Articles de revues : « Strategia nucleare »

1

Affek, Jarosław. « Strategiczne siły jądrowe Federacji Rosyjskiej ». Athenaeum Polskie Studia Politologiczne 50, n^o 2 (30 juin 2016) : 64–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/athena.2016.50.04.

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Pierre, Andrew J., Desmond Ball et Jeffrey Richelson. « Strategic Nuclear Targeting ». Foreign Affairs 65, n^o 1 (1986) : 181. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20042875.

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Hill III, Ralph S., Kenneth R. Balkey, Bryan A. Erler et C. Wesley Rowley. « ICONE15-10614 ASME Nuclear Codes & ; Standards Risk Management Strategic Planning ». Proceedings of the International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE) 2007.15 (2007) : _ICONE1510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1299/jsmeicone.2007.15._icone1510_336.

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Treverton, Gregory F., et Charles L. Glaser. « Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy ». Foreign Affairs 70, n^o 2 (1991) : 177. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20044724.

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Cohen, Eliot A., et Pavel Podvig. « Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces ». Foreign Affairs 81, n^o 1 (2002) : 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20033029.

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Mazarr, Michael J. « On Strategic Nuclear Policy ». SAIS Review 9, n^o 1 (1989) : 157–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sais.1989.0047.

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7

Gaietta, Michele. « La dorsale nucleare iraniana ». STORIA URBANA, n^o 131 (novembre 2011) : 71–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/su2011-131005.

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In questi ultimi dieci anni, il programma nucleare iraniano ha assunto una valenza cruciale per la definizione dei rapporti tra la Repubblica islamica dell'Iran e una parte rilevante della comunitŕ internazionale. Nonostante sia necessario valutare quanto le ambizioni nucleari di questo paese possano ulteriormente influenzare gli equilibri politico- strategici regionali, č altrettanto significativo analizzare come, storicamente, questo quadro regionale abbia inciso sulle decisioni assunte dall'Iran - monarchico e rivoluzionario - rispetto alle tempistiche di costruzione e al posizionamento territoriale dei propri siti nucleari. Puň essere quindi tracciata una "dorsale" Teheran-Esfahan-Bushehr che mette in relazione i principali siti nucleari iraniani attualmente in funzione, snodandosi sul corridoio strategico che dal Mar Caspio lambisce le acque del Golfo Persico. Questa "dorsale" include l'impianto di arricchimento di Natanz, principale oggetto della contesa con la comunitŕ internazionale, che dista pochi chilometri dal punto d'incontro delle direttrici che collegano Bagdad con Herat (e Kabul), Kuwait City con Ashgabat, il confine turco-armeno a nord-est con quello pakistano a sud-ovest. La centralitŕ politica assunta dal programma nucleare per l'Iran si traduce quindi in una "centralitŕ territoriale", a riprova del profondo radicamento tra questa questione e la concezione strategica dell'intero paese.

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8

Rueter, Theodore, et Thomas Kalil. « Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Winter ». World Politics 43, n^o 4 (juillet 1991) : 587–607. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010538.

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This essay explores the effect of the “nuclear winter” thesis upon the strategic debate. Both “hawks” and “doves” responded to the nuclear winter thesis in an ideological manner, illustrating the theological nature of the debate on nuclear strategy. Hawks used the nuclear winter data to argue for limited nuclear options, strategic modernization, environmentally sensitive weapons, and strategic defense. Doves used the same information to argue for mutual assured destruction, arms control, and/or global disarmament. Another group of analysts, the “pragmatic Center,” exhibited a more flexible, subtle understanding of the nuclear dilemma.

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9

Cimbala, Stephen J. « Russia's Evolving Strategic Nuclear Deterrent ». Defense & ; Security Analysis 23, n^o 3 (septembre 2007) : 257–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751790701573873.

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Yost, David S. « Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces ». International Affairs 77, n^o 3 (juillet 2001) : 531–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00205.

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Cain, Stephen Alexis. « Strategic Nuclear Forces : Unrealistic Planning ». Public Budgeting & ; Finance 9, n^o 4 (décembre 1989) : 94–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-5850.00842.

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12

Siddiqi, Asif A. « Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (review) ». Technology and Culture 43, n^o 4 (2002) : 822–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tech.2002.0184.

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13

Colombo, U. « Nuclear fusion - a strategic approach ». Plasma Physics and Controlled Fusion 31, n^o 10 (1 août 1989) : 1477–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0741-3335/31/10/301.

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14

Monteiro, Nuno P., et Alexandre Debs. « The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation ». International Security 39, n^o 2 (octobre 2014) : 7–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00177.

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When do states acquire nuclear weapons? To address this question, a strategic theory of nuclear proliferation must take into account the security goals of all of the key actors: the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and, when present, its allies. To acquire nuclear weapons, a state must possess both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. Willingness requires the presence of a grave security threat against which no ally offers reliable protection. Opportunity requires that the state pursuing nuclear weapons possess high relative power vis-à-vis its adversaries or enjoy the protection of a powerful ally. Whereas a relatively weak state without a powerful ally lacks the opportunity to develop a nuclear capability, one with such an ally lacks the willingness to do so. Therefore, only powerful states or relatively weak states with allies that do not guarantee fulfillment of at least some of their key security goals will acquire the bomb. These claims are supported by the overall pattern of nuclear proliferation as well as detailed analyses of the Soviet, Iraqi, Pakistani, South Korean, and West German nuclear development cases.

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15

Ball, Desmond. « Controlling Theatre Nuclear War ». British Journal of Political Science 19, n^o 3 (juillet 1989) : 303–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400005500.

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Over the past decade, both official defence establishments and independent strategic analysts have devoted increasing attention to the command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems which support the US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and to the role of these systems in crises and in strategic nuclear war-fighting. In particular, specific consideration has been given to such critical issues as the extent to which current strategic C3I systems enhance crisis stability or instability, and whether or not they would serve to control escalation in the event of a strategic nuclear exchange or, because of their vulnerabilities, would in fact contribute to the dynamics of the escalation process.

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16

Prasad Singh, Hanuman. « ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING STRATEGIC STABILITY ». International Journal of Advanced Research 10, n^o 03 (31 mars 2022) : 01–04. http://dx.doi.org/10.21474/ijar01/14356.

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Introduction of artificial intelligence(AI) in the nuclear weapons system exerts the stabilizing as well as destabilizing effect on strategic stability. AI enables informed decision making, development of more survivable delivery vehicle, physical and cyber security of nuclear assets, reduction in possibility of human error, surveillance of compliance of non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, integration of heterogeneous weapons for better performance, and underwater de-mining, etc. Simultaneously, by contrast, the threat to nuclear deterrence and nuclear assets from hypersonic glide vehicle leading to capability race, remote sensing over autonomous surface and underwater vehicles threatening invulnerable second strike capability, Patrov incident like situations possibility and requirement of human interference, instability inherent in threat detection with the deployment of AI driven more survivable and less controllable platforms including UCAVs, UAVs, UUVs, SLBMs, etc. are threatening the strategic stability. Which must be mitigated for long-lasting global peace through the development of universally accepted code of conduct in line with 1949 Geneva convention and Universal declaration of human rights 1948, etc, deliberation for risk reduction in regional as well as global stages, track two and 1.5 diplomacy, enabling human intervention in nuclear weapon launch system, commitment for No first use policy, complex interdependence etc.

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17

Abbasi, Rizwana, et Sufian Ullah. « Rising Strategic Instability and Declining Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia – A Pakistani Perspective ». Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 10, n^o 1 (31 mai 2022) : 215–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.18588/202202.00a207.

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18

deLeon, Peter. « Rethinking nuclear conflict : Strategic implications of a nuclear winter ». Defense Analysis 3, n^o 4 (décembre 1987) : 319–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07430178708405315.

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19

Kim, T. « Asymmetric strategic problems in nuclear nonproliferation ». International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14, n^o 2 (5 mars 2014) : 191–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcu002.

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20

Selth, Andrew. « Nuclear Strategic Superiority : Rhetoric or Reality ? » War & ; Society 4, n^o 2 (septembre 1986) : 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/war.1986.4.2.95.

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21

Mount, Adam. « The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Restraint ». Survival 57, n^o 4 (4 juillet 2015) : 53–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1069991.

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22

BASRUR, RAJESH M. « Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture ». Journal of Peace Research 38, n^o 2 (mars 2001) : 181–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343301038002004.

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23

Chyba, Christopher F., et Robert Legvold. « Conclusion : Strategic Stability & ; Nuclear War ». Daedalus 149, n^o 2 (avril 2020) : 222–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01799.

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24

Tuttle, Andrew C. « Book Review : The Strategic Nuclear Balance ». Armed Forces & ; Society 18, n^o 2 (janvier 1992) : 276–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x9201800211.

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25

Gartzke, Erik, et Matthew Kroenig. « A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation ». Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, n^o 2 (27 janvier 2009) : 151–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002708330039.

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26

Knepper, Jennifer. « Nuclear Weapons and Iranian Strategic Culture ». Comparative Strategy 27, n^o 5 (21 octobre 2008) : 451–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495930802430080.

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27

Ferrero, Christopher J. « Israel’s strategic interest in nuclear disarmament ». Comparative Strategy 38, n^o 3 (4 mai 2019) : 167–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1606658.

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28

Segal, Gerald. « Lawrence on strategic studies ». Review of International Studies 11, n^o 3 (1 janvier 1985) : 235–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500114469.

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The problem of strategy in the nuclear age is simple–how to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Unfortunately, the solution to the problem is far from simple, Philip Lawrence's belief that students of strategic studies do not appreciate the moral, political and military complexities of the issues is both unfair and unscrupulous. To be sure, strategic studies like most disciplines has its fair share of crazies. But to label such extremists as models of the discipline is akin to blaming all politicians for the horrors-of Hitler or Pol Pot. Students of strategy have shown themselves to be far more sophisticated, and the problems they analyse are more complex, than Lawrence admits. Strategic studies deserves a better press.

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29

Kostic, Marina. « Strategic stability and the possibilities of China's involvement in the strategic arms control negotiations ». Medjunarodni problemi 72, n^o 4 (2020) : 678–708. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp2004678k.

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Th? paper focuses on the research of general possibilities and limitations of the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiations and particularly the inclusion of China in these negotiations because, during 2019 and 2020, the US conditioned the extension of the New START Treaty with China?s involvement in the trilateral strategic arms control negotiations. By doing so, the US recognised China as an important factor influencing the maintenance of strategic stability and possibilities for further reduction of strategic arms. The main hypothesis is the claim that the limitations still overcome the possibilities regarding the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiation, and that the prospects of involving China in this kind of negotiation remain minimal. This hypothesis was tested through theoretical deliberation based on the notion of strategic stability, and its transformation during the Cold War until today, as well as on four indicators or preconditions of China?s involvement in the strategic arms control, which are: 1) quantitative reduction of the number of nuclear arms of the US and Russia to China?s level; 2) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and defense strategies of the great powers; 3) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons as the status symbol of the great power or superpower and 4) conclusion of the multilateral international agreement (not trilateral) on limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. The author uses the methods of content and discourse analysis, as well as the comparative method. The author concludes that the absence of the intention of the US and Russia to further reduce their strategic arms and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defense strategies, as well as the absence of consent on which parties or actors should be included in the arms control talks and China?s general suspicion about the effectiveness of the arms control agreements, influence China not to take part on any strategic arms control talks at this moment.

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30

Rogers, Paul. « Analyzing strategic nuclear policy and Nuclear diplomacy and crisis management ». International Affairs 68, n^o 3 (juillet 1992) : 521–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2622987.

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Clary, Christopher, et Vipin Narang. « India's Counterforce Temptations : Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities ». International Security 43, n^o 3 (février 2019) : 7–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00340.

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Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Continued aggression by Pakistan against India, enabled by Islamabad's nuclear strategy and India's inability to counter it, has prompted the leadership in Delhi to explore more flexible preemptive counterforce options in an attempt to reestablish deterrence. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce.

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32

Egres, Dorottya. « Strategic maneuvering in extended polylogues ». Journal of Argumentation in Context 10, n^o 2 (5 juillet 2021) : 145–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jaic.20003.egr.

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Abstract This paper presents the analysis of the Hungarian nuclear expansion controversy using a conceptual framework that links strategic maneuvering with an extended polylogical controversy and evaluates the strategic maneuvering of political, environmentalist and expert actors. The paper aims to show that the three aspects of strategic maneuvering (audience demand, topical potential, presentational devices) are flexible enough that they can be analyzed when the object of study is not a spatially and temporally localized argumentative situation, but a decade-long debate with multiple actors. In 2014, Hungary signed a deal with Russia to finance 80% of the investment costs and supply two new reactors to maintain the 40–50% of nuclear energy in the national energy production.

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33

Ayesha Rana. « Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia : An Analysis ». Strategic Studies 38, n^o 2 (9 août 2018) : 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.53532/ss.038.03.00147.

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The South Asian security environment is in a state of flux due to the rivalry of two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both the states cannot be retracted; however, it is critically important to maintain a stable and credible deterrence at the lowest possible level. Pakistan has often proposed India to develop a “strategic restraint regime” to avert the possibility of a total war that could culminate in a nuclear war. To establish such a regime, there is a need to improve bilateral relations and increase cooperation in the nuclear domain. To avoid chances of nuclear use, India and Pakistan should reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons by spending less on nuclear weapons development. This paper tries to examine the challenges to strategic stability in South Asia from domestic, regional and global perspectives and also explores that how the interplay of these challenges is undermining the South Asian strategic stability. The role of major powers, especially the US, has also been analysed for a thorough understanding of an already fragile security situation in the region.

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34

Zeb, Rizwan, et Ali Khan Ghumro. « ASSURED RETALIATION : MAKING SENSE OF THE CHINESE NUCLEAR DOCTRINE ». Asia-Pacific - Annual Research Journal of Far East & ; South East Asia 39 (20 février 2022) : 161–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.47781/asia-pacific.vol39.iss0.4400.

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Employing the qualitative and historical analysis method, this paper overviews the Chinese nuclear doctrine and how it has evolved over the years with particular focus on the Chinese policy of ‘no-first use of nuclear weapons’ and its future. This paper argues that to understand the role assigned to the nuclear weapons in the Chinese defense policy, one must comprehend Chinese strategic thinking and where does nuclear weapons lie in this thinking. The paper further argues that for a better understanding of Chinese strategic thinking, it is imperative to be cognizant of the strategic language and vocabulary used by the Chinese strategic thinkers. The paper also analyses the command and control set up for the Chinese nuclear weapons and the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capability. The argument put forth is that the American assessment of the Chinese nuclear capabilities is mostly exaggerated as it has security implications for American interests regionally and globally. The paper also argues that despite new emerging threats in the technological domain, China would continue pursuing the policy of no first use in the foreseeable future.

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35

Sundari, Rio. « Strategi Amerika Serikat dalam Menekan Pengembangan Nuklir Iran ». Frequency of International Relations (FETRIAN) 1, n^o 2 (27 février 2020) : 314–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.25077/fetrian.1.2.314-340.2019.

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The purpose of this research “United States strategy in Suppressing Iran's Nuclear Development” as a critical analysis related to the controversy over nuclear development conducted by Iran. In the history of Iran's nuclear development, the United States is one of the countries that fully support this nuclear development. However, the dynamics of relations between Iran and the United States are a factor in the status of nuclear development. As a result, Iranian attitudes and policies that are not in line with the United States will result in a decline in American support for Iran’s nuclear development. Finally, in 2018 the US announced its exit from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and decided to impose economic sanctions on Iran which coincided with Iranian support for Syria which was contrary to US political attitudes. This research uses qualitative research methods using secondary data such as books, journals, articles, and other sources to provide analysis of this case. This research results in a finding of efforts and strategies carried out by the United States to suppress Iran’s nuclear development. This was done because of two things, first, related to the interests of the United States in the Middle East. Iran’s political stance is often at odds with the politics of the United States. Second, reduce and maintain the hegemony of Israel as a close ally of the United States in the Middle East.

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36

Riqiang, Wu. « Living with Uncertainty : Modeling China's Nuclear Survivability ». International Security 44, n^o 4 (avril 2020) : 84–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00376.

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Many strategists argue that to deter a nuclear attack, states must be certain of their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike. China's nuclear posture of uncertain retaliation suggests an alternative logic. Given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack, uncertain retaliation can have a strong deterrent effect, and assured retaliation is not necessary. A simplified nuclear exchange model developed to evaluate China's nuclear retaliatory capabilities against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the United States in 2000 and 2010 shows that China's nuclear retaliatory capability has been and remains far from assured. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States promised to maintain strategic stability with China; therefore, the 2010 scenario can be considered as a baseline for China-U.S. strategic stability. Both China and the United States are developing or modernizing their strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The technical competition between China and the United States favors each in different ways. A hypothetical scenario of China versus the United States in 2025 reveals that China-U.S. strategic stability will likely be maintained at no lower than its 2010 level.

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37

Anin, A. « Influence of Strategic Offensive Armaments in Non-Nuclear Outfit on Strategic Stability ». World Economy and International Relations, n^o 6 (2011) : 45–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2011-6-45-55.

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The article deals with one of the most pressing issues in the spring of 2010 at the concluded Russian-American negotiations on a new START Treaty (DSNV-2010), namely to the issue of strategic non-nuclear offensive armaments (SNOA). As the author argues, the Russian and Western expert communities are is just beginning to analyze what has been achieved in this respect at DSNV-2010. Despite all the difficulties in the negotiating process, new DSNV includes an agreement on a temporary compromise to alleviate the problem.

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Arbatov, A., A. Pikaev et V. Dvorkin. « Nuclear Terrorism : Political, Strategic and Technologic Dimensions ». World Economy and International Relations, n^o 11 (2006) : 3–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2006-11-3-16.

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39

Booth, Ken. « The nuclear dilemma in American strategic thought ». International Affairs 65, n^o 1 (1988) : 119–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2620992.

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40

Norris, Robert S., et William M. Arkin. « U.S. strategic nuclear forces, end of 1998 ». Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, n^o 1 (1 janvier 1999) : 78–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2968/055001026.

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Norris, Robert S., et William M. Arkin. « Russian strategic nuclear forces, end of 1998 ». Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, n^o 2 (1 mars 1999) : 62–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2968/055002013.

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42

Cheng, Ta-Chen. « The Evolution of China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons ». Defense & ; Security Analysis 22, n^o 3 (septembre 2006) : 241–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751790600933863.

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43

Postol, Theodore A. « Strategic confusion—with or without nuclear winter ». Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, n^o 2 (février 1985) : 14–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1985.11455905.

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Norris, Robert S., et William M. Arkin. « U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1994 ». Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51, n^o 1 (janvier 1995) : 69–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1995.11658033.

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Ghosh, P. K. « Economic dimension of the strategic nuclear triad ». Strategic Analysis 26, n^o 2 (avril 2002) : 277–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160208450044.

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46

Powell, Robert. « The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence ». Political Science Quarterly 100, n^o 1 (1985) : 75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2150861.

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47

Freedman, Lawrence. « Strategic defence in the nuclear age : Introduction ». Adelphi Papers 27, n^o 224 (septembre 1987) : 3–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05679328708457551.

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Schulte, Paul. « The Strategic Risks of Devaluing Nuclear Weapons ». Contemporary Security Policy 34, n^o 1 (avril 2013) : 195–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2013.771058.

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Treverton, Gregory F., et Robert E. Osgood. « The Nuclear Dilemma in American Strategic Thought ». Foreign Affairs 66, n^o 4 (1988) : 872. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20043495.

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CIMBALA, STEPHEN. « Conventionalizing US and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces ». Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17, n^o 4 (décembre 2004) : 599–617. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518040490519947.

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Articles de revues sur le sujet « Strategia nucleare »

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