that there is nothing wrong with the methodology, but rather with the presumed aims and purposes of comparative inspiration in courts, which are then translated into incorrect yardsticks. Finally, the seemingly unpredictable patterns of comparative arguments when employed by courts are discussed. Can there be a theory of something one cannot in fact exactly foresee?
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Gerrits, Jeroen. « Conflicting Modes of Moral Reasoning ; The Case of 24 ». Dans 24 heures chrono, naissance du genre sécuritaire ? Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.53984/philoseries08299.
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In this article I will argue that 24 can be seen as a variation of the tendency towards “narrative complexity” in current US TV series. Its straight-jacketed adherence to chronological time may not allow for fundamental disturbances of the discourse characteristic of many of its cinematic and televised contemporaries, but 24 distinguishes itself by shifting complexity from conceptual and narratological levels to the realm of morality. By analyzing two episodes from different seasons, both closely related to actual political developments in the US War on Terror at the time, I will outline how the show hovers between (and plays with our expectations of) deontological and consequentialist (utilitarian) forms of moral reasoning.
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Sverdlik, Steven. « Bentham’s Chapter IV ». Dans Bentham's An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, C4—C4P62. Oxford University Press, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190089900.003.0005.
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Abstract Chapter IV discusses the measurement of pleasure and pain, and, by implication, happiness. It also implicitly discusses the measurement of intrinsic value. The claims that Bentham makes here about decision-making are discussed in later chapters. The focus is on his conception of utilitarian reasoning. Bentham’s conception of the quantities of pleasure and pain is first explained. Next, his implicit conception of the measurement of the intrinsic value of pleasures and pains is explained. His basic mathematical assumptions are presented. For example, he assumes that amounts of intrinsic goodness are represented by positive numbers, and amounts of intrinsic badness are represented by negative numbers. Bentham’s conception of utilitarian calculations that determine the rightness of actions is also presented. It’s argued that this conforms to the picture presented in chapter 1, that is, that Bentham thinks that the right action for an agent to perform is one that would produce the most happiness.
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Postema, Gerald J. « Publicity and the Development of Bentham’s Theory of Value ». Dans Utility, Publicity, and Law, 72–93. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793175.003.0004.
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Bentham was tempted to think of the welfare of the community as a grand composite of the pleasures and pains of individuals and he suggested that it is possible to construct a powerful ethical deliberating machine capable of churning out precise, determinate, and publicly verifiable judgments and prescriptions for all moral occasions (the “felicific calculus”). Yet, he also articulated a sophisticated critique of the assumptions on which this model rests. Although pleasure and pain must ultimately anchor all moral judgments, he insisted that the language of the ordinary business of utilitarian moral deliberation, policy making, and law making must be fully public. Despite his criticisms of the quale conception of pleasure, Bentham did not abandon rationality or the principle of utility. Proper utilitarian reasoning still, in Bentham’s view, involved “calculation”—that is, tracing out the consequences of all the options for action, laws, or institutions, consequencesassessed in terms of their impact on the welfare of all the members of the community in view. But these calculations need not fit the simple model, in fact, they must not, since the simple model cannot meet the demands of moral reasoning, in particular the demands of publicity. Bentham’s universal consequentialism took for its core theory of value concerns about expectations and interests, rather than immediate sensings of pleasure or pain.
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Salvano-Pardieu, Veronique, Leïla Oubrahim et Steve Kilpatrick. « Cognitive Structure of Moral Reasoning, Development, and Evolution With Age and Pathology ». Dans Advances in Religious and Cultural Studies, 30–57. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-1811-3.ch002.
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This chapter presents research on moral judgment from the beginning of the 20th century to the present day. First, the authors will present the contribution of Piaget and Kohlberg's work on moral development from childhood to adulthood as well as the work of Gilligan on moral orientation and the difference observed between men and women. Then, the authors will analyze underlying structures of moral judgment in the light of the Dual Process Theory with two systems: system 1: quick, deontological, emotional, intuitive, automatic, and system 2: slow, utilitarian, rational, controlled, involved in human reasoning. Finally, the model of Dual Process Theory will be confronted with data from moral judgment experiments, run on elderly adults with Alzheimer's disease, teenagers with Autism Spectrum Disorder, and children and teenagers with intellectual disability in order to understand how cognitive impairment affects the structures and components of moral judgment.
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Postema, Gerald J. « Afterword ». Dans Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 456–98. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793052.003.0014.
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Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (BCLT) is a work of philosophical jurisprudence. Philosophical jurisprudence recognizes that, like law itself, reflective thinking about law is inescapably historical. This chapter considers the challenges to the interpretation of Bentham's legal theory advanced in BCLT. The most important challenge to BCLT concerns the author's interpretation of Bentham's view of judicial reasoning. The author argued that consistently throughout his life Bentham understood the principle of utility to be the sole ultimate decision principle, the principle structuring and guiding deliberations of all rational agents. Judges, rational practical agents like all others, reason in this distinctively utilitarian way as they work within the framework of the law. This is true whether the judge operates within shadow of Bentham's pannomion or outside it.
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Hilty, Reto M., Jörg Hoffmann et Stefan Scheuerer. « Intellectual Property Justification for Artificial Intelligence ». Dans Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property, 50–72. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198870944.003.0004.
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Against the backdrop of the current discussion of how AI reshapes certain IP paradigms, this chapter reassesses the need for IP protection in AI markets per se. We assess the question of justification of IP rights for both AI as a tool and AI-generated output in light of the very theoretical foundations of IP protection (from both legal embedded deontological and utilitarian economic standpoints). Traditionally, IP protection is granted due to deontological reasoning, according to which a human creator’s personality and efforts have to be protected, and economic reasoning, according to which exclusive rights in intangible goods have to be established in order to remedy market failure in public goods markets. IP ought to serve as a regulatory system of stimulation of creation and innovation using market forces to achieve this goal. Based on the current state of knowledge, however, it seems that specific market implications of the widespread use of most AI applications may have altered the justification for AI-related IP protection in certain cases. Whereas this seems particularly true regarding AI tools, the case for AI outputs may be different.
Actes de conférences sur le sujet "Utilitarian reasoning"
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Huang, Xiaowei, et Ji Ruan. « ATL Strategic Reasoning Meets Correlated Equilibrium ». Dans Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/153.
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This paper is motivated by analysing a Google self-driving car accident, i.e., the car hit a bus, with the framework and the tools of strategic reasoning by model checking. First of all, we find that existing ATL model checking may find a solution to the accident with {\it irrational} joint strategy of the bus and the car. This leads to a restriction of treating both the bus and the car as rational agents, by which their joint strategy is an equilibrium of certain solution concepts. Second, we find that a randomly-selected joint strategy from the set of equilibria may result in the collision of the two agents, i.e., the accident. Based on these, we suggest taking Correlated Equilibrium (CE) as agents' joint stratgey and optimising over the utilitarian value which is the expected sum of the agents' total rewards. The language ATL is extended with two new modalities to express the existence of an CE and a unique CE, respectively. We implement the extension into a software model checker and use the tool to analyse the examples in the paper. We also study the complexity of the model checking problems.