Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Treaty-making power – Italy »

The article analyses the issue of introducing a permanent system of distribution of seats in the European Parliament, taking into account the existing legal and political conditions. It points out that as a result of the entry into force of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, and then Brexit, the indirect voting power of citizens of the largest Member States, especially Germany, France and Italy, in the decision-making process in the EU, has increased. At the same time, most of the proposed methods of distribution of seats in this institution lead to a significant increase in the number of parliamentary seats for the Member States with the largest populations. The paper presents the original concept of a permanent system of distribution of seats in the European Parliament, which ensures that when it is first applied, no Member State will have a smaller number of seats than it resulted from European Council Decision of 28 June 2013 establishing the composition of the European Parliament. It, therefore, meets the important political requirement that the introduction of the new method of distribution of parliamentary seats does not result in a reduction in the number of seats for any Member State.

On December 1, 1918, as Regent Alexander proclaimed the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the latter entered the new state under pressure from manifold motives. Besides the desire for Slavonic solidarity, there was also a more prosaic need that made them take that step. Following the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy, in which they had lived for centuries, they emerged in the international political arena completely alone and inexperienced “as political children.” They had no borders confirmed by history, and no army apart from a handful of volunteers. For a neighbor, they had victorious Italy with the London Treaty in its pocket, in which the Great Powers promised it a large portion of Slovene territory for its participation in the war. The only power which it was possible to rely upon at that moment was Serbia, which, in turn, dictated its own conditions for the unification. The future state was to become a monarchy under a Karadjordjevich dynasty and was to be centrally structured, irrespective of the ethnic and historical distinctions among various “tribes” making up the new state. The fact that the three constituent entities of the Kingdom were lowered to the level of tribes is clearly indicative: it proclaimed the belief in the existence of a single South-Slavic nation which, although cleft into three branches by events in the past, was to reach its initial unity again, in line with the principle: one state, one nation.

The paper reflects the political sense of the Albanians who realized that in the conditions of the end of World War I needed political alliances that could not be realized without the formation of a government and the Albanian state on legal and legal grounds, so that to be represented with the proper sovereignty not only in the face of the Great Powers, which would gather at the Peace Conference in Paris in the beginning of 19119, but it was the best opportunity to avoid any representation which did not have the sovereignty of Albanians. Whereas, the preparatory stages internally for the organization of the Durrës Congress were accompanied by the initiative for the gathering of a congress in the city of Shkodra. This meeting was held in Lezha on December 9, 1918, organized by Catholic clerics and the mayor of Mirdita Bayribs, Preng Bib Doda as a movement, which included only North Albania, had not found extensive support. Another attempt was that of the city of Tirana, which took place on December 19-20, in which only representatives from some parts of Central Albania participated. These political movements gradually fused to the Durrës Congress, the organizers of the who had previously received Italy's political approval. The Durrës Congress opened on 25 December 1918 with the participation of 53 delegates, who were accompanied by the mandate of the province they represented, although these provinces were under the control of the Italian army. But delegates from the city of Vlora did not attend the congress because the Italian authorities had received instructions from Rome not to be allowed to be delegates from this city. The representatives of the provinces under the Serbian occupation, Peshkopia and Luma, and even those who were under French occupation, such as the city of Korca, were also missing. The delegates initially expressed political trust in the winners of the war, associating this with a special greeting against President Wilson, who had declared the principles of the selfdetermination of peoples. The Congress also discussed about the policy that should be followed in relations with Italy and the possibility of supporting it, which, from a strategic point of view, could have an interest in supporting Albania's territorial requirements. Through archival sources, it emerges that the most prominent politician of the Albanians, Mehmet Konica, at the Durrës Congress, had presented the Italian proposal for the formation of an "Enforcement Committee", which would try to send an Albanian delegation to the Peace Conference and acted to ensure the national and political life of the Albanian people. But, in turn, the sources reflect the political will of another part of the decalogue, which they expressed, for the creation of a provisional government, which should politically accept Roma as well. Seeking that, before this was announced, a response from Rome was taken, in the hope that it would accept its formation. While some other delegates stated that the government was a wish of the Albanian people and it did not matter whether it would be accepted by Italy. The Government, based on the minutes of the Senate parliamentary work, had two tasks: First, to send an Albanian delegation to the Peace Conference, and second, to ensure the national political life of the Albanian people. While the formation of a council or a committee would no longer be a helpless institution, leaving at the same time a free path to foreign intrigues and create free ground for antagonistic opponent Esad Toptani. The analysis also reflects the other side of the discussions, which concerned the view that the Albanian people did not have that degree of maturity to act independently, which would lead Albania to the collapse of relations with the only friend Albania had, which was considered Italy. So the development of discussions in Congress had naturally reflected the formation of two pillar groups, which were different: first, a group of congressmen was of prominent Orienteering who declared that for the decision of the formation of the government the interim was notified and Rome through the Italian command and expected its response; second, while the other group stated that they had not come to the congress to be presented as "puppets" to judge and act upon the orders of others, but to think about the will and political will of the people, who was looking for one sounds self-restraint. In fact, the critical spirit of the delegates to the London Underground Treaty of 1915 is considerable in material through three fundamental issues related to Albania. First, on the political plane, through the creation of the government, they were opposed to the Italian protectorate of the Albanian state through the representation of this state from Italy in relations with the world, as envisaged in paragraph VII of the Secret Treaty of London on 26 April 1915. This treaty was also struck from a principled point of view. Congress through the majority managed to consider the decisions of 1913 untouched, coupled with the full independence of the Albanian state already formed. Secondly, Congress could not bypass those decisions of the Treaty of London that heavily affected the territory of Albania. The delegates expressed their sternness about the VIth paragraph of the Treaty through which Italy was recognized sovereignty over Vlora, as well as for Point VII, according to which Italy would not object to the passage of southern Albania to Greece and to the north of Serbia and Montenegro Black, under the conditions that this would require other Treaty firms, such as France and England. Thirdly, Congress reiterated its critical stance on Vth of the Treaty of London, which expressed the existence of a "Muslim" Albanian state in Middle East. While reflecting on the criticism of Italy's attitude to the obstacles it had created for the representation of Vlora in Congress, which made it possible to sensitize even the question of the city of Vlora, which according to the Secret Treaty of London was in the protectorate of Italy. By the time the material was refreshed on the morning of December 26th, the main representatives of Congress presented a reminder to Italy's political representative, bringing arguments on the formation of the government to devalue the possible efforts of France and the Balkan states to call delegates of Esad Toptani at the Peace Conference. The analysis also raises the issue of the Albanian state's legal status and political affiliation to one or the other winning power, for which there were disagreements, they acted silently and in a compromise with each other. While the essence of the subject we are presenting is the political program that underpinned: First, the rights of the Peace Conference by the Government of Durres; Second, the search for Albania's ethnic boundaries; thirdly, maintaining public order and peace in the Albanian political territory. The material also includes the political support that Albanian Diaspora organizations provided to the congressional work as "Vatra", which saw political compromise with Italy over the formation of the Government of Durres an essential point because it envisioned the anatonomic diversity of the Albanian political streams that would to be presented at the Peace Conference in Paris. But by making a careful study of the period in which this agreement was reached, this attitude seems to be fair. This agreement came about as a result of the change of Albania's historical circumstances at the end of the war, such as: the collapse of political balances in the Balkans as a result of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the loss of war from it.

The latest trend in modern European constitutionalism is the issue of constitutional identity. Constitutional courts, which are the embodiment not only of the protection of the Constitution, but also of the limitation of power, are influential subjects of assessing the country’s international obligations and their implementation in national legislation. The purpose of the article is to analyze the constitutional identity in the argumentation of decisions of constitutional courts. The research method is a comparative legal analysis of the practice of constitutional review bodies in order to assess the expression of the concept of respect for national identity, which has become a condition and principle of legal integration in the European region. In addition, empirical analysis of decisions of constitutional courts was used. Using the system-structural method, the doctrine of «constitutional boundaries» as a component of constitutional identity is analyzed. It is justified that the concept of «identity» appeared and began to be actively used by European constitutional courts to justify decisions related to the processes of European integration and the expansion of the influence of supranational institutions of international organizations, including the European Union. It is proved that the decisions of constitutional courts should be based on national legal values, taking into account international practice and the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. At the same time, national courts must take into account the country’s international obligations when making decisions. In today’s world, constitutional courts cooperate with the courts of international organizations, which form a common case law in the member states, in particular on the interpretation of human rights. This is manifested in the citation by constitutional courts in their acts of decisions of supranational judicial bodies. It should also be noted that the constitutional court may be guided by the positions of international courts in forming its legal position, but according to the doctrine of judicial discretion, the national court is free to assess the circumstances of the case and it is best acquainted with national features and specifics of national law. The analysis of the decisions of the bodies of constitutional proceedings, which used the concept of constitutional identity, gave grounds to claim that the courts in their practice in their interpretation appealed to different arguments depending on the specifics of the case. For example, in formulating the doctrine of constitutional boundaries, the Constitutional Court of Italy, in substantiating its decision, used at the same time an argument by analogy, an argument of agreement, an argument of general principles. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in its decision in the case of the Maastricht Treaty resorted to naturalistic and systemic arguments. It is concluded that constitutional identity is a system of interpretive arguments used by constitutional courts to substantiate decisions that verify compliance with the national specifics of constitutional norms. Of course, this applies to the categories of so-called «difficult cases», for the argumentation of which requires a system of strong arguments.

The enhanced cooperation procedure has recently acquired a new popularity with EU policy-makers. Yet, the use of enhanced cooperation has also come under scrutiny, with the ECJ being asked to rule for the first time on the matter in the legal challenges brought by Spain and Italy against the decision of the Council to authorize enhanced cooperation for the creation of a unitary patent protection regime. This article examines the Treaty rules on enhanced cooperation and seeks to provide a coherent reconstruction of the function of this procedure in the constitutional system of the EU. As the article argues, an historical and systematic interpretation of positive law suggests that enhanced cooperation is finalized toward multi-speed integration in the EU. As a result, Member States are allowed to resort to this instrument only when they disagree whether to act jointly at the EU level but not when they disagree how to do so. In light of this framework, the article critically examines Spain & Italy v. Council of the EU, dealing with the legality of enhanced cooperation in the creation of a unitary patent and concludes, contrary to the opinion of the AG and the judgment of the ECJ, that Spain and Italy were legally right in challenging the Council decision: despite their unreasonable position from a policy-making perspective, the Council had misused its powers in authorizing an enhanced cooperation in the case.

The article offers an overview of modern historical data on the origins, causes of World War II, the decisive role of the USSR in its victorious end, and also records the main results and lessons of World War II.Hitler's Germany was the main cause of World War II. Nazism, racial theory, mixed with far-reaching geopolitical designs, became the combustible mixture that ignited the fire of glob­al conflict. The war with the Soviet Union was planned to be waged with particular cruelty.The preconditions for the outbreak of World War II were the humiliating provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty for the German people, as well as the attitude of the "Western de­mocracies" to Russia after 1917 and the Soviet Union as an outcast of world development. Great Britain, France, the United States chose for themselves a policy of ignoring Moscow's interests, they were more likely to cooperate with Hitler's Germany than with Soviet Russia. It was the "Munich Agreement" that became the point of no return to the beginning of the Second World War. Under these conditions, for the USSR, its own security and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany began to come to the fore, defining the "spheres of interests" of the parties in order to limit the advance of German troops towards the Soviet borders in the event of German aggression against Poland. The non-aggression pact gave the USSR just under two years to rebuild the army and consolidate its defensive potential and pushed the Soviet borders hundreds of kilometers westward. The signing of the Pact was preceded by the failure in August 1939 of the negotiations between the military mis­sions of Britain, France and the USSR, although Moscow took the Anglo-French-Soviet nego­tiations with all seriousness.The huge losses of the USSR in the summer of 1941 are explained by the following circum­stances: before the war, a large-scale modernization of the Red Army was launched, a gradu­ate of a military school did not have sufficient experience in managing an entrusted unit by June 22, 1941; the Red Army was going to bleed the enemy in border battles, stop it with short counterattacks by covering units, carry out defensive operations, and then strike a de­cisive blow into the depths of the enemy's territory, so the importance of a multi-echeloned long-term defense in 1941 was underestimated by the command of the Red Army and it was not ready for it; significant groupings of the Western Special Military District were drawn into potential salients, which was used by the Germans at the initial stage of the war; Stalin's fear of provoking Hitler to start a war led to slowness in making the most urgent and necessary decisions to bring troops to combat readiness.The Allies delayed the opening of the second front for an unreasonably long time. They, of course, achieved outstanding success in the landing operation in France, however, the en­emy's losses in only one Soviet strategic operation in the summer of 1944 ("Bagration") are not inferior, and even exceed, the enemy’s losses on the second front. One of the goals of "Bagration" was to help the Allies.Soviet soldiers liberated Europe at the cost of their lives. At the same time, Moscow could not afford to re-establish a cordon sanitaire around its borders after the war, so that anti- Soviet forces would come to power in the border states. The United States and Great Britain took all measures available to them to quickly remove from the governments of Italy, France and other Western states all the left-wing forces that in 1944-1945 had a serious impact on the politics of their countries.

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Defence date: 15 June 1989
Examining board: Prof. Mauro Cappelletti (University of Stanford-Law School) ; Prof. Antonio Cassese (Istituto Universitario Europeo) ; Prof. Giorgio Gaja (Università di Firenze) ; Prof. Bruno Simma (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität - München) ; Prof. Joseph Weiler (University of Michigan - Law School)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

In 1908, the Ottoman Army revolted against Sultan Abdülhamit, eventually deposing him. The dormant Ottoman constitution was reinstated and democracy declared. However, real power was in the hands of military officers and the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee was hated and opposed by British representatives in Istanbul. Austria seized Ottoman Bosnia, which it had actually ruled since 1878. Bulgaria united Ottoman Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria. Both were violations of the Treaty of Berlin, but, again, European treaty commitments to the Ottomans were ignored. Italy invaded Ottoman Libya in 1911. Foreign Secretary Grey and the British government tacitly supported the Italians, refusing both intervention and mediation. The British were in large part responsible for Ottoman defeat. They did not allow Ottoman forces to pass through Egypt, technically Ottoman territory, making it impossible for the Ottomans to defeat the Italian invaders.